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**Obama winning- best models predict- prefer it to polls**

Nate **Silver, 9-18**-2012 <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/sept-17-electoral-college-may-not-help-obama/>

The FiveThirtyEight presidential forecast for Monday was essentially unchanged, with President Obama having a **74.8 percent chance** of winning another term. Taken on the whole, Monday’s data was consistent with the current “story” the forecast model is telling about the race, which is that Mr. Obama’s polls have declined slightly from their post-convention highs, but are also still slightly better than his preconvention polls. If you look hard enough, of course, you can find polls where Mr. Obama’s convention bounce has evaporated completely — or others in which it hasn’t declined at all. But the forecast model, whatever its strengths or weaknesses, is pretty good at determining what the consensus of the data says at any given time.

**Independent voters are key to the election- new spending kills support for Obama causing them to vote republican**

Douglas **Schoen**, pollster for President Clinton, 2-8-20**12**, The Forgotten Swing Voter, Politico, p. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=7ED8592F-2122-4A55-AA3B-C5460134BE4A>

Neither party focuses on issues that matter most to people: reviving the economy, promoting job creation, balancing the budget, reducing debt and taking on entitlements. Both Republicans and Democrats are virtually ignoring the concerns of swing voters, now close to 20 percent of the electorate, and independents, now at least 40 percent of the electorate and, according to Gallup, the single largest voting bloc.¶ These two groups share similar interests. And both give Republican and Democratic leaders net negative ratings.¶ Independents disapprove of how Obama is doing his job, 52 percent to 37 percent, according to a recent New York Times/CBS poll. Just 31 percent had a favorable opinion of Obama, with two-thirds saying he has not made progress fixing the economy. Six in 10 independents say Obama does not share their priorities for the country.¶ The president’s improved standing in the recent Washington Post poll has probably been overstated and has more to do with Romney’s weakness than with some dramatic turnaround in Obama’s own numbers. A majority of independents still disapprove of his job performance and a clear majority of the electorate disapproves of his handling of the economy, his performance in creating jobs and his efforts to balance the budget.¶ Independents have similar negative impressions of leading GOP presidential candidates Romney and Gingrich, according to a recent Washington Post poll. Independents look unfavorably on Romney, 51 percent to 23 percent, and have an unfavorable impression of Gingrich, 53 percent to 23 percent.¶ Another ominous sign for Romney, still the presumed nominee, is that voter turnout decreased about 15 percent in Florida’s primary from four years ago, and almost 40 percent of the voters said they were not satisfied with the current field.¶ It’s crucial the GOP candidates address these voter concerns. A recent national survey I conducted sheds light on who the swing voters are and what they want from government — which meshes closely with the independents’ policy preferences.¶ I isolated swing voters by looking at those voters who supported Bill Clinton in an imaginary trial heat against Romney but didn’t support Obama in a trial heat against Romney. This came to 15 percent of the electorate.¶ In a two-way race for president between Clinton and Romney, an overwhelming majority prefers Clinton, 60 percent to 24 percent. Meanwhile, between Obama and Romney, voters split almost evenly — with Obama at 45 percent and Romney at 43 percent.¶ A detailed assessment of swing voters shows that they are not liberal Democrats. Over three-quarters (76 percent) are moderates or conservatives, and close to two-thirds (65 percent) are Republicans or independents. Slightly less than half (49 percent) are Southerners.¶ This data underscore the voters’ desire for politicians who advocate for bipartisanship and coalition-building in a polarized country. The substantial degree of support for Clinton versus Romney shows that the more bipartisan, centrist and fiscally conservative the appeal, the broader the support.¶ A Third Way survey conducted after the midterms supports my findings. Sixty percent of voters who supported Obama in 2008, but voted Republican in 2010, feel that Obama is too liberal. About 66 percent say that Obama and the Democrats in Congress tried to have government do too much.¶ A USA Today/Gallup Poll released late last year also shows that the electorate believes Obama is too far left ideologically. Americans were asked to rate their own ideology as well as that of the major presidential candidates on a 5-point scale. Most rated themselves at 3.3 (slightly right of center), and Obama at 2.3 (left of center) — further away than all other major presidential candidates. A majority of Americans, 57 percent, see Obama as liberal, while only 23 percent see him as moderate.¶ Indeed, recent polling shows that independents want to rein in the size and scope of government. Gallup reports that 64 percent of independents say Big Government is the biggest threat to the country. Which may be one reason for Santorum’s growing support. Three-quarters are dissatisfied with the size and power of the federal government, while just 24 percent are satisfied.¶ **Other polling shows that these voters want policies that emphasize** economic growth and budget reduction. In the wake of the crippling economic downturn, 82 percent believe it is extremely or very important to expand the economy, according to recent Gallup polling. Seventy percent say the federal budget deficit should be **cut by** a combination of spending cuts and modest tax increases — with many polls showing these voters feel spending cuts are key.¶ Independents do not support more government spending. My polling last year shows ind**ependents believe government should refrain from spending money to stimulate the economy, given the large deficit we face, 62 percent to 24 percent.**¶ Independents, according to Gallup, are looking for government to expand the economy (82 percent), and promote equality of opportunity (69 percent). They are not looking for government to promote equality of outcome, since just 43 percent say they want to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. By 50 percent to 47 percent, they say the divide between the rich and the poor is an acceptable part of the economic system.¶ So it’s clear what these voters are looking for, and also that neither party is addressing their concerns. To be sure, independent voters want conciliation and compromise. Some are more conservative and market-oriented. Others are ready to accept government stimulus spending for our economic recovery. But all share the desire for economic growth, job creation and a path to fiscal stability.¶ The two parties cannot continue to ignore swing voters. Without them, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to win in November. Moreover, to win without addressing their concerns will almost certainly promise four more years of the same gridlock.

**Vote could still shift – recent Obama clip about redistribution proves**

**Adler, 9/19 –** Blogger at the Nation

(Ben, the Nation, “Conservative Media Try to Save Romney's Campaign,” <http://www.thenation.com/blogs/ben-adler>, 9/19./2012)

Mitt Romney sure is lucky that major media outlets exist to serve his interests. After a video came out on Monday afternoon in which Romney denigrates the nearly half the country that did not pay federal income taxes last year as irresponsible and entitled, it seemed he was in quite a political pickle. The comments were unlikely to endear him to swing voters who perceive Romney as an out-of-touch elitist. But since Romney got the idea that 47 percent of the country are lazy Democratic moochers from movement conservatives, he could not repudiate his own remarks. At first, Fox News had no idea how to respond. They simply ignored the story, even as it dominated coverage on other networks, all through their primetime lineup on Monday. Finally, when Romney gave a press conference after 10 pm, in which he admitted to having made poor word choices but not a substantive error, they showed it. On Tuesday, the Fox Business network hosted Romney for a softball interview with Neil Cavuto. Fox was determined to avoid covering the story except to help Romney burnish his self-defense. Alas, Romney himself did not have much of a defense, other than to say that he had simply been acknowledging that he will not win a landslide victory. But then, Providence struck. On Tuesday afternoon the Drudge Report released an audio recording from 1998 in which Barack Obama says, “I actually believe in redistribution.” Drudge splashed the phrase in a banner headline across his front page as if it were earth shattering news. Since then, according to Huffington Post media reporter Michael Calderone, Fox has played the audio clip twenty-two times. The Romney campaign immediately seized on the clip as a way of shifting their defense of Romney’s unappealing rhetoric into more friendly terrain. Speaking to Cavuto, Romney said: There is a tape that just came out today where the president is saying he likes redistribution. I disagree. I think a society based upon a government-centered nation where government plays a larger and larger role, redistributes money, that’s the wrong course for America…. The right course for America is to create growth, create wealth, not to redistribute wealth. Romney’s campaign sent out the quote as part of a press release. They followed up shortly with another press release that lists their usual litany of depressing economic indicators as proof that “Obama’s redistribution plan…didn’t work.” What is missing is any proof, besides a fourteen-year-old quote, that Obama actually pursued a redistribution plan once in office. By Wednesday, the Romney campaign had regained its footing. Reporters were being inundated with statements using the redistribution quote as a hook for all their usual talking points. For example, they released a statement headlined, “Obama’s Redistribution Didn’t Work For Small Businesses.” “Mitt Romney understands that opportunity and free enterprise create jobs and grow our nation’s small businesses—not government redistribution,” said Romney campaign spokesperson Andrea Saul. The campaign also worked the phrase into their stump speeches. Paul Ryan told a Virginia audience that, Obama is “going to try and distract and divide this country to win by default.” Then he asserted: President Obama said that he believes in redistribution. Mitt Romney and I are not running to redistribute the wealth. Mitt Romney and I are running to help Americans create wealth. Efforts that promote hard work and personal responsibility over government dependency are what have made this economy the envy of the world. As Slates Dave Weigel points out, it is ridiculous to blame Obama for distracting and dividing the country, and then attack Obama for something he said fourteen years ago. Conservative pundits, though, are cheering on the Romney/Ryan campaign’s silliness. After Romney’s appearance on Cavuto, Fox panelist and Weekly Standard writer Stephen Hayes said of the attack on Obama’s quote, “[It’s] good, [he should] make the argument. Going back to 1998 shows the president has believed this for a long time.” That’s a specious argument. If you go back to 1998 and look at anything Mitt Romney said, it may be diametrically opposed to what he believes today. Generally, the older the quote, the less relevant it is. Certainly that’s the standard Hayes would use if it were Romney who long ago said something Hayes considers damaging.

**Obama key to global climate change – only way to solve**

**Leber 12** - Think Progress research assistant

(Rebecca, Think Progress, “Report: Future of Global Climate Deal Dependent On 2012 Election,” <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/05/398600/report-future-of-global-climate-deal-dependent-on-2012-election/>, 1/5/2012)

World leaders struck a deal last month during the Durban United Nations conference that sets a path to a global climate deal by 2015 — a precarious agreement including major developing countries like China and India. However, a report by the research branch of the HSBC bank predicts a deal would be trashed if President Obama is not reelected. With climate denial and opposition to emissions limits rampant in the GOP field, HSBC finds a global deal would be “almost impossible” if a Republican wins the White House: [The] prospects for a new global climate deal in 2015 depend considerably on the election of a pro-climate action president. The election of a President opposed to climate action will not only damage growth prospects for low-carbon solutions in the USA itself, but will make the hard task of negotiating a new global agreement by 2015 almost impossible. If Obama is re-elected with support in both houses, we expect modest measures to introduce a federal clean energy standard for electricity; a stripped down cap and trade programme could re-emerge building on the regional scheme on the West and East coasts. Though some GOP contenders haven’t always positioned themselves as climate zombies, everyone from Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, to Jon Huntsman have doubted climate change science leading up to the primaries. Frontrunner Romney opposes carbon emissions limits and a cap and trade program, despite having supported pollution limits as Massachussets governor. Of course, the future of energy policy also hinges on political developments worldwide. The report also notes that elections worldwide, particularly France, will be an “important test of the resilience of pro-nuclear policies” in a post-Fukushima world.

**Warming is the only existential threat – causes extinction**

**Deibel, 7** - professor of IR at National War College

(Terry, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2, 2007)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to get the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

# Off

**Interpretation - Transportation investment must be new infrastructure**

**Collenette 99** Hon. David M. Collenette, P.C., M.P. Minister of Transportation of Canada Transportation in Canada 1999 annual reporthttp://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/T1-10-1999E.pdf BK

Whether made by business or government, “transport investment” can be defined as both **new infrastructure construction** and purchases of new machinery and equipment. Investment **excludes** repair and maintenance expenditure, which are expenditures on **existing infrastructure**, machinery and equipment.

**Violation – they change Polar SEA which is current infrastructure**

**That’s a voting issue**

**Ground- There is no links to existing projects or repairs because the programs have already been passed**

**Limits- this topic is already huge, allowing for maintenance allows for every infrastructure to be used**

**Extra-topicality is a voting issue because there’s an unlimited number of extra-topical things the aff could do that we could never predict**

# Off

**Transportation infrastructure is facilities – that’s distinct from vehicles**

**Rietveld 94** – professor in transport economics at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, and a fellow at the Tinbergen Institute (Piet, Spatial Economic Impacts of Transport Infrastructure Supply, 7/94, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice Volume 28, Issue 4, Pages 329–341)//EM

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As a definition for transport infrastructure we use those **immovable** capital goods for transport which are characterized by a considerable degree of economies of scale so that it is usually supplied as a collective input into production. As a consequence, the government has a high degree of control on the level of supply, price, and/or quality. Transport infrastructure includes facilities such as railway lines, railway stations, highways, canals, seaports, and airports. As indicated in Table l, transport infrastructure investments have both temporary and nontemporary effects on the economy. A major temporary effect concerns the stimulation of employment and income during the construction phase via the demand side.

**Violation – the affirmative increases investment in ships which are vehicles– they’re distinct**

**CFST 06** – Campaign for Sensible Transportation, collection of organizations for better transportation in the Santa Cruz area (“Aboard Transportation”, 2006, http://www.cfst.org/transportation.html)//RD

Transportation or transport is the carrying of people and goods from one destination to another. The term comes from the Latin trans meaning “across” and *portare* meaning “to carry”. **Transportation can be divided into three distinct fields**:

1. **Infrastructure -** When we refer to infrastructure it includes **our transport networks such as roads, railways, airways, canals, and pipeline**. This also includes the terminals or nodes such as **airports, railway stations, bus stations, and seaports.**

2. **Vehicle – These comprises of the vehicles that we regularly ride in the networks** for instance automobiles (buses, cars, taxis, and etc.), trains and airplanes.

3. Operations – They are the control of the whole transport system including traffic lights/signals on roads, ramp meters, railroad switches, air traffic control, and etc.

**Violation – they use vehicles**

**That’s a voting issue**

**There’s an unlimited number of vehicles that the aff could build – that prevents the neg from adequately preparing for each aff**

**Kills neg ground – they’d just say other vehicles non-unique our disads**

# Off

**The United States federal government should provide an investment in the construction of two new polar icebreakers only if private actors guarantee at least one-third of the funding upfront for a minimum of twenty years. In negotiating these partnerships, the United States federal government should open infrastructure plans to modification, including the possible transfer of project ownership to private actors. The United States federal government should make all necessary regulatory changes to encourage greater public-private partnerships in icebreakers and provide necessary technical assistance for implementation.** **The United States federal government should ensure that the POLAR SEA remains mission capable and that the POLAR STAR remain available for reactivation.**

#### This solves

Puentes, 8/23/10 - Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute (Robert, “New Partnerships for Accelerating Infrastructure Investments,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes>)

So as Congress continues to develop its plans for the reauthorization of the nation’s surface transportation law it should support metro areas that raise their own revenue for the long term. Though a new partnership, the federal government should provide incentives to metropolitan areas that secure long-term and substantial regional funding sources approved for a minimum of 20 years and that equal a significant (one-third to one-half) portion of the annual federal transportation funding received. As to the incentives, a possible menu of options might include: more direct funding to metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), more flexible “mode neutral funding,” more streamlined planning processes, more direct reporting to federal agencies, and reduced bureaucracy.[[7]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes" \l "note7)

#### The net benefit is infrastructure accountability

#### Public investment is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates aff benefits and causes massive cost overruns, and means better projects lose out

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

This situation may need some explication, because it may sound to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be agreed that project managers and other professionals involved in major infrastructure provision ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in their work. It is even stated in the Project Management Institute (PMI)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006, pp. 4, 5) that project managers should ‘provide accurate information in a timely manner’ and they must ‘not engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others’. Economists, engineers, planners, and others involved in major infrastructure provision have similar codes of conduct. But there is a dark side to their work, which is remarkably underexplored in the literature (Flyvbjerg, 1996).¶ On the dark side, project managers and planners ‘lie with numbers’. as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. They are busy not with getting forecasts and business cases right and following the PMI Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for a project. ‘The most effective planner,’ says Wachs (1989, p. 477), ‘is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientiﬁc or technical rationality.’ Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to PMI’s ruling that project managers should ‘make decisions and take actions based on the best interests of society’ (PMI, 2006, p. 2).¶ Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate beneﬁts have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difﬁcult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).¶ In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances that would give managers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a focus on transparency and accountability is necessary.¶ As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability deﬁne liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with signiﬁcant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.

#### Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project-approval stage to present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with beneﬁts emphasized and costs and risks de-emphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local ofﬁcials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to beneﬁt from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of beneﬁts, costs, and risks. National bodies, such as certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003) and UK Department for Transport (2006). Wachs (1986, 1990) found similar results for transit planning in the USA. Taken together, the UK and US studies both account well for existing data on cost underestimation and beneﬁt overestimation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organizational pressure the underestimation of costs and overestimation of beneﬁts is caused by non-intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to secure approval and funding for their projects: underestimated costs + overestimated beneﬁts = funding Using this formula, and thus ‘showing the project at its best’ as one interviewee said above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e the survival of the unﬁttest. It is not the best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and beneﬁt overestimates, other things being equal. But the larger the cost underestimate on paper, the greater the cost overrun in practice. And the larger the overestimate of beneﬁts, the greater the beneﬁt shortfall. Therefore the projects that have been made to look best on paper in this manner become the worst, or unﬁttest, projects in reality, in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, and risks of non-viability. They have been designed like that, as disasters waiting to happen.

#### The counterplan solves by doing less than the plan – the only projects that will be built are those that can secure private sector capital. This increases accountability in infrastructure design and reduces overall costs

Flyvbjerg, 10 - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In order to achieve accountability via competition and market control, the following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced by the relevant institutions. The decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the willingness of private ﬁnanciers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one-third of the total capital needs. 7 This should be required whether projects pass the market test or not—that is, whether projects are subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private lenders, shareholders, and stock-market analysts would produce their own forecasts or conduct due diligence for existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be added pressure to produce realistic forecasts and reduced risk to the taxpayer. Forecasters and their organizations must share ﬁnancial responsibility for covering cost overruns and beneﬁt shortfalls resulting from misrepresentation and bias in forecasting. The participation of risk capital would not mean that government reduces control of major infrastructure projects. On the contrary, it means that government can more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely as the ordinary citizen’s guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, environment, risk, and a proper use of public funds. Whether infrastructure projects are public, private, or public–private, they should be vested in one and only one project organization with a strong governance framework and strong contract-writing skills. The project organization may be a company or not, public or private, or a mixture. What is important is that this organization has the capacity to (i) set up and negotiate contracts that will effectively safeguard its interests, including in equity risk allocation, and (ii) enforce accountability vis-a-vis ` contractors, operators, etc. In turn, the directors of the organization must be held accountable for any cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, faulty designs, unmitigated risks, etc. that may occur during project planning, implementation, and operations. Experience with contract writing is a much-neglected topic, but is particularly important in developing and managing major infrastructure projects. This is because a fundamental asymmetry in experience with and resources allocated to contract writing often applies in the client– contractor relationship for such projects. Clients who decide to do major infrastructure—for instance, a city council deciding to build a new subway or toll road—do so relatively rarely, often only once, or never, in the lifetime of the individual city manager and council member. Learning is therefore impaired for clients, and if you do not know what your interests are, it is difﬁcult to safeguard them. Contractors, on the other hand, who bid for and build such projects, do so all the time. Contractors, therefore, typically know much more than clients about the ins and outs of projects and contracts, including the many risks and pitfalls that apply, plus which lawyers, bankers, and consultants to hire to safeguard their interests most effectively. This asymmetry has brought many a client to grief. A possible way to bring more symmetry into the client–contractor relationship would be for government to establish a central contract-writing unit at the state or national level, which would be in charge of negotiating, on behalf of local and other branches of government, the types of major contracts they do too infrequently to gain real experience. This would concentrate a larger number of contracts in one place, allowing experience—and the negotiating power that comes with it—to accumulate. Fortunately, better governance along the lines described above has recently become stronger around the world. The Enron scandal and its successors have triggered new legislation and a war on corporate deception that is spilling over into government with the same objective: to curb ﬁnancial waste and promote good governance. Although progress is slow, good governance is gaining a foothold also in major infrastructure project management. For example, in 2003 the Treasury of the United Kingdom required, for the ﬁrst time, that all ministries develop and implement procedures for major projects that will curb what the Treasury calls—with true British civility—’optimism bias’. Funding will be unavailable for projects that do not take into account this bias, and methods have been developed for how to do this (HM Treasury, 2003; Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004; UK Department for Transport, 2006). In the Netherlands in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Infrastructure Projects for the ﬁrst time conducted extensive public hearings to identify measures that will limit the misinformation about large infrastructure projects given to the Parliament, public, and media (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004). In Boston, the government has sued to recoup funds from contractor overcharges for the Big Dig related to cost overruns. More countries and cities are likely to follow the lead of the UK, the Netherlands, and Boston in coming years; Switzerland and Denmark are already doing so (Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts, 2006; Danish Ministry for Transport and Energy, 2006, 2008). Moreover, with private ﬁnance in major infrastructure projects on the rise over the past 15–20 years, capital funds and banks are increasingly gaining a say in the project development and management process. Private capital is no panacea for the ills in major infrastructure project management, to be sure (Hodge and Greve, 2009). But private investors place their own funds at risk, as opposed to governments who place the taxpayer’s money at risk. Capital funds and banks can therefore be observed not to automatically accept at face value the forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction. The false assumption that one forecast or one business case (which is also a forecast) may contain the truth about a project is problematized. Instead project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders have different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of objective science and engineering but of negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it is more truthful about our ability to predict the future and about the risks involved. If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infrastructures continued to implement, embed, and enforce such measures of accountability effectively, then the misrepresentation in cost, beneﬁt, and risk estimates, which is widespread today, might be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to continue, and the allocation of funds for major infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful, unethical, and sometimes even unlawful.

# Off

**The 1AC’s enframing of strategic and technical reason reifies an ontology and epistemology of violence—their technological worldview reduces all beings to standing-reserve and guarantees extinction**

**Burke 07—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)**

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeperbedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but **the apparently solid ground of** the real **itself**. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity:ontologies**, statements about truth and being** which claim a **rarefied privilege** to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: **a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that** limits **debate and** questioning, **that** confines it within **the boundaries of** a particular, closed system **of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here **we are witness to** an epistemology of violence **(strategy)** joined to **an** ontology **of violence (the national security state)**. When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken **the** resort to war and **to** lead to **its** escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not **so much** a tool that can be **picked up and** used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.**

**The judge should take on the role of the intellectual – vote negative to exchange the ontology of being for one of becoming—this free relationship to technology entails a questioning that can break free from technological thought and re-imagine the world from outside the political space**

**Burke 07—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)**

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to **place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies** that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system **of thinking and understanding** thatlays claim to our entire **space of truth and** existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of **scientific and political** truthrooted in **powerful** enlightenment images of being. **Confined within such** an **epistemological** and cultural **universe**, **policymakers' choices become necessities**, their **actions** become **inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism **and violence** as necessary **policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology **that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing**. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from **outside** the space of enframing and **utilitarian** strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would **seem to** hinge upon 'questioning'as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

# Off

**Upholding life as inherently valuable forces us into ontological slavery – instead we should embrace the liberation of sacrifice**

**Baudrillard 02** (Jean, “The Spirit of Terrorism: Hypotheses on Terrorism”, pg. 68-70)[]

All the same, we should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect for human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in oneself, something other than, and more than, life (existence isn’t everything, it is even the least of things): a destiny, a cause, a form of pride or of sacrifice. There are symbolic stakes which far exceed existence and freedom - which we find it unbearable to lose, because we have made them the fetishistic values of a universal humanist order. So we cannot imagine a terrorist act committed with entire autonomy and ‘freedom of conscience’. Now, choice in terms of symbolic obligations is sometimes profoundly mysterious - as in the case of Romand, the man with the double life, who murdered his whole family, not for fear of being unmasked, but for fear of inflicting on them the profound disappointment of discovering his deception. 3 Committing suicide would not have expunged the crime from the record; he would merely have passed the shame off on to the others. Where is the courage, where the cowardice? The question of freedom, one’s own or that of others, no longer poses itself in terms of moral consciousness, and a higher freedom must allow us to dispose of it to the point of abusing or sacrificing it. Omar Khayyam: ‘Rather one freeman bind with chains of love than set a thousand prisoned captives free.’ Seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labour. How do things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim, are the ones who today symbolically occupy the position of master.

**Attempts to prevent suffering miss the boat – instead we should embrace it and give it meaning, only then will suffering cease to be suffering, but sacrifice** **– any attempt to avoid suffering fails to acknowledge its necessary role.**

**Wrisley, 10** George Wrisley, Professor @ University of Iowa, “Nietzsche and Suffering—a Choice of Attitudes and Ideals,” <http://georgewrisley.com/Nietzsche%20and%20Suffering--A%20Choice%20of%20Attitudes%20and%20Ideals.pdf> Accessed 7/7/12 BJM

II Suffering as a Constituent of Life

“To live is to suffer”: this is only contentious if we thereby mean that to live is only to suffer. If we say that suffering pervades life, that need not mean that there are no pleasures in life. Even still, is it true that for every individual, life will involve suffering? Other than those who are born and die a quick, painless death shortly thereafter, the answer is surely going to be yes. However, before we rightfully answer whether life automatically means suffering, we should say what is meant by suffering. If we look at suffering as a genus, we can say that psychological suffering and physical suffering are its species. It is easy to think of examples of both kinds. Under mental suffering we find depression, anxiety, fear, unsatisfied desires (perhaps even desire itself before it is satisfied), loneliness, loss, anguish, grief, separation, lamentation, distress, dissatisfaction, rejection, failure, hopelessness, stress, boredom, ennui, angst, weltschmerz, existential malaise, and so on. While all of the above admit to degrees, one could argue that any degree of any of them constitutes suffering. Physical suffering presents more of a variety of clear and unclear cases of suffering due to degrees. There is pain—really the paradigm of physical suffering —in its various degrees (passing a kidney stone to a mild, dull, almost unnoticed ache), hunger, which can range from mild discomfort to actual pain, itching in its various degrees (most of one’s body covered in a rash to the itch one offhandedly scratches), degrees of being too hot or too cold, being tickled until one cannot stand it, and so on. One becomes acquainted with more kinds of suffering the longer one lives. But even a very young sheltered child has experienced many of the above kinds of suffering. At the very least, any child will experience hunger and unsatisfied desires; in all likelihood, however, a child will experience much more suffering. When we consider the full range of possible human suffering, it is hard to deny that to live is to suffer, as long as we do not mean that to live is only to suffer. However, it is not so clear that we can say that to live is to experience joy. For it seems quite clear from my experience, and that related to me by others, that it is far easier to suffer than to find joy, peace, or happiness. III An Important Complication to Suffering In section II, I listed many kinds of psychological and physical suffering; to those kinds of suffering we can add another: the suffering we experience due to our suffering. In its simplest form this might just be the lamentation of not being able to walk around as one would because of the pain from a sprained ankle. Such complications and additional suffering are important; however, a more pressing problem is the way we feel when we cannot find a purpose or meaning for our suffering. Nietzsche writes that man’s problem, “was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I suffer?’…The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far—” Lack of such meaning creates a suffocating void, opening the door to suicidal nihilism. In Man’s Search For Meaning, Viktor E. Frankl writes, “In some way, suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning, such as the meaning of a sacrifice….That is why man is even ready to suffer, on the condition, to be sure, that his suffering has a meaning.” So, in addressing what our attitude toward suffering should be, we need to take into consideration the problem of meaning for our suffering. As we will see, Nietzsche thinks that until he arrived the ascetic ideal was the only means whereby suffering could be given meaning. As Leiter does, I will argue that Nietzsche provides an alternative to the ascetic ideal. What the ascetic ideal and its Nietzschean alternative are will be the focus of our inquiry into what our attitude toward suffering should be. IV What Should Our Attitude Toward Suffering Be? How should we comport ourselves to the suffering we find in our lives? When touching a hot stove or confronted with danger, our natural reactions are to pull back, to flee, to find safety. In general it seems that we naturally shy away from discomfort and pain—suffering of all types. The child laments his boring afternoon and the adult fears the impending death of a parent and the subsequent anguish the loss will bring, hoping and wishing they will never come. Suffering, it seems, is quite rightly seen as undesirable. However: When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear. So, should we seek to abolish suffering as far as we can by removing its cause, or should we attempt to change our attitude toward suffering such that it is no longer seen as (always) undesirable? Taking Nietzsche seriously when he says that it is the meaning of our suffering that has been the problem, I will attempt to indirectly answer this question by looking at two possibilities found in Nietzsche for giving meaning to our suffering. The first possibility concerns a religious ethic that, according to Nietzsche, views suffering as undesirable, but which ultimately uses mendacious and deleterious means to provide a meaning for human suffering. The second possibility concerns the extent to which we can say Nietzsche endorsed the idea of giving meaning to suffering through acknowledging its necessary role in human enhancement and greatness. Since the religious ethic sees suffering as undesirable and thus something ultimately to be avoided (being itself the paradigmatic means for easing suffering), and the means it uses to give suffering meaning are ultimately mendacious, I will argue that if Nietzsche is significantly correct in both his attack on religious morality and his alternative ideal, we can take this as evidence that the avoidance of suffering is not the proper attitude. Unfortunately, I will not be able to address the question of whether Nietzsche is significantly correct in this paper. Secondly, given Nietzsche’s positive alternative—one that embraces the necessary role suffering has for the enhancement of human life—I will argue that we can take this as evidence that it is our attitude toward suffering that needs to be modified, i.e., we should modify so that we no longer see suffering as something to be avoided. Because of this, the middle position of avoiding suffering when possible and then seeing its positive attributes when it does occur does not recommend itself. That is, since it will be argued that suffering has a positive and necessary role to play, to seek to avoid it as far as possible and then to acknowledge its positive aspects when it does occur, is not really to acknowledge and accept suffering’s positive and necessary role. However, as we will see, all of this is complicated by the issue of the order of rank as found in Nietzsche’s writings.

# Mapping

**No arctic conflict, and science diplomacy high there already**

**Brigham 10, distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, 10** [Lawrence, “The Arctic”, Sep/Oct edition of *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/think\_again\_the\_arctic?page=0,5]

**Everyone wants a piece of the thawing far north. But that doesn't mean anarchy will reign at the top of the world**. "**Conflict Is Inevitable in the Arctic." No, it isn't. The Arctic has been a geopolitical flashpoint before: During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union faced off directly in the region. But that was then. Today's Arctic is governed by eight developed states that** arguably **cooperate more than they have at any other period in history. International collaboration in scientific researc**h, for instance, **is at record levels in the Arctic today**. **The looming Arctic resource boom doesn't threaten this stability -- it reinforces it**. **States such as Norway and Russia have much to lose economically from Arctic conflict**, as do the many non-Arctic countries and multinational corporations that will be among the eventual investors in, and consumers of, future Arctic ventures. **No one is contesting anyone else's sovereignty in the region**; in fact, the Arctic might one day play host to the emergence of a new sovereign state, Greenland, with the support and encouragement of Denmark, its long-time colonial ruler.

**If Russia wants to expand that badly, then they wouldn’t let icebreakers stop them, they’d use their military to destroy the Plan’s ships**

#### The Plan builds 2 more icebreakers so we’ll have like 8 – Russia has TWENTY-FIVE, do you really think they solve?

**O’Rourke 6-14 - Specialist in Naval Affairs**, Congressional Research Service, Quote from July 2010 Coast Guard High Latitude Study,“Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85474/>

Regarding the first two factors above, some observers note the size of the polar icebreaking fleets operated by other countries. Countries with interests in the polar regions have differing requirements for polar icebreakers, depending on the nature and extent of their polar activities. According to one source, as of January 2009, Russia had a fleet of 25 polar icebreakers (including 6 active heavy icebreakers, 2 heavy icebreakers in caretaker status, 15 other icebreakers, and 2 additional icebreakers leased from the Netherlands); Finland and Sweden each had 7 polar icebreakers; and Canada had 6.44

**No one’s gonna listen to the new borders the Plan imposes – they’re always gonan want more**

**There is no correlation between trade and war**

**Friedman 96** (George Friedman, founder and chairman of Stratfor, The Future of War, 1996, p. 7-9)

The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shift­ing the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and military strategies were tried.

**There’s no reason why Canadian protectionism spillovers – they’re not globalized enough, they engage in trade in NAFTA with Mexico and the U.S., they wouldn’t break down US-Chinese trade which is what their impact evidence is about**

**David’s article he mentioned in cross-x proves people will cooperate now – they’re just fear mongering**

**Protectionism won’t spiral out of control – interdependence.**

**Marshall**, **09** (Andrew – asia political risk correspondent, Assault on free trade a key political risk, Reuters, 1/21/2009, p. lexis)

PREVENTING DISASTER Despite the risks, many analysts argue that a wholesale retreat into protectionism can be averted, because globalization has brought benefits governments will not want to reverse. "Fears that the financial crisis is ushering in an era of intensive nationalism and protectionism are overwrought," said Control Risks in its outlook for 2009. "The financial crisis has ... demonstrated that the global economy remains deeply interconnected and dependent on forging compromises between domestic politics and international capital." Cheap imports from emerging markets have brought significant benefits to consumers and companies in the developed world. "This factor, combined with the entrenched nature of global supply chains, is likely to **limit** the political **tolerance for protectionism**, at least in the main developed-country markets and in emerging markets that are highly dependent on exports," the Economist Intelligence Unit said.

**Their impact is dumb**

**Byers 10, politics and law professor at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and a senior expert on the Arctic, 10** [“Interview: Expert decodes Arctic conflict”, 4/2, http://www.upi.com/Science\_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/02/Interview-Expert-decodes-Arctic-conflict/UPI-36031270235949/]

Q. What about **the Arctic**'s vast oil and gas resources? China has a growing hunger for these resources and would be happy to tap into the Arctic fields. **Is there potential for a conflict?** A. **I don't think so.** **China is very much part of the international economy**. They buy oil and gas on the global market and also invest in oil- and gas-producing countries. **You don't need sovereignty in order to access oil and gas -- you need money for foreign investment** and money to purchase oil and gas on the market. **We're not in a 19th-century situation anymore**. Q. **But military activities have increased in the region. And there are observers who fear a potential military conflict over resources in the Arctic.** A. **That's unrealistic. If you look at the statements by government officials -- in most instances, the military buildup is directed at non-state threats**. **When they talk about their Arctic rights they almost always talk about rights that are already within their jurisdiction if they are an arctic ocean country like Russia. Or in the case of China, they are talking about rights in the internationalized areas that will remain in the central Arctic Ocean. I understand that potential for conflict sells more newspapers but my sense is that countries like Russia and China have enough problems elsewhere and therefore don't want to create problems in the Arctic.**

**Even if Arctic conflict happened-status quo diplomacy prevents escalation**

**Brigham 10, distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, 10** [Lawrence, “The Arctic”, Sep/Oct edition of *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/think\_again\_the\_arctic?page=0,5]

**This isn't to say that saber rattling hasn't happened** and won't happen again in the future. Canada, Norway, and Russia have conducted military and naval operations in the region to showcase their capabilities and demonstrate their sovereignty. (The United States has been more modest in this regard, though the U.S. Navy last fall did release a "roadmap" for the Arctic, emphasizing the need for military readiness in the far north.) **NATO's role in the Arctic is uncertain and unfocused** -- five Arctic states are members, but three (Sweden, Finland, Russia) are not -- and the organization could go a long way toward reducing tension and building trust in the Arctic by promoting cooperation on matters of military security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism there. **But none of this friction is beyond the realm of diplomacy**. **Even Chilingarov, the flag-wielding champion of Russian northern expansionism, understands the virtues of negotiation. When he met Chuck Strahl, Canada's minister of northern affairs, in June, the first thing he reportedly did was invite his would-be adversary to a conference-called "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue" -- scheduled for this September in Moscow. The two countries' representatives have since trumpeted their thawing relations in the Arctic, meeting regularly and even discussing plans to work together on mapping the seafloor where Chilingarov planted the Russian standard. The lesson is clear enough: The world has plenty of regions where serious conflict is a way of life already. Let's worry about them first.**

**Arctic conflict won’t escalate**

**Borgerson 07**, visiting fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, (Scott G., August 8, pg. http://www.cfr.org/publication/14007)

Will the rhetoric escalate into armed brinksmanship on the ice? History offers reason not to worry. Fifty years ago, the South Pole was the scene of a similar showdown. Seven countries—Britain, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway, Australia and New Zealand— had made claims to territory in Antarctica. These and other countries had established dozens of ‘‘scientific’’ stations on the continent. In 1956, the United States launched Operation Deep Freeze II, the last of four huge naval expeditions to fly the Stars and Stripes in the Antarctic. Ultimately though, in a spirit of cooperation rare during the cold war, fostered by the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year, 12 countries signed onto a treaty that established a legal framework to govern the southernmost continent. The treaty prohibited nuclear explosions, radioactive waste disposal and military deployments on Antarctica. And it encouraged continued international cooperation in scientific research. The overlapping territorial claims were not relinquished, but ‘‘frozen.’’

**No conflict over the arctic**

**Victor 07**, professor of law @ Stanford, (David G., 11/12, pg. http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16020)

The false logic now runs in both directions. Not only will climate change multiply threats by putting stress on societies, but a flood of articles warns of new territorial conflicts as warming opens the formerly ice-bound Arctic for exploration. Russia recently planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole. In fact, the underlying causes of this exploration rush are ambiguous property rights and advances in undersea drilling that are unrelated to climate change. A similar pattern unfolded in the 1950s in Antarctica, which led to a standoff of territorial claims and no real harm to the region, no production of usable minerals and no resource wars.

# Science

#### Science diplomacy is insufficient to rebuild U.S. image and is rejected by suspicious developing countries

**Dickson 09 Direction Science & Development Network.Net ‘9**

(David, June 1, SciDev.Net, “Science diplomacy: a timely idea or a fashionable myth?”, <http://scidevnet.wordpress>. com/category/new-frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009)

Does science have a similar role in helping to meet the political challenges of today? The new US administration of President Barack Obama thinks it does. Enhanced scientific relations lie at the heart of its strategy of using “soft power” to rebuild political bridges with countries across the world, particularly in the Middle East. How far this commitment is shared by other countries will be debated over the next two days at a meeting in London jointly organised by the Royal Society and American Association for the Advancement of Science. Under the title “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy“, the meeting is bringing together eminent speakers from across the developed and developing world to look in detail at the role of science in foreign policy. Of course, there is much more to the issue than merely repolishing a tarnished international image (understandably the top US priority, following two successful terms of an isolationist administration which seemed to care little about this image). Other countries care more, for example, about ways in which science can help build a global consensus about the need to tackle problems such as climate change. And lurking in the background is the fact even soft power is still power. If the key purpose of a country’s foreign policy is to extend its influence over the policy of others, there is certainly a debate to be had over the extent to which science should tie itself to this strategy (even accepting the clear economic self-interest in doing so). The issue is particular acute when it comes to offering science as a form of aid to the developing world. Countries in former European colonies in particular remain highly suspicious of political leverage arriving in their aid packages – even those designed to boost their scientific capacities.

**They don’t spillover – countries still have their own self-interests, this is proven by their 1AC evidence about how countries want to go to the Arctic for oil and economic gains instead of actually learning about it – if their internal-link was true then people would cooperate over the Arctic for science now**

**Science diplomacy doesn’t resolve political tensions**

**Dickson 09** Direction Science & Development Network.Net **‘9** (David, June 2, SciDev.Net, “Science diplomacy: the case for caution”, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/new- frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009)

One of the frustrations of meetings at which scientists gather to discuss policy-related issues is the speed with which the requirements for evidence-based discussion they would expect in a professional context can go out of the window. Such has been the issue over the past two days in the meeting jointly organised in London by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society on the topic “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy“. There has been much lively discussion on the value of international collaboration in achieving scientific goals, on the need for researchers to work together on the scientific aspects of global challenges such as climate change and food security, and on the importance of science capacity building in developing countries in order to make this possible. But there remained little evidence at the end of the meeting on how useful it was to lump all these activities together under the umbrella term of “science diplomacy”. More significantly, although numerous claims were made during the conference about the broader social and political value of scientific collaboration – for example, in establishing a framework for collaboration in other areas, and in particular reducing tensions between rival countries – little was produced to demonstrate whether this hypothesis is true. If it is not, then some of the arguments made on behalf of “science diplomacy”, and in particular its value as a mechanism for exercising “soft power” in foreign policy, do not stand up to close scrutiny. Indeed, a case can be made that where scientific projects have successfully involved substantial international collaboration, such success is often heavily dependent on a prior political commitment to cooperation, rather than a mechanism for securing cooperation where the political will is lacking. Three messages appeared to emerge from the two days of discussion. Firstly, where the political will to collaborate does exist, a joint scientific project can be a useful expression of that will. Furthermore, it can be an enlightening experience for all those directly involved. But it is seldom a magic wand that can secure broader cooperation where none existed before.

**Be skeptical of their impact evidence they work in science and have an incentive to say science diplomacy solves everything to get more funding**

**Basic scientific nature and self-preservation make global scientific cooperation inevitable**

**Potocnik, 06** (Janez, European Commissioner for Science and Research, 1AC Article, 3/7/2006. “Between cooperation and Competition - Science and Research as a Transatlantic Bridge Builder”, http://www.iterfan.org/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=2)

Cooperation shortens the path leading from science to innovation and from knowledge to solutions in areas such as nanotech, biotech, environment, climate and cybersecurity. In all these areas, and in many more, we share information, knowledge, practices and results. In nanotechnology, for example, the Commission works together with the National Science Foundation to exchange information and organise seminars and workshops. Coordinated calls for joint EU-US research proposals have been launched since 1999, to draw on the best expertise on both side of the Atlantic. We work together because we realise that it is in the interest of both Europe and the US to do so. And often, of course, it is also in the interest of many other countries around the globe, whether they are directly involved in the cooperation, or not. But – of course – we also cooperate simply because that is what scientists do. Naturally, spontaneously and, often, effectively. Scientists are, by the mere nature of their work, mobile and outward looking. Research does not know of any national frontiers and scientists simply work where and with those that offer the best opportunities. But perhaps even more important for our transatlantic links is the dynamism and creativity that competition brings. Competition is part of our natural disposition as social individuals, and also an imperative of the societies we live in. Whether it’s the market share of our companies that we have at heart, or the wellbeing of our people, or the next breakthrough in science and technology, or - indeed, all of the above - competition is the name of the game. We compete because we know that today’s discoveries will most probably underpin tomorrow’s economic achievements. And we compete because – in the US as much as in Europe – we draw healthy stimuli and encouragement from comparing our respective figures. Numbers of science and engineering graduates, researchers as percentage of the workforce, figures for R&D investment, numbers of publications and patents and so on... This mix of cooperation and competition is a key engine of progress. That’s how we discover and advance. How we set and reach objectives, improve performances and achieve results. By finding the right mix or the right balance between cooperation and competition. Be it between individuals, organisations, economies or societies. And isn’t this also what scientists spontaneously do? They compete for excellence, for recognition, for results and for funds. They strive to be the first to publish or to patent. But they also learn from one another. They compare and exchange and they join forces aiming for common achievements. The same is true for companies and other organisations, for which a balanced mix of cooperation and competition is often the key to performance and achievement