**Negative**

I negate. I offer the following definitions for clarification.

Universal Health Care: A health insurance program that is financed by taxes and administered by the government to provide comprehensive health care that is accessible to all citizens of that nation" by the Mosby's Medical Dictionary, 8th Edition.

Ought: Used to express obligation, Dictionary.com

Since morality is directly implied by the word ‘ought’ in the resolution, I value morality for this round.

My value criterion will be abiding by side restraints. We cannot look towards consequentialism because there is no way to evaluate a moral action based on consequences.

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| J.J.C Smart, philosophy professor, University of Adelaide, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST, ed., Knightbridge, 1973, p. 82 (PDNSS1630)  **No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it in virtue of its consequences. If that were so, one would just go one for ever, and there would be an obviously hopeless regress. That regress would be hopeless, even if one takes the view,** which is not an absurd view, **that although mean set themselves ends and work towards them, it is very often not really the supposed end, but the effort towards which they set the value ��" that they travel, not really in order to arrive (for as soon as they have arrived they set out for somewhere else), but rather they choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel.** Even on that view, not everything would have consequential value; what would have non-consequential value would in fact be traveling, even though people had to think of traveling as having the consequential value, and something else ��" the destination ��" the non-consequential value. |

Recognizing rights and putting them before a utilitarian calculus is the only rational and moral option.

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| H. L. A. **Hart** in **79** (former principal of Oxford University, Tulane Law Review, “The Shell Foundation Lectures, 1978-1979: Utilitarianism and Natural Rights”, April, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 663, l/n)  Accordingly, the contemporary modern philosophers of whom I have spoken, and preeminently Rawls in his *Theory of Justice,* have argued that **any morally adequate political philosophy must recognise that there must be, in any morally tolerable form of social life, certain protections for the freedom and basic interests of individuals** which constitute an essential framework of individual rights. **Though the pursuit of the general welfare is indeed a legitimate and indeed necessary concern** of governments, **it is something to be pursued only within certain constraints imposed by recognition of such rights.** |

I content that the United States should not provide universal health care to its citizens.

Contention 1: Government provided health care violates liberty.

If the government decides to provide all people with health care, it needs to have a way of paying for the health services it provides. Since the government must pay for the services it offers, it relies on taxpayers to fund universal health programs. However, people have a right to their property.

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| **NOZICK**  **Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor.** Some persons find this claim obviously true: **taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another's purpose.** Others find the claim absurd. But even these, if they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person to work five extra hours each week for the benefit of the needy. But a system that takes five hours' wages in taxes does not seem to them like one that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers the person forced a wider range of choice in activities than does taxation in kind with the particular labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation of systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a particular activity, to one that gives a choice among two activities, to ... ; and so on up.)….  **The man who chooses to work longer to gain an income more than sufficient for his basic needs prefers some extra goods or services to the leisure and activities he could perform during the possible nonworking hours; whereas the man who chooses not to work the extra time prefers the leisure activities to the extra goods or services he could acquire by working more. Given this,** if **it would be illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy,** how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man's goods for that purpose? Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services differently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness? Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not? Indeed, isn't it surprising that redistributionists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are so easily attainable without extra labor, while adding yet another burden to the poor unfortunate who must work for his pleasures? If anything, one would have expected the reverse. Why is the person with the nonmaterial or nonconsumption desire allowed to proceed unimpeded to his most favored feasible alternative, whereas the man whose pleasures or desires involve material things and who must work for extra money (thereby serving whomever considers his activities valuable enough to pay him) is constrained in what he can realize? ... |

Therefore, since we cannot violate ones right to their property, providing universal health care is immoral. Furthermore, people can only gain and lose property on a voluntary agreement.

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| **Nozick**2 **writes**:  <http://vault.hanover.edu/~ahrens/texts/Nozick%20Anarchy%20State%20Utopia%20excerpt.pdf>  **The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics.** **The first is the original acquisition of holdings**, the appropriation of unheld things. **This includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held,** the process, or processes, by which unheld things may come to be held**, the things that may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process,** and so on.  We shall refer to the complicated truth about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of justice in acquisition. **The second topic concerns the transfer of holdings from one person to another.** By what processes may a person transfer holdings to another? How may a person acquire a holding from another who holds it? **Under this topic come general descriptions of voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other hand) fraud, as well as reference to particular conventional details fixed upon in a given society. The complicated truth about this subject (with placeholders for conventional details) we shall call the principle of justice in transfer.** (And we shall suppose it also includes principles governing how a person may divest himself of a holding, passing it into an unheld state.) |

Therefore, I negate.