Text –

**The United States federal government should:**

**-- devolve all control over the plan’s infrastructure to state and local governments, including returning any current federal funding spent on the plan’s infrastructure to the states.**

**-- eliminate any barriers to greater private sector investment in the plan’s infrastructure**

**--grant states permission to transfer ownership of the plan’s infrastructure to the private sector.**

**Solves the case – the CP encourages state experimentation with full privatization – this raises more capital than the plan and stimulates the economy without federal funding**

**Edwards, 11** - director of tax policy studies at Cato. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation (Chris, “Federal Infrastructure Investment” Congressional Testimony, 11/16, <http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/federal-infrastructure-investment)//DH>

Decentralizing Infrastructure…budget process.

**The CP’s experiment creates the political will for full-scale infrastructure privatization**

**Winston, 10** - applied microeconomist and senior fellow in the Economic Studies Program at the [Brookings Institution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings_Institution). He specializes in the analysis of and has written extensively on industrial organization, regulation, and transportation (Clifford, Last Exit: Privatization and Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System, p. 2-3)//DH

Do the … system’s performance.

**4 net benefits –**

**1. productivity – federal planning undermines productivity because it can’t accurately respond to price signals. Private decision making more efficiently allocates resources tailored to economic need**

**Edwards, 11** - director of tax policy studies at Cato. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation (Chris, “Federal Infrastructure Investment” Congressional Testimony, 11/16, <http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/federal-infrastructure-investment)//DH>

we can… price signals

**2. Innovation – federal planning doesn’t accurately target infrastructure development to best meet economic need – mismanagement deepens economic problems**

**Norcross and Sautet, 9** – both are senior research fellows at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (Eileen and Frederic, “THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: Will More Public Spending Pave the Way to a Better Infrastructure?” SSRN)//DH

Infrastructure development … what they consume.

**3. competitiveness – using private sector capital diverts it from other countries – maximizes competitiveness more effectively than public spending**

**Staley, 8** - senior research fellow at Reason Foundation and associate director of the DeVoe L. Moore Center at Florida State University in Tallahassee where he teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in urban planning, regulation, and urban economics (Samuel, “Gas Tax Increase or Private Capital?,” 7/16, <http://reason.org/news/show/1006992.html>)//DH

Congress isn't …global competitors.

**4. data cooking - public investment is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates aff benefits and causes massive cost overruns**

**Flyvbjerg, 10** - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)//DH

The consequence is…infrastructure projects.

**Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case**

**Flyvbjerg, 10** - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)//DH

In sum… waiting to happen.