# 2NC

### Framework

#### Ontology shapes our responses to ethics and politics – demands prioritization

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Prof of Politics @ University of Lancaster, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, p. 98)

In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

#### And – it’s a pre-requisite to effective policymaking

Cheeseman and Bruce 96 – Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce Assoc. Prof in social sciences @ Curtin univ, ‘96 (Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternativepolicies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow**.** As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### First – Produces WORSE policy making

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Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding – a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion. Furthermore, those funding ‘policy-relevant’ research already have predefined notions of what is ‘relevant’. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order. Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested à la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix. In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more ‘liberal’ credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nye’s work spans from After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheer-leading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administration’s ‘imperial ambition’ on the pragmatic grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led ‘liberal’ order. These scholars’ commitment to the continued ‘benign’ dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day ‘prince’; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd. At stake here is the fundamental distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problemsolvers, since policies seek precisely to – well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy. Indeed, the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders, corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1 Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very ‘policy relevant’ by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only ‘critical’ but also potentially ‘problem-solving’, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we consider the horrors that entails. At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their ‘research outputs’. They suggested a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital. There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics. ‘Policy relevance’, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as ‘irrelevant’, so the key question, as always, is ‘relevant to whom?’ Relevance to one’s research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be ‘policy-relevant’, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. (p. 127-30)

#### Fear of weakness results in endless cycles of antagonistic violence

Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2003, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World, pg 174-178

The world's only superpower is haunted by a fear of weakness. From psychiatric experience with individuals, we know that underneath expressions of megalomania and claims to omnipotence there tend to be profound feel­ings of powerlessness and emptiness. Feelings on that order may affect our leaders' projections of world control. These could take the form of fear of the political frag­mentation of our society, with accompanying death anx­iety related not just to 9/11 but to the potential collapse of the superpower entity itself. Underneath our leaders' arrogant certainties concerning the world, there may lie profound doubts about our own social and national inte­gration, about America's control of itself. Fear of being out of control can lead to the most aggressive efforts at total control of everyone else. Helping to overcome such fear is the claim to transcen­dent American virtue, to providing beneficent and liber­ating service to the world. That sense of a mission both altruistic and sacred can generate a surge of power that, in turn, suppresses feelings of powerlessness and weakness. Fear of weakness is, of course, bound up with related feelings of vulnerability, with a superpower's sense of being a very visible target, and with its unrealizable requirement of omnipotence. The world's only superpower has become a target not just because it is so dominant but because its recent policies and attitudes, emerging from superpower syndrome, have antagonized just about everyone. Its unre­alizable omnipotence has caused its leaders to embark on an aggressive quest for absolute security via domination, which is another form of entrapment in infinity. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, coming out in support of the Bush administration, made a case for invading Iraq based on a principle of "ultimate national security." But as the political scientist David C. Hendrickson pointed out at the time, Kissinger seemed to have forgotten his own earlier criticism of the "absolute security" sought by revolutionary powers, noting then that "the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others." In this sense and in the way that the present administration has sought to overthrow world diplomatic procedures and restraints on war-making, the United States has certainly become a "revolutionary power" in pursuit of absolute security and absolute invulnerability. But the fear of weakness will not go away.

#### We will force the end before we give up our dream

Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2003, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World, pg 27-29

But the phenomenon has hardly disappeared from our world. The hubris of “forcing the end” periodically expresses itself in militant apocalyptic movements. It may be at the heart of any grandiose claim to the ownership of death. All this is part of the universal human struggle with death and the continuity of life. Hence, the grandiose killing project of forcing the end is all too much part of the human psychological repertoire. Throughout most of history, apocalyptic sects rarely have moved from dreaming of or prayed for the end of time to forcing that end. Part of the reason was that the human means to force such an end did not seem to be at hand. But in our time, the means to force the end have caught up with apocalyptic dreams. Now those dreams are being married to apocalyptic weaponry (or at least the vision of obtaining it), and the idea of acting immediately to force the end is increasingly taking hold in apocalyptic movements. A compelling theology—or in secular terms, theory—with a world-ending narrative has been required to activate this human potential. That theology must forcefully divide the world into good and evil, and prescribe the necessary world destruction and renewal, all the while infusing believers with powerful currents of revitalization. All religions can provide such stories of cosmic redemption, but the Christian Armageddon narrative has had particular appeal—and not just in Christian hands—in its concreteness and simplicity, in its high-action rendering of death-and-rebirth mythology. Even secular movements like the Nazis have followed a version of the Armageddon script. Hitler’s followers sought to destroy much of what they saw as a racially polluted world by means of a vast biological purification program. Despite being murderously anti-Jewish and significantly anti-Christian as well, the Nazis drew upon what was most apocalyptic in both of those traditions. The Nazis came to empitomize the apocalyptic principle of killing to heal, of destroying vast numbers of human beings as therapy for the world.

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#### Predictions annihilate agency. This gives ideology a free pass to determine our collective fate rather than human action.

Bleiker, Senior Lecturer and Coordinater of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at Queensland, in ‘2K

[Roland, , Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, p. 48-49]

The very notion of prediction does, by its own logic, annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable through a convincing set of theoretical propositions is to assume that the course of global politics is to a certain extent predetermined. From such a vantage-point there is no more room for interference and human agency, no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. A predictive approach thus runs the risk of ending up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static image upon a far more complex set of transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to ignore the constantly changing domain of international relations. Rather, the main objective must consist of facilitating an understanding of transversal struggles that can grapple with those moments when people walk through walls precisely when nobody expects them to do so. Prediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, may well predict certain events only because their theoretical premises have become so objectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political dynamics. Dissent, in this case, is the process that reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuing political practices.

### A2: Realism

#### First, the ontological baggage of the 1ac is what produces realism as objective and inevitable. The aff incarcerates us in the prison of power politics.

Shapiro, and Alker, in ‘96

[Micheal J and Hayward R., Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, pg 42-43]

Consequently, two rather primitive subthemes have become inte­gral to the question of political reality in International Relations.25 The first projects reality as existing “out there” and is articulated through the logic and language of immediacy. The real world, ac­cordingly, is that which is immediately “there,” around us and dis­closed to us via sensory information. Realism in International Rela­tions thus becomes the commonsensical accommodation to the tangible, observable realities of this (externalized) world. The second primitive realist theme reaffirms the first and by its own logic, at least, grants it greater legitimacy. This is the necessity theme, which confirms the need for accommodation to the facts of reality but ac­cords them greater historical and philosophical status. Reality now becomes the realm of the unchangeable and inevitable, “a world of eternity, objectivity, gravity, substantiality and positive resistance to human purposes. “26 In this manner realism is imbued with moral, philosophical, and even religious connotation in its confrontation with the world “out there.” It becomes moral in its observance of certain rules of conduct integral to its understanding of human (power-politics) behavior. It can take on religious dimensions in its accommodations to the realm of inexorable destiny and ultimate ne­cessity. It can represent itself in philosophical terms as, for example, in the serious contemplative manner of the scholar/statesman dealing with the often unpalatable “is” of the world. All this pretention aside, the end result has been one variant or another of a crude power politics realism that has seen a generation of International Relations scholars and practitioners incarcerated within the narrow confines of an image of global life in which “states are involved in an unending struggle with each other (be­cause that is the nature of states in an anarchic world); power is nec­essary to survive in it or continue to fight [and] all states are poten­tial enemies. . . but the worst might be avoided by clever diplomacy and by virtue of the fact that all alike shared a similar conception of [utilitarian] rational behaviour. 27

#### And realism will always fail to deal with the reality that is beyond its grip. It’s monopoly on explanation culminates in destruction of the planet.

Campbell & Dillon in ‘93

[David & Michael, “The end of philosophy and the end of international relations,” *The Political Subject of Violence*, pp. 17-18]

To broach this task anew, however, we have briefly to re-visit again an aspect of the early formation of the terminus in which we are located. Should the old objection be advanced that a return to the ethical represents a retreat from the hard violent choices entailed in the political, the reply before we proceed should be brief and 'hard-nosed' enough to match any realist. Violence may be the ultima ratio of politics, but it has never been the only ratio; and in a life that now has to be lived with a proliferating array of devices capable of threatening lethal global consequences it simply cannot be allowed to enjoy the practical, intellectual and moral licence once extended to it in our political discourses. Neither is there anything in the history of the technology of political violence to warrant the claim that the political rationalisation of violence diminishes its sway. Monopolistic control and attempted rational deployment of the legitimate use of force by modern political authorities has helped bring human being to the threshold of planetary survival. The technology of modernity's political settlement realises its end in the real prospect ultimately not only of genocidal but also of species extinction. Human perdurance cannot afford the cost of the politics of political and ethical forgetting charged by the technologising of the political as violence. Realist and neo-realist answers not only fail intellectually - in a way that would not matter very much if they did not so impoverish our political imagination - they fail most because they are not good enough practically to match our circumstances. It is not a matter of getting knowledge 'to represent reality truly' (we shall see later how modern reality has become a function of its technologies of representation), but of acquiring 'habits of action for coping with reality';" a reality which always exceeds the realist representation of it, and whose unprecedented finitudes now define the horizon of life in novel ways.

## A2: Owen

#### Owen votes neg—their framing of the world is neither neutral nor inevitable

Owen 2 David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

## A2: Perm

#### Complete rejection is critical

Neocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re afﬁrming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143