# 1AC Round 2 Grapevine

## 1AC Advantage

**The current geopolitical climate is stressing military transportation infrastructure. Advances are necessary to address new strategic imperatives.**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf)//mat

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides strategic mobility to our nation. No other government, commercial, or private agency can move as much to as many places as quickly. The spirit and flexibility of the people who make up the Total Force USTRANSCOM team put the command on the world’s stage. The past two years have been among the most challenging in USTRANSCOM’s history. The simultaneous drawdown of 80,000 troops in Iraq, the surge of forces into Afghanistan, Haitian earthquake-relief operations, and the Pakistani flood-relief effort confronted us in 2010. 1 The year 2011 has proved no less dramatic. The “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. USTRANSCOM supported each situation, evacuating innocents, moving security forces, and delivering humanitarian-relief supplies. In Libya the command moved forces and offered around-the-clock air-refueling tanker capability for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces while also supporting the president’s travels in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. Then, the fourth most powerful earthquake since 1900 struck off the east coast of Japan, lasting over six minutes, literally knocking the earth off its axis, and shortening the length of a day. 2 Worse, the tsunami that followed devastated Japanese coastal areas, caused a nuclear meltdown, and even damaged property in California. USTRANSCOM’s emergency airlift and airrefueling support not only evacuated over 7,500 people and 400 pets but also made available crucial transport of nuclear expertise and material to help control the reactors at Fukushima. We did all of this in addition to supporting combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. In March 2011, for the first time in USTRANSCOM history, the command supported simultaneous priority-one movements in all six geographic combatant commands—truly March madness! In the face of two unbelievably difficult years, I’m proud to say that USTRANSCOM, together with our components and commercial partners, never failed to fulfill our promises to the war fighter, the president, and our nation. Yet, even as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, future challenges demand continued advances.

**Information Age military operations are making operational logistics impossible to control. Logistics are key to overall military transportation infrastructure.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190, mrs)

A year after the invasion of Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 1,400 trucks operate daily to provide supplies to the troops conducting peace enforcement missions and fighting the insurgents in Iraq. 1 What is on all of them? What are the priorities of movement? Where are they delivering, and when do they move on what routes?

No one knows the answers to all of these questions. Yet, it is just as important for a logistician to "see the battlefield" as it is for a tactician. The difference is what must be seen. In considering the answers to the questions posed above, and why they are important to know, there is a quick appreciation for the need for centralized knowledge management. There are information sets of data elements that define the materiel required to sustain the force. There is also a location associated with all materiel at any particular time. When this knowledge is managed simultaneously, these data sets define what the logistician must see. This logistician’s sight picture must extend beyond the immediate battlefield, and include the arrival of supplies in the strategic flow. What is entering the theater, or what was expected to enter but hasn’t, can effect tactical operations just as severely as the internal logistics operation within the Regional Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Despite attempts over the years by many leaders at various local levels to capture the data and manage the knowledge of supplies and materiel movement, the military forces have failed to create the automated systems and operational controls to successfully manage the vast data necessary to command and control large scale military logistics operations. The speed and volume of U.S. military operations in the Information Age has added another level of complexity to this already challenging task.

**Current distribution methods and proposed alternatives lack crucial in-transit visibility – this causes costs to skyrocket.**

**Hampton 12** (Lana, Defense Logistics Agency, January 5, 2012, “News: DLA develops local procurement process for Afghanistan customers,” http://www.dvidshub.net/news/82075/dla-develops-local-procurement-process-afghanistan-customers#.UC8vAN2PXAw, alp)

Early in the Northern Distribution Network local procurement effort, DLA recommended a system similar to the Defense Travel System be used to move goods procured in South Caucasus, Central and South Asian countries to Afghanistan. The key reasons were cost, custom issues, in-transit visibility, security and freight delivery, Rogers said. “Transportation costs to move goods from SC/CASA into Afghanistan are expensive for all shippers,” Rogers said. “Previously, DLA’s procurement process included the transportation costs as part of the product cost as a first destination transportation fee, making the overall product cost unjustifiable.” These commercial, prime-vendor shipments were outside DTS and lacked critical in-transit visibility and customs clearance assistance. The end results were expensive products with unreliable delivery times. DLA’s reimbursement efforts for these intratheater transportation costs were also manual and lengthy, Rogers said.

**Current in-transit visibility efforts are failing – lack of integration, usage, and identification technology. The GTN, RF-ITV, IRRIS, and BCS3 fail at consolidation.**

**DOD 10** (September 22, Department of Defense, “Afghanistan In-Transit Visibility Joint Task Force: Implementation Plan,” <https://wss.apan.org/1600/Document%20Library/BAR%20Reference%20Documents/Theater%20Enterprise%20Mvmt%20Control%20System/Afghan_ITV_Implementation_Plan_FINAL_10-07-10.pdf>, mrs)

The following major issues are negatively impacting ITV within the CJOA-A and are the focus of this implementation plan:

1. There is no enterprise automated information system (AIS) for movement control in the CJOA-A that gives users an effective management tool to request transportation, assign assets, control shipments, close out shipments when they reach their destination, or provide visibility of these actions at all levels of command.

2. There is incomplete visibility of common-user land transportation (CULT) assets moving cargo in the CJOA-A. Some host nation trucking (HNT) and U.S. green (military) trucks have satellite transponders, but others do not.

3. There is inconsistent or no use of automatic identification technology (AIT) media to capture shipment data that can then be communicated to a common operating picture (COP) where it becomes visible to all authorized users. 2-2

4. Numerous ITV databases are being used to capture partial ITV data, including the Global Transportation Network (GTN), Radio Frequency ITV (RF-ITV) server, Intelligent Road/Rail Information System (IRRIS), and Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3). But, no single system is available to consolidate and provide all needed data for common use throughout the CJOA-A. No single entity is responsible for consolidating this information and ensuring it is passed to the units that need it.

5. No single logistics COP displays both U.S. and coalition partner movement information to provide visibility of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) movements.

6. The movement control organizational structures in CJOA-A, both in the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A), are confusing and, in many cases, redundant. Moreover, they are inconsistent with both NATO and U.S. doctrine.

**Current ITV systems are dysfunctional and un-integrated**

**Andrews 10** – Army Major, Masters of Military Art and Science in Homeland Security Studies (November 6, Tacildayus, US Army Command and General Staff College, “THE LACK OF A DESIGNATED NATIONAL IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY SYSTEM AFFECTS THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF INFORMATION SHARING AND THE TIMELY DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS DURING NATURAL DISASTER EFFORTS,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524385>, mrs)

DoD has several ITV systems to track supplies; however, there is no document or policy that directs all players to use a specific system during national incidents. A review of their current supply accountability management systems from GAO and IG confirms that their systems are unproductive.

What Department of Defense National ITV System is in Place?

There are reports in this research that indicate that DoD does not have the resources or capability to support a national system. This finding implies that FEMA does not have the appropriate IT systems to bridge the many independent systems. Several IG reports and after action reports stress that FEMA needs to improve its ITV capability and to establish SOPs to better account and track supplies during hurricane response operations.

**Closing the in-transit visibility gap is key to operational control and strategic mobility in a dynamic world.**

**Kolleda 5** (David, “Achieving In-Transit (ITV) A Study of Technology in the Department of Defense,” DTIC, 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432190)//mat

The nation’s military Services are busy. DoD is not only focusing on the War on Terrorism, but also on a campaign for Transformation. These efforts must set the conditions for success for the Future Force. Two concepts are definite. First, no single Service will operate unilaterally. Second, logistics must achieve a set of capabilities necessary to support the Joint and expeditionary Army and all the Services. Again, the key is achieving ITV. OIF reinforced the experience of failed logistics during ODS, over a decade earlier. Without positive control over what is moving in the defense pipeline, control of the routing and arrival of goods becomes problematic. The effects are felt in the attempt to manage the ground transportation assets it takes to move them, and on the decisions necessary to deploy and operate viable military operations in a highly fluid and dynamic world. Infusing a level of shared situational awareness leading to achieving decision-making based on real time knowledge portends an achievement that translates into the desirable U.S. Future Force characteristics. The military must continue to develop and implement actions through the Combatant Commanders and Service departments if the U.S. is to achieve the necessary level of ITV that provides actionable information to make deployment and sustainment decisions. The Global Transportation Network (GTN) 30 is the backbone information system. It will hold the key to ITV by integrating systems to seek, track and manage data for identification, status, and location of materiel on commercial and military transportation assets around the globe. USTRANSCOM as the end-to-end process owner of the Defense Transportation System, and deploying units that must produce and provide the source data necessary for accurate tracking, are critical to success of the GTN. Within the combatant commands, ITV actions need to be enforced and exercised. The Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea began establishing an RFAIT infrastructure in 1996. 31 EUSA currently uses RF tags for Class IX and ammunition movements. EUSA established interrogators at key logistic nodes on the Korean peninsula to annotate materiel arrival and delivery to Corps Support Areas and Ammunition Supply Points. The regional server is accessible from the internet and all units need to become aware of the system and benefits. EUCOM has a policy for managing Theater level ITV. 32 The theater policy designates responsibilities from the EUCOM J-4, down to supporting organizations and subordinate11 component commanders. The ITV policy establishes minimum requirements for identification, how RF tags should be marked, and how the regional server will be maintained. RFID technologies and systems within the commercial industry are expanding rapidly as private companies employ them to gain efficiencies in the storage, shipping and handling requirements of products. Industry recognizes the cost saving associated with ITV system use and eagerly employ their benefits in order to realize them on the company’s bottom line. The radio frequency technology industry is projected to go from $1 billion last year to an anticipated $3 billion operation by 2007. The DoD is a part of this effort, and has not limited the infusion of AIT capability into military units and supporting logistics agencies, but also required commercial suppliers of military goods to begin using smart tags by this year. 33 This source data capture will provide the opportunity for inclusive application from the initial shipping point, into cargo consolidation points, and ultimately, all the way to the farthest end of the distribution pipeline. This final step is currently the most deficient part of the system. To date, there has been a “seam” at the transition point from the operational level of war to the tactical level. JFCOM and TRANSCOM will need to work hard in their new roles to reduce this seam and provide for a systemic process to enable the proper information flow – the management of knowledge – as well as we can manage the materiel from the CONUS base, into the Unified Command, and to the service or subunified commands. At the tactical level, services must design, equip, and field the ground units with the ability to network until delivery to forward units. In some case this will require unit structural changes, adding network enabling equipment into their authorizations, and updating doctrine to include new techniques and procedures. “The joint logistics system must include a responsive logistics infrastructure with simultaneous deployment, employment, and sustainment capabilities and a single, integrated, responsive end-to end distribution system.” 34 DoD can adopt existing commercial radio frequency applications in existence for use in tactical units. Products are available and in use across industry with all major distribution and transportation companies. Industry leaders such as FEDEX, the LANDSTAR trucking group, and WALMART all employ this technology to manage shipment data or keep stockages to cost effective minimums. The commercial application is proven. DoD’s initial, limited use of similar technology proves that Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) products are sufficient for military use. No new design or different production requirements are necessary to meet the DoD ITV goals.

**Seamless ITV is key to ending transportation bottlenecks that diminish warfighting capacity.**

**Brewer 4** (David L., “Military Sealift Command: making the defense distribution process work,” Defense Transportation Journal, 9/1, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-123240443.html)//mat

A new era in combat logistics dawned when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the single owner of the DoD distribution process. With the announcement, seamless integration of the transportation process, with production at the factory or deployment from the fort to consumption at the foxhole, by truck, train, ship and aircraft, began to enter the realm of reality. Key to this seamless journey of combat goods from their origins to the war-fighting commanders who need them to dominate the enemy in the field and win the day is in-transit visibility. Military Sealift Command has been working with TRANSCOM partners, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, for more than two years to bring new technology to bear on the visibility issue. One of the research outcomes is the use of radio frequency identification data (RFID) tags to make cargo selection and loading more accurate and much faster at those locations where the transportation mode changes. This technology significantly reduces or altogether eliminates the transportation "seam" that used to cause bottlenecks, sometimes leaving a small mountain of containers of combat gear waiting for forward transportation and field commanders nervously wondering if needed supplies and equipment would arrive in time. MSC ships are now using RFID tags in the cargo loading process instead of bar-code readers to identify each specific piece, a cumbersome process that required individuals to approach and point a bar-code reader at every vehicle or container being loaded. A remote reader, called an interrogator, reads the code being transmitted via radio frequency by the tag. Interrogators are located in the marshalling area, on the ship's loading ramp and in the cargo hold. The data is automatically entered into the digital database, providing an accurate record of what each ship is carrying and where the piece of equipment is stowed. Long the maritime innovator for the DoD, Military Sealift Command is also working closely with TRANSCOM and the Navy on several other concepts to further reduce transport interruptions thus increasing the speed and efficiency of delivery in the field, where war-fighting commanders need it most. One change being implemented within MSC will significantly increase our capability to rapidly and accurately disseminate operational information--a single, integrated worldwide command information center. By eliminating smaller, redundant command centers in each of our area commands and making maximum use of web-based communications, such as computer-assisted conference calls and sophisticated web links, MSC will be able to provide customers with virtually instantaneous status updates on specific ships--even specific cargo items. We'll be able to provide more accurate scheduling information and more precise delivery dates and times to war fighters. MSC is also looking at the current cumbersome method of loading and off-loading cargo. For instance, to reach a specific container of gear belonging to an Army unit, the entire ship sometimes must be off-loaded before the container can be found--a laborious process that takes hours. Selective discharge technology--the ability to know the location of and retrieve a specific container of combat gear from a ship's cargo hold through computerized automation--will revolutionize that process, reducing hours to minutes. Using the RFID tags, a computer database will be able to identify any container aboard ship. An automated gantry and conveyer system will locate the container and quickly move it to the ship's cargo discharge area for transfer to the next mode in the distribution system, virtually untouched by human hands. This technology will also allow for a smaller crew, thus saving money. At the same time, MSC is looking at the technical issues involved in making joint logistics over the sea (JLOTS) capable of handling higher sea states. Presently, JLOTS technology is capable of off-loading combat cargo at sea for transfer to shore via barges and other lighterage only in sea state one or two, which are essentially calm conditions. Since conflict doesn't wait for weather, we need to be able to safely conduct at-sea off-loads in worse sea conditions. MSC is seeking improvements in auto-compensating crane technology--cranes that automatically adjust to the ship's rolling or pitching in heavy seas--and more stable lighterage for the trip to shore. The crane technology would also be used in conjunction with selective discharge systems as part of the sea-basing concept. Part of the Chief of Naval Operations Seapower 21 strategy is sea basing, which would provide an at-sea platform as a US base for cargo transfer, mission aircraft launching, command and control, etc. The sea base could be as simple as one command ship or as complicated as several ships or vessels offering modular living quarters, hospital facilities, flight facilities and advanced communications. The sea-basing concept will provide flexibility to adapt the system to the specific mission and will take advantage of maneuvering space at sea for defense of the sea base. Throughout all the concepts being explored, customer service--the ability to get what the field commander needs, where needed, when needed--will be paramount. That's why we at MSC are working closely with our sister component commands in TRANSCOM to make the distribution process work faster and more efficiently.

**Forced military downsizing due to debt and cost-cutting will necessitate transportation infrastructure efficiency. This transportation infrastructure is key to crisis response to respond to China, North Korea, Iran, extremism, cyberwar, and other crises. This asymmetric advantage is crucial.**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf)//mat

Strategic Context Demands More with Less Against a backdrop of rising national debt and an uncertain future security environment, USTRANSCOM can do its part to secure our nation’s interests by improving the access and efficiency of our strategic mobility system—a national asymmetric advantage. The ongoing threats of global extremism, the rise of China, a nuclear North Korea, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, and the war in cyberspace are but a few of the difficulties we can see on the horizon. Even as we prepare for these kinds of problems, we know we will face disaster-related humanitarian crises like those that have occurred in Indonesia, Haiti, Japan, Pakistan, New Zealand, the United States, and elsewhere. Covering this crisis spectrum demands a wide range of capability, one in which our logistical forces must be equally capable of meeting warfighter needs in uncontested, semicontested, and contested domains; favorable and unfavorable terrain; all types of weather; and places with limited or no infrastructure. In short our mobility enterprise must have assured access to the entire globe, able to reach even the remotest areas and project power where our national interests dictate we must—a tall, expensive order. Our nation’s debt of $14.5 trillion (and growing) will shape future military capability more than any other factor. The enormity of this indebtedness led Adm Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to declare it “the most significant threat to our national security” 3 —one that we simply cannot address without considering defense. Our spending on national security—$881 billion in fiscal year 2012—consumes more than any other category of the federal budget. 4 As the debate rages in Washington over how to handle our debt issues, it seems only prudent that the Department of Defense (DOD) find ways of operating in a shrinking budget environment. To do so, we must become more efficient at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Balancing the opposing challenges of increasing access while using fewer resources will likely produce an ever-growing demand for mobility. The DOD probably will not be able to recapitalize its aging inventory of ships, planes, and vehicles on a one-for-one basis. A RAND study of 2008 concluded that the annual cost growth of all types of military aircraft has far outpaced inflation because of many factors, the lion’s share coming from technological complexity of design—a trend not unique to aircraft. 5 Analyses of the US Navy’s ship fleet and the US Army’s / Marine Corps’s tactical vehicle fleets show similar trends in cost growth. Across the board, Services are forecasting declining platform numbers because of such growth and budgetary constraints. 6 All the while, the world security environment is becoming more complex and multipolar. Quite simply, the American military will have to do more with fewer things and in more places than it ever has before. As the more-with-less trend accelerates, strategic mobility will increasingly assert itself as a multiplying force for good—a prospect that will necessitate a global network of interconnected ports in suitable positions to enable global reach.

**Scenario one is North Korea—**

**North Korean collapse is inevitable – multiple social, political, military, and ecological factors – empirics prove.**

**Lee 8/27** (Michael, CEO of ATM Industry Associations, member of the World Future Society, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of Physics, and the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, IEET, “Unmasking North Korea’s Future,” <http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/6399>, alp)

Everyone can see that North Korea is trapped in a tragic time-warp, a kind of living museum of 1950s style Cold War socialism. Its political bubble of unreality is likely to burst open with great force well before mid-century. The near-implosion of North Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union provides a glimpse into both the past and future of the country. At the time of the partition of Korea into North and South Korea, [1] the former was largely industrial and the latter agrarian. While South Korea advanced in the intervening decades into a leading Asian Tiger economy, its northern counterpart descended into a dystopia begging to be captured on celluloid. It is a story of two Koreas: to the north, economic decline of an industrial society brought about by an energy crisis coupled with ecological degradation, and, to the south, economic prosperity and technological innovation catapulting an agricultural society into the 21st Century. The fact that North Korea fell so hard after the fall of communism shows the extent to which this small nation has relied upon foreign supplies. Since the Korean peninsula as a whole has little oil and gas of its own, communist North Korea depended upon the Soviet Union for its industrial energy needs until that Union broke up at the end of the 1980s. Then North Korea lost the bulk of its supply of energy to run its industries. In 1990, for example, it had imported 18.3 million barrels of oil from Russia, China and Iran. Then, abruptly, its imports from Russia fell by 90%, [2] a catastrophic depletion. Then floods in 1995 and 1996 washed away precious top soil, damaged and silted dams and flooded coal mining shafts. These natural disasters were followed by a massive drought in 1997, and then by a tsunami. It is difficult to survive twin energy and environmental challenges of this magnitude. The country’s aging economic infrastructure and systems faltered and fell under the burden. A dangerous feedback loop was created between industrial and ecological decline as the government began burning biomass to create heat and energy to compensate for its meagre supply of oil and gas: “North Koreans turned to burning biomass, thus destroying their remaining forests. Deforestation led, in turn, to more flooding and increasing levels of soil erosion. Likewise, soils were depleted as plant matter was burned for heat, rather than being mulched and composted…Biomass harvesting reduces ground cover, disrupts habitats and leads to increasing soil erosion and siltation.” [3] Since modern agriculture depends upon fossil fuels almost as much as modern industry does, North Korea’s energy crisis was bound to lead eventually to a food crisis. Famine struck the country in the second half of the 1990s. During this period, mass starvation decimated about 10% of the population. This must have been a terrifying time for the nation. Even today, around 6.5 million of the state’s 23 million people are dependent upon food aid from the UN’s World Food Program (WFP). The agency reports that 37% of children and 32% of women in the country are badly malnourished. Behind the façade of television broadcasts of military pomp and power, North Korea is, in reality, a depleted society unable to properly feed its own population. It is at least halfway along the road to destruction. It has undergone an industrial and agricultural collapse from which it will never fully recover unless it modernises its society and economy. The dilemma for the authorities in Pyongyang is that such a modernisation process would lead rapidly to the demise of its totalitarian political system. The country reminds me of how the Maya civilisation declined as a result of a combination of energy shortages, food crises, natural disasters, ecological deterioration and a political vacuum. Inappropriate, rigid leadership, which was unresponsive to the rootcauses of its national crisis, played a significant role in the Maya Collapse. It is going to be a key element of North Korea’s future fall. The country’s totalitarian military dictatorship, which hosts about 200,000 political prisoners, seems more interested in developing its nuclear weapons programme than in feeding all its people. The state first allocates fuel to the military and then lets the other sectors – agriculture, transportation and industry – compete for the remainder of the limited fuel supplies available to the country. The Maya civilization broke down as a result of its over-consumed, exhausted resource base, which increased competition for resources and conflict. Degraded, deforested land such as we see in North Korea, becomes more vulnerable to climate change, which, in turn, further damages the soil and its fertility, leading to worsening droughts and decreased food production. This, in turn, further aggravates competition for resources, leading to social conflict. Social conflict then makes it harder for the kind of collective, co-operative action required to solve the deep-seated socio-ecological dilemma. Decline then slides down into disintegration. From a systems point of view, such destructive feedback loops are difficult to solve even by governments with high levels of credibility. This kind of collapse is what happened to the Mayas. Unfortunately, this is likely to happen to the North Koreans, too. It would only take some catalytic force, possibly the next inevitable famine or an internal leadership power struggle, to release the pent-up, long-repressed anger of these masses and groups.

**Effective in-transit visibility is key to US military operations and preparedness in Korea.**

**LaPorte 5** – General, Commander – United Nations Command, Commander – Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, Commander – United States Forces Korea (March 8, Leon J, “Statement Of General Leon J. Laporte Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic Of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; And Commander, United States Forces Korea Before The Senate Armed Services Committee,” www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test05-03-08LaPorte.doc, mrs)

Logistically supporting United States Forces Korea is a complex, multi-faceted undertaking. The proximity of the North Korean threat, coupled with the long distances from United States sustainment bases, requires a robust and responsive logistics system to support United States forces based in Korea. The capability enhancements currently programmed will significantly improve our core logistics functions through modern pre-positioned equipment, responsive strategic transportation, and modern logistics tracking systems. Pre-positioned equipment sets, which include critical weapons systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, are critical to the rapid power projection to reinforce the Korean theater. Responsive strategic transportation -- fast sealift ships and cargo aircraft -- remains indispensable to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain United States forces. Expeditious fielding of the Air Force’s C-17 fleet, the Army’s Theater Support Vessel, and the Marine Corps’ High Speed Vessel to the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility remains a high priority to support United States forces based in Korea. Equally important is the ability to maintain in-transit visibility of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint Logistics Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information system. Lessons from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted several areas where relatively small investments in asset tracking systems and theater distribution yield significant efficiencies and improves the overall effectiveness of our logistics systems. Your continued support for improved logistics and sustainment programs will ensure that United States forces have the right equipment and supplies at the right time.

**America military preparedness is key to stability on the Peninsula. Degradations in capacity will undermine that stabilizing force.**

**Ra 1/19**—former national security advisor to South Korean president Roh, president of Woosuk University (Jong-yil, 19 January 2011, “Military First Doctrine Is Behind North Korea Adventurism,” New Perspectives Quarterly Vol. 28 Iss. 1, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2011.01223.x/pdf, RBatra)

Not long ago, against the background of the sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan Ham, and then the clash over an island between China and Japan, I was interviewed by Chinese television. “Why should America, an external power, intervene in the affairs of this region?” my questioner asked. “Why does it still maintain such a military presence on the Korean peninsula?”

I gently reminded her that America came to be involved in this region as a result of the Pacific War, which it entered after being attacked by Japan, and has maintained its presence ever since. As for its military presence in Korea, America had withdrawn from the peninsula but had to return when war broke out less than a year afterits withdrawal.

As East Asians, we may have objections to foreign military presence on our lands. But it is an undeniable fact that there has not been a major military conflict on the peninsula or in other parts of the region for more than a half a century since the Korean War. Without doubt, dating back to the time of the Japanese invasion of its neighbors, America has become a stabilizing factor in the region mainly because we have not been able to manage our own affairs.

In the current crisis, we cannot simply sit back and say that the North Korean problem is ultimately only resolvable by America and North Korea, while arguing at the same time for less of an American presence in the region.

**Collapse will escalate absent US preparedness and maintenance of our asymmetric transportation advantage.**

Maxwell 10 – US Army Special Forces Officer, Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, Faculty at the National War College (November 30, David S, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula,” http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch\_14.asp, mrs)

The fundamental assumption for this paper is that the threats that may emerge following collapse or conflict on the peninsula will be characterized by being irregular and these irregular threats will pose a dangerous and complex situation that if not properly planned and prepared for could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region for years to come. These threats will be a source of human suffering in the region, as well as cause significant security threats and economic turmoil, perhaps on a global scale. It is imperative that these potential irregular threats be identified and understood and that countermeasures be developed. The second fundamental assumption is that the North Korean people will not welcome the Republic of Korea and its allies with open arms. They may be welcomed by some, perhaps many, but certainly not by all and therein is a significant threat. It should be recalled that an assumption regarding liberation of Iraq was made in 2003 that postulated the Iraqi people would welcome the US as liberators and this incorrect assumption led to years of insurgency that was only countered after belated recognition of the conditions of insurgency and then undertaking a significant shift in strategy. The third assumption is that while Irregular Warfare is the current 21st Century term of art for the conflicts that the US is likely to face, planners and policy makers do not appear to view the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats 2.0 dated 17 May 2010) as applying to the problems that can be expected to be posed by a post-Kim Family regime in North Korea. While the IW JOC appears to be pre-disposed to countering the violent extremism of non-state actors as well as asymmetric threats from state actors, a post Kim Family Regime North Korea will at once have many characteristics of violent extremism (though based on a different ideology: the religious-like Juche ideology) and at the same time use many of the already existing asymmetric capabilities developed by the North Korean state. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly the assumption is made that remnants of the North Korean military, Communist Party and population will oppose the introduction of non-North Korean forces and conduct a uniquely North Korean insurgency to accomplish the classic insurgent goal of ridding a land of an occupying power. Additionally, it should be noted that the term irregular warfare in Korean is the same as unconventional warfare and this breeds confusion within the alliance.

**Escalation goes global**

**Bennet and Lind 11** – Senior Defense Analyst at The RAND Corporation and Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Fall, Bruce W and Jennifer, International Security, Volume 36 Number 2, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Collapse\_of\_North\_Korea.pdf, mrs)

A government collapse in North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-reaching regional and global effects. Collapse would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis. Many of North Korea’s 24 million inhabitants are already severely malnourished; if government-provided food and health services were to cease, the population would rapidly face the prospect of starvation. Food shortages and the possibility of civil war [End Page 84] would trigger a massive outflow of refugees, as desperate North Koreans searched for food and safety across international borders. North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way out of the country and onto the global black market. If other countries wanted to intervene to mitigate such instability, they would need to perform complex military operations. The provision of humanitarian relief could not be delegated to international relief organizations. Because North Korea has some 1.2 million active-duty military personnel and 7.7 million reservists,5 outside military intervention would likely be necessary to provide security for such operations. The consequences of a poorly planned response to a government collapse in North Korea are potentially calamitous. Rapid cooperation would be essential because many response missions are time-sensitive—for example, the longer it takes to organize humanitarian efforts, the higher the number of North Koreans who might perish or decide to leave their homes; in addition, the longer North Korean WMD are left unsecured, the larger the risk that they will disappear across international borders. Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send their militaries in without coordination to stabilize the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while U.S. and South Korean troops race north is terrifying given the experience of the Korean War, a climate of suspicion among the three countries,6 and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.7

**Scenario two is America—**

**Logistics are key to combatting the effects of force reduction and operational tempo to enable rapid engagement**

**Honea et al. 2k** - PhD (Robert B., Sarah E. Brown, Henry M. Bennett, “U.S. Military Transportation,” Committee on Military Transportation, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/millennium/00137.pdf)//mat

Recent closure or loss of overseas bases and assets now requires a greater dependence on deploying forces from the continental United States (CONUS), thus requiring efficient deployment planning. At the same time, widely scattered and increasingly numerous lowscale operations result in a greater pace of military deployments than ever before. Deploying from home station directly into theaters together with resupply and sustainment presents a highly complicated problem in military logistics that demands the application of appropriate technologies. In the civilian world, technology and advanced logistics concepts have greatly increased transportation efficiency and capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) theater commanders in chief (CINCs) have recognized the emergence of the new technologies and now routinely demand constant updates and estimates on when the “forces will close.” Furthermore, the Wal-Mart approach to resupply and sustainment is becoming the norm. In most military operations, early deployment cargo moves on military assets. Although these early movements may account for only a small portion of the total, they are often the most critical. Still, most military cargo, personnel, and war-fighting assets now move on commercial assets. For example, more than 95 percent of the equipment and cargo shipped in Desert Shield and Desert Storm moved on commercial carriers. Because of this, DoD instituted agreements with commercial carriers to ensure asset availability when needed. However, in an era of increasing need for military augmentation, competitive pressures have reduced civilian excess capacity and increased the need for closer coordination between the military and civilian carriers. Civilian-sector efficiency improvements result from the rapidly increasing use of technology to identify, track, and quickly locate cargo and shipments. For example, global positioning systems are now commonplace in the commercial trucking industry. The military sector needs to adopt these commercial successes more rapidly. Many disciplines are available to improve the planning and execution of military deployments, such as information technology and computers; communications; network flow models; operations research and logistics science; design of lift assets; demand reduction; and vehicle scheduling, routing, and monitoring. Many military transportation problems are being addressed by commercial companies or are the subject of research in universities and national laboratories. Because of the military’s conservative nature, the research community has the lead in developing and using advanced technology. We need a mechanism to bring these groups—military, business, and research centers—together to ensure that the latest developments in transportation are made available to solve military transportation problems. We believe that the Transportation Research Board’s Committee on Military Transportation is that mechanism.

**Asymmetric warfare is the new global paradigm. Rapid military engagement is critical to maintain military leadership and solve conflict.**

**Barno 11** – Lieutenant General (retired), former US Commander in Afghanistan, senior adviser and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (March 22, David, World Politics Review, “Military Power in a Disorderly World,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8259/military-power-in-a-disorderly-world, mrs)

The opening acts of the 21st century have fundamentally challenged long-held notions of military power. The past decade has unveiled not only the disruptive power of terrorist groups with global reach, but also the ability of low-budget insurgent groups to directly confront the best military forces of the West -- with surprising success. Moreover, recent revolutionary events across the Arab world have demonstrated the limits of military power when facing mass popular uprisings. Disorder, chaos and violent extremism seem on course to replace state-on-state violence as the most common forms of conflict in the new century. Given this new security environment, the U.S. military must begin to play a larger role in conflict prevention in order to fully realize its value, commensurate with its cost, in this new disorderly world.

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 -- launched not with tanks, warplanes or intercontinental missiles, but with commercial airliners -- were the most deadly assaults on U.S. soil since the American Civil War. Unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have also rattled the conventions of military thought, as insurgents equipped with inexpensive weaponry have inflicted prolonged attrition on U.S. forces. The U.S. military has spent billions of dollars defending against these new, low-cost threats, but the West and its military thinkers are still grappling with the full security implications of these dramatic upheavals in traditional military power balances. The era of asymmetric warfare has arrived with a vengeance.

Recent revolutionary events in the Arab world -- starting in Tunisia and rapidly spreading to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain -- have further highlighted today's shifting balance of power. While the outcome of these upheavals is still unclear, they reflect a new sort of asymmetrical power wielded by popular movements and expressed through mass street demonstrations. These spontaneous movements -- organized and enabled by modern technologies such as cellphones, Twitter and Facebook -- have directly challenged the "hard power" of state militaries, albeit with mixed results to date. Yet at the same time, the West's hard-power response to the Libyan regime's harsh backlash against its people has further demonstrated that conventional military power remains a powerful tool -- in this case employed to enforce the will of the broader international community as expressed by U.N. resolutions.

Another version of this asymmetric power shift has played out against Western forces in the wars for Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite successful high-tech U.S. military campaigns at the outset of each conflict, the enemy quickly adapted with inexpensive forms of asymmetry, in the shape of attacks by car bombs, suicide vests and IEDs, and with clashes often captured and disseminated via cellphone videos. The cost to the insurgents of these unconventional weapons is minimal, but the U.S. defensive response to protect its army is staggering. The multibillion-dollar fleet of heavily protected MRAP vehicles designed to protect U.S. soldiers against IEDs is just one example. This reflects in part an insurgent strategy of "cost imposition," whereby the enemy attempts to drive the costs of the war in lives and fortune to a point where it no longer makes strategic sense for the U.S. to pursue its aims.

The evolving nature of global threats echoes the tactical asymmetry found on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where the 19th and 20th centuries were dominated by a Westphalian order of nation-states, nonstate actors have moved to center stage in today's global order. This is a "flat world" of multinational companies, interwoven crime syndicates, global special interest groups, Internet-fueled extremist ideologies and terrorist networks. In many ways, the comfortable order and rule of law represented by the nation-states seated at the U.N. is fading, overtaken by a complex mix of other competitors for power. Of even greater concern, the destructive power accessible to even tiny groups is skyrocketing, rendering both deterrence and containment of fringe actors exceedingly difficult.

The role of U.S. military forces in this new era of global disorder requires a careful assessment. The U.S. Department of Defense has traditionally analyzed foreign military capabilities and assigned priorities based upon their potential threat to U.S. interests. In today's world, a threat-calculus based upon conventional military capabilities makes less sense, as does the impetus to simply build a U.S. military to confront these nation-state threats. In a disorderly world, terrorist groups, transnational criminals or state failure may generate a serious threat to U.S. vital interests as readily as a cross-border invasion. In this environment, a U.S. military too deeply invested in conventional military capabilities may be poorly positioned for other strategic challenges facing the United States. But if it seems obvious that the next U.S. military must be able to more than just fight or deter other armies, navies and air forces, exactly what else it should be doing is less clear.

In many ways, the current "supply of security capital" by the United States is woefully out of balance with the "demand signal" driven by threats in this new disorderly world. A U.S. Foreign Service with fewer than 8,000 diplomats to cover the globe contrasts with a U.S. Marine Corps of 200,000 leathernecks. A foreign aid and development budget of less than $60 billion competes with a base defense budget that exceeds $550 billion a year. But the bureaucratic realities of Washington and the U.S. Congress give scant hope that any major realignments between U.S. government departments will occur. This is a fundamental dose of reality: Even in an era of fiscal austerity, Defense will continue to have a disproportionate share of U.S. government discretionary spending. This recognition should drive new thinking on maximizing those assets.

One outcome should be clear: The U.S. military must begin to play a larger role in global conflict prevention in this new disorderly world. Military forces based largely in the United States waiting for a war to break out are simply an unaffordable resource drain in a financial environment where the annual interest payments on the nation's debt will exceed its $550 billion defense budget by the end of this decade. The U.S. military is no longer a sound investment if it only defends and deters -- it must now also actively help prevent conflicts and stabilize key regions of the world where instability can threaten vital U.S. interests. All three missions -- defend, deter, prevent -- are important, and the next U.S. military should be organized, trained and equipped to actively engage in each.

Making this change will require a strategic reset in both U.S. military and diplomatic thinking. Fortunately, the nation-building and counterinsurgency experiences of the past 10 years have prepared the military well for this adjustment. Building on this experience makes sense. This new task of "selective stabilization" can better align the military with U.S. diplomatic missions abroad in at-risk areas and leverage a broader array of U.S. power. Yet this logic will be strongly opposed by those worried about a further "militarization of foreign policy" -- while failing to recognize that the diplomat's traditional remit of "represent, report and negotiate" is shrinking in today's disorderly world. Fewer regions will demand these traditional diplomatic talents alone, and many more will require new skills in integrating U.S. hard and soft power in potential conflict zones.

Demographic and natural resource trends signal that violent upheaval and the threat of instability will menace ever greater parts of the world, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Central and South Asia. U.S. vital interests in these regions are less threatened by interstate war than by the risks of internal extremism, instability and terrorism. Stabilizing the most important of these regions is an essential new task, and one that will require the combined talents of State and Defense.

None of this suggests the deployment of Army divisions to the Maghreb or Marine landings on the Nigerian coast -- quite the opposite. Nor does it suggest the U.S. military abandon war fighting to take on a global nation-building role in lieu of its traditional combat responsibilities. But the nation's large investment in the military argues for a greater return on investment in response to an increasingly disorderly world.

That said, the lead for any expanded engagement by U.S. military forces overseas must remain the U.S. ambassador as chief of mission in any country with a U.S. presence. But in zones of potential conflict, the military can provide the ambassador with planners and strategists, logisticians and analysts, technicians and foreign area officers -- and, often, defense dollars. The U.S. military can also deliver core capabilities to help train and professionalize less-capable militaries in these regions around the world, modeling U.S. values and norms that are the global standard of military excellence. The restraint and responsibility exercised by the U.S.-trained Egyptian military in responding to the popular protests and managing the ongoing transition of power in Egypt is the best recent example of the power of this influence.

The Era of the Disorderly World has already dawned. The importance of conventional militaries in this world has changed, but it has not gone away. Hard military power remains potent, and U.S. military power remains the dominant hard power force in the world -- and will remain so even in an era of U.S. fiscal austerity. But in order to prepare to confront the most dangerous conventional and unconventional threats to the nation, more is demanded. The U.S. military must add to its strategic portfolio a new mission: conflict prevention. Too many scarce resources are vested in the military to simply preserve it for the next war. These costly investments should be leveraged to make that war much less likely -- particularly in the highest-priority regions for U.S. vital interests around the world. Confronting this dangerous and disorderly world will require all of the diverse sources of talent that the United States can muster.

**Hegemony cannot survive in the 21st century, but American military leadership is key to prevent global chaos and conflict – there’s no alternative to the US.**

**Brzezinski 12** – trustee and co-chair of the CSIS Advisory Board, CSIS counselor, professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, co-chair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus, member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council (January/February, Zbigniew, Foreign Policy, “After America,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america?page=full, mrs)

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.

The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role.

China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.

At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.

A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

## 1AC Plan

**Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its transportation infrastructure investment in the United States through passive radio-frequency identification for integrated in-transit visibility.**

## 1AC Solvency

**Effective ITV is the only way to end transport bottlenecks that undermine military capabilities.**

**Brewer 4** (David L., “Military Sealift Command: making the defense distribution process work,” Defense Transportation Journal, 9/1, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-123240443.html)//mat

A new era in combat logistics dawned when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the single owner of the DoD distribution process. With the announcement, seamless integration of the transportation process, with production at the factory or deployment from the fort to consumption at the foxhole, by truck, train, ship and aircraft, began to enter the realm of reality. Key to this seamless journey of combat goods from their origins to the war-fighting commanders who need them to dominate the enemy in the field and win the day is in-transit visibility. Military Sealift Command has been working with TRANSCOM partners, Air Mobility Command and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, for more than two years to bring new technology to bear on the visibility issue. One of the research outcomes is the use of radio frequency identification data (RFID) tags to make cargo selection and loading more accurate and much faster at those locations where the transportation mode changes. This technology significantly reduces or altogether eliminates the transportation "seam" that used to cause bottlenecks, sometimes leaving a small mountain of containers of combat gear waiting for forward transportation and field commanders nervously wondering if needed supplies and equipment would arrive in time. MSC ships are now using RFID tags in the cargo loading process instead of bar-code readers to identify each specific piece, a cumbersome process that required individuals to approach and point a bar-code reader at every vehicle or container being loaded. A remote reader, called an interrogator, reads the code being transmitted via radio frequency by the tag. Interrogators are located in the marshalling area, on the ship's loading ramp and in the cargo hold. The data is automatically entered into the digital database, providing an accurate record of what each ship is carrying and where the piece of equipment is stowed. Long the maritime innovator for the DoD, Military Sealift Command is also working closely with TRANSCOM and the Navy on several other concepts to further reduce transport interruptions thus increasing the speed and efficiency of delivery in the field, where war-fighting commanders need it most. One change being implemented within MSC will significantly increase our capability to rapidly and accurately disseminate operational information--a single, integrated worldwide command information center. By eliminating smaller, redundant command centers in each of our area commands and making maximum use of web-based communications, such as computer-assisted conference calls and sophisticated web links, MSC will be able to provide customers with virtually instantaneous status updates on specific ships--even specific cargo items. We'll be able to provide more accurate scheduling information and more precise delivery dates and times to war fighters. MSC is also looking at the current cumbersome method of loading and off-loading cargo. For instance, to reach a specific container of gear belonging to an Army unit, the entire ship sometimes must be off-loaded before the container can be found--a laborious process that takes hours. Selective discharge technology--the ability to know the location of and retrieve a specific container of combat gear from a ship's cargo hold through computerized automation--will revolutionize that process, reducing hours to minutes. Using the RFID tags, a computer database will be able to identify any container aboard ship. An automated gantry and conveyer system will locate the container and quickly move it to the ship's cargo discharge area for transfer to the next mode in the distribution system, virtually untouched by human hands. This technology will also allow for a smaller crew, thus saving money. At the same time, MSC is looking at the technical issues involved in making joint logistics over the sea (JLOTS) capable of handling higher sea states. Presently, JLOTS technology is capable of off-loading combat cargo at sea for transfer to shore via barges and other lighterage only in sea state one or two, which are essentially calm conditions. Since conflict doesn't wait for weather, we need to be able to safely conduct at-sea off-loads in worse sea conditions. MSC is seeking improvements in auto-compensating crane technology--cranes that automatically adjust to the ship's rolling or pitching in heavy seas--and more stable lighterage for the trip to shore. The crane technology would also be used in conjunction with selective discharge systems as part of the sea-basing concept. Part of the Chief of Naval Operations Seapower 21 strategy is sea basing, which would provide an at-sea platform as a US base for cargo transfer, mission aircraft launching, command and control, etc. The sea base could be as simple as one command ship or as complicated as several ships or vessels offering modular living quarters, hospital facilities, flight facilities and advanced communications. The sea-basing concept will provide flexibility to adapt the system to the specific mission and will take advantage of maneuvering space at sea for defense of the sea base. Throughout all the concepts being explored, customer service--the ability to get what the field commander needs, where needed, when needed--will be paramount. That's why we at MSC are working closely with our sister component commands in TRANSCOM to make the distribution process work faster and more efficiently.