## 2AC Deterrence

**Carriers are strong enough to overcome any threat**

**Nathman 01**, a vice admiral, is commander of Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 8-12-2K1 (“The Navy needs its large carriers”, The San Diego Union-Tribune, OPINION; Pg. G-3)

The extended reach of the large carrier's wing applies not only to its strike capability, but also to its surveillance, electronic warfare, air-to-air warfare and air-to-surface defense. The advantage and synergy of these assets on one platform makes the large-deck carrier the ideal command and control center for the war-fighting commander. The survivability of the large-deck carrier is also an overwhelming advantage over any of its proposed smaller clones. The construction of large carriers incorporates structural robustness, redundancy of critical systems, and layered self-defense systems. Larger designs also provide for the efficient use of protective schemes such as armor plating, complex compartmentation, electronic countermeasures and anti-aircraft protection systems. Smaller designs do not offer the sizing and volume flexibility to incorporate this wide range of features. Also, a large carrier is inherently more sustainable than smaller counterparts due to its nuclear propulsion plant. Forward-deployed nuclear carriers provide distinct advantages over conventionally powered alternatives. Nuclear carriers hav[ing] nearly twice the aviation fuel storage capacity because there is no demand on space for conventional propulsion fuel. Large nuclear carriers afford 50 percent more ammunition storage magazine volume for the same reason. Nuclear platforms are therefore better able to sustain combat flight operations for extended periods of time, and there is a decreased need for under way replenishment of fuel and ammunition. The large-deck nuclear carrier is consequently less vulnerable to enemy targeting and attack because it is not as frequently constrained in its course or maneuverability during under way replenishment or by fuel conservation.

## 2AC Elections DA

**War with Russia is not an existential threat**

**Bostrom 07**, director of The Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, chair of the the World Transhumanist Association and the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, 2009 finalist for the Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, PhD from the London School of Economics, 2**K7** (Nick, Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School. "The Future of Humanity," New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf>, )

Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. **There are** many possible **global catastrophes that would** cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet **fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States** might be an example of a global catastrophe that **would be unlikely to result in extinction.** A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world's population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. **A non-existential disaster** causing the breakdown of global civilization **is**, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, **a** potentially **recoverable setback**: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

**Defense spending popular – it creates jobs**

**Sorcher 9/18**/12 - Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University (Sara, “Romney's Attacks on Obama Over Defense Cuts Won't Move Needle for Voters”, National Security, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-romney-s-attacks-on-obama-over-defense-cuts-won-t-move-needle-for-voters-20120918>)

Defense-minded voters’ worries could kick into overdrive if companies with Pentagon contracts start to send out mass-layoff notices or warning that industry jobs could be lost due to the cuts set to take effect next year. “The president is holding defense hostage, via sequestration, to tax increases,” said one Insider, predicting that layoff notices will mean “hundreds of thousands of people will fear for their jobs — and not only those in the defense sector.”

**Obama needs to invest in the navy to win Virginia voters**

**Lawrence 9/20/**12 (Quil, “Military Vote Seen As A Key To Capturing Virginia”, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/09/20/161417655/military-vote-seen-as-a-key-to-capturing-virginia>)

Both presidential campaigns are focusing on just a few swing states, and the relatively few remaining undecided voters. One of those states is Virginia, where a key swing constituency is military veterans. Troops and veterans have long been considered a natural part of the Republican base. But President Obama is pushing hard for the veterans' vote to help him in a state he captured in 2008. Mitt Romney has been courting the military vote as well, and in Hampton Roads, it shows. It's the area around Norfolk, Newport News and Virginia Beach, home to the world's largest Navy base, as well as Air Force, Marine and Army bases. President Obama is greeted by naval officers at Naval Air Station Norfolk, in Norfolk, Va., on Sept. 4. Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images President Obama is greeted by naval officers at Naval Air Station Norfolk, in Norfolk, Va., on Sept. 4. It's an attractive place for military families to live and retire. And judging by the posters on the lawns in Virginia Beach, this seems like Mitt Romney country. Cathy Boyd, a military mom and wife, has a "Romney/Ryan" bumper sticker. She's out with her granddaughters to watch the jets warm up for a show at the airfield of Naval Air Station Oceana. "I'm supporting Romney because he has class, he has character, he has deep moral courage and conviction, because our country can't stand four more years of Obama," says Boyd. She expects military families all agree with her, but she also knows that Obama won Virginia — including this military-heavy congressional district — in 2008. Locals say they're getting pounded with attack ads from both sides. With their push, Democrats are hoping to carve out a few more votes from troops and veterans who have long been considered a part of the Republican base. But Boyd says many military families don't trust Obama, citing the threat of defense budget cuts required to take effect in January unless Congress and the president act. Military cuts worry people here in Hampton Roads, where so many people are connected to the defense industry or the military itself. Boyd was referring to the hundreds of billions of dollars to be automatically cut from Pentagon spending if Congress cannot break the budget impasse. **Whom you blame for those looming cuts could pretty much predict whom you're going to support in the election.** "Anecdotally, I would say that probably 80 percent of the people I know are politically conservative," says Paul Pierce, a retired Navy master chief petty officer. He faults President Obama's leadership for allowing the budget logjam. The national debt is his No. 1 issue; he also mentions support of Israel. Pierce points to the spot up along the Norfolk waterfront where Romney chose to announce his running mate, Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, last month, with a battleship in the background. Romney was here again last week pushing for an increase in fighter jet production. Pierce knows the president has also campaigned hard here, but Pierce is skeptical that military voters will cross over to Obama. "Everybody's trying to peel off the small numbers and for the military vote I don't have any sense that they're swinging toward Obama at all," he says. But Democrats think they can win a substantial number of military votes — in part because veterans don't all vote the same way. Nationwide, the majority of veterans are older, white, and male — classic Republican voters. **But younger vets are different. "The military vote cannot be taken for granted**," says Tyre Nelson, 42, a retired Navy lieutenant, who says he has been a lifelong Republican but this year he expects to cross party lines. "In 2008, I voted for Sen. John McCain, but this year I am supporting President Obama for re-election," says Nelson. "He has proven that he can support veterans' issues, over the last four years, not through any sort of discourse but through actions, actual legislation." Nelson points to improvements in military health care, and programs to hire veterans. He also highlights what he calls the recklessness of the George W. Bush administration, and the wars that cost lives and money. Nelson says those eight years cost Republicans credibility with the military. He thinks Obama has made inroads with military voters — enough to carry Hampton Roads and perhaps Virginia. But it's clear — no one can take veterans' vote for granted, which is why both campaigns are pulling out the stops to court them.

**Virginia is key**

**Chebium 12** (Raju, Staff writer at USA Today “Virginia seen as a top prize by presidential campaigns” 6/11/12 [www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-06-11/virginia-campaign-swing-state/55525938/1](http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-06-11/virginia-campaign-swing-state/55525938/1)) KY

WASHINGTON – Virginia, until recently a reliable supporter of Republican presidential candidates, has become a vitally important swing state that may hold the key to this year's presidential elections. That's why President Obama, GOP challenger Mitt Romney and independent groups allied with both candidates have spent more on ads in Virginia than in any other state except Ohio, campaign figures show. "The fact that both camps are advertising for the general election in early June shows that both camps are taking this (state) seriously," said Roanoke College political scientist Harry Wilson. That's far different from a few election cycles ago, when Republicans could afford to take Virginia's support for granted and Democrats wrote off the state as unwinnable. Neither candidate will neglect Virginia this year, when its 13 electoral votes are up for grabs. Estimated ad expenditures by both sides in Virginia totaled $4.3 million between April 10 — when former senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania exited the race and Romney became the presumptive GOP nominee — and May 29, according to ad data analyzed by Elizabeth Wilner of Kantar Mitt Romney is joined by Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell during a campaign stop in Portsmouth, Va., on May 3. By Election Day, Virginians will have seen and heard so many campaign ads, "everybody is going to be glad that it's over," Wilson said. "Everybody is going to be sick of the ads." Ohio, with 18 electoral votes, was the only other swing state that saw higher ad expenditures — $8.4 million, according to data compiled by Kantar Media and published by National Journal magazine. In Virginia, independent groups aligned with Romney are outspending those supporting Obama, Wilner said in an email. Obama is raising more money than Romney from Virginia donors, though that may change as the election nears. Federal records show Obama had raised nearly $4.2 million in Virginia as of April 30. Romney had raised nearly $3.4 million. In 2008, Obama became the first Democratic presidential candidate since 1964 to win Virginia. Last month, he kicked off his re-election campaign with appearances at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond and Ohio. Obama can expect to fare better in Virginia than in swing states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, according to James Madison University political scientist Bob Roberts. That's because the state has fewer blue-collar white voters, a higher proportion of voters between 18 and 30, and many more upper-income suburban voters, he said.

**Romney will win now – polls oversample democrats, independents favor Romney and GOP enthusiasm**

**Talgo 9/16**/12 (Tyler Talgo, September 16, 2012, Why Romney Will Win The Election, http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/09/why-romney-will-win-election)

It was also understood at the beginning of the election season that this race would come down to the independent vote. **CNN reports that among independents, Romney leads Obama 52 to 42 percent**, and Talking Points Memo reports that Romney has a 46.3 to 43.5 percent lead among independents. **The majority of independents in this election have chosen Romney as their candidate because they see him as the one who is better suited to fix the economy**: according to Rasmussen, 50 percent trust Romney more on the economy, as compared to the 43 percent that trust Obama more on the same issue. **Given** the **post-convention polling bounces, some may give Obama the advantage** at this stage of the race, although the bounces are subsiding. For example, new NBC/WSJ polls of three swing states have Obama leading Romney by 49 to 44 percent in Florida and Virginia, and by 50 to 43 percent in Ohio. **However**, **when we take a closer look at the numbers, a different story is revealed. In the Florida and Virginia polls, Democrats were oversampled by 5 percent**, and **in Ohio they were oversampled by 10 percent.** Not convinced? Here’s another fact: **recent CBS/NYT**/Quinnipiac po**lls oversampled Democrats by nine percent in Florida and by eight percent in Ohio**. The Florida poll had Obama at 51 percent and Romney at 45 percent, and the Ohio poll had Obama at 50 percent and Romney at 44 percent; so, both leads were smaller than the oversampling gap. If you ask me, the advantage here clearly goes to Romney; and, believe me, these are not the only examples. All of this is revealed in the context of a time in which **Republicans are much more enthusiastic than Democrats.** Last month the number of Americans who consider themselves Republicans was the highest ever recorded since 2002 at 37.6 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent who consider themselves Democrats.

**No Russia bashing- Romney’s campaign rhetoric won’t translate to foreign policy and relations don’t spill over- issues are compartmentalized**

Matt **Lewis, 8-3**- 12 (senior contributor to The Daily Caller ,“A Mitt Romney loss wouldn’t necessarily be a disaster”, The Caller)

**Romney and Obama do display differences in policy objectives and outcomes** **— when it comes to** other **areas, such as Russia** — **but many of those differences are largely irrelevant due to the realities of the relationship.** As Leon Aron, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (and a Romney adviser), says, **the reality of the situation** is that “[**O]n every issue where we deal with Russia, we have either reached the limit or Russia is less relevant.”**¶ **Whether the issue is energy policy, security in the Middle East and South Asia, or the American attitude to Russian human rights violations, the reality is that very little is likely to hang on which party occupies the White House**. An exception to that, however, is missile defense and nuclear disarmament.

**Obama won’t get blamed – he’s the one calling for defense cuts**

**Eaglen 12** - Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at The Heritage Foundation (Mackenzie, August 08, “Defense Cuts: Arbitrary and Putting America at Risk”, <http://www.aei.org/press/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/defense-cuts-arbitrary-and-putting-america-at-risk-press-release/>)

Eaglen explains:¶ Cuts no one wants? Contrary to the claims of President Obama and congressional Democrats, defense cuts--based on budgetary targets, not strategy or requirements--have always been planned. The President outlined $400 billion in defense cuts in April 2011 and said he wanted to "do that again," even before the sequestration deal was reached.¶ Aging equipment needs replacement. President Obama's 2013 budget request would purchase the fewest aircraft since 1916. Many of the Air Force's aerial refueling tankers predate human space flight. Training aircraft are twice as old as the students flying them. The F-15 fighter first flew 40 years ago. A-10 ground-attack planes were developed in the Carter years. The Navy is the smallest it has been since 1916. And all of our B-52 bombers predate the Cuban missile crisis.¶

**No impact to the elections disad- political gridlock prevents either candidates agenda from being effective**

**LA Times, 8-23**- 12 (“Gridlock likely in Washington no matter who wins presidential race”)

But **here's the worst thing about this presidential campaign: No matter what happens on election day, there's little hope of a good outcome.**¶ **For most of the last four years, Washington has been mired in political** gridlock, **deadlock**edbetween Republicans who want to slash government and keep taxes low and Democrats who are willing to trim government a bit but also want to raise taxes on the affluent. That deadlock has sent us careening toward one fiscal cliff after another. **It's made it virtually impossible for Congress to do anything more ambitious than writing short-term spending bills that merely kick the can down the road.**¶ One purpose of elections is to break that kind of deadlock and send politicians a message about what direction voters want them to go. That's what happened in 2008, when President Obama won a mandate to pursue his vision of an activist government — and again in 2010, when voters decided that Obama had gone too far and handed the House of Representatives to Republicans.¶ But **this year? It's unlikely voters will deliver a clear message.**¶ **The presidential polls have been balanced around the 50% mark for months.** Strategists in both parties say the outcome is likely to be a squeaker. **The morning after election day, the winner,** whoever he is, **will declare that voters have given him a ringing mandate to do whatever he promised — but it won't be true. Polls show that on most of the major issues the candidates are arguing about** — tax rates, the size of government, the repeal of Obama's healthcare plan — **the public is divided.**¶ Even worse, **Congress is likely to remain deadlocked as well. The most recent forecast** by Charlie Cook, the dean of congressional election soothsayers, **suggests that the Senate will end up around 50-50, too close for either party to control with ease. In the House** of Representatives, Cook projects that **Democrats could gain as many as eight seats,** but that's far short of the 25 they need to take control away from SpeakerJohn A. Boehner(R-Ohio).¶ In the absence of a clear-cut victory for either side, we face two possible scenarios.¶ **In one outcome**, Obama narrowly wins reelection and spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will be determined to stand in his way as never before.¶ In the other, **Romney narrowly wins** election **and** spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will interpret his election as a popular mandate for a tea party program whether it is or not. He **could have a Democratic Senate to wrestle with as well.**¶ **The almost inevitable result? More gridlock. Neither Obama nor Romney has much of a track record negotiating with** wily **legislators**. Obama tried to work out a fiscal "grand bargain" with Boehner last year, but the effort collapsed in a flurry of finger-pointing that made both men look weak. Romney's single term as governor of Massachusetts produced one major piece of legislation, his 2006 healthcare law, but he has since renounced that kind of bipartisanship. Many of his other proposals went nowhere because he had a CEO's aversion to bargaining with the state Legislature, according to "The Real Romney," a biography by Boston Globe reporters Michael Kranish and Scott Helman.

## 2AC Nuclear Deterrence T/O DA

**Presidential Veto Checks Defunding**

**The Hill 11**

[The Hill Political Blog, “ Obama threatens to veto House Republican spending measure”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/144285-obama-waves-veto-threat-at-continuing-resolution>, 2/15/11,]

The Obama administration on Tuesday threatened to veto the House GOP's measure funding the federal government. In a statement of administration policy, the Office of Management and Budget said cuts included in the Republican continuing resolution would hamstring the U.S. economy and compromise national security. "If the president is presented with a bill that undermines critical priorities or national security through funding levels or restrictions, contains earmarks or curtails the drivers of long-term economic growth and job creation while continuing to burden future generations with deficits, the president will veto the bill," the statement said.

**Our nuclear deterrent is flawed and isn’t even protecting the U.S. – we’re protecting other countries**

**Broad 9-11**-12 – is a senior writer at The New York Times and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. (William, “U.S. Missile Defense Strategy Is Flawed, Expert Panel Finds” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/science/us-missile-defense-protections-are-called-vulnerable.html?pagewanted=1&src=recg)

After two years of study, a panel of top scientists and military experts working for the [National Research Council](http://www.nationalacademies.org) has concluded that the nation’s protections against missile attacks suffer from major shortcomings, leaving the United States vulnerable to some kinds of long-range strikes. In a report, the panel suggested that President Obama shift course by expanding a system he inherited from President George W. Bush and by setting aside the final part of an antimissile strategy he unveiled in 2009. In so doing, the panel said, the president could set up the nation’s defenses to better defeat the kinds of long-range missiles that Iran may be developing. It is the first time that the research council, an arm of the [National Academy of Sciences](http://www.nasonline.org/), has weighed in on the nation’s overall plans for defeating missile attacks. Chartered by Congress to give scientific and technical advice to the government, the council is considered to be the nation’s preeminent group of scientists. The 16-person panel consists of scientists, engineers and weapons experts from universities, research groups and national laboratories, including one in Livermore, Calif., that deals with nuclear arms. Philip E. Coyle III, a former national security official in the Obama White House and a former director of weapons testing at the Pentagon, said the panel’s report exposed a system that should be rebuilt from top to bottom, adding that the antimissile complex was geared toward “producing and fielding hardware” rather than actually devising ways to deflect enemy attacks. The Pentagon wrote off the report as pedestrian. Richard Lehner of the Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that erects the ground-based interceptors, called the panel’s alarm bells about the system’s limitations “an old story” and the need to focus more on enemy countermeasures unsurprising and “totally logical.” In its highly technical, [260-page report](http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13189), the panel recommended an overhaul that would make the antimissile system “far more effective,” including adding new sensors and interceptor rockets, as well as an additional base in Maine or upstate New York from which interceptors could be fired. The nation’s two existing bases are in California and Alaska. The report called the plan affordable, saying it could fit within current antimissile spending — which runs about $10 billion a year — if the military eliminated what the panel described as costly and unneeded systems, like a $28 billion constellation of satellites meant to track enemy warheads. The assessment is a major blow to Mr. Obama’s strategy of playing down the long-range defenses he inherited from Mr. Bush and focusing instead on defenses in Europe against shorter-range Iranian missiles. He articulated the shift in September 2009, calling the envisioned system “stronger, smarter and swifter.” But the report, released Tuesday, faulted the results. It said the domestic defenses in place could probably handle crude missiles fired from North Korea, but nothing more sophisticated. It called the current generation of antimissile arms “fragile” and full of “shortcomings that limit their effectiveness against even modestly improved threats.” Mr. Obama’s European shift is still a work in progress, and the report gave it conditional approval provided that the technical advances planned for the next six years, like improved sensors and interceptor rockets, actually materialize. But it recommended that the plan’s final phase — intended to protect the United States from long-range Iranian missiles — be scrapped in favor of the stronger domestic system. In short, the panel would undo part of Mr. Obama’s shift and strengthen Mr. Bush’s antimissile approach, creating more of a hybrid. The report comes as worries rise over Iran’s nuclear program and fears take hold that Tehran might one day decide to develop warheads for its rapidly growing fleet of missiles. Today, Iran’s missiles are short and medium range. The report looks ahead a decade or more to what it calls the “likely development” of Iranian missiles designed to rain warheads down on the United States. Since the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan began the modern hunt for defenses against long-range missiles, Washington has spent more than $200 billion devising ways to hit incoming enemy warheads that move at speeds in excess of four miles per second. Critics have long faulted the goal as delusional, saying that any country smart enough to make intercontinental ballistic missiles could also make simple countermeasures sure to foil any defense. In a nod to critics, the new report identifies enemy countermeasures as the main challenge for the domestic system, with many of its recommendations aimed at improving ways to distinguish between decoys and real warheads. “For too long, the U.S. has been committed to expensive missile defense strategies without sufficient consideration of the costs and real utility,” said L. David Montague, the panel’s co-chairman and a retired president of Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space. The Pentagon must strengthen its technical analyses, he added, so it “can better evaluate new initiatives.” Mr. Montague, an engineer by training, is an independent consultant and one of the few members of the panel whose roots lie in the defense industry. It was 2002 when Mr. Bush announced plans to deploy a limited system designed to protect the United States from missile attacks. Today, the rudimentary system consists of 30 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. They are designed to zoom into space and destroy enemy warheads by force of impact. In September 2009, Mr. Obama switched the focus from protecting the continental United States to defending Europe and the Middle East from short- and medium-range Iranian missiles. New intelligence, he said, had made Tehran’s more modest accomplishments the more pressing threat. The report called for developing a new generation of interceptor rockets that would be smaller and more capable, as well as five new radars at existing early warning sites. The panel said these radars, combined with sensors aboard the interceptors, would provide more time to identify enemy warheads and shoot at them repeatedly if the first shots failed. The East Coast site, the report said, would require 50 of the new interceptors — 30 for operations and 20 for testing and evaluation. On Tuesday, a number of experts faulted the new plan. Theodore A. Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a prominent antimissile critic, called the calculations behind the proposed radars “completely wrong and unrealistic.” He continued, “They’re claiming they can do things that are not physically possible.” Tom Z. Collina, research director at the [Arms Control Association](http://www.armscontrol.org/), a private group in Washington, said the report made clear that the current domestic interceptors are woefully deficient and that developing new ones for an East Coast site “might take a decade or more.” At a news conference Tuesday, Mr. Montague defended the report and said the large panel had its own skeptics and proponents. “What we’ve agreed on,” he said, “is what we said in the report.” Outside critics, he added, tended to overstate the skills of enemies of the United States seeking to build long-range missiles to develop ways to foil defenses. People in the aerospace industry who have made countermeasures for the warheads of United States missiles, Mr. Montague said, “know it’s not as simple as a PowerPoint chart.”

**Affs must be a net-increase in funding - increase means net increase**

**Words and Phrases, 2K5 (Cumulative Supplementary Pamphlet, v. 20a, p.295)**

Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term “increase,” as used in statute giving the Energy Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or improvement of equipment that results in “increase” of 50 megawatts or more in electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to “net increase” in power plant’s total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25123.

**That must come from a baseline**

**Rogers 05 (Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis)**

[\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition

**Lack of civilian control means states won’t adhere to the normal rules of nuclear deterrence – carriers are the only way to resolve conflicts**

**Clark 97, director of the national security studies program at California State University**

(Mark T., “Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age-book reviews: Neorealism versus Organizational Theory,” http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0365/is\_n1\_v41/ai\_19238111)

¶ Sagan's critique is a healthy antidote to Waltz's optimism. In his view, there are two principal arguments that suggest pessimism about any future with a greater number of nuclear-armed adversaries. From his study of militaries, Sagan finds that their organizational behavior inclines them towards deterrence failure. It is not that militaries want war but that, of all groups in a society, they are the most likely to believe war is probable and are most inclined to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies. Military officers are more skeptical of nonmilitary solutions to conflicts than are their civilian counterparts, according to Sagan. It also makes sense, in classical military terms, to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies, since no military prefers to fight on its adversary's terms. Taking the offensive alleviates some of these problems.¶ Secondly, Sagan argues that newly armed nuclear states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. Here, Sagan's critique is very strong. By examining the history of the U.S. nuclear safety record he is able to document many near accidents and bureaucratic snafus that could have led to catastrophic accidents, and in this way he points out the weakness in Waltz's arguments. Sagan comments:Waltz asked why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than did the old ones? The evidence of the number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War suggests that there would be reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new nuclear states even if their safety difficulties were "only" as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers (p. 80).He adds six reasons why new nuclear powers are unlikely to compile the safety record of the United States. But if the problem is acute for newly emergent nuclear powers that develop their programs indigenously, it will be doubly so for those that inherit or buy their programs. They will lack even the discipline that a new nuclear nation will accrue by investing enormous amounts of time, talent, and treasure into developing its nuclear program.

#### Sequestration is cutting the military now

Ashton 8/20 – (Adam, “Sequestration sparks military spending cut concerns in Washington state”, The Miami Herald, 8/20/12, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/20/2959718\_p2/sequestration-sparks-military.html)

Even people in the know are having trouble making sense of how sudden, automatic defense cuts could ripple across Washington state if federal lawmakers fail to reach a budget compromise this fall. That danger comes from so-called sequestration – $1.2 trillion in across-the-board reductions to domestic budgets and defense spending. The cuts would take effect over the next 10 years unless Congress finds a way to forestall them by Jan. 2. The Defense Department makes up a disproportionate share of the cuts – $500 billion, at least $55 billion of which would go into effect immediately. It’s not clear yet how the Pentagon would put them in place. Washington state, with its dense concentration of military-related industries, could lose at least 41,000 jobs, according to a July study by Stephen Fuller of George Mason University’s Center for Regional Analysis. The heavy cuts also would impact federally funded domestic programs such as courts, farm subsidies, national park rangers, air traffic controllers and public housing projects. Fuller’s report, funded by the Aerospace Industries Association, estimated the country would lose 2 million jobs under sequestration as federal layoffs mount and drag down the economy. Sequestration wouldn’t affect military pay, but defense service contracts and construction could be on the chopping block. It’s unclear how it could unfold at Joint Base Lewis-McChord after a bonanza of government investment there over the last decade. Col. Charles Hodges, Lewis-McChord’s new garrison commander, manages all the services the Defense Department provides to the base’s 29,000 residents and its 43,000 service members. Hodges said the Pentagon has not asked him to start drawing up plans for how the base south of Tacoma might adopt the cuts described under sequestration. “We’re hoping for the best,” Hodges said. The federal cuts were supposed to be so unthinkable that they would compel lawmakers to get back to the table to craft a long-term budget deal and deficit reduction plan after Congress’ “supercommittee” failed to do so in 2011. A year later, the partisan divide has only worsened. “At this point, there is a distinct risk of it happening because in order to prevent sequestration you have to have the House and Senate agree on something,” said Rep. Adam Smith of Tacoma, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. Smith characterized the odds of Congress making a deal to halt sequestration as “50-50.” He thinks it’s unlikely lawmakers would reach an agreement until after the November election. They’ll also have to decide whether to extend some or all of the Bush-era tax cuts that are set to expire. Both parties say they want to avoid the sharp defense cuts of sequestration, but they differ on the Bush tax cuts and strategies to trim deficit spending. “Post election, I think you’ll have a different dynamic,” Smith said. “Everyone coming back will have different incentives to stop the expiration of tax cuts, stop the sequestration.” House Republicans in May passed a budget that would have avoided sequestration and reduced the military cuts. President Obama rejected it because he believed it slashed spending on other programs too severely. “We want to be prudent with how we spend taxpayers’ money, but the way sequestration goes about it is not the best way and is actually a pretty bad way to do it,” said Todd Winer, spokesman for Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-Spokane. McMorris Rodgers supported the House Republican budget, and she has been hearing concern about sequestration from military families around Fairchild Air Force Base in her district. Military service members and representatives from the state’s defense industry are struggling to figure out where and how the ax might fall. “Our members know cuts are coming, but the cuts built into sequestration are extreme, and overnight,” said Sean Murphy, executive director of the Portland-based Pacific Northwest Defense Coalition. The organization advocates for defense manufacturers and contractors. “What makes sequestration a bigger issue is the uncertainty that surrounds it,” he added. “No one knows for sure what programs will be cut or eliminated, or if Congress will take corrective action or not.” Lewis-McChord’s new garrison commander is in the dark, too. Hodges was at a public meeting in Lakewood Tuesday when he asked Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., to make sense of whether sequestration will move forward and what kind of impact it might have. She replied that lawmakers never intended for sequestration to take place when they wrote it into a bill called the Budget Control Act of 2011. She couldn’t say exactly how it would impact the country, but she said Congress would have a clearer picture next month when a report is due detailing probable cuts. “No one wants sequestration to happen. It is just about the wrong way to do anything,” said Murray, who last year led the supercommittee that was tasked with making a plan to reduce the nation’s deficit by at least $1.2 trillion. Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Belfair, said it’s time for leaders in the House, Senate and White House to sit down and make a deal to at least remove the threat of sequestration. So far, he said few voters are talking about the spending reductions even though they could severely hurt the economic recovery. “I’ve been trying to talk this up and trying to get some action on it,” he said. “There’s been a void on leadership here in all corners.” “The whole idea of the Budget Control Act was to help the economy, help unemployment and reduce the deficit,” said Dicks, who is retiring this year. “If we let this happen, it will hurt the economy, it will make unemployment worse and it’ll hurt the deficit, so it’s totally counterproductive.”

**Carriers are key to prevent Taiwan invasion and save the US-Japan alliance**

**Loo** **09**, Board Member at Large of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Distinguished Fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, one of the founders of Taiwan’s Formosan independence movement, (Jay T., April 3rd, “A storm is gathering in the Strait”, published under the pen-name Li Thian-hok, Taipei Times)

After years of double-digit increases in China’s military budget and intensive efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China now has the capacity to invade and overwhelm Taiwan in the absence of US intervention. But the US is preoccupied with the financial crisis and the intractable wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. The US military is stretched thin — especially in East Asia. The Taiwanese government, meanwhile, has been feckless in its national defense efforts for more than a decade. China is now Taiwan’s largest export destination. Most of Taiwan’s high-tech manufacturing has moved to China. The resultant outflow of capital, technology and manpower is hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. Yet the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is determined to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement to turn Taiwan’s economy into an appendage of China’s economy. This would not only erode the standard of living in Taiwan but irreparably damage US-Taiwan relations. James Lilley, former US ambassador to China and Taipei, has observed: “Although the Taiwanese love freedom, they love money more.” So what are the practical implications of the above developments? While the TRA stipulates that the “President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan,” in practice Beijing’s reaction is now one of the main considerations. While the TRA imposes on the US a moral obligation to come to Taiwan’s aid in case of Chinese military aggression, William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, wrote in a celebrated paper last fall that if China attacks Taiwan, the US should hold back, observe the war’s progress and take its time in deciding whether to intervene. His reason: The US may risk a strategic failure, in other words, the US may be defeated if it tried to rescue Taiwan. Today there is a gathering crisis in the Taiwan Strait that seems to escape the attention of much of Washington’s policy establishment. A vast majority of the people on Taiwan would reject Chinese communist rule, yet the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government is pursuing a policy of incremental capitulation by reducing the budget and size of Taiwan’s military, deepening the dependency of its economy on China and downgrading Taiwan’s international status. Economic integration measures negotiated by the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT are implemented by the Executive Yuan without public debate or approval by the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is in danger of being delivered into Beijing’s hands by stealth. While most observers believe there has been an easing of tension in the Taiwan Strait because of the concessions the Ma administration has made to China, China has in fact added another 100 missiles to its arsenal targeting Taiwan since Ma took office. The PLA’s preparations for war against Taiwan have not slackened. Because of declining exports, more than 20 million migrant workers in China have lost their jobs. Ann Marie Slaughter, chief of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, has pointed out that China could launch a military venture against a neighbor (meaning Taiwan) to divert attention from growing social unrest at home. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) wants to visit Taiwan and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) has said that Wen would be welcome. Such a visit could trigger massive, bloody protests. The resulting chaos could provide the PLA with a pretext to invade Taiwan. Taiwan is facing double jeopardy: an external military threat from China and internal subversion by the Ma government, which is dominated by radical elements in the KMT who are collaborating with Beijing to demolish Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy as expediently as possible. If Taiwan were to fall by PLA coercion or internal subversion, the US would suffer a **geostrategic disaster**. The sea lanes and air space around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China would be in position to pressure Japan and South Korea to become its vassal states. Given Japan’s unstable domestic politics and its aversion to nuclear weapons, chances are Japan would cave once the credibility of the US as keeper of peace in East Asia had been lost. With the demise of the US-Japan military alliance, the US would be forced to retreat all the way back to Hawaii. Using coercion against Taiwan would mean that China had irreversibly forgone the path of development that would lead to a humane, democratic society in favor of keeping its authoritarian model. This would **inevitably bring it into conflict with the US**. The greatest threat to the US’ homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected, **nuclear Pearl Harbor.**  The basic US national security strategy is misdirected. In order to keep the peace in East Asia and ultimately to protect homeland security, the US must continue to support democracy and uphold the Taiwanese people’s legitimate aspirations for freedom. To keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait and to encourage China to pursue peaceful development, we urge the US president and Congress to take the following steps: First, reaffirm the US policy that the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful means and that the US opposes any unilateral action to change the status quo; Second, deploy at least two aircraft carrier task forces in the Western Pacific and secure basing rights in the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands as part of US efforts to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion;

**US-China war causes extinction**

**Glaser 11**, **PolSci Prof at Goerge Washington,** (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

**The alliance solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war**

Armitage 2K - former Deputy Secretary of State, 10-11-2K (Richard, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University)

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come Security Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner. We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements: Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations. Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.