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#### Contention One: Hegemony

**Any code of conduct agreement fails – can’t ensure foreign adherence and guts US leadership**

Bolton and Yoo 3/8/12 [John R. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006. John C. Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley and a former Justice Department official, “Hands off the Heavens” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html]

OUTER space has become the next frontier for American national security and business. From space, we follow terrorists and intercept their communications, detect foreign military deployments, and monitor a proliferation of unconventional weapons. Our Global Positioning System gives us targeting and tactical advantages, spacecraft create image-rich maps, and satellites beam data around the world. But instead of advancing American primacy in this realm, the Obama administration has wrongly decided not only to follow a European Union draft “code of conduct” regulating outer space, but also to circumvent the Senate’s central constitutional role in making treaties. The Obama administration recently declared that America would follow, though not sign, a European Union code of conduct for outer space — a transparent end run around the constitutional requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties. This code, drafted by Europeans who do not bear America’s global responsibilities, restricts military activities in space as well as some peaceful dual-use technologies, like the multistage rockets used to launch commercial satellites. Europe aspires to prevent an “arms race” in the heavens, but in reality, its code would substantially impede advances in space technology because such innovations could also be labeled as military. While security activities receive an exception, it appears confined to self-defense, a term often defined narrowly to include only cross-border attacks. We should not take the unnecessary risk that our rivals will exploit such ambiguity to prevent legitimate American actions. Since there is little our friends across the pond don’t want to regulate, it is no surprise that they are now reaching for space. Taken literally, the European Union code would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space, test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence. And we shouldn’t expect China to voluntarily accept limits on its space strategy anytime soon. In 2007, China tested weapons that destroyed defunct satellites, and it is deploying its own GPS system. In a war, China could potentially destroy our satellites and still retain its own GPS capabilities. Military and intelligence strategists understand the risks these limits could pose to our national security. A Joint Staff analysis provided to the House Armed Services Committee states that “if the United States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft Code,” it would most likely have an adverse impact on military operations. Members of Congress recognize the national security threats, too. They realize that America must not commit to military limitations in a rapidly changing field before we understand all the costs and benefits. But the more far-reaching danger is that Mr. Obama is eroding American sovereignty on the sly. He knows that an arms-control treaty for space is unlikely. He barely managed to push the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia — a bad deal — through the Senate. In addition, he is trying to enter the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea through the back door, by committing our Navy to follow its terms even though the Senate refuses to consider it. Other presidents have tried to comply with international agreements without Senate approval. Bill Clinton bypassed the Senate when he signed the International Criminal Court Treaty and regarded the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as binding even after Senate rejection. Even Ronald Reagan adhered to the 1979 strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, but not under the delusion that international law required it. And after seeing evidence of Soviet cheating, Reagan ceased American compliance in 1986. The Obama administration has characterized its policies as voluntary compliance with European standards, not a legal agreement. While such subterfuges allow presidents to ignore selected parts of unratified agreements, the Obama administration’s objective is precisely the opposite. When they were academics, several of his current advisers loudly proclaimed that simply signing treaties without the Senate’s consent helped form binding “customary international law.”

#### Weaponization inevitable—vulnerability of assets combined with ease of access to ASAT technology

Brown 2009 (Trevor, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, contributor to Air and Space Power Journal, “Soft Power and Space Weaponization” http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html#brown]

Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that “the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets—including commercial communications and broadcast satellites—even more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.”16 Such notions were shattered when China conducted its first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing ASAT capabilities. The United States—as well as the rest of the world, for that matter—should not allow itself to be duped. The record shows that although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the People’s Liberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons.The notion that the United States can keep space from becoming a “shooting gallery” by agreeing to a comprehensive ban on space weapons is naïve.17 The hard truth is that as long as US economic and military power depends on massive, complex, and expensive sets of vulnerable space assets, the incentive for any potential foe to develop ways of attacking them remains too great to be overcome by any international agreement.18 If, however, such an agreement can constrain the United States from developing and deploying effective countermeasures, foes would have every reason to pressure Washington into limiting its own actions.19 As space technology spreads, the incentives forsmall and medium states to seek space-warfare capabilities increase, and the destruction of a major US satellite would represent both a substantive and symbolic victory over the United States.20 There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons—only a question of how to do sowith the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power.

#### Even if we are dominant now, Russia, China, India and Japan all are advancing

Pfaltzgraff et al 2009 (Robert, PhD and Professor of Int. Security Studies @ Tufts and President @ the IFPA, William Cleave, PhD and Professor @ Missouri State, Ilan Berman, VP for Policy @ the American Foreign Policy Council, Kiron Skinner, PhD and Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Henry Cooper, Chairman @ High Frontier, H. Baker Spring, Research Fellow @ Heritage, Jacquelyn Davis, PhD and Executive VP @ IFPA, Mead Treadwell, Senior Fellow @ Institute of the North, Daniel Fine, PhD and Research Associate @ MIT, Robert Turner, Professor at University of Virginia, Robert Jastrow, PhD and Chairman of the Board @ the Marshall Institute, J.D. Williams, Vice Admiral of the USN, Thomas Karako, Director of Programs @ Claremont Institute, Paul Weyrich, CEO @ the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, Brian Kennedy, President @ Claremont Institute, Lowell Wood, PhD and Visiting Fellow @ Hoover, Jeff Kueter, President @ the Marshall Institute, Eric Licht, Senior Analyst @ the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, R. Daniel McMichael, Secretary @ the Carthage Foundation and the Sarah Scaife Foundation, “Report of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century,” Prepared by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,” <https://www.claremont.org/repository/docLib/200901291_iwg2009.pdf>, )

Although the United States remains at the forefront of space technology and exploration, America’s continued preeminence is not assured.Other states are engaged in programs intended to enable them to become twenty-first century space powers capable of challenging the United States. At least 35 countries have space research programs designed to augment existing space capabilities or lead to their first deployments in space. For example: • India announced in June 2008 that it will boost itsdefense presence in space by developing a military space program to complement its already robust civilian space program. In October 2008, India launched its first lunar mission. • Japan has launched four surveillance satellites and plans to launch two more in 2009. Japan also operates a satellite known as the Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS), which is believed to provide positioning data to the Japanese military. Japan’s parliament also passed a new space law in May 2008 that allows for non-offensive use of space to support national security. • Russia has used its Soyuz rockets for commercial space launches since 1999. • The European Union is building a 30-satellite navigation network, called Galileo, that – with the possible participation of China and other countries – has the potential to far exceed the precision of the U.S. global positioning system. Galileo is scheduled for completion by 2013. With extensive Russian military help, Iran has a spy satellite, the Mesbah, in geostationary orbit, which could potentially provide Iran with strategic intelligence that could be used in a future attack, for example, against Israel. 15 In January 2005 Iran and Russia signed a $132-million deal for Russia to manufacture and launch a telecom satellite, the Zohreh, by 2009. 16 Iran attempted to place a satellite into orbit in August 2008, only to see the launch vehicle fail, but analysts believe they will apply valuable lessons in their next attempted launch. 17 As these examples suggest, knowledge about space systems, including the means to counter them, is becoming more widely available, and perhaps so too is the ability to disrupt U.S. space systems. What is clear is that whether or not the United States moves forward in space, other countries will do so.

#### The ONLY OPTION is for the US to weaponize space and now is key—only way to stop an arms race and maintain hegemony

Dolman2010 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony ofUS dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition,has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-beingthan the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadershipposition. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis andits cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the immediate demise of theextantinternational system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure that any other stateor group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to entrench itself in spaceand readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all,would opt not to counter US deploymentsdirectly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—is remote.

#### China is intent on taking over Earth by establishing military dominance in space- only the creation of a US Space Force can stop this by taking us beyond hegemony- American power will be invincible and eternal, guaranteeing world peace and ending terrorism- forever.

Yoshida, B.C. Director of the Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003 (Adam, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, <http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003_10_01_archive.html> )

If all goes according to plan on October 15th the Peopleâ€™s Republic of China will become the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to independently launch a man into space. The craft, named Shenzhou (or â€˜Divine Vesselâ€™) 5, along with its occupant is scheduled to remain in space for nearly a full day, orbiting the earth fourteen times. This is a critical step in Communist China’s plan to establish itself as dominant in space. It must be recalled that just seven years passed between John Glennâ€™s fight space flight and the American landing on the Moon. During that time the United States was required to develop virtually all of the technology involved in the process. Much of that technology is today readily available, as a result the time between China’s first manned space launch and China’s (already-planned) trip to the Moon could be much shorter.Present plans would see a Chinese Lunar base by the year 2010.This is a serious threat to the national security of the United States and that of all free people. In the military sphere space is the ultimate high ground. Whoever controls the stars shall control the destiny of the earth. The Military Dimensions of Space:  Already, as it stands today, we are dependent upon space for reconnaissance, communications, and the global positioning system. The capabilities provided in these areas by space-based assets are irreplaceable. Were somebody able to destroy those assets the American military would be essentially crippled. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles and JDAM bombs would not be able to be targeted. Communications systems would be severely disrupted. Nuclear early-warning systems would not function. US intelligence, both the type garnered via both direct observation and signals intelligence would be inoperable. In other words, absent-space based systems, the US military would lack all capacity for offensive operationsof any serious sort.The Chinese mean to establish military superiority over the United States. Unlike the American movement into space, which was a mostly civilian affair, the Chinese are moving with an obvious military purpose. Once they establish their ability to reliably move people into space, they will rapidly produce manned orbital space stationsand, unlike the bizarre International Space Station, these Chinese stations will have a military purpose. They will almost certainly becovertly armed with anti-satellite weapons. This will allow the Chinese to contest the United States for control of space, thereby negating the greatest of American advantages in any future conflict with China. All of this, I might add, fails to take into account the future military utility of space. Not only will many of the more effective anti-missile weapons be deployed in space (lasers, â€˜brilliant pebbleâ€™ mines, and such), but space also offers serious possibilities for attacks against targets upon the Earth. Space-based nuclear weapons could hit targets seconds after their launch. Rocks dropped from space could prove to be devastatingly effective kinetic-energy weapons. All of this leads to two natural conclusions. First, America must maintain and expand its presence in the stars, if only because it is essential to the future dominance of the American military upon the Earth. Second: measures, even extreme measures, must be taken to prevent the emergence of a competitor in space.Countering  Chinese Extraterrestrial Expansionism: The fight against the Chinese in space must move on two fronts. Not only must the United States bring its space program back into gear- but it also must take steps to slow down and, where possible, halt the Chinese space program. I will begin with the latter. Fighting to stop the Chicom program will take resolve, daring, and a cold willingness to kill where necessary. Great amounts of money can be used to induce some Chinese scientists to defect. Others can be blackmailed through the uncovering and use of personal peccadilloes. Those bought off or threatened into compliance can be used to sabotage the program both through deliberately delaying research and, occasionally, through direct action. The experience of NASA shows that any number of small errors can lead to the loss of a craft and a crew. It hardly strikes me as impossible that, with the right sort of threat or inducement, some people might not be convinced to deliberately create such errors during Chinese launches, thereby increasing the natural rate of loss in both equipment and personnel. The more Chinese astronauts who die and the more craft which explode or crash the better it will be for the forces of freedom. This would be especially desirable because, after one or two such losses, the Chinese would (rightly) attribute those losses to sabotage and descend upon with a blanket of scrutiny which would serve to cripple the development and planning of future missions. If possible, it might also be worthwhile to arrange a few losses of Chinese craft in flight. Perhaps a few satellites could be launched, ostensibly for some civilian purpose, and equipped to allow them to collide with a Chinese capsule in mid-flight. Such losses could, presumably, be blamed on Chinese incompetence. However, disrupting the Chicom program is simply part of the answer. In order to fully meet the challenge America must be ready to go back into space. More than that, the renewed American interest in space must be of a much more militaristic character than previous forays. The most obvious answer is to strip NASA of its primary responsibility in this area. NASA does fine work- but it’s a civilian agency with a civilian mission. The new American duty in space is not to simply explore, to visit the Moon, dispatch probes to Mars, or study far-distant stars. It is now a classically military mission. US forces must safeguard US assets in space and threaten the assets of others. American forces in space require the ability to kill stuff and break things. This is not a mission for any one of the services. It is a mission for all of them. Small craft, akin to those used by the Air Force, will be required. As, eventually, will larger ships, such as those that the Navy is familiar with. Ground troops will be needed to defend various extra-terrestrial installations. The United States Space Force: The unique mission in space, combined with the need for a solid focus on the area, calls for the establishment of an entirely new branch of the Armed Forces. This branch, which would be designated as the ˜Space Force” would have a dedicated budget and a single mission, thereby avoiding the problems created where space is only part of the mission of a service and it is thereby forced to take a secondary priority to more Earth-bound concerns. The Space Force would have control of all military missions in space- including ballistic missile defense (perhaps even control over ABM systems could be turned over to the service). Most important, by launching an independent Space Force with a relatively large budget (perhaps $20 billion a year to begin) and entrusting that budget to skilled military officers (who would, hopefully, be given very wide latitude to experiment) the advancement of space technology would become self-perpetuating. Over time the mission of the Space Force would evolve. Initially its tasks would be confined to the Earth’s orbit: attacking enemy satellites, shooting down ballistic missiles, and protecting vital orbital installations. However, in a relatively short amount of time, that role would evolve to include more offensive missions. Weapons would be built to attack targets upon the Earth. Orbital weapons would be required to intercept enemy hypersonic bombers and, perhaps, protect American ones. Advanced military spacecraft might be launched from orbit to attack Earth-based targets. The advent of the first military spacecraft would lead to the creation of more advanced platforms from which to launch them and ships from which to attack those platforms. In other words, merely beginning to move down this road will set off a revolution in military technology. The development of advanced weapons will, inevitably, lead to the development of other, even more advanced weapons and the further spread of technology. As ship drives and weapons speed improve, the area of militarized space would increase, thereby giving humanity further reason to expand outwards from the Earth. Manifest Destiny: My final suggestion is going to sound absurd, but I mean it sincerely. The United States ought to immediately withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty, a Cold War relic, hinders the United States in two areas. First, it bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, thereby preventing the deployment of useful military weapons in this sphere. Second, the treaty states that, Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means? In effect, this prohibits any nation which is a party to the treaty from annexing any territory beyond the Earth. This is a serious impediment to any future plans for the development of space, essentially placing all lands beyond the Earth under a sort of nebulous international administration. The United States should, as is provided for in Article Sixteen of the Treaty, provide notice to all other signatories that the United States is withdrawing from the treaty. One year to the day later, as provided for under the treaty, the United States Government should declare, citing the fact that Americans were the first humans to set foot on the Moon, that it is now the sovereign territory of the United States of America. Efforts should be made to rapidly send human expeditions to Mars and Saturn’s moon of Titian, the two other most valuable planets in the Solar System, to make a claim on similar grounds.Why, you might ask, would anyone want the Moon? There are several answers. By some accounts the Moon may contain vast quantities of hidden water or other resources which might be valuable either on the Earth or in fueling further spaceward expansion. The proximity of the Moon would allow for the construction of a large base, free of the Earth’s atmosphere, for the staging of further operations (using rockets, it would be much easier to launch a mission to Mars from the Moon than from the Surface of the Earth), for the training of astronauts (imagine a zero-g boot camp!) and for military operations elsewhere in the Solar System (or even in Earth orbit). More than that, the acquisition of the Moon and other planets would help to promote patriotism and generate enthusiasm for spaceflight. While, at present, trips beyond the atmosphere of the Earth are grossly expensive, who is to say that they will remain that way forever? We might find, a few decades hence, that the Moon will, with regular support from the Earth, be a popular vacation spot capable of sustaining a large permanent population. The possibilities are limitless. A Flight to a Better Future:Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order. An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, militarily invincible.How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that America’s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs. China, I think, understands all of this. That is why they are now rushing forwards on their own space program. Space is an untested area, one where American domination is less than absolute. They must be stopped. Everything that will follow depends upon it.

#### Maintaining space assets is key to all conventional warfighting capabilities

Dolman and Cooper 11 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems of the DOD and Chairman of High Fronteir, a non-profit organization studying issues of missile defense and space, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>)

Space weapons are expensive; alternatives are cheaper and just as effective. This is the first argument against space weaponization, although it is an easy one to set aside. Of course space weapons are expensive—very expensive, though not necessarily more expensive than terrestrially based systems that may accomplish the same objectives, not to mention objectives that cannot be met otherwise—but so are all revolutionary technologies, particularly those that pioneer a new medium. Furthermore,the state that achieves cutting-edge military technology first has historically been the recipient of tremendous battlefield advantage, and so pursuit of cut-ting-edge technology continues— despite the enormous cost. Moreover, the cultural and economic infrastructure that allows for and promotes innovation in the highest technologies tends to remain at the forefront of international influence. All empires decline and eventually are subsumed, but it has not been their search for the newest technologies or desire to stay at the forefront of innovation that causes their declines. Rather, it has been the policies of those states, generally an overexpansion of imperial control or an economic decision to freeze technologies, that result in their stagnation and demise. Space and space technology represent both the resources and the innovation that can keepa liberal and responsible American hegemony in place for decades, if not centuries, to come; furthermore,unless America maintains this technological edge, it willlikelylose its preeminence.

#### Heg is good

Zhang and Shi 2011 (Yuhan, is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin, independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Space Denial capabilities are key to preserve heg and sustain status quo assets – parasitic microsats uniquely ensure leadership**

**Tirpak ’06** [John A., Executive editor at the airforce association, and former senior military editor at the Aerospace Daily, “Space and Counterspace” <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2006/June%202006/0606space.aspx>]

The Pentagon is hoping it can avoid conflict in space. More than any other nation, **the United States is heavily dependent on space assets for all manner of enabling functions**, from eye-in-the-sky information about adversaries to communications and navigation. The US has the most to lose if space becomes a battleground. However, it is this very dependency on space that makes those assets such an attractive target. Already, other countries have, on a few occasions, attempted to damage or jam satellites, and the United States has been the mark of some of those attempts. Though it hopes to avoid an arms race in space, the Pentagon nevertheless has to take some steps to prepare for such a clash. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review once again took up the subject. Compared to the QDR conducted in 2001, the 2005 version was mild in tone. The earlier version—coming on the heels of the 2001 report of the Space Commission—stridently insisted that the US must not only exploit the advantages of the “high ground” of space, but that it also should develop a robust means to deny the use of space assets to any adversary. The new QDR, released in February, simply noted that **Washington must have “unfettered, reliable, and secure” access to its space assets**, assured, for now, by “improving space situational awareness and protection, and through other space control measures.” The Air Force is taking its cue from the QDR, focusing most of its nonclassified efforts at space superiority on systems that will broadly enhance its knowledge of what’s in orbit, as well as its ability to know if American space systems are under attack. What’s Up There? “We have to know what’s up there,” said Gen. T. Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff. “We have to continually modernize the early warning systems to know what is up there, what has been added, what are the orbital paths, and what are the opportunities to see.” This is what the United States must do to avoid “a Pearl Harbor in space,” Moseley observed. The emphasis remains on space situational awareness, rather than attacks of adversary systems, because, as Moseley noted, “There’s a 1996 convention on military activities in space, and, as you would expect us to do, we actually live within the law and attempt in every way to stay within the policy guidance. So we, in fact, do that.” The US will certainly develop means “to be able to defend our systems,” he added, to “make them survivable and make them so we know where they are [and] where other systems are relative to them.” However, there’s not much decided beyond that, he said. “It’s going to take a bit more of a policy discussion to move from defensive counterspace and space situational awareness” into offensive counterspace. Moseley also noted that it’s still an open discussion as to how space conflict is directed and coordinated. Strategic Command, he said, has the overall responsibility for coordinating space awareness and action, but the Air Force, as the service with the greatest space infrastructure, is the principal provider of space control capabilities to STRATCOM. Still, USAF must be collaborative with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the other services, and other agencies, both military and civilian. “There are so many players in this,” Moseley noted, that “you have to ... bring people in, you have to continue to demonstrate competence, and continue to work this supporting-and-supported [command] relationship.” Moseley asserted, though, that space is fundamentally an Air Force mission. “It’s in my world,” he said. “I got it; now let’s get all these other people together, so we’re not fussing with each other and we can ... move down this path together.” He hopes to reduce the number of moving parts in the organization of space control and neck down the number of agencies involved so there aren’t “a lot of people launching systems.” Maj. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford, director of plans and requirements at Air Force Space Command, said the relationship between MDA, the Air Force, and the other agencies “is still developing.” Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, Space Command’s acting commander, said that, as MDA “becomes more space-oriented, which I suspect they’re considering in the future, we will be hand in hand with them through that process, and I suspect they will want us to help them understand what’s going on around their satellites.” Not Adequate In March, Klotz told the House Armed Services Committee’s panel on strategic forces that space situational awareness capabilities “are not adequate to counter future threats” and that the Air Force must “know what each new spacecraft is capable of before it is in position to impact our support to the joint warfighter.” Klotz went on, “We have witnessed attempts to negate [the US space advantage] and understand the need to protect our space systems. Given the opportunity, our adversaries will attempt to exploit any and all weaknesses.” This sentiment is reflected in the basic USAF doctrine document for counterspace operations, written in 2004. Regarding it, Gen. John P. Jumper, then the Chief of Staff, wrote that “adversaries will target space capabilities in an attempt to deny [our] combat advantage. We must also be prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities when American interests and lives are at stake.” Jumper pointed out that **space superiority**, “like air superiority, **cannot be taken for granted**.” He declared flatly that “counterspace operations ... is one of the Air Force’s air and space power functions.” The level of US vulnerability in space was validated in a QDR exercise last year, in which it was postulated that a concerted physical and information attack on US satellites took out half the systems. The result was a US military forced to fight in much the same manner **as it did in the 1970s**, having to rely on mass and attrition instead of precision and speed. To prevent such a situation, the Air Force is charged with enhancing its space surveillance network, so it can watch the orbits where critical US satellites are and detect anything that changes or becomes threatening. It also is putting into place systems that monitor the health and condition of satellites and their output, watching for indications that the spacecraft are being affected by natural or artificial means and whether this constitutes an attack. Finally, USAF is looking into the means to disable foreign or commercial systems, to deny an adversary the means to use space against the US. Some of these systems are space-based, while others are ground-based surveillance or jamming devices. In the Fiscal 2007 budget request, the Air Force is asking for $47.3 million for counterspace systems and $27.1 million for space control technologies. Together, these requests total $29.7 million more than what was requested for the same programs last year. Air Force budget documents note that “consistent with DOD policy, the negation efforts of this program currently focus on ... technologies which have temporary, localized, and reversible means.” They Have Issues There’s good reason for that, according to Col. Ronald A. Grundman, head of AFSPC’s Space Superiority Division. Destructive antisatellite (ASAT) systems “do come along with some issues,” Grundman said. “One of them is, they tend to leave a lot of debris in space, which is an important operating area for us. So there’s long been a debate about the advisability of using ASATs for blowing up satellites,” Grundman pointed out. Even minute scraps of debris in space must be cataloged and tracked, because at orbital speeds, the tiniest paint chip can be a powerful missile if it strikes a spacecraft. Items already being tracked range from large spent booster rockets all the way down to nuts and bolts. Newly launched spacecraft must be carefully steered so they don’t intersect with the orbit of a piece of space junk that could destroy them—a headache that is worsened any time a space object breaks up. The Air Force is focusing for now on nondestructive, temporary effects in disabling other satellites because some of those it may want to turn off could be those operated by allies, who will want their expensive hardware to be available again after a conflict. Former AFSPC vice commander Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf (now deputy head of US Pacific Command) told Foreign Policy magazine last August, “You don’t have to be a spacefaring nation to have access to space capabilities. All you need is a credit card, and you can get imagery derived from satellites very readily. That’s a space capability. Nonstate adversaries that are opposing the United States or its allies could access commercial imagery and use it against us.” Some of the targets of counterspace operations could be commercial satellites operated by companies in a friendly nation. Leaf told Foreign Policy that it’s important to have these nondestructive means available to disable satellites because the US recognizes that “spurring an arms race [in space] will have more negative consequences than we can stand. ... We appreciate the dangers of space debris.” However, he added that “it would be foolish to eliminate from our consideration some capabilities that may be necessary in the future.” Leaf asserted that the Air Force’s approach so far has been “very responsible and thoughtful.” Grundman observed that the debate over whether and when to use destructive antisatellite systems “will probably continue, but we don’t have any programs right now that are funded in that regard.” For now, the Air Force is focused on the space situational awareness aspect and has a number of programs under way that will sharply increase its knowledge of what’s going on in orbit. Space Fence: Previously known as the Navy Fence, the Air Force took over this program in 2004. (See “Aerospace World: Air Force Takes Over Navy Fence,” December 2004, p. 20.) The Space Fence is an array of dispersed radars that track satellites as they pass over the United States. The Air Force is planning a $275 million upgrade over the next five years that will convert the system to S-band radar, allowing greater search capability and faster revisit times. It also will sharpen the resolution of the radar, so that it can see objects from a current minimum of 12 inches in size down to two inches in size. The radars themselves will be distributed over a wider geographical area, giving a better view of the horizon. They will be able to see beyond low earth orbit (LEO) to medium Earth orbit (MEO). Grundman said the old hardware likely will be retired around 2011, because “it’s reaching some sustainability limits.” Space-Based Surveillance System: Planned to be a constellation of five satellites, the SBSS would operate in in LEO to look at satellites and other objects in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), at about 26,000 miles from the Earth’s surface. SBSS builds on a missile defense experiment launched in 1996 that looked for ballistic missiles using a visible and an infrared sensor. The IR sensor quit after 18 months, but the visible sensor has continued to function, now for almost 10 years, as proof of concept for a space-based sensor. However, Grundman said, “We think it’s probably going to run out of life at any time.” A Block 10 version of the SBSS is to be ready to fly in 2009. It will be a “risk reducer” for the objective system—the remaining four satellites—which should be launched between 2013 and 2014. The SBSS will be a visible-spectrum telescope. It will “help us find things” at GEO and MEO “that we don’t already know about,” Grundman noted, as well as “keep track of things up there that we do know about, and to get more frequent revisit on them.” The SBSS will be able to survey an area of interest “a few times a day as opposed to every few days.” RAIDRS: The Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System is not a satellite, but a “hybrid architecture” of sensors, comm links, and data processing systems intended to analyze the data from satellites and determine if they are being affected by some external force, Grundman explained. “It’s a data situational awareness system” that analyzes the data received at satellite downlinks. RAIDRS detects electromagnetic interference on satellites; “in other words, it’s looking to see if our commsats are being jammed by others.” Spiral 1 also will be able to pinpoint the source of the jamming. By 2010, full operational capability will be 32 ground-based, deployable RAIDRS with broad capability to analyze radio frequency energy across many bands.Grundman noted that interference or jamming may not always be a hostile act. “It’s not that uncommon that we end up interfering with our own communications, sometimes,” he noted. However, it’s important to find a jamming signal and stop it, no matter the source. Spiral 2 will have more data fusion and more automated connections with space command and control systems. On the offensive counterspace front is the Counter Communications System. Known as CounterComm for short, this project funds a series of ground-deployable jamming units, each with two antennas, set up in the vicinity of an area where the Air Force wants to interfere with an adversary’s satellites. Operational since 2004, the Air Force now has three Block 10 systems and, in the Fiscal 2007 budget, asked for three more. There are plans to upgrade the units to a Block 20 configuration. Further details are classified. The Counter-Space Reconnaissance System, a shadowy project meant to defeat the intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance systems of US adversaries with reversible, nonkinetic means, was canceled, Grundman said, even though the Air Force continues to have a validated requirement for it. (See “Securing the Space Arena,” July 2004, p. 30.) “As we are in a very tight budget environment, the decision was made to move those funds toward higher ... Air Force priorities,” said Grundman. “And we’re going to look at opportunities and approaches towards meeting those mission needs.” The same fate befell the Orbital Deep-Space Imager, a space telescope intended to give high-resolution imagery of objects at GEO. There’s a validated requirement, Grundman said, but the Air Force has decided “not to pursue an operational system at this time.” Grundman said he has nothing in his portfolio involving a kinetic ASAT capability. Asked about ASATs that disable a target satellite by spraying their optics or solar panels with paint, Grundman said, “There have been some studies looking at potential concepts in that regard. They’re sometimes called ‘coaters.’ And I think that’s about as much as I can say about that.” There are a few concepts and programs outside of AFSPC that are looking at ASAT possibilities, however. The Air Force Research Laboratory put out a request for information last fall for a program called Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space, or ANGELS. This program seeks to launch a small satellite in 2009 into GEO, where it would escort a larger satellite, not yet selected. Its function would be to monitor the space around the host satellite, watching for intruders and threats. ANGELS could be the forerunner of a series of “escort satellites” that would move to intercept an attacking ASAT launched by another country. Contractors will be selected next year; AFRL has about $20 million for the project. ANGELS will build on experience from XSS-10 and **XSS-11**, also AFRL projects to **explore rendezvous, proximity, and station-keeping techniques** with very small satellites. The heaviest of the spacecraft weighs in at just 220 pounds. The XSS-10 was used to rendezvous with the Delta II booster that brought it to orbit, flying around the booster and inspecting it visually, sending TV images back to ground controllers from less than 100 yards away. The XSS-11 was steered to a rendezvous with a spent booster last November, getting within about one mile of it. The satellite orbits at about 500 miles and is also a test bed for miniaturized optics and communications gear. Air Force officials also report that the craft will experiment with techniques for on-orbit refueling of spacecraft propellant systems. Ready To Act Although never mentioned in any of the official descriptions of the XSS-11’s mission, **the satellite is able to do everything necessary to intercept and destroy an enemy satellite.** The craft’s small **size and maneuvering capability suggest that low-cost clones could be manufactured rapidly and inexpensively for a variety of ASAT missions**, should the Air Force be tasked to provide such a capability. Setting aside the external steps that can be taken to protect satellites, can anything be done so they can defend themselves? There are techniques, Grundman said, that include radiation hardening, on-board sensors, and armoring. Until now, such self-protection measures usually have lost out in the zero-sum trade-off analysis about what goes on a spacecraft and what doesn’t. “There has been, historically, a preference to put as much emphasis as you can on performance of the spacecraft,” Grundman explained. “So, if you’re trading off weight, ... you usually have to give up some mission capability, and ... program offices have wanted to emphasize their mission performance.” Now, however, “as we recognize more of a threat, you’ll probably see the trade tipping more in the other direction.” That won’t always be true, but on a case-by-case basis, “defensive measures” may start to claim more of a satellite’s weight allowance. Grundman said recognition of the importance of space superiority “is rising, due to the fact that we know we have the most to lose in space. And we have prioritized that the most important thing we need to do ... is improved space situational awareness.” The ability to defend space assets will come next, he said, followed by the capability of denying the advantages of space-based capabilities to others. However, he acknowledged that some of that capability is already present.

#### Even if hegemonic decline is inevitable, plan prevents transition wars

Dolman 2006 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “ Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408)

Dolman: Well, I think that some assumptions that you made are extremely problematic. You know, the Soviet Union launched twenty ASATs into space and those were the worst of debris smashing into other satellites. Did that cause a debris problem? No, because it is a planned orbital mechanics issue that the kinetic force of that engagement goes into the atmosphere and debris is burned up on reentry. There are thus ways to use weapons in space that don’t really cause a debris problem, and there are ways to use them that ac-tually clean up space in orbit. But also I agree with you. No hegemon, no empire, no state or businesslasts forever. Does that mean that we should accelerate our own decline? No. It is important to do things to extend it. The United States inevitably will lose its power relative to the rest of the world, so it needs to set up the conditions that are seen as beneficial around the world in such a way that whoever replaces the United States is going to be in the same sort of liberal model that the United States had been, the same type of benevolent hegemon or follow-on power. What it cannot do is set up a situation where the next power is likely to be antithetical to those ideas. What I am talking about is extending the period of American hegemony into the foreseeable future, not creating a permanent empire in that sense, but continuing to have a situation where there is a power to create and enforce some sort of order.

#### Contention Two: China

#### Weaponization and subversion of U.S. space dominance is China’s goal—uncertainty means escalation is imminent

Cheng 7-16-2011 (Dean, Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, “China’s Space Program: A Growing Factor in U.S. Security Planning”)

The divergence of views on how to emplace a policy of space deterrence raises questions about the extent to which the PLA necessarily governs larger Chinese space policy. This is underscored by the discrepancy between how PLA authors describe the utility of testing space weapons and how the PRC behaved at the time of the January 2007 ASAT test. Not only was there no prior publicity, but the PRC Foreign Ministry seemed to handle the aftermath in a singularly hesitant fashion. Consequently, one must wonder whether the Chinese civilian leadership necessarily subscribes to the same view of deterrence that Chinese military space analysts have laid out. On the other hand, some PLA writers, including the author of a PLA textbook on military space operations, suggest that such tests should not be announced, precisely to foster uncertainty in an opponent. Given that the other Chinese tests appear to have involved no real advance warning, this may be a matter of policy. Similarly, the description of reinforcing available space forces would seem to imply a very slowly developing crisis. During a rapidly escalating situation, it is open to question whether such measured steps would be possible or be interpreted in the presented manner. The track record of Chinese crisis management—including the Belgrade embassy bombing, the EP-3 incident, and the more recent Senkakus/Diaoyutai fishing boat incident—hardly inspires confidence. What the U.S. Should Do For the United States, the ability to maintain space superiority is essential for the American approach to conflict. American forces rely on space assets for weather information, positioning and navigation assistance, communications, time synchronization, and tactical and strategic intelligence and warning. The growing Chinese ability to threaten American space superiority has direct implications for the ability of the UnitedStates to support friends and allies in the western Pacific and to deter aggression. It is therefore essential that the U.S. government take steps to ensure that the U.S. ability to secure space superiority is never called into question. Toward these ends, the U.S. government should:

PLA doctrine and deployments prove a space conflict is imminent – unchecked Chinese weaponization cripples the navy and escalates into war

Neil 1/27/12 [Alexander Neil, head of the Asia Security Programme at the Royal United Services Institute in Britain, “http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16588557

At the Pentagon recently, US President Barack Obama announced deep cuts to the US military and set out a shift in attention towards the Asia-Pacific region, in a thinly-veiled message to China. Despite a narrative of peaceful intent, China's leaders have struggled to reassure the US over the direction of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Both countries admit that their military dialogue falls well behind other aspects of the relationship. So the shift has brought renewed scrutiny of the PLA's latest capabilities against US dominance in the Pacific. In recent years the PLA has demonstrated impressive new capabilities at sea and in space, aimed at showcasing the success of its modernisation effort. The obvious message is to deliver a powerful warning if Taiwan were to declare formal independence. But Pentagon planners are now concerned that the Taiwan contingency has been eclipsed by China's broader maritime territorial claims and demands for more international space to protect the arteries feeding China's growth. 'Unrestricted warfare' China is developing a range of capabilities linked to the space and cyber domain in order to sidestep the overwhelming might of the US military in the Pacific region. The PLA calls this fighting "local wars under informationised conditions". China recognised almost two decades ago that in the mid-term the PLA could be no match for US conventional forces. So it began working on what was dubbed "unrestricted warfare" - combining multiple methods to defeat a superior opponent. At the same time party leaders launched adventurous civilian acquisition projects in the high-tech domain to increase Chinese competitiveness and to boost indigenous production capabilities. The PLA has been running military projects mirroring these civilian acquisition ventures. Sometimes involving dual-use technologies, the military and civilian strands have often been indistinguishable. China's space programme is a case in point. The recent successful docking manoeuvre between a Shenzhou module and the Tiangong Space station is as much a triumph for the PLA as it is for China's civilian space agency. Space theatre Should the US ever intervene in a cross-strait clash or challenge China's maritime claims, Beijing would employ a pre-emptive "sea denial" strategy alongside its conventional operations - preventing US battle carrier groups operating in or near its claimed territorial waters. Its submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles are now a lethal force. China's long-range nuclear weapons systems have also undergone significant upgrades and its strategic rocket force, the Second Artillery Corps, is very much the pride of the PLA. One of the most pressing concerns for the US navy is the threat posed by a "carrier killer" anti-ship missile with enhanced targeting capabilities facilitated from space. China very recently launched its own Beidou Positioning System, challenging the monopoly of the US Global Positioning System (GPS). One of the PLA's most sensitive advances has been the secret deployment and testing of advanced anti-satellite (ASAT) and Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) weapons systems. Two years ago, China successfully intercepted one of its own ballistic missiles as it streaked through space. This test coincided with the Pentagon's sale of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Patriot systems to Taiwan. Some experts believe a Chinese ASAT campaign against a careful selected group of US satellites could have catastrophic effect on the US military. This capability, combined with the potential for China to develop its own Ballistic Missile Defence umbrella, suggests that the space domain will be a new theatre for US-China rivalry. Chinese ASAT capabilities are not exclusively reserved for "kill vehicles", like the one which obliterated an ageing Chinese weather satellite in 2007. It is now believed that the successful 2007 "kill" was in fact the third test in a series. Previous tests had demonstrated an ability to manoeuvre in proximity to targeted satellites. This would suggest that China has experimented with techniques which could be used for "space mining", where mines or mini-satellites armed with jamming technologies could be placed within the orbits of an opponent's spacecraft.

#### The risk of crisis instability and miscalculation in space is high – the PLA is likely to initiate an attack in a crisis

MacDonald, 11 - Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, 5/11, lexis)

One characteristic of too many wars in the last century is that they are the result of miscalculation that ignites the tinder of fundamental geopolitical tensions. Averting major power conflict requires skillful management of tensions by senior leaders of the major powers. China has become much more internationally sophisticated, though with important exceptions, in its dealings with the rest of the world than has been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian leadership. Unfortunately, the PLA's senior officer corps trails its civilian counterparts in this respect. They have much less interaction with foreign official and travel abroad much less frequently than their U.S. counterparts. This means that the PLA overall views world events from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective, a danger in this increasingly complex world, and could explain, for example, the political "tonedeafness" of the PLA in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test.This PLA problem becomes more serious when one realizes that the PLA is organizationally separate from the rest of the Chinese government, and reports only to the Central Military Commission, currently chaired by President Hu Jintao. President Hu, and his likely successors, have no significant military background, and the majority of the CMC's members are top PLA officers, suggesting that civilian oversight of major military decisions and consideration of their larger implications are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government. Normally this would not be too great a concern, but in a crisis this could be dangerous. Add to this the fact that China has no equivalent of our National Security Council, a critically important body for coordinating our security decisionmaking, and one comes away concerned about the relative insularity of the PLA in the Chinese power structure. In a crisis, the PLA probably cannot be counted on to show as sophisticated a sense of judgment as one would hope any country's military leaders, even an enemy's, to show. All these problems and many more pose potential threats to internal political stability andCommunist Party control, providing ample opportunity for crisis and conflict in the years ahead. Overview of The Strategic Landscape of Space Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, transmitted, or both. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these space related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets in any future conflict, and their relative vulnerability can provide dangerously attractive incentives in a crisis to preempt, escalating to war. Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be strategically unwise: going first in a space conflict with a nearpeer space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an opponent fully expecting such a response, appears to be militarily and strategically quite undesirable. As technology advances, the ways of interfering with, disrupting, or destroying information streams in space or supporting space systems will likely increase, as will U.S. and others' dependence upon such systems. Providing defensive options for U.S. space assets should be pursued where appropriate, but most space observers believe that offense has the advantage in space over defense, as General Cartwright observed last May. Cartwright also noted that the challenging issues that space poses has made the Space Posture Review "the most difficult of all the defense reviews" the Obama Administration has undertaken. The overall U.S. goal in space should be to shape the space domain to the advantage of the United States and its allies, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. and allied security. The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies. This need not mean that China and others must perforce be disadvantaged by such an arrangement - there should be ample opportunity for many countries to benefit and prosper from a properly crafted system of space management. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with space offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in space when "going first" pays off - destroying an adversary's satellites before he destroys yours. We don't know what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow.

#### History proves that realists are right about the inevitability of a space race with China—both sides want the military and economic benefits

Dolman 2010 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. The stakes are high. The side that prevails will have a clear path to domination of the international system. Although its effects will be far-reaching, the conflict itself will not be visible to those looking up into the night sky. It will not be televised. Most will not even be aware that it is occurring. It may already have begun. And yet, this new kind of remotely-controlled proxy war will not be so different that it is unrecognizable. The principles of war and the logic of competition remain as they always have. Only the context has changed. When perceived through this mind-set, via the tenets of traditional realist and geopolitical theories that have survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is that the United States andthe People’s Republic of China are on a collision course for war.Such determinist theory is quickly countered by those who find its implications abhorrent. Inevitability is a crass and unsubtle divination. Because a thing has always happened does not mean that it always will. Nor does the reverse hold—because a thing has never happened does not mean that it cannot be so. The realist paradigm of power politics does not have to hold sway. The cruelly consistent narrative of history need not be eternally retold. Nothing is inevitable, counter the idealists. The world can be made different, the world today is different. The power of possibility is tantalizing, but the brusque strength of probability, for a decision maker, usually holds sway. The past foreshadows the future—and it is the calculation of probability over time combined with risk that is more persuasive than platitudes. If an event is likely, its outcome perceptible, and its influence measurable, the prudent state must make preparations to mitigate its effects. If an event is unlikely, even if its impact is serious, actions necessary to mitigate it are often deferred to the future—though this form of political gambling tends to magnify the deleterious effects of the event when it eventually comes to pass. If the state’s sovereignty is at risk, however, no matter how unlikely the event, it must be dealt with directly. On the surface, it may seem as though geopolitical forces are currently in dynamic balance. The US is the overwhelming sea and air power, offensively oriented and favoring maneuver and precision strike for advantage in war. The PRC is potentially the greatest land power the world has ever known, defensively established and reliant on masses of infantry as its core strength. Neither has a globally significant advantage vis-à-vis the other. There is no plausible near-term scenario in which the US could invade and sustain an occupation of the Chinese mainland. Likewise, the US is currently impervious to any invasion and occupation by Chinese forces. Neither state’s sovereignty appears in doubt due to actions by the other. At the level of grand strategy neither mass or maneuver, offense or defense, has a transformational advantage. From this perspective, war, inevitable though it may be, is not imminent. Less venerable theories of conflict and cooperation are more favorable toward long-term peace. Economically, the US and PRC are tightly bound. Chinese markets are opening and the productivity of PRC manufacturing has allowed the US to move into a post-industrial economy. Trade is increasing substantially, and much of America’s foreign debt is held by China, to the point that it is not to either state’s fiscal advantage to engage in a conflict that will sever or (even just weaken) these ties. Culturally and historically, the Chinese and American people are inclined toward mutual admiration and respect. Despite the political differences between Chinese Communism and Western Liberal Democratic Capitalism, human connections and government rapprochement are valued by both sides. An appreciation of American technological innovation and Chinese work and spiritual ethics imbues the still-developing relationship. Both sides seem willing to work together and sustain a world system in which each nation-state has its place and its independence. In every sphere but one, it seems, the two great powers are building toward peace. In every sphere of competition, with one exception, there is room for negotiation and mutually beneficial outcomes. That one incompatible, uncompromising realm is outer space. A Twenty-First Century Great Wall in Space: **No state relies on space power and space support more than the US**.Since at least the mid-1980s, its armed forces have undergone a radical transformation. Space intelligence and observations, high bandwidth communications, and navigation support have created the most deadly combat force in history. America can engage targets anywhere in the world, in all weather, day or night, with extraordinary precision and lethality, and with a minimum of collateral damage. The progress of this transformation has been stymied with the continuing emphasis on ground forces occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the American military is operating more effectively and efficiently today with the smallest percentage of its population actively engaged in military service since the post-WWII demobilization. Just over two years ago—and perhaps again earlier this year as part of a ballistic missile defense system test—China successfully engaged one of its own derelict satellites in space. This was an extraordinarily provocative action. **The U**nited **S**tates simply **has no defense against such a capability**, and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test was intended to remind the world of this weakness. Moreover, its use of an MRBM (which the PRC produces in mass) to propel the kill vehicle indicates a potential ASAT weapons capability sufficient to target the entire US low-earth orbit inventory. The US responded in kind, engaging and destroying one of its own de-orbiting satellites with a modified surface-to-air missile interceptor launched from an Aegis cruiser. While this response demonstrated an enhanced American capability to engage low-earth orbiting (LEO) satellites from a mobile platform, the message sent was straight-forward. There is no current defense against a satellite attack, and the only option available to US or PRC strategists is retaliation. If deterrence fails, LEO will become a global no-fly zone. Both sides will engage and destroy any and all satellites within range, cheaply and effectively.

#### The impact is US-Sino nuclear war over Taiwan

Lewis 2004 (Jeffrey, postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program @ the Center for Inter- national and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf]

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that “China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability.”22 The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, “the PLA wouldattempt toweaken U.S. or other third party’s resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk – or actually striking – high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary’s superiorities.”23 These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the communications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. If the United States were to deploy space-based missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard a space maneuver vehicle like NASA’s X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as well. This situation would essentially put the United States on “**hair trigger” alert** in space. A Chinese military exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise attack. With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack. Such an attack could be very large or very small. The United States might attempt to use CAVs, aided by guidance from space-based radar systems, to attack Chinese command and control systems, disable the arsenal of Chinese ballistic missiles or merely attack the sites of suspected Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Missile defense, using space-based sensors and perhaps intercep- tors, would be used to discourage the Chinese from attempting any retaliation. It is not clear whether even a very large American first strike would completely neutralize the 75 to 100 Chinese nuclear weapons that the CIA anticipates will be capable of reaching the United States in the next 10 to 15 years.24 Controlling escalation, however, appears dicey – if the United States succeeded in severely degrading the Chinese command and control system, Chinese leaders might not even know that the original attack had been confined to conventional weapons. Those who say this scenario is far fetched may be surprised to learn that it happened – in a war game sponsored by the Naval War College.25 In that game, which was held August 14-25, 2000, a large Asian nation with over a billion people called Red (China) was conducting large-scale military exercises that the Blue Team (the United States) believed were a prelude to an attack on a U.S. ally located in region, designated Brown. During these exercises, the commander of Blue Forces became concerned that Red might use ground-based lasers against U.S. satellites. Fearing the loss of such important assets, he ordered a limited preemptive strike – using a fleet of CAVs that he had deployed in space – against suspected ground-based laser sites deep inside Red’s country. At the same time, he refrained from striking other targets “rationalizing that the preemptive strike was only protecting high-value space assets, not initiating hostilities.”26 The Blue Team was stunned when Red viewed the strike on targets deep inside its territory as an act of war and retaliated – causing a general war. One flabbergasted participant, sounding not completely convinced of what had just hap- pened, reportedly explained: “We thought these preemptive strikes might very well have stopped the crisis situation. But there were some who had a different point of view – that the strikes may have been provocative.”27 It is important to note that **the Chinese don’t even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen**. The Pentagon’s assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence – a Hong Kong news- paper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that “specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified” and that press reports of a so-called “parasitic” microsatellite “cannot be confirmed.”28 Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on “unambiguous warning” of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system – or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch – would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding – as he did with Iraq – that “we cannot wait for the final proof– the smoking gun – **that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud**.”29

#### Any loss of satellites causes escalation to spiral out of control—most likely scenario for great power war

Easton 2009(Ian, specialist in Chinese aeronautics at the Washington-based Project 2049 Institute,“The Great Game in Space” http://project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could **quickly escalate to a dangerous level**. According to two experts on the subject, “**if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century**, our crystal ball says that **it will be between the U**nited States **and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process**.”38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards fielding ASAT weapons could have.

#### China will escalate the conflict—perception of rational escalation ensures US gets drawn into a broader nuclear conflict

Glaser 2011 (Charles, Political Science Professor @ George Washington University, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China-whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan couldfairlyeasily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but **ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis**. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Plan: The United States Department of Defense should develop and deploy microsatellites tasked with inspection, surveillance, maintenance, protection, and propulsion capabilities to facilitate a Parasitic Attitude Control System.

#### Contention 3: Solvency

#### The best covert seizure of space would be deployment of micro-satellites in the form of a Parasitic Attitude Control System to hack and dismantle enemy capabilities without debris or negative perception

Page 2006 (Joseph, Assistant flight commander and ICBM combat crew commander (Squadron Command Post) at the 741st Missile Squadron, 91st Space Wing, Minor AFB, North Dakota, “Stealing Zeus's Thunder” Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2006 pg. 29-31)

The idea of covertly supplanting a satellite's ACS is technologically feasible and may become a desired, mature capability when conflict arises in space. The Orbital Recovery Group is working on a life-extension package for high-interest geosynchronous satellites such as high-revenue-generating 29commercial communication satellites. Discussion of Orbital Recovery's technical plan concentrate, on the topic of refueling communication satellites, but the key focus for space warfare remains on the intent of the system: to help extend the life of aging geosynchronous satellites by additional ACS.For space control, the actions remain remarkably similar to refueling, but the intent of the user differs markedly. The space-control angle of the additional ACS (hereafter referred to as space-controlPACS [SC PACS])involves controlling an enemy satellite by supplanting its original ACS and negating the satellite’s mission with the PACS. An SC PACS can control a satellite in numerous ways,incorporated within the five Ds of OCS:Depleting the satellite's primary ACS fuel until the satellite is drifting (denial/ disruption). Once a satellite runs out of maneuvering fuel to counter drifting, it is considered dead. Stressing and straining the satellite bus until body-part separation occurs from changes in angular-momentum spin rates (destruction). Assuming the satellite is three-axis stabilized, enough rotational velocity would put tremendous stress on the solar panels/ deployed1 antennae. Application of enough stress and strain will separate the appendages, depending upon the rate of spin applied to the satellite bus.” Realigning C2/payload antennae for friendly-force intelligence collection by moving the directional antenna's "footprint" away from hostile ground-station coverage areas and towards space-based signals-intelligence satellites or simply aiming the antennae into deep space, away from Earth (deception/ denial). Although such movement will not directly affect omnidirectional antennae due to their 360-degree orientation, their altered pickup patterns will result in less collected signal strength. "Pushing the satellite into transfer orbit for atmospheric reentry or physical capture destruction/ denial/degradation/disruption). Deliberatemovement of the satellite out of its expected orbital plane would allow the PACS controller full, positive control over the satellite'sdesignated path. Physical capture by friendly spacecraft and crews becomes possible by bringing the satellite down to an acceptable orbital altitude. If the plan calls for its physical destruction, lowering the satellite's altitude and speed can allow atmospheric friction to heat up and structurally weaken or burn up the satellite bus and payload. Concerns about Orbital Debris The purpose of SC PACS is to create an ASAT capability with a low probability of destruction. Pieces may break off the satellite bus when torqued, but the system seeks to minimize orbital debris, unlike the kinetic-kill ASM135 or nuclear-tipped Program 437 ASATs. 7 Designers planned for early ASATs to destroy hostile satellites with a kinetic kill (i.e., an explosion on or 30near the target spacecraft), but these produced too much dangerous orbital debris, affecting other friendly systems. Early satellite experiments such as West Ford, a communications program, (lumped hundreds of thousands of small copper needles in near-Earth space, much to the chagrin of research scientists and military space planners.' Paint flecks impacting on the space shuttle's window have shown us how dangerous space debris can become." SC PACS renders orbital debris negligible; however, secondary effects may occur with intentional physical damage to the satellite (bending and twisting around the center of gravity). Military/intelligence Functions of a Space-Control Parasitic Attitude Control System The military functions of SC PACS offer a great leap in terms of legitimate space-control ability for any nation that possesses it. The advantage of physically removing a problem from the situation without destroying it lends a "kinder, gentler" approach to warfare operations and may earn the user some respect in the eyes of the world community. When dealing with hostile nations and their space operations, the United States must contend with eavesdropping intelligence satellites that monitor activities around the globe: high resolution imagery satellites that photograph troop movements or buildup operations (similar to the buildup (luring Operation Iraqi Freedoin in the Middle East in 2003). Following the Air Force's five Ds, SC PACS offers many avenues of approach to neutralize enemy satellites without necessarily obliterating them

#### Even if it was detected, PACS renders countermeasures or escalation pointless

Klein 2006 [Commander John - United States Navy, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (Space Power and Politics) Pg. 77]

Perhaps the best defensive position is obtained by taking station where the enemy would not dare risk attacking.This would be achieved by locating space systems in close vicinity to high-value or national assets of a neutral or enemy state. For example, parasitic microsatellites could be physically attached to each of the satellites in a positioning, navigation, and timing constellation. If offensive weapons were used against these parasitic satellites, the positioning satellite would also be likely to suffer irreparable harm, thus rendering it useless.In such a situation involving the GPS constellation, the United States may be reluctant to destroy the enemy microsatellite for fear of destroying its own GPS satellite. This example demonstrates that, if a position of advantage is taken, the defense is indeed the stronger form of warfare.If an attack is subsequently launched against the parasitic satellites, the attacking systems can be more readily located and targeted for counterattack, since the application of force often gives the attacker's position away. Such locating and targeting to support a counterattack need not be done withspace-based assets, but can employ any combination of land, sea, and air assets to accomplish this as well.So a counterattack to a space-based attack need not be in kind. Once the location of the attacking system is determined, the enemy can await the most opportune moment to conduct his counterattack, thus taking advantage of the benefits coming from defensive strategy.

#### Microsat defense systems are the best and ONLY way to protect current satellites and stay covert until necessary

Schendzielos 2008 (Kurt, Director, 13th Air Force Commander's Action Group at US Air Force, “Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites” http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada485553.pdf

An inherent advantage of microsats and nanosatsis the capability to renew or repopulate constellations quickly. Additionally microsats and nanosatsenjoy a reduced acquisition and production cycle. Updated microsats could be built and launched within a few months using the latest technology available ensuring that satellite defense keep pace with emerging threats. 129 Because microsats are a relatively proven concept, and additional applications are constantly emerging, the costs of the program, once mature, would be reasonably lessened by the bulk acquisition of components. Conceptually the basic components remain the same and the mission equipment changes;drastically shortening the test and development timelines. 130 Microsats could be clustered on today’s larger boosters or be placed one or two at a time on smaller launching systems, such as a modified AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile converted to place a microsat in LEO. 131 A secondary advantage of using smaller boosters like an AIM-7 is that **launches would be indistinguishable from regular aircraft missile tests providing a means for covertly placing microsats into orbit and denying an adversary the knowledge that the bodyguards are there**, if such an action were warranted. 132 Lastly, the biggest advantage of bodyguard satellites is that they can be sent to protect a satellite that is already on orbit. It is, therefore, the only means available to protect satellites launched three years ago. Other satellite self-defense measures will have to be included during manufacture on the ground, and will, for the most part, not be able to be added once the satellite is orbiting.

#### And, PACS is the most effective microsat technology—cohesive with anti-ASAT capabilities and easily developed

Page 2006 (Joseph, Assistant flight commander and ICBM combat crew commander (Squadron Command Post) at the 741st Missile Squadron, 91st Space Wing, Minor AFB, North Dakota, “Stealing Zeus's Thunder” Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2006 pg. 27-28)

If the United States were able to develop a means of effective OCS that performed most or all of the five Ds, what impact would it have? How would the world react to it? More importantly, would US space forces use this technology to full advantage? Even though the answers to these questions seem to lie in the realm of policy and strategy, a commercial system currently in the research-and-development phase has the potential to turn ASAT war fare and the concept of space control on its head. New Way of Thinking The five Ds of OCS exist as ways to hamper the enemy's ability to use space to his advantage-an effect easily attained through satellite control. US space forces' control of enemy satellites by means of an additional attitude control system (a PACS) would all but assure exerciseof the five Ds. Supplementing or supplanting a satellite's integrated ACS allows control of the orientation of payload and bus (the structural shell that houses the mission performing payload). Most work on the PACS has dealt with topics of extending the life of satellites on a particular mission, primarily communications. Previous research dealt with refueling satellites in orbit and using a 27 satellite's own control system, but the PACS concept disregards the integrated ACS and provides control through an add-on system. Depleted fuel tanks no longer mean the end of a satellite's mission life-with the PACS, the mission extends until PACS fuel runs out or the payload fails. The control result remains the same when one uses a PACS on a normally operating satellite for space-control purposes. The controller of the PACS has ultimate power in moving the satellite, not only by primary use of its thrusters to throw it out of control but also by making changes in the moment of inertia for spinning satellites or in the center of gravity for three-axis-stabilized satellites. Since payload-pointing accuracy depends heavily on stabilization of the satellite bus, additional thrusters that cause unwanted movement or stabilization changes will affect the target satellite's mission performance. Whatever the technique or intention, the PACS allows control over a satellite by using means other than its original attitudeand-orientation subsystems, an extraordinary capability in the realm of space control and space warfare.