# Round 2

## Off

#### The United States federal government should provide a Common Scheduling Enterprise air traffic control system exclusively to areas in which private actors guarantee at least one-third of the funding upfront for a minimum of twenty years. In negotiating these partnerships, the United States federal government should open infrastructure plans to modification, including the possible transfer of project ownership to private actors. The United States federal government should make all necessary regulatory changes to encourage greater public-private partnerships in air traffic control systems, and provide necessary technical assistance for implementation.

#### This solves

Puentes, 8/23/10 - Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute (Robert, “New Partnerships for Accelerating Infrastructure Investments,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes>)

So as Congress continues to develop its plans for the reauthorization of the nation’s surface transportation law it should support metro areas that raise their own revenue for the long term. Though a new partnership, the federal government should provide incentives to metropolitan areas that secure long-term and substantial regional funding sources approved for a minimum of 20 years and that equal a significant (one-third to one-half) portion of the annual federal transportation funding received. As to the incentives, a possible menu of options might include: more direct funding to metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), more flexible “mode neutral funding,” more streamlined planning processes, more direct reporting to federal agencies, and reduced bureaucracy.[[7]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes" \l "note7)

#### The net benefit is infrastructure accountability

#### Public investment is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates aff benefits and causes massive cost overruns, and means better projects lose out

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

This situation may need some explication, because it may sound to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be agreed that project managers and other professionals involved in major infrastructure provision ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in their work. It is even stated in the Project Management Institute (PMI)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006, pp. 4, 5) that project managers should ‘provide accurate information in a timely manner’ and they must ‘not engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others’. Economists, engineers, planners, and others involved in major infrastructure provision have similar codes of conduct. But there is a dark side to their work, which is remarkably underexplored in the literature (Flyvbjerg, 1996).¶ On the dark side, project managers and planners ‘lie with numbers’. as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. They are busy not with getting forecasts and business cases right and following the PMI Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for a project. ‘The most effective planner,’ says Wachs (1989, p. 477), ‘is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientiﬁc or technical rationality.’ Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to PMI’s ruling that project managers should ‘make decisions and take actions based on the best interests of society’ (PMI, 2006, p. 2).¶ Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate beneﬁts have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difﬁcult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).¶ In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances that would give managers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a focus on transparency and accountability is necessary.¶ As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability deﬁne liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with signiﬁcant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.

#### Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project-approval stage to present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with beneﬁts emphasized and costs and risks de-emphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local ofﬁcials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to beneﬁt from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of beneﬁts, costs, and risks. National bodies, such as certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003) and UK Department for Transport (2006). Wachs (1986, 1990) found similar results for transit planning in the USA. Taken together, the UK and US studies both account well for existing data on cost underestimation and beneﬁt overestimation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organizational pressure the underestimation of costs and overestimation of beneﬁts is caused by non-intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to secure approval and funding for their projects: underestimated costs + overestimated beneﬁts = funding Using this formula, and thus ‘showing the project at its best’ as one interviewee said above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e the survival of the unﬁttest. It is not the best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and beneﬁt overestimates, other things being equal. But the larger the cost underestimate on paper, the greater the cost overrun in practice. And the larger the overestimate of beneﬁts, the greater the beneﬁt shortfall. Therefore the projects that have been made to look best on paper in this manner become the worst, or unﬁttest, projects in reality, in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, and risks of non-viability. They have been designed like that, as disasters waiting to happen.

#### The counterplan solves by doing less than the plan – the only projects that will be built are those that can secure private sector capital. This increases accountability in infrastructure design and reduces overall costs

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In order to achieve accountability via competition and market control, the following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced by the relevant institutions. The decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the willingness of private ﬁnanciers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one-third of the total capital needs. 7 This should be required whether projects pass the market test or not—that is, whether projects are subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private lenders, shareholders, and stock-market analysts would produce their own forecasts or conduct due diligence for existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be added pressure to produce realistic forecasts and reduced risk to the taxpayer. Forecasters and their organizations must share ﬁnancial responsibility for covering cost overruns and beneﬁt shortfalls resulting from misrepresentation and bias in forecasting. The participation of risk capital would not mean that government reduces control of major infrastructure projects. On the contrary, it means that government can more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely as the ordinary citizen’s guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, environment, risk, and a proper use of public funds. Whether infrastructure projects are public, private, or public–private, they should be vested in one and only one project organization with a strong governance framework and strong contract-writing skills. The project organization may be a company or not, public or private, or a mixture. What is important is that this organization has the capacity to (i) set up and negotiate contracts that will effectively safeguard its interests, including in equity risk allocation, and (ii) enforce accountability vis-a-vis ` contractors, operators, etc. In turn, the directors of the organization must be held accountable for any cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, faulty designs, unmitigated risks, etc. that may occur during project planning, implementation, and operations. Experience with contract writing is a much-neglected topic, but is particularly important in developing and managing major infrastructure projects. This is because a fundamental asymmetry in experience with and resources allocated to contract writing often applies in the client– contractor relationship for such projects. Clients who decide to do major infrastructure—for instance, a city council deciding to build a new subway or toll road—do so relatively rarely, often only once, or never, in the lifetime of the individual city manager and council member. Learning is therefore impaired for clients, and if you do not know what your interests are, it is difﬁcult to safeguard them. Contractors, on the other hand, who bid for and build such projects, do so all the time. Contractors, therefore, typically know much more than clients about the ins and outs of projects and contracts, including the many risks and pitfalls that apply, plus which lawyers, bankers, and consultants to hire to safeguard their interests most effectively. This asymmetry has brought many a client to grief. A possible way to bring more symmetry into the client–contractor relationship would be for government to establish a central contract-writing unit at the state or national level, which would be in charge of negotiating, on behalf of local and other branches of government, the types of major contracts they do too infrequently to gain real experience. This would concentrate a larger number of contracts in one place, allowing experience—and the negotiating power that comes with it—to accumulate. Fortunately, better governance along the lines described above has recently become stronger around the world. The Enron scandal and its successors have triggered new legislation and a war on corporate deception that is spilling over into government with the same objective: to curb ﬁnancial waste and promote good governance. Although progress is slow, good governance is gaining a foothold also in major infrastructure project management. For example, in 2003 the Treasury of the United Kingdom required, for the ﬁrst time, that all ministries develop and implement procedures for major projects that will curb what the Treasury calls—with true British civility—’optimism bias’. Funding will be unavailable for projects that do not take into account this bias, and methods have been developed for how to do this (HM Treasury, 2003; Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004; UK Department for Transport, 2006). In the Netherlands in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Infrastructure Projects for the ﬁrst time conducted extensive public hearings to identify measures that will limit the misinformation about large infrastructure projects given to the Parliament, public, and media (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004). In Boston, the government has sued to recoup funds from contractor overcharges for the Big Dig related to cost overruns. More countries and cities are likely to follow the lead of the UK, the Netherlands, and Boston in coming years; Switzerland and Denmark are already doing so (Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts, 2006; Danish Ministry for Transport and Energy, 2006, 2008). Moreover, with private ﬁnance in major infrastructure projects on the rise over the past 15–20 years, capital funds and banks are increasingly gaining a say in the project development and management process. Private capital is no panacea for the ills in major infrastructure project management, to be sure (Hodge and Greve, 2009). But private investors place their own funds at risk, as opposed to governments who place the taxpayer’s money at risk. Capital funds and banks can therefore be observed not to automatically accept at face value the forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction. The false assumption that one forecast or one business case (which is also a forecast) may contain the truth about a project is problematized. Instead project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders have different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of objective science and engineering but of negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it is more truthful about our ability to predict the future and about the risks involved. If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infrastructures continued to implement, embed, and enforce such measures of accountability effectively, then the misrepresentation in cost, beneﬁt, and risk estimates, which is widespread today, might be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to continue, and the allocation of funds for major infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful, unethical, and sometimes even unlawful.

## Off

**Interpretation - Increase requires making an already existing thing greater**

**Buckley et al 06 -** attorney (Jeremiah, Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al,

<http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf>)

First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin-ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”).

Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

**Violation – the aff isn’t pre-existing**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They underlimit the topic – there’s hundreds of non-pre-existing affs in the literature, only we allow the neg to prepare case-specific strategies that go in-depth on each Plan**

## Off

#### The 1AC’s enframing of strategic and technical reason reifies an ontology and epistemology of violence—their technological worldview reduces all beings to standing-reserve and guarantees extinction

Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.

#### The judge should take on the role of the intellectual – vote negative to exchange the ontology of being for one of becoming—this free relationship to technology entails a questioning that can break free from technological thought and re-imagine the world from outside the political space

Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

## Off

#### F-35 being funded now– new budget proposals can derail

Jeremiah Gertler, February 16, 2012 [Specialist in Military Aviation, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf]

FY2012 defense authorization act: The report on the House-passed version of the FY2011¶ defense authorization bill included language limiting expenditure of funds for performance¶ improvements to the F-35 propulsion system unless development and production of such¶ propulsion system is done competitively. Other language required the Secretary of Defense to¶ preserve and store government-owned property acquired under the F136 propulsion system¶ development contract and allows the contractor to conduct research, development, test, and¶ evaluation of the F136 engine at the contractor’s expense. The Senate Armed Services Committee¶ report required that the fifth F-35 low-rate initial production contract lot be a fixed price contract,¶ and that the contractor assume full responsibility for costs under the contract above the target cost¶ specified in the contract. The Senate report also required DOD to implement the requirements of¶ the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 in the F-35 program. These provisions, less¶ the language regarding allowing the F136 contractor to continue development, and with a¶ required report on the status of F-35B development, were included in the final conference report.¶ FY2012 DOD appropriations bill: The House Appropriations Committee funded 19 F-35As, 6¶ F-35Bs, and 7 F-35Cs, as requested, while cutting $55 million from F-35C and $75 million from¶ F-35 research and development. The Senate Appropriations Committee funded 17 F-35As, 6 F-¶ 35Bs, and 6 F-35Cs. With cuts to R&D and advance procurement, the SAC mark funded $695¶ million less than the Administration request.

#### Short-term shift in defense budget causes serious disruptions in funding for Operation and Maintenance- this hallows out the military and destroys military superiority

Koehl, 10-31-‘8 (Stuart- Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, senior research fellow on US-European defense cooperation at the Center for Transatlantic Relations,, “The Unbearable Lightness of Barney; A Democratic congressman's irresponsible and impossible plan to cut the defense budget by 25 percent”, The Weekly Standard)

The first thing to know is the Defense budget is not a pot of money. In fact, it consists of several different pots of money, known as "accounts"; each fiscal year (which runs from October 1 to September 30), the president submits a budget to Congress that indicates how much money is needed in each account, and Congress appropriates that money and authorizes the Defense Department to spend it. Money can be moved from one pot to another during the fiscal year to respond to emergencies, but this causes serious disruption throughout the military, since each service has planned how it will spend its money. It's robbing Peter to pay Paul, and it's best to avoid it, if possible. The four main accounts are Military Personnel (MILPERS); Procurement (PROC); Research and Development (R&D); and Operations & Maintenance (O&M). MILPERS includes all funds used to pay the troops, provide subsistence for their dependents, their pensions and retirement pay, and their medical expenses (housing is paid out of a separate but relatively small account). Procurement is money spent to buy equipment--everything from rifles to aircraft carriers, including money spent to upgrade existing weapon systems. R&D is money spent to develop the next generation of weapon systems, to ensure that the U.S. maintains a technological edge over our adversaries. Finally, O&M is the money used for training, to buy fuel and food and other consumables, to fix broken equipment, and to sustain forces in the field. O&M is by far the largest account, mainly because the country is at war, and wartime operations are expensive. In Fiscal Year 2008, the total defense budget (including $141 billion in supplemental appropriations to pay for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan) came to $624 billion. Of that, some $165 billion (26 percent) went to O&M in the "baseline" appropriation. But about two-thirds of the $141 billion "supplemental" appropriation was also directed to O&M. So the total O&M account comes to $258 billion (41 percent). If we exclude supplementals from the calculations and use only the baseline submission, then O&M accounts for 35 percent of the budget. MILPERS is the next largest account, at $119 billion. About 15 percent of the supplemental goes to MILPERS, for a total of $140 billion (23 percent of total DoD expenditures). Again, if we only consider the baseline request, MILPERS accounts for 25 percent of the budget. Procurement includes $102 billion in the baseline submission, plus about 19 percent of the supplemental, for a total of $129 billion, or 21 percent of total DoD expenditures; using just the baseline submission, it accounts for 22 percent of the budget. Almost all of the $75 billion allocated to R&D is paid out of the baseline submission (16 percent); if we include the supplemental, this falls to just 12 percent. Now that we know where the money is going, we can try to meet Barney Frank's goal of cutting 25 percent from the budget. The easiest thing to do would be eliminating all supplemental appropriations for the war--assuming that somehow one could instantly end the war and return all our troops to the U.S. But reality interferes with this fantasy: the war is not going to end overnight, and even a total U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would not substantially reduce the tempo of operations and the need for supplementals. Following candidate Obama's policy (to the extent that one can nail Jell-O to the wall), one might expect that any savings in Iraq would be diverted to Afghanistan, where, even if the number of troops is lower, the cost of sustaining them in the field is much higher. At best, we might see supplementals to support the war fall to half their present level, or about $70 billion, an 11 percent saving. We now have to find the remaining 16 percent. Let's agree from the outset that MILPERS cannot be reduced. The troops need to be paid (they get fussy if they are not), their expenses have to be met. The Democrats are on record as supporting both an increase in the number of troops and improvements in their quality of life, so this actually requires an increase in MILPERS, perhaps to as much as $130 billion--which puts back 2 percent from the 11 percent we just saved off the supplemental, requiring us to find cuts worth 18 percent from the Procurement, R&D and O&M accounts. O&M is by far the largest account, so surely we can find something to cut there. But most of the cuts we took from the supplemental already come from O&M, and, as we noted, the tempo of operations will remain high, even if we pull out of Iraq. So we will have to keep spending about the same on O&M as we are today, unless we intend to cut back on training and maintenance, which would put the lives of troops at risk and create the kind of "hollow" forces we saw in the late 1970s and almost saw again in the mid-1990s. So we aren't going to be able to cut O&M.

#### F-35s key to hegemony—cutting them would kill the aerospace industry and alliances

Donnelly, 2011 **- director of the Center for Defense Studies** [7/18/11Thomas, The Weekly Standard, “An Extremely Immodest Proposal,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/extremely-immodest-proposal\_576967.html?, accessed 7/24/)

No doubt the legal and monetary obligations would be great, but the strategic, operational, and defense industrial consequences of terminating the F-35 program would be catastrophic. To begin with, the F-35 is a multinational program. To kill it would not only yank the rug out from under America’s closest friends and allies – long-time partners like Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, for example – but destroy the prospects for closer partnerships in the Middle East and, particularly, the Asia-Pacific, where Japan, Korea and Singapore are likely F-35 customers. And it would forestall the opportunity to share a common fifth-generation aircraft with others like India, which could only turn to Russia or try to develop such an aircraft on its own. Terminating the F-35 would be the clearest signal one can imagine, even beyond retreat from Iraq or Afghanistan, that the United States no longer will assume the burdens of international security. Terminating the F-35, or simply terminating the F-35B short take off vertical landing (or STOVL), would be fatal for the Marine Corps as a serious war fighting service. The modernization of the Marines is already at risk; the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport turned out to be more difficult and more expensive than anticipated, and last year the Obama administration cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, which would have given the Marines both enhanced amphibious assault capability but, even more important, more firepower and mobility ashore. The Marines’ AV-8B Harriers – a development of the original British jump jet – are at the end of their service life, and the Marines’ F-18s cannot operate from Marine amphibious assault ships. And there’s hardly reason to have the big-deck amphibs without the F-35B. Conversely, operating a fifth-generation aircraft would give the Marine Corps a new viability in small-scale contingencies – think Libya – and allow them to contribute to more challenging “anti-access, area-denial” contingencies in East Asia or in an Iran-type operation. Similar challenges face the Navy; without a fifth-generation aircraft, its own aircraft carriers are increasingly irrelevant to high-end strike campaigns. Ending the F-35 program would also eviscerate what remains of the American military aviation industry. Only two companies in the world have prime contractor experience in building manned “stealth” aircraft, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Northrop’s B-2 bomber, designed in the late 1970s, was last bought in 1997; only 21 of a planned 132 bombers. Northrop is no longer in that business. Lockheed built the F-117 Nighthawk, the first stealth fighter, another 1970s design and also long out of production. Lockheed also builds the F-22 Raptor, but that program was ended (with just 187 of a planned 750 aircraft produced) two years ago and the last F-22 will soon roll off the line. The F-35 line itself was sized (and the workforce planned) to build up to several hundred planes a year; under current plans, it’s not going to reach maximum efficiency. Indeed, the company may have to lay off workers. There’s no other place for the designers, engineers, or management to go; the investment, knowledge, and production experience to make stealthy, manned combat aircraft will rapidly disappear.

#### Biggest Impact- Solves all conflict

Lowther, PhD, military defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Fall 10 (Adam, “Air Diplomacy Protecting American National Interests” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/fall/lowther.pdf)

Air diplomacy is likely to become more important because of the speed, flexibility, and limited footprint of airpower. The US Army’s dominance in military decision making during America’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past decade has left the nation focused on the use of hard power. The ground-centric nature of these two conflicts provided the leverage needed by the Army to reassert itself after a long period of perceived subservience to the Air Force. As the president looks for an alternative to current strategy, air diplomacy will seem an attractive choice. Simply stated, air diplomacy is an effective way of defending vital national interests, building necessary partnerships, preventing conflict, and expanding American influence without creating the anti-American sentiment that often accompanies thousands of boots on the ground. Practicing air diplomacy deliberately and coherently has greater potential to effectively leverage the capabilities of the Air Force in the interests of the nation than the current approach. One obvious point argues against further development of air diplomacy as an Air Force capability, however—the contention that it does not fall within the service’s core mission. On the contrary, air diplomacy is a more complete conceptualization of “building partnerships,” currently one of 12 Air Force core functions. As currently understood, building partner ships fails to encompass many Air Force missions that would fall within air diplomacy. Every service builds partnerships, but only the Air Force conducts air diplomacy. Although the Air Force prepares—in peacetime—to fight the nation’s wars, preventing war is equally desirable. Air diplomacy is a primary contributor to that mission.

## Off

#### Obama winning- best models predict- prefer it to polls

Nate Silver, 9-18-2012 <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/sept-17-electoral-college-may-not-help-obama/>

The FiveThirtyEight presidential forecast for Monday was essentially unchanged, with President Obama having a 74.8 percent chance of winning another term. Taken on the whole, Monday’s data was consistent with the current “story” the forecast model is telling about the race, which is that Mr. Obama’s polls have declined slightly from their post-convention highs, but are also still slightly better than his preconvention polls. If you look hard enough, of course, you can find polls where Mr. Obama’s convention bounce has evaporated completely — or others in which it hasn’t declined at all. But the forecast model, whatever its strengths or weaknesses, is pretty good at determining what the consensus of the data says at any given time.

#### Independent voters are key to the election- new spending kills support for Obama causing them to vote republican

Douglas Schoen, pollster for President Clinton, 2-8-2012, The Forgotten Swing Voter, Politico, p. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=7ED8592F-2122-4A55-AA3B-C5460134BE4A>

Neither party focuses on issues that matter most to people: reviving the economy, promoting job creation, balancing the budget, reducing debt and taking on entitlements. Both Republicans and Democrats are virtually ignoring the concerns of swing voters, now close to 20 percent of the electorate, and independents, now at least 40 percent of the electorate and, according to Gallup, the single largest voting bloc.¶ These two groups share similar interests. And both give Republican and Democratic leaders net negative ratings.¶ Independents disapprove of how Obama is doing his job, 52 percent to 37 percent, according to a recent New York Times/CBS poll. Just 31 percent had a favorable opinion of Obama, with two-thirds saying he has not made progress fixing the economy. Six in 10 independents say Obama does not share their priorities for the country.¶ The president’s improved standing in the recent Washington Post poll has probably been overstated and has more to do with Romney’s weakness than with some dramatic turnaround in Obama’s own numbers. A majority of independents still disapprove of his job performance and a clear majority of the electorate disapproves of his handling of the economy, his performance in creating jobs and his efforts to balance the budget.¶ Independents have similar negative impressions of leading GOP presidential candidates Romney and Gingrich, according to a recent Washington Post poll. Independents look unfavorably on Romney, 51 percent to 23 percent, and have an unfavorable impression of Gingrich, 53 percent to 23 percent.¶ Another ominous sign for Romney, still the presumed nominee, is that voter turnout decreased about 15 percent in Florida’s primary from four years ago, and almost 40 percent of the voters said they were not satisfied with the current field.¶ It’s crucial the GOP candidates address these voter concerns. A recent national survey I conducted sheds light on who the swing voters are and what they want from government — which meshes closely with the independents’ policy preferences.¶ I isolated swing voters by looking at those voters who supported Bill Clinton in an imaginary trial heat against Romney but didn’t support Obama in a trial heat against Romney. This came to 15 percent of the electorate.¶ In a two-way race for president between Clinton and Romney, an overwhelming majority prefers Clinton, 60 percent to 24 percent. Meanwhile, between Obama and Romney, voters split almost evenly — with Obama at 45 percent and Romney at 43 percent.¶ A detailed assessment of swing voters shows that they are not liberal Democrats. Over three-quarters (76 percent) are moderates or conservatives, and close to two-thirds (65 percent) are Republicans or independents. Slightly less than half (49 percent) are Southerners.¶ This data underscore the voters’ desire for politicians who advocate for bipartisanship and coalition-building in a polarized country. The substantial degree of support for Clinton versus Romney shows that the more bipartisan, centrist and fiscally conservative the appeal, the broader the support.¶ A Third Way survey conducted after the midterms supports my findings. Sixty percent of voters who supported Obama in 2008, but voted Republican in 2010, feel that Obama is too liberal. About 66 percent say that Obama and the Democrats in Congress tried to have government do too much.¶ A USA Today/Gallup Poll released late last year also shows that the electorate believes Obama is too far left ideologically. Americans were asked to rate their own ideology as well as that of the major presidential candidates on a 5-point scale. Most rated themselves at 3.3 (slightly right of center), and Obama at 2.3 (left of center) — further away than all other major presidential candidates. A majority of Americans, 57 percent, see Obama as liberal, while only 23 percent see him as moderate.¶ Indeed, recent polling shows that independents want to rein in the size and scope of government. Gallup reports that 64 percent of independents say Big Government is the biggest threat to the country. Which may be one reason for Santorum’s growing support. Three-quarters are dissatisfied with the size and power of the federal government, while just 24 percent are satisfied.¶ Other polling shows that these voters want policies that emphasize economic growth and budget reduction. In the wake of the crippling economic downturn, 82 percent believe it is extremely or very important to expand the economy, according to recent Gallup polling. Seventy percent say the federal budget deficit should be cut by a combination of spending cuts and modest tax increases — with many polls showing these voters feel spending cuts are key.¶ Independents do not support more government spending. My polling last year shows independents believe government should refrain from spending money to stimulate the economy, given the large deficit we face, 62 percent to 24 percent.¶ Independents, according to Gallup, are looking for government to expand the economy (82 percent), and promote equality of opportunity (69 percent). They are not looking for government to promote equality of outcome, since just 43 percent say they want to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. By 50 percent to 47 percent, they say the divide between the rich and the poor is an acceptable part of the economic system.¶ So it’s clear what these voters are looking for, and also that neither party is addressing their concerns. To be sure, independent voters want conciliation and compromise. Some are more conservative and market-oriented. Others are ready to accept government stimulus spending for our economic recovery. But all share the desire for economic growth, job creation and a path to fiscal stability.¶ The two parties cannot continue to ignore swing voters. Without them, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to win in November. Moreover, to win without addressing their concerns will almost certainly promise four more years of the same gridlock.

#### Vote could still shift – recent Obama clip about redistribution proves

Adler, 9/19 – Blogger at the Nation

(Ben, the Nation, “Conservative Media Try to Save Romney's Campaign,” <http://www.thenation.com/blogs/ben-adler>, 9/19./2012)

Mitt Romney sure is lucky that major media outlets exist to serve his interests. After a video came out on Monday afternoon in which Romney denigrates the nearly half the country that did not pay federal income taxes last year as irresponsible and entitled, it seemed he was in quite a political pickle. The comments were unlikely to endear him to swing voters who perceive Romney as an out-of-touch elitist. But since Romney got the idea that 47 percent of the country are lazy Democratic moochers from movement conservatives, he could not repudiate his own remarks. At first, Fox News had no idea how to respond. They simply ignored the story, even as it dominated coverage on other networks, all through their primetime lineup on Monday. Finally, when Romney gave a press conference after 10 pm, in which he admitted to having made poor word choices but not a substantive error, they showed it. On Tuesday, the Fox Business network hosted Romney for a softball interview with Neil Cavuto. Fox was determined to avoid covering the story except to help Romney burnish his self-defense. Alas, Romney himself did not have much of a defense, other than to say that he had simply been acknowledging that he will not win a landslide victory. But then, Providence struck. On Tuesday afternoon the Drudge Report released an audio recording from 1998 in which Barack Obama says, “I actually believe in redistribution.” Drudge splashed the phrase in a banner headline across his front page as if it were earth shattering news. Since then, according to Huffington Post media reporter Michael Calderone, Fox has played the audio clip twenty-two times. The Romney campaign immediately seized on the clip as a way of shifting their defense of Romney’s unappealing rhetoric into more friendly terrain. Speaking to Cavuto, Romney said: There is a tape that just came out today where the president is saying he likes redistribution. I disagree. I think a society based upon a government-centered nation where government plays a larger and larger role, redistributes money, that’s the wrong course for America…. The right course for America is to create growth, create wealth, not to redistribute wealth. Romney’s campaign sent out the quote as part of a press release. They followed up shortly with another press release that lists their usual litany of depressing economic indicators as proof that “Obama’s redistribution plan…didn’t work.” What is missing is any proof, besides a fourteen-year-old quote, that Obama actually pursued a redistribution plan once in office. By Wednesday, the Romney campaign had regained its footing. Reporters were being inundated with statements using the redistribution quote as a hook for all their usual talking points. For example, they released a statement headlined, “Obama’s Redistribution Didn’t Work For Small Businesses.” “Mitt Romney understands that opportunity and free enterprise create jobs and grow our nation’s small businesses—not government redistribution,” said Romney campaign spokesperson Andrea Saul. The campaign also worked the phrase into their stump speeches. Paul Ryan told a Virginia audience that, Obama is “going to try and distract and divide this country to win by default.” Then he asserted: President Obama said that he believes in redistribution. Mitt Romney and I are not running to redistribute the wealth. Mitt Romney and I are running to help Americans create wealth. Efforts that promote hard work and personal responsibility over government dependency are what have made this economy the envy of the world. As Slates Dave Weigel points out, it is ridiculous to blame Obama for distracting and dividing the country, and then attack Obama for something he said fourteen years ago. Conservative pundits, though, are cheering on the Romney/Ryan campaign’s silliness. After Romney’s appearance on Cavuto, Fox panelist and Weekly Standard writer Stephen Hayes said of the attack on Obama’s quote, “[It’s] good, [he should] make the argument. Going back to 1998 shows the president has believed this for a long time.” That’s a specious argument. If you go back to 1998 and look at anything Mitt Romney said, it may be diametrically opposed to what he believes today. Generally, the older the quote, the less relevant it is. Certainly that’s the standard Hayes would use if it were Romney who long ago said something Hayes considers damaging.

#### Obama key to global climate change – only way to solve

Leber 12 - Think Progress research assistant

(Rebecca, Think Progress, “Report: Future of Global Climate Deal Dependent On 2012 Election,” <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/05/398600/report-future-of-global-climate-deal-dependent-on-2012-election/>, 1/5/2012)

World leaders struck a deal last month during the Durban United Nations conference that sets a path to a global climate deal by 2015 — a precarious agreement including major developing countries like China and India. However, a report by the research branch of the HSBC bank predicts a deal would be trashed if President Obama is not reelected. With climate denial and opposition to emissions limits rampant in the GOP field, HSBC finds a global deal would be “almost impossible” if a Republican wins the White House: [The] prospects for a new global climate deal in 2015 depend considerably on the election of a pro-climate action president. The election of a President opposed to climate action will not only damage growth prospects for low-carbon solutions in the USA itself, but will make the hard task of negotiating a new global agreement by 2015 almost impossible. If Obama is re-elected with support in both houses, we expect modest measures to introduce a federal clean energy standard for electricity; a stripped down cap and trade programme could re-emerge building on the regional scheme on the West and East coasts. Though some GOP contenders haven’t always positioned themselves as climate zombies, everyone from Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, to Jon Huntsman have doubted climate change science leading up to the primaries. Frontrunner Romney opposes carbon emissions limits and a cap and trade program, despite having supported pollution limits as Massachussets governor. Of course, the future of energy policy also hinges on political developments worldwide. The report also notes that elections worldwide, particularly France, will be an “important test of the resilience of pro-nuclear policies” in a post-Fukushima world.

#### Warming is the only existential threat – causes extinction

Deibel, 7 - professor of IR at National War College

(Terry, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2, 2007)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to get the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

## Case

**History proves – prolif is slow and solves conflict through mutual deterrence**

**Bennett, 05** – Staff Writer for the Boston Globe (Drake, "Give nukes a chance", Boston Globe, March 20th 2005, July 14th 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give\_nukes\_a\_chance?pg=full, KONTOPOULOS)

KENNETH N. WALTZ, adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, doesn't like the phrase ''nuclear proliferation.'' ''The term proliferation' is a great misnomer,'' he said in a recent interview. ''It refers to things that spread like wildfire. But we've had nuclear military capabilities extant in the world for 50 years and now, even counting North Korea, we only have nine nuclear countries.'' Strictly speaking, then, Waltz is as against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the next sane human being. After all, he argues, “most countries don't need them.” But the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons by those few countries that see fit to pursue them, that he's for. As he sees it, nuclear weapons prevent wars. ''The only thing a country can do with nuclear weapons is use them for a deterrent,'' Waltz told me. ''And that makes for internal stability, that makes for peace, and that makes for cautious behavior.'' Especially in a unipolar world, argues Waltz, the possession of nuclear deterrents by smaller nations can check the disruptive ambitions of a reckless superpower. As a result, in words Waltz wrote 10 years ago and has been reiterating ever since, ''The gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”

**Even if wars still happen, prolif solves escalation – history proves**

**Sechser, 08** – Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Todd S., "Nuclear Weapons", University of Virginia, December 30th 2008, July 14th 2010, p. 4-5, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

What about conflicts which, despite the shadow of nuclear weapons, nevertheless occur? Proliferation optimists argue that **even if** nuclear-armed states fight one another, their wars will not be intense: leaders will prevent such conflicts from escalating to avoid the risk that nuclear weapons might be used. As Waltz writes, “Everyone knows that if force gets out of hand all the parties to a conflict face catastrophe. With conventional weapons, the crystal ball is clouded. With nuclear weapons, it is **perfectly clear**” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 114). This reasoning was borne out clearly by the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan—the only war ever to occur between two nuclear states. The episode is instructive because the war entailed far **fewer causalities than any of the prior wars** between India and Pakistan (see table 1), owing in part to the restraint of the Indian military in expelling Pakistani insurgents from the Kargil region. The Indian military could have reduced its own losses and ended the war more quickly by attacking critical communication and supply lines in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, yet because crossing into Pakistani territory might have widened the war and **risked provoking a Pakistani nuclear threat**, Indian leaders instead opted for caution. It is not hard to find other military crises in which the risk of nuclear escalation induced restraint. In March 1969, Chinese forces ambushed Russian troops along the Ussuri River in northwest China, prompting a Soviet counterattack. But one important reason we do not read about the catastrophic Sino- Soviet War of 1969 is that a Soviet threat to launch preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear targets induced Chinese leaders to de-escalate the crisis. Despite having initiated the challenge, China backed down rather than risk letting events get out of hand. The Soviet Union, of course, had itself recently backed down from a crisis it precipitated when Nikita Khrushchev agreed in 1962 to remove Soviet missile bases from Cuba rather than risk a potentially nuclear conflict with the United States. These examples make clear that nuclear weapons cannot prevent all conflicts: indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Ussuri River crisis, and the Kargil War all came about because one nuclear power was bold enough to challenge another. But in a world without nuclear weapons, these clashes might have escalated to **large-scale conventional wars**. Instead, in each case the shadow of nuclear weapons helped to cool tempers and contain the crisis: retaliation remained limited, escalatory options were rejected, and eventually the challenger backed down.

#### Iranian proliferation prevents Iran-Israeli war

#### Madson 06

[Peter N. Madson, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Master’s degree in National Security Affairs, 3-6, “The Sky is Not Falling: Regional Reaction to a Nuclear Armed Iran,” http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA445779]

It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty what will happen in the future; however, based upon historical actions, statements by national leaders, and likely alternatives, it is possible to eliminate unlikely options. According to this chapter, Israel’s response to a nuclear-armed Iran will likely be a behind-the-scenes agreement of mutual deterrence. Animus shared since the 1979 Islamic Revolution is not relevant to the situation. Both will realize the potential of their destruction, if one attacks the other. Following a careful study of the debate in Israel, military strikes, either by air or special operations, are mitigated through Tehran’s dispersal of production and likely storage facilities. An increased security understanding with the United States, though useful, still places the security of Israel in the hands of an outsider. The understanding between Israel and Iran will add to the overall stability in the region by removing one aspect of uncertainty that causes instability: the violent rhetoric and threats of attack between Jerusalem and Tehran. Over time, this tie may lead to the removal of concerns in Israel over Hezbollah and concerns in Iran over the Palestinians. In the end, this may produce greater understanding between the two, instilling greater economic prosperity for Iran and Israel while also enhancing the economic and security interests of the United States. This outcome is predicted by Nuclear Optimists who feel more nuclear states may be better for global security. When Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will be normal for Israel to be concerned; however, the stability that comes from a deterrent relationship will far outweigh secondary issues. Instead, both states will be able to focus upon other matters, having gained greater security.

**prefer our ev – proliferation pessimists give in to nuclear phobia and fail to make rational, calculated assessments**

**Tepperman, 09** -- Former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, Assistant Managing Editor at Newsweek (Jonathon, "Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb", Newsweek, August 29th 2009, July 14th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html, KONTOPOULOS)

Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a **nuclear phobia**, an **irrational fear** that's grounded in good evidence—nuclear weapons are terrifying—but that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad—conventional war—won't happen. This may well be a **rational bet** to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public.

**Weaponzation and ASAT attack won’t happen**

**Mueller, 6 (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the opening sentence “Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal” is a statement the author is attempting to refute.**

2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal. This is a political matter: it’s consequently true only if people believe it • Like it or not, the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we don’t know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, “Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it.” I would liken them to the people who on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, “We shouldn’t have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesn’t start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000.” That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant because this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, it’s up to you. There is a norm of space sanctuary that exists and that is largely because of the behavior of the United States over the last forty or fifty years. The United States could take steps to convince people that the millennium was actually in 2001 instead of 2000 or convince people that it already had weaponized space or convince people that GPS is a weapons system. However, there are a number of reasons why we haven’t done that to this point and why we might not want to do that in the future. I don’t want to suggest that because everybody thinks it is so means that it is immutably the case, but for the time being, space weaponization would be a big deal. So it is something that needs to be ad-dressed in political terms as well as technological terms.

**Their inside Pentagon evidence says drones will be done at least by 2018 and they’re inevitable because they want to use them, the Plan isn’t key**

**No oil war**

**Eland 11** 12/21, \*Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, “No War for Oil: US Dependency and the Middle East,” http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2011/12/20/no-war-for-oil-us-dependency-and-the-middle-east/, AJ

The one prominent issue that both American political parties can seemingly agree on is that the U.S. should be less dependent on foreign oil. And Santa Claus has apparently listened and granted their wish. The United States is in the midst of a mini-oil boom, which has reversed, at least temporarily, the country’s increasing dependence on foreign sources of oil. Oil extracted from shale deposits in North Dakota, Montana, and Texas has reversed years of decreasing American oil production, **leading to increased domestic extraction and thus reducing dependence on overseas oil from 60 percent** of U.S. consumption in 2005 to a little less than half now. Add to this the exports from Canada of oil from tar sands for refining in U.S. refineries (some of which will come through the future Keystone pipeline), and the United States will be, for the first time since 1949, a net exporter of petroleum products, such as jet fuel, gasoline, diesel fuel, and heating oil. Shouldn’t the two parties pat themselves on the back? After all, under their stewardship, aren’t we reducing dependence on the terrorist nations and dictatorships of the Persian Gulf? Not really. Dependence on foreign oil is not the problem that conventional wisdom makes it out to be. As a corollary, all the wars we have fought over oil — for example, two with Iraq and the threat of such with Iran — have been largely unnecessary and immensely expensive. Of the less than half of U.S. petroleum consumed that is imported, about half of that comes from the Western Hemisphere. **Only about 18 percent of imports originate from the Persian Gulf**. But it would not matter much if the United States produced 100 percent of what it consumed or whether it all came from the Persian Gulf, because the price at the pump is determined by the worldwide oil market. If more oil is put on market from anywhere around the globe, the price will go down; similarly, if oil production is cut anywhere in the world and not offset by increases elsewhere, the price will go up. Thus, this American mini-boom will not likely make much of a difference in what the U.S. consumer pays for gasoline, diesel fuel, or heating oil. But at least we don’t have to buy as much oil or petroleum products from Persian Gulf autocracies or terrorist-sponsoring nations, right? Maybe so, but it doesn’t reduce our imports from those nations that much. Also, if the United States is now a net exporter of petroleum products, shouldn’t we stanch this flow and buy from the Persian Gulf even less? No. Even if nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia didn’t sell to the United States (come to think of it, the U.S. hasn’t bought oil from Iran in decades), **they would simply sell to other**, more than willing buyers. The rapidly growing countries in the developing world — such as China and India — care a lot less about the political nature of the countries supplying their oil than do the United States and Europe. So embargoes, boycotts, and efforts at becoming oil-independent have little effect. Supplies just reorder around obstacles in the world market. But didn’t world oil production peak in 2006, as the International Energy Agency concluded probably occurred? Doesn’t this condemn the world to fighting more future wars over dwindling petroleum resources? No. First of all, “**experts” have been repeatedly predicting the depletion of the world’s oil reserves since the late 1800s, but it never seems to happen**. New technologies and periodic higher prices make previously uneconomic deposits viable — such as the tar sands and shale oil that have recently become economic — thus sustaining world production. Second, academic research has indicated that conflicts are much more likely over allocation of money received from abundant natural resources (for example, fighting in Nigeria over who gets proceeds from oil exports) than conflict over scarce resources that can be priced in a market. That is, **it is cheaper to pay the market price than to go to war**. So if that is true — and it has been true since the classical economists discovered in the late 1700s that empire didn’t pay — then why has the U.S. military, over the years, essentially become an oil-protection force? Could it be that the U.S. is not aggressively employing military power to ensure that it has oil supplies — as the Imperial Japanese did before and during World War II — but is instead using the threat of armed force to keep a thumb on the oil lifelines of other nations (for example, China)?

**No impact to space attack - the US only needs 4 to have full GPS capabilities and redundancy means an attack would leave some standing**

**Forden, 7 – writer for Arms Control Today (Geoffrey, “After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons. Arms Control Today, April 2007,** [**http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_04/Forden**](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden)**)**

On the other hand, an attacker would have to destroy a considerable number of satellites in order to have an immediate effect on military operations. There are on average about 10 GPS satellites visible at any given time and point on the Earth's surface even though a high positional accuracy requires only six. An attacker would have to destroy at least six satellites to affect precision-guided munitions even momentarily because other GPS satellites would soon appear as their orbits took them into view. A country would need to disable nearly one-half of the United States' 24 NAVSTAR/GPS satellites currently in orbit to eliminate the ability to employ precision-guided munitions for more than a few hours each day.[[9](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Forden.asp#Note9)] Likewise, the United States has a number of alternatives for communications satellites in the short term. Other space assets, such as weather and mapping satellites, although important in the long term, are not as time critical.

**1. Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons**

**Waltz, 03** (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

**Carrier-based deterrence solves their aff**

**Admiral Johnson and General Krulak 97** (Jay is the Chief of Naval Operations and Charles is the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, “Forward Presence is Essential to American Interests”, <http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/navy/fwdpresn.htm>)

Also this morning, United States Navy amphibious assault ships carrying 4,400 combat-ready American Marines are forward deployed in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. And at sea in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf are aircraft carrier battle groups with 16,000 Sailors and two air wings of combat ready aircraft. And finally, in the Far East, the United States has permanently deployed a third aircraft carrier battle group and a third amphibious ready group. The vigilant "forward presence" of these forces is vital, but not always as visible to Americans as it is to the rest of the world. Their routine daily efforts don't always make the headlines, but they are vitally important to world peace and stability. Some argue that the forward presence these forces represent is no longer necessary. They argue that forces reacting from the United States are enough to maintain international stability. They further maintain that "brushfires," or outbreaks of regional instability, are insignificant, or incidental at best. And they argue that America can no longer afford the forward presence of these forces on what amounts to a near continuous basis. We would argue just the opposite. Forward deployed U.S. forces, primarily naval expeditionary forces — the Navy-Marine Corps team — are vital to regional stability and to keeping these crises from escalating into full-scale wars. To those who argue that the United States can't afford to have this degree of vigilance anymore, we say: The United States can't afford not to. These brushfires, whether the result of long-standing ethnic tensions or resurgent nationalism in the wake of the Cold War will only continue. The Cold War was an anomaly. Never again will we live in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. We have, in some respects, reverted back to the world our ancestors knew: A world in disorder. Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq and the Taiwan Straits are merely examples of the types of continuing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos. The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to the United States', and the world's, vital interests. And while the skies are not dark with smoke from these brushfires, today's world demands a new approach. The concepts of choice must be selective and committed engagement, unencumbered global operations and prompt crisis resolution. There is no better way to maintain and enforce these concepts than with the forward presence of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team. There are four basic tenets to international security in today's world; prevention, deterrence, crisis resolution and war termination. The underlying assumption of these tenets is that the U.S. and its allies should not be forced into winning a war in an overwhelming (and expensive) fashion. Instead, it is much better — and cheaper — to resolve a crisis before it burns out of control. \* Prevent: The key to prevention is continuous presence in a region. This lets our friends know we have an interest and lets potential foes know that we're there to check any move. Both effects occur without any direct action taken. Although hard to measure, the psychological impact of naval expeditionary forces is undeniable. This regional presence underwrites political and economic stability. This is forward presence. \* Deter: Presence does not prevent every crisis. Some rogues are going to be tempted to strike no matter what the odds, and will require active measures to be deterred. When crises reach this threshold, there is no substitute for sustained actual presence. Naval expeditionary forces can quickly take on the role of the very visible fist. Friends and potential enemies recognize naval expeditionary forces as capable of defending or destroying. This visible fist, free from diplomatic and territorial constraints, forms the bedrock of regional deterrence. For example, the mere presence of naval expeditionary forces deterred Chinese attempts to derail the democratic process in Taiwan and countered Iraqi saber-rattling toward Jordan. It's hard to quantify the cost savings of deterring a crisis before it requires our intervention. But the savings are real — in dollars, and often in blood and human misery. This is forward presence. \* Resolve: If a crisis can be neither prevented nor deterred, then prompt and decisive crisis resolution is imperative before the crisis threatens vital interests. U.S. Naval expeditionary forces are a transoceanic key that finds and opens — forcibly if necessary — any gateway into a fiery world. This ability is equally expandable and retractable according to the situation. Perhaps most importantly, naval expeditionary forces don't need permission from foreign governments to be on scene and take unilateral action in a crisis. This both unencumbers the force and takes the pressure off allies to host any outside forces. Over the past two years, for example, U.S. naval expeditionary forces simultaneously and unilaterally deployed to Liberia and to the Central African Republic (1,500 miles inland) to protect U.S. and international citizens. They also launched measured retaliatory Tomahawk strikes to constrain unacceptable Iraqi behavior, and conducted naval air and Tomahawk strikes which brought the warring parties in Bosnia to the negotiating table. This is forward presence. \* Terminate: Each of the above tenets is worthy of the United States paying an annual peace insurance premium. Otherwise we, and our allies, risk paying the emotional, physical and financial costs of a full-blown conflagration that began as just another brushfire. If there is a war, naval expeditionary forces will be first to fight. They are inherently capable of enabling the follow-on forces from the United States for as long as it takes. And they will remain on-scene to enforce the settlement that ends the conflict. This is forward presence. The Iraqis, Central Africas, Somalias and Bosnias inevitably destabilize and erode world order and respect for the rule of law. Indeed, a failure to respond to them encourages future — more serious — crises. The United States must foster stability around the world, today and tomorrow. The peace insurance premium is a small price and is the cost of leadership. Who else is capable of this type of forward presence on a global basis? For the United States, maintaining a steady commitment to stability will be a challenge. But maintain it we must, or the price, literally and figuratively, will be much greater down the road. The example of fighting forest fires is precisely applicable. The philosophy is simple: Prevention through living in the environment; deterrence through vigilance; and resolution through quick and selective engagement. Ninety-five percent of all forest fires are contained — the direct result of the watchful presence of the local initial attack crews who attack flashpoints. As for the other five percent, once the window of opportunity for decisive early action is missed, firefighters must be brought in from outside the region, and it is exponentially more expensive. Sometimes there are casualties — casualties that would not have been incurred had the fire been contained before it had the opportunity to flare. America's Navy-Marine Corps team is underway, ready and on-scene at trouble spots around the world. Forward presence makes it — and will keep it — the right force, tailor-made for these uncertain and sometimes fiery times.

**2. No risk of nuclear terrorism—can’t get material, can’t make the bomb, and can’t bring it into the US**

**Chapman, 08** (Steve, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the\_implausibility\_of\_nuclear.html)

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother.