ST. Mark’s TS – 2AC AT Criticisms (1/8/12)

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Top-Level Stuff

## 2AC Cede the Political

**The alt retreats from politics – dooms their project and causes extinction**

**Boggs 97** – professor of social sciences, Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor, AG)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

## 2AC Discourse/Reps

**Discourse doesn’t change the effect of the aff**

**Tuathail, 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

## 2AC Framework

**Our framework is better**

**McClean 1**, SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU [DAVID E., “THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm]

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

**Failure to prioritize policy prescriptions cedes the political and makes perpetual war inevitable—turns the K**

**Boggs 2k**, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA [CAROL, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1]

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises.

Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

## 2AC Generic Alt

**Nuclear war closes space for your alternative – turns your impact framework**

**Martin 2** – Science, Technology and Society Professor, Wollongong (Brian, 11/3, Activism after nuclear war?, http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2002/Martin\_ActivismNuclearWar.html, AG)

Nuclear war would also lead to increased political repression. Martial law might be declared. Activists would be targeted for surveillance or arrest. Dissent would become even riskier. War always brings restraints on civil liberties. The political aftermath of September 11 - increased powers for police forces and spy agencies, increased intolerance of and controls over political dissent - is just a taste of what would be in store in the aftermath of nuclear war.

## 2AC Ontology/Epistemology

**Ontology and epistemology not first**

**Owen 2**—Reader of Political Theory, U Southampton (David, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

## 2AC Util

**Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences**

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse, AG)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

**Util first**

**Cummisky 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, pg. 145)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake for others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value ( GMM 436)., but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapter 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support th view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, the equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

**Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil**

**Isaac 2** [Jeffrey, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring]

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

Specific Ks

## 2AC K Capitalism

**Transition wars—alt leads to global chaos**

**Gubrud 97** (Mark, Nanotechnology and International Security, http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/index.html, AG)

As global capitalism retreats, it will leave behind a world dominated by politics, and possibly feudal concentrations of wealth and power. Economic insecurity, and fears for the material and moral future of humankind may lead to the rise of demagogic and intemperate national leaders. With almost two hundred sovereign nations, each struggling to create a new economic and social order, perhaps the most predictable outcome is chaos: shifting alignments, displaced populations, power struggles, ethnic conflicts inflamed by demagogues, class conflicts, land disputes, etc. Small and underdeveloped nations will be more than ever dependent on the major powers for access to technology, and more than ever vulnerable to sophisticated forms of control or subversion, or to outright domination. Competition among the leading technological powers for the political loyalty of clients might imply reversion to some form of nationalistic imperialism.

**Perm solves best**

**Dickens and Ormrod 7** - \*Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex AND \*\*Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton

(Peter and James, Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe pg 190, dml)

Explanatory critique can only go so far. Philosophy and sociology are only tools for uncovering how reality is structured and for freeing up the discussion of feasible alternatives. It will take much hard work and politics on a mass scale to forge new social alliances, counter-hegemonic ideologies and space projects that benefit oppressed populations. The ultimate aim of this must be a relationship with the universe that does not further empower the already powerful.

**Ignore value to life claims – deciding other people’s lives are not worth living enslaves the world and denies pluralistic conceptions of life’s value**

**Szacki 96** – Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Warsaw (Jerzy, Liberalism After Communism, p 197, AG)

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that - as Joseph Raz wrote -'there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible'.56 It recognizes that - as John Rawls put it - 'a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines'.57 What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of: he or she is ready to acknowledge that 'now this variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different'.58 Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, 'political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.'59

**Capitalism solves global poverty**

**Perry 9** professor of economics and finance @ Univ of Michigan, M.A. and Ph.D @ George Mason University, MBA in finance from Curtis L. Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota, 11-18-2009 (Mark, “World Poverty Rate Plummets”, http://blog.american.com/?p=7291, RBatra) note – NBER = national bureau of economic research

In Kevin Hassett’s National Review article “The Poor Need Capitalism,” he points to a new NBER study, “Parametric Estimations of the World Distribution of Income,” and writes:

The chart [below] draws on a landmark new study by economists Maxim Pinkovskiy and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. The authors set out to study changes in the world distribution of income by gathering data from many different countries. As a byproduct of their work, they are able to count the number of individuals who live on $1 per day or less, a key measure of poverty.

According to their calculations, the number of people living in poverty so defined has plummeted, from 967,574,000 in 1970 to 350,436,000 in 2006, a decrease of a whopping 64 percent. Whence the reduction? The biggest factor is the emergence of middle classes in previously poverty stricken China and India. And the spread of capitalism to other countries has similarly been followed by prosperity. The trend is even more impressive if one considers that the world population skyrocketed over that time, increasing by 3 billion.

If the trend continues for just 40 more years, poverty will have been essentially eradicated from the globe. And capitalism will have done it. There are those who have argued that the current financial crisis has served as proof that capitalism is a failed ideology. The work of Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin suggests that there are about a billion people whose lives prove otherwise.

The NBER paper also finds that the world poverty rate fell by 80 percent, from 26.8 percent in 1970 to only 5.4 percent in 2006 based on the $1 per day poverty measure (see chart below).

The study also estimates poverty rates separately for five geographical regions (see chart below), with some pretty amazing results for East Asia (China, Taiwan, and S. Korea), which in 1960 had the highest regional poverty rate in the world by far, at 58.8 percent, compared to 39.9 percent for Africa, 11.6 percent for Latin America, 8.4 percent for MENA (Middle East and North Africa), and 20.1 percent for South Asia. In the 36-year period between 1970 and 2006, the poverty rate in East Asia fell to only 1.7 percent, which is now below all of the other regions: Africa (31.8 percent), Latin America (3.1 percent), MENA (5.2 percent), and South Asia (2.6 percent). poverty3Bottom Line: The 80 percent decrease in the world poverty rate between 1970 and 2006 has to be the greatest reduction in world poverty in such a short time span ever in history, and the 97 percent reduction in the poverty rate of East Asia (from 58.8 percent to 1.7 percent) has to be the most significant improvement in a regional standard of living in history over such a short period. Thanks to Hassett for pointing out that capitalism is alive and well, and is spreading around the world helping to eliminate povery

**No impact—it’s self-correcting and key to democracy**

**Noble 3** – chair of the department of Political Science and director of the international studies program at the California State University

Charles, Why Capitalism Needs the Left, http://www.logosjournal.com/noble.htm

In combination, free market and capitalism have also helped usher in and sustain fundamental political changes, widening the scope both of personal freedom and political democracy. Because of this system, more people get to choose where to work, what to consume, and what to make than ever before, while ancient inequalities of rank and status are overturned. The spread of market capitalism has also laid the foundation for the expansion of democratic decision-making. With the establishment of private property and free exchange, political movements demanding other freedoms, including wider access to government, have proliferated. To be sure, capitalism cannot guarantee personal liberty or political democracy. It has produced it share of dictatorships too. But, to date, no society has been able to establish and maintain political democracy without first establishing and securing a market capitalist system. The large corporations that stand at the heart of contemporary capitalism have proven indispensable in this transformation. They are the essential intermediaries in the modern economy, linking financial capital, expertise, technology, managerial skill, labor and leadership. They are spreading everywhere in the world not only because they are powerful, but also because they work. But market capitalism is not a machine that can run on its own. It needs rules, limits, and above all else stewardship. Partly because the system feeds off of people's darker instincts, partly because it is a machine, and therefore indifferent to human values, and partly because there is no central planner to assure that everything works out in the end, there must be some conscious effort to bring order to this chaos, however creative it might be. Left to its own devices, unfettered capitalism produces great inequities, great suffering, and great instability. In fact, these in-built tendencies are enough to destroy the system itself. Karl Marx figured this out in the mid-19th century and built his revolutionary system on the expectation that these dark forces would prevail. But Marx underestimated our ability to use politics to impose limits on the economic system itself. At one time, and still in other places, even conservatives knew this to be true, and offered themselves up as responsible social stewards. Whether out of a sense of noblesse oblige or enlightened self interest, they volunteered to lead a collective effort to reform the system so that capitalism could survive and continue to serve human interests. From the 1930s through the 1970s, American corporate leaders and a fair number of Republicans seemed to understand this too. They made their piece with "big" government, seeing in the New Deal and even the Great Society a way to forge both social peace and political stability through the creation of a "mixed" economy.

**Capitalism won’t collapse and is inevitable**

**Kimball 1** – Institute of American History, St John’s (Roger, The New Anti-Americanism, The New Criterion 20.2, http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/20/oct01/empire.htm)

The single greatest embarrassment to Marxist theory has always been the longevity of capitalism. It was supposed to implode from “internal contradictions” long ago. But here it is 2001 and capitalism is still going strong and making the world richer and richer. Attempting to explain this is the greatest test of a Marxist’s ingenuity. Here is how Hardt and Negri handle the problem: As we write this book and the twentieth century draws to a close, capitalism is miraculously healthy, its accumulation more robust than ever. How can we reconcile this fact with the careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors at the beginning of the century who point to the imperialist conflicts as symptoms of an impending ecological disaster running up against the limits of nature? They offer three hypotheses for this imponderable situation. One, that capitalism has reformed itself and so is no longer in danger of collapse (an option they dismiss out of hand). Two, that the Marxist theory is right except for the timetable: “Sooner or later the once abundant resources of nature will run out.” Three—well, it is a little difficult to say what the third hypothesis is. It has to do, they say, with the idea that capitalism’s expansion is “internal” rather than “external,” that it “subsumes not the noncapitalist environment but its own capitalist terrain— that is, that the subsumption is no longer formal but real.” I won’t attempt to explain this for the simple reason that I haven’t a clue about what it means. Is there any important option they have neglected? Could it, just possibly, be that the “careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors” was just plain wrong?

## 2AC K Gender

**The alt reifies gender-centrism without the perm**

**Caprioli 4** (“Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076). Note- [IR] added in

If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of [IR] international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.

## 2AC K Heidegger

**Alt eliminates our capacity for coping with the negative consequences of existing destruction of being. We should combine an appreciation for being with political action—this card also answers their nihilism argument**

**Villa 96** – Prof Political Theory, Notre Dame (Dana, Arendt and Heidegger, p 228-9, AG)

It is at this point that even reasonably sympathetic readers, such as Richard Bernstein, balk. Heidegger's account, by emphasizing the mutual belonging together of theoria and praxis within the broader, metaphysical-technologizing interpretation of Being, evidently renders the distinctions between praxis and poiesis, phronesis and techne, superfluous. Heidegger was intimately familiar with these distinctions, as the famous Marburg Seminar on Plato's Sophist (attended by Hams-Georg Gadamer and Arendt) makes clear. Nevertheless, he chooses, in his later work, to "pass over these distinctions in silence." The reason for this, Bernstein argues, is that the later Heidegger's exclusive focus upon the question of Being and the ontological difference between beings and Being – the difference unthought, or not thought deeply enough, by metaphysics – results in a "relentless, inductable drive toward making manifest the concealed technical thrust implicit in the history of metaphysics." If one views philosophy/metaphysics/humanism as culminating in the technological nihilism of enframing, and if one sees "the seeds of the technical sense of action and calculative thinking already implicit in Plato and Aristotle," then the conclusion that "all human activity ... reduces itself – flattens out – into Gestell, manipulation, control, will to will, nihilism" will seem inescapable. The only human activity that can possibly escape this all-encompassing technical horizon is the thinking Heidegger describes – a thinking that "accomplishes" the relation of Being to man by "unfolding" it, whose "inconsequential accomplishment" (the bringing of Being to language) mark it as the "simplest" yet "highest" form of action; indeed, as the only genuine action. Bernstein, then, suggests that the later Heidegger's primary contribution to the "oblivion of praxis" is the adoption of a perspective that renders reflection on the modem assimilation of praxis to a technical mentality redundant, since praxis, like theoria, was always already on the way toward Gestell. He argues that Heidegger further obscures things by identifying thinking with genuine action, by seeing the "thought of Being" as the only real deed. Habermas goes Bernstein one better, suggesting that Seinsgeschichte constitutes an attack on the most basic categories of Western political thought, an attack in which the human faculties of reason, will, and freedom are denigrated as "subjectivist," as part and parcel of the "oblivion of Being." According to Habermas, the Kehre signifies the switch from a radical voluntarism to an equally radical fatalism: Heidegger's later philosophy has "the illocutionary sense of demanding resignation to fate [in the form of Seinsgeschick]. Its practical-political side consists in the perlocationary effect of a diffuse readiness to obey in relation to an auratic but indeterminate authority [Being]." Heidegger's later philosophy does not merely cover over the category of praxis, as Bernstein suggests; rather, the perspective of Seinsgeschichte (the history of Being) and Seinsgeschick (destiny of Being) is tantamount to a denial of the responsibility to act, and to act rationally and justly. By subjecting human will and reason to a radical critique, Heidegger contributes to a destruction of the conceptual resources within our tradition that make praxis conceivable in the first place, and that could potentially lead to a renewal of both practical philosophy and a democratic politics. This side of Habemas's critique is pushed very hard by Richard Wolin, who claims that the later Heidegger purveys a "philosophy of hetetonomy," one that celebrates mysterious, fateful powers, while denigrating the human capacity for action; one that actually regresses behind the "inherited ethico-political foundations of the Western tradition." Through his "uncritical celebration of a superordinate, nameless destiny," Heidegger supposedly negates "the central category of Western political thought" – freedom.

**Their rejection of calculative thought is calculative**

**Buckley 96** – McGill University (Philip, Rationality and Responsibility in Heidegger’s and Husserl’s View of Technology, http://web.archive.org/web/20010111031000/http://ulla.mcgill.ca/arts150/arts150r3.htm, AG)

This "gap" does not mean that calculative thought is somehow "bad," or that contemplative thinking is "better." To judge contemplative thought as superior to calculative thought is to think calculatively, and hence cannot be the task of authentic philosophy. Neither is Heidegger claiming that the nature of modern science as calculative is to be viewed as negative. It is the good "fortune" of science that it cannot "think" in the contemplative, deliberative or recollective sense.7 The problem, it seems, occurs when calculative thought pushes aside other forms of thinking. Heidegger wants to undermine the exclusivity of calculative thinking without denigrating it. He desires to open a space for other forms of thinking.

**Their Alternative eliminates any commitment to social and economic justice. Their fear of calculatability and concern for ontology condemns all practical political engagement**

**Yar 2k** – Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Lancaster (Majid, Arendt's Heideggerianism, Cultural Values 4.1, AG)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [ 1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [ 2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[ 20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.

**Perm solves best and isn’t severance**

**Padrutt 92** – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, Heidegger and the Earth, “Heidegger and Ecology,” ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

**Critiques of tech cause extinction – standing-reserve is key to life**

**Heaberlin 4** – nuclear engineer, led the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Scott, A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity, p. 31-40)

Well, then let's not do that, huh? Well, no, not hardly, because without that use of fertilizers we couldn't produce the food to feed the population. We just couldn't do it. Here are some comparisons." If you used no fertilizers or pesticides you could get 500 kilograms of grain from a hectare in a dry climate and as much as 1000 kilograms in a humid cli¬mate. If you got organic and used animal manure as fertilizer, assuming you could find enough, you might get as much as 2000 kilograms per hectare. For a sense of scale, the average in the United States, where recall we only get half the food value to hectare as the intensively farmed Chinese crop land, we get about 4500 kilograms per hectare on the average. In serious cornfields with fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides, the value is 7000 kilograms per hectare. Modern mechanized, chemically supported agriculture produces 7 to 14 times the food that you would get without those advantages. Even the best organic farming would produce only 30 to 45% of the food value you would get from the same sized chemically fertilized farm, and that is assuming you could get the manure you needed to make it work. In very stark terms, without the chemically enhanced farming we would have probably something like one-fifth the food supply we have now. That means four-fifths the population would not be fed, at least as we are organized now. So, no, just giving up on fertilizers is not in the deal. However, we could get the hydrogen and energy from sources other than natural gas. Nuclear energy could be used to provide electricity to extract hydrogen from water and produce the process heat required to combine the hydrogen and nitrogen from the air. That is just a thought to stick in your mind. While we are looking at energy use in agriculture, here are a few more numbers for you.10 If you look at the energy input into agriculture and the energy you get out, you see some interesting facts. By combining the energy used to make fertilizers and pesticides, power irrigation, and run the farm machinery in the United States, we use about 0.7 kcal of fossil fuel energy for each 1 kcal of food we make. This doesn't include the energy needed to process and transport the food. In Europe where they farm more intensely, the amount of energy out is just about the same as energy in. In Germany and Italy the numbers are 1.4 and 1.7 kcal energy input to each 1 kcal output respectively. The point is you need energy to feed people, well at least a lot of people. Which gets us back to Cohen and his question. One of the studies he examined looked at a "self-sustaining solar energy system." For the United States, this would replace all fossil energy and provide one-fifth to one-half the current energy use. The conclusion of the study was that this would either produce" a significant reduction in our standard of living ... even if all the energy conservation measures known today were adopted" or if set at the current standard of living, "then the ideal U.S. population should be targeted at 40-100 million people." The authors of that study then cheerfully go on to point out that we do have enough fossil fuel to last a least a century, as long as we can work out the pesky environmental problems. So, you can go to a "self-sustaining" energy economy as long as you are willing to shoot between 2 out of 3 and 6 out of 7 of your neighbors. And this is a real question. The massive use of fossil fuel driven agriculture to provide the fertilizers and pesticides, and power the farm equipment, is a) vitally important to feed everyone, and b) something we just can't keep up in a business-as-usual fashion. Sustainable means you can keep doing it. Fossil energy supplies are finite; you will run out some time. Massive use of fossil energy and the greenhouse gases they produce also may very well tip the planet into one of those extinction events in which a lot of very bad things happen to a lot of the life on the earth. O.K. to Cohen's big question, how many people can the earth support? What it comes down to is that the "Well, it depends" answer depends on • what quality of life you will accept, • what level of technology you will use, and • what level of social integration you will accept. We have seen some of the numbers regarding quality of life. Clearly if you are willing to accept the Bangladesh diet, you can feed 1.8 times more people than if you chose the United States diet. If you choose the back-to-nature, live like our hearty forefathers, level of technology, you can feed perhaps one-fifth as many people as you can with modern chemical fertilized agriculture. The rest have to go. And here is the tough one. You can do a lot better, get a lot more people on the planet, if you just force a few things. Like, no more land wasted in growing grapes for wine or grains for whiskey and beer. No cropland used for tobacco. No more grain wasted on animals for meat, just grain for people. No more rich diets for the rich countries, share equally for everyone. No more trade barriers; too bad for the farmers in Japan and France, those countries would just have to accept their dependence on other countries for their food. It is easy to see that at least some of those might actually be a pretty good thing; however, the kicker is how do you get them to happen? After all, Mussolinill did make the trains run on time. How could you force these things without a totalitarian state? Are you willing to give up your ability to choose for yourself for the common good? It is not pretty, is it? Cohen looked at all the various population estimates and concluded that most fell into the range of 4 to 16 billion. Taking the highest value when researchers offered a range, Cohen calculated a high median of 12 billion and taking the lower part of the range a low median of 7.7 billion. The good news in this is 12 billion is twice as many people as we have now. The bad news is that the projections for world population for 2050 are between 7.8 and 12.5 billion. That means we have got no more than 50 years before we exceed the nominal carrying capacity of the earth. Cohen also offers a qualifying observation by stating the "First Law of Information," which asserts that 97.6% of all statistics are made up. This helps us appreciate that application of these numbers to real life is subject to a lot of assumptions and insufficiencies in our understanding of the processes and data. However, we can draw some insights from all of this. What it comes down to is that if you choose the fully sustainable, non-fossil fuel long-term options with only limited social integration, the various estimates Cohen looked at give you a number like 1 billion or less people that the earth can support. That means 5 out of 6 of us have got to go, plus no new babies without an offsetting death. On the other hand, if you let technology continue to do its thing and perhaps get even better, the picture need not be so bleak. We haven't made all our farmland as productive as it can be. Remember, the Chinese get twice the food value per hectare as we do in the United States. There is also a lot of land that would become arable if we could get water to it. And, of course, in case you need to go back and check the title of this book, there are alternatives to fossil fuels to provide the energy to power that technology. So given a positive and perhaps optimistic view of technology, we can look to some of the high technology assumption based studies from Cohen's review. From the semi-credible set of these, we can find estimates from 19 to 157 billion as the number of people the earth could support with a rough average coming in about 60 billion. This is a good time to be reminded of the First Law of Information. The middle to lower end of this range, however, might be done without wholesale social reprogramming. Hopefully we would see the improvement in the quality of life in the developing countries as they industrialize and increase their use of energy. Hopefully, also this would lead to a matching of the reduction in fertility rates that has been observed in the developed countries, which in turn would lead to an eventual balancing of the human population. The point to all this is the near-term future of the human race depends on technology. If we turn away from technology, a very large fraction of the current and future human race will starve. If we just keep on as we are, with our current level of technology and dependence on fossil fuel resources, in the near term it will be a race between fertility decrease and our ability to feed ourselves, with, frankly, disaster the slight odds-on bet. In a slightly longer term, dependence on fossil fuels has got to lead to either social chaos or environmental disaster. There are no other end points to that road. It doesn't go anywhere else. However, if we accept that it is technology that makes us human, that technology uniquely identifies us as the only animal that can choose its future, we can choose to live, choose to make it a better world for everyone and all life. This means more and better technology. It means more efficient technology that is kinder to the planet but also allows humans to support large numbers in a high quality of life. That road is not easy and has a number of ways to screw up. However, it is a road that can lead to a happier place, a better place. Two Concluding Thoughts on the Case for Technology Two more points and I will end my defense of technology. First, I want to bring you back from all the historical tour and all the numbers about population to something more directly personal. Let me ask you two questions. What do you do for a living? What did you have for breakfast? Don't see any connection between these questions or of their connection to•the subject of technology? Don't worry, the point will come out shortly. I am just trying to bring the idea of technology back from this grand vision to its impact on your daily life. Just as a wild guess, your answer to the first question was something that, say 500 years ago, didn't even exist. If we look 20,000 years ago, the only job was" get food." Even if you have a really directly socially valuable job like a medical doctor, 20,000 years ago you would have been extraneous. That is, the tribe couldn't afford you. What, no way! A doctor could save lives, surely a tribe would value such a skill. Well, sure, but the tribe could not afford taking one of their members out of the productive /I getting the food" job for 20 years while that individual learned all those doctor skills. If you examine the "what you do for a living" just a bit I think you will see a grand interconnectedness of all things. I personally find it pretty remarkable that we have a society that values nuclear engineers enough that I can make a living at it. Think about it. Somehow what I have done has been of enough value that, through various taxpayer and utility ratepayers, society has given me enough money for food and shelter. The tribe 20,000 years ago wouldn't have put up with me for a day. You see, that is why we as humans are successful, wildly successful in fact. We work together. "Yeah, sure we do," you reply, " read a newspaper lately?" Well, O.K., we fuss and fight a good deal and some of us do some pretty stupid and pretty mean things. But the degree of cooperation is amazing if you just step back a bit. O.K., what did you have for breakfast: orange juice, coffee, toast, maybe some cereal and milk? Where do these things come from? Orange juice came from Florida or California. Coffee came from South America. Bread for the toast came perhaps from Kansas; cereal, from the Mid-West somewhere. The jam on the toast may have come from Oregon, or maybe Chile. Milk is probably the only thing that came from within a hundred miles of your breakfast table. Think about it. There were hundreds of people involved in your breakfast. Farmers, food-processing workers, packaging manufacturers, transportation people, energy producers, wholesale and retail people. Perhaps each one only spent a second on their personal contribution to your personal breakfast, but they touch thousands of other people's breakfasts as well. In turn, you buying the various components of your breakfast supported, in your part, all those people. They in turn, in some way or another, bought whatever you provide to society that allowed you to buy breakfast. Pretty amazing, don't you think? Now when you look at all that, think about what ties all the planetwide interconnection, Yep, you guessed it: technology. Without technology, you get what is available within your personal reach, and what you produce is available only to those who are near enough that you can personally carry it to them on your own two feet. Technology makes our world work. It gives you personally a productive and socially valuable way to make both a living and to provide your contribution to the rest of us. I want you to stop a minute and really think about that. What would your life be like without technology? Could you do what you currently do? Would anyone be able to use what you do? Would anyone pay you for that? "But I am a school teacher," you say, "of course, they would pay me!" Are you sure? Why do you need schools if there is no technology? All I need is to teach the kid how to farm and how to hunt. Sons and daughters can learn that by working in the fields along with their parents. See what I mean? Now, I have hopefully reset your brain. Sure, you are still going to be hit with daily "technology is bad" messages. Hopefully, you are a bit more shielded against that din, and you have been given some perspective to balance that message and are prepared to see the true critical value of technology to human existence. The point is that technology is what makes us human. Without it, we are just slightly smarter monkeys. You may feel that 6 billion of us are too many, and that may very well be. I personally don't know how to make that value decision. Which particular person does one select as being one of the excess ones? However, the fact is that there are 6 billion of us, and it looks like we are headed for 10 to 12 billion in the next 50 years, Without not only the technology we have, but significantly better and more environmentally friendly technology, the world is going to get ugly as we approach these numbers, On the other hand, with the right technologies we can not only support those numbers, we can do it while we close the gap between the haves and have-nots. We can make it a better place for everyone. It takes technology and the energy to drive it. Choosing technology is what we have to do to secure the evolutionary selection of us as a successful species, Remember, some pages back in discussing the unlikely evolutionary path to us, I said we are not the chosen, unless. Unless we choose us. This is what I meant. We are totally unique in all of evolutionary history. We humans have the unique ability and opportunity to choose either our evolutionary success or failure. A choice of technology gives us a chance. A choice rejecting technology dooms us as a species and gives the cockroaches the chance in our place. Nature doesn't care what survives, algae seas, dinosaurs, humans, cockroaches, or whatever is successful. If we care, we have to choose correctly. As an aside, let me address a point of philosophy here. If any of this offends your personal theology, I offer this for your consideration. Genesis tells us God gave all the Earth to humanity and charged us with the stewardship thereof. So it is ours to use as well as we can. That insightful social philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli put it this way in 1501: "What remains to be done must be done by you; since in order not to deprive us of our free will and such share of glory as belongs to us, God will not do everything Himself." O.K., you are saying, "I give." You have beaten the socks off me. Technology is good; technology is the identifying human trait and our only hope. But what is this stuff about choosing technology or not? Technology just happens doesn't it? I mean, technology always advances, it always has, so why the big deal? Well, that is my last point on technology. It doesn't always just happen, and people have chosen to turn away from technology. In what might have seemed at the time to be a practical social decision, huge future implications were imposed on many generations to come. It has happened. Let me take you on one more trip through history. I think you will find it enlightening. In Guns, Germs, and Steel, Jared Diamond explores the question of why the European societies came to be dominate over all the other human cultures on earth. It is a fascinating story and provides a lot of insight into how modern societies evolved. In moving through history, he comes across a very odd discontinuity. He observes that if you came to earth from space in the year 1400 A.D., looked around, and went home to write your research paper on the probable future of the earth, you would clearly conclude the Chinese would run the entire planet shortly. Furthermore, you could conclude they would do it pretty darn well. If those same extraterrestrial researchers were to pop into their time machine and come back to earth in any year from say 1800 to now, they would be totally amazed to see China as a large, but relatively backward, country, struggling to catch up with their European and American peers. To understand the significance of this, you have to go on that research trip with the extraterrestrials and look at China before 1400. In The Lever af Riches, Joel Mokyr dedicates one chapter looking at the comparisons of technology development in China to that in Europe. He lists the following as technology advantages China had in the centuries before 1400: • Extensive water control projects, alternately draining and irrigating land, significantly boosting agricultural production • Sophisticated iron plow introduced sixth century B.C. • Seed drills and other farm tools, introduced around 1000 A.D. • Chemical and organic fertilizers and pesticides used • Blast furnaces and casting of iron as early as 200 B.C., not known in Europe until fourteenth century • Advanced use of power sources in textile production, not seen in Europe until the Industrial Revolution • Invention of compass around 960 A.D. • Major advances in maritime technology (more in a bit on this) • Invention of paper around 100 A.D. (application as toilet paper by 590 A.D.). In the year 1400 AD., China was a world power, perhaps the only true world power. Their technology in agriculture, textiles, metallurgy, and maritime transportation were far in advance of any other country. They had a strong central government and a very healthy economy. Their naval strength provides a real insight into the degree of this dominance. Dr. Diamond sends us to an extremely readable book When China Ruled the Seas-The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne 1405-1433 by Dr. Louise Levathes. Dr. Levathes takes us on an inside tour of the Chinese empire during these years. She focuses on the great treasure fleets that China set forth in these early years of the fifteenth century. In her book she has a wonderful graphic that overlays a Chinese vessel of the treasure fleet (-1410) with Columbus's St. Maria (1492). At 85 feet in length and three masts, the St. Maria is dwarfed by the nine-masted, 400-foot-long Chinese vessel. The Chinese sailed fleets of these magnificent vessels throughout oceans of South Asia, to India, and even as far as the eastern coast of Africa. With this naval domination China claimed tribute from Japan, Korea, the nations of the Malay Archipelago, and various states within what is now India. Through both trade and the occasional application of military force, China provided an enlightened and progressive direction for all the nations within this sphere of influence. If two princes in India were fighting over a throne, it was the recognition, or lack thereof, from the Chinese emperor that decided who would rule. Setting a policy of religious inclusion and tolerance, the Chinese engaged the Arabian traders and calmed religious disputes within Asia. With applications of power sources in textiles and advanced metallurgy, the Chinese were in the same position in 1400 as the British were in 1750, ready to launch into the Industrial Revolution. They traded with nations thousands of miles from home with vast, sophisticated shipping fleets. They were poised to extend this trade all the way to Europe and perhaps find the New World by going east instead of the European's going west in search of the rich Chinese markets. But if we pop into that extraterrestrial time machine and drop into China in 1800, we find a technologically backward nation, humbled by a relatively small force of Europeans with "modern" military technology who wantonly imposed their will on the Chinese. The Chinese have been struggling to catch up with European and American technology ever since and so far not quite being able to do that. The domination of China by the Japanese during World War II shows how complete the turnaround was. In 1400 Japan was but one of many vassal states huddled about the feet of the Imperial Chinese throne. In 1940 the Japanese military crushed the Chinese government while marching on to control much of South Asia. What could have happened to turn this clear champion of technology, trade, enlightened leadership with all its advantages over both its neighbors and yet-distant foreign competitors into such a weak, backward giant? Mokyr goes through a pretty complete list of potential causes. He looks at diet, climate, and inherent philosophical mindset rejecting each as a credible actor mainly on the bases that all of these conditions were present during the period of technological and economic growth as well as the subsequent stagnation. Therefore, these were not determining factors in the turnabout. In the end he concludes, as does Diamond and Levathes, that it was just politics. Yep, that is right. It was good, old human politics. Dr. Levathes gives us a delightful insider's view of the personalities and politics of Imperial progressions during this critical time period. To make a short story of it, the party that had been in control during the expansionist period supported the great treasure fleets, commerce with foreign nations, use and expansion of technology, and a rather harsh control of the rival party. The rival party was based on Confucian philosophy that preached a rigid, inward-looking, controlled existence. When the Confucian party gained control of the throne, they had their opportunity to push back on the prior ruling party that had oppressed them so harshly for so long. And they did. They wanted nothing to do with foreigners; we have all we need at home, here in China, they said. The fleet was disbanded and the making of ocean-going vessels forbidden. Technology was no longer "encouraged." Again, their position was what we have is good enough, stop with all this new nonsense. Over a period of just a few years, the course of the entire nation was shifted from what would have appeared to be a bright future as the leading power in the world to a large, but relatively insignificant, backwater, rich in history and culture, but all backward looking to a former glory. That was it. A shift in the political agenda. At the time, to the leaders in control, one that made sense. Focus at home, use what you have now, create order, discipline, control. In 50 years Japanese pirates controlled the coast of China, and the former ruler of the seas from Asia to Africa could not get out of their harbors safely. So, you see if the "technology is bad" message gets incorporated into too many of our daily decisions, we can turn from our bright future into something else. The difference is that this time the stakes are much higher than they were in fifteenth century China. If we, in the developed nations, make the wrong choices, we doom all of humanity by our folly. It is not just that we miss the potential bright future, we miss the chance to avoid the combined human population growth and resources exhaustion disaster coming at us like a runaway train. Technology is the only way to prevent that train wreck. We can hear the siren's call of anti-technology, come back to nature and let the train run us down in a bloody mess, or we can try our best to use technology wisely and win free to make a better life for everyone.

## 2AC K Security

**Threats real—default to expert consensus**

**Knudsen 1** – PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence or whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the cold War, threats—in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger—referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real—it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard for objective actors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Waever’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic,’ as Waever aptly calls it. Now, here—in the case of urgency—another baby is thrown our with the Waeverian bathwater. When situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

**Predictions are feasible – they can be made logically from empirical evidence**

**Chernoff 9** (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage)

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

**Their alternative fails—security can’t be deconstructed. The ethical response is to engage in scenario planning to minimize violence**

**Weaver 2k** - Ole International relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit-ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans¬formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan¬tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage¬ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi¬bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre¬empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

**Predictions are key to rational decision-making—even if they’re not accurate you shouldn’t reject them**

**Fitzsimmons 7** (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

Much has been made about the defining role of uncertainty in strategic plan- ning since the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolar competition, so the argument goes, and the accelerating pace of change in technology and inter- national political and economic relations, forecasting world events even a few years into the future has become exceedingly difficult. Indeed, few in the year 2000 would have described with much accuracy the current conditions facing national-security decision-makers. Moreover, history offers ample evidence, from the Schlieffen Plan to the Soviet economy, that rigid planning creates risks of catastrophic failure. Clearly, uncertainty demands an appreciation for the importance of flexibility in strategic planning. For all of its importance, however, recognition of uncertainty poses a dilemma for strategists: in predicting the future, they are likely to be wrong; but in resisting prediction, they risk clouding the rational bases for making strategic choices. Over-confidence in prediction may lead to good preparation for the wrong future, but wholesale dismissal of prediction may lead a strategist to spread his resources too thinly. In pursuit of flexibility, he ends up well pre- pared for nothing. A natural compromise is to build strategies that are robust across multiple alternative future events but are still tailored to meet the chal- lenges of the most likely future events. Recent US national security strategy, especially in the Department of Defense, has veered from this middle course and placed too much emphasis on the role of uncertainty. This emphasis, paradoxically, illustrates the hazards of both too much allowance for uncertainty and too little. Current policies on nuclear-force planning and the results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are examples of overreaching for strategic flexibility. The record of planning for post-war operations in Iraq, by contrast, indicates that decision-makers, in enlisting uncertainty as a rationale for discounting one set of predictions, have fallen prey to overconfidence in their own alternative set of predictions. A more balanced approach to accounting for uncertainty in strategic plan- ning would address a wide range of potential threats and security challenges, but would also incorporate explicit, transparent, probabilistic reasoning into planning processes. The main benefit of such an approach would not neces- sarily be more precise predictions of the future, but rather greater clarity and discipline applied to the difficult judgements about the future upon which strategy depends.

**The self-fulfilling prophecy has already happened – now it’s only a question of how to limit the impact**

**Chang 9** columnist for Forbes (11/6/09, Gordon G., Forbes.com, “Should the U.S. and China cooperate?” http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html)RK

Did the arms race in space begin this week?

"Competition between military forces is developing towards the sky and space, it is extending beyond the atmosphere and even into outer space," said the chief of the Chinese air force in the Nov. 2 edition of People's Liberation Army Daily, the official newspaper of China's military. "This development is a historical inevitability and cannot be undone."

What cannot be undone is the effect of General Xu Qiliang's words. Chinese state media, however, tried to do just that, contending that the foreign media misinterpreted him. Then Chinese diplomats got in on the act. "China has never and will not participate in an outer space arms race in any form," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu on Nov. 5. "The position of China on this point remains unchanged."

China's position--at least up until this week--was that no nation should use space for the purposes of war. In February of last year, Beijing and Moscow introduced a draft space treaty at a disarmament conference in Geneva. The Bush administration opposed it on the sensible ground that a deal would be unverifiable--any object in space can be used as a weapon if it can be maneuvered to arrange a collision, for instance. Moreover, a ground-launched missile can also be used to knock out satellites, space stations or shuttles.

The Russians and Chinese, in all probability, were just engaging in a public relations exercise last year because they obviously had no intention of ever allowing the intrusive inspections that would have to be built into any meaningful treaty. Yet, minutes after his inauguration, President Obama called Beijing's and Moscow's bluff by coming out in favor of a global agreement to keep weapons out of the heavens.

In response to Obama's countermove, Beijing--or at least the People's Liberation Army--has now changed tack and announced its intention to begin the space arms race in earnest. General Xu's bold words, interestingly enough, come at the same time that some in Washington are calling for civilian cooperation with the Chinese in space.

And why would we do that? The U.S. shuttle fleet will be retired next year. Its replacement, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, is not slated to make its first crewed flight until 2015, and it may not fly until well after that. In the interim, NASA intends to rely on Russian launch vehicles to get Americans into orbit.

The United States, therefore, will be at the complete mercy of Moscow when the last shuttle is grounded--unless we are willing to hitchhike with the only other nation that will be able to put a human into space then. "I think it's possible in principle to develop the required degree of confidence in the Chinese," said John Holdren, President Obama's science advisor, in April. And he is not alone in this view. According to the just-released report of the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, better known as the Augustine report, "China offers significant potential in a space partnership."

In one sense, this statement is correct. After all, China has put a man into space three times. Moreover, the Chinese have said on numerous occasions that they are prepared to work with us.

So what is the problem with doing so? First, even though the United States will soon find itself without a way to put humans into orbit, any partnership would essentially be a one-way transfer of technology from us to the Chinese. Second, the Chinese did not respond favorably to past American efforts--made during the administration of George W. Bush--to involve them in cooperative space efforts.

Third, there is no such thing as a civilian space program in China. The China National Space Administration is really a military operation. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves a question: Should we transfer technology to a potential adversary so that it can improve its war-fighting capabilities?

General Kevin Chilton, the chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, called for a dialogue with his Chinese counterparts the day after General Xu's space-race declaration. "Where they're heading is one of the things a lot of people would like to understand better," Chilton said.

But do we really need to talk to the Chinese to figure out their intentions? In August 2006, the Chinese lasered at least one American satellite with the apparent intention of blinding it, a direct attack on the United States. In the following January, the People's Liberation Army destroyed one of its old weather satellites with a ground-launched missile, sending more than 35,000 fragments into low-earth orbit.

The Chinese want to dominate space. General Xu did the United States a favor by removing any doubt about where his country stands. Whether we like it or not, there is now a brutal competition between the United States and China to control the high ground of space.

**No impact**

**O’Kane 97** – Prof Comparative Political Theory, U Keele (Rosemary, “Modernity, the Holocaust and politics,” Economy and Society 26:1, p 58-9, AG)

Modern bureaucracy is not 'intrinsically capable of genocidal action' (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very 'ordinary and common' attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

**Threat con stops genocide**

**Reinhard 4** – Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

## 2AC K Virilio

**Injecting pragmatics into the alternative is good – revealing philosophy to the military requires speed to be culturally intelligible – only the perm creates lasting change**

**Derrida ’84** [Jacques, Catherine Porter, Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now”, p 21-30, jstor]

Second reason. So we are not experts in strategy, in diplomacy, or in the techno-science known as nuclear science, we are oriented rather toward .what is called not humanity but the humanities, history, literature, languages, philology, the social sciences, in short all that which in the Kantian university was situated in the inferior class of the philosophy school, foreign to any exercise of power. We are specialists in discourse and in texts, all sorts of texts. Now I shall venture to say that in spite of all appearances this specialty is what entitles us, and doubly so, to concern ourselves seriously with the nuclear issue. And by the same token, if we have not done so before, this entitlement, this responsibility that we would thus have been neglecting until now, directs us to concern ourselves with the nuclear issue- first, inasmuch as we are representatives of humanity and of the incompetent humanities which have to think through as rigorously as possible the problem of competence, given that the stakes of the nuclear question are those of humanity, of the humanities. How, in the face of the nuclear issue, are we to get speech to circulate not only among the self-styled competent parties and those who are alleged to be incompetent, but among the competent parties themselves. For we are more than just suspicious: we are certain that, in this area in par- ticular, there is a multiplicity of dissociated, heterogeneous competencies. Such knowledge is neither coherent nor totalizable. Moreover, between those whose competence is techno- scientific (those who invent in the sense of unveiling or of "constative" discovery as well as in the sense of production of new technical or "performing" mechanisms) and those whose competence is politico-military, those who are empowered to make decisions, the deputies of performance or of the performative, the frontier is more undecidable than ever, as it is between the good and evil of all nuclear technology. If on the one hand it is apparently the first time that these competencies are so dangerously and effectively dissociated, on the other hand and from another point of view, they have never been so terribly accumulated, concentrated, entrusted as in a dice game to so few hands: the military men are also scientists, and they find themselves inevitably in the position of participating in the final decision, whatever precautions may be taken in this area. All of them, that is, very few, are in the posi- tion of inventing, inaugurating, improvising procedures and giving orders where no model - we shall talk about this later on - can help them at all. Among the acts of observing, reveal- ing, knowing, promising, acting, simulating, giving orders, and so on, the limits have never been so precarious, so undecidable. Today it is on the basis of that situation- the limit case in which the limit itself is suspended, in which therefore the krinein, crisis, decision itself, and choice are being subtracted from us, are abandoning us like the remainder of that subtrac- tion- it is on the basis of that situation that we have to re-think the relations between know- ing and acting, between constative speech acts and performative speech acts, between the invention that finds what was already there and the one that^produces new mechanisms or new spaces. In the undecidable and at the moment of a decision that has no common ground with any other we have to reinvent invention or conceive of another "pragmatics.

**Speed is good – working at the pace of global movements exposes unrealized potential that can deconstruct negative forms of security**

**Featherstone ‘1** [Mark, Prof @ Sociology / Cultural School of Social Relations Keele University, “Speed and Violence”, <http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0602/virilio.htm>]

In contrast to the subterranean bias which drives these narratives, Virilio’s theory of technology introduces a consideration of structural power relations through a dromological thesis that shows how technology empowers the dominant center at the expense of otherness. The dichotomous notion of techno-stratification (stratification of the technocratic social order into techno-rich / techno-poor) is made clear by texts such as The Information Bomb (2000a), which enact the continual separation of the virtual and the actual. Within this binary structure, the virtual is the sphere of high velocity which concerns the center, while the actual remains the province of the low-speed periphery. Indeed, for Virilio it is precisely because the continued success of the former is dependent on the exclusion of the latter that politics should argue against the fascism of speed. Opposing Derrida, whose article on the aporia of speed, "No Apocalypse, Not Now" (1984) suggests that criticism must speed-up in order to keep pace with the movements of the world system, Virilio advises against the pursuit of high velocity. Akin to Girard’s Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (1987), Virilio views the technological apocalypse as a cataclysmic horizon. As Crogan (2000) points out, although the speed of Virilio’s work allows one to see how he writes from within the confines of the tendency, the attempt to save critical content from the savage effects of speeding structure remains central to his dromological project. While Virilio tries to slow the pace of the world system from within the confines of the "tendency," Derrida embraces speed and violence as signs of unrealized potential. In "No Apocalypse, Not Now" he explains how the value of the aporia of speed may lie in its destructive function, its ability to destabilize existing structures and suggest the emergence of new forms of political organization. According to the theories advanced by both Virilio and Girard, such a commitment illuminates deconstruction’s relation to the structures of technological fundamentalism and the machine-like process that allows form to overwhelm the warnings advanced by critical content. Like the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1988) and Manuel De Landa (1991), this theory documents the progress of the technological war-machine. Both Virilio, in his book Pure War (1997), and Girard, whose Theatre of Envy (2000) compares Hamlet’s desire for revenge to the Cold War nuclear stand-off, show how the military model infects all areas of human experience. Similarly, both thinkers warn against the dangers of embracing high speed by suggesting that we look towards the memorialization of victimary groups for cautionary evidence. While Girard views the New Testament as the "excessive supplement" that has the potential to over-code further episodes of scapegoat violence, Virilio advocates the creation of a Museum of Accidents (1989) to allow future generations to remember the horrors of high-modern speed. Against Virilio’s museum of accidents, which commemorates the victims of technological speed, Derrida’s victimary sign is represented by the spectrality of timeless textuality. The notion of difference detemporalizes the condition monumentalized in the Hiroshima War Museum; Derrida’s spectral signs, ghosts that haunt the dream of verticality, fetishize the fleshy remains of the Keloids, the deformed mutations that populate the Hiroshima archive. Thus Derrida buries the bodies Virilio remembers and chooses the antiseptic level of textuality over the anthropology of foundational violence. Following the Nietzschean realization of the death of God, the thesis that marks the end of humanity’s originary position, Derrida looks to the tombstone, the undecidability of the pyramidal a, for security. However, this fetishization of the outside-inside does violence to the victims of the technological war-machine. As Bandera notes, deconstruction erases the victim who generated the pyramidal a of différance in order to secure the integrity of the textual sphere. Against this process, a repetition of Girard’s theory of the scapegoat mechanism, Virilio’s thesis of the destructive violence of the accident memorializes the victims of the progressive technological system and remembers the dead who lie beneath the tombstones of ideological textuality.