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**Contention x is oil –**

**Oil dependence increases the risk of war**

**Glaser 11** (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, Online, Doc, if anyone needs this article email me at neilp1215@gmail.com) GANGEEZY

Military capability is threatened by insecure access to oil ¶ Oil dependence could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can leave a state open to coercion—recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a weaker bargaining position and is more likely to make concessions.[[1]](#footnote-1) Closely related, if war occurs the state is more likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil;[[2]](#footnote-2) rather, when states already have incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war. ¶ Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States to fight a long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an important role in destroying Japan’s ability to fight.[[3]](#footnote-3) This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger today because the United States does not face a major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy.¶ Protecting access to oil threatens other states—an access-driven security dilemma¶ The vulnerability of a state’s access to oil supplies could reduce its security via a second, more complicated mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s security, then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow standard security-dilemma logic, but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing the standard focus on protection of territory. In the most extreme case, a state could try to solve its import vulnerability through territorial expansion. In less extreme cases, the state could deal with its vulnerability by building up military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of decreasing its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the state’s motives are malign, which decreases the adversary’s security, which leads the adversary to build up its own military forces.[[4]](#footnote-4) Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt an offensive capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by this security dilemma need not be over oil or access to oil; by damaging political relations the security dilemma could prevent the states from resolving political disputes and avoiding the escalation of crises. ¶ Here again, the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military status quo currently favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts to protect its access to oil could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States.¶ Oil makes territory increasingly valuable ¶ In this type of case, a state places greater value on owning territory because the territory contains energy resources that are increasingly valuable. The greater value of territory can increase competition between states, because the benefits of success grow relative to the costs of competition, for example, the costs of arming. For similar reasons, the greater value of territory increases the probability that crises over territory will lead to war instead of negotiated compromises, as states are more willing to run the risks of fighting.[[5]](#footnote-5) This type of conflict is the classic resource war, which is the path by which oil is most commonly envisioned leading to conflict.[[6]](#footnote-6) ¶ We can also hypothesize that the probability of conflict is greater when territorial boundaries are contested and the political status quo is ambiguous. Because the norm of state sovereignty is now widely held, states are less likely to launch expansionist wars to take other states’ territory. However, when boundaries are not settled, states are more likely to compete to acquire territory they value and will compete harder when they value it more.[[7]](#footnote-7) In addition, unsettled boundaries increase the possibilities for boundedly rational bargaining failures that could lead to war. ¶ There are two basic paths via which a state could become involved in this type of oil conflict. The more obvious is for the state to be a claimant in the dispute and become directly involved in a territorial conflict. The second is likely more important for the United States—an alliance commitment could draw the state into a resource conflict that initially began between its ally and another state.[[8]](#footnote-8) The state would not have energy interests of its own at stake, but intervenes to protect its ally. Along this path, energy plays an important but less direct role in damaging the state’s security, because although energy interests fuel the initial conflict, they do not motivate the state’s intervention.[[9]](#footnote-9) A later section explores the possibility of conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, with the United States drawn in to protect Japan and consequently involved in a war with China.

**Additionally oil shocks cause war**

**Roberts 04** (Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, “The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World”, p. 93-94)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

**u.s. oil dependence destroys US power projection in every global region  
Sussman 12** (Michael Sussman, The writer conducted his graduate studies at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. He served in the office of the Critic of International Cooperation in the Canadian House of Commons, where he conducted foreign policy analyses. He is currently the president of the strategic consulting firm Samuel Sussman Strategic Consulting Group. His forthcoming book is entitled, Multiple Modernities in the Contemporary Scene, “American military spending and oil dependency”, February 9, 2012)

One of the most crucial problems facing the United States is whether it will be able to maintain its strategic interests in the Middle East. It is expected that US defense expenditures will drastically decrease in the coming six years – official estimates are as high as eight percent, roughly $477 billion, a significant sum when it comes to defense. It is also projected that the US will not have the financial means at its disposal to bolster its allies, marginalizing the potential for Marshall-Plan type subsidies (which totaled $13 billion at the time). Since the Second World War, military might and financially aiding its allies in the Middle East have been two of the major methods used by the US to protect its interests. The reality dictated by the today’s situation is ingenuity: the US will have to be resourceful in projecting (at least the perception of) its power, and find new ways of supporting its allies. But even that will not be enough. To mitigate the problem to a manageable level the US must reduce its dependence on oil. It is important to clarify what the expected reduction in US military spending means for US military capabilities. The US is currently the strongest military in the world; its capabilities are exponentially greater than those of any other military in the world. That reality is unlikely to change in the near future, even with the proposed spending cuts. US military spending accounts for over 43% of global military expenditures. The magnitude of that sum becomes realizable when compared to China, which ranks second with 7.3%, and Russia, which ranks third with 3.6%. US military superiority is also evident in the amount of military equipment at its disposal. The US currently possesses 11 aircraft carriers, whereas the rest of the world only has eight (China is building one, but it is not expected to be completed until 2015). What the spending cuts will do, however, is limit the ability of the US to achieve its objectives in the Middle East; the manpower and machinery to conduct such operations will no longer be available. For instance, even if the US maintains the largest air force in the world, it will not have the manpower to conduct the number of operations that it did in the past. In recent years, the US has implemented defense policies aimed at countering the problem, including greater focus on intelligence, special forces units and network-centric warfare. These options are less costly than all-out war; however, they are not able to fully substitute for conventional standing forces. An additional factor is that while aircraft carriers and a well-trained army require time, expertise and capital to develop, and spy rings and anti-missile technology are less costly, it is therefore easier for the US’s adversaries to counter these measures with their own spy rings and anti-missile defense technology. It is well known that the reason the Middle East is of particular importance to the US is oil. The US consumes about 25% of all of the crude oil produced in the world, while producing less than 9%. A large percentage of US imports comes from Middle Eastern countries, not to mention the fact that 60% of the world’s known oil resources are in the Middle East. Oil may be only a commodity, but it is the commodity that fuels US society, from transporting foods and manufactured goods across the country to powering industries to transporting civilians to work. At the recent Herzliya Conference former CIA director James Woolsey advocated decreased dependency on oil. That can be achieved by the use of alternative fuels, including natural gas. For example, today in Brazil, cars are fueled by ethanol fuel produced from sugarcane. The view that the US should decrease its reliance on foreign oil is not a new one but given the economic downturn it is of even more importance. America’s policies in the Middle East in the last half century have often been skewed by the fact that it is beholden to the oil producing regimes. Through incremental decreases in foreign aid and defense spending, coupled with investment in alternative energy technology the US can reach a point where it need no longer rely on some of these local regimes and where it can pursue its true self interest and policies. The money saved on US defense expenditures in the region could be put toward placing its military in other regions. For instances, the US plans to expand its operations in Asia. This will be very difficult to achieve given the defense cuts and its many commitments around the world. It would also deliver a blow to the oil producing regimes that supply the US, and which are also among the greatest violators of human rights and sponsors of terrorism. Without money coming from oil producing countries, Islamist terrorists will suffer a major setback. As an additional benefit, some of the money saved can go towards strengthening manufacturing and US industry. With government support, as well as a large domestic market, the alternative energy industry can become a booming industry in the US – helping to strengthen its economy. By decreasing dependency on the oil producing regimes in the Middle East the US will be freer to focus on other core strategic issues, such as increased Iranian influence, democratization and maintaining security and stability in the region. The US faces a problem of defense cuts and maintaining its interests. Alternative fuels are ready to be utilized. The defense spending problem can be eliminated. Americans should ask themselves why these solutions are not being implemented.

**Abesnt effective u.s. hegemony global wars will ensue**

**Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13** (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens thebalefuleffects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regionalmultipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regionalproxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that couldspin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. **security** commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlyinglogic ofthedeep engagementstrategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

**Engagement is inevitable – its just a question of effectiveness**

**Dorfman ‘12** (Zach Dorfman, Zach Dorfman is assistant editor of Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, an online magazine of books, art, and culture, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>, May 18, 2012, LEQ)

The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

**Oil independence is inevitable – natural gas facilitates the transition**

**Gibson 12** ([Thomas Gibson](http://energy.nationaljournal.com/contributors/thomas-gibson.php), President & CEO, American Iron and Steel Institute, “Shale Natural Gas Biggest Game-Changer,” September 9, 2012, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/09/seeking-elusive-energy-indepen.php#2243543>) GANGEEZY

The United States is moving closer to the goal of being able to supply all of its energy needs from domestic energy sources. The biggest game-changer in this quest for energy self-sufficiency has been the discovery and development of America’s vast shale reserves. Developing our natural gas resources from these shale formations across the country is providing low-cost and reliable sources of energy that will boost the U.S. manufacturing sector’s competitiveness. This is especially true for America’s steel industry where energy costs generally represent up to 20% of the total cost of making steel in the U.S. AISI member companies often compete internationally with steelmakers from countries where those energy costs are subsidized. This makes it imperative that we have an effective national energy plan focused on maximizing production from U.S. domestic gas, oil, and coal resources to create and maintain valuable American jobs in steel and other key industries. As an energy-intensive industry that creates essential American jobs and manufactures materials critical to America’s economic and national security, we believe energy policies must be crafted to foster – and not hinder – our international competitiveness. We are strongly supportive of policy measures to increase production of on- and off-shore energy resources, especially natural gas from shale formations, and appropriate regulatory reforms so that all forms of energy supply (coal, natural gas and electricity) remain affordable and reliable. In particular, by embracing our abundant shale reserves as the tremendous domestic resource that they are, while developing them in a careful manner, our nation can lessen its dependency on foreign energy supplies, create thousands of jobs and spur economic growth for years to come.

**Natural gas reduces US oil dependence**

**Ganos 12** ([Todd Ganos](http://blogs.forbes.com/toddganos/), Contributor, “Breaking U.S. Dependence On Foreign Oil,” 1/3/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddganos/2012/01/03/breaking-u-s-dependence-on-foreign-oil/>) GANGEEZY

We’ve heard the beating of the drum time and time again: “We must reduce our dependence on foreign oil.” It forces us into poor economic, political, diplomatic, and military choices. But, what are we really doing about it?¶ In this column, I’ve discussed a widely accepted concept called “peak oil”. It is a logistics model that has been able to predict the point in time at which the maximum rate of extraction occurs for a specific well, a field, a region, or the world, after which extraction quickly declines. Under this model, it appears that peak oil for the world might well occur this decade. While the extraction of oil might decline, energy consumption certainly won’t. So, energy consumers will turn to different sources.¶ Given a combination of factors – our nation’s infrastructure, domestic resources, technology, and environmental impact – it might be that natural gas is the natural choice. Of course, we would want to ultimately move to zero-emission sources of energy, but we’re not there yet . . . at least our infrastructure and technology are not there yet.¶ U.S. crude oil consumption is roughly 7 billion barrels per year, of which approximately 4.5 billion barrels is imported. Based on data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 24 trillion cubic feet of natural gas per year would be needed to replace the 4.5 billion barrels per year we import.¶ The U.S. currently produces just under this amount each year. With an effective doubling of consumption of natural gas each year, an expansion of infrastructure would be needed. Such an expansion might take ten years to implement. But, it would be a shift from energy investment that we are already paying for outside the United States to energy investment inside the United States. This would likely have the effect of pulling jobs back into the U.S.¶ Various sources estimate that the U.S. has between 1.5 and 2.5 quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. If we were to assume its complete replacement of foreign oil, this translates to a 60 to 100-year supply. Tacking on the additional ten years for implementation, what might technology yield in the 2080 to 2120 timeframe? I posit that technology will yield a clean, green, cheap source of domestic energy that will once and for all put the issue to rest.¶ So, while natural gas certainly is not the final solution, it might well be the steppingstone that gets us there.

**US natural gas market will crash without exports**

**Hulbert and Goldthau 8-5-12** (Matthew, consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, and Andreas, prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate, Goldthau, Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary, “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/print/)

The same debate is raging in the US. Despite the phenomenal breakthroughs in American shale developments, the front runner of the revolution now risks becoming a victim of its own success in terms of Henry Hub prices dropping so low, that full cycle economics for US shale gas plays have become negative. Unless prices organically firm, or US producers learn the dark art of supply restraint, current output levels will be difficult to maintain or enhance for American consumers. Companies will fold; fields will be mothballed, with Chesapeake providing the best ‘poster boy’ example of how precarious shale gas economics have become. The quick fix option to get Henry Hub back at a sustainable $4-7/MMbtu level (and by far the most lucrative for some of the mid-cap players involved), is to sign up international LNG contracts. That’s exactly what’s being done, with some of the larger IOCs (Royal Dutch Shell, BP and ExxonMobil) also aggressively pushing for LNG exports to capitalise on huge spreads, not to mention preventing further write-downs on shale assets. It’s not like Chinese champions working on US plays would have any ideological opposition to such a prospect. In total, FERC has around 125bcm/y of LNG applications currently awaiting approval – even on a ‘bad day’ 40-50bcm exports should be very feasible by 2020. That would make the US the third largest LNG player in the world. It’s also going to be the crucial factor over the next five years to decide where gas markets are heading. America will be decisive for future pricing models, whether they shift to gas (rather than oil) fundamentals. US LNG could be the straw that breaks oil indexation back.

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**China is seeking LNG imports in the status quo**

**Zhu and Sethuraman 12** (Bloomberg reporters (Winnie AND Dinakar, “China’s Easing Grip on Gas Opening Door to North America Exports,” 6/4/12, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-04/china-s-easing-grip-on-gas-opening-door-to-north-america-exports>)

Chinese consumers may buy natural gas at more than five times current U.S. futures prices as the government eases control over domestic costs, opening the world’s biggest energy market to more overseas sellers.¶ Wholesale, or city-gate gas, in China’s Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, where the country is running a pilot program linking prices to oil, cost as much as 2.74 yuan (43 cents) a cubic meter since December, according to the National Development and Reform Commission. That’s about $12 per million British thermal units, or five times more expensive than benchmark U.S. futures in New York.¶ China plans to extend the pricing nationwide in two to three years, according to the official Xinhua News Agency, potentially boosting imports from North America, where Henry Hub futures contracts fell to a 10-year low in April. While China seeks to boost the use of cleaner fuels such as gas, retail price caps are discouraging energy companies from increasing supplies because they have to pay international rates and sell at a loss on the domestic market.¶ “The price reform helps to create an environment that supports a high cost of gas,” Gavin Thompson, a manager at Wood Mackenzie Ltd. in Beijing, said in a telephone interview May 30. “U.S. pricing will be attractive to the Chinese buyers. Looking at our view of delivered cost into east coast China and Henry Hub gas prices, U.S. Gulf Coast exports look competitive.”¶ Executives from the world’s biggest gas companies including Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Exxon Mobil Corp., OAO Gazprom and PetroChina Co. are likely to discuss the prospect of rising North American exports to Asia when they meet in Kuala Lumpur this week for the World Gas Conference. Shell Chief Executive Officer Peter Voser last month called gas “the fuel of the future.”¶ U.S. LNG¶ The U.S. may export about 40 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas a year by 2022 as low-cost supplies from shale deposits encourage shipments to Asia, Jen Snyder, a Boston-based analyst at Wood Mackenzie, said May 22. LNG is natural gas chilled to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit (minus 162 degrees Celsius), liquefying it for shipment by tanker.¶ U.S. exports will cost Asia buyers $9.35 per million Btu, based on a Henry Hub price of $3 and after accounting for freight rates, according to a May 29 presentation byCheniere Energy Inc. ([LNG](http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot.asp?ticker=LNG:US)), the Houston-based company that’s developing the nation’s largest LNG export terminal in Louisiana. That compares to $11.08 per million Btu that China paid on average in April, according to customs data.¶ Price Slump¶ Gas futures slumped to $1.91 per million Btu on the New York Mercantile Exchange on April 19, the lowest price since September 2001. The contract for July delivery was at $2.348 per million Btu today in New York.¶ “China will be seriously importing gas from North America as it offers potentially lower prices compared to other sources,” Neil Beveridge, a Hong Kong-based analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein, said in a telephone interview May 30. “There is a lot of interest from Asian buyers, but the question is very much a political one in terms of how much the U.S. will allow to export.”¶ If China’s gas pricing reform is rolled out nationwide, retail gas prices could double to as much as 5 yuan per cubic meter, from 2.5 yuan currently, Beveridge said in a May 9 report. Wellhead prices would be three times those implied by U.S. forward price curves, according to Beveridge.¶ Import Surge¶ China may purchase an additional 10 million tons of LNG a year by 2030 from overseas markets, including North America, South America and Africa, on top of a further 10 million tons from traditional sources in Asia and the Middle East, Fereidun Fesharaki, the Singapore-based chairman of Facts Global Energy, said in a report last month.¶ China, which aims to double gas use in five years by 2015, increased overseas purchases of LNG by 31 percent to a record 12.2 million tons last year, according to Chinese customs. Purchases may more than double to 30 million tons by 2015 and rise fourfold to 50 million tons by 2020, according to Bernstein.

**This hard-lined stance on natural gas claims in the South China Sea damages ASEAN’s ability to handle regional disputes and undermines multilateralism**

[**Kurlantzick**](http://www.cfr.org/experts/asia-southeast-asia-democracy-human-rights/joshua-kurlantzick/b15522) **12** [Joshua: Fellow for Southeast Asia Areas of expertise include Southeast Asia, China; Asian regionalism; public diplomacy; democratization in the developing world. “South China Sea: From Bad to Worse?” <http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-bad-worse/p28739> July 2012]//BM

Tensions in the South China Sea have risen to their highest level in at least two years in the wake of the disastrous breakup of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting in Phnom Penh. Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, an eternal optimist, admitted that the summit was an "unprecedented" failure in ASEAN's history, and Indonesia's foreign minister rushed to mediate tensions between ASEAN members lest they explode again. At nearly the same time, a Chinese naval frigate ran aground in a disputed area of the sea, raising regional suspicions that Beijing was trying to bolster its claim to the entire South China Sea. As it has over the past three years, the Obama administration has taken a cautious but firm position on South China Sea sovereignty and adjudication of disputes. While noting that the United States does not have any claim on the South China Sea, the Obama administration has more vocally backed the ASEAN claimants' rights on territorial claims, even saying that freedom of navigation and a resolution of claims accepted by all nations was a U.S. "national interest." The sides have turned virtually uninhabited rocks into new provinces and states. The administration also has upped its assistance to mainland Southeast Asia, such as announcing earlier this month $50 million in new funding for the Lower Mekong Initiative, a project for Mekong River nations like Laos. Regional partners of the United States like the Philippines are rapidly buying up arms, while at the same time, China and most of the Southeast Asian claimants of portions of the sea (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) are ramping up rhetoric about their claims and increasingly sending naval and "civilian" fishing boats into the sea to test adversaries' positions. Yet at the same time, there remains some room for compromise among all sea claimants and the United States. Chinese officials recognize that their increasingly vocal positions on the sea have alienated many Southeast Asian nations and pushed countries like Vietnam and the Philippines closer to the United States. At the same time, though some ASEAN nations like Cambodia are drawing nearer to China, while others such as the Philippines are moving closer to Washington, all ASEAN nations realize that Southeast Asian states must generally provide a united front on issues if they are to be treated as a major power in East Asia. Hardening Territorial Claims Tensions over the South China Sea, which is strategically vital and believed to contain rich deposits of petroleum, go back decades, but over the past two years they have escalated dramatically. China, which in theory claims nearly the entire sea, has in recent years publicly advocated its claims more forcefully. This can be attributed to various causes: Perhaps U.S. economic problems distracted it from Asia in the latter half of the 2000s; China's leadership recognizes Beijing's own rising naval strength; China's government is responding to growing nationalism; China's resources companies want to expedite exploration of the sea; or some combination of these and other factors. Then last summer, ASEAN appeared willing to simply let China move any resolution down the road by publicly celebrating the drafting of an agreement between Southeast Asian states and China to resolve South China Sea disputes peacefully. But the agreement was not a binding code of conduct, and it skirted any real resolution of key issues like overlapping territorial claims to the sea and exploration of its potential undersea resources. ASEAN's weak stand may have encouraged Beijing to take a harder-line position this year. This spring and summer, the Southeast Asian claimants (except Malaysia, which has taken a more passive role) and China have hardened their positions by putting into place more physical manifestations of their claims. The sides have turned virtually uninhabited rocks into new provinces and states. Earlier this year, China announced that the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as another area of the sea, have become a Chinese administrative area called Sansha City, with its own governing officials. The dispute also has done serious damage to ASEAN claims to be able to handle important regional issues and, in the future, drive regional integration They have begun staking out oil and gas claims as another physical manifestation of their power: China National Offshore Oil Company recently invited foreign oil companies to offer it bids to explore potential blocks that are just off of the coast of Vietnam. And they have increasingly used non-military boats to make their points. Last month, for instance, Beijing declared that it would expand the fleets of fishing vessels it will be sending to disputed regions of the sea. Many Southeast Asian diplomats claim that these boats are essentially paramilitary vessels, yet Vietnam and the Philippines increasingly use the same types of boats to stake their claims. Meanwhile, Philippine officials are increasingly pressing Washington for higher-quality military equipment. Vietnam and the Philippines also have been inviting foreign petroleum companies to engage in joint exploration projects in contested areas. Following the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, several critical indicators will show whether all sides are willing to step back from the dispute, which now increasingly threatens to turn into a shooting war. (After considerable arm-twisting from Indonesian leaders on July 20, ASEAN eventually reached what it called a consensus on the sea, but this simply papered over divisions and had little new of substance.) Observers are watching to see how publicly China discusses the new "territory" of Sansha. And many Southeast Asian officials are watching to see whether Beijing disburses large new grants or low-interest loans to Cambodia and Malaysia, the two ASEAN nations that have taken a much lower-profile approach to the sea (Cambodia virtually advocated the Chinese position during the summit). Ultimately, Beijing's signals that it was willing to once again begin negotiating a code of conduct that would govern how ships act in disputed maritime waters would be the sign that China is stepping back from the brink. On the Southeast Asian side, Vietnam and the Philippines' willingness to call back some of their fishing boats, as well as Hanoi's willingness to stop passing resolutions in its legislature claiming portions of the sea, would be important calming signs. ASEAN's Divisions More than at any other time, the dispute this year also has done serious damage to ASEAN claims to be able to handle important regional issues and in the future drive regional integration. Even some of the most ardent backers of the organization now wonder whether ASEAN's traditional consensus style is defunct. This is hardly the first time the consensus approach has proven counterproductive: ASEAN failed, in the past, to take strong positions even on conflict within Southeast Asia, as occurred in East Timor in 1999, because of this adherence to consensus and noninterference, a sharp contrast from some other regional organizations like the African Union. The desire for consensus is further challenged by the new closeness between China and some of the mainland Southeast Asian states, raising fears in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei, among others, that countries like Cambodia, Laos, and even Thailand will be pawns of China. Phnom Penh, which holds the chair of ASEAN this year, has become increasingly dependent on Chinese aid and investment. Two-way trade between China and Cambodia is estimated to roughly double between now and 2017 to $5 billion, while China has become by far the largest aid donor in Cambodia. Laos and Thailand have become increasingly dependent on China as well. Creating a binding code of conduct signed by the Southeast Asian claimants and China seems very unlikely, at least for now. Preventing a Conflict The priority on all sides should be to avoid military conflict [editor's note: See [CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum](http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883) by expert Bonnie Glaser]. ASEAN and China both have good reasons to avoid a shooting war in the South China Sea. Even as China spars with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries, it is becoming the largest trading partner and one of the biggest direct investors of most Southeast Asian states since an ASEAN-China free trade area came into effect.

**The plan supplies China – reduces their agression**

**Levi, 2012** David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change Council on Foreign Relations (Michael, “A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports,” June 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)

The prospect of further exports beyond those initially approved to non-FTA countries will be attractive to many potential importers, including Korea, Japan, India, and China. This will be the case even if the United States approves enough capacity to theoretically cover plausible export demands, since many firms that have received approval to export LNG may not actually succeed in building export facilities. ¶ U.S. trade negotiators should use the prospect of preferential access to future exports in trade negotiations with those countries, which could create an opportunity to further increase the economic benefits to the United States of natural gas exports. In particular, the United States should make access to U.S. LNG a part of ongoing TPP negotiations with Japan, something Japan has signaled that it desires. The specific “asks” in return for preferential access should be determined by broader U.S. priorities in these negotiations. State Department diplomats should also emphasize the value of FTA access to U.S. LNG exports in their engagement with those Korean policy-makers who are skeptical of the U.S.Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS).¶ The prospect of a more diverse LNG market—which U.S. entry as an exporter would contribute to—carries with it the prospect of introducing more transparent market-based pricing to gas trade, particularly in Asia. That would help disentangle natural gas trade from political relationships, particularly between Asian consumers and Middle Eastern suppliers, to the broader benefit of the United States. The U.S. government has limited influence over the geopolitical impact of LNG exports, but it can take several steps to improve the odds of success.

**Asian multilateralism is crucial to solving disease – southeast Asia is the next ground zero**

**Green and Gill 9** [Micheal, Professor of IR, and Bates, PhD in Foreign Affairs “Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community” pg. 310-311 googlebooks]

Since the Asia-wide outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the threats from infectious diseases appear to have become more severe. As the SARS experience showed, in this era of globalization and regionalization such types of infectious diseases have the capacity to affect detrimentally the security and well-being of all members of a society and all aspects of its economy. This point was well highlighted at the zoo6 World Economic Forum with the release of the report Global Risks 2006. The report ranked pandemics and natural disasters among the highest in the list of risks confronting the international community. The study also concluded that despite the interplay of these multiple global risks and their combined ripple effects, disaster planning and crisis management suffer from a number of shortcomings.” Among these shortcomings are limited investments of resources in health systems and varying responses to different assessments of threats How have regional institutions dealt with the problem? The record is mixed. Along with SARS amid the looming threat of a new pandemic, possibly from the mutation of the H5N1 virus (a strain of avian influenza), it is disturbing to note that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that Southeast Asia would be the “next ground zero” if the H5N1 strain mutates to become infectious to humans on a pandemic scale.” The WHO warning reminds ASEAN and other regional governments that they may well be the first line of defense in case of an outbreak, hence raising the critical urgency of putting in place emergency plans and effective surveillance systems in the region. The question, however, is whether Asian governments are organized for such an eventuality.

**Disease causes extinction**

**Leather** 10/12/**11** (Tony, “The Inevitable Pandemic” <http://healthmad.com/conditions-and-diseases/the-inevitable-pandemic/>, PZ)

You will have pictured this possible scenario many times, living in a country where people are suddenly dropping like flies because of some mystery virus. Hospitals full to overflowing, patients laid out in corridors, because of lack of room, health services frustrated, because they just can’t cope. You feel panic with no way of knowing who will be the next victim, intimate personal contact with anyone the death of you, quite possibly. This is no scene from a movie, or even a daydream, but UK reality in 1998, when the worst influenza epidemic in living memory swept savagely across the country. Whilst this was just one epidemic in one country, how terrifying is the idea that a global pandemic would see this horror story repeated many times over around the globe, death toll numbers in the millions. Humanity is outnumbered many fold by bacteria and viruses, the deadliest of all killers among these microscopic organisms. Death due to disease is a threat we all live with daily, trusting medical science combat it, but the fact is, frighteningly, that we have yet to experience the inevitable pandemic that might conceivably push humanity to the edge of extinction because so many of us become victims. Devastating viral diseases are nothing new. Bubonic plague killed almost half all Roman Empire citizens in542AD. Europe lost three quarters of the population to the Black Death in 1334. One fifth of Londoners succumbed to the 1665 Great Plague, and Russia was the site of the first official influenza pandemic, in 1729, which quickly spread to Europe and America, at the costs of many thousands of lives. Another epidemic of so-called Russian flu, originating in 1889 in central Asia spreading rapidly around the world, European death toll alone 250,000 people. In 1918 so-called Spanish Influenza killed 40million people worldwide, another strain originating Hong Kong in 1969 killed off 700,000, a 1989 UK epidemic killing 29,000. Small numbers, granted, as compared to the world population of seven billion, but the truth is that, should a true world pandemic occur, western governments will of course want to save their own people first, potentially globally disastrous. World Health Organisation laboratories worldwide constantly monitor and record new strains of virus, ensuring drug companies maintain stockpiles against most virulent strains known, maintaining a fighting chance of coping with new pandemics. They do theoretical models of likely effects of new pandemics, their predictions making chilling reading. Put into perspective, during a pandemic, tanker loads of antiviral agents, which simply do not exist would be needed so prioritizing vaccination recipients would be inevitable. Such a pandemic would, in UK alone, be at least 10 times deadlier than previously experienced, likely number of dead in first two months 72,000 in London alone. Any new virus would need a three to six month wait for effective vaccine, so the devastation on a global scale, flu virus notoriously indifferent to international borders, would be truly colossal. Our knowledge of history should be pointing the way to prepare for that living nightmare of the next, inevitable world pandemic. The microscopic villains of these scenarios have inhabited this planet far longer than we have, and they too evolve. It would be comforting to think that humanity was genuinely ready, though it seems doubtful at best.

**Disease outweighs war**

Zakaria, ‘5. Fareed, “A Threat Worse than Terror,” 10-31, Newsweek, <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/103105.html>)

A flu pandemic is the most dangerous threat the United States faces today," says Richard Falkenrath, who until recently served in the Bush administration as deputy Homeland Security adviser. "It's a bigger threat than terrorism. In fact it's bigger than anything I dealt with when I was in government." One makes a threat assessment on the basis of two factors: the probability of the event, and the loss of life if it happened. On both counts, a pandemic ranks higher than a major terror attack, even one involving weapons of mass destruction. A crude nuclear device would probably kill hundreds of thousands. A flu pandemic could easily kill millions.  Whether this particular virus makes the final, fatal mutation that allows it to move from human to human, one day some virus will. The basic factor that is fueling this surge of viruses is China's growth. (China is the natural habitat of the influenza virus.) As China develops, it urbanizes, and its forests and wetlands shrink. That forces migratory birds to gather closer together-and closer to human habitation--which increases the chances of a virus spreading from one species to the next. Also, growth means a huge rise in chicken consumption. Across thousands of homes in China every day, chickens are slaughtered in highly unhygienic ways. "Every day the chances that this virus or another such virus will move from one species to another grow," says Laurie Garrett, author of "The Coming Plague," who has been writing brilliantly on this topic for years.  Nobody really disputes that we are badly unprepared for this threat. "If something like this pandemic were to happen today," says Falkenrath, "the government would be mostly an observer, not a manager." The government can't even give intelligent advice to its citizens because it doesn't actually know what to say. We don't know whether people should stay put, leave cities, stay home or go to the nearest hospital. During the cold war, hundreds of people in government participated in dozens of crisis simulations of nuclear wars, accidents and incidents. These "tabletop exercises" were conducted so that if and when a real crisis hit, policymakers would not be confronting critical decisions for the first time. No such expertise exists for today's deadliest threat.

1. For a full analysis of the when and how oil dependence leaves states vulnerable to coercion, see Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For important exceptions, see Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. In terms of bargaining theory, see Robert Powell, *Bargaining in the Shadow of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chp. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For a generally skeptical analysis of the standard resource war arguments see David G. Victor, “What Resource Wars,” *The National Interest* (November/December 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For related points, see Shaffer, *Energy Politics*, pp. 67-70, who identifies additional examples that I do not address, including the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the Arctic Circle. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Still another path is for a state to intervene in an energy-driven conflict to protect its access to oil; this is an example of how various mechanisms could overlap with each other. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This can be understood as a form of alliance entrapment; see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)