The Velvet Glove Kritik

Framework:

My argument is that the negative is entitled to a single unconditional test of the methodological and linguistic choices of the affirmative

The A sub point is that this is a credible test of the affirmative. Bad methodology breeds bad policy, which means we control the internal link to you policymaking good arguments. Without evaluating the methodological foundations of policy then the formulation of polices are doomed to fail. The lack of an exit strategy in Iraq proves this.

The B sub point is that divorcing ourselves from methodological or linguistic choices simply because we’re pretending to be someone else is ontologically irresponsible. Because language is the gateway to communicating out conceptions of reality, we must determine whether or not our linguistic choices are ontologically acceptable as a prior question of the Aff. Linguistic domination has an immediate effect, which means you should privilege our framework.

The C sub point is that our interpretation guarantees unique education that their interpretation erases. If critical education produces activists and normative fiat education produces policymakers, we need both in order to remain a system of balance. Our framework for resolving questions of education is inclusion versus exclusion, since greater inclusion incorporates the greatest totality of voices into a system of education. Our framework enables the manifestation of all of your arguments as methodological disads to the alternative while yours closes off critical discourse to begin with. That is not educational for the activity

(And)

Resolving the criticism comes before issues of procedural fairness because the point of fairness-based arguments is to determine which parts of the debate to refuse to consider. You have to evaluate the criticism in order to determine its value as a precondition to excluding it.

(And)

Education outweighs fairness. Fairness is premised on the next 45 minutes while education is something we can take and utilize for a life time. Eventually the rules of debate won’t matter for any of us because we’ll all be in the real world where a little education might be helpful

**The affirmative’s realization that brute force is insufficient in asymmetric warfare, and their plan to withdraw and rely on alternative methods of control – social, economic, political, and psychological – results the biopolitical dream of ‘full spectrum of power,’ advancing imperial control in a subtler and more nefarious manner.**

**Hardt and Negri 04** (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, Multitude, 51-3, jbh)

The technological advantage of the U.S. military not only raises social and political questions, but also poses practical military problems. Sometimes technological advantage turns out to be no advantage at all. Military strategists are constantly confronted by the fact that advanced technology weapons can only fulfill some very specific tasks, whereas older, conventional weapons and strategies are necessary for most applications. This is especially true in asymmetrical conflicts in which one combatant has incomparably greater means than the other or others. In a symmetrical conflict, such as that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, technological advantages can be decisive—the nuclear arms race, for instance, played a major role—but in asymmetrical conflicts the applications of advanced technologies are often undercut. In many cases the enemy simply does not have the kind of resources that can be threatened by the most advanced weapons; in other cases lethal force is inappropriate, and other forms of control are required. The fact that a dominant military power often finds itself at a disadvantage in asymmetrical conflicts has been the key to guerrilla strategy at least since bands of Spanish peasants tormented Napoleon's army: invert the relationship of military power and transform weakness into strength. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan to incomparably inferior forces in terms of military might and technology can serve as symbols of the potential superiority of the weak in asymmetrical conflicts. Guerrilla forces cannot survive without the support of the population and a superior knowledge of the social and physical terrain. Guerrilla attacks often rely on unpredictability: any member of the population could be a guerrilla fighter, and the attack can come from anywhere with unknown means. Guerrillas thus force the dominant military power to live in a state of perpetual paranoia. The dominant power in such an asymmetrical conflict must adopt counterinsurgency strategies that seek not only to defeat the enemy through military means but also to control it with social, political, ideological, and psychological weapons. Today the United States, the uncontested military superpower, has an asymmetrical relationship with all potential combatants, leaving it vulnerable to guerrilla or unconventional attacks from all quarters. The counterinsurgency strategies developed to combat and control weaker enemies in Southeast Asia and Latin America in the late twentieth century must therefore now be generalized and applied everywhere by the United States. This situation is complicated by the fact that most of the current military engagements of the United States are unconventional conflicts or low-intensity conflicts that fall in the gray zone between war and peace. The tasks given the military alternate between making war and peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcing, or nation building—and indeed at times it is difficult to tell the difference among these tasks. The tendency for there to be less and less difference between war and peace that we recognized earlier from a philosophical perspective reappears now as an element of military strategy. This gray zone is the zone in which counterinsurgency efforts must be effective, both combating and controlling the indefinite and often unknown enemy, but it is also the zone in which the dominant military power is most vulnerable to attack in an asymmetrical conflict. The U.S. occupation of Iraq, for example, illustrates all the ambiguities of this gray zone. U.S. military analysts are very concerned about the vulnerability of the powerful in asymmetrical conflict. Military might in itself, they recognize, is not sufficient. The recognition of the limitations and vulnerability of military and technological dominance leads strategists to propose an unlimited form of dominance that involves all dimensions, the full spectrum of power. 'What is required, they say, is a "full spectrum dominance" that combines military might with social, economic, political, psychological, and ideological control. Military theorists have thus, in effect, discovered the concept of biopower. This full-spectrum dominance follows directly from the previous developments of counterinsurgency strategies. When confronting unconventional and low-intensity conflicts, which occupy a gray zone between war and peace, these military analysts propose a "gray" strategy that mixes military and civilian components. If Vietnam remains the symbol of the failure of the United States in an asymmetrical conflict, military analysts conceive Nicaragua and El Salvador as prime examples of the success of the United States and U.S.-backed forces using a full spectrum of counterinsurgency strategies in a low-intensity conflict.

**The Result of this Military Control Disguised as Good Will is Biopolitical Murder on A Global Scale.**

**Dillon And Reid ‘00** [Michael and Julian, Lecturer at the University of Lancaster and Lecturer on International Politics at University of London, Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, Vol. 25 Ish. 1, January-March ]

We argue in addition that each such "emergency" reduces human life to a zone of indistinction in which it becomes mere stuff for the ordering strategies of the hybrid form of sovereign and governmental power that distinguishes the liberal peace of global governance. Interpreted this way, complex emergencies not only draw attention to the operation of a specific international political rationality--that of global liberal governance--but also to certain key distinguishing features of it as a hybrid order of power. Sovereign power creates biopolitical control over those it claims to save, creating the paradoxical idea that those that are now “protected” can at the same time be totally open death, becoming open to disposal and destruction, only existing to serve the interest of the sovereign.

Impact:

**We are left in a state of constant war – the specter of insurgency born from the impossible dream of global liberalization blurs the distinction of war and peace and creates war as a general condition of life.**

**Hardt and Negri 04** (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, Multitude, 3-5, jbh)

The world is at war again, but things are different this time. Traditionally war has been conceived as the armed conflict between sovereign political entities, that is, during the modern period, between nation-states. To the extent that the sovereign authority of nation-states, even the most dominant nation-states, is declining and there is instead emerging a new supranational form of sovereignty, a global Empire, the conditions and nature of war and political violence are necessarily changing. War is becoming a general phenomenon, global and interminable. There are innumerable armed conflicts waged across the globe today, some brief and limited to a specific place, others long lasting and expansive.' These conflicts might be best conceived as instances not of war but rather civil war. Whereas war, as conceived traditionally by international law, is armed conflict between sovereign political entities, civil war is armed conflict between sovereign and/or nonsovereign combatants within a single sovereign territory. This civil war should be understood now not within the national space, since that is no longer the effective unit of sovereignty, but across the global terrain. The framework of international law regarding war has been undermined. From this perspective all of the world's current armed conflicts, hot and cold—in Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Aceh, as much as in Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq—should be considered imperial civil wars, even when states are involved. This does not mean that any of these conflicts mobilizes all of Empire—indeed each of these conflicts is local and specific—but rather that they exist within, are conditioned by, and in turn affect the global imperial system. Each local war should not be viewed in isolation, then, but seen as part of a grand constellation, linked in varying degrees both to other war zones and to areas not presently at war. The pretense to sovereignty of these combatants is doubtful to say the least. They are struggling rather for relative dominance within the hierarchies at the highest and lowest levels of the global system. A new framework, beyond international law, would be necessary to confront this global civil war. 2 The attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, did not create or fundamentally change this global situation, but perhaps they did force us to recognize its generality. There is no escaping the state of war within Empire, and there is no end to it in sight. The situation was obviously already mature. Just as the "defenestration of Prague" on May 23, 1618, when two regents of the Holy Roman Empire were thrown from a window of the Hradcany castle, ignited the Thirty Years' War, the attacks on September 11 opened a new era of war. Back then Catholics and Protestants massacred each other (but soon the sides became confused), and today Christians seem to be pitted against Muslims (although the sides are already confused). This air of a war of religion only masks the profound historical transformation, the opening of a new era. In the seventeenth century it was the passage in Europe from the Middle Ages to modernity, and today the new era is the global passage from modernity to postmodernity. In this context, war has become a general condition: there may be a cessation of hostilities at times and in certain places, but lethal violence is present as a constant potentiality, ready always and everywhere to erupt. "So the nature of War," Thomas Hobbes explains, "consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." 3 These are not isolated wars, then, but a general global state of war that erodes the distinction between war and peace such that we can no longer imagine or even hope for a real peace

**Democracy is impossible in the post-modern perpetual state of exception**

**Hardt and Negri 04** (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University, *Multitude*, 17-8, jbh)

Finally, like justice, democracy does not belong to war. War always requires strict hierarchy and obedience and thus the partial or total suspension of democratic participation and exchange. "In wartime," explains the legal theorist Hans Kelsen, "the democratic principle has to yield to a strictly autocratic one: everyone must pay unconditional obedience to the leader."26 In the modern period the wartime suspension of democratic politics was usually posed as temporary, since war was conceived as an exceptional condition. 27 If our hypothesis is correct and today the state of war has instead become our permanent global condition, then the suspension of democracy tends also to become the norm rather than the exception. Following John Dewey's statement that serves as one of the epigraphs to this chapter, we can see that the current global state of war forces all nations, even the professedly most democratic, to become authoritarian and totalitarian. Some say that ours is a world in which real democracy has become impossible, perhaps even unthinkable.

Alternative:

**Vote negative to endorse our critical interrogation of the power/knowledge of the affirmative. This is itself a critical resistance that opens up the possibility of escaping biopolitics by rejecting its manipulation of knowledge to control populations**

**Hamann in 2k9** (Trent, St. John’s University, Foucault Studes no 6, *Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics*, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/2471/2469)

Whether neoliberalism will ultimately be viewed as having presented a radically new form of governmentality or just a set of variations on classical liberalism, we can certainly recognize that there are a number of characteristics in contemporary practices that are new in the history of governmentality, a number of which I’ve al-ready discussed. Another one of these outstanding features is the extent to which the imposition of market values has pushed towards the evisceration of any autonomy that may previously have existed among economic, political, legal, and moral dis-courses, institutions, and practices. Foucault notes, for example, that in the sixteenth century jurists were able to posit the law in a critical relation to the reason of state in order to put a check on the sovereign power of the king. By contrast, neoliberalism, at least in its most utopian formulations, is the dream of a perfectly limitless (as op-posed perhaps to totalizing) and all-encompassing (as opposed to exclusionary and normalizing) form of governance that would effectively rule out all challenge or op-position. This seems to be the kind of thing that Margaret Thatcher was dreaming about when she claimed that there is “no alternative”. Such formulations of what might be called “hyper-capitalism” seem to lend themselves to certain traditional forms of criticism. However, critical analyses that produce a totalizing conception of power and domination risk the same danger, noted above, of overlooking the some-times subtle and complex formations of power and knowledge that can be revealed through genealogical analyses of local practices. Important for any genealogical analysis is the recognition that, **while there is no** ”**outside” in relation to power**, **re-sistance and power are** coterminous, **fluid, and**, except in instances of domination, **reversible**. There is an echo of this formulation in Foucault’s understanding of go-vernmentality as ”the conduct of conduct”. **Governmentality is not a matter of a dominant force having direct control over** the **conduct** of individuals; rather, **it is a matter of trying to determine the conditions** within or **out of which individuals are able to freely conduct themselves**. And we can see how this is especially true in the case of neoliberalism insofar as it is society itself and not the individual that is the direct object of power. **Foucault** provides examples of this in “The Subject and Pow-er”, in which he **discussed a number of struggles of resistance that have developed over the past few years such as “opposition to the power of men over women,** of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the popu-lation, **of administration over the ways people live**”. Despite their diversity, **these struggles were significant** for Foucault **because they share a set of** common **points that allow us to recognize them as** forms of **resistance to governmentality, that is, ”critique**”. Through the examples he uses **Foucault notes the local and immediate nature of resistance. These** oppositional **struggles focus on the effects of power expe-rienced by those individuals who are immediately subject to them**. **Despite the fact that these are local**, anarchistic **forms of resistance, Foucault points out** that **they are not** necessarily **limited to one place but intersect with struggles** going on **elsewhere**. **Of greatest importance is** the fact that **these struggles are critical responses to con-temporary forms of governmentality, specifically the administrative techniques of subjectification used to shape individuals in terms of their** free **conduct**. **These struggles question the** status of the **individual** in relation to community life, **in terms of** the forms of **knowledge and instruments** of judgment **used to determine the ”truth**” of individuals, and in relation to the obfuscation of the real differences that make individuals irreducibly individual beings. Tying all of these modes of resistance together is the question “**Who are we**?” While some might be concerned about exactly who this we is suggested by Foucault, both here and in his discussions of Kant and enlightenment, I think the question is in some ways its own answer. In other words, it **is meant to remain an ongoing critical question that can never be definitively answered**, or, as John Rajchman has sug-gested, it is a question that can only be answered by those who ask it and through the process of asking it. In his introduction to The Politics of Truth he writes: The ‘we’ always comes after, emerging only through the on-going light its activi-ties shed on the habits and practices through which people come to govern themselves—and so see themselves and one another. Indeed in this lies precisely the originality of the critical attitude, its singular sort of universality, its distinc-tive relation to ‘today’—to ‘now’, ‘the present’, l’actuel. **This ”critical attitude**” that Foucault repeatedly refers to in all of his discussions of Kant from the 1970’s and 1980’s **is inseparable from** both his **analysis of governmen-tality and his discussions of ethics** and the history of the experience of the relation-ship between the subject and truth. **What fascinated Foucault about the ”care of the self**” he discovered in Greek and Roman ethics **was the** ”spiritual” **relationship that existed between the subject and truth**. **In order to** gain access to the truth, that is, in order to **acquire the ”right” to the truth, individuals had to take care of themselves by engaging in certain** self-transformative **practices** or ascetic exercises. **Here we find critical and resistant forms of subjectivation where, rather than objectifying them-selves within a given discourse of power/knowledge, individuals engaged in prac-tices of freedom that allowed them to** engage in ethical parrhesia or **speak truth to power. In modernity,** however, following what Foucault identified as ”the Cartesian moment” the principle ”take care of yourself” has been replaced by the imperative to “know yourself” [THS, 1 - 24]. In contemporary life that which gives an individual access to the truth is knowledge and knowledge alone, including knowledge of one’s self. In this context knowledge of **the self** is not something produced through the work individuals perform on themselves, rather it **is something given through dis-ciplines such as** biology, medicine, and the **social sciences. These** modern **forms of knowledge**, of course, **become crucial to the emerging biopolitical forms of govern-mentality**. Whereas individuals were once urged to take care of themselves by using self-reflexive ethical techniques to give form to their freedom, modern biopolitics ensures that individuals are already taken care of in terms of biological and econom-ic forms of knowledge and practices. As Edward F. McGushin puts it in his book Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Power functions by investing, defining, and caring for the body understood as a bioeconomic entity. The operation of biopower is to define the freedom and truth of the individual in economic and biological terms. Reason is given the task of comprehending the body in these terms and setting the conditions within which it can be free. ...The formation of the disciplines marks the moment where askesis itself was absorbed within biopolitics.