PART ONE IS FRAMEWORK.

The notion of value to life gives their impacts meaning. The aff story is predicated upon the idea that life has some inherent value making it worthy of protection and improvement, so your ballot is a mechanism to foster value to life and endorse the ideals and policy options that do so. Their framework prescribes an ethical value like morality or justice without telling you why we care about these notions of truth in the first place; the only function of ethics is to give meaning to our life experience, so all values are reducible to promoting value to life.

PART TWO IS LINKS.

They characterize health care as a protective mechanism against human suffering, relying on universally provided access to medical services designed to eschew pain. The very idea of universal health care undermines the human project; it attempts to reduce the chaotic suffering and meaninglessness inherent in our uncomfortable experience with the world: disease, injury, madness.

Suffering and antagonism are inescapable conditions of human existence. The aff’s focus on eliminating instability and vulnerability to suffering fosters a constant state of ressentiment in which we abandon the real conditions of life in favor of conforming existence to the ascetic ideal. Their attempt to order the world within a problem-solution framework binds our existence to utopian ideals and reveals their futile attempt to escape humanity’s fate. If that fate is death and suffering, so be it. We must embrace it. Life is amoral - anyone who denies this and attempts to reduce and eliminate suffering is a coward too fearful to engage life. The aff’s fixation with righting the world is a delusion that masks the true nature and meaning of suffering. Kain:  
**Kain**, Phillip J. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Santa Clara); *Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence*; *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*; 20**07**

**The** third vision takes the **cosmos** to be alien. It **was not designed for human beings** at all**; nor were they designed for it.** We just do not fit. **We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all.** It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.[5](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v033/33.1kain.html%20\%20FOOT5) **For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress** (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, **we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will** simply **weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less.** It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). **If we look deeply into** the essence of things, into **the horror of existence,** Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet **we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things** (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "**a profound illusion** . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . **can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it.** This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. **Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion.**

By attempting to minimize suffering, the aff’s addiction to security creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the unpredictability of the world becomes a threat to humanity. This redirects our perpetual ressentiment against the unknown, which triggers inexplicable hatred for our fate and mortality. The aff’s will to power constructs a false sense of rationality in which our fear of suffering reflexively justifies our false ideals. As a result, they subjugate any affirmative value to the nihilism of security that fosters refusal to engage life. Der Derian:  
James(Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts and the Institute Research Professor of International Studies at Brown University); *The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard*; Cianet: http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html;19**98**

**[Nietzsche’s] method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.** 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. **It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.** Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of selfpreservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 **The will to power**, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, **produce[s] a reactive and resentful longing for** only **power, leading**, in Nietzsche's view, **to a triumph of nihilism.** But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. **Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life**, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism[.] in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But **[T]he denial of this permanent condition, the effort** to disguise it with a consensual rationality or **to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are** all **effects of this suppression of fear.** The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. **Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown.** Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 **The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces.** The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable.In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes identified as evil,** and evil provokes hostility--**recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity,"** as Nietzsche puts it, **creates a people who** are willing to **subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security**: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

*Their rejection of inequality and suffering through redistributive state programs is the desire for collective strength to overcome the suffering inherent in our world. Ure:  
Ure 6 (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09)*

*However, if Nietzsche thus conflates a number of very different discourses, his conceptualization of the social phenomenon he objects to remains much more sharply focused.* ***In theorizing the cult of philanthropy****, he accentuates what* ***[Nietzsche] sees*** *as the tight connection between the modern form of communal integration and* ***a lamentable*** *process of* ***deindividuation****: Today it seems to do everyone good when they hear that society is on the way to adapting the individual to general requirements, and that the happiness and at the same time the sacrifice of the individual lies in feeling himself to be a useful member and instrument of the whole. . . . [T]here is . . . a wonderful and fair-sounding unanimity in the demand that the ego has to deny itself until, in the form of the adaptation to the whole, it again acquires its firmly set circle of rights and duties— until it has become something quite novel and different.* ***What is wanted*** *. . .* ***is*** *nothing less than* ***the fundamental remoulding,*** *indeed* ***weakening and abolition of the individual: one never tires of*** *enumerating and* ***indicting all that is evil*** *and inimical, prodigal, costly, extravagant**in the form individual existence has assumed hitherto, one hopes to manage more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, more uniformly if there exists only large bodies and their members. (D 132) Nietzsche’s analysis of this post-Enlightenment transformation and valorization of Mitleid is significant for our purposes because it reveals the notion of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that underpins his lament over a communitarianism that, as he sees it, entirely enfolds the individual into the collective.47 Nietzsche suggests that the concepts of pity, sympathy, and vivre pour autrui have become little more than the ideological stalking horses for the “moral fashion of a commercial society” (D 173, emphasis added)—a moral fashion, that is to say, that transforms individuals into industrious, calculable instruments of social labor. He argues that* ***what unites*** *the modern mantras of* ***“pity,” “impersonal action,” “self-sacrifice,” “adaptation,”*** *and the “blessing of work”* ***is*** *the fact* ***that they share one covert idea: the fear of individuality****. “In the glorification of ‘work,’” as he writes, “I see the same covert idea as in the praise of useful impersonal actions: that of fear of everything individual” (D 173). (The scare quotes around “work” are Nietzsche’s; he evidently means to imply that the worship of instrumental, material labor, or “hard industriousness,” should not be confused with what he considers the more valuable work, the work on the self [D 173].) In this context, then, his critique of pity highlights his resistance to philosophical and sociological perspectives whose conception of human beings is exhausted by the image of homo faber and homo economicus.48 Nietzsche challenges the legitimacy of social relations that construct individuals as nothing more than disciplined instruments of labor and uniform members of an integrated collectivity. Such perspectives, he implies, are symptomatic of an anxious desire to cordon ourselves off from the intrapsychic domain. The “blessing of work,” he jokes, “is the best policeman. . . . [I]t keeps everyone in bounds and can mightily hinder the development of reason, covetousness, desire for independence” (D 173). Instrumental labor, we might say, is our psychological cordon sanitaire. Of course, Nietzsche concedes,* ***this policing of the self*** *through the discipline of work**also* ***has its benefits insofar as the regular satisfaction of small, instrumental problems gives one a sense of “security.”*** *However, this is not merely material security but, indeed, a security from the temptations of “reflection, brooding and dreaming,” and such security, as Nietzsche puts it, “is now worshipped as the supreme divinity” (D 173). In Daybreak he defines the post- Enlightenment age as one in which the metaphysical and theological dream of salvation has been displaced by the worship of a divinity that protects one from the risks (and possible gains) of confronting and working on one’s own psychical reality. According to Nietzsche,* ***the idol of security*** *that modern commercial society worships* ***is a divinity it has erected in order to save us the trouble of working on and cultivating ourselves****.*

Political solutions to inequality are rooted in a suicidal slave morality and nihilistic deference to the state that destroys value to life. Brown:Brown, 2000 (Wendy, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University and UC Berkeley Humanities Fellow “Nietzsche for Politics” in “Why Nietzsche Still?” Edited by Alan Schrift, pg. 217)

If Nietzsche bears some ambivalence toward philosophy in the name of life, **there is no** such **ambiguity in [Nietzsche’s]** open **hostility toward politics, where the latter encompasses moral doctrines** such as equality, institutions such as the state and political parties, politicians, righteous position taking, and policy making. **Nietzsche's objections to moral political doctrine**, especially liberalism, **include his** notorious **disdain for the** rabble and for the **"little men" whose** envious, petty, and poisonous **nature** he believes **sap[s] all strength from a culture.** **Nietzsche's critique of political solutions to** unfairness and **injustice** and their origins in resentment and revenge **is distilled in his** forthright **claim, "'Men are not equal'.** ‘Life wants to climb and overcome itself climbing" (2:2 "On the Tarantulas"). **If liberal doctrine** thus **inevitably partakes of slave morality, when this critique is compounded by Nietzsche's despisal of the state-"coldest of all cold monsters ... where the slow suicide of all is called 'life'" -then all state-centered political formations**, whether socialist, democratic, or totalitarian, **appear even more antagonistic** than philosophy **to "life"** and culture (2:r "On the New Idol"), "The better the state is established," Nietzsche polemicizes, "the fainter is humanity." 25 Even these critiques do not plumb the depths of Nietzsche's hostility to politics, a hostility many have termed aesthetic but that might be better understood as an intense anti-institutionalism [is]rooted in his critique of slave morality. **"'The will to power' is so hated in democratic ages**," he argues, "**that their entire psychology seems directed towards belittling and defaming it"** (WP 751).In *Twilight ofthe Idols,* Nietzsche emphasizes the massified, deindividualizing character of democratic institutions, the way in which they lose "man" in a regime putatively designed to protect" everyman": "Equality" , .. belongs essentially to decline: the chasm between man and man, class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out-that which I call *pathos of* distance-characterizes every *strong* age. The tension, the range between the extremes is today growing less and less~ the extremes themselves are finally obliterated to the point of similarity. (Tl "Skirmishes" 37)

PART THREE IS IMPACTS.

In succumbing to the ascetic ideal, they negate the ability to have value in life and foster resentment towards life. Deleuze:

Gilles Deleuze [Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Paris VIII]. “Nietzsche and Philosophy”. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. 1962.

From the speculative position to the moral opposition, from the moral opposition to the ascetic contradiction . . But the ascetic contradiction is, in turn, a symptom which must be interpreted.What does **the man of the ascetic ideal** want? The one who repudiates life **is** also **the one who wants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power and triumph, the triumph and contagion of reactive forces.** At this point reactive forces discover the disturbing ally that leads them to victory: nihilism, the will to nothingness (GM III 13). The will to nothingness which can only bear life in its reactive form. **The will to nothingness** is the one that **used reactive forces as a way of ensuring that life must contradict, deny and annihilate itself.** The will to nothingness from the beginning, inspires all the values that are called "superior" to life. This is Schopenhauer's greatest error: he believed that the will is denied in all values superior to life. In fact, it is not the will which is denied in superior values, **it is the superior values that are related to a will to deny, to annihilate life. This will to deny defines "the value" of superior values. Its weapon is to hand life over to the domination of reactive forces in such a way that the whole of life slips further and further away**, separated from what it can do, getting smaller and smaller, **towards nothingness,** towards the poignant feeling of his nothingness" (GM III 25). The will to nothingness and reactive forces, **these are the** two **constituent elements of the ascetic ideal.**

Suffering is inevitable regardless of the AC. Their claims to solve for some instances of suffering ignore that even if affirming is good in the short term, its overall effect will be irrelevant in the project of giving meaning to our existence and foster unwillingness to engage in this project of value-finding. We must embrace suffering and better ourselves by overcoming, not avoiding, its challenges. Kain 2:

**Even if we could show** that **it** will be **possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is** very **unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is** not **better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it.** But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (*TL* 1, 79). **Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering**, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it **may all amount to nothing more than a brief** and accidental **moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will** finally **confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not** so much **about the quantity of suffering** that we can expect to find in the world **but, rather, its nature.** For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. **For Nietzsche,** even if we can change this or that, **even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life.** The very nature of things, **the very essence of existence**, **means suffering.** Moreover, **it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.**

The aff’s attempt to order the world and reduce suffering denies humankind the ability to better itself and discover the meaning in existence. This obsession with avoiding suffering makes death, suffering, and extinction desirable by forcing humanity to remain stuck in its state of imperfection, avoidance, and reactivity. We must engage suffering and allow it to unveil the value to life lest we become wandering vagabonds with no meaning to our existence and no will to live. Nietzsche:  
**Nietzsche**, Friedrich; *Beyond Good and Evil*; aphorism #225: p. 342; 18**86**

Whetherhedonism, or pessimism, or **utilitarian**ism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these **ways of thinking**, which measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, **are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which** everyone who knows about creative forces and **an artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for yourself[,]**—that is, of course**, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky people**, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us—even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom." **Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making himself smaller**, how you make him smaller**—and there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want**, if possible—and there is no wilder "if possible"—**to do away with suffering.** What about us? It does seem that **we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well being**, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that **looks like an end, a condition which** immediately **makes human beings laughable and contemptible,** something **which makes their destruction desirable!** The culture of suffering, of great suffering, **don't you realize that** up to this point **it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up?**

PART FOUR IS THE ALTERNATIVE.

Embrace our fate and affirm the eternal recurrence of our life. Live according to the knowledge that suffering and death are inevitable and do what you would will yourself to spend eternity doing over and over again. Suffering just happens; we are not responsible for it and we can’t change it. Without suffering, our life project becomes meaningless. Eternal recurrence is the only way to reject the ascetic ideal and solve our resentment of life. Kain 3:

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. **Eternal recurrence**, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (*WP* 55). It **implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is** no plan, **no purpose, no reason for it.** Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, **we must see that there is meaning here—**it is just that **it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself,** meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, **suffering for no reason at all.** But **[A]t the** very **same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering.** That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. **Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt.** There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (*TI* "Errors" 8; *HH* 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. **This** itself **could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt.** Eternal recurrence brings the Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. **Eternal recurrence** gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It **fills the void**. With what? It fills it **with** something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with **one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but** (given the horror of existence) **suffering cannot be avoided** anyway, **and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of** sin, punishment, or **guilt.**

The alt is your chance to do something about the way the aff tries to engage ethics. You can’t pass the aff advocacy through Congress, nor can you convince anyone else in the room to do it. However, you have the power to promote the type of thought and critical engagement necessary for all of us to gain an understanding of how we define the value of our lives. Vote not only AGAINST their ascetic ideal, but FOR a type of thought we can all positively engage. Deleuze 2:

Gilles Deleuze [Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Paris VIII]. “Nietzsche and Philosophy”. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. 1962.

When knowledge becomes a legislator, the most important thing to be subjected is thought. Knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason. The instinct for knowledge is therefore thought, but thought in its relation to the reactive forces which seize and conquer it. For rational knowledge sets the same limits to life as reasonable life sets to thought; life is subject to knowledge and at the same time thought is subject to life. **Reason** sometimes **dissuades and** sometimes **forbids us to cross certain limits: because it is useless** (knowledge is there to predict) because it would be evil (life is there to be virtuous), **because it is impossible** (there is nothing to see or think behind the truth). 2' — But does not critique, understood as **critique of knowledge** itself, **express[es] new forces capable of giving thought another sense,** a thought that would go to the limit of what life can do, **a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can do, a thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life. Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the affirmative power of life.** Both would go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity. **Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life.** "There are lives with prodigious difficulties; these are the lives of the thinkers. And we must lend an ear to what we are told about them, for here we discover possibilities of life the mere story of which gives us joy and strength and sheds light on the lives of their successors. There is as much invention, reflection, boldness, despair and hope here as in the voyages of the great navigators; and to tell the truth, these are also voyages of exploration in the most distant and perilous domains of life. What is surprising in these lives is that two opposed instincts, which pull in opposite directions, seem to be forced to walk under the same yoke: the instinct that leads to knowledge is constantly constrained to abandon the ground where man habitually lives and to throw itself into the uncertain, and the instinct that wills life is forced to grope ceaselessly in the dark for a new place to establish itself' (PTG). In other words**, life goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it, but thought goes beyond the limits that life fixes for it.** Thought ceases to be a ratio **y**26\* life ceases to be a reaction. **The thinker** thus **expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirmative.**

Morality for physicians. — The sick man is a parasite of society. In a certain state it is indecent to live longer. To go on vegetating in cowardly dependence on physicians and machinations, after the meaning of life, the right to life, has been lost, that ought to prompt a profound contempt in society. The physicians, in turn, would have to be the mediators of this contempt — not prescriptions, but every day a new dose of nausea with their patients. To create a new responsibility, that of the physician, for all cases in which the highest interest of life, of ascending life, demands the most inconsiderate pushing down and aside of degenerating life — for example, for the right of procreation, for the right to be born, for the right to live. To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death freely chosen, death at the right time, brightly and cheerfully accomplished amid children and witnesses: then a real farewell is still possible, as the one who is taking leave is still there; also a real estimate of what one has achieved and what one has wished, drawing the sum of one's life — all in opposition to the wretched and revolting comedy that Christianity has made of the hour of death. One should never forget that Christianity has exploited the weakness of the dying for a rape of the conscience; and the manner of death itself, for value judgments about man and the past.- Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

To be indifferent — that too is a form of strength — for that we are likewise too old, too late. Our

morality of sympathy, against which I was the first to issue a warning — that which one might call

l'impressionisme morale — is just another expression of that physiological overexcitability which is

characteristic of everything decadent. That movement which tried to introduce itself scientifically with

Schopenhauer's morality of pity — a very unfortunate attempt! — is the real movement of decadence

in morality; as such, it is profoundly related to Christian morality. Strong ages, noble cultures, all

consider pity, "neighbor-love," and the lack of self and self-assurance as something contemptible. Ages

must be measured by their positive strength — and then that lavishly squandering and fatal age of the

Renaissance appears as the last great age; and we moderns, with our anxious self-solicitude and

neighbor-love, with our virtues of work, modesty, legality, and scientism — accumulating, economic,

machinelike — appear as a weak age. Our virtues are conditional on, are provoked by, our weaknesses.

"Equality" as a certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory of

"equal rights," is an essential feature of decline. The cleavage between man and man, status and status,

the plurality of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out — what I call the pathos of distance, that is

characteristic of every strong age. The strength to withstand tension, the width of the tensions between

extremes, becomes ever smaller today; finally, the extremes themselves become blurred to the point of

similarity.- Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

My conception of freedom. — The value of a thing sometimes does not lie in that which one attains by

it, but in what one pays for it — what it costs us. I shall give an example. Liberal institutions cease to

be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of

freedom than liberal institutions. Their effects are known well enough: they undermine the will to

power; they level mountain and valley, and call that morality; they make men small, cowardly, and

hedonistic — every time it is the herd animal that triumphs with them. Liberalism: in other words,

herd-animalization.

These same institutions produce quite different effects while they are still being fought for; then they

really promote freedom in a powerful way. On closer inspection it is war that produces these effects,

the war for liberal institutions, which, as a war, permits illiberal instincts to continue. And war educates

for freedom. For what is freedom? That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one

maintains the distance which separates us. That one becomes more indifferent to difficulties, hardships,

privation, even to life itself. That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one's cause, not

excluding oneself. Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate

over other instincts, for example, over those of "pleasure." The human being who has become free —

and how much more the spirit who has become free — spits on the contemptible type of well-being

dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man

is a warrior.

How is freedom measured in individuals and peoples? According to the resistance which must be

overcome, according to the exertion required, to remain on top. The highest type of free men should be

sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome: five steps from tyranny, close to the

threshold of the danger of servitude. This is true psychologically if by "tyrants" are meant inexorable

and fearful instincts that provoke the maximum of authority and discipline against themselves; most

beautiful type: Julius Caesar. This is true politically too; one need only go through history. The peoples

who had some value, attained some value, never attained it under liberal institutions: it was great

danger that made something of them that merits respect. Danger alone acquaints us with our own

resources, our virtues, our armor and weapons, our spirit, and forces us to be strong. First principle: one

must need to be strong — otherwise one will never become strong.- Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols