*I negate: Resolved- It is morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domestic violence.*

*The value’s MORALITY.*

The resolution is a statement of fact since it questions what “is”, using a descriptive adjective as opposed to prescriptive verb such as “ought”. Traditional logic dictates that a statement can only be sound if it is both valid and true; the truth of a statement indicates that the judgment of truth is derived from some form of knowledge. Thus, the topic is a question of moral knowledge. Moral obligations rely upon our cognitive capacities to construct and act according to maxims. Obligations must be universally applicable; unless all agents can rationally will compliance with a maxim, the action of compliance cannot be permitted. The objective validity of obligations is determined by the universalizeability of subjective judgment. Engstrom:  
Stephen Engstrom, “The Form of Practical Knowledge”, Harvard University Press 2009. Pg 202-203

As we saw, rational cognition is characterized by a universality that has both a subjective and an objective aspect, each grounded in a conception of a single shared capacity. On the subjective side, this conception is of an identical capacity to know, by which all cognizing subjects share a capacity to communicate uniting them as members in a community of knowers; on the objective side, it is cognition's original representation of the possibility of its objects' coexistence, by which all cognizable objects share a capacity to interact uniting them as members in a law-governed system. But we have just seen that practical knowledge is distinctive in that, on account of its efficacy, its object and its subject must be one and the same. It follows that in the case of such cognition these two conceptions necessarily coincide, so that every subject that shares the capacity for practical knowledge must, precisely through possessing it, likewise be a member of the system of coexisting, interacting agents represented in such cognition. We also saw that the two-sided universality of rational knowledge entails that such cognition's validity is likewise universal in two corresponding senses, that rational knowledge is both valid ***for*** every subject capable of grasping the concept determined in such cognition and valid ***of*** every object falling under its concept. Given the self-relation of practical knowledge, it follows that in such knowledge subjective and objective universal validity necessarily coincide in the sense that the subjects for which the cognition is valid are the very beings to which it applies. This necessary coincidence of practical cognition's subjective and objective universal validity entails that the act of practical self-determination is inherently universal, in that any particular act of practical cognition, whether a practical judgment of the primary or the secondary type, is always, as knowledge of the particular in the universal, based in doubly universal knowledge, knowledge ***every*** practically cognizing subject can have of what ***every*** such subject is, or ought, to do. Practical self-determination is, accordingly, a universal self-relation, whereas the practical self-specification characteristic of bare practical thought is merely particular, indeed singular. Practical self-determination is never the bare self-relation of an isolated practical *I*; it always has a footing the self-relation of the *we* of practical knowledge.

The test of universality mandates the exclusion of circumstantial justification. Engstrom 2:  
Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 124-125.

Even where the maxim prescribes a specific end or type of action in the light of certain specific conditions, and even where it depends on an influence on the will’s exercise by a condition regarded by the subject itself only as valid for the will of the subject, it still involves the presupposition [presupposes] that all persons could act from a common recognition that every person is to act accordingly when in such conditions as those on which its prescription is based.

Thus, the necessary and sufficient burden is to prove that a maxim of killing in self-defense is universalizeable. I contend that a maxim of killing cannot be universalized.

Individuals cannot advocate the destruction of their own wills. Harman:  
Murder and Mayhem p. 121, Barbara Harman

For **if I will anything at all, I must will the necessary conditions of continued agency** (**or I must will**, as I can, **the omission of what would undermine the conditions of my continued existence**). And, given my inability to guarantee avoidance of the Hobbesian condition or its consequences, I cannot guarantee that I will not also have willed the cause of the loss of my life. A maxim of convenience killing would pass the CW test only if the agent could guarantee that **the willed universal principle of indifference to life cannot conflict with what else he must will, if he wills at all.** **No human rational agent can guarantee this. Since I must will**, as I can, **that others take my existence as a limiting condition on their actions**, the maxim of convenience killing is rejected. **One cannot will the universalized killing maxim and acknowledge the conditions of human agency.**

Any normative conception of ethics must be capable of universally prescribing action independent of context; a maxim of permitted killing results in self-defeat through conditional contradiction. Engstrom 3:

Engstrom, Stephen “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge”

Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how **a maxim** of action **that assaults the freedom of others** with a view **to further**ing **one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we** attempt to **will it as a universal law** in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. 19In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of **universal law involves considering whether** it’s possible for **every person**—every subject capable of practical judgment—to **share[s] the** practical **judgment asserting the goodness of** every person’sacting according to **the maxim** in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. **Since** here **all persons** are on the one hand **deem**ing **good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own** freedom, while on the other hand, **insofar as they agree with the** similar **judgments of others,** also **deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’** freedom**, they** are all **deem**ing **good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.**

Weighing:

The aff’s advocacy excludes the voices of the dead abusers since we can never hear their side of the story in order to determine the permissibility of their victim’s response. We can’t know if they were psychologically ill or if the victim exaggerated the extent of the violence perpetrated against them, so the aff can never coherently evaluate lethal force and unjustifiably silences others.

The potential impact of death outweighs on reversibility and timeframe, as exemplified by Pascal’s Wager. A punishment of death potentially condemns the abuser to infinite suffering in eternal hellfire, which significantly outweighs temporally-constrained acts of violence. The abuser may suffer sufficiently in the next life, so there is no need to disproportionately punish them on earth.