NC Turns

Rehabilitation treats offenders as Inferiors and denies their Culpability

**Flanders 2010 explains**

(Chad Flanders, Assistant Professor of Law @ Saint Louis University School of Law, *Retribution and Reform*, 2010, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=chad\_flanders)

**When we punish the criminal by depriving him of his liberty, we are again making him equal to us**. As Whitman summarizes the position, **“[o]nly blame takes the offender seriously as a moral equal. To try to “cure” the offender would be to treat him as a patient, as somehow “sick” and needing to be managed and manipulated rather than simply held responsible**. **Nor will it do to punish simply for the sake of deterring others, because that would be to treat the offender as a means for the sake of others’ safety.** This is why Hegel, following Kant and still in the grips of the Kantian picture, would speak of the prisoner’s “right” to be punished. **To not punish is a denial of the offender’s right to be treated as an equal, as someone who has autonomously chosen to break the law, who has at the same time chosen to be punished.**

To make the notion that Rehabilitation respects the criminal is preposterous in so far as it denies them their basic philosophical essence.

Eye for an Eye is often misconstrued to philosophically denounce Retribution

**Flanders 2010 explains**

(Chad Flanders, Assistant Professor of Law @ Saint Louis University School of Law, *Retribution and Reform*, 2010, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=chad\_flanders)

I start with a passage from Augustine that exemplifies this particular thread in the retributive narrative. **Augustine takes** this narrative from the Old Testament, and its principle of lex talionis, or the “law of the claw.” **The scriptural maxim** he is interpreting is **that one should take an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Many have heard this as a counsel for brutal revenge, and condemned it for this reason. For Augustine, the problem with taking “an eye for an eye” is not only conceptual, it is also scriptural**. In the New Testament, **Jesus says that we should not seek revenge, but rather “turn the other cheek” when someone has wronged us. Indeed, Jesus seems to explicitly repudiate the tenet that one should repay “an eye for an eye**” (“you have heard it said … but I say”). To put it in Whitman’s terms, **Jesus seems to be advocating that we replace a regime of harshness (the law of revenge or an “eye for an eye”) with a regime of mildness (the law of compassion or love).** **It would seem that we have to accept one and give up the other; we cannot have both. Augustine says that to interpret the two passages as contradictory is to make a mistake, for they are not in tension. Both, despite appearances, prescribe mildness. It is important to read the principle of an eye for an eye as a limiting principle; you can take an eye for an eye, but no more than an eye. To take more than an eye from someone who has taken out your eye would be disproportionate**. **This is the familiar equation of retribution and proportionality -- pay someone according to his desert, no more no less -- and Augustine makes it.**

Retribution is not seeking mindless revenge, but proportionality

**Flanders 2010 explains**

(Chad Flanders, Assistant Professor of Law @ Saint Louis University School of Law, *Retribution and Reform*, 2010, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=chad\_flanders)

In other words, retributive theory, at least in Augustine’s hands, understands part of the point of punishment as dealing with unruly emotions, and putting a constraint on them.  **Retribution is not meant to be harsh, but to stop us from being harsh. For, Augustine says, “who . . . is easily satisfied with merely exacting revenge equal to the injury that he received?” To the implied answer -- no one -- Augustine replies that this is the point of the commandment: to “hold in check the flames of hatred and to rein in the unbridled hearts of raging people. Later, Augustine states explicitly that this is the job of the law, to set the penalty at equal retaliation and not to indulge the retaliation that a person may want to give, which may not stop at extracting an eye for an eye**

Retribution is the only way to solve Proportionality

**Flanders 2010 explains**

(Chad Flanders, Assistant Professor of Law @ Saint Louis University School of Law, *Retribution and Reform*, 2010, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=chad\_flanders)

**Retribution is** often seen as a **desirable** theory precisely **because it can explain proportionality while other theories of punishment cannot**. **This inability to explain how disproportionate punishments are unjust is considered a main objection against deterrence theories of punishment especially. If the goal of punishment is deterrence, then it is an open empirical question of how much punishment it will take to deter either the person or others from committing the crime in the future. It could, in principle, be endless punishment.** **That is to say, there is nothing built-in to the concept of deterrence that says any punishment for an offender is prima facie “too much.” We won’t know that until we know what will optimize deterrence**. **There is no reason in principle why we wouldn’t need to punish someone fifty, sixty, or a hundred years, to deter others from committing a similar crime.**

This ultimately begs the question, how much rehabilitation does it take until someone can become a productive member of society again? There is no answer to this question so eventually this leads to an endless amount of punishment. Rehabilitation inherently has no check on fairness.

[**1967 Parole Hearings Man**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0112393/): Ellis Boyd Redding, your files say you've served 40 years of a life sentence. Do you feel you've been rehabilitated?   
[**Red**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000151/): Rehabilitated? Well, now let me see. You know, I don't have any idea what that means.   
[**1967 Parole Hearings Man**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0112393/): Well, it means that you're ready to rejoin society...   
[**Red**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000151/): I know what \*you\* think it means, sonny. To me it's just a made up word. A politician's word, so young fellas like yourself can wear a suit and a tie, and have a job. What do you really want to know? Am I sorry for what I did?   
[**1967 Parole Hearings Man**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0112393/): Well, are you?   
[**Red**](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000151/): There's not a day goes by I don't feel regret. Not because I'm in here, or because you think I should. I look back on the way I was then: a young, stupid kid who committed that terrible crime. I want to talk to him. I want to try and talk some sense to him, tell him the way things are. But I can't. That kid's long gone and this old man is all that's left. I got to live with that. Rehabilitated? It's just a bullshit word. So you go on and stamp your form, sonny, and stop wasting my time. Because to tell you the truth, I don't give a shit.   
[Share this quote](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111161/quotes?qt0470706)

Rehabilitation in principle is not concerned with the humanity of the Criminal. Rehabilitation has no link to humanitarian efforts.

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**[Some scholars] argue that, “Rehabilitation is the only justification of criminal sanctioning that obligates the state to care for an offender's needs or welfare. We disagree. Rehabilitation raises the question of whether it is society's obligation to transform the inmate into a law-abiding citizen, not whether it is society's duty to treat the inmate humanely. None of the purposes of punishment directly defines a state's obligation to care for inmates. In fact, almost any justification of punishment might be interpreted to imply conditions that range from the brutal to the benign. Rehabilitation** in some of its paternalistic forms **is just as coercive as other justifications.** Inmates may well be "encouraged," or "persuaded" into treatment against their wishes. Retribution, often associated with harsh treatment, also can imply that a prolonged separation from society, proportional to the crime, is sufficient punishment, but that the prison climate must be safe and must offer enough amenities so that prison life is not inhumane

Meta-Analysis is inherently flawed

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

M**eta-analysis contains many problems** (Lab and Whitehead 1990; Logan et al. 1991), **but the most serious is the apparently tautological character of the "appropriate treatment" label**. **Is treatment effective because it is appropriate, or is it called "appropriate" when it is seen to be effective? To avoid circular reasoning, one must be able to identify a particular treatment or form of treatment as "appropriate" or "inappropriate" without any prior knowledge of its effects.** If a treatment were labeled "appropriate" or "inappropriate" according to theoretically based predictions of effectiveness before the point at which a research study measured the effect of applying that treatment to one group (a treatment group) and withholding it from another (a control group), there would be no problem in conducting a meta-analysis of many such studies to compare the effects of "appropriate" and "inappropriate" treatments. **A problem exists**, however, **when the original research studies seek and discover positive effects by reanalyzing their data to test the effectiveness of treatment under different conditions or on different subgroups, and then declare the treatment to be appropriate or inappropriate according to its differential effectiveness.** This is the result in this mete-analysis when treatment is labeled "appropriate" or "inappropriate" according to its relation to the factors of “risk,” “responsivity,” and “need.”

Retribution is far more humane than Rehabilitation

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**Those who suppose that rehabilitative treatment is intrinsically more humane than punishment have bought into a false dichotomy between punishment and "humanitarianism." It is precisely within the context of punishment, as opposed to treatment, that humanistic concepts are most relevant. Principled and fair punishment for wrongdoing treats individuals as persons and as human beings rather than as objects. Punishment is an affirmation of the autonomy, responsibility, and dignity of the individual; paternalistic rehabilitative treatment is a denial of all three.**

Rehabilitation does not make Prison Life more “Just”

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**Proponents believe that rehabilitation programs reduce the harshness of imprisonment by softening and humanizing the prison environment. But what if this effect is more apparent than real?** What if prisons merely pay lip service to the ideal of rehabilitation and create what amounts to a facade of fine-sounding programs that masks the harsh reality of doing time? Might this approach not reduce pressure from the public for real reform? A veneer of good intentions could undermine the vigilance and the restraint of power that we need to maintain a system of just punishment. **Rather than softening the pains of imprisonment, the rehabilitative goal may even add injustice to injury because it encourages individualized treatment, which undermines consistency and fairness. Individualized treatment requires discretion, which lends itself to abuse in the form of arbitrary and capricious distinctions. In pursuit of rehabilitation, offenders who have committed similar wrongs often are treated differently because of differences in personality, background, and social skills.** Furthermore, **when rehabilitative treatment is defined as an official goal of the agents and institutions of authority, then treatment, too, becomes paternalistic and authoritarian. The result is cynicism and resistance on the part of the intended beneficiaries. If our goal is to reform the conditions of life inside prisons, it is better to do so directly than under the rubric of rehabilitation. The direct approach has less chance of backfiring.**

Rehabilitation leads to more racism and a poorer perception of Criminality

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**Outside the walls, linking imprisonment with rehabilitation conveys a confusing message to the general public. As punishment, the message of imprisonment is "Felonies are very wrong acts, and those who commit them will be held to account." But the message of the rehabilitation ethic is "Felonies are the result of personal deficiencies (of knowledge, skills, habits, values, temperament, motivation, personality, and so on) on the part of the individual; society must attempt to correct those personal deficiencies." That is not an appropriate message for society to construct through its institutions of punishment. Such a message depicts criminal behavior in deterministic terms and portrays offenders as objects in need of adjustment, rather than as responsible human beings who must accept the consequences of their actions.** **This also leads to a misrepresented view of people who have those deterministic qualities.**

Rehabilitation is unfair to those who do follow the law

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**Prison rehabilitation programs, especially if they are successful, confer valuable but unearned benefits on the undeserving at the expense of law-abiding taxpayers; To benefit convicts thus on the grounds that they have violated the law and may do so again is, in effect, to reward extortion. As an alternative, one legitimately might argue that prisoners deserve certain kinds of help merely because they are human beings, or because they are citizens toward whom, merely as citizens, society has some obligations and in whom it has some investment. That rationale would be legitimate, but only to the same extent as it would apply to all other citizens. Thus rehabilitation programs are more justifiable outside than inside the criminal justice system**

Cost-Benefit Analysis is not sufficient for policy making decisions

**Francis Cullen 2000 explains**

(Francis Cullen, Research Professor of Criminal Justice @ the University of Cincinnati, 2000, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, learn.uci.edu/media/SP06/99015/Assess%20Rehab%20Cullen%2003d.pdf)

**This kind of cost-benefit analysis is not intended to be used to fully determine policy decisions**. For example, **although governmental jurisdictions that administer treatment programs may save costs for community residents who are spared victimization, they may strain their budget since the monetary savings from the crimes prevented do not bring in revenues to the jurisdiction.**

Statistical Studies are skewed and don’t accurately represent the real world

**Francis Cullen 2000 explains**

(Francis Cullen, Research Professor of Criminal Justice @ the University of Cincinnati, 2000, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, learn.uci.edu/media/SP06/99015/Assess%20Rehab%20Cullen%2003d.pdf)

Okay, a skeptic may continue, rehabilitation programs seem to work with serious offenders. But even if that is true, **isn’t it also true that many treatment programs are established or guided by the researchers who conduct the evaluations? Might they not “cook” the data? Or, even if they do not, aren’t these programs different than every day, run-of-the-mill interventions that do not have researchers around to train the staff, to provide manuals detailing how to deliver treatment, to monitor and advise workers, and, more generally, to ensure therapeutic integrity? Also, isn’t it true that what might work in the special circumstances of a well-controlled experimental study might not work in the real and bleak world of American Corrections?** **Lipsey’s (1999) meta-analysis of 205 “demonstration” programs in which researchers were involved, as opposed to 196 “practical programs,” sheds light on this issue. He found that the effect size** for practical programs, while positive (3-percent reduction in recidivism), **was only about half that of the demonstration programs**

Current Education, Work, and training programs in prison are improperly referred to as rehabilitation. Although the effects might be rehabilitating, the value/goal is actually more retributive.

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

**Many inmate programs currently offered in prisons–such as work, training, education, and recreation- can be justified under the heading of constructive activity ("keep them busy").** **"Constructive" activity is not defined here as "contributing to the betterment of inmates" but as activity that is, on its face, consistent with the orderly, safe, secure, and humane operation of a prison.** John DiIulio (1991:114) notes that **most prison and jail administrators view correctional programs from** what he calls **an "institutional perspective." That is, they "evaluate programs not mainly in terms of what they do to reduce the likelihood of recidivism or otherwise affect inmates' post-release behavior but as institutional management tools. Idleness and boredom can be viewed as wrong from a work ethic standpoint, or as unnatural because human beings are not meant to be idle, or as so fundamentally related to mischief as to be undesirable for that reason. In any case, prison programs can be defended as forms of constructive and meaningful activity and as antidotes to idleness, without invoking claims of rehabilitative effectiveness.** **This is not to say that it does not matter whether the programs have any rehabilitative effects; it would be fine if they did so. But when we say that the primary purpose of prison is to punish through confinement, we become more interested in the operation of these programs inside the prison gates and less concerned about their effects beyond.**

The Affirmative’s choice to use specificity to a certain crime helps skew their evidence. Reject their Meta-Analysis

**Charles Logan ’93 explains**

(Charles Logan, Professor of Law @ University of Connecticut Law School, 1993, *Meta-analysis and the Rehabilitation of Punishment,* Justice Quarterly Magazine, www.bop.gov/news/research\_projects/published\_reports/cond\_envir/oreprlogangaes.pdf)

Consider the history of a typical evaluation research project. An experimental group and a control group are compared, and no significant difference in outcome is found. **The researcher, not satisfied with such an uninteresting and seemingly uninformative finding, asks "Aren't there any conditions under which the effect I am looking for occurs?"** In fact, even if an effect is found, most researchers will want to know what happens to that effect under different conditions. **Thus the researcher starts to introduce third variables into the analysis, and tries holding them constant at different cutting points, until something interesting (or more interesting) results.** At that point the researcher must give a name and an interpretation to the variable that has been discovered to condition the existence, strength, sign, or form of the treatment effect. **Because the variables included in the original analysis,** and thus available for the reanalysis**, were chosen because they were thought to be predictors of outcome, the odds are good that some of the variables tested (age, race, sex, class, prior record, attitudes, personality traits, whatever) can be labeled elements of "risk"** (i.e., predictors of outcome). **Then the researcher's conclusion will be "Treatment has an effect, but only on offenders of a certain type (high- or low-risk)." If the control variable by itself does not predict outcome but does condition the effect of treatment, the researcher can label this interactive effect "responsivity." In such a case the conclusion will be "Treatment has an effect, but only on offenders who are responsive to this type of treatment."** Separately, **studies like these are perfectly legitimate, but they do not prove anything. They are tautological; they explain their results with after-the-fact hypotheses but do not test those explanations. What, then, if a meta-analysis of 100 studies finds, a significant relation between “risk” or “responsivity” or “needs,” on the one hand, and treatment effect, on the other**? Could this metas-analysis be regarded a confirmatory--a summary of replications? Not necessarily. **If the operational definitions of "risk" and "responsivity" and "needs" (the predictor variables) differ from study to study, we will learn nothing from a meta-analysis showing that treatment effect depends on these factors. Even if "risk" always were based, say, on prior record, at least two problems still could exist. First, the criterion of how long or how serious a record had to be in order to be "risky" still could be defined differently, and ex post facto, for each study; thus "risk" still would be tautological. Second, researchers typically do not report all the interactions they test; they tend to report only those that make a difference. Thus most of the negative evidence showing that treatment effects do not vary by level of risk goes unreported. A bias is thereby created in favor of the conclusion that treatment works, if only for cases in which risk makes a difference and therefore is reported** **In any case, the claim that meta-analysis now demonstrates that rehabilitative treatment "works" (in the sense of being significantly and reliably effective) as long as it is of the "appropriate" type and is applied "appropriately," is seriously flawed, unsubstantiated, and largely circular.**

Not all Rehabilitation programs are effective

**James Wilson ’07 explains**

(James. A Wilson, Assistant professor of Sociology @ Fordham University in New York, 2007, NIJ Joural No.257, “Habilitation or Harm: Project Greenlight and the Potential Consequences of Correctional Programming”, www.nij.gov/journals/257/habilitation-or-harm.html)

**Project Greenlight participants showed worse outcomes for every type of recidivism at 6 and 12 months after release**. The chart “Percent of Participants Who Recidivated at 6 and 12 Months” shows the percentage of each group that experienced any kind of arrest (misdemeanor or felony), felony arrest only, and parole revocation. **It is especially noteworthy—because it is statistically significant—that the overall arrest rate for the Project Greenlight group was 10 percent higher than that for the TSP group at 12 months postrelease (34 percent versus 24 percent). Also statistically significant is the 12 percent more parole revocations experienced by the Project Greenlight group than the control group at 12 months postrelease (25 percent versus 13 percent).**

Rehabilitation won’t work on a large scale

**James Wilson ’07 explains**

(James. A Wilson, Assistant professor of Sociology @ Fordham University in New York, 2007, NIJ Joural No.257, “Habilitation or Harm: Project Greenlight and the Potential Consequences of Correctional Programming”, www.nij.gov/journals/257/habilitation-or-harm.html)

**First, the standard cognitive-behavioral program that, in the past, has produced robust results in reducing offender recidivism was radically restructured in the Project Greenlight program. The recommended class size for cognitive-skills training is 10 to 13 participants; the Project Greenlight class size was 26. Given that many incarcerated people have limited interpersonal skills and education and are likely to be impulsive, a small class size is considered crucial in helping them maintain attention and helping instructors deliver material**

Rehabilitation has no effect if it cannot be implemented properly

**Lipsey ’07** explains

(Mark W. Lipsey, Senior Research Associate @ Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews”, *Review of Law and Social Science,* 2007, www.parliament.wa.gov.au/intranet/libpages.nsf/WebFiles/ITS+-+prisons+article+Lipsey+07/$FILE/prison+article+Lipsey+07].pdf)

**A major source of variability in the effects of treatment on the recidivism of offenders relates to how well the treatment program is implemented**. **Implementation has several facets. One is simply whether the treatment delivered is the treatment intended, a matter of treatment integrity or fidelity. Therapists may, for instance, substitute their own preferred treatment techniques for those prescribed by the rehabilitation program. Or, a poor quality version of the treatment may be delivered by poorly trained or unmotivated providers. Another facet of implementation is dosage—the amount of treatment offered and received. The strength of an otherwise effective treatment may be diminished if too little is offered** (e.g., five sessions are provided when ten are required to have good effects**). It may also be undermined by lack of participation by the offenders being served if they are present but not engaged, have poor attendance at treatment events, or drop out before completing treatment. It is a truism that a treatment that is not delivered cannot have effects.**

Rehabilitation Studies are not accurate representations of actual programs

**Lipsey ’07** explains

(Mark W. Lipsey, Senior Research Associate @ Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews”, *Review of Law and Social Science,* 2007, www.parliament.wa.gov.au/intranet/libpages.nsf/WebFiles/ITS+-+prisons+article+Lipsey+07/$FILE/prison+article+Lipsey+07].pdf)

**The rehabilitation treatments on which the available research is based also differ from correctional practice in another important way. Many of the research studies involve treatments that were developed by the researcher or delivered by the researcher, for example, with the researcher or developer selecting and training the personnel, monitoring the quality of service**, and the like. **Treatments provided in the context of such research and demonstration projects are not necessarily representative of typical correctional practice. Nor are their results representative—the recidivism effects for treatments in which the researcher is involved are larger than those for similar treatments without such involvement** (Petrosino & Soydan 2005). In one meta-analytic comparison (Lipsey 1999), the mean effect size for research and demonstration programs was twice as large as that found in evaluations of routine practice programs in which the researcher had no role in design or implementation

No Rehabilitation Study can close the difference between Theory and Practice

**Lipsey ’07** explains

(Mark W. Lipsey, Senior Research Associate @ Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews”, *Review of Law and Social Science,* 2007, www.parliament.wa.gov.au/intranet/libpages.nsf/WebFiles/ITS+-+prisons+article+Lipsey+07/$FILE/prison+article+Lipsey+07].pdf)

In short, the **research on rehabilitation** treatment reviewed here provides an encouraging indication of the relatively large effects that might be attainable in actual practice, but **cannot be interpreted as evidence that current practice has such effects or, indeed, that it has any positive effects at all. We have too little systematic research on the nature of the rehabilitation programs that are actually in use in correctional practice to fully appraise the gap between research and practice, but there is every reason to believe it is enormous. The greatest obstacle to using rehabilitation treatment effectively to reduce criminal behavior is not a “nothing works” research literature with nothing to offer but, rather, a correctional system that does not use the research that is available and has no history of doing so**

Even if programs are successful they are not the ones that will be implemented

**Edward Latessa ’02 explains**

(Edward Latessa, Professor of Criminal Justice @ The University of Cincinnati, 2002, Beyond Correctional Quackery—Professionalism and the Possibility of Effective Treatment, 199.107.22.105/fedprob/2002sepfp.pdf#page=45)

At this stage, it is inexcusable either to ignore this research or to implement programs that have been shown to be ineffective. Yet, as we have argued**, the neglect of the existing research on effective treatment models is widespread. In the study of 240 programs noted above, it was reported that two-thirds of adult programs and over half of juvenile programs did not use a treatment model that research had shown to be effective** (Matthews et al., 2001; Latessa, 2002). **Another study—a meta-analysis of 230 program evaluations** (which yielded 374 tests or effect sizes)—**categorized the extent to which interventions conformed to the principles of effective intervention. In only 13 percent of the tests were the interventions judged to fall into the “most appropriate” category.**