# 1AC ITV

## 1AC Logistics

**The current geopolitical climate is stressing military transportation infrastructure. Advances are key to address new strategic imperatives.**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf)//mat

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides strategic mobility to our nation. No other government, commercial, or private agency can move as much to as many places as quickly. The spirit and flexibility of the people who make up the Total Force USTRANSCOM team put the command on the world’s stage. The past two years have been among the most challenging in USTRANSCOM’s history. The simultaneous drawdown of 80,000 troops in Iraq, the surge of forces into Afghanistan, Haitian earthquake-relief operations, and the Pakistani flood-relief effort confronted us in 2010. 1 The year 2011 has proved no less dramatic. The “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. USTRANSCOM supported each situation, evacuating innocents, moving security forces, and delivering humanitarian-relief supplies. In Libya the command moved forces and offered around-the-clock air-refueling tanker capability for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces while also supporting the president’s travels in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. Then, the fourth most powerful earthquake since 1900 struck off the east coast of Japan, lasting over six minutes, literally knocking the earth off its axis, and shortening the length of a day. 2 Worse, the tsunami that followed devastated Japanese coastal areas, caused a nuclear meltdown, and even damaged property in California. USTRANSCOM’s emergency airlift and airrefueling support not only evacuated over 7,500 people and 400 pets but also made available crucial transport of nuclear expertise and material to help control the reactors at Fukushima. We did all of this in addition to supporting combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. In March 2011, for the first time in USTRANSCOM history, the command supported simultaneous priority-one movements in all six geographic combatant commands—truly March madness! In the face of two unbelievably difficult years, I’m proud to say that USTRANSCOM, together with our components and commercial partners, never failed to fulfill our promises to the war fighter, the president, and our nation. Yet, even as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, future challenges demand continued advances.

**Information Age military operations are making operational logistics impossible to control. Logistics are key to overall military transportation infrastructure.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190, mrs)

A year after the invasion of Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 1,400 trucks operate daily to provide supplies to the troops conducting peace enforcement missions and fighting the insurgents in Iraq. 1 What is on all of them? What are the priorities of movement? Where are they delivering, and when do they move on what routes?

No one knows the answers to all of these questions. Yet, it is just as important for a logistician to "see the battlefield" as it is for a tactician. The difference is what must be seen. In considering the answers to the questions posed above, and why they are important to know, there is a quick appreciation for the need for centralized knowledge management. There are information sets of data elements that define the materiel required to sustain the force. There is also a location associated with all materiel at any particular time. When this knowledge is managed simultaneously, these data sets define what the logistician must see. This logistician’s sight picture must extend beyond the immediate battlefield, and include the arrival of supplies in the strategic flow. What is entering the theater, or what was expected to enter but hasn’t, can effect tactical operations just as severely as the internal logistics operation within the Regional Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Despite attempts over the years by many leaders at various local levels to capture the data and manage the knowledge of supplies and materiel movement, the military forces have failed to create the automated systems and operational controls to successfully manage the vast data necessary to command and control large scale military logistics operations. The speed and volume of U.S. military operations in the Information Age has added another level of complexity to this already challenging task.

**Current distribution methods and proposed alternatives lack crucial in-transit visibility – this causes costs to skyrocket.**

**Hampton 12** (Lana, Defense Logistics Agency, January 5, 2012, “News: DLA develops local procurement process for Afghanistan customers,” http://www.dvidshub.net/news/82075/dla-develops-local-procurement-process-afghanistan-customers#.UC8vAN2PXAw, alp)

Early in the Northern Distribution Network local procurement effort, DLA recommended a system similar to the Defense Travel System be used to move goods procured in South Caucasus, Central and South Asian countries to Afghanistan. The key reasons were cost, custom issues, in-transit visibility, security and freight delivery, Rogers said. “Transportation costs to move goods from SC/CASA into Afghanistan are expensive for all shippers,” Rogers said. “Previously, DLA’s procurement process included the transportation costs as part of the product cost as a first destination transportation fee, making the overall product cost unjustifiable.” These commercial, prime-vendor shipments were outside DTS and lacked critical in-transit visibility and customs clearance assistance. The end results were expensive products with unreliable delivery times. DLA’s reimbursement efforts for these intratheater transportation costs were also manual and lengthy, Rogers said.

**Current in-transit visibility efforts are failing – lack of integration, usage, and identification technology means they fail at consolidation.**

**DOD 10** (September 22, Department of Defense, “Afghanistan In-Transit Visibility Joint Task Force: Implementation Plan,” https://wss.apan.org/1600/Document%20Library/BAR%20Reference%20Documents/Theater%20Enterprise%20Mvmt%20Control%20System/Afghan\_ITV\_Implementation\_Plan\_FINAL\_10-07-10.pdf, mrs)

The following major issues are negatively impacting ITV within the CJOA-A and are the focus of this implementation plan:

1. There is no enterprise automated information system (AIS) for movement control in the CJOA-A that gives users an effective management tool to request transportation, assign assets, control shipments, close out shipments when they reach their destination, or provide visibility of these actions at all levels of command.

2. There is incomplete visibility of common-user land transportation (CULT) assets moving cargo in the CJOA-A. Some host nation trucking (HNT) and U.S. green (military) trucks have satellite transponders, but others do not.

3. There is inconsistent or no use of automatic identification technology (AIT) media to capture shipment data that can then be communicated to a common operating picture (COP) where it becomes visible to all authorized users. 2-2

4. Numerous ITV databases are being used to capture partial ITV data, including the Global Transportation Network (GTN), Radio Frequency ITV (RF-ITV) server, Intelligent Road/Rail Information System (IRRIS), and Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3). But, no single system is available to consolidate and provide all needed data for common use throughout the CJOA-A. No single entity is responsible for consolidating this information and ensuring it is passed to the units that need it.

5. No single logistics COP displays both U.S. and coalition partner movement information to provide visibility of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) movements.

6. The movement control organizational structures in CJOA-A, both in the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), are confusing and, in many cases, redundant. Moreover, they are inconsistent with both NATO and U.S. doctrine.

**Current ITV systems are dysfunctional and un-integrated**

**Andrews 10** – Army Major, Masters of Military Art and Science in Homeland Security Studies (November 6, Tacildayus, US Army Command and General Staff College, “THE LACK OF A DESIGNATED NATIONAL IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY SYSTEM AFFECTS THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF INFORMATION SHARING AND THE TIMELY DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS DURING NATURAL DISASTER EFFORTS,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524385, mrs)

DoD has several ITV systems to track supplies; however, there is no document or policy that directs all players to use a specific system during national incidents. A review of their current supply accountability management systems from GAO and IG confirms that their systems are unproductive.

What Department of Defense National ITV System is in Place?

There are reports in this research that indicate that DoD does not have the resources or capability to support a national system. This finding implies that FEMA does not have the appropriate IT systems to bridge the many independent systems. Several IG reports and after action reports stress that FEMA needs to improve its ITV capability and to establish SOPs to better account and track supplies during hurricane response operations.

**Closing the in-transit visibility gap is key to operational control and strategic mobility in a dynamic world.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190)//mat

The nation’s military Services are busy. DoD is not only focusing on the War on Terrorism, but also on a campaign for Transformation. These efforts must set the conditions for success for the Future Force. Two concepts are definite. First, no single Service will operate unilaterally. Second, logistics must achieve a set of capabilities necessary to support the Joint and expeditionary Army and all the Services. Again, the key is achieving ITV. OIF reinforced the experience of failed logistics during ODS, over a decade earlier. Without positive control over what is moving in the defense pipeline, control of the routing and arrival of goods becomes problematic. The effects are felt in the attempt to manage the ground transportation assets it takes to move them, and on the decisions necessary to deploy and operate viable military operations in a highly fluid and dynamic world. Infusing a level of shared situational awareness leading to achieving decision-making based on real time knowledge portends an achievement that translates into the desirable U.S. Future Force characteristics. The military must continue to develop and implement actions through the Combatant Commanders and Service departments if the U.S. is to achieve the necessary level of ITV that provides actionable information to make deployment and sustainment decisions. The Global Transportation Network (GTN) 30 is the backbone information system. It will hold the key to ITV by integrating systems to seek, track and manage data for identification, status, and location of materiel on commercial and military transportation assets around the globe. USTRANSCOM as the end-to-end process owner of the Defense Transportation System, and deploying units that must produce and provide the source data necessary for accurate tracking, are critical to success of the GTN. Within the combatant commands, ITV actions need to be enforced and exercised. The Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea began establishing an RFAIT infrastructure in 1996. 31 EUSA currently uses RF tags for Class IX and ammunition movements. EUSA established interrogators at key logistic nodes on the Korean peninsula to annotate materiel arrival and delivery to Corps Support Areas and Ammunition Supply Points. The regional server is accessible from the internet and all units need to become aware of the system and benefits. EUCOM has a policy for managing Theater level ITV. 32 The theater policy designates responsibilities from the EUCOM J-4, down to supporting organizations and subordinate11 component commanders. The ITV policy establishes minimum requirements for identification, how RF tags should be marked, and how the regional server will be maintained. RFID technologies and systems within the commercial industry are expanding rapidly as private companies employ them to gain efficiencies in the storage, shipping and handling requirements of products. Industry recognizes the cost saving associated with ITV system use and eagerly employ their benefits in order to realize them on the company’s bottom line. The radio frequency technology industry is projected to go from $1 billion last year to an anticipated $3 billion operation by 2007. The DoD is a part of this effort, and has not limited the infusion of AIT capability into military units and supporting logistics agencies, but also required commercial suppliers of military goods to begin using smart tags by this year. 33 This source data capture will provide the opportunity for inclusive application from the initial shipping point, into cargo consolidation points, and ultimately, all the way to the farthest end of the distribution pipeline. This final step is currently the most deficient part of the system. To date, there has been a “seam” at the transition point from the operational level of war to the tactical level. JFCOM and TRANSCOM will need to work hard in their new roles to reduce this seam and provide for a systemic process to enable the proper information flow – the management of knowledge – as well as we can manage the materiel from the CONUS base, into the Unified Command, and to the service or subunified commands. At the tactical level, services must design, equip, and field the ground units with the ability to network until delivery to forward units. In some case this will require unit structural changes, adding network enabling equipment into their authorizations, and updating doctrine to include new techniques and procedures. “The joint logistics system must include a responsive logistics infrastructure with simultaneous deployment, employment, and sustainment capabilities and a single, integrated, responsive end-to end distribution system.” 34 DoD can adopt existing commercial radio frequency applications in existence for use in tactical units. Products are available and in use across industry with all major distribution and transportation companies. Industry leaders such as FEDEX, the LANDSTAR trucking group, and WALMART all employ this technology to manage shipment data or keep stockages to cost effective minimums. The commercial application is proven. DoD’s initial, limited use of similar technology proves that Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) products are sufficient for military use. No new design or different production requirements are necessary to meet the DoD ITV goals.

## 1AC North Korea

**North Korean collapse is inevitable – multiple social, political, military, and ecological factors – empirics prove.**

**Lee 8/27** (Michael, CEO of ATM Industry Associations, member of the World Future Society, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of Physics, and the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, IEET, “Unmasking North Korea’s Future,” http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/6399, alp)

Everyone can see that North Korea is trapped in a tragic time-warp, a kind of living museum of 1950s style Cold War socialism. Its political bubble of unreality is likely to burst open with great force well before mid-century. The near-implosion of North Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union provides a glimpse into both the past and future of the country. At the time of the partition of Korea into North and South Korea, [1] the former was largely industrial and the latter agrarian. While South Korea advanced in the intervening decades into a leading Asian Tiger economy, its northern counterpart descended into a dystopia begging to be captured on celluloid. It is a story of two Koreas: to the north, economic decline of an industrial society brought about by an energy crisis coupled with ecological degradation, and, to the south, economic prosperity and technological innovation catapulting an agricultural society into the 21st Century. The fact that North Korea fell so hard after the fall of communism shows the extent to which this small nation has relied upon foreign supplies. Since the Korean peninsula as a whole has little oil and gas of its own, communist North Korea depended upon the Soviet Union for its industrial energy needs until that Union broke up at the end of the 1980s. Then North Korea lost the bulk of its supply of energy to run its industries. In 1990, for example, it had imported 18.3 million barrels of oil from Russia, China and Iran. Then, abruptly, its imports from Russia fell by 90%, [2] a catastrophic depletion. Then floods in 1995 and 1996 washed away precious top soil, damaged and silted dams and flooded coal mining shafts. These natural disasters were followed by a massive drought in 1997, and then by a tsunami. It is difficult to survive twin energy and environmental challenges of this magnitude. The country’s aging economic infrastructure and systems faltered and fell under the burden. A dangerous feedback loop was created between industrial and ecological decline as the government began burning biomass to create heat and energy to compensate for its meagre supply of oil and gas: “North Koreans turned to burning biomass, thus destroying their remaining forests. Deforestation led, in turn, to more flooding and increasing levels of soil erosion. Likewise, soils were depleted as plant matter was burned for heat, rather than being mulched and composted…Biomass harvesting reduces ground cover, disrupts habitats and leads to increasing soil erosion and siltation.” [3] Since modern agriculture depends upon fossil fuels almost as much as modern industry does, North Korea’s energy crisis was bound to lead eventually to a food crisis. Famine struck the country in the second half of the 1990s. During this period, mass starvation decimated about 10% of the population. This must have been a terrifying time for the nation. Even today, around 6.5 million of the state’s 23 million people are dependent upon food aid from the UN’s World Food Program (WFP). The agency reports that 37% of children and 32% of women in the country are badly malnourished. Behind the façade of television broadcasts of military pomp and power, North Korea is, in reality, a depleted society unable to properly feed its own population. It is at least halfway along the road to destruction. It has undergone an industrial and agricultural collapse from which it will never fully recover unless it modernises its society and economy. The dilemma for the authorities in Pyongyang is that such a modernisation process would lead rapidly to the demise of its totalitarian political system. The country reminds me of how the Maya civilisation declined as a result of a combination of energy shortages, food crises, natural disasters, ecological deterioration and a political vacuum. Inappropriate, rigid leadership, which was unresponsive to the rootcauses of its national crisis, played a significant role in the Maya Collapse. It is going to be a key element of North Korea’s future fall. The country’s totalitarian military dictatorship, which hosts about 200,000 political prisoners, seems more interested in developing its nuclear weapons programme than in feeding all its people. The state first allocates fuel to the military and then lets the other sectors – agriculture, transportation and industry – compete for the remainder of the limited fuel supplies available to the country. The Maya civilization broke down as a result of its over-consumed, exhausted resource base, which increased competition for resources and conflict. Degraded, deforested land such as we see in North Korea, becomes more vulnerable to climate change, which, in turn, further damages the soil and its fertility, leading to worsening droughts and decreased food production. This, in turn, further aggravates competition for resources, leading to social conflict. Social conflict then makes it harder for the kind of collective, co-operative action required to solve the deep-seated socio-ecological dilemma. Decline then slides down into disintegration. From a systems point of view, such destructive feedback loops are difficult to solve even by governments with high levels of credibility. This kind of collapse is what happened to the Mayas. Unfortunately, this is likely to happen to the North Koreans, too. It would only take some catalytic force, possibly the next inevitable famine or an internal leadership power struggle, to release the pent-up, long-repressed anger of these masses and groups.

**Effective in-transit visibility is key to US military operations and preparedness in Korea.**

**LaPorte 5** – General, Commander – United Nations Command, Commander – Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, Commander – United States Forces Korea (March 8, Leon J, “Statement Of General Leon J. Laporte Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic Of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; And Commander, United States Forces Korea Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,” www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-08LaPorte.doc, mrs)

Logistically supporting United States Forces Korea is a complex, multi-faceted undertaking. The proximity of the North Korean threat, coupled with the long distances from United States sustainment bases, requires a robust and responsive logistics system to support United States forces based in Korea. The capability enhancements currently programmed will significantly improve our core logistics functions through modern pre-positioned equipment, responsive strategic transportation, and modern logistics tracking systems. Pre-positioned equipment sets, which include critical weapons systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, are critical to the rapid power projection to reinforce the Korean theater. Responsive strategic transportation -- fast sealift ships and cargo aircraft -- remains indispensable to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain United States forces. Expeditious fielding of the Air Force’s C-17 fleet, the Army’s Theater Support Vessel, and the Marine Corps’ High Speed Vessel to the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility remains a high priority to support United States forces based in Korea. Equally important is the ability to maintain in-transit visibility of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint Logistics Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information system. Lessons from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted several areas where relatively small investments in asset tracking systems and theater distribution yield significant efficiencies and improves the overall effectiveness of our logistics systems. Your continued support for improved logistics and sustainment programs will ensure that United States forces have the right equipment and supplies at the right time.

**America military preparedness is key to stability on the Peninsula. Degradations in capacity will undermine that stabilizing force.**

**Ra 1/19**—former national security advisor to South Korean president Roh, president of Woosuk University (Jong-yil, 19 January 2011, “Military First Doctrine Is Behind North Korea Adventurism,” New Perspectives Quarterly Vol. 28 Iss. 1, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2011.01223.x/pdf, RBatra)

Not long ago, against the background of the sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan Ham, and then the clash over an island between China and Japan, I was interviewed by Chinese television. “Why should America, an external power, intervene in the affairs of this region?” my questioner asked. “Why does it still maintain such a military presence on the Korean peninsula?”

I gently reminded her that America came to be involved in this region as a result of the Pacific War, which it entered after being attacked by Japan, and has maintained its presence ever since. As for its military presence in Korea, America had withdrawn from the peninsula but had to return when war broke out less than a year after its withdrawal.

As East Asians, we may have objections to foreign military presence on our lands. But it is an undeniable fact that there has not been a major military conflict on the peninsula or in other parts of the region for more than a half a century since the Korean War. Without doubt, dating back to the time of the Japanese invasion of its neighbors, America has become a stabilizing factor in the region mainly because we have not been able to manage our own affairs.

In the current crisis, we cannot simply sit back and say that the North Korean problem is ultimately only resolvable by America and North Korea, while arguing at the same time for less of an American presence in the region.

**Collapse will escalate absent US preparedness and maintenance of our asymmetric transportation advantage.**

**Maxwell 10** – US Army Special Forces Officer, Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, Faculty at the National War College (November 30, David S, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula,” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch\_14.asp, mrs)

The fundamental assumption for this paper is that the threats that may emerge following collapse or conflict on the peninsula will be characterized by being irregular and these irregular threats will pose a dangerous and complex situation that if not properly planned and prepared for could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region for years to come. These threats will be a source of human suffering in the region, as well as cause significant security threats and economic turmoil, perhaps on a global scale. It is imperative that these potential irregular threats be identified and understood and that countermeasures be developed. The second fundamental assumption is that the North Korean people will not welcome the Republic of Korea and its allies with open arms. They may be welcomed by some, perhaps many, but certainly not by all and therein is a significant threat. It should be recalled that an assumption regarding liberation of Iraq was made in 2003 that postulated the Iraqi people would welcome the US as liberators and this incorrect assumption led to years of insurgency that was only countered after belated recognition of the conditions of insurgency and then undertaking a significant shift in strategy. The third assumption is that while Irregular Warfare is the current 21st Century term of art for the conflicts that the US is likely to face, planners and policy makers do not appear to view the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats 2.0 dated 17 May 2010) as applying to the problems that can be expected to be posed by a post-Kim Family regime in North Korea. While the IW JOC appears to be pre-disposed to countering the violent extremism of non-state actors as well as asymmetric threats from state actors, a post Kim Family Regime North Korea will at once have many characteristics of violent extremism (though based on a different ideology: the religious-like Juche ideology) and at the same time use many of the already existing asymmetric capabilities developed by the North Korean state. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly the assumption is made that remnants of the North Korean military, Communist Party and population will oppose the introduction of non-North Korean forces and conduct a uniquely North Korean insurgency to accomplish the classic insurgent goal of ridding a land of an occupying power. Additionally, it should be noted that the term irregular warfare in Korean is the same as unconventional warfare and this breeds confusion within the alliance.

**Escalation goes global**

**Bennet and Lind 11** – Senior Defense Analyst at The RAND Corporation and Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Fall, Bruce W and Jennifer, International Security, Volume 36 Number 2, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Collapse\_of\_North\_Korea.pdf, mrs)

A government collapse in North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-reaching regional and global effects. Collapse would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis. Many of North Korea’s 24 million inhabitants are already severely malnourished; if government-provided food and health services were to cease, the population would rapidly face the prospect of starvation. Food shortages and the possibility of civil war [End Page 84] would trigger a massive outflow of refugees, as desperate North Koreans searched for food and safety across international borders. North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way out of the country and onto the global black market. If other countries wanted to intervene to mitigate such instability, they would need to perform complex military operations. The provision of humanitarian relief could not be delegated to international relief organizations. Because North Korea has some 1.2 million active-duty military personnel and 7.7 million reservists,5 outside military intervention would likely be necessary to provide security for such operations. The consequences of a poorly planned response to a government collapse in North Korea are potentially calamitous. Rapid cooperation would be essential because many response missions are time-sensitive—for example, the longer it takes to organize humanitarian efforts, the higher the number of North Koreans who might perish or decide to leave their homes; in addition, the longer North Korean WMD are left unsecured, the larger the risk that they will disappear across international borders. Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send their militaries in without coordination to stabilize the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while U.S. and South Korean troops race north is terrifying given the experience of the Korean War, a climate of suspicion among the three countries,6 and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.7

## 1AC America

**Seamless ITV is key to ending transportation bottlenecks that diminish warfighting capacity.**

**Brewer 4** (David L., “Military Sealift Command: making the defense distribution process work,” Defense Transportation Journal, 9/1, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-123240443.html)//mat

A new era in combat logistics dawned when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the single owner of the DoD distribution process. With the announcement, seamless integration of the transportation process, with production at the factory or deployment from the fort to consumption at the foxhole, by truck, train, ship and aircraft, began to enter the realm of reality. Key to this seamless journey of combat goods from their origins to the war-fighting commanders who need them to dominate the enemy in the field and win the day is in-transit visibility. Military Sealift Command has been working with TRANSCOM partners, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, for more than two years to bring new technology to bear on the visibility issue. One of the research outcomes is the use of radio frequency identification data (RFID) tags to make cargo selection and loading more accurate and much faster at those locations where the transportation mode changes. This technology significantly reduces or altogether eliminates the transportation "seam" that used to cause bottlenecks, sometimes leaving a small mountain of containers of combat gear waiting for forward transportation and field commanders nervously wondering if needed supplies and equipment would arrive in time. MSC ships are now using RFID tags in the cargo loading process instead of bar-code readers to identify each specific piece, a cumbersome process that required individuals to approach and point a bar-code reader at every vehicle or container being loaded. A remote reader, called an interrogator, reads the code being transmitted via radio frequency by the tag. Interrogators are located in the marshalling area, on the ship's loading ramp and in the cargo hold. The data is automatically entered into the digital database, providing an accurate record of what each ship is carrying and where the piece of equipment is stowed. Long the maritime innovator for the DoD, Military Sealift Command is also working closely with TRANSCOM and the Navy on several other concepts to further reduce transport interruptions thus increasing the speed and efficiency of delivery in the field, where war-fighting commanders need it most. One change being implemented within MSC will significantly increase our capability to rapidly and accurately disseminate operational information--a single, integrated worldwide command information center. By eliminating smaller, redundant command centers in each of our area commands and making maximum use of web-based communications, such as computer-assisted conference calls and sophisticated web links, MSC will be able to provide customers with virtually instantaneous status updates on specific ships--even specific cargo items. We'll be able to provide more accurate scheduling information and more precise delivery dates and times to war fighters. MSC is also looking at the current cumbersome method of loading and off-loading cargo. For instance, to reach a specific container of gear belonging to an Army unit, the entire ship sometimes must be off-loaded before the container can be found--a laborious process that takes hours. Selective discharge technology--the ability to know the location of and retrieve a specific container of combat gear from a ship's cargo hold through computerized automation--will revolutionize that process, reducing hours to minutes. Using the RFID tags, a computer database will be able to identify any container aboard ship. An automated gantry and conveyer system will locate the container and quickly move it to the ship's cargo discharge area for transfer to the next mode in the distribution system, virtually untouched by human hands. This technology will also allow for a smaller crew, thus saving money. At the same time, MSC is looking at the technical issues involved in making joint logistics over the sea (JLOTS) capable of handling higher sea states. Presently, JLOTS technology is capable of off-loading combat cargo at sea for transfer to shore via barges and other lighterage only in sea state one or two, which are essentially calm conditions. Since conflict doesn't wait for weather, we need to be able to safely conduct at-sea off-loads in worse sea conditions. MSC is seeking improvements in auto-compensating crane technology--cranes that automatically adjust to the ship's rolling or pitching in heavy seas--and more stable lighterage for the trip to shore. The crane technology would also be used in conjunction with selective discharge systems as part of the sea-basing concept. Part of the Chief of Naval Operations Seapower 21 strategy is sea basing, which would provide an at-sea platform as a US base for cargo transfer, mission aircraft launching, command and control, etc. The sea base could be as simple as one command ship or as complicated as several ships or vessels offering modular living quarters, hospital facilities, flight facilities and advanced communications. The sea-basing concept will provide flexibility to adapt the system to the specific mission and will take advantage of maneuvering space at sea for defense of the sea base. Throughout all the concepts being explored, customer service--the ability to get what the field commander needs, where needed, when needed--will be paramount. That's why we at MSC are working closely with our sister component commands in TRANSCOM to make the distribution process work faster and more efficiently.

**Forced military downsizing due to debt and cost-cutting will necessitate transportation infrastructure efficiency. This transportation infrastructure is key to crisis response to respond to China, North Korea, Iran, extremism, cyberwar, and other crises. This asymmetric advantage is crucial.**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf)//mat

Strategic Context Demands More with Less Against a backdrop of rising national debt and an uncertain future security environment, USTRANSCOM can do its part to secure our nation’s interests by improving the access and efficiency of our strategic mobility system—a national asymmetric advantage. The ongoing threats of global extremism, the rise of China, a nuclear North Korea, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, and the war in cyberspace are but a few of the difficulties we can see on the horizon. Even as we prepare for these kinds of problems, we know we will face disaster-related humanitarian crises like those that have occurred in Indonesia, Haiti, Japan, Pakistan, New Zealand, the United States, and elsewhere. Covering this crisis spectrum demands a wide range of capability, one in which our logistical forces must be equally capable of meeting warfighter needs in uncontested, semicontested, and contested domains; favorable and unfavorable terrain; all types of weather; and places with limited or no infrastructure. In short our mobility enterprise must have assured access to the entire globe, able to reach even the remotest areas and project power where our national interests dictate we must—a tall, expensive order. Our nation’s debt of $14.5 trillion (and growing) will shape future military capability more than any other factor. The enormity of this indebtedness led Adm Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to declare it “the most significant threat to our national security” 3 —one that we simply cannot address without considering defense. Our spending on national security—$881 billion in fiscal year 2012—consumes more than any other category of the federal budget. 4 As the debate rages in Washington over how to handle our debt issues, it seems only prudent that the Department of Defense (DOD) find ways of operating in a shrinking budget environment. To do so, we must become more efficient at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Balancing the opposing challenges of increasing access while using fewer resources will likely produce an ever-growing demand for mobility. The DOD probably will not be able to recapitalize its aging inventory of ships, planes, and vehicles on a one-for-one basis. A RAND study of 2008 concluded that the annual cost growth of all types of military aircraft has far outpaced inflation because of many factors, the lion’s share coming from technological complexity of design—a trend not unique to aircraft. 5 Analyses of the US Navy’s ship fleet and the US Army’s / Marine Corps’s tactical vehicle fleets show similar trends in cost growth. Across the board, Services are forecasting declining platform numbers because of such growth and budgetary constraints. 6 All the while, the world security environment is becoming more complex and multipolar. Quite simply, the American military will have to do more with fewer things and in more places than it ever has before. As the more-with-less trend accelerates, strategic mobility will increasingly assert itself as a multiplying force for good—a prospect that will necessitate a global network of interconnected ports in suitable positions to enable global reach.

**Logistics are key to combatting the effects of force reduction and operational tempo to enable rapid engagement**

**Honea et al. 2k** - PhD (Robert B., Sarah E. Brown, Henry M. Bennett, “U.S. Military Transportation,” Committee on Military Transportation, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/millennium/00137.pdf)//mat

Recent closure or loss of overseas bases and assets now requires a greater dependence on deploying forces from the continental United States (CONUS), thus requiring efficient deployment planning. At the same time, widely scattered and increasingly numerous lowscale operations result in a greater pace of military deployments than ever before. Deploying from home station directly into theaters together with resupply and sustainment presents a highly complicated problem in military logistics that demands the application of appropriate technologies. In the civilian world, technology and advanced logistics concepts have greatly increased transportation efficiency and capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) theater commanders in chief (CINCs) have recognized the emergence of the new technologies and now routinely demand constant updates and estimates on when the “forces will close.” Furthermore, the Wal-Mart approach to resupply and sustainment is becoming the norm. In most military operations, early deployment cargo moves on military assets. Although these early movements may account for only a small portion of the total, they are often the most critical. Still, most military cargo, personnel, and war-fighting assets now move on commercial assets. For example, more than 95 percent of the equipment and cargo shipped in Desert Shield and Desert Storm moved on commercial carriers. Because of this, DoD instituted agreements with commercial carriers to ensure asset availability when needed. However, in an era of increasing need for military augmentation, competitive pressures have reduced civilian excess capacity and increased the need for closer coordination between the military and civilian carriers. Civilian-sector efficiency improvements result from the rapidly increasing use of technology to identify, track, and quickly locate cargo and shipments. For example, global positioning systems are now commonplace in the commercial trucking industry. The military sector needs to adopt these commercial successes more rapidly. Many disciplines are available to improve the planning and execution of military deployments, such as information technology and computers; communications; network flow models; operations research and logistics science; design of lift assets; demand reduction; and vehicle scheduling, routing, and monitoring. Many military transportation problems are being addressed by commercial companies or are the subject of research in universities and national laboratories. Because of the military’s conservative nature, the research community has the lead in developing and using advanced technology. We need a mechanism to bring these groups—military, business, and research centers—together to ensure that the latest developments in transportation are made available to solve military transportation problems. We believe that the Transportation Research Board’s Committee on Military Transportation is that mechanism.

**Asymmetric warfare is the new global paradigm. Rapid military engagement is critical to maintain military leadership and solve conflict.**

**Barno 11** – Lieutenant General (retired), former US Commander in Afghanistan, senior adviser and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (March 22, David, World Politics Review, “Military Power in a Disorderly World,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8259/military-power-in-a-disorderly-world, mrs)

The opening acts of the 21st century have fundamentally challenged long-held notions of military power. The past decade has unveiled not only the disruptive power of terrorist groups with global reach, but also the ability of low-budget insurgent groups to directly confront the best military forces of the West -- with surprising success. Moreover, recent revolutionary events across the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of military power when facing mass popular uprisings. Disorder, chaos and violent extremism seem on course to replace state-on-state violence as the most common forms of conflict in the new century. Given this new security environment, the U.S. military must begin to play a larger role in conflict prevention in order to fully realize its value, commensurate with its cost, in this new disorderly world.

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 -- launched not with tanks, warplanes or intercontinental missiles, but with commercial airliners -- were the most deadly assaults on U.S. soil since the American Civil War. Unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have also rattled the conventions of military thought, as insurgents equipped with inexpensive weaponry have inflicted prolonged attrition on U.S. forces. The U.S. military has spent billions of dollars defending against these new, low-cost threats, but the West and its military thinkers are still grappling with the full security implications of these dramatic upheavals in traditional military power balances. The era of asymmetric warfare has arrived with a vengeance.

Recent revolutionary events in the Arab world -- starting in Tunisia and rapidly spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain -- have further highlighted today's shifting balance of power. While the outcome of these upheavals is still unclear, they reflect a new sort of asymmetrical power wielded by popular movements and expressed through mass street demonstrations. These spontaneous movements -- organized and enabled by modern technologies such as cellphones, Twitter and Facebook -- have directly challenged the "hard power" of state militaries, albeit with mixed results to date. Yet at the same time, the West's hard-power response to the Libyan regime's harsh backlash against its people has further demonstrated that conventional military power remains a powerful tool -- in this case employed to enforce the will of the broader international community as expressed by U.N. resolutions.

Another version of this asymmetric power shift has played out against Western forces in the wars for Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite successful high-tech U.S. military campaigns at the outset of each conflict, the enemy quickly adapted with inexpensive forms of asymmetry, in the shape of attacks by car bombs, suicide vests and IEDs, and with clashes often captured and disseminated via cellphone videos. The cost to the insurgents of these unconventional weapons is minimal, but the U.S. defensive response to protect its army is staggering. The multibillion-dollar fleet of heavily protected MRAP vehicles designed to protect U.S. soldiers against IEDs is just one example. This reflects in part an insurgent strategy of "cost imposition," whereby the enemy attempts to drive the costs of the war in lives and fortune to a point where it no longer makes strategic sense for the U.S. to pursue its aims.

The evolving nature of global threats echoes the tactical asymmetry found on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where the 19th and 20th centuries were dominated by a Westphalian order of nation-states, nonstate actors have moved to center stage in today's global order. This is a "flat world" of multinational companies, interwoven crime syndicates, global special interest groups, Internet-fueled extremist ideologies and terrorist networks. In many ways, the comfortable order and rule of law represented by the nation-states seated at the U.N. is fading, overtaken by a complex mix of other competitors for power. Of even greater concern, the destructive power accessible to even tiny groups is skyrocketing, rendering both deterrence and containment of fringe actors exceedingly difficult.

The role of U.S. military forces in this new era of global disorder requires a careful assessment. The U.S. Department of Defense has traditionally analyzed foreign military capabilities and assigned priorities based upon their potential threat to U.S. interests. In today's world, a threat-calculus based upon conventional military capabilities makes less sense, as does the impetus to simply build a U.S. military to confront these nation-state threats. In a disorderly world, terrorist groups, transnational criminals or state failure may generate a serious threat to U.S. vital interests as readily as a cross-border invasion. In this environment, a U.S. military too deeply invested in conventional military capabilities may be poorly positioned for other strategic challenges facing the United States. But if it seems obvious that the next U.S. military must be able to more than just fight or deter other armies, navies and air forces, exactly what else it should be doing is less clear.

In many ways, the current "supply of security capital" by the United States is woefully out of balance with the "demand signal" driven by threats in this new disorderly world. A U.S. Foreign Service with fewer than 8,000 diplomats to cover the globe contrasts with a U.S. Marine Corps of 200,000 leathernecks. A foreign aid and development budget of less than $60 billion competes with a base defense budget that exceeds $550 billion a year. But the bureaucratic realities of Washington and the U.S. Congress give scant hope that any major realignments between U.S. government departments will occur. This is a fundamental dose of reality: Even in an era of fiscal austerity, Defense will continue to have a disproportionate share of U.S. government discretionary spending. This recognition should drive new thinking on maximizing those assets.

One outcome should be clear: The U.S. military must begin to play a larger role in global conflict prevention in this new disorderly world. Military forces based largely in the United States waiting for a war to break out are simply an unaffordable resource drain in a financial environment where the annual interest payments on the nation's debt will exceed its $550 billion defense budget by the end of this decade. The U.S. military is no longer a sound investment if it only defends and deters -- it must now also actively help prevent conflicts and stabilize key regions of the world where instability can threaten vital U.S. interests. All three missions -- defend, deter, prevent -- are important, and the next U.S. military should be organized, trained and equipped to actively engage in each.

Making this change will require a strategic reset in both U.S. military and diplomatic thinking. Fortunately, the nation-building and counterinsurgency experiences of the past 10 years have prepared the military well for this adjustment. Building on this experience makes sense. This new task of "selective stabilization" can better align the military with U.S. diplomatic missions abroad in at-risk areas and leverage a broader array of U.S. power. Yet this logic will be strongly opposed by those worried about a further "militarization of foreign policy" -- while failing to recognize that the diplomat's traditional remit of "represent, report and negotiate" is shrinking in today's disorderly world. Fewer regions will demand these traditional diplomatic talents alone, and many more will require new skills in integrating U.S. hard and soft power in potential conflict zones.

Demographic and natural resource trends signal that violent upheaval and the threat of instability will menace ever greater parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Central and South Asia. U.S. vital interests in these regions are less threatened by interstate war than by the risks of internal extremism, instability and terrorism. Stabilizing the most important of these regions is an essential new task, and one that will require the combined talents of State and Defense.

None of this suggests the deployment of Army divisions to the Maghreb or Marine landings on the Nigerian coast -- quite the opposite. Nor does it suggest the U.S. military abandon war fighting to take on a global nation-building role in lieu of its traditional combat responsibilities. But the nation's large investment in the military argues for a greater return on investment in response to an increasingly disorderly world.

That said, the lead for any expanded engagement by U.S. military forces overseas must remain the U.S. ambassador as chief of mission in any country with a U.S. presence. But in zones of potential conflict, the military can provide the ambassador with planners and strategists, logisticians and analysts, technicians and foreign area officers -- and, often, defense dollars. The U.S. military can also deliver core capabilities to help train and professionalize less-capable militaries in these regions around the world, modeling U.S. values and norms that are the global standard of military excellence. The restraint and responsibility exercised by the U.S.-trained Egyptian military in responding to the popular protests and managing the ongoing transition of power in Egypt is the best recent example of the power of this influence.

The Era of the Disorderly World has already dawned. The importance of conventional militaries in this world has changed, but it has not gone away. Hard military power remains potent, and U.S. military power remains the dominant hard power force in the world -- and will remain so even in an era of U.S. fiscal austerity. But in order to prepare to confront the most dangerous conventional and unconventional threats to the nation, more is demanded. The U.S. military must add to its strategic portfolio a new mission: conflict prevention. Too many scarce resources are vested in the military to simply preserve it for the next war. These costly investments should be leveraged to make that war much less likely -- particularly in the highest-priority regions for U.S. vital interests around the world. Confronting this dangerous and disorderly world will require all of the diverse sources of talent that the United States can muster.

**Hegemony cannot survive in the 21st century, but American military leadership is key to prevent global chaos and conflict – there’s no alternative to the US.**

**Brzezinski 12** – trustee and co-chair of the CSIS Advisory Board, CSIS counselor, professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, co-chair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus, member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council (January/February, Zbigniew, Foreign Policy, “After America,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america?page=full, mrs)

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.

The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role.

China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.

At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.

A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

## 1AC Plan

**Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its transportation infrastructure investment in the United States through passive radio-frequency identification for integrated in-transit visibility.**

## 1AC Solvency

**Federal action on ITV is key to military operations – high-level policy formulation is key to integration and success.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190)//mat

. This paper addresses the impact that the most recent United States military logistics experiences in supporting OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has on the future of logistics. The specific focus is on achieving In-Transit Visibility (ITV) as a means of knowledge management. ITV is the term used to define the reporting and management of what is moving within the Defense Transportation System (DTS) and the Defense Department’s geographic operational theaters. It is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of unit equipment, and non-unit cargo, from origin to destination. 2 This is not only physical management, but knowledge management; the ability to plan and predict requirements based on the information at hand. ITV is a component of Total Asset Visibility (TAV), which is the capability to provide users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, materiel, and supplies. It also includes the capability to act upon that information to improve overall performance of logistics practices. 3 Relegating management of materiel to the physical actions as it flows is inefficient. It leads to lost time and resources and places unacceptable sustainment risk on our fighting forces. Improve ITV, and through that, an ability to see and decide on support requirements in a theater of war, and the result is a savings in money, time, resources, and materiel handling. Streamline the supply chain, and proper support to forward tactical forces will follow. It is not sufficient to be able to manage the handling and movement of the materiel itself, but to also be able to manage the data that defines what is moving. "Lack of visibility hides bottlenecks, precludes accurate asset accounting, and forces unnecessary procurement at the national level." 4 It is the data flow that arms the decision-making process. "Sustaining and increasing the qualitative military advantages the United States enjoys today will require transformation - a transformation achieved by combining technology, intellect and cultural changes across the joint community. The goal is Full Spectrum Dominance - the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations." 5 Such dominance must include the procedures for deployment and sustainment. Services have a responsibility to change doctrine and practice to meet future operating goals, but the key is to achieve joint interdependency of forces. Thus, integration of logistics operations at the strategic level is the ultimate goal, and this must be driven by policy formulation at the highest level. Policy will enable Unified Commanders to create the structures and functions necessary to establish systems reaching to the tactical level. Services, then must train and equip the force so the necessary skills and equipment are available at the unit level for tactical execution and close the circle from the strategic to the tactical level of war. Despite an obvious profitability recognizable by any novice accountant or businessman, the fact is, the Department of Defense (DoD) failed to establish feasible ITV policy, even after the benefits were experienced as a result of supply chain management and distribution failures from Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) over a dozen years ago. At some command levels, minor implementation of identification technologies was accomplished. These efforts were far from system-wide implementation and contributed more to “stove-pipe” Service or command processes rather than efficient handling. Services learned again, through a major finding from OIF, that there was a lack of knowledge and decision capability over what was flowing into the theater through the strategic pipeline. Complicating a holistic view of resources, Services failed to manage what was stored or moving within the AOR. Twice is enough. It is time to fix the problem. The solution is not simple. It is not improvement of old techniques. The character of warfare changed with the execution of OEF/OIF. The pace is rapid. The advance across Iraq was the quickest of any attacking army in history. Distances are great. OIF was the deepest advance of land forces in such a short period of time. The battlespace is noncontiguous. Forces bypassed congested/contested areas and left other open spaces virtually unassailed, while operating across hundreds of miles in both Iraq and Afghanistan. All of these traits of recent land warfare had an impact on U.S. logistics planning and execution. The view of these changes upon warfare in the information age reinforces the need to infuse a higher discipline into the supply chain through DoD network centric operations and new policy requirements. These implications cannot be ignored if the U.S. military is to achieve what they desire in the future, which is to "rapidly build momentum and close the gaps between the decision to employ force and the deployment of initial entry and follow-on forces in order to rapidly achieve objectives."

**ITV technology exists now – TRANSCOM implementation is key. All the investment happens at USTRANSCOM headquarters in the United States.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190)//mat

The important first steps to achieving ITV have been realized. DoD organizations recognize ITV as a necessary enabler. The U.S. military transformation effort cannot deliver Future Force capabilities without the ability to achieve ITV over the distribution system. Full spectrum dominance entails an agile logistics structure to support an agile force. The strategic logistic system must support and enable the tactical level systems to provide capability throughout the entire pipeline. Policy formulation from DoD has established the operating guidance necessary for joint commands and military agencies to establish and operate viable ITV programs, including prescriptive format for uniform data compliance by the service departments. This foundation provides the integrating policy at the national level. Success starts with proper policy formulation. By all evidence, U.S. forces have that today and it defines the desirable ends. Following the new OSD guidance are implementation strategies across the Unified Commands and Services. These actions have been initiated and are steadily progressing in JFCOM and TRANSCOM as deployment and distribution process owners at the joint level, and must permeate into the Regional Combatant Commands logistic operations and deployment programs. The Army implemented these in the Korean and European theaters, and with them, has accomplished the first step in implementing the ways. Significant actions remain in establishing the means necessary to achieve the change demanded by OSD policy. To create a network centric, end-to-end capability for ITV requires very deliberate actions to accomplish two advancements. First, is the necessary integration of the two separate functions of unit deployment and sustainment operations. The second is the institutional determination and sourcing of tracking technologies to create ITV at the far end of the pipeline, the operational theater. These plans have not yet been formulated. The roadmap to follow is based on the descriptive capabilities outlined in the Joint Operational Concepts for the Future Force, and the military’s own experience in recent and current operations as a result of experimentation with various commercial tracking systems. Once the Services arrive at the implementation strategy of the OSD policy, in 2005, they will be able to close the link between the prescribed capabilities of an end-to-end system, and what the tactical units need to operate a successful sensing and reporting system, managed by a control structure at Joint or operational JTF headquarters. This will change the entire execution of logistics operations in the Future Force, realize significant cost savings, reduce the logistics infrastructure required in the operational theater, and reduce the risk of sustainment to engaged forces.13 First, strategic deployment and sustainment systems must be integrated in the theater. The logistics pipeline flow originates in CONUS and flows into the main battle area. All military services and supporting agencies must apply consistent capability from the beginning to the end. This will happen only when the theater level control and management systems are fed by strategic systems, and by joint integration of system capability to integrate the logistics network so that any origin location and source data is sufficient to populate all ITV requirements. Management of knowledge must be the focus. Through Joint and Service transformation efforts the communications and decision support systems necessary to enable continuous realtime knowledge management will be achieved. The tactical level equipping and training requirement is the weakest point in the solution. Until the field units that provide the transportation and quartermaster functions in order to enable distribution and supply management functions at the tactical level, no amount of strategic architecture will provide a solution. Additionally, unless the same data used by all sources and commands has the same functional qualities and populate the same information systems, ITV of materiel will continue to be lost at the tactical level, which will equate to lack of supply support to the warfighter. This leads to the second requirement, which is to resource the far end of the pipeline properly. Systemic integration of data for tracking storage, supply, and movement data, as resident in JOPES, or processed through supply and deployment information systems for execution, 35 or as originated by commercial sources, or in prepositioned stocks, must be interchangeable. All necessary technology is available. It is used throughout commercial enterprise. The Army’s use of systems such as Blue Force Tracker and Movement Tracking System demonstrate the possible integration of these decision support templates into contemporary warfare. The complete solution will come with data integration and transmission capability. A recommendation is necessary to address several outstanding issues. Based on the research for this paper and professional experience, the question of resourcing for a large quantity of RF tags remains undetermined. There are two likely scenarios which appear to be most feasible for assigning responsibility to source and provide tags to units and wholesale supply agencies alike. These are either USTRANSCOM as the Joint level headquarters responsible for distribution and transportation support or the Installation Management Agency, which owns the deployment and shipment functions at the Army installation level. A companion to the issue of initial resourcing of RFID tags is the recycling and return of assets for recurring use. Historically, forces in combat succumb quickly to possession rules or feel anything they don’t need is a throw-away product. History has illustrated a gross deficiency14 in recycling RF tags during deployment exercises and operations. The accumulation of millions of dollars in rental and delinquency charges on shipping containers and the “Bogarting” of 463L air pallet systems causing shortages in the airlift cycle are indications that the systemic return of a device that can fit in a soldiers hand or be quickly dropped to the ground will never make it back into the transportation network. Finally, compliance checks must be considered. The policy from USD (AT&L) lacks an assessment tool to determine compliance. Proper enforcement and reinforcement of the procedures is necessary. Assessment metrics concerning source data quality, use and tracking factors, and return of tags into the transportation system will indicate how well the warfighter is supported. In conclusion, ITV can be achieved. DoD policy and industrial technologies exist to deliver the capabilities needed throughout DoD agencies and units. Though some additional actions are needed to “close the loop” in tactics, techniques, and procedures, the value of ITV acknowledged by commanders, combined with the actions pursued in force transformation into the Information Age, will drive the process through integration at the tactical level.

**A weak military doesn’t prevent aggression – it encourages miscalculation**

**Feaver 5** - Professor of Political Science at Duke (Peter, “Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations,” p. 4-5, mat)

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks. The military primarily exists as a guard against disaster and should always be ready even if it is never used. Moreover, its strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution may be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression: strong enough in appearance to threaten powerful enemies, but not strong enough in fact to defend against their predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence, leading them to rash behavior and then failing in the ultimate military contest.

**Passive radio-frequency identification is the best method for implementing in-transit visibility – massively increases speed and accuracy – includes identification ability that solves the reason other attempts at ITV have failed.**

**Kinsella 9** (Bret, “SMART containers—the UAV for logistics,” Defense Transportation Journal, September, Proquest)

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) revolutionized air supremacy and visibility over the battlefield. UAVs provide greater visibility at a lower cost than alternative means. Most importantly, critical airborne tasks are accomplished without highly trained and scarce resources: pilots. Thanks to the DOD's RFlD mandate and 21st century technology, there is now a UAV for logistics. The old adage "a good man is hard to find" applies to any specialty. Pilots have long been a bottleneck resource that are hard to find and train. By contrast, UAVs are controlled from distant locations away from enemy fire and provide inexpensive and rapidly deployable battlefield reconnaissance and firepower. Removing the human requirement from aerial observation and direct combat reduced cost and increased warfighter safety. The solution was automation. The US military scans billions of barcodes each year that all have one thing in common: a person doing the scanning. A scarce resource counting manually, one barcode at a time. Recording DOD assets is essential to understanding military readiness, inventory positioning, imminent needs for replenishment, and security of controlled items. But when you assign a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine to count and record inventory, they are not available for other tasks. Enter the SMART container, using combinations of battery-powered active RFID and passive RFID. It's a new class of product that allows existing shipping containers to be transformed in just minutes into a powerful visibility tool. It reads passive RFlD tags on items and sends that data automatically to the DOD's ITV servers via Iridium or active RFID. Some containers are also being designed from the ground up to be Smarter, made not of metal but of much lighter composites. Other manufacturers are solving the tough problems of retrograde visibility by enabling one-minute retrofits to existing ISO containers - a real technological breakthrough. Automation for logistics, inventory, and asset management can eliminate the need for human intervention to record asset location or changes in custody. Through RFID and automation, a machine - an RFID reader - can capture data automatically. RFID eliminates manual scanning and actually increases data collection accuracy while reducing time and cost. It tracks inventory location with no human required. Now SMART Container Retrofits can be deployed in under a minute and can work without a local power source. SMART Containers are like having one soldier outside it telling you where it is and two soldiers inside telling you what's in there and what's happened to it. When retired Army General William G. T. Tuttle, former commander of the Army Materiel Command and CEO of LMI, first saw a SMART Container he dubbed it "the UAV for Logistics." RECORDING. FINDING, ACCOUNTING, FINDING Over the past two decades, the US military has focused on changing military missions and capability requirements. Mission complexity is increasing, and mission timelines and manpower for logistics and materials management are decreasing. These changes have put greater stress on forward leaning logistics operations. The only way to relieve the logistics stress is by using 21st century automation technology. This automation is possible because the DOD has standardized on RFID using ISO 18000-6 for passive RFID and ISO 18000-7 for active RFID. The infrastructure for automation is now in place and can be leveraged by accurate inventory data sources like the SMART Container, warehouse portals and forklifts, tables, and other RFID devices such as readers that eliminate a human from manual scanning. One military unit that is employing a SMART Container has a policy requirement for nightly inventory accounting as they put items back into containers. They do not, however, have the manpower to complete daily mission tasks, then spend 8 to 15 labor hours per container validating inventory each night. In reality, inventory is only captured every two weeks, assets get lost, and mission capability is reduced. By leveraging new RFID Container technologies and integrating them with systems like GCSS Army or SUPMIS, soldiers and sailors can put toois away or close a container or truck door and inventory is taken automatically. Replenishment requirements are broadcast out for automated replacement. Construction battalions, expeditionary forces, and SpecOp reams can focus on their missions, not counting tools or weapons at the end of a long day. An even more common scenario RFID-enabled containers address is the need to find a specific item. For instance a critical repair part, engine turbine, or weapons system is in a supply yard in one of twenty or thirty possible containers. For more than a dozen years, containers, other conveyances, and valuable assets equipped with active RFID have enabled the DOD to automatically track and manage millions of shipments in near real-time through the In-Transit Visibility network and beyond. Associating contents inside the conveyance or loading manifest information onto the active RFID tag gives logisticians added in-transit visibility of individual supplies so they can quickly find specific items. Today, even greater visibility at the item level can be achieved with advances in passive RFID. Visibility of items affixed with passive RFID labels can occur even when those items are disassociated from their container or conveyance and stored on their own in a yard, depot, or staging area. The active RFID (aRFID) In-transit Visibility (ITV) server says it is in a specific container. In-transit visibility (ITV) exists today through the DODs aRFID systems. When a container is loaded, its contents are recorded and loaded onto a Savi tag on the container. When the aRFID tag is read downstream, the Iogistician can view the contents and start the allocation or use of the assets. This information can be uploaded to the DOD s Total Asset Visibility system, enabling the DOD to locate almost any item whether it is inside or outside of a container. Where ITV can improve is after the containers arc opened. "As soon as items are removed, we are back to clipboards," commented one Marine. The data on the ITV aRFID tag are not always updated with the new container content levels due to the time and effort involved in barcode scanning and manual recording. It is easiest to think of ITV as container tracking whereas TAV is about item locations regardless of what container may have transported them. The new SMART Container solutions provide item level visibility (TAV) and automatically increments or decrements container contents when items move into and out of the container. It fills the gap in ITV visibility, providing true, real-time TAV achieved through automation. It proves the powerful combinarion of active and passive RFID technology. Even as weapons have become increasingly more sophisticated simple tasks remain. Warfighters must eat, communications must be established, and in-theater assets must be recorded, accounted for, and found. RFID-enabled SMART Containers automate inventory processes and bring logistics up to the sophistication level of the modern weapons systems they support, thanks to the DODs foresight to deploy two global RFID standards and infrastructure for both active and passive RFID technology. SELF-INVENTORYING SMART CONTAINERS VS. BARCODES In order for a self-inventorying SMART Container to be effective, it must consistendy read passive and active RFID tags and do it faster and with less human effort than other means. Two recent tests provide some results. First, a Trans-Pacific shipment of two 20-foot ISO containers were loaded side by side. When loading containers involving barcode, each case of goods is scanned to verify the load contents. Container One followed this practice - each case and pallet was scanned, and pallets were loaded. Container Two leveraged passive RFID on the cases. All of the pallets were loaded directly into a standard 20-foot ISO container with a Self-Inventorying SMART Container unit installed inside. After it was loaded, the doors were closed, and the contents were automatically inventoried with no humans involved. The result: 45 minutes for the barcode approach and 15 minutes for the RFID-enabled SMART Container. A second trial involved a Navy unit conducting a full container inventory during a pilot field exercise. Using barcode and other manual means, the container required nine man hours as opposed to just a couple of minutes with the SMART Container leveraging passive and active technologies - not valuable soldier resources. It's no surprise that pRFID is faster than barcode, since you can scan hundreds of tags at a time. However, die implications may surprise you. Faster, more accurate inventories provide two immediate benefits for a unit. First, it frees up time that warfighters can apply toward mission objectives instead of administrative logistics tasks. Second, it improves supply visibility and in turn enhances mission readiness and capability. Like the UAV, RFIDenabled containers eliminate the need for humans to collect data, and also like the UAV, they often provide more detail than current practices. Because inventories are cumbersome and taken infrequently in the field, visibility to supply levels and potential asset shortages are decreased. Automating these processes through RFID enhances visibility and enables quicker notification of supply needs before a critical shortage sidelines a unit. WHATS IN A NAME? As with all things military, names matter. It is important to understand the differences between options for the warfighter. The self-inventorying SMART Container is a retrofit system that recently won "Best in Show" for new RFID product from RFID Journal. It is meant to retrofit any of the DOD's hundreds of thousands of existing containers in just minutes and send data back over Iridium or aRFID and is available exclusively from ODIN in Ashburn, VA. The new Logistics Innovation Agency funded system is an entirely new composite container system available from ARINC of Annapolis, MD. Further, passive RFID can augment existing "Smart Containers" using active RFID-based security seals, often called e-Seals, which automatically report on the security status of a container and can also provide sensor data on the integrity of its contents. Now that both passive and active RFID have stabilized standards and technology costs have decreased more and more, RFID-enabled container options will be adopted. MARRYING BATTLEFIELD VISIBILITY TO SUPPLY VISIBILITY Military experts talk about forces in terms of a "tooth to tail" rado. The tooth is the forward fighting force, and the tail is the rear echelon logisticians. What many people fail to recognize is that logistics and inventory management needs don't end when materials arrive in theater. Items still need to be issued, returned and accounted for, and new orders must be placed for replenishment. When in theater, the fighting forces, the teeth, must allocate manpower to manage mese tail processes. RFID-enabled SMART Containers are an example of emerging and complementary RFID technologies that put the power of automation in the logisticians hands. It is a solution aligned with current DOD operational requirements for greater flexibility, speed, and asset visibility. Whereas the UAV automated greater battlefield visibility in aerial operations, the Self-Inventorying SMART Container retrofit is the first step in providing the same benefits to supply. The result will be heightened readiness and more tooth to take a bigger bite out of the enemy. [Sidebar] SMART Containers are like having one soldier outside it telling you where it is and two soldiers inside telling you what's in there and what's happened to it.

**Transportation investment is key to prevent base closures from causing a hollow military**

**Fogleman 94**- MA in military history and pol sci, former chief of staff of the Air Force (Ronald R., “Reengineering Defense Transportation,” DTIC, Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA528899)//mat

The ability of Assyria in the 7th century B.C. to field 50,000-strong armies in deserts and mountains is attributed to smoothly operating staffs and logistics. Over the centuries the innovative commander has mastered the art of foraging with two effects: limiting the avenue of attack to those places where sustainment is found, and muting popular support by the local inhabitants when their crops are confiscated or burnt, cities pillaged, and families separated. General Erwin Rommel said that the first condition for armies to endure the strain of battle is to have ample stocks of weapons, ammunition, and fuel. He added that battles are decided by quartermasters, for even brave soldiers can do nothing without weapons. And weapons can accomplish nothing without ammunition, and weapons and ammunition are useless in mobile warfare unless vehicles have the fuel to haul them. Admiral Ernest King echoed a similar point when in frustration he said: “I don’t know what the hell this logistics is that [General George] Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.” Such historical vignettes should remind joint planners and commanders when preparing for war or a contingency to train to get where they are going and to be sustained when they get there. Dangerous Assumptions Having participated in a variety of wargames, exercises, and contingencies, it is clear to me that we frequently assume difficulties of deployment and sustainment, but bank on infrastructure—at home, en route, and in theater—to meet our requirements. We assume that we will know the location of every critical piece of equipment at all times and that the transportation assets needed to rapidly mobilize and sustain a force will be there in adequate numbers, ready for battle. Such assumptions lead to complacency and sometimes to disaster. Many assumed that the C–141 aircraft designed in the 50s, built in the 60s, stretched in the 80s, and flown hard ever since would be there as our core airlifter. They overlooked that the size of equipment and the amount of supplies to be lifted have grown since the 50s, that we are not just postured for operations to large airfields in Western Europe, and that the majority of our forces will now be predominantly based in America. Some assumed that the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet would still be there in sufficient numbers with the appropriate types of vessels to provide bulk sustainment for the Armed Forces. They assumed there would always be a pool of trained U.S. merchant mariners to man Fast Sealift Ships and Ready Reserve Force vessels. Others assumed that railheads, roads, cranes, and ports would always be ready to support surges accompanying major contingencies. Assumptions lull us into thinking that we will always be able to fly and sail to facilities that are well maintained, sized to handle the load, and immune from enemy attack. I want to hang out a banner for everyone to read: check your assumptions. Don’t conduct wargames with invalid Timed Phase Force Deployment Data and assume that all your forces will be there when needed. Accounts of employing forces that don’t consider deploying and sustaining them are probably suspect. Discussions about long arm movements over maps without mention of railheads, roads, airports and airlift, seaports and sealift, the health of the civil transport sector, and access to key, capable international transportation facilities should be carefully scrutinized. The System Today When the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, asks if ports and airfields are secure, air superiority has been achieved, a ground offensive is ready to begin, or victory has been achieved, he is actually asking about deployment and sustainment or, in other words, about strategic mobility. In the recent past a significant portion of the C–141 core airlifter fleet is grounded, a larger portion restricted from air refueling operations, and each aircraft limited to carrying only 74 percent of its designed load capacity. Both U.S.-flagged merchant marine fleet vessels and the Americans aboard them are declining in number with no improvement in sight. Commercial air carriers, under pressure to achieve profitability, have declined to participate in the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) program to such an extent that we are not able to meet all CRAF stage II and III requirements. Today, the United States is withdrawing from overseas facilities which were once ready and available for global deployment and sustainment operations. It is fortunate that the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and CINCs, as well as many in the Congress, support strategic mobility programs like the C–17, sealift ship conversion and construction, and Ready Reserve Force expansion and maintenance. But there are some who suggest we can’t afford the mix of assets recommended by the congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) which did not meet the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. Deploying forces with a low risk to lives was too expensive. Thus a compromise was struck: delay the closure of necessary forces by giving the enemy more time to lay land mines, seize key terrain, move tanks and equipment forward, sow harbors with mines, and attack U.S. and allied forces that may be present, and thereby reduce the cost of transportation. Let me illustrate the importance of reevaluating planning. MRS assumed that in FY99 there would be a certain number of fully mission-capable C–141s (which is now highly unlikely), that there would be a fully supported CRAF program (which is now in doubt), that there would be a certain number of converted or constructed sealift ships (which is now delayed), and that a badly needed new C–17 core airlift program would be supported (which is now under attack). The study also pointed out that even after an expected 120 C–17s were built, a shortfall would exist (which is as yet unaddressed). Today MRS is undergoing further review. The Case for Change One learns from a constant stream of articles and speeches that change is required, coming, or even here already. I couldn’t agree more. But the distance between the United States and other regions of the world hasn’t changed. The speed at which surface, sea, and airlift assets will travel isn’t likely to change any time soon. And the need to rapidly respond, almost simultaneously, in many parts of the globe hasn’t changed. What is changing—really happening—is that America is returning to its origins as a militia nation. America has not historically maintained large standing forces, instead encouraging reliance on the Guard and Reserve, and avoiding international entanglements. After major wars, including the Cold War, administrations have sought to radically downsize the military by shifting resources to domestic priorities on the assumption that the remaining force structure is trained, deployable, sustainable, and capable of winning future wars—however winning is defined. The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was established in 1987 with the idea that unity of effort in mobility is essential to ensuring joint combat effectiveness on the battlefield. It was not until Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm that TRANSCOM really came into its own. While successful, the experience proved what coaches have known for decades: you must practice the way you are going to play. That realization led to a 1993 DOD Directive which designates TRANSCOM as the single manager for defense transportation in both war and peace by placing the Military Sealift, Military Traffic Management, and Air Mobility Commands under one combatant command and assigning strategic mobility (or common user) forces to an operational command. TRANSCOM is taking its newly assigned responsibilities very seriously. The warfighting CINCs determine requirements for their respective theaters of operations. We, in turn, determine within the constraints of the existing defense transportation system whether these requirements can be met. If not, we work with the CINC’s staff to minimize shortfalls and maximize opportunities for victory. In concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military services, Department of Transportation, and commercial transportation sector, we will strongly advocate the need for and promote the acquisition of mobility assets to support our national military strategy. With the current administration’s call for reduced defense budgets while still maintaining the capability to achieve victory when the Armed Forces are committed, we got a clear, unambiguous message: we can’t continue to conduct business as usual, we can’t afford it financially nor do the men and women who are asked to go in harm’s way deserve a transportation system that reduces their chance of victory—even of survival. In sum, a smaller force structure based predominantly in the United States which is not deployable or sustainable in a manner that allows us to win with what are considered acceptable losses is a hollow force. Reengineering the System To ensure military forces are successful despite declining defense budgets, TRANSCOM is hard at work charting a course for the defense transportation system into the next century. Change means more than total quality management or improving existing processes. It is investing the time and resources to reengineer the defense transportation system. The first task of a recently formed TRANSCOM initiatives team is to develop an ought to be defense transportation system as well as to provide a framework to get there. The team will work with the Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center—which was recently chartered by DOD—to further refine plans to include detailed procedural, organizational, and technological reforms. In retrospect one can see how in part the defense transportation system developed in both service and functional stovepipes. This has affected the ways in which requirements are identified, tasked, contracted, monitored, and billed to customers, and involves various automation systems used to run these processes—many of which originated centuries ago (if measured in technological years) and most of which don’t talk with one another, even within a single headquarters. Some ask why TRANSCOM is unable to provide services like the private sector. Why is it that in the marketplace there are local travel agents who, upon request, can book a flight to Florida, a ship for a cruise, a bus tour en route at intermediate stops, and a train trip to complete the journey—one agent for air, sea, road, and rail, and with only one bill? After sending parcels via a delivery service a toll free number is available to check on where the shipments are, anytime of day or night. If that can be done by private enterprise, why can’t critical spare parts destined for a CINC’s area of responsibility be located and arrival times determined in the DOD pipeline? Reengineering the defense transportation system will give customers—the Armed Forces—the type of quality service offered by the private sector, or perhaps better. Soldiers , sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen—active and Reserve—as well as members of the civil service and the commercial transport industries, have ensured a strong and robust defense transportation system throughout our Nation’s history. For those who today go in harm’s way, TRANSCOM pledges to develop a new system that lives up to Winston Churchill’s dictum: “Victory is the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.”