## 2AC Heg Bad

**Being off-shore takes out the link to their turns while still deterring**

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[Christopher. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

American primacy does benefit the world in some ways. Scholars of international political economy have devised an explanation—"hegemonic stability theory"—to show just why this is so. Like Britain during the period from 1814 to 1914, American military and economic power provides the framework or an open, economically interdependent—in today's catchword, "globalized"—international economy. The U.S. dollar is the international economy's "reserve currency," which serves as the medium of exchange and thus lubricates international trade and investment. Through the huge outflow of dollars—a combined effect of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit, overseas investments by American firms, and foreign aid and military expenditures overseas—the United States provides the international economy with liquidity. The United States—generally acting through institutions that it controls like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—also is the international economy's "lender of last resort." American largess—typically in the form of low-interest loans by the IMF—is what keeps tottering economies in East Asia, Mexico, and Latin America from going belly-up. Finally, the United States is the world's market, or consumer, of last resort. Americans' seemingly insatiable demand for overseas products—cars, electronics, computers, apparel—drives the growth of overseas economies like those of China, India, South Korea, and Latin America. The boundless appetite of U.S. consumers for foreign goods is the locomotive force for global economic growth.¶ Other countries also benefit from American military power. Wars are bad for business, and the U.S. military presence abroad supposedly "reassures" East Asia and Europe that these regions will remain stable and peaceful, thereby contributing to economic confidence. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it, other states "think of the value [U.S.-provided] security provides the world, and the fact that all of the economic activity that takes place is stunted and frightened by instability and fear...: 4' Moreover, the U.S. military protects the "global commons" of air, sea, and space—the avenues through which information is transmitted, and through which goods and people flow from nation to nation. Most important, because many states abroad live in dangerous neighborhoods, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces protects them from troublemakers that live nearby. Moreover, because American military power supposedly is "off-shore," the United States does not threaten the security of other states. As Stephen Walt puts it, "The United States is by far the world's most powerful state, but it does not pose a significant threat to the vital interests of the major powers.” <65-66>

**The US try to be a hegemon no matter what – it’s just a question of effectiveness**

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

The downward spiral the United States has taken was anything but inevitable. Washington has always had a choice in how to approach grand strategy. One popular option among some libertarians is isolationism. This approach is based on the assumption that there is no region outside the Western Hemisphere that is strategically important enough to justify expending American blood and treasure. Isolationists believe that the United States is remarkably secure because it is separated from all of the world’s great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— and on top of that it has had nuclear weapons—the ultimate deterrent—since 1945. But in truth, **there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy**, though the United States had strong isolationist tendencies until World War II. For since then, an internationalist activism, fostered by the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation, has thoroughly delegitimized this approach. American policy makers have come to believe the country should be militarily involved on the world stage. Yet though no mainstream politician would dare advocate isolationism at this point, the rationale for this grand strategy shows just how safe the United States is. This means, among other things, that it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places. Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked. Selective engagement also assumes that Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only areas of the world where the United States should be willing to deploy its military might. It is a more ambitious strategy than offshore balancing in that it calls for permanently stationing U.S. troops in those regions to help maintain peace. For selective engagers, it is not enough just to thwart aspiring hegemons. It is also necessary to prevent war in those key regions, either because upheaval will damage our economy or because we will eventually get dragged into the fight in any case. An American presence is also said to be valuable for limiting nuclear proliferation. But none of these strategies call for Washington to spread democracy around the globe—especially through war. The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless. This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

## 2AC Lopez CP

**Congress is needed to increase the Navy budget which is key to nuclear procurement and nuclear operators**

**CQ Weekly 08, [7/6/08, Go Nuclear, Navy, Nexis]**

Ultimately, money will probably be the primary obstacle to adding more nuclear ships. The Navy built and com-missioned nine nuclear-powered cruisers in the 1960s and 1970s, as escorts for the nuclear carriers, but quit because of their high procurement costs, according to the Congressional Research Service. Today, it would cost at least an extra $600 million to give each new cruiser nuclear power, money that could be used to turn out more ships. Unless the Navy's shipbuilding budget is increased to keep pace with the added cost of going nuclear, the Navy's Winter said, "it's going to be very difficult to see how we can significantly expand the use of nuclear power within the Navy." Then there's another cost not included in the $600 million price hike: If the nuclear power industry ashore is, in fact, reborn, it will be increasingly expensive for the Navy to recruit and retain workers with nuclear skills.

**The NNSA has sole jurisdiction over nuclear engine R&D**

**NNSA 03** - National Nuclear Security Administration

(FY 2003 Congressional Budget. “National Nuclear Security Administration Corporate Context for NNSA (NS) Programs”, 2003. http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/03budget/content/nnsaadm/nnsaover.pdf)

Naval Reactors

This program is responsible for all Naval nuclear propulsion work, which includes technology development continuing through reactor plant operations and disposal. Efforts have ensured the safety operation of reactor plants in nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers such as the 102 U.S. Naval reactor plants in warships that comprise 40 percent of the Navy’s’s major combatants. Long-term development work ensures nuclear propulsion technology provides options to maintain and upgrade current capabilities and meet evolving national defense demands. The presence of radiation dictates a careful, measured approach to developing and verifying nuclear technology. Intricate engineering challenges and long-lead times to fabricate the massive, complex components require many years of effort before technological advances can be introduced into the Navy. The FY 2003 budget request of $707 million will allow this program to facilitate U.S. national security through the application of nuclear energy for propulsion of warships; and provide the U.S. Navy with safe, militarily-effective nuclear propulsion plants, and ensure their continued safe and reliable operation. The increase of $18.8 million is primarily to bring the dry spent fuel storage facility in Idaho online, increased laboratory costs to support Naval Reactors prototype facilities, and work to support operating nuclear propulsion plants.

**Congressional mandates are the only way to build nuclear carriers – which is our aff**

**Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 07** (12/17, Bartlett prevails in writing nuclear Navy into policy law, Page 4., Volume 224, No. 54, Nexis)

It took almost two years and a handover of Congress to the opposition party, but Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) has succeeded in passing legislation that will try to direct the Navy toward nuclear propulsion across its fleet, starting with a futuristic cruiser planned next decade. Bartlett, a well-known scientist who has long warned Washington of so-called peak oil concerns, has advocated for an all-nuclear Navy since he was chairman of the House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee under Republican rule of Congress (DAILY, April 12, 2006). Now under Democrats, the final fiscal 2008 defense authorization bill being approved by both chambers includes a provision he championed with current subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) that requires integrated nuclear propulsion for future major combatants -- unless the Defense Department notifies Congress that nuclear power in such ships would not be in the national interest. "This year, the Congress has clearly established it is the policy of the United States to utilize nuclear propulsion for major naval combatants," Bartlett said Dec. 12 on the House floor. He said it is a vital step to secure national and energy security. "Nuclear propulsion for naval ships is the right thing to do from economic, combat effectiveness, homeland defense and energy policy perspectives," Bartlett asserted. Bartlett and Taylor maintain that without congressional pressure, budgetary constraints would "forever" prevent the Navy pursuing such a "farsighted" change. The sea service is strapped for money to fund an already precarious long-term shipbuilding plan and widely investing in nuclear power was a luxury it could not afford.

**Counterplan fails- will inevitably be delayed**

**Heiligenstein 06**(Mike Heiligenstein- Executive Director at Central Texas Regional Mobility Authority, “The Devolution of Transportation Funding How Innovative Financing Is Putting Local Communities Back in the Drivers Seat.” 7/20.<http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/44380/1/TransportPaper-Heiligenstein.pdf>)

The devolution of transportation funding and the paradigm shift that has put local leaders in the drivers’ seat is poorly and not readily understood by the public. As a result, implementation has been difficult. Despite a looming transportation funding crisis and a wide range of new funding tools at the disposal of public officials, the development of new facilities has been painfully slow and plagued by setbacks. Still the process moves forward, driven by the reality that there are few other realistic options and that local government and regions must bring new ¶ dollars to the table to leverage the already scarce gas tax dollars. The most ¶ important thing to focus on as this new course is charted is what brought us to ¶ this point: the inadequacy of the gas tax , as currently structured, to provide ¶ sufficient funding for future completed needs. The promise of surplus revenue ¶ from tolling brings with it the same risks born out in the history of the gas tax.

**Working with Congress is critical to the overall credibility of the policy**

**Hamilton 93, Democratic Representative from Indiana, 4-9-93 (Lee, “How US Can Advance Reform in China,” Christian Science Monitor)**

Soon members of Congress will want reassurance from the new administration that their concerns on human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation are being adequately addressed. The president needs to show he takes a personal interest in China policy and will work with Congress. He should explain his policy to the American public and spell it out to China as well. Since 1989, policymaking on China has been handicapped by division in the government and differences over objectives. With a new administration, we have a chance to restore a consensus between Congress and the White House and to develop a more credible policy. We should seize this opportunity. Our efforts will produce better policy, one more likely to bring change in China.

**Congress must grant authority for multiyear contracts- its key to procurement and shows we’re committed to the Plan**

**Inside the Navy 07 [March 26, DOD ASKS CONGRESS FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR SUBS, Volume 20 No. 12, Nexis]**

The Pentagon's fiscal year 2008 legislative proposals ask Congress to grant the Navy the authority to purchase Virginia-class submarines through a multiyear contract spanning FY-09 to FY-13. A multiyear deal would let the Navy commit to buying a certain number of subs over multiple years, instead of having those plans subject to revision on an annual basis by either the service or Congress. A multiyear deal for this period would enable the Navy to save $190 million for each submarine and $250 million for government-furnished equipment, according to the Pentagon's analysis for legislative proposals. That would mean a total savings of more than $1 billion for the sub building effort, the Pentagon says. This estimate is based on a vendor survey conducted by General Dynamics' Electric Boat, a submarine construction company, according to the Pentagon. During a House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee hearing this month, Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for ships, explained why the proposal was part of the FY-08 package of requests even though it would not take effect until FY-09. "We submitted a multiyear request this year as opposed to waiting for next year to show the commitment that we in the department are serious about multiyear procurement for this next block of submarines," she said. The Navy's budgeting and contracting strategies are based on the assumption that multiyear contracts will be available, according to an analysis of the legislative proposals. "Due to the complexity of shipbuilding contracts, much of the proposal development by the shipbuilders, as well as the negotiations between the Navy and the shipbuilders, will take place in FY 2008," the analysis states. "It would greatly simplify these efforts, and give the Navy a stronger negotiating position, if the Navy could enter into those efforts with [multiyear procurement] authority from Congress." Multiyear procurement from FY-04 to FY-08 saved $400 million on five ships, or about $80 million per ship, according to the Navy.

## 2AC Security K

**Pure ontological focus precludes politics – leads to endless questioning and inaction**

Wolin 90 – Professor of European History

Richard Wolin, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History at Rice, 1990, The Politics of Being, pg. 117-118

Moreover, as Harries indicates, Heidegger's theory of the state as a "work" is modeled upon his theory of the work of art. Thus, as we have seen, in Heidegger's view, both works of art and the state are examples of the "setting-to-work of truth." In essence, the state becomes a *giant work of art:* like the work of art, it partici­pates in the revelation of truth, yet on a much more grandiose and fundamental scale, since it is the *Gesamtkunstwerk* within which all the other sub-works enact their preassigned roles. However, the idea of basing political judgments on analogy with aesthetic judg­ments is an extremely tenuous proposition. Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art re­veal the truth or essence of beings ("The work [of art] ... is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be pres­ent at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's *general essence*"),66we must ques­tion the attempt to transpose aesthetico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, in­stitutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense **dangerous**to expect "metaphysical results" from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of hu­man plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a sub­ordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of **totalitarian constraint** on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? And even if Heidegger's own conception of truth (which we shall turn to shortly) is suffi­ciently tolerant and pluralistic to allay such fears, shouldn't the main category of political life be justice instead of truth? Undoubt­edly, Heidegger's long-standing prejudices against "value-philosophy” prevented him from seriously entertaining this proposition; and thus, as a category of political judgment, justice would not stand in sufficiently close proximity to Being. In all of the aforementioned instances, we see that Heidegger’s political philosophy is **overburdened with ontological considerations** that end up stifling the inner logic of politics as an independent sphere of human action.

**Russia is revisionist – The Plan’s deterrence posture is key to stop them, their kritik undermines the U.S.**

**Chandler 08, (Robert, PhD in political science, former political strategist with the Air Force, Defense Department and the CIA, Shadow World: Resurgent Russia, the Global New Left, and Radical Islam, pg 59- 61)**

RUSSIA LOOMS AS A major global geopolitical competitor to establish a one-world government system sometime in the second half of the twenty-first century. Unless the United States allows its deterrent posture to erode over time or a strike by militant Islamists so weakens the country that Americans drop their guard, a Russian nuclear attack will remain unlikely. It is important to remember, however, that not much has changed between yesterday's strategic objectives of the Soviet Union and those of Russia today. One former Soviet KGB officer was quoted by J. R. Nyquist as saying his training identified Soviet geopolitical goals as being "... the vast infiltration of agents all over the globe. The communist plan, based on Lenin's teachings, was to take over the world without physical struggle." Nyquist quoted Cold War defectors as saying Soviet objectives were to extinguish capitalism and "socialize" [Marxize] the United States, separate Europe from America, defeat the U.S. with a superior strategy hacked by propaganda and disinformation, and reconcile with China to develop a "scissors strategy."1 The Andropov Plan put into motion by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988 maintained these goals but flipped the Soviet-Russian geopolitical strategy from open Marxism-Leninism and confrontation against the West to Antonio Gramsci's stealthy approach of cooperation and promotion of a quiet cultural transformation of capitalist countries. Moreover, reconciliation with China, close relations with Iran and Cuba/Brazil/Venezuela, and engaging "progressive" supporters inside the United States, have collectively positioned Russia for long-term geopolitical competition with the capitalist West and militant Islam. Hidden deeply in the darkness of Russia's shadow world is a Strategy that some in the West have called "The Andropov Plan," named after Yuri Andropov, KGB chief from 1967 to 1982 and General Secretary of the Communist Party froml982 until his death in February 1984. Many in the West remain skeptical about the Plan's existence and label it a "legend." But there is a funny thing about hindsight, especially when seeing the whole of events from the tumultuous 1980s leading to the death of twentieth century Marxism-Leninism, followed by the chaos and mayhem of the 1990s, and finally stumbling into President Vladimir Putin's regressive years in the new millennium. A multitude of new facts have become evident from the writings of numerous journalists, researchers, and commentators of the world scene since the implosion of the Soviet Union. Collectively, when their perspectives are integrated with the (ilasfiost ("openness") and Perestroika ("restrucmring") initiatives of Communist Party chairman Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, it becomes quite evident that some kind of a plan was in place and that the KGB played a key political role in executing a wide-range of covert operations necessary to implement it. Since the Andropov Plan was born under the cover of great secrecy; the covert actions that put it into motion were shrouded in a shadow world of deception and disinformation. The sheer enormity of the shift in the Soviet Russian long-range deception strategy makes it a difficult story to tell. Yet, by comparing the Andropov Plan's strategic framework with key points of an alleged new disinformation strategy, old facts, as seen through the light of new evidence, make an informed historical interpretation possible. Former KGB officer Anatoliy Golitsyn's Memoranda tor the CIA in the 1980s detailed the bold transformation of Soviet Russia's grand strategy that was designed to bring about a "... convergence of the capitalist West with the Communist Fast on Soviet terms and the creation of a socialist World Government as a solution to the arms race and nuclear confrontation."2 Golitsyn's warnings, however, were largely ignored by CIA analysts and swept under the rug as being useless disinformation. The evolution of the initial ideas rooted in todays Russian grand strategy to achieve global power and influence began as long ago as the late 1950s and 1960s. While striving to put the Stalin years behind them, it had become obvious to Soviet leaders that, despite their substantial industrial and military advances. Western economies would eventually outstrip their troubled economy and frustrate the attainment of the Kremlin's global goals. Something had to give. A new grand strategy was needed. With a boldness characteristic of the Russian character, the strategy developed through the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years in the 1960s and 1970s outlined an approach entailing an enormous realignment of the political and economic systems inside the Soviet Union to strengthen its long-term competition with the West.

**Russian expansionism triggers multiple scenarios for extinction**

**Blank 09, strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989; former Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base; B.A. in History University of Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, (Stephen J., “RUSSIA AND ARMS CONTROL: ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION?”)**

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances 67 in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD.171 Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172

**Deterrence breaks cycles of hostility and generates cooperation**

**Lupovici 08 – Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto (Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,”  [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf" \t "_blank)**

 Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities.  Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors.  In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

**Our system doesn’t cause war – empirically, transition to the alternative does**

**Yoon 03 – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea (Young-Kwan, “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)**

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

## 2AC Elections DA

**Romney will win now – polls oversample democrats, independents favor Romney and GOP enthusiasm**

**Talgo 9/16**/12 (Tyler Talgo, September 16, 2012, Why Romney Will Win The Election, http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/09/why-romney-will-win-election)

It was also understood at the beginning of the election season that this race would come down to the independent vote. **CNN reports that among independents, Romney leads Obama 52 to 42 percent**, and Talking Points Memo reports that Romney has a 46.3 to 43.5 percent lead among independents. **The majority of independents in this election have chosen Romney as their candidate because they see him as the one who is better suited to fix the economy**: according to Rasmussen, 50 percent trust Romney more on the economy, as compared to the 43 percent that trust Obama more on the same issue. **Given** the **post-convention polling bounces, some may give Obama the advantage** at this stage of the race, although the bounces are subsiding. For example, new NBC/WSJ polls of three swing states have Obama leading Romney by 49 to 44 percent in Florida and Virginia, and by 50 to 43 percent in Ohio. **However**, **when we take a closer look at the numbers, a different story is revealed. In the Florida and Virginia polls, Democrats were oversampled by 5 percent**, and **in Ohio they were oversampled by 10 percent.** Not convinced? Here’s another fact: **recent CBS/NYT**/Quinnipiac po**lls oversampled Democrats by nine percent in Florida and by eight percent in Ohio**. The Florida poll had Obama at 51 percent and Romney at 45 percent, and the Ohio poll had Obama at 50 percent and Romney at 44 percent; so, both leads were smaller than the oversampling gap. If you ask me, the advantage here clearly goes to Romney; and, believe me, these are not the only examples. All of this is revealed in the context of a time in which **Republicans are much more enthusiastic than Democrats.** Last month the number of Americans who consider themselves Republicans was the highest ever recorded since 2002 at 37.6 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent who consider themselves Democrats.

**Defense spending popular – jobs**

**Sorcher 9/18**/12 - Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University (Sara, “Romney's Attacks on Obama Over Defense Cuts Won't Move Needle for Voters”, National Security, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-romney-s-attacks-on-obama-over-defense-cuts-won-t-move-needle-for-voters-20120918>)

Defense-minded voters’ worries could kick into overdrive if companies with Pentagon contracts start to send out mass-layoff notices or warning that industry jobs could be lost due to the cuts set to take effect next year. “The president is holding defense hostage, via sequestration, to tax increases,” said one Insider, predicting that layoff notices will mean “hundreds of thousands of people will fear for their jobs — and not only those in the defense sector.”

#### No Russia bashing- Romney’s campaign rhetoric won’t translate to foreign policy and relations don’t spill over- issues are compartmentalized

Matt Lewis, 8-3- 12 (senior contributor to The Daily Caller ,“A Mitt Romney loss wouldn’t necessarily be a disaster”, The Caller)

Romney and Obama do display differences in policy objectives and outcomes — when it comes to other areas, such as Russia — but many of those differences are largely irrelevant due to the realities of the relationship. As Leon Aron, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (and a Romney adviser), says, the reality of the situation is that “[O]n every issue where we deal with Russia, we have either reached the limit or Russia is less relevant.”¶Whether the issue is energy policy, security in the Middle East and South Asia, or the American attitude to Russian human rights violations, the reality is that very little is likely to hang on which party occupies the White House. An exception to that, however, is missile defense and nuclear disarmament.

**Virginia is key**

**Chebium 12** (Raju, Staff writer at USA Today “Virginia seen as a top prize by presidential campaigns” 6/11/12 [www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-06-11/virginia-campaign-swing-state/55525938/1](http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-06-11/virginia-campaign-swing-state/55525938/1)) KY

WASHINGTON – Virginia, until recently a reliable supporter of Republican presidential candidates, has become a vitally important swing state that may hold the key to this year's presidential elections. That's why President Obama, GOP challenger Mitt Romney and independent groups allied with both candidates have spent more on ads in Virginia than in any other state except Ohio, campaign figures show. "The fact that both camps are advertising for the general election in early June shows that both camps are taking this (state) seriously," said Roanoke College political scientist Harry Wilson. That's far different from a few election cycles ago, when Republicans could afford to take Virginia's support for granted and Democrats wrote off the state as unwinnable. Neither candidate will neglect Virginia this year, when its 13 electoral votes are up for grabs. Estimated ad expenditures by both sides in Virginia totaled $4.3 million between April 10 — when former senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania exited the race and Romney became the presumptive GOP nominee — and May 29, according to ad data analyzed by Elizabeth Wilner of Kantar Mitt Romney is joined by Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell during a campaign stop in Portsmouth, Va., on May 3. By Election Day, Virginians will have seen and heard so many campaign ads, "everybody is going to be glad that it's over," Wilson said. "Everybody is going to be sick of the ads." Ohio, with 18 electoral votes, was the only other swing state that saw higher ad expenditures — $8.4 million, according to data compiled by Kantar Media and published by National Journal magazine. In Virginia, independent groups aligned with Romney are outspending those supporting Obama, Wilner said in an email. Obama is raising more money than Romney from Virginia donors, though that may change as the election nears. Federal records show Obama had raised nearly $4.2 million in Virginia as of April 30. Romney had raised nearly $3.4 million. In 2008, Obama became the first Democratic presidential candidate since 1964 to win Virginia. Last month, he kicked off his re-election campaign with appearances at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond and Ohio. Obama can expect to fare better in Virginia than in swing states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, according to James Madison University political scientist Bob Roberts. That's because the state has fewer blue-collar white voters, a higher proportion of voters between 18 and 30, and many more upper-income suburban voters, he said.

**No impact to the elections disad- political gridlock prevents either candidates agenda from being effective**

**LA Times, 8-23**- 12 (“Gridlock likely in Washington no matter who wins presidential race”)

But **here's the worst thing about this presidential campaign: No matter what happens on election day, there's little hope of a good outcome.**¶ **For most of the last four years, Washington has been mired in political** gridlock, **deadlock**edbetween Republicans who want to slash government and keep taxes low and Democrats who are willing to trim government a bit but also want to raise taxes on the affluent. That deadlock has sent us careening toward one fiscal cliff after another. **It's made it virtually impossible for Congress to do anything more ambitious than writing short-term spending bills that merely kick the can down the road.**¶ One purpose of elections is to break that kind of deadlock and send politicians a message about what direction voters want them to go. That's what happened in 2008, when President Obama won a mandate to pursue his vision of an activist government — and again in 2010, when voters decided that Obama had gone too far and handed the House of Representatives to Republicans.¶ But **this year? It's unlikely voters will deliver a clear message.**¶ **The presidential polls have been balanced around the 50% mark for months.** Strategists in both parties say the outcome is likely to be a squeaker. **The morning after election day, the winner,** whoever he is, **will declare that voters have given him a ringing mandate to do whatever he promised — but it won't be true. Polls show that on most of the major issues the candidates are arguing about** — tax rates, the size of government, the repeal of Obama's healthcare plan — **the public is divided.**¶ Even worse, **Congress is likely to remain deadlocked as well. The most recent forecast** by Charlie Cook, the dean of congressional election soothsayers, **suggests that the Senate will end up around 50-50, too close for either party to control with ease. In the House** of Representatives, Cook projects that **Democrats could gain as many as eight seats,** but that's far short of the 25 they need to take control away from SpeakerJohn A. Boehner(R-Ohio).¶ In the absence of a clear-cut victory for either side, we face two possible scenarios.¶ **In one outcome**, Obama narrowly wins reelection and spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will be determined to stand in his way as never before.¶ In the other, **Romney narrowly wins** election **and** spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will interpret his election as a popular mandate for a tea party program whether it is or not. He **could have a Democratic Senate to wrestle with as well.**¶ **The almost inevitable result? More gridlock. Neither Obama nor Romney has much of a track record negotiating with** wily **legislators**. Obama tried to work out a fiscal "grand bargain" with Boehner last year, but the effort collapsed in a flurry of finger-pointing that made both men look weak. Romney's single term as governor of Massachusetts produced one major piece of legislation, his 2006 healthcare law, but he has since renounced that kind of bipartisanship. Many of his other proposals went nowhere because he had a CEO's aversion to bargaining with the state Legislature, according to "The Real Romney," a biography by Boston Globe reporters Michael Kranish and Scott Helman.

**Obama won’t get blamed – he’s the one calling for defense cuts**

**Eaglen 12** - Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at The Heritage Foundation (Mackenzie, August 08, “Defense Cuts: Arbitrary and Putting America at Risk”, <http://www.aei.org/press/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/defense-cuts-arbitrary-and-putting-america-at-risk-press-release/>)

Eaglen explains:¶ Cuts no one wants? Contrary to the claims of President Obama and congressional Democrats, defense cuts--based on budgetary targets, not strategy or requirements--have always been planned. The President outlined $400 billion in defense cuts in April 2011 and said he wanted to "do that again," even before the sequestration deal was reached.¶ Aging equipment needs replacement. President Obama's 2013 budget request would purchase the fewest aircraft since 1916. Many of the Air Force's aerial refueling tankers predate human space flight. Training aircraft are twice as old as the students flying them. The F-15 fighter first flew 40 years ago. A-10 ground-attack planes were developed in the Carter years. The Navy is the smallest it has been since 1916. And all of our B-52 bombers predate the Cuban missile crisis.¶