# Contention 1

**Contention 1 is the Carrier Gap**

**First, Carriers are getting cut now and the Navy is shifting away – the Plan is key to solve political fights**

**Scarborough 12** - Hoover Institution Media Fellow, (Rowan, January 15, “New Navy budgets may sink plans for aircraft carriers: Fight is on to save flattop fleet” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/15/new-navy-budgets-may-sink-plans-for-carriers/?page=all>)

On the surface, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/)’s cherished fleet of 11 active aircraft carriers seems safe from President Obama’s budget slashers.¶ Conventional wisdom says the requirement to cut $488 billion from the [Pentagon](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/pentagon/) within 10 years will not necessitate banishing a single carrier because the president’s military strategy focuses on two carrier-dependent regions: Asia, where [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) is building a robust navy, and the Persian Gulf, where [Iran](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/islamic-republic-of-iran/) threatens to block international oil shipping.¶ As Defense Secretary [Leon E. Panetta](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/leon-e-panetta/) prepares to introduce the strategy’s first budget next month, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) has been in a furious fight behind the scenes to protect only 10 carriers, sources familiar with the issue told The Washington Times.¶ The sources say that, while the fiscal 2013 budget may well continue 11 carriers, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) will be down to 10 or even nine carriers within in the next five years.¶ A carrier typically transports about 80 aircraft and leads a battle group comprising 7,500 sailors, a guided-missile cruiser, two guided-missile destroyers, an attack submarine and a supply ship. Eliminating one carrier battle group would save billions of dollars.¶ In addition, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) complements its carriers with amphibious-ready groups of warships, helicopters, fighter jets and Marines for sea-land operations. Some of those groups also might be scrapped.¶ A scenario discussed inside the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/): Reduce the carrier fleet by retiring the flattops short of their 50-year life spans, and continue to build more advanced carriers at the Newport News, Va., shipyard at seven-year intervals instead of launching one every five years.¶ Reducing one carrier would set off a fight in [Congress](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/congress/), which under law has required the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) to maintain 11 active flattops. A source familiar with the discussions said the Obama administration would not want to take up that fight until after November’s presidential election, given the importance of Virginia and its 13 electoral votes.¶ In general, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) has three carriers at sea, three returning from six-month deployments, three preparing to be deployed and two in some type of overhaul. For example, the USS Ronald Reagan, commissioned less than 10 years ago, is going into dry dock this month for a year of extensive repairs.¶ Under [Mr. Panetta](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/leon-e-panetta/), the [Pentagon](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/pentagon/) has clamped down on the release of any details about the budget — following the model of predecessor [Robert M. Gates](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/robert-m-gates/), who forced senior officials to sign nondisclosure forms.¶ But sources say a $488 billion in mandated savings will come from two principal sources: cutting the [Army](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/army/) and [Marine Corps](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-marine-corps/) ground forces by more than 100,000 troops combined and reducing the purchase and delaying the procurement of big weapons systems, such as the F-35 fighter.¶ Cutting back to 10 carriers would save the [Pentagon](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/pentagon/) additional billions of dollars. A carrier’s payroll for a crew of officers and sailors, not counting its air wing, is about $225 million annually.¶ “I think the United States will continue to operate at least 10 carriers over the next five years,” said [Loren Thompson](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/loren-thompson/), who heads the [Lexington Institute](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/lexington-institute/) defense think tank. “But over the long run, it’s likely the cost and operating concept will gradually shift the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) away from carriers.”¶ In fact, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) will soon undergo a 10-carrier trial. When the USS Enterprise is retired in November, 10 carriers will be active until the USS Gerald R. Ford becomes operational in 2015. [Congress](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/congress/) granted the[Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) a waiver for the 33-month breach of the law.¶ “They’re going down to 10 for programming reasons,” [Mr. Thompson](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/loren-thompson/) said. “It is supposed to be temporary, but I think during the period the Enterprise is gone and the Ford class has not arrived, the [Navy](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/navy/) may grow accustomed to operating with only 10 carriers.”

The Navy is being overstretched between Iran and China now

Freedberg 5/21/12 Jr. - is the deputy editor for AOL Defense and is writing stories that won awards from the association of Military Reporters & Editors in 2008 and 2009, as well as an honorable mention in 2010. (Sydney J., 5-21-12, “Navy Strains To Handle Both China And Iran At Once” http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/21/navy-strains-to-handle-both-china-and-iran-at-once/)

VIRGINIA BEACH, VA: Coping with [China and Iran](http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/16/navy-let-its-sub-hunting-skills-slide-while-china-and-iran-built-m/) at the same time is stretching the Navy thin, and it will soon have to choose which theater to prioritize, warned [Peter Daly](http://www.usni.org/executive-staff), the recently retired admiral who now heads the prestigious [US Naval Institute](http://defense.aol.com/tag/US+Naval+Institute/). The Obama administration's new strategic guidance said the US would boost its presence in the Pacific as it drew down in the Middle East, but [subsequent statements have qualified that as a "pivot to Asia."](http://defense.aol.com/2012/01/27/a-pivot-to-asia-not-so-fast/) The first problem is the force isn't truly fungible: it's mainly ground troops coming out of Afghanistan and Iraq, while [the Pacific requires mainly ship](http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/30/navy-shrinking-while-obama-pivots-to-asia-does-not-add-up/)s and [long-range airpower](http://defense.aol.com/2012/02/15/dod-fast-tracks-new-bomber-planning-number-is-550-million-pe/). The second problem is that [Iran](http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/04/iran-mine-threat-scares-navy-cno-scrambles-to-fix-decades-of-ne/) isn't cooperating. "The annoying realities of the Iranian situation fly in the face of this wonderfully crafted strategy," Daly said. Instead of shifting carrier strike groups and other naval forces from the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific, the Navy is trying to reinforce both at once. That's not an effort the fleet can sustain indefinitely. "We've been on a 'temporary' bump up to two carriers in Southwest Asia, and now that is likely to continue," Daly explained in an interview with AOL Defense on the sidelines of the annual [Joint Warfighting Conference](http://defense.aol.com/tag/joint+warfighting+conference+2012/) co-sponsored by the Naval Institute and the industry group [AFCEA](http://defense.aol.com/tag/AFCEA/). "If the Navy is asked to do two carriers in the Gulf after the fall, you could see deployment lengths at least at nine months, possibly more, and you'll see some tradeoffs of carrier coverage in the Pacific coming back to Southwest Asia, when the plan said the flow would go the other way." Carriers are particularly critical because the Navy has already dropped from 12 to 11 of the massive floating airfields, and when the 50-year-old USS Enterprise is retired this fall, said Daly, "we're going to [go down to 10 deployable carriers](http://defense.aol.com/2011/08/05/navy-drops-carrier-group-down-to-nine/) between now and the time the Ford comes out in 2016." But carriers aren't the only ship in short supply. Although the Chinese have an [aggressive policy towards maritime neighbors like the Philippines](http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/12/dont-push-china-vice-chief-of-joint-staff-says-we-can-all-get/) and [an estimated 100,000 naval mines](http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/05/marines-debate-is-china-enemy-no-1/), soon just six of the Navy's 14 Avenger-class minesweepers will soon be in the Pacific and eight in the Gulf, with four of the small ships leaving the West Coast for Bahrain. "They just left Long Beach a few days ago," said Daly. Although Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert announced the move in March, "there's a lot that had to be done" to get them ready to go, Daly said, including loading the relatively small minesweepers onto more seaworthy "heavy lift" vessels to haul them across the ocean. Now they're actually en route, Daly said, "it should take at least five weeks to get them over there." Since demand is growing and the fleet is not, the short-term expedient is to use each ship more. The almost 11-month deployment of the USS Bataan (pictured, in the Strait of Hormuz) was extreme, but it's a sign of things to come. "Right now demand exceeds supply, so that is driving longer deployments," Daly said, "getting much, much more out of the existing force." Before 9/11, on a typical day, about a third of Navy ships were out of port and underway and about 28 percent were actually deployed, operating in foreign seas rather than training in waters close to home. "Today those numbers are much, much higher," Daly said, more like 44 percent of ships underway and 38 percent deployed. In the long term, though, this higher tempo of operations puts more strain on both sailors and ships. A warship's complex systems take a lot of work to maintain, much of which can't be done underway but rather requires the facilities of a port. With more, longer deployments and shorter intervals in between, "when that ship has to be maintained, that's the time," said Daly. There's no more margin of error for delays or unexpected problems – including [sequestration](http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/18/critics-knock-ndaa-as-sequestration-looms-export-reforms-do-pas/): "All these ship repair contracts and all these ship repair actions...they'll come to a screeching halt" if there's a sequester, Daly warned. "The Navy will be forced only to execute emergency maintenance actions," and with the pace of deployments up, "there're only certain windows where you can do maintenance." The long-term salvation of the fleet is supposed to be the [Littoral Combat Ship](http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/21/navy-needs-both-lcs-types-for-war-with-china-iran-robert-work/), an innovative and affordable class of smaller vessels intended to be the most numerous in the Navy, with a planned buy of 55. LCS isn't a battleship by any means, but it's intended as a versatile workhorse to hunt submarines, mines, and small boats of the kind employed by the Iranians or Somalia pirates. "It's probably an inefficient use of a multi-mission platform like an Arleigh Burke [guided-missile destroyer] to assign them to anti-piracy missions off Somalia," said Daly. "LCS is much better suited to missions like that." Likewise, the move of more minesweepers to the Gulf highlights up the Navy's [longstanding shortfalls in mine warfare](http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/04/iran-mine-threat-scares-navy-cno-scrambles-to-fix-decades-of-ne/), which the LCS is intended to correct – when its mine-hunting "mission module" completes testing and enters production sometime around 2014. "There's a real need for this LCS package capability, but it's just not going to be ready," said Daly. "There has to be something now." Daly also has misgivings about the way the LCS program has been run, particularly the Navy's decision to award two different companies contracts to build two different variants of the vessel, each with its own unique demands for training and spare parts. "I think it was a missed opportunity not to take more time and neck down to a single type-model series," he said. "But it's not irretrievable. Now you have to go back and ensure that you're building a sustainable, effective platform and fielding it correctly." With the world unlikely to get much safer any time soon, the Littoral Combat Ship is something the Navy needs to get right.

# Plan

**Thus the Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increases its investment in its production of its aircraft carriers in the United States.**

# Heg

**Advantage 1 Hegemony**

#### First, Failure to shore up the carrier fleet will embolden potential adversaries- that risks great power war

Brookes 08 - Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs (Peter, May 2nd, “Flattop Follies: Navy Cuts Back on Carriers”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/flattop\_follies\_navy\_cuts\_back.html)

CHECK this: After cutting the number of active aircraft carriers from 12 to 11 last year, the Navy is now requesting Congress' permission to go down from 11 flattops to 10 for the years 2012 to 2015. It gets worse. Maintenance required on nuclear-powered carriers means one ship is always in overhaul in the yards - so we'd actually only have nine carriers available for those years. And some fear that the **drop to** a **10**-carrier force **would wind up being permanent**. Look: Carriers are vital to our defense needs - the Navy deployed a second carrier this week to Iran's vicinity as what Defense Secretary Robert Gates called a "reminder." Scanning all the potential flashpoints around the world, it's not at all clear that we have enough flattops to meet current - and potential - wartime needs now. How did we get to this point? Basically, the Navy brass are in a bind: The budget is tight, programs are behind schedule and they're trying to avoid sinking the fleet's total of battle-force ships below today's 279 hulls. So the Navy asked Congress to waive current law, which requires 11 carriers to meet wartime needs. (And that minimum was 12 active carriers until last year. . . ) This dispensation would let the Navy retire CVN-65 Enterprise, which at age 50 is past its service life, three years before CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford joins the fleet. The admirals want to prevent new shortfalls in their shipbuilding budget by avoiding a $2.2 billion price tag to keep Enterprise "operational" (on paper, anyway) to meet the letter of the law. Fact is, we need balance in our armed forces to meet a range of challenges, from terrorism to major-power wars. The carrier's combat-strike capability is going to be a key element of that force. And while the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan (and other anti-terror ops) don't always need the punch of a carrier group's ships, planes and submarines daily, other threats would. It's troubling that, like our ground forces, the carrier fleet is also stretched thin. Navy brass already have difficulty meeting the need for carriers. What if another major crisis, such as a serious dust-up in the Taiwan Strait between powerhouse China and its rival Taiwan, comes across our bow? Considering China's military buildup, you can bet that we'll need several (at least) carrier groups to deal with People's Liberation Army's navy and air force. If the Korean peninsula goes up in flames and a million North Korean soldiers pour over the border, we'll need lots of carriers to support South Korea and the nearly 30,000 US GIs and airmen stationed there. Not to mention Russia, another (re)emerging major power, which recently announced plans to build a carrier fleet of its own in support of its growing global interests. Carriers are also handy tools of (gunboat) diplomacy. They provide US policymakers with 90,000 tons of deployable, difficult-to-ignore, cold-steel persuasion, as evidenced by the recent deployment near Iran. Without firing a single shot, the presence of 4.5 acres of floating, sovereign US territory off the coast has given more than one foreign leader pause. At the onset of a crisis, the first words a president often utters are: "Where are the carriers?" A failure to adequately maintain our carrier fleet will embolden potential adversaries. More than one historically great naval power became a shadow of its former self - much to its detriment. Given the challenges we face, how can this nation not afford to maintain a fleet of at least 12 carriers? Remember: Even in a high-tech warfare world, quantity has a quality all its own.

#### US naval power guarantees hegemony - prevents attacks on the US mainland and deters potential rivals

Friedman 07 (George, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and founder of STRATFOR, “The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power,” April 10, http://www.stratfor.com/limitations\_and\_necessity\_naval\_power)

This raises a more fundamental question: What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought? To frame the question more clearly, let us begin by noting that the United States has maintained global maritime hegemony since the end of World War II. Except for the failed Soviet attempt to partially challenge the United States, the most important geopolitical fact since World War II was that the world’s oceans were effectively under the control of the U.S. Navy. Prior to World War II, there were multiple contenders for maritime power, such as Britain, Japan and most major powers. No one power, not even Britain, had global maritime hegemony. The United States now does. The question is whether this hegemony has any real value at this time — a question made relevant by the issue of whether to blockade Iran. The United States controls the blue water. To be a little more precise, the U.S. Navy can assert direct and overwhelming control over any portion of the blue water it wishes, and it can do so in multiple places. It cannot directly control all of the oceans at the same time. However, the total available naval force that can be deployed by non-U.S. powers (friendly and other) is so limited that they lack the ability, even taken together, to assert control anywhere should the United States challenge their presence. This is an unprecedented situation historically. The current situation is, of course, invaluable to the United States. It means that a seaborne invasion of the United States by any power is completely impractical. Given the geopolitical condition of the United States, the homeland is secure from conventional military attack but vulnerable to terrorist strikes and nuclear attacks. At the same time, the United States is in a position to project forces at will to any part of the globe. Such power projection might not be wise at times, but **even failure does not lead to reciprocation**. For instance, no matter how badly U.S. forces fare in Iraq, the Iraqis will not invade the United States if the Americans are defeated there. This is not a trivial fact. Control of the seas means that military or political failure in Eurasia will not result in a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nor does such failure necessarily preclude future U.S. intervention in that region. It also means that no other state can choose to invade the United States. Control of the seas allows the United States to intervene where it wants, survive the consequences of failure and be immune to occupation itself. It was the most important geopolitical consequence of World War II, and one that still defines the world. The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas — that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations. One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically — since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge. The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy’s amphibious capabilities — particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines — make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States. That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory — or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation. If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them? If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq’s conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice. The Risk Not Taken The argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers. The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy, or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy — the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear. There are times when the Navy’s use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The **domination of the world’s oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy**. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security.

**And, Naval superiority is the foundation of U.S. geopolitical dominance- It provides the “bandwidth” needed to confront all other threats**

**Stratfor 08** - world's leading private intelligence firm, clients range from Fortune 500 companies to international government agencies (August 5th, “U.S. Naval Dominance and the Importance of the Oceans”, <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/u_s_naval_dominance_and_importance_oceans>)

The geographic position of the United States, situated comfortably between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, is a critical dynamic in its fundamental security, and U.S. naval dominance in the world’s oceans is a key dynamic of the international system. Our statement that control of the world’s oceans is a cornerstone of U.S. geopolitical security and keeps any potential adversary half a world away sparked extensive comment. This is a long-standing STRATFOR position, not a casual assertion, and is crucial to the way we see the world. In his 1890 classic “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” U.S. Naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan examines the decisive role superior sea power played in geopolitical competition and conflict from 1660 to 1783. His work has made him perhaps the foremost theorist of naval power in the United States. At the risk of oversimplification, Mahan’s thesis is that control of the sea can be decisive in both peacetime and wartime, and has far-reaching military, economic and geopolitical ramifications. Mahan is required reading at STRATFOR. The world has changed quite a bit since the time of Mahan, who wrote as sail was giving way to steam as the principal method of naval propulsion. Indeed, a common question from our readers has been about the applicability of the oceans to U.S. security in the 21st century, particularly in the context of globalization. In essence, readers have asked us whether oceans still matter after globalization has so reduced transit times and increased interconnectivity that transnational terrorism and cyberspace have come into existence. While aviation, the intercontinental ballistic missile, satellites and the Internet have all fundamentally altered the way the world interacts and how wars are fought, Mahan’s analysis holds true. Over the course of a century, but particularly during and after World War II, the United States honed and perfected expeditionary naval operations. Washington’s ability to function on the other side of the planet from home port is unparalleled and has surpassed the sea power of the British Empire that Mahan so admired. The importance of this cannot be overstated, and has broad applicability. Globalization has massively increased, not decreased seaborne commerce. As the dominant global naval power, Washington exercises a decisive influence over the principal avenue of both international trade and the flow of the world’s oil (and, increasingly, natural gas). In addition to wielding this as a lever over other countries, the U.S. Navy is the guarantor of America’s global supply lines. That Washington has claim to both the world’s foremost navy and the world’s foremost economy is no coincidence, and it is a key dynamic of the entire international system. From a military perspective, the last shooting war in the Western Hemisphere of any strategic significance for the United States was the Spanish-American War. That conflict resulted in the expulsion at the end of the 19th century of the last Eastern Hemispheric power from Washington’s periphery. For more than a century now, the United States has fought its wars abroad, with the only strategic threat to the homeland being Soviet (and to a much lesser extent, Chinese) nuclear weapons. Indeed, the fundamental value of naval dominance was demonstrated in 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington was able to prevent the re-emergence of an outside power’s beachhead in Cuba because U.S. naval dominance made the situation untenable for the Kremlin. The Russian navy was not in a position to sustain forces there in the face of concerted U.S. naval opposition. And while the notion of “invasion” in the 21st century may seem anachronistic in the U.S. perspective, the rest of the world sees things very differently. That apparent anachronism is symptomatic of fundamental U.S. geopolitical security. Across the oceans, even much of Europe still looks east over the open Northern European plain and remembers columns of Soviet armor. Nations the world over continue to struggle day in and day out with their neighbors. Pakistan, India and China continue to squabble over Kashmir, which they each consider core to their geographic security. Russia’s foremost geopolitical struggle is the re-establishment of some semblance of a peripheral buffer in Europe and the Caucasus — necessary buffers, but a poor compensation for unfavorable geography. These issues — crucial geopolitical objectives — keep Eurasia divided and restrict (but obviously do not eliminate) other countries’ bandwidth to deal with global issues farther afield. The ultimate consequence of this division is the prevention of the emergence of a potential challenger to the United States. By this, we mean the emergence of a country so secure in its geopolitical position that the mustering of resources necessary to project military force across the Atlantic or Pacific to meaningfully challenge the strategic security of the North American continent becomes a possibility. More simply, U.S. naval dominance allows Washington to keep the costs of projecting hostile military force across the world’s oceans prohibitively high. The countries of the world are thus largely left confronting geopolitical challenges in their own backyards, unable to militarily challenge the United States in its backyard. All the while, the U.S. Navy conducts operations daily in Eurasia’s backyard. This is a secure and enviable geopolitical position. This is not to say that threats to the United States do not exist. But while hijacked airliners, rogue ballistic missiles, smuggling in shipping containers and cybercrime are all legitimate security threats that must be defended against, they are generally not strategic security threats. That the United States has the bandwidth to confront them is emblematic of the fundamental strategic security — not insecurity — of the American position, insulated as it is by the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific.

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but we have to maintain it

**Kagan 12** (Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, January 17, 2012, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline”, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/17-us-power-kagan>)

The challenges today are great, and the rise of China is the most obvious of them. But they are not greater than the challenges the United States faced during the Cold War. Only in retrospect can the Cold War seem easy. Americans at the end of World War II faced a major strategic crisis. The Soviet Union, if only by virtue of its size and location, seemed to threaten vital strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In all these regions, it confronted nations devastated and prostrate from the war. To meet this challenge, the United States had to project its own power, which was great but limited, into each of those regions. It had to form alliances with local powers, some of them former enemies, and provide them with economic, political, and military assistance to help them stand on their own feet and resist Soviet pressure. In the Cold War, the Soviets wielded influence and put pressure on American interests merely by standing still, while the United States had to scramble. It is worth recalling that this strategy of “containment,” now hallowed by its apparent success, struck some influential observers at the time as entirely unworkable. Walter Lippmann attacked it as “misconceived,” based on “hope,” conceding the “strategic initiative” to the Soviets while the United States exhausted its resources trying to establish “satellite states, puppet governments” that were weak, ineffective, and unreliable. Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed. Although China is and will be much richer, and will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult. World War II left China in a comparatively weak position from which it has been working hard to recover ever since. Several of its neighbors are strong nations with close ties to the United States. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon so long as Taiwan remains independent and strategically tied to the United States, and so long as strong regional powers such as Japan, Korea, and Australia continue to host American troops and bases. China would need at least a few allies to have any chance of pushing the United States out of its strongholds in the western Pacific, but right now it is the United States that has the allies. It is the United States that has its troops deployed in forward bases. It is the United States that currently enjoys naval predominance in the key waters and waterways through which China must trade. Altogether, China’s task as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than America’s task, which is only to hold on to what it has. Can the United States do that? In their pessimistic mood today, some Americans doubt that it can. Indeed, they doubt whether the United States can afford to continue playing in any part of the world the predominant role that it has played in the past. Some argue that while Paul Kennedy’s warning of imperial overstretch may not have been correct in 1987, it accurately describes America’s current predicament. The fiscal crisis, the deadlocked political system, the various maladies of American society (including wage stagnation and income inequality), the weaknesses of the educational system, the deteriorating infrastructure—all of these are cited these days as reasons why the United States needs to retrench internationally, to pull back from some overseas commitments, to focus on “nation building at home” rather than try to keep shaping the world as it has in the past. Again, these common assumptions require some examination. For one thing, how “overstretched” is the United States? The answer, in historical terms, is not nearly as much as people imagine. Consider the straightforward matter of the number of troops that the United States deploys overseas. To listen to the debate today, one might imagine there were more American troops committed abroad than ever before. But that is not remotely the case. In 1953, the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas—325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In 1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil—537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere. By contrast, in the summer of 2011, at the height of America’s deployments in its two wars, there were about 200,000 troops deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and another roughly 160,000 troops stationed in Europe and East Asia. Altogether, and including other forces stationed around the world, there were about 500,000 troops deployed overseas. This was lower even than the peacetime deployments of the Cold War. In 1957, for instance, there were over 750,000 troops deployed overseas. Only in the decade between the breakup of the Soviet empire and the attacks of September 11 was the number of deployed forces overseas lower than it is today. The comparison is even more striking if one takes into account the growth of the American population. When the United States had one million troops deployed overseas in 1953, the total American population was only 160 million. Today, when there are half a million troops deployed overseas, the American population is 313 million. The country is twice as large, with half as many troops deployed as fifty years ago. What about the financial expense? Many seem to believe that the cost of these deployments, and of the armed forces generally, is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, the scary projections of future deficits are not “caused by rising defense spending,” much less by spending on foreign assistance. The runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion, a small fraction—between 4 and 8 percent—of the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at America’s ability to remain “the world’s single superpower on the cheap,” the United States was spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending a little under 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower again—still “cheap” by historical standards. The cost of remaining the world’s predominant power is not prohibitive. If we are serious about this exercise in accounting, moreover, the costs of maintaining this position cannot be measured without considering the costs of losing it. Some of the costs of reducing the American role in the world are, of course, unquantifiable. What is it worth to Americans to live in a world dominated by democracies rather than by autocracies? But some of the potential costs could be measured, if anyone cared to try. If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less so—if all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident? American military strength reduces the risk of accidents by deterring conflict, and lowers the price of the accidents that occur by reducing the chance of losing. These savings need to be part of the calculation, too. As a simple matter of dollars and cents, it may be a lot cheaper to preserve the current level of American involvement in the world than to reduce it. Perhaps the greatest concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twenty-first-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least some reason to be hopeful. Americans have experienced this unease before, and many previous generations have also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost virtue: as long ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nation’s fall from past glory, “when the American spirit was in its youth.” There have been many times over the past two centuries when the political system was dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problems—from slavery and then Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis, cannot really believe that our present difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American society, which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and with the relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to influence the behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of Rights—but the system also possesses a remarkable ability to undertake changes just when the steam kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional “critical elections” that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without war. But on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to overcome what had appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic crisis. American businessmen and politicians “reacted strongly to the debate about ‘decline’ by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in newer technologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to produce significant year-on-year advances in productivity.” It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise to this latest economic challenge as well. It is also reasonable to expect that other nations will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations currently enjoying economic miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy histories that suggest the route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question whether the autocratic model of China, which can be so effective in making some strategic decisions about the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible enough to permit adaptation to a changing international economic, political, and strategic environment. In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again. But there is a danger. It is that in the meantime, while the nation continues to struggle, Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order. The underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment. In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.

#### Loss of hegemony causes global instability

Kagan 12, Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3/14/12 “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” CNN,[http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp\_c1](http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c1" \t "_blank))

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

#### Primacy has resulted in the lowest level of war in history – best statistics prove

Owen 11 [John Owen, Associate professor in the University of Virginia's Department of Politics, recipient of fellowships from the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, and the Center of International Studies at Princeton, PhD in international relations from Harvard, February 11, 2011, “Don’t Discount Hegemony, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

# Deterrence

#### Advantage 2 is Deterrence –

#### First, carriers are key to power projection – ground forces are not sufficient

Thompson 09 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer at the Lexington Institute, PhD in government from Georgetown, March 10th, “Navy Will Offer Up Carrier & Air Wing in Quadrennial Review”, http://lexingtoninstitute.org/1383.shtml)

Of course, today's carriers make World War Two carriers look like toys. With nuclear propulsion, supersonic fighters, and over four acres of deck space, they are the biggest warships in history. But at any given time some are being repaired, some are being replenished, some are in training and some are in transit; if the fleet is cut to ten then maybe half a dozen will be available for quick action on any given day. Congress didn't think that was enough, so it mandated in law that at least eleven carriers must be maintained in the force. But with big bills coming from the Obama Administration and other items like healthcare costs pressuring Navy budgets, the service has repeatedly sought relief from that requirement. This year's quadrennial review is the likely venue for another such bid. The issue is coming to a head now because the pace of new carrier commissionings is not keeping up with the rate of retirements. Kitty Hawk, the last carrier in the fleet powered by fossil fuels, was removed from the force last summer after nearly 50 years of service. The Navy plans to decommission the nuclear-powered Enterprise in November of 2012, leaving the fleet with only the ten flattops of the Nimitz class for three years, until the next-generation Ford class of carriers debuts in September of 2015. Going to ten isn't supposed to happen under present law, but since the service has**n**'t made budgetary provisions for maintaining the Enterprise and its crew until the Ford class arrives, it looks like ten carriers will be the total number in the fleet. In the current budget environment, **once the Navy gets used to having ten carriers, that's probably where it will stay**. Navy insiders think the service will decide to forego the refueling of the Lincoln, which is scheduled for 2012. And when the decision to stay at ten is formalized, the service can also move to eliminate one of its carrier wings. That step would cut the Navy's projected shortfall in strike aircraft by half. So billions of dollars are saved by skipping the refueling, cutting the purchase of aircraft, and eliminating the need to sustain 6,000 personnel associated with ship operations and air-wing support. There's only one problem with all this. **It reduces the nation's capacity to project power from the sea at the same time access to foreign bases is becoming doubtful.** And why is such a move necessary? Because the Obama Administration has decided to stick with Bush-era plans to grow the size of ground forces by 92,000 personnel, and the Navy must pay part of the bill for that. Yet the administration is getting ready to depart Iraq, which was the main reason for increasing the size of ground forces in the first place. There are precious few other places where the warfighting scenarios for the next QDR suggest a big ground force will be needed. Most of the scenarios envision reliance on air power for the big fights of the future -- the kind of air power delivered by carriers. So cutting carriers to build a bigger ground force doesn't make much sense.

#### Second, Carriers ensure rapid response to any region in the world – they’re successful even when the US has no allied support

**Eaglen 08** (Mackenzie Eaglen is Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at The Heritage Foundation, “Aircraft Carriers Are Crucial,” July 31, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/30/AR2008073003078.html)

For any U.S. president, the aircraft carrier embodies the ultimate crisis management tool. Continuously deployed throughout the globe, carrier-strike groups give our military unparalleled freedom of action to respond to a range of combat and non-combat missions. The recent George Washington incident only further emphasizes the significance of maintaining a robust carrier fleet, one large enough to meet all contingencies and "surge" in crises, no matter what may happen. Carriers can move large contingents of forces and their support to distant theaters, respond rapidly to changing tactical situations, support several missions simultaneously, and, perhaps most importantly, guarantee access to any region in the world. In a time when America's political relationships with other countries can shift almost overnight, aircraft carriers can reduce America's reliance on others -- often including suspect regimes -- for basing rights. A carrier's air wing can typically support 125 sorties a day at a distance up to 750 nautical miles. They also operate as a hub in the strike group's command, control, communications and intelligence network, playing an increasingly larger role in controlling the battlespace at sea. Whether in a direct or support role, carriers have taken part in almost every major military operation the U.S. has undertaken since the Second World War. They also serve as first-rate diplomatic tools to either heighten or ease political pressure. When tensions with North Korea or Iran increase, a carrier, or sometimes two, is sent to patrol off their coast. And when an election takes place in a nascent democracy or country central to U.S. interests, a strike group typically is sailing offshore. In March, when Taiwan held important presidential elections that will chart the future of that country's relationship with China, both the Kitty Hawk and Nimitz trolled nearby to ensure a smooth transition of events and deliver a psychological message of U.S. interest.

**Third, even if conflict occurs, carriers solve the terminal impact – they’re key to all other operations**

**Swan and Horres 08** (Swan, Brigadier General, Director, Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), National Security Program Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, AND Horres, CAPT completed 26 years of active service, received his master's degrees at Navy War College, Robin P; Edward J, “Opportunity at Hand New Roles for Carriers”, United States Naval Institute: Proceedings, Vol. 134 No. 6, June)

The services must provide Joint Force Commanders (JFC) with the maximum number of strategic and operational options for them to successfully meet the breadth, depth, and longevity of the myriad future challenges they face. To develop and maintain a capable force structure mix, it seems prudent that we wrest maximum flexibility from our current weapon platforms. We should thus examine how to expand the use of our carriers throughout the range of joint expeditionary operations. One suggestion is to reconfigure carrier strike groups into formations better suited for the operations they will most likely encounter during deployment, such as the joint sea base, of which the aircraft carrier would be the nucleus. At face value, using carriers in this manner is not a radical idea given its support, at least in spirit, in the 2006 Naval Operations Concept. It becomes potentially more radical with the suggestion that they be used routinely as force-projection platforms for selective ground forces to conduct a variety of distributed operations from the sea. This borders on cultural heresy at the suggestion that the ground forces include Army units. The last suggestion begs several culturally based questions. Army readers might ask: Why do we need joint seabasing? Navy readers: Why tie-up potent strike systems as ground force projection platforms? And Marines will wonder: Why is the Army poking around in our backyard? These questions must be viewed from the joint force commanders' perspective. Why Joint Seabasing? One must first understand joint seabasing for what it is and isn't. It offers the necessary means to facilitate assured access and entry from the sea, allowing us the use of the sea as a secure base of maneuver to counter military, political, and geographical anti-access environments.2 Yet joint seabasing is but one method of projecting ground forces for rapid operational employment. More additive than alternative, it is a scalable capability that expands operational maneuver options by rapidly projecting power from over-the-horizon to seize the initiative and, by synchronizing with other means of force projection, support the employment of much larger ground forces-forces that would deploy not from but through the seabase. By no means does seabasing threaten to mothball current strategic airlift or sealift fleets. Nor does it fall into the exclusive domain of the relatively few brigades supported by afloat prepositioned equipment sets, unless of course that is the operational requirement. Why is this important? The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations states that the joint force must adopt a new paradigm of simultaneous deployment, employment, and sustainment to conduct operational maneuver from multiple points of origin, over inter- and intra-theater distances. It must do this while carrying out several integrated/interdependent actions in multiple directions and domains. As if this isn't sufficiently challenging, with the proliferation of advanced yet relatively inexpensive technologies, we anticipate our adversaries will better be able to counter our ability to project power, both by military/technological and political/hegemonic means. This is especially true if we remain limited to deploying forces by way of well-developed but predictable air and seaports.3 Fully developed joint seabasing promises to amplify the historical value of amphibious warfare by confronting an enemy with multiple dilemmas to resolve. It also decreases our own predictability and vulnerability by projecting ground forces ashore through multiple air and seaports that have joint capabilities to support those forces with extended air and missile defense and fire support. Seabasing also reduces shore-based sustainment infrastructure and the time required to emplace it, especially early in the campaign. Why Large-Deck Carriers? Carriers will remain in the Fleet for quite some time. The future operating environment still recognizes the possibility of engaging in combat operations with traditional near-peer challengers during which carriers will most certainly be needed in their capacity as the centerpiece of the Navy's battle force. As well, notwithstanding current advances in unmanned systems, carrier-based aircraft remain well suited to attack global insurgency, especially given its potential spreading to other locations; for example, given a different anti-access environment, the Air Force bombs that neutralized Abu Musab al-Zarqawi would likely have been delivered from carrier-based aircraft. Conversely, it would take considerable time to build a fleet of unmanned vehicles with the equivalent sustainable combat significance. Another key reason for keeping CVNs in the Fleet is that their large size provides the maximum available flexibility toward increasing their joint expeditionary relevance. To that end, optimizing both current and future force capabilities will require whole-hearted adoption of a joint interdependent mind-set. As outlined in the capstone concept: Interdependence is a Service's purposeful reliance on another Service's capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing relative vulnerabilities to achieve the mission requirements of the JFC.... Prerequisites for interdependence are: interoperable systems, broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each Service's capabilities and how they are applied, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be integrated in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust in and commitment to interdependence throughout the joint force.4 One potential mission envisions employing Army air assault forces from carriers to conduct vertical maneuver operations, the coupling of air and ground maneuver with long-range precision fires to cause multiple problems for an opponent. Years of wargaming results indicate that this capability would provide significant operational agility where access by land or air is constrained and when operational requirements exceed Marine Corps force capacity. Dubbed the joint Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), this capability proves more significant as the adversaries' anti-access capabilities increase. New War, New Thinking Beyond joint forcible-entry operations aimed at establishing a lodgment to introduce follow-on forces, future counterinsurgency operations could also be skewed toward conducting more single-mission strikes and raids to reduce the exposure of ground forces to continuous asymmetric threats. This capability would also provide an advantage in conducting weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation missions, if so required. Other potential joint interdependent missions include large noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign and domestic civil support, consequence management, humanitarian/disaster relief, and security assistance and regional stability operations. Employing Army helicopters from Navy ships would not be a perfect fit as they lack the attributes of sea-going aircraft, but it has been done successfully in the past on an ad hoc basis. Thus, there is merit in formalizing this practice. One means of mitigating Army aircraft challenges would be a "lily pad" concept: use conventional strategic lift to deploy Army aviation assets and troops to an intermediate support base, and then embark them on carriers for intra-theater transit and employment. In conjunction with the ongoing Joint Seabasing Capability Based Analysis, the Army is establishing a multi-service integrated capability development team to examine the feasibility of enhancing the current ad hoc capability with some afloat forward staging base variant. The near-term objective will be to conduct operations with light infantry forces to provide reinforcement to existing Marine Corps ship-to-objective-maneuver capabilities. The long-term-and transformational-objective will be to adapt emerging Joint Heavy Lift, Stryker, and, potentially, Future Combat Systems technologies and organizations to complement the Marines' maneuver capabilities. The development team will look at all possible platforms, including the acquisition of dedicated vessels. However, a priority will be to examine what can be done in the near-term using existing assets, with the intention of adding new capabilities as they are refined. Again, a near-term marriage would not be perfect, but perfection is a rare commodity during war. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously observed that we have to go to war with the force we have, not the one we want.5 The true test becomes how quickly we adapt the force we have. While such operations can be conducted from large deck amphibious vessels, their smaller size considerably reduces the degree of employable combat significance. More important, they would be used for concurrent Marine Corps operations. They could certainly be so used if Army forces were assigned to provide sequential reinforcement during the campaign, but to achieve the maximum advantages ascribed to joint seabasing, the primary focus should remain on providing joint simultaneous capabilities. Army Forces On Carriers? The Army has always come from the sea. Certainly, the Normandy and Inchon invasions stand as historical examples; so too the massive sealift operations undertaken in the first Gulf War and Iraqi Freedom. Thus the Army is not seeking a new niche capability, and it's certainly not looking for a roles-and-mission fight with the Marine Corps. Arriving by sea is an Army core competency and the increasing anti-access environment demands it do so with less dependence on developed air and sea ports. As for arriving by aircraft carrier, the Army seeks to help close the perennial gap between the arrival of early entry and follow-on forces, as noted by the 2003 Defense Science Board Task Force on Seabasing.6 Using surge CVNs as joint afloat forward staging bases could provide one such gap-filler. Some see a joint Afloat Forward Staging Base capability as redundant to Marine Corps air assault capabilities. However, wargame findings repeatedly indicate an insufficient overall capacity. This shortfall becomes more precipitous for future operations because of an operational tempo that will likely require continued Marine Corps engagement in sustained operations ashore. Opportunity At Hand The carrier debate should not be related to that of its historic battleship predecessor, nor should it devolve into an inter-service domain supremacy or roles-and-mission budget battle. It should be viewed simply as an opportunity to collaborate on leveraging extant joint force capabilities to enhance strategic agility, thus providing the joint force commanders with more options to successfully meet growing operational challenges. We have entered a period that many cite as being one of the most-if not the most-dangerous in our history. The tremendous dual costs of sustaining current operations while transforming the force will place increasingly severe stress on the federal budget and, in turn, the nation's economy. This situation is made all the more ominous given the stark reality that our economy is a target.7 In turn, the services will need to collaboratively prioritize future capital investments on a scale perhaps not seen since World War II-or perhaps ever. This is not to infer that logistics-more specifically, money-should be the primary driver of strategy and force structure. One does need to consider, however, a broad application of Rear Admiral Henry Eccles' adage: "The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics." We must exercise pragmatic logic in striving to develop and maintain a force structure capable of meeting the breadth, depth, and longevity of the many and disparate security challenges facing us now and in the future. In doing so, we must ensure that we harvest maximum capability from our investments-including the use of traditional platforms in non-traditional ways. In this light, using CVNs to project Army ground forces ashore may well be the most critical operational requirement the next time the commander-in-chief asks "Where are the carriers?"

**Carrier-based deterrence maintains world peace- they prevent conflicts from escalating**

**Admiral Johnson and General Krulak 97** (Jay is the Chief of Naval Operations and Charles is the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, “Forward Presence is Essential to American Interests”, <http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/navy/fwdpresn.htm>)

Also this morning, United States Navy amphibious assault ships carrying 4,400 combat-ready American Marines are forward deployed in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. And at sea in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf are aircraft carrier battle groups with 16,000 Sailors and two air wings of combat ready aircraft. And finally, in the Far East, the United States has permanently deployed a third aircraft carrier battle group and a third amphibious ready group. The vigilant "forward presence" of these forces is vital, but not always as visible to Americans as it is to the rest of the world. Their routine daily efforts don't always make the headlines, but they are vitally important to world peace and stability. Some argue that the forward presence these forces represent is no longer necessary. They argue that forces reacting from the United States are enough to maintain international stability. They further maintain that "brushfires," or outbreaks of regional instability, are insignificant, or incidental at best. And they argue that America can no longer afford the forward presence of these forces on what amounts to a near continuous basis. We would argue just the opposite. Forward deployed U.S. forces, primarily naval expeditionary forces — the Navy-Marine Corps team — are vital to regional stability and to keeping these crises from escalating into full-scale wars. To those who argue that the United States can't afford to have this degree of vigilance anymore, we say: The United States can't afford not to. These brushfires, whether the result of long-standing ethnic tensions or resurgent nationalism in the wake of the Cold War will only continue. The Cold War was an anomaly. Never again will we live in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. We have, in some respects, reverted back to the world our ancestors knew: A world in disorder. Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq and the Taiwan Straits are merely examples of the types of continuing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos. The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to the United States', and the world's, vital interests. And while the skies are not dark with smoke from these brushfires, today's world demands a new approach. The concepts of choice must be selective and committed engagement, unencumbered global operations and prompt crisis resolution. There is no better way to maintain and enforce these concepts than with the forward presence of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team. There are four basic tenets to international security in today's world; prevention, deterrence, crisis resolution and war termination. The underlying assumption of these tenets is that the U.S. and its allies should not be forced into winning a war in an overwhelming (and expensive) fashion. Instead, it is much better — and cheaper — to resolve a crisis before it burns out of control. \* Prevent: The key to prevention is continuous presence in a region. This lets our friends know we have an interest and lets potential foes know that we're there to check any move. Both effects occur without any direct action taken. Although hard to measure, the psychological impact of naval expeditionary forces is undeniable. This regional presence underwrites political and economic stability. This is forward presence. \* Deter: Presence does not prevent every crisis. Some rogues are going to be tempted to strike no matter what the odds, and will require active measures to be deterred. When crises reach this threshold, there is no substitute for sustained actual presence. Naval expeditionary forces can quickly take on the role of the very visible fist. Friends and potential enemies recognize naval expeditionary forces as capable of defending or destroying. This visible fist, free from diplomatic and territorial constraints, forms the bedrock of regional deterrence. For example, the mere presence of naval expeditionary forces deterred Chinese attempts to derail the democratic process in Taiwan and countered Iraqi saber-rattling toward Jordan. It's hard to quantify the cost savings of deterring a crisis before it requires our intervention. But the savings are real — in dollars, and often in blood and human misery. This is forward presence. \* Resolve: If a crisis can be neither prevented nor deterred, then prompt and decisive crisis resolution is imperative before the crisis threatens vital interests. U.S. Naval expeditionary forces are a transoceanic key that finds and opens — forcibly if necessary — any gateway into a fiery world. This ability is equally expandable and retractable according to the situation. Perhaps most importantly, naval expeditionary forces don't need permission from foreign governments to be on scene and take unilateral action in a crisis. This both unencumbers the force and takes the pressure off allies to host any outside forces. Over the past two years, for example, U.S. naval expeditionary forces simultaneously and unilaterally deployed to Liberia and to the Central African Republic (1,500 miles inland) to protect U.S. and international citizens. They also launched measured retaliatory Tomahawk strikes to constrain unacceptable Iraqi behavior, and conducted naval air and Tomahawk strikes which brought the warring parties in Bosnia to the negotiating table. This is forward presence. \* Terminate: Each of the above tenets is worthy of the United States paying an annual peace insurance premium. Otherwise we, and our allies, risk paying the emotional, physical and financial costs of a full-blown conflagration that began as just another brushfire. If there is a war, naval expeditionary forces will be first to fight. They are inherently capable of enabling the follow-on forces from the United States for as long as it takes. And they will remain on-scene to enforce the settlement that ends the conflict. This is forward presence. The Iraqis, Central Africas, Somalias and Bosnias inevitably destabilize and erode world order and respect for the rule of law. Indeed, a failure to respond to them encourages future — more serious — crises. The United States must foster stability around the world, today and tomorrow. The peace insurance premium is a small price and is the cost of leadership. Who else is capable of this type of forward presence on a global basis? For the United States, maintaining a steady commitment to stability will be a challenge. But maintain it we must, or the price, literally and figuratively, will be much greater down the road. The example of fighting forest fires is precisely applicable. The philosophy is simple: Prevention through living in the environment; deterrence through vigilance; and resolution through quick and selective engagement. Ninety-five percent of all forest fires are contained — the direct result of the watchful presence of the local initial attack crews who attack flashpoints. As for the other five percent, once the window of opportunity for decisive early action is missed, firefighters must be brought in from outside the region, and it is exponentially more expensive. Sometimes there are casualties — casualties that would not have been incurred had the fire been contained before it had the opportunity to flare. America's Navy-Marine Corps team is underway, ready and on-scene at trouble spots around the world. Forward presence makes it — and will keep it — the right force, tailor-made for these uncertain and sometimes fiery times.

#### Only deterrence is an empirically verifiable solution to war

Moore 04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 27-31.

As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion,were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book heconducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence. Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32 Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose. In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

# Commerce

#### Advantage 3 is Commerce

#### First, Maritime stability is the backbone of the global economy- America must build more carriers to protect vital shipping lanes

Eaglen, 09 - Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at The Heritage Foundation, Sayers, Research Assistant for National Security at The Heritage Foundation, (Mackenzie and Eric, March 24th, “A 21st Century Maritime Posture for an Uncertain Future”, <http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed032409b.cfm?RenderforPrint=1>)

Beyond the vagaries of history and human behavior, a central element of America's national strength is tied to maritime security and stability. Only a secure global maritime environment will continue to ensure economic viability, and promote global freedom of trade and the movement of people. America's $14 trillion economy depends on maritime trade as its lifeline. Fully 95% of the nation's imports and 90% of total global commerce are carried by sea. In the last half century, whose defining feature has been a dramatic rise in overall global prosperity, global trade has grown 60% faster than the world's combined Gross Domestic Product. With over 100 maritime shipping chokepoints around the world, and much of the world economy now operating around a just-in-time delivery business model that requires the steady flow of cargo, the U.S. cannot afford to leave these shipping lanes unprotected. The same imperatives face developing nations like China and India, who see the ability to project maritime power as a rising national security priority. Chinese President Hu Jiantao has referred to his nation's need to secure the shipment of energy resources through the narrow Strait of Malacca as the "Malacca dilemma." In 2008, the Heritage Foundation conducted a gaming exercise that simulated the effects on world oil supplies, demand, and prices following a series of terrorist attacks in the Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia. The findings demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the global system's capacity to produce and deliver oil supplies in the face of a concerted transnational terrorist threat. This exercise also suggests that major producer and consumer nations ,and key geostrategic allies who can act in concert with one another while protecting their own national interests, can ameliorate the severity of long-term disruptions. The geographical proximity of a majority of the world's population to the seas (75% live within 200 miles of coastlines) has also ensured that coastal zones will become more immediate security concerns. Further, 65% of the world's oil and 35% of global gas reserves are resident in the littorals. The maritime consequences of weak and failed states have already been demonstrated off the coast of Somalia. Likewise, the trafficking of narcotics and proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction is almost entirely a seaborne enterprise. U.S. Navy leaders are predicting a disorderly future world whose challenges are concentrated along its coasts. These problems will require a multi-faceted maritime solution that includes cooperation with the private sector, between agencies and services, and among nation states. States are increasingly looking to the seas as a means to project power and secure their territorial and energy interests. Naval analyst Bob Work has observed the "United States may be on the leading edge of a broader, longer-term global naval competition, with either China or Russia, or perhaps both." Emerging naval powers like China are beginning to challenge our shipbuilding capabilities, with indigenous industrial bases that can produce high-quality maritime assets, in quantity. Indeed, China is in the middle of a peacetime naval buildup that is unprecedented in modern history. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) foreign procurement and indigenous develop of anti-ship cruise missiles adds to the risks faced by America's major surface combatants. Though Russia has a long way to go, its intent to again project power globally is leading to a national rearmament drive, beginning with the deployment of a more capable navy. Both Russia and China are also building, and in Russia's case, exporting, modern submarines. They are not alone. U.S. Navy leaders project a startling 280% growth in the number of submarines in operation around the world over the next 2 decades alone, with most of that growth occurring outside the United States or Europe. At the same time, today's Navy has fewer sailors than it has at any period since 1941, and is the smallest fleet since 1960. An American Navy that could be hedged from vital shipping lanes in times of crisis, or from key maritime theaters of operation, would sharply undercut America's global influence. Yet that is exactly the challenge poses by these and other trends. The global proliferation of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles also presents challenges. The Chief of Naval Operations recently cautioned that every 3 years since the early 1990s, a nation becomes capable of launching ballistic missiles. Continuing the Navy's evolution into a key component of America's global Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) mission will be one of its primary responsibilities in the decades ahead. A Navy for Force Projection The future US Navy will require the ability to achieve and maintain access above, on, and below the seas, specifically in the blue waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. We believe that aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships, attack submarines, and converted trident submarines should make up the bulk of this force. The enhanced strike platforms China is developing as part of a sophisticated anti-access / battlespace-denial strategy ensure that the United States should be more concerned with fighting and protecting naval and allied forces far out to sea, rather than in Asia-Pacific's littorals. The carrier strike group (CSG) remains the U.S. Navy's preeminent power projection strike-platform. The current shipbuilding plan calls for 11 aircraft carriers (CVN). Between 2019 and 2037, this **number should increase to 12, and potentially even 13** in the long-term. **This level is adequate to meet combatant commander requirements, and will offer substantial surge capacity.** A consequence of the reduction of America's carrier fleet and tightened budgets in recent decades is the rushed trend towards acquiring multi-mission aircraft and loss of specific capabilities. The F/A-18 Super Hornet is a primary example. In the future, however, with the development of naval unmanned combat air systems (N-UCAS), carrier strike groups could be turned into global strike platforms. While the feasibility of unmanned N-UCAS platforms to perform air superiority missions are decades off and not a high priority, N-UCAS equipped to strike targets at long range could potentially allow a small reduction in the CVN fleet.

#### Naval power projection key to sustaining the economy through open sea-lanes that facilitate free trade

England 12 - Former Secretary of Navy (Gordon- President of E6 Partners LLC, January, “Naval Forces Underpin Economic Success” Proceedings Magazine, Vol 138 No 1, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-01/special-naval-forces-underpin-economic-success)

In response, I would comment that security and economic development are two sides of the same coin. Security, and the stability it brings, is necessary for economic development. Capital quickly leaves countries or regions that are not safe, secure, and stable. In turn, economic development longer-term is necessary to afford security. Since the end of World War II, deployed U.S. military forces around the globe, backed by a strong military at home, along with committed political leadership and advanced technology, provided the security blanket for Europe and Asia to thrive economically. Many European nations are now squandering that wealth, and the United States, unfortunately, is on the same path and not far behind. In this fiscal environment, the Department of Defense can certainly be more effective and efficient. Defense budgets should be reduced. But if U.S. forces shrink too much, or pull back too far to U.S. shores, the nation and the world could find themselves without security or economic development. Security, and the stability it brings, is essential if the world is to recover economically. Here, we must sound a caution. The President and the Congress, as they look to reduce deficits and hopefully one day again balance the budget, must be mindful that our economy and the world economy are inextricably intertwined with security and the stability that security brings. A strong military, and especially strong naval forces, are crucial for the nation to thrive economically. Beyond Politics Over the 40 long years of the Cold War, work on these issues by America’s leadership transcended politics, and Congresses, and administrations. It was not a question of being a Republican or a Democrat, or a conservative or a liberal. Everyone came together and put national security first. After World War II, President Harry S. Truman and his Republican Congress rarely saw eye to eye. But they created strong, flexible, new national-security institutions, to include the Department of Defense. They forged a consensus on national defense to defeat the Soviet threat. That same consensus is needed now. During the Cold War, Soviet shipyards on the White Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean were building new generations of submarine and surface combatants. Throughout the 1950s, ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, the nation knew the U.S. Navy was needed. The nuclear superpower rivalry framed the debate and shaped decisions on the size of the Fleet and funding. With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the economic and security forces of the world entered a process of change that continues and is accelerating. The nation entered a new, long, asymmetric war against extremists that is today only a part of the security challenge. We are faced with state-based nuclear and conventional threats, and the threat that non-state actors may acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The future courses of major powers such as China and Russia are not clear, and they continue their sophisticated military modernization. The nation’s responsibility is to be prepared for the future. The global role of the Navy is essential to this preparation. President Theodore Roosevelt’s words from more than a century ago ring truer than ever: “A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.” In today’s world, naval forces are ever more vital. The U.S. Navy is forward-deployed globally with embedded Marines. Naval forces and the Coast Guard are contributing to the nation’s homeland defense. The Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers conduct ballistic-missile defense operations. Naval forces operate freely on the world’s oceans, exercising sea control, collaborating with allies and foreign partners, deterring strategic and conventional aggression, providing sealift, and projecting power ashore when and where needed, all day, every day. Humanity and Technology The strength of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard starts with their men and women in uniform. Those serving are without peer. To see them in action is to witness talent, training, capability, and commitment. The Navy’s strength—surface, subsurface, and air—builds from its technological prowess. Since the launch of the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) in 1954, the Navy’s use and advances in nuclear propulsion in submarines and surface ships of the Fleet is an unmatched, incredible achievement, embracing science, research and development, shipbuilding, seamanship, strategy, tactics, and vision. That Fleet today includes ballistic-missile submarines providing strategic deterrence, guided-missile submarines with missile-power projection and special-forces-power projection ashore, and carrier strike groups, forward deployed and acting on some of the nation’s highest security priorities. A sampling of the work of these carrier strike groups, sea-based, largely self-sustaining, operating in places with no need for bases across the world’s oceans, is instructive. In late 2010, President Obama ordered the USS George Washington (CVN-73) carrier strike group to the waters off the Korean Peninsula to commence operations with our South Korean allies following the North Korean shelling of the island of Yeonpueong. Thousands of miles away in the Arabian Sea, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) strike group was conducting air operations against insurgents in Afghanistan. Within hours of the March 2011 catastrophic earthquake/tsunami/nuclear power-plant disaster in Japan, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) strike group was operating in waters off the stricken nation bringing relief supplies and searching for survivors. During Nelson’s time, there was a clear connection between the Royal Navy’s control of the seas and British commercial success. Today, the connection for the United States is not as evident but just as strong, as our nation relies on the freedom of the seas for much of our international commerce and wealth. Maritime Security is Crucial Multinational corporations are responsible for an ever-increasing percentage of world trade. Some 90 percent of that trade is moving by sea. Upward of 200 million containers on board cargo ships are on the move each year. Trade to and from the United States around the world is carried almost entirely by ships. The U.S. Navy, U.S. sea power—on-scene and from afar, strategic and tactical, surface, air, cyber, and space—provides a stabilizing presence for the world’s global economy. The safeguarding of seaborne commerce is an enduring part of the Navy’s global mission. Bear in mind, security and economic development are intertwined. A strong national defense is essential for economic strength. Strong naval forces are central to that defense. The Navy and Marine Corps exercise a strategic concept of global operations that contributes uniquely and indispensably to the defense, security, and economic well-being of the United States. Control of the sea, deterrence of aggression, projection of power from the sea, and stabilizing global presence are functions of first-order importance to the nation. They underscore the wisdom of our Founding Fathers who gave Congress explicit power to provide and maintain a Navy in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. That guidance has withstood the test of time as our nation has grown in wealth and influence. It is especially relevant today.

**Free trades disincentivizes countries to go to war against each other and solves terrorism**

**Griswold 11** - is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization (Daniel, “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

**Terrorism causes extinction**

**Morgan, 9 -** Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea

(Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

**Broad statistical models proves collapse leads to conflict**

**Royal 10** – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter.¶ Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.