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**Obama is spending all of his political capital on preventing a new Iran sanctions vote – he’ll win, but it’s reversible**

**Sargent, 12/11/13** (Greg, “White House to Senate Dems: Your Iran sanctions bill makes war more likely” The Plum Line – a Washington Post blog, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/12/19/white-house-to-senate-dems-your-iran-sanctions-bill-makes-war-more-likely/>)

With Senate Dems increasingly likely to introduce and even vote on a bill imposing new sanctions on Iran, the White House is escalating its behind the scenes pressure on them to hold off, warning them that in moving such a measure, they are making war with Iran more likely.¶ “Members of Congress pressing for this bill are effectively choosing to close the door on diplomacy, making it far more likely that we’ll be left only with a military option,” one senior administration official tells me, characterizing the message that’s being delivered directly to Senators. “You close the door on diplomacy, and you’re left only with a choice between a possible military option or Iran steadily advancing its nuclear program.”¶ National Journal reported today that Senator Bob Menendez, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and other Democrats, along with GOP Senator Mark Kirk, may introduce a bill imposing new sanctions on Iran as early as today. As NJ notes, this would set up the bill to be voted on when the Senate returns in January, and would represent a “bold act of defiance against the administration, which was still begging lawmakers this week to sit back and wait to see whether a comprehensive agreement can be reached.”¶ The bill Dems may introduce would impose sanctions after the six month deadline in the current, temporary deal, and it would probably have flexibility built in so the White House can delay the sanctions for limited periods, if both sides think a deal is within reach and want to keep talking. Democrats have argued that passing a sanctions bill now would give the White House the flexibility it wants, while also helping the prospects for a longer term deal, by dangling the threat of sanctions later, to increase pressure on Iran.¶ But the administration has told these Democrats — publicly and privately — that their bill does not give them the flexibility they need and that they don’t need the added pressure. They’ve also said passing a bill now that takes hold in six months would not have a materially different impact than waiting six months before passing one would, even as it could also allow Iran — and the U.S.’s negotiating partners — to argue that the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith.¶ “It is not necessary for Congress to pass this bill, because we are enforcing existing sanctions and can move to sanctions if negotiations don’t succeed or if Iran cheats,” the senior administration official says. “The fact is, passing new sanctions now would split the international community, embolden Iranian hard-liners, and likely derail any prospect of a diplomatic resolution.”¶ The push for a new sanctions bill is also splitting Democrats. While Senators like Menendez and Chuck Schumer support such a bill, others oppose this course of action, including Banking Committee chair Tim Johnson, and possibly Harry Reid as well, though he has been quiet. Senators Barbara Boxer and Carl Levin published an op ed today opposing new sanctions, arguing that Congressional action now would “endanger negotiations that most people and countries want to succeed” and could “bolster the efforts of Iran’s militants to kill the deal.”¶ With some Senate Dems coming out against Congressional action — and with the administration lobbying hard behind the scenes – it’s possible that a sanctions bill could actually go down to defeat in the Senate, which would be a rebuke to the hawks. But it’s very possible one could pass, and if the White House is right, it would put the prospects of a long term diplomatic breakthrough in doubt.

**Lifting the Cuban Embargo costs political capital – leads to a fierce political fight**

Cave, Foreign Correspondent for the NY Times, 2012,

(Damien; Pulitzer Prize in 2008; “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”; New York Times; November 19th) Austin Bae, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses. Even these adjustments — which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by the Cuba Study Group — would probably mean a fierce political fight. The handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress for whom the embargo is sacred oppose looser rules. “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered,” she wrote in an e-mail. “Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip on its people.”

**Diminished capital means Obama will lose the Iran vote**

**Krasuhaar, 11/21/13** (Josh, National Journal, “The Iran Deal Puts Pro-Israel Democrats in a Bind” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-iran-deal-puts-pro-israel-democrats-in-a-bind-20131121>)

All of this puts Democrats, who routinely win overwhelming support from Jewish Americans on Election Day, in an awkward position. Do they stand with the president on politically sensitive foreign policy issues, or stake their own course? That difficult dynamic is currently playing out in Congress, where the Obama administration is resisting a Senate push to maintain tough sanctions against Iran. This week, Obama met with leading senators on the Banking and Foreign Relations committees to dissuade them from their efforts while diplomacy is underway.¶ "There's a fundamental disagreement between the vast majority of Congress and the president when it comes to increasing Iran sanctions right now," said one Democratic operative involved in the advocacy efforts. "Pro-Israel groups, like AIPAC, try to do things in a bipartisan way; they don't like open confrontation. But in this instance, it's hard."¶ That awkwardness has been evident in the lukewarm reaction from many of Obama's Senate Democratic allies to the administration's outreach to Iran. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez of New Jersey said last week he was concerned that the administration seems "to want the deal almost more than the Iranians." Normally outspoken Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, a reliable ally of Israel, has been conspicuously quiet about his views on the negotiations. In a CNN interview this month, Democratic Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, whose job as chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee is to defend the president, notably declined to endorse the administration's approach, focusing instead on Obama's past support of sanctions. This, despite the full-court press from Secretary of State John Kerry, a former congressional colleague.¶ On Tuesday, after meeting with Obama, Menendez and Schumer signed a bipartisan letter to Kerry warning the administration about accepting a deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear program. The letter was also signed by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Robert Casey, D-Pa.¶ Democrats, of course, realize that the president plays an outsized role in the policy direction of his party. Just as George W. Bush moved the Republican Party in a more hawkish direction during his war-riven presidency, Obama is nudging Democrats away from their traditionally instinctive support for the Jewish state. "I can't remember the last time the differences [between the U.S. and Israel] were this stark," said one former Democratic White House official with ties to the Jewish community. "There's now a little more freedom [for progressive Democrats] to say what they want to say, without fear of getting their tuchus kicked by the organized Jewish community."¶ A Gallup survey conducted this year showed 55 percent of Democrats sympathizing with the Israelis over the Palestinians, compared with 78 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of independents who do so. A landmark Pew poll of American Jews, released in October, showed that 35 percent of Jewish Democrats said they had little or no attachment to Israel, more than double the 15 percent of Jewish Republicans who answered similarly. At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, many delegates booed a platform proposal supporting the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2011, Democrats lost Anthony Weiner's heavily Jewish, solidly Democratic Brooklyn House seat because enough Jewish voters wanted to rebuke the president's perceived hostility toward Israel.¶ Pro-Israel advocacy groups rely on the mantra that support for Israel carries overwhelming bipartisan support, a maxim that has held true for decades in Congress. But most also reluctantly acknowledge the growing influence of a faction within the Democratic Party that is more critical of the two countries' close relationship. Within the Jewish community, that faction is represented by J Street, which positions itself as the home for "pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans" and supports the Iran negotiations. "Organizations that claim to represent the American Jewish community are undermining [Obama's] approach by pushing for new and harsher penalties against Iran," the group wrote in an action alert to its members.¶ Some supporters of Israel view J Street with concern. "There's a small cadre of people that comes from the progressive side of the party that are in the business of blaming Israel first. There's a chorus of these guys," said a former Clinton administration foreign policy official. "But that doesn't make them the dominant folks in the policy space of the party, or the Hill."¶ Pro-Israel activists worry that one of the ironies of Obama's situation is that as his poll numbers sink, his interest in striking a deal with Iran will grow because he'll be looking for any bit of positive news that can draw attention away from the health care law's problems. Thus far, Obama's diminished political fortunes aren't deterring Democrats from protecting the administration's prerogatives. Congressional sources expect the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by South Dakota Democrat Tim Johnson, to hold off on any sanctions legislation until there's a resolution to the Iranian negotiations. ¶ But if Obama's standing continues to drop, and negotiations produce a deal that Israel doesn't like, don't be surprised to see Democrats become less hesitant about going their own way.

**That collapses negotiations**

**Gharib, 12/18/13** (Ali, The Cable – a Foreign Policy blog, “Exclusive: Top Senate Democrats Break with White House and Circulate New Iran Sanctions Bill” <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/18/exclusive_top_senate_democrats_break_with_white_house_and_circulate_new_iran_sancti>)

Critics of imposing new sanctions fear that the bill will violate either the spirit or the letter of the Joint Plan of Action signed in Geneva. The interim deal allows some flexibility, mandating that "the U.S. administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions." Administration officials have mounted a so-far successful effort to stall new sanctions in the Senate. (The House overwhelmingly passed new sanctions in the summer.) Previous rumors of a bill in the Senate were said to contain a six-month delay that would prevent the legislation from taking effect while talks continued, but this iteration of the legislation doesn't contain that kind of fail-safe. Asked this month by Time what would happen if a bill, even with a delay, passed Congress, Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said, "The entire deal is dead."¶ "The law as written comes close to violating the letter [of the Geneva agreement] since the sanctions go into effect immediately unless the administration immediately waives them," said Colin Kahl, who stepped down in 2011\* as the Pentagon's top Mideast policy official. "There is no question the legislation violates the spirit of the Geneva agreement and it would undoubtedly be seen by the Iranians that way, giving ammunition to hard-liners and other spoilers looking to derail further progress."¶ Though a fact-sheet circulating with the new bill says it "does not violate the Joint Plan of Action," critics allege it would mark a defeat for the administration and the broader push for a diplomatic solution to the Iran crisis.¶ "It would kill the talks, invalidate the interim deal to freeze Iran's nuclear program, and pledge U.S. military and economic support for an Israel-led war on Iran," said Jamal Abdi, the policy director for the Washington-based National Iranian American Council, a group that supports diplomatic efforts to head off the Iranian nuclear crisis. "There is no better way to cut Iranian moderates down, empower hardliners who want to kill the talks, and ensure that this standoff ends with war instead of a deal."¶ The bill would in effect set up a direct confrontation with the White House, which is negotiating a final deal with Tehran that would allow for continued Iranian enrichment capabilities. According to the agreement, the comprehensive deal would "involve a mutually defined enrichment program" with strict curbs. In a forum this month at the Brookings Institution, Obama dismissed the possibility that Tehran would agree to a deal that eliminated Iran's entire nuclear program or its domestic enrichment capabilities.¶ "If we could create an option in which Iran eliminated every single nut and bolt of their nuclear program, and foreswore the possibility of ever having a nuclear program, and, for that matter, got rid of all its military capabilities, I would take it," Obama said. "That particular option is not available." Asked again about not allowing any Iranian enrichment, Obama quipped, to laughter from the audience, "One can envision an ideal world in which Iran said, 'We'll destroy every element and facility and you name it, it's all gone.' I can envision a world in which Congress passed every one of my bills that I put forward. I mean, there are a lot of things that I can envision that would be wonderful."¶ Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation, agreed dismantling Iran's entire nuclear program would be "pretty unrealistic." He added such an aim would be moving "backward": "The Geneva agreement basically states that if Iran is more transparent regarding its nuclear program and intentions, then it can be met with sanctions relief. That's the goal: transparency."¶ Nader said that diplomacy required flexibility from both sides, something the legislation doesn't seem to contain. "When you have these kinds of bills, it shows that there are those in the U.S. who don't want to be flexible," he said.

**That accelerates Iranian prolif and causes Israeli strikes**

**Stephens, 11/14/13** – columnist for the Financial Times (Phillip, Financial Times, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT>

The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence.¶ The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world.¶ Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it.¶ The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy.¶ It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions.¶ By the same token, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it.¶ You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking.¶ The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage.¶ The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.¶ Seen from this vantage point – and in spite of the inconclusive outcome – Geneva can be counted a modest success. Iran and the US broke the habit of more than 30 years and sat down to talk to each other. Know your enemy is a first rule of diplomacy – and of intelligence. John Kerry has his detractors but, unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state understands that serious diplomacy demands a willingness to take risks.¶ The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. Iran will not surrender the right it asserts to uranium enrichment, but will lower the level of enrichment from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per cent. It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak – a potential source of plutonium – negotiate about the disposal of some of its existing stocks of enriched uranium, and accept intrusive international inspections. A debate between the six powers about the strength and credibility of such pledges is inevitable, as is an argument with Tehran about the speed and scope of a run down of sanctions.

**An Israeli strike fails, but triggers World War 3, collapses heg and the global economy**

**Reuveny, 10** – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression” Gazette Xtra, 8/7, - See more at: <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.ec4zqu8o.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops.¶ Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

# 2

#### Text: The President of the United States should remove all restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances, grant visas to Cubans invited to the United States to participate in educational, cultural, religious, humanitarian, and scientific activities if they pass normal visa security reviews, communicate to the Cuban government its desire to restore the diplomatic function of the Interest Section as its core mission, immediately turn off the electronic ticker-tape billboard on the Interests Section building in Havana, propose immediate resumption of regular consultations with Cuba over implementation of the migration agreements signed by Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and remove travel limits of U.S. and Cuban diplomats.

#### The counterplan is distinct from economic engagement.

Rose and Spiegel 08(Andrew K. and Mark M., Professor of International Business, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley; and Research Fellow, CEPR; and Vice President, Economic Research and Data at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, respectively; “NON-ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES,” 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf?new\_window=1)

Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions. ¶ Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in international trade of ¶ goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense. ¶ For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear ¶ proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other ¶ countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy ¶ objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the ¶ International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements **(IEAs**). We ask whether participation ¶ in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The ¶ answer, in both theory and practice, is positive. ¶ Memberships in IEAs yield costs and benefits. A country can gain directly from such ¶ interactions; its air might be cleaner, or there might be more fish in the sea. However, some ¶ gains can be indirect. For instance, countries with long horizons and low discount rates might be ¶ more willing both to protect the environment and to maintain a reputation as a good credit risk. ¶ If they can signal their discount rate through IEA activity, participation in IEAs may indirectly ¶ yield gains from improvements in credit terms. Alternatively, countries that are tightly tied into ¶ a web of international relationships may find that withdrawing from one domain (such as ¶ environmental cooperation), may adversely affect activities in an unrelated area (such as ¶ finance). The fear of these spillovers may then encourage good behavior in the first area.

#### CP solves the aff.

LeoGrande 8 (William M. LeoGrande is dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and a specialist on U.S. relations with Latin America. “Engaging Cuba: A Roadmap,” World Policy Journal 2008 25: 87, pg Sage //um-ef)

From the time Fidel Castro seized power nearly three generations ago, Cuba has served as an important symbol to Latin America. Washington’s unwavering hostility, which has spanned ten presidents from both political parties, is an anachronistic remnant of the Cold War—a reminder of an era when the United States too often imposed its will on Latin America in the name of its own national security. Nothing would more clearly signal the visionary intent of a young and forward-looking global leader to open a new chapter in U.S.-Latin American relations than a change in Cuba policy. It would be welcomed across the hemisphere, and enable us to work together with our friends on a strategy to create a positive climate for change in Cuba. Internally, Cuba is already in the midst of change, evolving from a centrally planned economy controlled by a single Leninist party to a mixed, market-oriented economy and an increasingly plural civil society. After Fidel Castro fell ill in August 2006 and his brother, Raúl, replaced him as president, the younger Castro opened a candid dialogue with Cubans about the problems they face. In a series of speeches, he acknowledged the inadequacy of state-sector incomes, the inability of state farms to raise agricultural production, the existence of serious corruption and cronyism, and the inequality produced by a dual currency system where people who have access to U.S. dollars and Euros through employment in the tourist sector or from relatives abroad live far better than ordinary Cubans. Raúl has promised action on all these fronts, and has already adopted measures to make daily life easier— such as replacing Havana’s antiquated Soviet buses with a fleet of new Chinese imports. Raúl’s frank discussion of the regime’s shortcomings and declarations of the need for change have raised popular expectations enormously. From the Cuban leadership to the man and woman in the street, Cubans agree that the old system needs a drastic overhaul. The pace and extent of change are uncertain, especially on the political front, but they will depend in part on the external environment—the mix of incentives and disincentives for change that other countries offer. During the presidential campaign, Senator Obama argued that Washington’s policy of hostility, isolation, and economic denial had not achieved the desired result. “We’ve been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for the last 50 years,” he declared at a campaign rally in Miami. “And we need to change it.” If the United States hopes to exert a positive influence on the changes underway in Cuba, it must reestablish some measure of engagement. More immediately, Cuba and its people are facing an acute crisis that the United States can and should help alleviate, on both humanitarian grounds and out of selfinterest. Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, and Paloma inflicted terrible damage to the Cuban economy, destroying many food crops and stored food supplies. The government itself has warned of food shortages. Over the next year, falling consumption will increase pressures for migration, just as economic privation in 1994, led to the balsero (rafters) migration crisis. President Bill Clinton thought he could put Cuba policy on the backburner after the 1992 election, a shortsighted approach that left his administration unprepared for the migration crisis that followed. President Obama should not repeat that mistake. Acting quickly and decisively now can reduce the likelihood of another crisis next summer, but the cooperation of the Cuban government is essential to complement even the best of American intentions. Engaging People and Government During the presidential campaign, Senator Obama offered two elements of a new Cuba policy—lifting government restrictions on Cuban-American family visits and remittances, and opening a diplomatic dialogue with the Cuban government. These two elements comprise the core of a strategic shift in U.S. policy from one of isolation and deprivation to one of engagement with both the Cuban people and the Cuban government. We can engage the Cuban people by encouraging interaction between U.S. and Cuban societies at all levels—via CubanAmerican family linkages, cultural and educational exchanges, scientific cooperation, and non-governmental humanitarian assistance. President Clinton expanded these people-to-people contacts to good effect. President George W. Bush, however, curtailed almost all interaction with Cuba by U.S. civil society. He ended most categories of travel for cultural and educational purposes. He restricted religious, scientific, and Cuban-American travel. He virtually banned travel to the United States by Cuban scholars, artists, and scientists. During the Bush years, authentic civil society contact between the United States and Cuba was replaced by narrowly targeted U.S. government material support for selected Cuban dissidents. Washington publicly proclaimed that this support was intended to subvert the government, leading Cuban authorities to do everything possible to make America’s efforts ineffective, including the imprisonment of many aid recipients. Engaging the Cuban government diplomatically will reduce bilateral tensions, help avoid future crises, and advance U.S. interests on a variety of issues. Every American president from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bill Clinton held negotiations with Cuba, and Ronald Reagan signed more agreements with Havana than any other president. Only George W. Bush refused to see the utility of skillful diplomacy. Just as he cut off people to-people exchanges, he cut off virtually all diplomatic contact between the United States and Cuba, using the U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana as a depot for aiding Cuban dissidents while publicly excoriating the Cuban government. President Obama has declared that the goal of U.S. policy should be to seek democ racy in Cuba, but diplomacy offers only an indirect path to a democratic opening. Cuban leaders will not negotiate their domestic political arrangements with a foreign country, any more than we would. When Raúl Castro offered in 2006 to negotiate with the United States on a basis of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty, he was signaling his rejection of U.S. demands that Cuba change its political regime. That has been Cuba’s unwavering position since 1959, and if we insist on explicitly adding democracy to the agenda, negotiations will go nowhere. Our allies in Latin America and the European Union who have been pursuing strategies of engagement with Cuba for many years can attest that this is the one issue that is always off the table. Nevertheless, through engagement they have been able to reach bilateral agreements with Cuba on issues of mutual interest and, in some cases, win freedom for some political prisoners. A strategy of engagement should be designed to create an international environment that makes it beneficial for Cuban leaders to allow greater political and economic liberty on the island, while at the same time creating a more vibrant civil society that will, in time, press Cuba’s leaders from below to allow a political opening. This indirect approach will not work quickly and it offers no guarantees, although similar strategies proved successful in promoting democratic transitions in Spain and Greece in the 1970s, in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico during their transition from authoritarian rule, and in Eastern Europe at the end of the communist era.

# 3

**The only blockade preventing Saudi Arabian proliferation is a strong US security commitment – perception of shifting oil consumption causes proliferation**

**Rogers 3/20** – [2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day. Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, **low-density crude oil**, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from **Saudi Arabia**. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point). Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and **partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region**. After all, **if the U**nited **S**tates **no longer relies on energy from the region,** why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – **or so the narrative goes**. The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment. Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil. So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term. This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, **and the** domestic **narrative speaks for itself**. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public **perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed carefully. What a tightrope to walk.**

**Cuban production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties**

**Alhaiji and Maris 04** – [Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition” refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily mean regime change. The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic, and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region. The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war**

**Edelman 11** – (Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

# 4

**Chinese influence in Latin America is expanding at the expense of the US – it’s zero-sum**

**Martinez, 13** – Columnist for the Sun Sentinel (Guillermo I., “America Losing Influence Throughout Latin America”, SunSentinel, 5/23, <http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri)//VP>

Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America. It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is **no more**. The days when John F. Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was elected. The rising price of oil gave Chávez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Peña Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Peña Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an **alternative economic trading partner** for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been **further** from American influence. Many of the **leftists' presidents** in the region consider the United States their **enemy**. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power. This is no fairy tale.

**Bolstering US engagement with Cuba undermines China’s presence in the region**

**Benjamin-Alvadaro 06 –** (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and **a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding**. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, **a successful normalization of relations** between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) **fears of a Chinese incursion** in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

**Chinese influence in Latin America is a key to their soft power**

**Castillo 09 –** Anthony Castillo is a writer for the Diplomat, (“China in Latin America, June 18, 2009, <http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/?all=true)//sawyer>

China’s aim in Latin America these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America. ‘Chinese policy towards Latin America today is highly **pragmatic** rather than ideologically driven,’ Professor Gonzalo Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a ‘new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries. A sign of this new paradigm is the **growing and wider range of bilateral agreements** China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation.The trade between China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a healthy surplus. The Chinese diplomatic model – **soft power**, multipolar and non-interference – is considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region.‘ South-south cooperation’, ‘strategic partnership of common development’ or ‘common understanding’ is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of **high-ranking Chinese officials** who have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says a lot.Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said China’s soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. ‘The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,’ Hearn said. The first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn suggests, ‘Chinatowns are **key to the soft power** exercised by China in the region.’ This is especially the case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese immigrants. ‘Chinatown’s leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.’

**Chinese soft power is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction**

**Zhang 12 –** (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy, “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 <http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm>)

As China plays an **increasingly significant** role in the world, its **soft power** must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread **poverty**, international **conflict**, the clash of civilizations and **environmental protection**. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has **produced a more turbulent world**, as the increased risk of **terrorism threatens global security**. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more **preferable** than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being **perfected**, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of **China's** political soft power, which has **significantly** helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, **and manage global issues**. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

# transition

#### Empirically denied – past circa 60 years should’ve triggered the impacts.

#### Their Bosco ev cites a ton of things that also must be solved.

**Bosco 06** David (a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine) July 2006 “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm\_

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. ¶ This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. ¶ Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. ¶ Consider the following scenarios: ¶ Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. ¶ Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. ¶ Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. ¶ The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. ¶ As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? ¶ The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored.¶ But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang?¶ Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II.

#### Gradual transition now---political liberalization is facilitating an economic “soft landing”---solves the Aff

**Piccone, 10/3** – Acting Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute (Ted, “Cuba’s Stroll Toward Change: A View from the Streets”, Brookings Institute, 10/3/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/03-cuba-trip-piccone)//SJF

We are witnessing today the unfolding of a transitional hybrid economy that has one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake. On one hand, a host of ongoing reforms in the domains of agriculture, tourism, property transfers, travel abroad and even sports are unshackling Cubans from a predominant state. President Obama’s decision in 2009 to relax U.S. travel and remittances rules has also helped give oxygen to the more liberal features of the reforms by providing seed money for new businesses and facilitating the flow of goods and capital from the Cuban diaspora in Florida. On the other hand, implementation of reforms is slow and often limited to pilot projects dispersed throughout the island. Rules for foreign investment are too restrictive and arbitrarily enforced and property rights remain in doubt.¶ Nonetheless, the package of changes underway in Cuba, under the auspices of Raúl Castro and other heroes of the Revolution, lends a certain political legitimacy to the project that could facilitate a soft landing for such a hard situation. As Richard Feinberg argues in a new Brookings report on the emerging middle classes due out this November, such a soft landing is already underway as small and medium enterprises and cooperatives gain traction. Castro’s announcement last year that his current five-year term will be his last, and the appointment of a much younger vice president to guide the party to the next phase of “prosperous socialism,” give Cubans I spoke to some hope that, in the next five years, Cuba will look even more different than it did five years ago.¶ This shift is already visible. Open debates among Cuban citizens, including one I attended on the national budget process in a well-appointed theater organized by a leading public affairs magazine, are slowly underway. The Catholic Church is also playing an interesting role. The Conference of Catholic Bishops in Cuba recently released its first pastoral letter in 20 years endorsing the government’s economic liberalization and calling for a political opening that respects “the right to diversity with respect to thoughts, to creativity and to the search for truth.” Outspoken activists are touring European, Latin American and North American cities with their critiques of the current system and returning to the island determined to continue their campaign for greater freedoms, despite continued harassment and detentions. Change is in the tropical air.¶ As Cuba opens its economy to the world, and gradually finds the confidence to let Cubans be more open at home as well, the United States would be smart to move beyond the confines of its Cold War policy and let Americans see what they can do to support the Cuban people. President Obama can start by expanding the steps he took in his first term to facilitate greater trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people and budding small enterprises. He can also credibly remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which is severely hampering a whole host of basic financial transactions for legitimate American travelers and businesses alike. It is time to exploit the opportunity offered by Cuba’s economic reforms and let reconciliation – both within the island and across the Florida Straits – begin.

#### Cuba has no preparation for change and wouldn’t be able to take it all at once---lifting the embargo would cause a rapid democratic uprising

**Erikson, 8** – Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has an M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard University and a B.A. from Brown University (Daniel P., “The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution”, Bloomsbury Press, 10/28/08, p. 250-251)//EX

Like most of his colleagues, Monreal readily agreed that the United States was the unpredictable eight-hundred pound gorilla with the potential to transform Cuba’s future: “Lifting the embargo would be totally disruptive for Cuba. I don’t know if the impact would be good or bad,” he told me. “You know it’s a mistake to believe that the Cuban government would have the ability and the manpower to manage or control the events that would follow. That is false. Because if the embargo were lifted, it would have such a huge, rapid impact that Cuba – at least the Cuba I know – would not be prepared for the changes it would bring. If you imagine that this is a boxing match, then right now the Cuban boxer is in the United States, but he knows the other guy’s moves and how to protect himself. But what if, all at once, the boxer is put in the ring against fifteen other guys? You’d have the ring crying! And for better or worse, the ability of the Cuban government to control this fight is very limited.”

#### Taiwan war won’t happen since nobody cares anymore. They ignore new political shifts

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at the University of Maryland and former China Security Fellow at the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (Phillip and Scott, International Security, 33.4, “Bridge over troubled water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan peace agreement”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.87, WEA)

\*China and Taiwan expressed desire to improve relations, expand contacts, and negotiate peace agreement

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Most observers agree that the issue of Taiwan’s status is not ripe for resolution. China remains committed to the ultimate goal of unification and refuses to renounce the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence. Former President Jiang Zemin emphasized the goal of unification, and China’s policies sometimes implied a timetable for achievement of that objective.2 China’s policy toward the Taiwan issue, however, has undergone a significant shift under President Hu Jintao, who has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future.3

On Taiwan, public opinion polls consistently show strong (more than 75 percent) public support for maintaining the status quo. Only a small percentage favors either immediate independence or immediate unification with China.4 Although this polling reflects conditional preferences that factor in the likelihood of China using force if Taiwan were to declare independence,5 it accurately reflects the widespread view on Taiwan that permanent resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s status is not presently possible. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to mobilize voters by highlighting Taiwan’s separate identity and sought ways to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty during President Chen Shui-bian’s term in office, the KMT has adjusted the emphasis in its cross-strait policy to more closely match the views of mainstream Taiwan voters. In the 2008 presidential campaign, KMT candidate (and eventual victor) Ma Ying-jeou articulated “three nos” that would govern policy toward China in his administration. These were a pledge that there would be no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland about unification, and no use of force.6 President Ma reiterated these points in his May 20, 2008, inaugural address.

Collectively, these positions suggest that China and Taiwan may be prepared to defer the issue of Taiwan’s status for resolution at some point in the future. **Both sides have expressed the desire to improve relations, expand cross-strait contacts, and negotiate a peace agreement** between Taipei and Beijing. These goals were articulated in the joint press communiqué issued following KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s April 2005 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.7 Hu Jintao reiterated China’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Taiwan in his statements at the October 2007 17th Party Congress: “On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development.”8 Both candidates in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election called for negotiation of a peace agreement with Beijing, and President Ma repeated the call in his inaugural address.9 Upon assuming office, Ma moved quickly to restart dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semiofficial bodies that previously served as vehicles for cross-strait dialogue.10

#### No risk of Korean war – they're rational and it's all rhetoric

Sullivan, 4/13 – Associated Press bureau chief in New Delhi (Tim, "Looking for logic in North Korea's threats," Huffington Post, 4-13-13, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20130413/as-nkorea-lunacy-and-logic/>, SMS)

SEOUL, South Korea — To the outside world, the talk often appears to border on the lunatic, with the poor, hungry and electricity-starved nation threatening to lay waste to America's cities in an atomic firestorm, or to overrun South Korea in a lightning attack. Enemy capitals, North Korea said, will be turned "into a sea of fire." North Korea's first strikes will be "a signal flare marking the start of a holy war." Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal is "mounted on launch pads, aimed at the windpipe of our enemies." And it's not all talk. The profoundly isolated, totalitarian nation has launched two rockets over the past year. A February nuclear test resulted in still more U.N. sanctions. Another missile test may be in the planning stages. But there is also a logic behind North Korea's behavior, a logic steeped in internal politics, one family's fear of losing control and the ways that a weak, poverty-wracked nation can extract concessions from some of the world's most fearsome military powers. It's also steeped in another important fact: It works. At various points over the past two decades, North Korea's cycles of threats and belligerence have pressured the international community into providing billions of dollars in aid and, for a time, helped push South Korea's government into improving ties. Most importantly to Pyongyang, it has helped the Kim family remain in power decades after the fall of its patron, the Soviet Union, and long after North Korea had become an international pariah. Now the third generation of Kims, the baby-faced Kim Jong Un, is warning the world that it may soon face the wrath of Pyongyang. If the virulence of Kim Jong Un's threats have come as a surprise, he appears largely to be following in his father's diplomatic footsteps. "You keep playing the game as long as it works," said Christopher Voss, a longtime FBI hostage negotiator and now the CEO of the Black Swan Group, a strategic advisory firm focusing on negotiation. "From their perspective, why should they evolve out of this? If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Like hostage-takers, the North Koreans find themselves backed into a corner of their own creation, surrounded by heavily armed foes and driven by beliefs that seem completely illogical to everyone else. "From the outside, it makes no sense," said Voss. "From the inside it makes all the sense in the world." But the North Koreans also have repeatedly and purposefully backed themselves into those corners, terrifying the world with missile launches and nuclear tests that often end with North Korea getting more international assistance. Take the early 1990s, when Pyongyang backed away from a nuclear weapons program in exchange for promises of $5 billion in fuel and two nuclear reactors. Or the late 1990s, when North Korea launched a suspected missile over Japan and dispatched a submarine into South Korean waters. But by 2000 the leaders of both Koreas were sitting down for a historic summit in Pyongyang. Then, in 2006, North Korea terrified the world with a nuclear weapons test, but a year later ratcheted back its nuclear program in exchange for aid and political concessions. The predictability of the pattern is an important sign to scholars that at least part of what is going on has been carefully considered, and that Pyongyang has clear goals in mind. In other words: No matter how irrational the situation looks, North Korea's leadership is not crazy. Instead, many observers believe, North Korea simply wants the world to believe it is crazy, leveraging the international community's fear of unpredictability to magnify its power. The result is obvious. "How many countries have been overrun since the end of the Cold War? How many dictators have been deposed?" asked Rodger Baker, an analyst for Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm. "And where is North Korea? It's still there." The North Korean leadership also retains, as far as is known, the support of its people. Their lives are often miserable, hunger is widespread and indoor toilets are a luxury to many. But other than a few whispered rumors of minor military rebellions, there has been no sign of revolt. To many North Korean exiles, the recent round of threats are really about retaining that internal support "Kim Jong Un is so young," said Nam-su Han, who fled North Korea as a young man after his father, a military officer, was executed, and who now runs a Seoul-based activist group. "He needs to gather the support of his citizens ... and he's using this (belligerence) to make the people come together." Fear of outsiders, and pride in their own resilience, has long helped unify the people of North Korea. The country was pulverized during the Korean War, when more than 1 million North Koreans are believed to have died. In the mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of people are believed to have died as famine swept the country. Through it all, North Koreans have been fed an unrelenting stream of propaganda that the Kims are watching over them as parents, and are bravely standing up to the aggressive foreign powers – South Korea and the United States – who are said to be preparing to attack. Now it is Kim Jong Un – "the great, brilliant commander ... leading the world's most powerful country" – who is standing up to the aggressors.

#### No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts

Matt Fay 13, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

\*Al Qaeda never wanted to actually acquire a nuclear weapon

\*multiple steps to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon

\*terrorists must interact with multiple levels of systems to smuggle

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and argued against the prevailing alarmism. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

# relations

#### No internal link – multiple reasons.

Hanson and Lee ’13 - Senior Production Editors at CFR (Updated: 1/31/13, Stephanie, Brianna, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”,

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113#p5)

\*ideological differences over politics, human rights, gitmo, Cuban exile community.

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations? A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region. What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

#### Turn – Lifting the embargo hurts Latin American relations.

Suchlicki 2k. (Jaime, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History ¶ and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban ¶ and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**No Latin American democracy**

**Dibbert 11** [t aylor Dibbert earned a BA in political science from the University of Georgia and a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) “Democratic Speed Bumps in Latin America” <http://fpif.org/democratic_speed_bumps_in_latin_america/> Dec 9 2011]//BMitch

After a decade of growing popularity, democracy has hit a slump in Latin America. A [recent Latinobarómetro poll](http://www.economist.com/node/21534798) cited by The Economist in late October underscores this point. In all but three Latin American countries, fewer people than last year believe that democracy is preferable to any other type of government. In the cases of Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, the drop in support for democracy is significant. The 2009 removal of democratically elected Manuel Zelaya and the [post-coup human rights abuses](http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/honduras) of the government of Porfirio Lobo are obvious indicators that Honduras is on the wrong track. [Dozens of political murders](http://www.jofr.org/2011/11/19/honduras-americas-great-foreign-policy-disgrace/) have taken place in Honduras, and there has been little outrage from Washington. Additionally, November’s presidential elections in Nicaragua and Guatemala (and recent polling on Mexico’s 2012 election) reinforce the notion that many in the region have grown skeptical about democratic governance. Reasons to be Skeptical Many reasons could explain this change in perceptions. Increased crime — particularly around the flow of illegal drugs — is perhaps the most obvious factor. Latin Americans want law and order and are willing to overlook an administration’s democratic lapses to achieve domestic security. As people get wealthier, the Latinobarómetro poll suggests, they expect more and better government services. This craving is understandable, although the highly inefficient tax regimes in the region make this difficult to achieve. Large informal economies and numerous loopholes or exemptions to current tax collection systems pose challenges that most politicians have been unwilling to address. For example, Mexico’s rate of tax collection is the worst of any country in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). But Guatemala’s is [even worse](http://globaledge.msu.edu/Countries/Guatemala/economy); it was only 10.5 percent of GDP last year. The average rate in Latin America is about 14 percent of GDP. Legislative inertia is also a factor. Since the end of military dictatorships in Latin America, many countries have been plagued by frustrating legislative gridlock. “The truth is that people in Latin America care very little about parties and congresses, and expect even less from them,” according to a [Brookings Institution analysis](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0202_latin_america_casaszamora.aspx). Global financial crises have also not helped. In terms of economic prosperity, Latin America remains [the most unequal region in the world](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/que-pasa/the-worlds-most-unequal-countries). During these crises, the poor and lower-middle classes prioritize meeting their daily needs. If their ability to make ends meet declines, they tend to blame the ruling parties and give in to the temptation to simply “throw the bums out” and bring in new leaders, regardless of their stances on human rights, transparency, good governance, or the rule of law. At a time when electorates view their leaders as weak and ineffectual, those who promise a “strong hand” become more attractive. Backward Steps in Nicaragua, Guatemala During his campaign for a third term as president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega repeatedly reassured voters that he was a strong, experienced leader who knew how to get things done. To a certain extent, he is right: Nicaragua has a history of economic volatility, but the situation has remained relatively stable under Ortega’s recent stewardship. His anti-poverty programs and subsidies, partly a result of generous Venezuelan loans, also [helped persuade](http://www.americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/1182) voters. Nevertheless, from banished term limits to alleged corruption, and from a judiciary stacked with Ortega loyalists to convincing evidence of electoral fraud (which was not even [necessary](http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/opinion/editorial/11/18/the-nicaraguan-elections/)), Ortega is already well on his way to bringing Nicaragua back to the authoritarianism that the country is all too familiar with. In 2006, Ortega was instrumental in changing Nicaraguan electoral law to lower the threshold for a first-round presidential victory from 45 percent to either 40 percent of votes cast or 35 percent, as long as there is at least a five-point difference between the first- and second-place candidates. In the 2006 presidential election, Daniel Ortega captured 38 percent of the vote, thereby precluding a run-off that many analysts believe[he would have lost](http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/87361.pdf). Ortega accepted electoral defeat back in 1990, although Nicaragua has remained, at best, a fledgling democracy since then. Nicaraguans were again reminded of Ortega’s perennial presence on the Nicaraguan political scene in 1999 with the implementation ofel Pacto, or “the Pact,” an agreement reached between Ortega and then-President Arnoldo Alemán of the Partido Liberal Constitutional. Although the two leaders were not close at the time, their two parties held almost all the power in the country’s National Assembly. This “pact” shielded both leaders from criminal prosecution and consolidated power in the judiciary and the Supreme Electoral Council. (This agreement is still in place, even though it has now become clear that Ortega has gotten more out of the deal than Alemán.) Alemán still did get a [20-year prison sentence](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3299289.stm) for numerous charges of corruption in 2003. In 2009, Nicaragua’s Supreme Court exonerated Alemán; his conviction was conveniently overturned. Transparency International recently honored Alemán in their list of “[The World’s Ten Most Corrupt Leaders](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1616952,00.html)” in recent history. The 2009 Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruling that exempted Ortega from only serving two presidential terms sent a strong message that good governance in Nicaragua was waning. Under the Nicaraguan constitution, presidents are not allowed to run for consecutive terms and are supposed to respect a two-term limit. But because Mr. Ortega essentially controlled the Supreme Court, its judges ruled that the previous laws constituted human rights violations and [should not apply to him](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/o/daniel_ortega/index.html). Legally speaking, Ortega could be president for the [rest of his life](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/20/nicaragua-ortega-sandinista-reelection). Nicaragua’s institutions were never particularly strong, but as its extremely politicized court makes clear, they are undoubtedly weakening under Ortega’s watch. Due to rampant fraud committed by Ortega’s Sandinista party in 2008 municipal elections, the EU and the United States[suspended aid](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3299289.stm). In Guatemala, meanwhile, the incoming administration of Otto Peréz promises to be a[step backwards](http://themorningsidepost.com/2011/11/old-habits-die-hard-what-the-election-of-otto-perez-means-for-guatemala/) in terms of human rights. Peréz held a number of high positions in the Guatemalan military during Latin America’s bloodiest civil war. Many voters were too young to remember the massacres in the country’s western highlands, most of which occurred during the early 1980s. Crime statistics in Guatemala are atrocious, and security was voters’ foremost concern throughout the campaign. Guatemala has one of the world’s highest homicide rates. In 2010, there were more than 40 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, rising to an astounding 110 per 100,000 in the capital. To put this in perspective, the homicide rate in the United States is less than five per 100,000. Guatemala’s neighbor Mexico, which is in the throes of a bloody drug war, has a homicide rate of about 14 per 100,000. With a pitiful prosecution rate hovering around 2 or 3 percent, Guatemalan voters are desperate for a solution to what they consider their most pressing problem. Peréz’s campaign slogan of mano dura — or “the strong hand” — promised to crack down on violent crime and pursue offenders relentlessly. Security concerns dominated the presidential campaign, as runner-up [Manuel Baldizón](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Baldiz%C3%B3n) also put an anti-crime message at the top of his agenda. Once in office, Peréz will likely involve the military in police matters, reversing a trend toward civilian control. Feckless Governance in Mexico Mexicans, meanwhile, have grown tired of the feckless governance the country has experienced since its “democratic breakthrough” in 2000. Nowhere is the lack of compromise or legitimate negotiation more obvious than in Mexico’s federal legislature. Under Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) leadership, legislative gridlock has plagued Mexican political life for the past decade. President Felipe Calderón has fared slightly better than former President Vicente Fox, although frustration among the Mexican citizenry remains. Voters have finally gotten a taste of multiparty democracy and discovered how bittersweet it is. A recent [report published by Human Rights Watch](http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/09/mexico-widespread-rights-abuses-war-drugs), which documents widespread abuses by state security personnel and even judicial actors, has shown how damaging President Calderón’s misguided “war on drugs” has been for ordinary Mexican citizens. Calderón’s egregious mismanagement of Mexican security policy has exacerbated citizens’ growing exasperation, and rightfully so. Systematic and widespread abuses by state security personnel under the auspices of PAN “democracy” would make anyone question whether democracy has developed in Mexico over the past decade. Certainly, the media environment has improved since 2000, and the country’s judicial system is more relevant and unbiased than it was under the rule of the long-serving Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Nevertheless, much of the political power in Mexico has moved from the federal executive to the country’s various governorships and, perhaps most tellingly, to Congress and key players within Mexico’s three big political parties. During the 70 years of PRI authoritarianism, political actors from disparate groups [did not need](http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089) to work together. Mexican politicians are still learning how to accomplish this. Calderon’s drug war has undoubtedly failed, but more fundamentally, Mexican citizens simply [do not trust the country’s existing institutions](http://www.clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/Spring2011/pdf/BRLAS-Fall2011-Aguayo.pdf), of which political parties would probably top the list. For next year’s presidential election, the PRI candidate [Enrique Peña Nieto](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrique_Pe%C3%B1a_Nieto), a former governor of the state of Mexico, is the current frontrunner. As in Guatemala, many voters[are too young](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/world/americas/03mexico.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all) to remember the authoritarian past and the PRI’s connection to it. In a 2010 Latinóbarometro survey that included 18 Latin American nations, Mexicans were [more apathetic about democracy](http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracy-crossroads/p24089) than anyone else. Nothing would indicate that things have changed since then. A recent [UN study](http://mazmessenger.com/2011/11/01/mexican-perception-of-crime-grows/) revealed that 36 percent of households were victims of crime last year, a year that witnessed around 22 million “common crimes.” This is not entirely drug-related violence; criminal activities are more pervasive than that. There is no evidence to suggest that these statistics will improve between now and next July’s presidential election. Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala may be bellwethers for a regional shift away from democracy, or they may simply be exceptions. The counter-examples of Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama suggest that democracy is not completely on the decline in the region. Nevertheless, challenges from crime to legislative gridlock are likely to persist in the region, and these challenges will put pressure on what are still fragile democracies. U.S. Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Latin America There was a real and not unfounded hope that the administration of George W. Bush would make a concerted effort to engage with Latin America’s political leaders. But after 9/11, the region fell to the bottom of U.S. foreign policy priorities. The Obama administration has not done much better. Plan Colombia and the Mérida initiative, which deal largely with security issues and fighting an unwinnable drug war, do not constitute a coherent grand strategy. More recently, U.S. policymakers have again been reminded of the tight links between energy security and national security. This provides [another reason](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=0,0) to strengthen U.S.-Latin American ties, especially since China’s influence in Latin America will only grow over the coming decades. In 2009, China became Brazil’s biggest [trading partner](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=0,0). Placing a greater emphasis on human rights and respect for civil liberties is crucial. Washington’s lackluster response to post-coup violence in Honduras only encourages further democratic backsliding elsewhere. Revisiting comprehensive immigration reform would be another good place to start. The devastating effects of the 40-year war on drugs are related to current violence in Central America. And yet, there is little to suggest that anyone in Washington is willing to reexamine U.S. drug policy. As the United States shifts its focus to East Asia, reengagement with Latin America will probably be a gradual process. U.S. policymakers must approach the region with more nuanced strategies. Latin America is not a monolithic entity, where a certain set of policy goals in one country will be relevant or entirely applicable to another. In spite of many similarities, Mexico is not Guatemala. Andean nations should not just be lumped together in the same policy category. Although there are no easy answers, appreciating the specific context of each country will be essential. Strengthening relationships must go beyond military or security-related bonds. Right now, American foreign policy in the region is unacceptable, counterproductive, and will likely presage a continued rise in authoritarianism. Latin America is not the Cold War hot spot it once was, but it is a region that still merits attention. Diplomacy on the cheap usually produces undesirable outcomes. The perpetuation of current U.S. policy will be no exception.

# 2nc

# grad

### solvency – economy

#### CP solves the economy through cooperation by creating reforms.

Pascual et al 09 (Carlos pascual Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution vicki huddleston Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, Gustavo Arnavat Attorney at law Ann Louise Bardach Author/Journalist University of California Santa Barbara dr. ramon Colás Co-Director Center for the Understanding of Cubans of African Descent dr. Jorge i. domínguez Vice-provost for international Affairs Antonio Madero professor of Mexican and latin American politics and Economics Harvard University daniel erikson Senior Associate for U.S. policy Director of Caribbean programs inter-American Dialogue dr. Mark falcoff resident Scholar Emeritus American Enterprise institute dr. damián J. fernández provost and Executive Vice president purchase College dr. Andy s. Gomez Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution Assistant provost, University of Miami Senior Fellow, institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies Jesús Gracia Former Spanish Ambassador to Cuba paul hare Former British Ambassador to Cuba francisco J. (pepe) hernández president Cuban American National Foundation dr. William LeoGrande Dean, School of public Affairs American University dr. Marifeli pérez-stable Vice president for Democratic Governance inter-American Dialogue Jorge r. piñón Energy Fellow Center for Hemispheric policy University of Miami dr. Archibald ritter Distinguished research professor Emeritus Department of Economics and Norman paterson School of international Affairs Carleton University Andrés rozental Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico Carlos saladrigas Co-Chairman Cuba Study Group“CUBA:A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” pg online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf //um-ef)

The April 17, 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago provides president Obama with an opportunity to enhance U.S. credibility and leadership in the region by signaling a new direction in U.S.-Cuba policy. rather than continuing to demand preconditions for engaging the Cuban government in the multilateral arena, the president should encourage the Organization of American States and international financial institutions to support Cuba’s integration into their organizations as long as it meets their membership criteria of human rights, democracy, and financial transparency. if Cuba’s leaders know that Cuba can become a full member upon meeting standard requirements, they could have an incentive to carry out difficult reforms that ultimately benefit the Cuban people

#### Remittances and Tourism solve.

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Short-Term Initiatives During the campaign, president Barack Obama made clear that the Cuban government must release all political prisoners if the United States is to move toward normal relations. The initiatives in this first basket would permit greater interaction between the two governments and their citizens, thereby setting the stage for improved understanding and bilateral relations and the potential for enhanced U.S. influence on the island. The more open travel and remittance measures put in place by the Clinton administration in 1998 and continued by the Bush administration until 2003 contributed to creating the conditions that brought about a more open political atmosphere. During the period now known as the “Cuban Spring,” Oswaldo payá, leader of the Varela project, worked with Cuba’s human rights activists to collect 11,000 signatures on a petition that requested a referendum on the Cuban constitution. Former president Jimmy Carter gave a speech at the University of Havana in Spanish in which he asked Fidel Castro—who was sitting in the front row—to permit the vote; the speech was broadcast live throughout the island. Martha Beatriz roque, an important dissident leader, held a national assembly to advocate reforms to the Cuban government. religious groups, with help from their American counterparts, provided equipment, food, and medicines to sister organizations that bolstered outreach to their communities. Students from colleges throughout the United States studying in Cuba were engaged in a lively discussion with students, academics, and people across the island. The presence of licensed American and Cuban American visitors provided moral support, advice, and assistance to diverse civil society institutions, allowing them to expand and more effectively assist their membership. And, interventions by U.S. government and private sector personalities with high-level Cuban officials resulted in reducing repression against dissidents, human rights activists, independent journalists, and librarians. This more fluid and open atmosphere was essential to the growth of civil society and to the freedoms and creation of spaces in which human rights activists and dissidents could operate. president Obama should replicate these conditions through unilateral and unconditional actions that promote enhanced human contact by generously licensing all categories of travel permitted in the TSrA. He should, first, follow his campaign promise to grant Cuban Americans unrestricted rights to family travel and to send remittances to the island, since Cuban American connections to family are our best tool for helping to foster the beginnings of grass-roots democracy on the island. Further, the president should expand travel for all American citizens and permanent residents by instructing the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to license people-to-people travel for educational, cultural, and humanitarian purposes. Cuban citizens should also be permitted to travel to the United States for a variety of purposes —including family, academic and cultural visits—in order to enhance their understanding of our open and democratic society. The Secretary of State should instruct the Department of State and the United States interests Section (USiNT) in Havana to use standard criteria applied around the world for awarding non-immigrant visas to Cubans. This more tolerant approach would strengthen the bonds of family and culture, while helping the Cuban people improve their lives and grow the social organizations necessary for a democratic civil society.

### solvency – latin america relations

#### The CP resolves regional relations.

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Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time.

#### Solves Latin Relations.

LeoGrande 08 (William M. LeoGrande is dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and a specialist on U.S. relations with Latin America. “Engaging Cuba: A Roadmap,” World Policy Journal 2008 25: 87, pg Sage //um-ef)

The Obama administration’s efforts to engage Cuba should be multilateral as well as bilateral. The Fifth Summit of the Americas and the preparations leading up to it present an opportunity to seek the counsel of our Latin American allies about U.S. policy toward Cuba. Washington’s willingness to engage Cuba will give a major boost to U.S. efforts to improve relations with the rest of Latin America, while at the same time having the added benefit of taking the steam out of Hugo Chávez’s unrelenting anti-Americanism.

### solvency – oas

#### CP solves OAS – steps away from current hostile policies towards progressive, bilateral policies.

Leogrande and Kornbluh ’09 William M. LeoGrande is dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and a specialist on U.S. relations with Latin America. Peter Kornbluh is director of the National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project and of the Cuba Documentation Project. (William M, Peter, “Reach out to Cuba”, LA times, 1/12, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-leogrande12-2009jan12,0,2601970.story)//RS  
  
As with China, bilateral hostility has persisted long after the causes of the initial break have ceased to hold sway, held in place by seemingly implacable domestic opposition to normalizing relations and the policy inertia of official Washington. When Nixon broke the stalemate by announcing his impending trip in 1972, the pro-Taiwan "China lobby" proved to be a paper tiger, and the foreign policy establishment heaved a great sigh of relief that such a manifestly irrational, ineffective and anachronistic policy had finally been put to rest. U.S. policy toward Cuba today, like policy toward China in 1972, is overdue for change. Relations broke down 50 years ago because Washington was unwilling to countenance a Latin American client state escaping the orbit of U.S. hegemony, and because Fidel Castro was determined to do just that. The Soviet Union's willingness to provide Cuba an essential safety net brought Cold War confrontation to the Western Hemisphere, escalating the U.S.-Cuba skirmish to potential Armageddon. These original insults to U.S. interests have long since faded. The end of the Cold War ended Havana's pretensions to world power and its threat to U.S. strategic interests. Cuban troops came home from Africa and no longer train aspiring Latin American guerrillas. Castro, who relished tweaking the noses of U.S. presidents and built both his domestic support and international prestige on defying them, has, since his illness, retired to the role of pundit. His more pragmatic younger brother, Raul, abstains from the anti-American rhetoric that made Fidel famous, and on several occasions has offered dialogue. Long before Nixon went to China, the rest of the world community had acknowledged that China was governed from Beijing, not Taiwan. U.S. allies in Latin America and Europe, which followed Washington's lead half a century ago by breaking ties with Cuba, today have normal economic and diplomatic relations with the island. Last October, the United Nations General Assembly voted for the 17th time in as many years to condemn the U.S. embargo by a vote of 185 to 3. In December, 33 Latin American and Caribbean nations in the Rio Group granted Cuba full membership and called for an end to the U.S. embargo. A policy adopted half a century ago to isolate Cuba today isolates only the U.S. Several of Barack Obama's predecessors in the White House considered normalizing relations, but something always went awry. John F. Kennedy hoped to win Cuba back from the Soviet camp by exploiting Castro's anger at Moscow for negotiating an end to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis without consulting him. Kennedy's diplomacy began through private envoys and was on the verge of graduating to talks between U.S. and Cuban officials at the United Nations when Kennedy was killed. During Gerald Ford's administration, Henry Kissinger set his sights on detente with Havana. The efficacy of isolating Cuba had already begun to break down as allies in Latin America and Europe, one by one, restored normal ties with the island. Using journalist Frank Mankiewicz as a courier, Kissinger sent Castro a letter proposing talks to normalize relations, and Castro agreed. Over the next 18 months, U.S. and Cuban diplomats met secretly half a dozen times, in venues as varied as the grungy cafeteria at the LaGuardia airport terminal and the swanky Pierre Hotel in New York. Before the dialogue could gain traction, however, it was interrupted by Cuba's decision to send 30,000 combat troops to halt South Africa's intervention in Angola. Jimmy Carter, like President-elect Obama, believed in the value of engaging adversaries. Within weeks of assuming office, Carter ordered the government to resume negotiations with Havana. "I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba," he declared in a presidential directive in March 1977. In quick succession, U.S. and Cuban negotiators signed agreements on fishing and maritime boundaries and posted diplomats in each other's capitals for the first time since relations were severed in 1961. But when Cuba expanded its role in Africa by sending troops to defend Ethiopia's leftist government from invasion by neighboring Somalia, Carter decided to condition normalization on Cuba's withdrawal. After that, he backed away from normalization, even though a secret dialogue with Cuba continued during the remainder of his presidency. By the time Bill Clinton took the oath of office, the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union dissolved. As Washington normalized relations with other former enemies, from Russia to Vietnam, the time seemed right to end the Cold War in the Caribbean too. But Clinton confronted a new obstacle -- the wealthy, well-organized and politically astute lobby of Cuban Americans in southern Florida. Although Clinton officials generally favored better relations with Havana, the president recoiled at the political price. Nevertheless, in a secret agreement brokered by Mexican President Carlos Salinas in 1994, during a crisis of dangerous attempted raft crossings to Florida by Cubans trying to leave the island, Clinton promised Castro a dialogue to move toward normalization. Talks produced a new migration agreement in 1995 but faltered in February 1996, when Cuban MIG fighters shot down two civil aircraft that had violated Cuban airspace, killing the four Cuban American pilots. As Obama enters the White House, he enjoys many of the same propitious conditions that moved Kennedy, Ford, Carter and Clinton toward better relations with Havana. Kennedy sought to take advantage of the Cuban leadership's disenchantment with Moscow, which made it more open to U.S. blandishments; Obama faces new Cuban leaders who covet the economic benefits from travel, trade and investment that better relations would bring. Ford and Kissinger realized that the U.S. policy of hostility toward Cuba was hurting U.S. relations abroad more than it was hurting Castro; Obama faces allies in Latin America and Europe that are virtually unanimous in their opposition to current U.S. policy. Carter believed implicitly that engagement with Havana would prove more productive than isolation; Obama echoed those sentiments during the campaign. Clinton hoped to gradually improve relations but was stymied by Cuban American opposition; Obama faces a less monolithic Cuban American community that has expressed growing support for engagement. A November poll of Cuban Americans in southern Florida found for the first time that a majority (55%) favors lifting the embargo. Obama's relative success among Cuban American voters (he won 35% of them in Florida, compared with just 25% for John Kerry in 2004) demonstrated that a Democrat could take a moderate stance on Cuba policy and still make inroads with this solidly Republican constituency. This month marks not only the 50th anniversary of the Cuban revolution but also the anniversary of the formal break in U.S.-Cuban relations on Jan. 3, 1961. For perhaps the first time in the last half a century, both the policy logic and political realities of U.S.-Cuban relations are aligned to allow President Obama to cut the Gordian knot that has bedeviled so many of his predecessors. During the campaign, Obama pledged to meet with Raul Castro as part of a new policy of engagement. Summits require careful preparation, of course, but Obama should keep his pledge sooner rather than later. For all Nixon's faults, his trip to China is remembered as a courageous, farsighted initiative that opened a new era in Sino-American relations. A trip to Cuba by President Obama would be no less historic.

### 2nc – politics nb

#### 2. The Counterplan would be quiet diplomacy – would solve before Congress even found out.

Pascual et al 09 (Carlos pascual Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution vicki huddleston Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, Gustavo Arnavat Attorney at law Ann Louise Bardach Author/Journalist University of California Santa Barbara dr. ramon Colás Co-Director Center for the Understanding of Cubans of African Descent dr. Jorge i. domínguez Vice-provost for international Affairs Antonio Madero professor of Mexican and latin American politics and Economics Harvard University daniel erikson Senior Associate for U.S. policy Director of Caribbean programs inter-American Dialogue dr. Mark falcoff resident Scholar Emeritus American Enterprise institute dr. damián J. fernández provost and Executive Vice president purchase College dr. Andy s. Gomez Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution Assistant provost, University of Miami Senior Fellow, institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies Jesús Gracia Former Spanish Ambassador to Cuba paul hare Former British Ambassador to Cuba francisco J. (pepe) hernández president Cuban American National Foundation dr. William LeoGrande Dean, School of public Affairs American University dr. Marifeli pérez-stable Vice president for Democratic Governance inter-American Dialogue Jorge r. piñón Energy Fellow Center for Hemispheric policy University of Miami dr. Archibald ritter Distinguished research professor Emeritus Department of Economics and Norman paterson School of international Affairs Carleton University Andrés rozental Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings institution Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico Carlos saladrigas Co-Chairman Cuba Study Group“CUBA:A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” pg online @ http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf //um-ef)

Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The president might first announce the principles he hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of engagement that promotes human rights, the wellbeing of the Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the president’s vision, the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to publicize them. This quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone diplomacy, in which our governments trade insults across the Straits of Florida, and which only contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully.

#### 3. Only lifting the embargo requires Congress – the CP doesn’t.

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Despite the myth that Congress must legislate to change U.S. policy toward Cuba, history has shown that presidents routinely take actions to strengthen or loosen the embargo as they see fit. Thus, like his predecessors, president Obama can change regulations in order to modify the Cuban embargo without the need for an act of Congress. He will, however, ultimately require Congress to legislate in order to remove the embargo and lift all restrictions on travel.

# transition

#### **Cuba economy increasing now—prefer our evidence its predictive and the most recent**

AHORA 12/13 – News Agency, “Cuban Economy expected to grow 3.7% in 2013”, AHORA News Agency, 12/13/13, <http://www.ahora.cu/en/sections/cuba/6207-cuban-economy-expected-to-grow-3-7-percent-in-2013>) //KC

The Cuban economy is expected to grow 3.7 percent next year, according to a recent meeting of the Cuban Council of Ministers. Economic growth is forecast to surpass the increase of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2012, expected to reach 3.1 percent, below a predicted 3.4 percent. According to an article published in this morning’s edition of Granma newspaper, the expected growth this year will not be possible, particularly due to the failure in meeting plans, especially in the construction sector. However, social services -- like education, healthcare, social assistance, culture and sports -- have kept their growth levels similar to those of 2011, and other economic areas will grow 4.5 percent, which is in tune with the country’s strategies to increase the production of material goods and guarantee higher efficiency in the social area. During the gathering of the Council of Ministers, President Raul Castro called for the meeting of economic plans in order to avoid the expenditure of additional millions of dollars. The meeting also analyzed the ongoing implementation of the social and economic guidelines adopted by the 6th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. / RHC

#### Economic reforms are causing a “sea-change” in US-Cuba diplomatic relations---UNGA proves

**Hungwe, 10/3** – reporter at the Financial Gazette (Allen, “Contrast Of Priorities”, The Financial Gazette, 10/3/13, http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/contrast-of-priorities/)//SJF

\*Castro decided cuban model doesn’t work anymore

- emphasis on productivity, investments, and private secotr

In Cuba, the Communist Party remains in control but Raul Castro, who succeeded Fidel Castro has taken some courageous moves towards internal reforms in the country.

He is quoted at one time saying, “The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore”.

He has managed to re-arrange the interactions among the state, its citizens and the individual members of society.

Primarily Cuba is moving towards more freedoms for its citizens. The country has revised its immigration laws that restricted the movement of its professionals and athletes in and out of the country.

There is now more emphasis on productivity, investments and private-public sector engagement. The state is also dissolving its rigid grip in business which had prevailed through a strong presence of state-controlled enterprises and is allowing its citizens to play a greater role through small enterprise development.

Agricultural reforms are also being pursued and the new government has expressed its appetite for strategic thinking and innovation.

Rahul Castro has also moved fast enough in identifying a successor, Miguel Diaz-Canel, a 53-year-old who is currently the vice president.

It is projected that the basic livelihoods of the citizens of Cuba will within a period of time begin to show massive improvements and growth. This reflects a new Cuban mythological emergence, more embracing of internal reforms than the tone of the past.

In Iran, the new President Hassan Rouhani has taken a completely different swing from his predecessor, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. He has been actively pursuing internal and external reforms for Iran.

Rouhani’s election was marked by his promise of pursuing a “path to moderation” and dismantling the radicalism known of Iranian politics domestically and at the international level.

He has prioritised economic development which had been side-lined by the previous government. The new leader has also reached out to the private sector and appointed technocrats to work with government in an attempt to heal the animosity that has existed between the two sectors.

His international engagement, including his most recent with the United States, must be motivated from the biting sanctions that have seen oil exports plummet from 2,5 to one million barrels per day within a year. Investments have been low and industries have had restrictions in accessing capital equipment and raw materials. Inflation was up to 60 percent and conservative youth unemployment figures were quoted to be about 28 percent.

Rouhani’s new courageous pathway is therefore seen as decisive in how the socio-economic profile of Iranian citizens will proceed.

Considering the two examples of Cuba and Iran, we see that these countries have primarily been consumed by their internal socio-economics and in how that affects its citizens.

This priority obligation seems to be determining how and what role they now play at the international platform; especially in their messaging at platforms such as the UNGA.

For Cuba, the country is breaking with its traditional internal restrictions in order to ensure that its citizens go to bed well fed. There is a pursuance of tangible reforms, seen as already promising some fruitful outcome. Cuba, unlike in the Castro days, has also taken a back seat in “spitting the anti-West venom” during the UNGA.

#### Economic change, Diaz-Canel, and Betancourt are signaling political opening

**Wicary, 10/7** – former Globe and mail reporter, foreign policy reporter (Stephen, “A business-friendly Cuba gets a hand from Canada”, Globe and Mail, 10/7/13, http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/a-business-friendly-cuba-gets-a-hand-from-canada/article14006239/?service=mobile#!/)//SJF

“We can already see that it will be an economy with a much larger private sector than before,” says Peters of the Cuba Research Center, “and a smaller government workforce than before, with many more actors operating independently.”

Perhaps most importantly, Diaz-Canel’s last name is not Castro – which increases the odds of reconciling with the United States. “Remove the Castro brothers, or at least move them to the background, and that defangs a lot of the hostility,” says Feinberg, the Brookings Institution expert.

Moreover, if Cuba can retain people like Betancourt, the university professor, its gamble will likely pay off. His family fled communism after the Revolution. But by the late 1980s – degrees, jobs and marriage behind him – he started to wonder what kind of future the U.S. could offer beyond his being “one more professional economist working and making money and consuming more and more.” So he returned to the island and began putting his skills to more fulfilling use. In addition to teaching economics, he has partnered with Biniowsky, the lawyer, on Havanada Consulting, which channels funds from social investors and philanthropists to nonprofit development projects in Cuba

#### Raul’s gonna make it happen

**Weber, 2/25** – graduate of Northwestern University (Peter, “A post-Castro Cuba: What Raúl Castro's looming retirement means”, The Week, 2/25/13, http://theweek.com/article/index/240531/a-post-castro-cuba-what-rauacutel-castros-looming-retirement-means)//EX

Last week, Cuban leader Raúl Castro playfully suggested that he might step down — "I am going to be 82 years old," he told reporters on Feb. 22. "I have the right to retire, don't you think?" — and on Sunday he made it official. As Cuba's parliament ratified Castro for a second five-year term, Castro announced it will be his last, meaning that in 2018, someone not named Castro will lead the island nation for the first time since 1959. That person may well be Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, a 52-year-old rising star in Cuba's Communist Party and the man Raúl Castro has apparently anointed as his successor. The post-Castro Cuba, assuming Raúl does step down as planned, won't necessarily be post-communist. Castro, who has gradually assumed power from his ailing older brother, Fidel Castro, since 2006, told the parliament that he "was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba" but rather "to defend, maintain, and continue to perfect socialism," though he said his ongoing reforms nudging Cuba toward freer markets will make the country "less egalitarian, but more just." Fidel Castro made a rare public appearance in parliament for his brother's re-election but left before Raúl's speech. Díaz-Canel was elected to become first vice president of the Council of State, the No. 2 position, and Raúl Castro explicitly said appointing him to the position, normally held by Castro loyalists as old or older than the brothers, is a moment of "historic transcendence" that "represents a definitive step in the configuration of the future leadership of the nation." Any number of things could derail Díaz-Canel before 2018 — he could fall out of favor with Castro, or be sidelined by another politician from his generation — but assuming he takes control in the gradual transition Raúl Castro laid out Sunday, what exactly can we expect of the relatively unknown politician, and of his post-Castro Cuba? First, the man: Díaz-Canel got his degree in electrical engineering, and taught at the regional university in Villa Clara province before entering politics and rising to de facto governor of both that province and Holguin. After 16 years as provincial party chief, he became the youngest-ever member of the ruling Politburo in 2003 and minister of higher education from 2009 to 2012. Largely unknown outside of Cuba, Díaz-Canel "is widely seen inside Cuba as a technocrat" who earned Raúl Castro's trust "not only with youth and loyalty, but also by being a good manager," says Damien Cave in The New York Times. "Tall, dapper, and carefully groomed with a 52-year-old's salt-and-pepper hair, Díaz-Canel presents a serious public face before TV cameras, even as some people who know him describe him as a sharp-minded jokester who can be surprisingly relaxed in private," says The Associated Press' Andrea Rodriguez. One official tells the AP that "he's a much more flexible type than he seems, open-minded and above all intelligent." Cuban journalists who worked with Díaz-Canel in the 1990s and 2000s have a similar impression, says Juan O. Tamayo in The Miami Herald. One recalls him as "something of an ideologue, but he was smart and you could talk to him," while the other calls him "very smart, above all affable and accessible" and given to joking. "He loved to exercise and had something of a narcissistic streak about his body image," but he doesn't have a reputation as a ladies' man or heavy drinker. His parents were reputed to be wealthy before the revolution, and Castro went out of his way to reinforce Díaz-Canel's reputation as a key driver of the slow shift toward private enterprise. But as important as Díaz-Canel will be to the post-Castro Cuba, Raúl Castro still "seemed intent on changing how his successors will rule," says the Times' Cave. "In an announcement more surprising than his retirement plan, Mr. Castro said he hoped to establish term limits and age caps for political offices, including the presidency," and get those changes enshrined in the constitution before he leaves office, possibly through a referendum. So while tapping a 52-year-old is a momentous generational passing of the baton, Raúl Castro will apparently ensure that Cuba won't have any more Castros, literally or figuratively.

# OAS

#### No cyberwar impact – even if it happens, it doesn’t affect the US

**Tanji, ‘9** [Michael, Threats Watch, 12-7, “"Digital Pearl Harbor?" How About the War We're Actually In?” http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2009/12/digital-pearl-harbor-how-about/]

There is no such thing as an Electronic Pearl Harbor. On a fundamental level, for something to qualify as an EPH, we would have to have been untouched by offensive action by a belligerent adversary. We would have to ignore the glaring warning indicators, both strategic and tactical, that would lead to the destruction and disruption of so much technical capability that our ability to function as a power of any sort would be dramatically diminished for - in information-age terms - an extended period of time. Yet every year banks get hacked, the government gets pwned, the digital duct tape holding critical infrastructure together loses its grip . . . and the lights are still on, the nation is still in one piece and there is still a balance in everyone's accounts. Why? Because in a wartime footing people learn to deal with the damage, the destruction, the interruption and - to coin a phrase - soldier on. Stiff upper lip and all that. "War" might be too strong a word, but if we are going to draw parallels to conflicts past, we are actually engaged in something more akin to the First Battle of the Marne than we are waiting for Pearl Harbor. Make no mistake: we have been engaged in conflicts in the digital realm for forty-plus years. It has steadily grown against enemies both within and outside of our own institutions, both governmental and private. It's a war of attrition with aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and plain old criminal motivations. The battles rage daily, but you only really hear about the big ones. Like our most recent shooting war, hundreds of millions may have felt it necessary to engage in a fight, but a tiny fraction of those actually have to bloody themselves. The natural consequence is that everyone else forgets there are people fighting, so headlines that talk of concern over a sneak attack still get press. War, real war, requires that an adversary do much, much more than turn off the lights or cause tertiary deaths. I don't think for a second that our status as a world power, or our integrity as a nation, is endangered by a digital attack; unless of course we're the sort that just rolls over when our nose is bloodied.