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# Plan

**Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in expeditious port dredging in the United States.**

# Free Trade

**Advantage 1 is Free Trade**

**Panama Canal expansion will drastically change global trade – dredging is key to U.S. competitiveness**

**Bridges 11 –**Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority (Jerry A., “Testimony of Jerry A. Bridges Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority before the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee Hearing: the Economic importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?” , October 26, 2011,  [<http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Bridges.pdf>)](http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Darcy.pdf)//MM)

Since the birth of our nation, U.S. seaports and waterways that connect them have served as a vital economic lifeline by bringing goods and services to people around the world and by delivering prosperity to our nation. U.S. seaports are responsible for moving more than 99 percent of our country’s overseas cargo. Today, international trade accounts for more than a quarter of Americas Gross Domestic Product. Americas seaports support the employment of 13.3 million U.S. workers, and seaport- related jobs account for $649 billion in annual personal income. For every $1 billion in exports shipped through seaports, 15,000 U.S. jobs are created. Seaports facilitate trade and commerce, create jobs, help secure our borders, support our military and serve as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources. Ports are dynamic, vibrant centers of trade and commerce, but what is most important to understand is that seaports rely on partnerships. Seaports invest more than $2.5 billion every year to maintain and improve their infrastructure. In recent years, however, this commitment has not been adequately matched by the federal government. Federal funding for dredging federal navigation channels has slowed and decreased, especially for new construction**.** Further**,** maintenance dredging is sorely underfunded, despite a more than $6 billion and growing surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Landside improvements have also been too low a priority, with little of the highway funds going to freight transportation projects. The only bright light has been the newly created TIGER grants, although not enough of this funding benefited ports. Virginia Port Authority received a TIGER grant for its heartland project. As we look to the future, we do know that there are challenges and opportunities. As we recover from this economic downturn, we must make investments today to address the trade realities of the future. Here are some the challenges and we have to ask: are we ready?¶ The Panama Canal expansion is due to be completed in 2014 and is expected to influence trade patterns. VPA and other ports have been making investments, but federal funding has been slow to match these investments. Ship sizes continue to get larger, requiring on-'going modernization of ports and federal navigation channels, even for ports that will not require 50 feet of depth. ¶ Canada and Mexico are making investments which could result in losses of maritime jobs in the U.S. as cargo enters the U.S. through these countries. We have already seen this job loss on the West Coast. ¶ The U.S. seeks to double exports; however countries like Brazil and Chile, who we compete against the U.S. in terms of agricultural exports, are making investments that could make their exports more competitive. ¶ New trade agreements with Korea, Panama and Colombia have been approved, with other trade agreements under negotiations which should result in increased exports and imports through ports. ¶ In addition to these near-term challenges, we know that the U.S. population is forecast to grow by 100 million - a 30 percent increase - before the middle of the 2lst century. And many of the goods used by this population will flow through seaports.¶ So are we ready? While ports are planning for the future, the federal government has not kept pace with the industry or our international competitors. The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure that enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long. Many of our land and water connections are insufficient and outdated, affecting the ports' ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S. This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers and hurts our national economy. Port projects take decades to plan and build and we cannot wait. Federal investments in seaports are an essential and effective utilization of limited resources, paying dividends through increased trade and commerce, long-term job creation, secure borders, military support, environmental stewardship, and more than $200 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue. Earlier this month, the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness made an urgent plea for improvements in the nation's transportation infrastructure, including landside and waterside access to seaports. We cannot wait. ¶

**The Plan’s perception is key to retaining foreign customers – loss of them collapses the economy**

**Calhoun 11**-- President of Cargo Carriers (Cargill) and Chairman of Waterways Council, Inc (Rick, “DREDGING FOR PROSPERITY”, Marine Log, August, ProQuest, <http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/889143450?accountid=14667>”)

¶ Just like the nation itself, our maritime industry is facing a multitude of challenges like flooding in the Midwest, silting of our major shipping arteries, and the need for recapitalization for our lock and dam infrastructure, to name a few. ¶ But these challenges and the solutions to them must be viewed as investments in the future of our nation itself because without a strong, reliable marine transportation industry, we simply cannot competitively sell our export products in the world marketplace. Those countries that buy from America do so because we are a dependable supplier of products at a competitive price, thanks in no small part to the existence of our enviable transportation system. If that system becomes compromised, those foreign buyers will simply shop elsewhere and that will further impact the United States' precarious economic recovery. ¶ Witness the dredging situation on the Lower Mississippi River. This year, we have seen unprecedented levels of high water on the Mississippi River carrying millions of tons of silt and debris to the mouth of the River. This silting has resulted in restrictions being imposed for ships and vessels that rely on this passageway to export products to the world market, as well as import goods competitively, via ports in south Louisiana. In the past the Corps of Engineers has been able to manage silting issues with funding for dredging that sometimes required the reprogramming of funds to be sure shortfalls did not occur. This year the Corps has said it can no longer reprogram funds and that a funding shortfall indeed exists on this vital part of the system. ¶ Throughout this country's great history, the federal government's role is in part to ensure that the inland navigation system, including the Mississippi River, remains open to transport products such as grain, coal, steel, petroleum and aggregate materials. The federal government now needs to take necessary steps to provide funding for our national transportation asset and to allow the Lower Mississippi River to remain fully open for commerce. We urge the White House to immediately submit an emergency request for supplemental funds to Congress, and we ask that Congress expeditiously process that request for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding. All of us who are responsible for managing money have faced times when cutting costs have become necessary, yet those who are successful rarely focus on reducing costs if it results in an even greater loss in the revenue stream. Again, dredging this critical artery should be viewed as an investment, not a cost, in the future of our inland waterways transportation system.

**Dredging is key to the US economy and trade competitiveness – current projects are too slow and insufficiently funded**

**Nagle 11** --- president and chief executive officer of the American Association of Port Authorities (December 2011, Kurt, Industry Today, “Association: American Association of Port Authorities; Port-Related Infrastructure Investments Can Reap Dividends,” vol. 14, no. 3, <http://www.industrytoday.com/article_view.asp?ArticleID=F370>)

 ¶ It seems the United States willingly allows infrastructure to crumble as other countries – particularly the BRICs – bolster the physical support systems that foster economic growth. The American Association of Port Authorities is concerned over the state of America’s aged transportation infrastructure so it’s urging investments in both landside and waterside connections with ports.¶ The burning question on the mind of many US lawmakers, administration officials and others is how best to stimulate the economy and spur job creation. The answer lies in focusing scarce federal resources in areas that will have the greatest impact on economic growth, immediate and long-term job creation, national security, and our current and future competitiveness in the global economy. Enhancements in seaport-related infrastructure should be a high priority among the limited investment options.¶ For centuries, US seaports – and the connecting waterways – have served as a vital economic lifeline, bringing goods and services to people around the world and delivering prosperity to our nation. They facilitate trade and commerce, create jobs, secure our borders, support our military and serve as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources.¶ Seaports are the primary gateway for overseas trade. They’re essential to economic security. As such, federal funding for infrastructure in and around ports pays dividends. Deep-draft coastal and Great Lakes ports are the nexus of critical transportation infrastructure that connects America’s exporters with markets overseas, and they provide access for imports of raw materials, components and consumer goods that are a key part of US manufacturing and help define our standard of living.¶ Investments in America’s port infrastructure and the intermodal connections that serve seaports – both land and waterside – foster prosperity and provide an opportunity to bolster the country’s economic and employment recovery.¶ ECONOMIC IMPACT: HUGE¶ Currently, international trade accounts for more than a quarter of America’s GDP (gross domestic product). Oceangoing vessels that load and unload cargo at US seaports move 99.4 percent of the nation’s overseas trade by volume and 65.5 percent by value. Further, customs collections from seaport cargo provide tens of billions of dollars a year to the federal government, including $23.2 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2007, $24.1 billion in FY 2008, $20.3 billion in FY 2009 and $22.5 billion in FY 2010.¶ The latest economic impacts analyses conducted in 2007 indicated that US seaport activities generated $3.15 trillion in annual economic output, with $3.8 billion worth of goods moving in and out of seaports every day. Impact extends far beyond seaport communities. On average, any given state uses the services of 15 different ports around the country to handle its imports and exports. Also, seaports are a proven job creator.¶ In addition to handling international trade, US seaports – and the waterways that serve them – represent important transportation modes for the movement of domestic freight. Greater utilization of America’s coastal and inland water routes for freight transportation complements other surface transportation modes – providing a safe and secure alternative for cargo while offering significant energy savings and traffic congestion relief.¶ VIEW FROM WATERSIDE¶ As US investment in its waterways infrastructure is trending downward, countries like India, Brazil and the United Kingdom commit the equivalent of billions of US dollars to port and channel modernization. The expansion of the Panama Canal slated for completion in 2014 – the first major expansion in more than a century – is driving ports around the world to deepen navigation channels and improve harbor facilities. Look at what’s happening:¶ India plans to invest $60 billion – including both public and private funds – to create seven new major ports by 2020. Expect this to have a substantial impact: It will handle the anticipated rapid expansion of merchandise exports, forecasted to triple by 2017.¶ Brazil expects tonnage at its coastal ports to more than double (to 1.7 billion tons) by 2022. In response, the nation is committing $17 billion to port improvements (including $14 billion from the private sector).¶ In Great Britain, DP World (the world’s fourth-largest marine terminal operator) plans to spend $2.5 billion on London’s Deep-Water Gateway, the country’s first such development in the last 20 years.¶ Meanwhile, in the United States, public funding for new navigation channel improvements has all but dried up. Lawmakers focus on reducing the deficit and eliminating appropriation “earmarks” that have traditionally funded federal navigation deepening projects. At the same time, funding for projects already approved and underway is slow, incremental and insufficient.¶ Insufficient appropriations make it impossible to maintain most federal navigation channels at their authorized and required dimensions. The US Army Corps of Engineers has been commissioned with the responsibility of improving and maintaining the nation’s water access to ports. But while this charge comes from the US government, the federal government is less than supportive. It spends only about half of the tax that it collects specifically directed toward deep-draft channel maintenance. The rest – more than $6 billion since 1986 – has essentially been “disappeared” into the US Treasury while serious dredging needs remain neglected.¶ This is unfortunate at a crucial juncture. Projects to maintain these critical waterways would create jobs immediately and would provide transportation savings to benefit US businesses. With decreases in the cost of freight transportation, these sectors can enhance their global competitiveness and create more jobs. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) has continually and strongly urged Congress to take action to ensure that 100-percent of the annual amount collected from the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) is utilized to maintain federal navigation channels.

**Increasing exports makes growth sustainable and decreases our trade deficit**

**Istrate et al, 10** -- senior research analyst and associate fellow with the Metropolitan Infrastructure Initiative (Emilia, "Export Nation: How U.S. Metros Lead National Export Growth and Boost Competitiveness", July, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/7/26%20mountain%20exports%20muro/0726_exports_istrate_rothwell_katz.pdf>)

¶ Exports Could Contribute to the Rebalancing of the U.S. Economy and a Lower Trade Deficit¶ For the most of the last 20 years, the United States has witnessed strong economic growth and low unemployment in comparison with other developed countries.18 Yet, the U.S. economy was affected by the wide fluctuations at the end of two business cycles, the so called IT bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble that ended between sometime during 2006 and 2007. Meanwhile, in 2006 household income inequality reached its post-World War II peak.19 Real median income in 2008 fell below 1999 levels.20 These three conditions—a tepid rise in living standards, increasing inequality, and bubble economies—are embedded in the consumption driven American economy.¶ In 1982, U.S. residents spent 86 cents of every dollar of after-tax income, but the intensity of consumption grew steadily such that by 2005, that share had reached 95 cents of every dollar.21 All this spending depleted savings, which dropped precipitously over the time period from over 10 percent in the early 1980s to just 1.7 percent in 2005.22 At the same time, an increasing share of consumption involved the purchase of imports. While the value of U.S. total imports was eight percent higher than the value of U.S. total exports in 1982, by 2005, the difference was 36 percent, the highest gap since 1960.23¶ With minimal household savings, domestic investment declined over the last two decades relative to the size of the economy. The United States invested about 7.3 percent of GDP in the 2000s, much less than the 9.4 percent rate of the 1970s.24 Moreover, from 2000 to 2007, private manufacturing investment as a share of GDP was just 0.26 percent per year compared to 0.37 percent during the 1990s. At the same time, foreign investment compensated to some extent, though more in the real estate sector. For example, Chinese holdings represented 6 percent of all federal agency debt and 29 percent of foreign-held agency debt in 2007, making China the largest foreign holder of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt.25¶ The externalization of risk is another major problem with trade deficits. A large portion of the dollars spent on imports end up being re-invested back into the United States and that process increases the risk of bubbles. No sector can sustain limitless growth, and as the safest and most valuable investments become saturated with funding, the excess liquidity begins to seep into riskier and riskier propositions like no-income-no-asset subprime mortgage derivatives. The economists Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak have shown that current account deficits have coincided with and contributed to rapid housing price appreciation across OECD countries between 1990 and 2005.26¶ While the United States based its growth on private consumption over the last three decades, the other developed countries exploited foreign demand. Over the last 30 years, private consumption, as a share of GDP, increased by seven percentage points in the United States, while total exports grew by only two percentage points. The other large developed countries, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, maintained an almost constant share of private spending, but increased their share of total exports in GDP by seven percentage points.28 In 2008, the U.S. total exports were only 12.7 of domestic production, in comparison with 29.7 percent in the other large developed countries. Moreover, as a recent Brookings report shows, this underperformance is not entirely explained by the size of the U.S. economy and its distance from trading partners.¶ There are a number of potential explanations for why the United States under-exports. First, the dollar is over-valued relative to the currencies of a number of important U.S. trading partners.29 In addition, U.S. companies have been focused on catering to the large and growing U.S market. About one percent of U.S. companies exported in 2008.30 It seems that many small and medium companies lack information regarding exports and perceive exporting as a risky endeavor.31 Finally, many countries still put up significant trade barriers against U.S. companies. In the absence of free trade agreements with emerging countries, U.S. companies had additional incentives to locate production abroad in order to take advantage of these foreign markets. For example, while nominal total exports grew by 10 percent annually between 1994 and 2007, nominal sales of U.S. affiliates located in foreign countries increased by almost 18 percent a year during the same period.32¶ Whatever the reasons why the United States is less export-oriented than other countries, **increasing¶ exports relative to imports can be part of the solution to many long-standing difficulties.**

**Trade deficit kills the economy – the Plan solves it  
Weller et. al. 2011** (Christian, Dr. Christian E. Weller is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and an associate professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts Boston. His area of expertise includes retirement income security, macroeconomics, money and banking, and international finance. He is also a research scholar at the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Political Economy Research Institute and an institute fellow at the University of Massachusetts Boston’s Gerontology Institute. Prior to joining the Center, he was on the research staff at the Economic Policy Institute, where he remains a research associate. “The Case for Strategic Export Promotion”, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/high_tech_trade.html/print.html>)

The United States faces enormous economic obstacles in the immediate future as it recovers from the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. The private-sector recovery is under way, with industrial production growing by 9.2 percent from June 2009 to July 2010, and with business investment up by an inflation-adjusted 5.2 percent from June 2009 to June 2010. Private-sector employment is also on the rise with more than 1.1 million jobs created in 2010.¶ This is good news, but large challenges still loom that could derail the fledgling private-sector momentum contributing to our economic recovery. An important challenge is the trade deficit. The U.S. trade deficit is widening again, reaching 3.7 percent of gross domestic product (the total amount of goods and services produced in our economy) in the third quarter of 2010, up from 2.4 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2009. This widening gap poses a drag on economic growth since the country has to borrow money overseas to pay for the extra imports—a debt that ultimately will have to be repaid.¶ A country can only import more than it exports if overseas investors lend it money. For the United States this means a persistent trade deficit requires taking on ever more foreign debt to pay for the excess of imports over exports. That’s why maintaining U.S. international economic competitiveness and strengthening our exports must be a key component of any serious strategy to produce sustained and long-term economic growth.

**US is key to the global economy**

**Caploe 09** David, CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that **there is no other engine for the world economy** - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

**Statistics prove collapse leads to conflict**

**Royal 10** – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, (Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter.¶ Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

**Slow growth makes the US uncooperative and desperate – leads to hegemonic wars**

**Goldstein 07** - Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, Avery Goldstein, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” [Journal of Strategic Studies](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636064), Volume[30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636064~tab=issueslist~branches=30#v30), Issue [4 & 5](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g780703608)August 2007, pages 639 – 682

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to theultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance**.** The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth(much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650

**Data proves resolving the deficit solves protectionism  
Hufbauer et. al. 10** (Gary, Former Senior Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, Author of multiple books on international trade, Peterson Institute for International Economics, “US Protectionist Impulses in the Wake of the Great Recession”, <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf>)

The U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled between the onset of the Great Recession in¶ December 2007 and December 2009, and is now hovering just below 10 percent (figure 1).¶ 1¶ Considering that this discouraging figure likely understates broader deterioration in the U.S.¶ labor market,¶ 2¶ the absence of sustained Congressional pressure for large‐scale protectionist¶ measures, beyond “Buy American” provisions and several smaller companions (all examined in¶ this report), is in some ways surprising.¶ 3¶ At least part of the explanation for the restrained political response is the simultaneous large¶ improvement in the U.S. trade balance during 2008 and early 2009. Figure 1 illustrates how the¶ total U.S. deficit in goods and services trade was nearly cut in half during this period, creating a¶ political obstacle to kneejerk protectionism. As we will elaborate in section IV, during recessions¶ an improving external balance (from imports falling faster than exports) often acts an¶ “automatic international economic stabilizer,” which temporarily fulfills an equivalent¶ economic function to a Keynesian government stimulus package. The “external sector” of the¶ U.S. economy during the early quarters of the Great Recession provided an “automatic offset”¶ to sliding U.S. economic activity. This probably caused policymakers to think twice about¶ succumbing to short‐term protectionist instincts.¶ However, figure 1 also shows how the improvement in the U.S. trade balance has been only¶ temporary and indeed began to reverse as the U.S. economy exited the Great Recession during¶ the second half of 2009. Crucial for the political threat of protectionism, economic forecasts¶ indicate that the U.S. unemployment rate will probably remain at very high levels over the¶ medium term, despite President Obama’s emphasis on “jobs, jobs, jobs” in his State of the¶ Union Address delivered on January 27¶ th¶ , 2010.¶ 4¶ A time lag of at least 12 to 18 months probably separates the point at which the U.S. trade¶ balance showed maximum improvement (spring 2009) and the expected drop in measured¶ unemployment well below 10 percent (fall 2010). Absent the “feel good” factor of an improving¶ trade balance, but facing continuing high unemployment levels, protectionist sentiment in the¶ U.S. Congress may increase in the coming months, especially as the November 2010 midterm¶ election draws near.¶ This is particularly so, as current economic forecasts suggest a more robust U.S. economic¶ recovery in the coming years, relative to other industrial trading partners (table 1). A large and¶ growing deficit in the U.S. external balances will likely persist for some time, while the external¶ balances of other major trading partners could hold steady or even improve. If the United¶ States thus returns to its “pre‐crisis role as the world’s importer/consumer of last resort,”¶ protectionist impulses in the U.S. Congress are destined to escalate.¶ 5¶ Fresh U.S. protectionist initiatives, at a time when the U.S. economy is growing at a decent pace,¶ will likely invite in‐kind retaliation by America’s trading partners, despite the relatively muted¶ reaction to the original “Buy American” provisions in early 2009 and other protectionist measures implemented since then. No longer facing a newly‐elected U.S. president, who¶ entered office with considerable global appeal in the midst of an unprecedented economic¶ crisis, foreign leaders are unlikely to give the U.S. an easy pass on future new instances of U.S.¶ protectionism.

#### Protectionism causes nuclear war

Panzner 08, Instructor New York Institute of Finance, (Michael J.-, Financial Armageddon: Protecting Your Future from Four Impending Catastrophes, P. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by non-citizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

**Studies prove free trade solves war**

**Griswold 11** - is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization (Daniel, “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the **least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study** for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, **found** the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

**Collapse of US trade leadership causes trade blocs and conflict**

**Bergsten 97** – Peterson Institute for International Economics (Fred C., “Global Trade and American Politics”, September 27, 1997, The Economist, <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=291>)

¶ Second, the trade policy credibility of the United States will totally evaporate if it sits on the sidelines for the next four years—the minimum result of a failure to win new negotiating authority. The United States led the agreement of the 34 democracies in the Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The United States turned the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), whose 18 members comprise half the world economy, into a substantive organisation by initiating annual summit meetings in 1993 and supporting its agreement to achieve “free and open trade and investment” by 2010 (for its industrialised members ) and 2020 (for the rest). The United States insisted that the World Trade Organisation agree to resume negotiations on agriculture, services and other central issues by 2000. American withdrawal from these initiatives would doom them all, threatening a reversal into protectionism.¶ Third, American leadership has been crucial in assuring the compatibility, indeed the complimentarity, of regional and global liberalisation. Some purists have condemned the United States for deviating from the exclusive pursuit of multilateral agreements. But American strategy has promoted regional arrangements (starting with its pact with Canada and extending through NAFTA to the current FTAA and APEC initiatives) partly to press the more inward-looking EU and others to move ahead on the global path. Now that so many regional arrangements are in place or underway, America's defection could throw the whole process into reverse. Key groups—the EU, Mercosur and perhaps some new Asian groupings—could forget the global track and bring to life the much feared nightmare of a world of hostile trade blocs.¶ Fourth, American trade policy itself could suffer irreparable harm from a failure of the current legislative effort. The United States is in its seventh year of expansion with unemployment and inflation at their lowest in decades. Its chief competitors in Europe and Japan remain mired in prolonged slumps. President Clinton was decisively re-elected a year ago and remains extremely popular. If the United States cannot pursue trade liberalisation now, when will it ever be able to?¶ A failure, or a severe limitation on the use of new authority (e.g., to add only Chile to NAFTA), would represent a stunning victory for organised labor and others that oppose globalisation. Such a victory would be led by Congressman Richard Gephardt, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and a likely presidential candidate in 2000. The United States has not had a protectionist President for a century (though Ronald Reagan's wrong-headed macroeconomic policies produced a spate of new import quotas) but such an outcome is by no means impossible if the present debate were to misfire. The countries that have taken out insurance policies against a US reversion to protectionism via free trade agreements, Canada and Mexico, have not idly overcome their historical aversions to getting into bed with their superpower neighbor.¶ The Global Impact¶ Would all this be so serious for the rest of the world? After all, the United States is no longer hegemonic in economic terms. Its share of world output has dropped below a quarter and its share of trade is even less. The EU is larger on both counts and the creation of the euro will end America's monetary dominance. Moreover, globalisation has enormous momentum. Big trade agreements have been proceeding without America. The EU brokered an interim financial services agreement in 1995 when America chose to stay out, is expanding its membership and heading toward mostly free trade with its Mediterranean neighbors by 2010, and is pursuing agreements with Mercosur and Mexico. Subregional pacts such as Mercosur and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement are moving ahead. Canada and Mexico have concluded their own free trade agreements with Chile.¶ All these deals hurt the United States, by creating or threatening discrimination against it,—but this is nothing more than turnabout for America's own preferential compacts. The global problem is that American disengagement would puncture, and probably destroy, the prospects for consummating the extraordinarily promising scenario for world trade that has evolved since the end of the Uruguay Round and is now poised to proceed. That scenario has two related elements.¶ The first is credible implementation of the two huge regional free trade agreements launched in 1994, the FTAA and APEC. Their conversion from political pledges to practical realities would provide huge new reductions of trade barriers. It would also bring irresistible pressure on the EU and others to avoid the risk of facing costly discrimination by joining a new global liberalisation initiative.¶ APEC is particularly crucial to this strategy. Because of it's size, its pledge in 1994 to achieve free trade in the region is potentially the most far-reaching economic agreement in history. At the same time, its devotion to “open regionalism” means that it will offer to extend its liberalisation to non-members. The EU has always said that “it will not be left behind if APEC does what it says it will do,” as was indeed the case with the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) a year ago. APEC thus dramatically magnifies America's own effort to continue reducing global barriers.¶ The second element in the global scenario would then be a major new effort in the WTO, perhaps the “Millennium Round” called for by Sir Leon Brittan or at least a simultaneous “round-up” of key issues as proposed by my colleague Jeffrey Schott. As in the past, rounds or round-ups that include a number of issues and sectors will be needed to meet the diverse interests of the full WTO membership and permit the necessary tradeoffs across topics that produce far-reaching liberalisation. It is true that the ITA and the telecommunications agreement represented victories for the sectoral approach but talks on maritime services collapsed and the outcome of the current renewed effort on financial services is unclear. A broader approach will almost certainly be required to provide substantial global progress.¶ Once all the regional arrangements are on their way to being realised, about two-thirds of world trade will in fact have achieved, or be headed toward, barrier-free status. The WTO membership would then recognise that global free trade was a practical reality and guide the next round(s) by setting an explicit goal of reaching that milestone—perhaps by 2010 on the APEC and Euromed models. The WTO's director-general Renato Ruggiero, the Canadian government, and the declaration of the WTO's ministerial conference in Singapore last December have all already endorsed variants of that prospect.¶ In addition, this scenario would decisively counter the risk that the regional pacts will become sources of new international conflict. Mr. Ruggiero has put it nicely: regionalism will undoubtedly continue to proliferate so the issue is whether the groupings go off on their own, with possibly disastrous consequences, or increasingly fuse into a common global context that eventually wipes out their preferential features. The latter outcome is obviously superior but the chances of reaching it would be severely jeopardised by a prolonged period of American inaction.¶ There would be even bigger cost to the world from a failure of the Clinton fast-track effort: an enormous boost to the backlash against globalisation. Such a backlash is evident almost everywhere, from striking workers in France to the tirades of Malaysia's prime minister against international investors. There is some justice in the complaints. On balance, globalisation is clearly good for every country, but many governments have been slow to erect the necessary domestic complements. Without adequate safety nets to cushion adjustment burdens, and worker training that will convert potential losers into winners who can take advantage of the better jobs and higher wages that become available, political support for globalisation may be impossible to sustain.¶ In this environment, victory for the anti-globalisation forces in the United States could have terrible global consequences. Defensive reactions would surface almost immediately, especially in the Asian and Latin American countries that depend most heavily on the American market. China, Russia and others could lose interest in further liberalisation and joining the WTO. A half century of global economic opening could stall or even be thrown into reverse.¶ The broader international credibility of the United States would of course suffer severely as well, with substantial implications for international politics and even global security. It would be impossible for America to withdraw from such a central component of international affairs, or indeed repudiate initiatives undertaken with great fanfare by its own president and his predecessors, without jolting confidence in its staying power in other respects.

# Navy

**Advantage 2 is the Navy**

**Light loading will occur without dredging – that destroys the U.S. maritime industry and the economy**

**Weakley 08** – Realize America’s Maritime promise, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, testimony of James Weakley the president of the Lake Carriers’ Association (James, “Realize America’s Maritime Promise”, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, 4/30/08, <http://www.ramphmtf.org/speeches_043008.html>)

¶ Port-related jobs are critical to augment our economy. Direct and indirect jobs generated by ports result in the employment of more than 8 million Americans who earned and spent $314.5 billion in 2006. Every $1 billion in exports alone creates an estimated 15, 000 new jobs. In Texas alone one in every four jobs is linked to trade. ¶ America´s deep-draft navigation system is at a crossroads, with a future that can be bright or bleak. Our waterways´ ability to support the Nation?s continuing growth in trade and in the defense of our Nation, hinges on much-needed Federal attention to unresolved funding needs that are derailing critical channel maintenance and deep-draft construction projects of the water highways to our ports. Because most ports do not have naturally deep harbors, they must be regularly dredged to allow ships to move safely through Federal navigation channels. Also, as modern vessels increase in size, navigation channel depths must increase accordingly, if we are to continue to be a player on the international marketplace. A recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers study reports that almost 30 percent of the 95, 550 vessel calls at U.S. ports are constrained due to inadequate channel depths. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the things that cause port directors nightmares.¶ Without a channel dredged to its authorized depth, nothing else comes into play. Attracting new customers, dealing with labor issues, environmental concerns, and the public - all go away - because without a properly-dredged channel, business goes away. Public ports are at a critical state in keeping their channels open for business. We are losing existing business and potential new business to ports outside of the United States ? and once lost, it is rarely regained. ¶ Dredging can literally make or break our industry, and a lack of dredging is an issue throughout the United States. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that in many parts of the United States, we face a dredging crisis. On the Great Lakes, as Chairman James L. Oberstar of this Committee and Chairman David R. Obey of the Appropriations Committee well know, decades of inadequate funding for dredging have left a backlog of 18 million cubic yards of sediment. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates removing the backlog will cost more than $230 million on the Great Lakes alone. In some cases, ports on the Great Lakes have actually shutdown due to inadequate dredging. There are similar examples of dredging problems in ports and harbors on all coasts of our Nation. ¶ In many cases, vessels must ?load light? because of dredging shortfalls. The economic implications of light loading are enormous. On the Great Lakes, for example, vessels lose between 50 to 270 tons of cargo for each inch they must reduce their draft and, in some areas, the lost draft is measured in feet, not inches. Light loading because of inadequate dredging impacts everyone. A ship that is light-loaded reduces its efficiencies in the same way that a commercial airplane that is required to set aside seats with no passengers would quickly lose its efficiencies. ¶ The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund¶ The Harbor Maintenance Tax and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund were established in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986. The Trust Fund (HMTF) applies a 0.125 percent ad valorem tax on the value of commercial cargo loaded or unloaded on vessels using Federally-maintained channels. The tax is only assessed on imports and domestic cargo, as it was ruled as an unconstitutional assessment on exports in a 1998 Supreme Court ruling. This Fund - that you, members of Congress - established, was authorized to be utilized to recover 100 percent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers eligible Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures for commercial navigation, along with 100 percent of the O&M cost of the St. Lawrence Seaway, certain costs of NOAA, and the costs to Customs to collect the tax. ¶ Fixing the Problem¶ Ladies and gentleman - would it surprise you to know that this utilization has not been honored? HMTF revenues exceed transfers for authorized activities by an increasing margin. Yet, our Federal channels are not being maintained at authorized depths. The Fund is being held hostage to paper balance the budget - interestingly, not one of its legal uses. In 2007, the HMTF began with a $3.3 billion surplus and collected an additional $1.4 billion - resulting in a $4.7 billion surplus, while only $751 million was utilized for maintenance dredging. That is incredible. I would ask that you consider this analogy offered by my colleague in a Gulf Coast port: "What would you say to a toll booth operator who took your money to use the toll road only to then tell you that the road was unusable?"? ¶ That is what is happening to shippers who pay this tax every day. We must solve this problem. We must draft legislation that mandates that the Fund be utilized for its intended purpose - the maintenance dredging of Federal ports and harbors. There are a number of ways to address this problem. As you know, other modes of transportation - surface transportation and aviation ? have faced similar problems in the past decade. Although we are in the early stages of addressing this problem, our Coalition believes Congress should consider an approach similar to that taken with the Highway Trust Fund in 1998 and with the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in 2000. In those cases, Congress legislatively enacted "firewalls" around the Trust Funds ? essentially guaranteeing minimum levels of spending that could only be used to support eligible projects. Although there are some variations between the Highway, Aviation, and Harbor Maintenance Trust, the point of a firewall in each case is the same - ensuring that monies from a tax would be used for their intended purpose and not merely for deficit reduction.

**The maritime industry is key to the Navy**

**NLUS 12** (Navy League of the United States, Since 1902, the NLUS has sought to provide a stronger sea voice to Congress and to the American people, “America’s Maritime Industry: the foundation of American seapower.”, <http://www.navyleague.org/files/americas-maritime-industry.pdf>)

The American Maritime Industry also ¶ contributes to our national defense ¶ by sustaining the shipbuilding and ¶ repair sector of our national defense ¶ industrial base upon which our standing ¶ as a seapower is based. History has¶ proven that without a strong maritime ¶ infrastructure —shipyards, suppliers, ¶ and seafarers— no country can hope to ¶ build and support a Navy of sufficient size and capability to protect its interests on a global basis.¶ Both our commercial and naval fleets rely on U.S. shipyards and their numerous industrial vendors ¶ for building and repairs. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding and repair industry also impacts our ¶ national economy by adding billions of dollars to U.S. economic output annually. ¶ In 2004, there were 89 shipyards in the major shipbuilding and repair base of the United States, ¶ defined by the Maritime Administration as including those shipyards capable of building, ¶ repairing, or providing topside repairs for ships 122 meters (400 feet) in length and over. This ¶ includes six large shipyards that build large ships for the U.S. Navy. Based on U.S. Coast Guard¶ vessel registration data for 2008, in that year U.S. shipyards delivered 13 large deep-draft vessels ¶ including naval ships, merchant ships, and drilling rigs; 58 offshore service vessels; 142 tugs and¶ towboats, 51 passenger vessels greater than 50 feet in length; 9 commercial fishing vessels; 240¶ other self- propelled vessels; 23 mega-yachts; 10 oceangoing barges; and 224 tank barges under¶ 5,000 GT.¶ 11¶ Since the mid 1990’s, the industry has been experiencing a period of modernization and renewal¶ that is largely market-driven, backed by long-term customer commitments. Over the six-year¶ period from 2000-05, a total of $2.336 billion was invested in the industry, while in 2006, capital ¶ investments in the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry amounted to $270 million.¶ 12¶ The state of the industrial base that services this nation’s Sea Services is of great concern to ¶ the U.S. Navy. Even a modest increase in oceangoing commercial shipbuilding would give a ¶ substantial boost to our shipyards and marine vendors. Shipyard facilities at the larger shipyards ¶ in the United States are capable of constructing merchant ships as well as warships, but often ¶ cannot match the output of shipyards in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, **U.S. yards construct** ¶ and equip **the best warships**, aircraft carriers and submarines **in the world**. They are **unmatched in**¶ **capability**, but must maintain that lead. ¶ 13¶ Maintaining a strong industrial base supporting ¶ the seagoing elements of the U.S. Merchant Marine ¶ and U.S. Navy includes having the trained and ¶ experienced manpower necessary to crew the vessels¶ comprising the commercial merchant fleet and the ¶ skilled shipyard workers needed to build and repair ¶ both Navy and commercial ships. Thus seafarers and ¶ shipyard labor are key elements in maintaining U.S. ¶ maritime superiority.

**Dredging is key to container vessels – key to naval readiness**

**DOTMA 5** (U.S. department of transportation maritime administration “ REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF PORTS AND THE INTERMODAL SYSTEM” http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Rpt\_to\_Congress-Perf\_Ports\_Intermodal\_Sys-June2005.pdf)

Lack of attention to port maintenance and improvement dredging is starting to restrict trade and military movements. Some ports are struggling to keep up with newer, deeper draft container vessels which are now calling on the United States. Further, military movements onto some deployment docks are restricted to daylight operation because of channel width and depth restrictions. MARAD recommends that some of the most critical dredging and infrastructure projects be identified for the purpose of bringing attention to the areas that may soon restrict military or significant commercial cargo.

**A strong navy solves multiple scenarios for extinction**

**Admiral Johnson and General Krulak 97** (Jay is the Chief of Naval Operations and Charles is the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, “Forward Presence is Essential to American Interests”, <http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/navy/fwdpresn.htm>)

Also this morning, United States Navy amphibious assault ships carrying 4,400 combat-ready American Marines are forward deployed in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. And at sea in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf are aircraft carrier battle groups with 16,000 Sailors and two air wings of combat ready aircraft. And finally, in the Far East, the United States has permanently deployed a third aircraft carrier battle group and a third amphibious ready group. The vigilant "forward presence" of these forces is vital, but not always as visible to Americans as it is to the rest of the world. Their routine daily efforts don't always make the headlines, but they are vitally important to world peace and stability. Some argue that the forward presence these forces represent is no longer necessary. They argue that forces reacting from the United States are enough to maintain international stability. They further maintain that "brushfires," or outbreaks of regional instability, are insignificant, or incidental at best. And they argue that America can no longer afford the forward presence of these forces on what amounts to a near continuous basis. We would argue just the opposite. Forward deployed U.S. forces, primarily naval expeditionary forces — the Navy-Marine Corps team — are vital to regional stability and to keeping these crises from escalating into full-scale wars. To those who argue that the United States can't afford to have this degree of vigilance anymore, we say: The United States can't afford not to. These brushfires, whether the result of long-standing ethnic tensions or resurgent nationalism in the wake of the Cold War will only continue. The Cold War was an anomaly. Never again will we live in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. We have, in some respects, reverted back to the world our ancestors knew: A world in disorder. Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq and the Taiwan Straits are merely examples of the types of continuing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos. The United States and the world cannot afford to allow any crisis to escalate into threats to the United States', and the world's, vital interests. And while the skies are not dark with smoke from these brushfires, today's world demands a new approach. The concepts of choice must be selective and committed engagement, unencumbered global operations and prompt crisis resolution. There is no better way to maintain and enforce these concepts than with the forward presence of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team. There are four basic tenets to international security in today's world; prevention, deterrence, crisis resolution and war termination. The underlying assumption of these tenets is that the U.S. and its allies should not be forced into winning a war in an overwhelming (and expensive) fashion. Instead, it is much better — and cheaper — to resolve a crisis before it burns out of control. \* Prevent: The key to prevention is continuous presence in a region. This lets our friends know we have an interest and lets potential foes know that we're there to check any move. Both effects occur without any direct action taken. Although hard to measure, the psychological impact of naval expeditionary forces is undeniable. This regional presence underwrites political and economic stability. This is forward presence. \* Deter: Presence does not prevent every crisis. Some rogues are going to be tempted to strike no matter what the odds, and will require active measures to be deterred. When crises reach this threshold, there is no substitute for sustained actual presence. Naval expeditionary forces can quickly take on the role of the very visible fist. Friends and potential enemies recognize naval expeditionary forces as capable of defending or destroying. This visible fist, free from diplomatic and territorial constraints, forms the bedrock of regional deterrence. For example, the mere presence of naval expeditionary forces deterred Chinese attempts to derail the democratic process in Taiwan and countered Iraqi saber-rattling toward Jordan. It's hard to quantify the cost savings of deterring a crisis before it requires our intervention. But the savings are real — in dollars, and often in blood and human misery. This is forward presence. \* Resolve: If a crisis can be neither prevented nor deterred, then prompt and decisive crisis resolution is imperative before the crisis threatens vital interests. U.S. Naval expeditionary forces are a transoceanic key that finds and opens — forcibly if necessary — any gateway into a fiery world. This ability is equally expandable and retractable according to the situation. Perhaps most importantly, naval expeditionary forces don't need permission from foreign governments to be on scene and take unilateral action in a crisis. This both unencumbers the force and takes the pressure off allies to host any outside forces. Over the past two years, for example, U.S. naval expeditionary forces simultaneously and unilaterally deployed to Liberia and to the Central African Republic (1,500 miles inland) to protect U.S. and international citizens. They also launched measured retaliatory Tomahawk strikes to constrain unacceptable Iraqi behavior, and conducted naval air and Tomahawk strikes which brought the warring parties in Bosnia to the negotiating table. This is forward presence. \* Terminate: Each of the above tenets is worthy of the United States paying an annual peace insurance premium. Otherwise we, and our allies, risk paying the emotional, physical and financial costs of a full-blown conflagration that began as just another brushfire. If there is a war, naval expeditionary forces will be first to fight. They are inherently capable of enabling the follow-on forces from the United States for as long as it takes. And they will remain on-scene to enforce the settlement that ends the conflict. This is forward presence. The Iraqis, Central Africas, Somalias and Bosnias inevitably destabilize and erode world order and respect for the rule of law. Indeed, a failure to respond to them encourages future — more serious — crises. The United States must foster stability around the world, today and tomorrow. The peace insurance premium is a small price and is the cost of leadership. Who else is capable of this type of forward presence on a global basis? For the United States, maintaining a steady commitment to stability will be a challenge. But maintain it we must, or the price, literally and figuratively, will be much greater down the road. The example of fighting forest fires is precisely applicable. The philosophy is simple: Prevention through living in the environment; deterrence through vigilance; and resolution through quick and selective engagement. Ninety-five percent of all forest fires are contained — the direct result of the watchful presence of the local initial attack crews who attack flashpoints. As for the other five percent, once the window of opportunity for decisive early action is missed, firefighters must be brought in from outside the region, and it is exponentially more expensive. Sometimes there are casualties — casualties that would not have been incurred had the fire been contained before it had the opportunity to flare. America's Navy-Marine Corps team is underway, ready and on-scene at trouble spots around the world. Forward presence makes it — and will keep it — the right force, tailor-made for these uncertain and sometimes fiery times.

**Turkey-Syrian war is likely and will happen**

**Wright 12** (Robert is a senior editor at The Atlantic and the author, most recently, of [The Evolution of God](http://www.evolutionofgod.net/), a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, “Why Turkey and Syria are Heading toward War”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/why-turkey-and-syria-are-heading-toward-war/263415/>)

But wars are often fought by countries whose leaders didn't really want them. (See World War I.) A common reason is that neither regime feels it can afford to be seen by its people as backing down. But perhaps more important are some other dynamics pushing these countries toward war: [1] Turkey could decide before long that war is preferable to the alternatives. The Syrian civil war is creating all kinds of problems for Turkey. There's a big influx of refugees, and there's also the Kurdish issue: Many of Syria's Kurds hope to use the civil war as an opportunity to carve out an autonomous or even sovereign Kurdish region in Syria, and Turkey fears that this could prove contagious, emboldening Kurdish separatists in Turkey and energizing longstanding dreams of a new Kurdish nation that comprises parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Both of these issues--refugees and Kurdish nationalism--could lead Turkey to conclude that the sooner the Syrian civil war ends, the better. And helping fight it could help end it--especially if Turkey's fellow members of NATO [help out](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/us-syria-crisis-idUSBRE88J0X720121009).¶ [2] Speaking of NATO: The fact that a Turkish-Syrian war could draw America into the conflict will make such a war more attractive to some backers of American intervention. That includes some influential Americans (largely, but not entirely, drawn from the crowd that got the U.S. into the Iraq war), but it also includes non-Americans, among them, presumably, the leaders of some Arab states. And the more influential players there are who want a war to happen, the more likely it is to happen.¶ [3] Syria feels it can't afford to ignore the Turkish border. The casual reader of the news might ask: If Syria doesn't want a war, and Syrian shells that fall on the Turkish side of the border could start a war, why doesn't Syria quit firing shells anywhere near the border? Indeed, why not bow to the Turkish demand for a buffer zone on the Syrian side of the border? The answer is simple: The Syrian regime is fighting for its life, and along the Turkish-Syrian border lies the lifeline of its enemy*.* The rebels are being supplied with weapons via Turkey and are seizing control of border crossings inside Syria, and their goal is to build, from there, an expanding zone of control. Can you imagine any regime, in the Syrian regime's situation, not fighting to keep control, or retake control, of border crossings, and not trying to disrupt the enemy's supply of arms and ammunition near the point of origin?¶ [4] Turkey is, in a sense, already at war with the Syrian regime. The rebels aren't just being supplied *via* Turkey; they're being supplied *by* Turkey--at least in the sense that Turkey has willingly, even eagerly, turned itself into an arms and ammunition conveyer belt that is stocked by such countries as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. (The US is confining its contribution to "non-lethal" supplies such as communications equipment--which, of course, does in fact help the rebels kill people.) So the Turkish indignation at shells landing on Turkish soil is ironic; Turkey is sending lots more ammo into Syria than Syria is sending into Turkey--the difference is that the ammo Turkey is sending actually kills lots of people. That Turkey's role as a conduit of arms and ammunition isn't a passive one may make Syria even less inclined to keep its fire far from the border.

**Syrian defectors confirm our argument**

**Sherlock 12** (Ruth has covered the Arab Spring for the Daily Telegraph from Egypt, Libya, and Syria. She was awarded Young Journalist of the Year at the 2012 British Press Awards., November 6, “Former Syrian PM reveals Assad in favour of all-out war”, <http://www.watoday.com.au/world/former-syrian-pm-reveals-assad-in-favour-of-allout-war-20121105-28u3a.html>)  
¶ AMMAN: The most senior politician to defect from Bashar al-Assad's regime has revealed that the President repeatedly rejected calls by his own government for a political compromise, in favour of all-out war.¶ In his first full interview with a Western newspaper since he fled to Jordan in August, Riyad Hijab, the former prime minister, said he and other senior regime figures pleaded with Mr Assad to negotiate with the Syrian opposition.¶ One week before his defection, Mr Hijab, the vice-president, the parliamentary speaker and the deputy head of the Baath party together held a private meeting with Mr Assad. ''We told Bashar he needed to find a political solution to the crisis,'' he said. ''We said, 'These are our people that we are killing'.¶ ''We suggested that we work with the Friends of Syria group, but he refused to stop the operations or to negotiate.''¶ Advertisement¶ Mr Hijab referred to the war waged against the Muslim Brotherhood by Mr Assad's father, Hafez, which led to the deaths of up to 10,000 people in an assault on the city of Hama.¶ ''Bashar really thinks that he can settle this militarily,'' he said. ''He is trying to replicate his father's fight in the 1980s.''¶ Mr Hijab was speaking as key anti-regime figures gathered in the Qatari capital Doha to replace the fractured opposition Syrian National Council with a new government-in-exile. Once formed, the new council would seek to gain formal international recognition, and, crucially, better weapons.¶ Mr Hijab said the lack of serious action by the West had consolidated Mr Assad's confidence.¶ ''Bashar used to be scared of the international community - he was really worried that they would impose a no-fly zone over Syria,'' he said. ''But then he tested the waters, and pushed and pushed and nothing happened. Now he can run air strikes and drop cluster bombs on his own population.''¶ Mr Assad's acceptance of ceasefire proposals by the United Nations envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi was ''just a manoeuvre to buy time for more killings'', he said. In a speech to his cabinet Mr Assad extolled only the dictums of warfare, Mr Hijab said.¶ ''My brief was to lead a national reconciliation government,'' Mr Hijab said. ''But in our first meeting Bashar made it clear that this was a cover.''¶ The explosion at the Damascus national security building that killed the country's defence minister and the president's brother-in-law marked a turning point, Mr Hijab said. ''The new minister of defence sent out a communique telling all heads in the military that they should do 'whatever is necessary' to win,'' he said.¶ ''I am shocked to see Bashar do what he has been doing,'' he said. ''He used to seem like a good human being, but he is worse than his father.''

**And that goes nuclear**

**Gatto 12** (July 12,2012, Timothy V., retired Army Sergeant and former Chairman of The Liberal Party of America, “Is Syria Worth World War III?”, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2012/07/16/s-syria-worth-world-war-iii)\

The question of Syria’s problems resulting in a nuclear holocaust is real, not imagined. According to the NATO treaty the treaty states that an attack on a NATO member is regarded as an attack on all NATO members.¶ “By joining NATO you receive the protection of The Alliance in exchange for your willing defense in times of need. An attack against one NATO member is an attack against all of NATO”. (http://cybernations.wikia.com/wiki/North\_Atlantic\_Treaty\_Organization)¶ This situation is what the Brits would say “A bit of a sticky wicket”. Indeed it is. The scenario of Turkey being attacked by Syria is a real possibility. Even if Syria doesn’t attack Turkey, and Turkey attacks Syria, do nations ever advertise the fact that they fired the first shot? This would be ridiculous when you consider that they would lose the protection that being a member State of NATO provides.¶ The Russians have a naval base in Tartus:¶ The site, at the port of Tartus, is little more than a pier, fuel tanks and some barracks. But it is the last Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union, and its only Mediterranean fueling spot, sparing Russia’s warships the trip back to their Black Sea bases through straits in Turkey, a NATO member. (NY Times by ANDREW E. KRAME June 18, 2012)¶ This small naval base could be a real problem for NATO. A stray shot into the base, or over-zealous Syrian nationalists attacking the base could be the pre-cursor to World War III.¶ The question that most American citizens are asking is this, is Syria so much of a national security matter that we would commit to a nuclear holocaust? Is the civil strife in Syria so important that we would commit to destroying the world?

**Naval forces in the Mediterranean near Syria solves**

**Vego 08** — professor of operations at the Naval War College, former commanding officer in the former Yugoslav Navy and former West German merchant marine (Milan N., “On Naval Power”, Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2008, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-50/JFQ-50.pdf)

Naval forces can be employed in support of foreign policy, military (theater) strategy, and peace operations. Navies are an ideal tool for providing support of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country’s diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy— actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish one’s rights in areas of interest, reassure allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force. Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition-building. Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution. Naval forces can be used in conflict prevention, coercive diplomacy, and peace operations. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. The main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively.

**Navy solves**

**Trombly 12** (Daniel Trombly, 8/22/12 analyst and writer on international affairs and strategy. Contributor to “Abu Muqawama” and “Slouching Toward Columbia” “The cost of a Syria Intervention” <http://news.usni.org/news-analysis/news/cost-syrian-intervention>)

When Odyssey Dawn began in March 2011, it appeared to hail a new model for military interventions. The relatively swift, painless and low-cost application of offshore and aerial power against a hostile regime to protect a rising hub of Libyan resistance in Benghazi began the military unraveling of the Gadhafi regime. Today, as Syria’s own civil war intensifies and officials such as Senators Lindsey Graham, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman call for military action, might another aerial and offshore campaign effectively establish a haven for the Syrian opposition and topple the Syrian government?¶ Brian Haggerty, doctoral candidate at MIT, recently released an extensive open-source analysis of what an aerial campaign to suppress Syrian air defenses and establish a safe zone would entail. While the operation is feasible, mitigating its significant risks would require a major campaign—one requiring at least 191 strike aircraft, at least six times the number of comparable aircraft in the opening phase of Odyssey Dawn, and perhaps several times more bombers and cruise missiles.¶Discerning the capability of Syria’s integrated air defense system (IADS) is critical to that question. American officials, such as General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stress the sophistication of Syria’s IADS relative to other countries in the region and particularly in comparison with Libya. Syria has faced American air power before, while the embarrassments of Israel defeating of its air force in the 1982 Lebanon War and destroying a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 left it acutely aware of the need to deter and defeat hostile air power.¶ Nevertheless, analysts such as Sam O’Connor, of IHS Jane’s, have asserted that with adequate resources, America and its allies could effectively defeat Syrian IADS and achieve air superiority for follow-on operations. Those could include decapitation strikes to directly target Syrian leadership, or the establishment of safe zones to create buffers between cities and the Syrian military.¶ Libya’s IADS relied on obsolete or aging Soviet-era weapons clustered along the coastline. Enjoying warming Western ties early in the 21st century, Libya did not invest heavily in a capability for defending against modern air power. Syria, in contrast, has sought to extensively upgrade its IADS in recent years. Seeking to counter the Israeli air force and concerned with its tense border with Turkey or an American attack, Syria’s IADS features much deeper and denser coverage, with newer and more effective weapon systems.¶ MIT’s Haggerty identifies nearly 450 likely targets for a suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) campaign, including more than 20 C2 (command and control) and early warning facilities, 150 surface-to-air (SAM) sites, 205 aircraft shelters, and 32 additional airfield-related targets, as well as dozens of additional surface-to-surface or anti-ship missile targets that could threaten bases or ships in the theater. Libya had only 31 comparable SAM sites, some of which were already in rebel-controlled territory, and just five airfields required serious strikes, because some were under rebel control. Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) appear to offer an easy solution to initial SEAD needs, but limitations exist.¶ First, stocks of TLAMs are limited, particularly in the aftermath of the Libyan effort. By 19 March, the United States and U.K. had launched roughly 100 TLAMs from surface ships and submarines. Within a week, they launched another 100 strikes. With America launching the vast majority of those strikes, Raytheon recently received a contract for an additional 361 TLAMs to replenish Libya-depleted stocks and meet FY2012 needs. Secondly, TLAMs are not always sufficient for destroying hard targets such as aircraft shelters. As Haggerty notes, precision strikes from bombers—likely B-2s, but potentially also B-1Bs or B-52s if SAM suppression is adequate—will likely need to drop multiple precision-guided munitions to destroy Syria’s air force on the ground.¶ The increased need for TLAMs, strategic bombers, and aircraft specialized for electronic warfare and SEAD missions for these initial strikes alone are all likely to shift the burden onto American forces, relative to both Odyssey Dawn and Allied Force. Not only that, but follow-on strikes will **require** a significantly larger number of strike aircraft and may require **deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier**, a commitment unneeded for the Libyan operation.¶ Haggerty estimates more than 200 remaining targets for strike-aircraft sorties. Simply for delivering adequate munitions, at least 191 strike aircraft would participate, with about 105 additional support aircraft contributing to the air campaign. This lower bound number is roughly equivalent to Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, but neutralizing Syrian IADS will likely require higher numbers of sorties from electronic warfare (EW) aircraft and other specialized platforms.¶ By comparison, in Libya, the U.S. contributed ten F-15Es and eight F-16CJs to efforts associated with SEAD. NATO forces added an additional 28 F-16s, 11 F-18 variants from Canada and Spain, 8 Rafales, 4 Mirages, and 10 Tornados (including 2 Italian SEAD variants). Besides strike aircraft, the United States contributed three B-2s and two B-1 bombers. A NATO effort in Syria would clearly be a much larger effort, in terms of both strategic bombing, TLAM strikes, and strike aircraft. While it would be within the realm of possibility, complicating factors remain.¶ Although reporting likely exaggerated the degree of ordnance-stock depletion during Libya, the large number of sorties that smaller countries such as Denmark undertook will shift the burden onto larger air forces, such as the United States, U.K., and France. Mitigating that, fortunately, would be presumed Turkish participation in a Syrian air campaign, bringing to bear the world’s third-largest F-16 operator. That said, given the potential susceptibility of Turkish aircraft to insufficiently degraded Syrian IADS, the burden they can bear in initial strikes is unclear. While Turkey has a clear stake in Syria, the political will for participating in another aerial campaign is also questionable.¶ While European countries, especially France, were enthusiastic about intervention in Libya, for Syria there seems no comparable fervor. Even under the aegis of a NATO operation, it is unlikely Germany—sadly, given its advanced SEAD capabilities—would participate, and other countries, such as Britain, France, and Italy, may not be as forthcoming with their aerial support. Yet the Phase 1 of any air campaign in Syria—the reduction of its IADS—is likely to be a massive undertaking, significantly larger in scale than Libya, and in some ways more sophisticated in its technical challenges than the campaign in Kosovo.¶ Important questions remain, however. The ability of Phase 1 SEAD operations to clear the way for a broader campaign targeting the regime, enforcement of a “safe zone” against concentrated Syrian regime forces, or both, is partially dependent on the response of Syrian forces to initial SEAD efforts. In Libya, the regime had little in the way of mobile or semi-mobile SAMs, and even less cohesion or preparation for doing so. However, despite the inability of Libyans to respond to Odyssey Dawn’s overwhelming force, the will of the Libyan armed forces to resist remained unbroken.¶ Were Syria to judiciously disperse and delay use of its IADS, as Serbia did in 1999, it would severely limit Allied freedom of action. A persistent, dispersed, and mobile Syrian IADS capability would significantly complicate Allied attempts to enforce a no-fly zone, safe zone, or conduct other strikes against the regime. The threat of hidden or elusive SAMs would lower the rate of follow-on strike sorties and likely significantly increase the cost and potential casualties for the intervening force.¶ Several commentators, noting the efficacy of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes in U.S. counterterrorism, have suggested using them in lieu of a broader campaign, but past campaigns demonstrate SEAD’s essential role. While UAVs are nigh invulnerable against insurgent groups without antiaircraft weapons, against well-equipped government, this omnipotence evaporates. In 1999, the U.S. Air Force sent five MQ-1 Predators to Serbia, which shot three down. A fourth crashed. In Libya, Predator strikes only began in April, after SEAD operations. Because combat UAVs are more vulnerable to hostile attack than manned aircraft, SEAD is a vital prerequisite.¶ While Syria is hardly invincible, Haggerty’s analysis is a stark reminder of the requirements simply for clearing the way for any kind of military campaign. The United States and its allies make unfettered access to aerial battlespace an integral part of their military operations. Given the cost of fighting without assured IADS suppression and air superiority, they will need to spare no expense in resourcing and prosecuting a comprehensive SEAD campaign over Syria. Though not insurmountable, a sober reading of the military challenges and resources available to meet them suggest that a Syrian air campaign—if it is to be painless—will not come cheaply.