## 1AC

#### Advantage 1 – Hegemony

#### Global space weaponization inevitable – treaties and commercial ventures simply mask military capabilities

Pandey ’10 [ BK Pandey, an Indian Air Marshal, former air officer in command of training command for the indian Air Force, vol. 25.3 of the indian defence review, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-&-aerospace/Space-the-emerging-battleground.html]

History is witness to the fact that nations that have controlled the seas have ruled the world. With the passage of time, the ability to dominate the world progressively shifted into the hands of nations that acquired highly developed capabilities in military aviation with which they were able to establish mastery of the air. Indications are that in the future, those nations which would be able to extend their control over the regime of space will, in the final analysis, be the ones to control the earth. It is not surprising therefore that leading space faring nations of today are engaged in a determined struggle to develop capabilities to push military weapons into space not only to safeguard their commercial assets orbiting the earth but also to develop the capability to influence or even directly control warfare in space, on land, sea or in the air. It is therefore only a matter of time before the evolving doctrines of warfare will envelope space as a new dimension and seek to achieve synergy between military operations in space and those conducted closer to the earth’s surface. One of the new paradigms of warfare would be to significantly enhance the capabilities of conventional forces through the “Force Multiplier” effect with the use of space based weapons. This will undoubtedly further inspire the development of the newer, advanced and more lethal technologies thereby driving the world into an arms race qualitatively different from the variety witnessed in the twentieth century. As agreements and treaties are generally feeble of fragile, the attendant risk of the breakout of war in space by default or design, could be real. In future wars, the capability to dominate and exploit the space regime could make the crucial difference between victory and defeat thus reorienting the focus of the development of new weapon systems hitherto unknown. The race between the US and the Soviet Union to conquer space was triggered by the latter in 1957, with its launch of the Sputnik. This lasted at an intense pace till 1975, but this period was influenced by the Cold War and also witnessed a number of pioneering events including a landing on the moon. During the little over five decades that have gone by since the momentous event of 1957, the US, Russia, France, China, India, Germany and Japan have made rapid strides in developing space exploration capabilities. Several smaller nations such as South Korea, Algeria, South Africa, Libya, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea are also believed to be in the process of acquiring or developing missile technologies, satellites and space launch capabilities purported to be for commercial exploitation of space. This list will only grow with the passage of time as the facility of commercial employment of space or scientific experimentation is freely available to all. Ostensibly for civilian use, the technology associated with exploration of space in the pursuit of commercial interests, is quite easily adaptable for military use. Hence the dividing line between civilian and military application of assets for the exploitation of space, is usually blurred. Space thus could quite easily get militarised or weaponised unobtrusively and the possibility, that the new players emerging on the scene in the near future could well pose a serious threat to the leading space faring nations of today, can become a reality.

#### Attempts at Code of Conduct agreements fail – lack of foreign adherence prevents us from getting ahead

Bolton and Yoo 3/8/12 [John R. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006. John C. Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley and a former Justice Department official, “Hands off the Heavens” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html]

OUTER space has become the next frontier for American national security and business. From space, we follow terrorists and intercept their communications, detect foreign military deployments, and monitor a proliferation of unconventional weapons. Our Global Positioning System gives us targeting and tactical advantages, spacecraft create image-rich maps, and satellites beam data around the world. But instead of advancing American primacy in this realm, the Obama administration has wrongly decided not only to follow a European Union draft “code of conduct” regulating outer space, but also to circumvent the Senate’s central constitutional role in making treaties. The Obama administration recently declared that America would follow, though not sign, a European Union code of conduct for outer space — a transparent end run around the constitutional requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties. This code, drafted by Europeans who do not bear America’s global responsibilities, restricts military activities in space as well as some peaceful dual-use technologies, like the multistage rockets used to launch commercial satellites. Europe aspires to prevent an “arms race” in the heavens, but in reality, its code would substantially impede advances in space technology because such innovations could also be labeled as military. While security activities receive an exception, it appears confined to self-defense, a term often defined narrowly to include only cross-border attacks. We should not take the unnecessary risk that our rivals will exploit such ambiguity to prevent legitimate American actions. Since there is little our friends across the pond don’t want to regulate, it is no surprise that they are now reaching for space. Taken literally, the European Union code would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space, test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence. And we shouldn’t expect China to voluntarily accept limits on its space strategy anytime soon. In 2007, China tested weapons that destroyed defunct satellites, and it is deploying its own GPS system. In a war, China could potentially destroy our satellites and still retain its own GPS capabilities. Military and intelligence strategists understand the risks these limits could pose to our national security. A Joint Staff analysis provided to the House Armed Services Committee states that “if the United States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft Code,” it would most likely have an adverse impact on military operations. Members of Congress recognize the national security threats, too. They realize that America must not commit to military limitations in a rapidly changing field before we understand all the costs and benefits. But the more far-reaching danger is that Mr. Obama is eroding American sovereignty on the sly. He knows that an arms-control treaty for space is unlikely. He barely managed to push the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia — a bad deal — through the Senate. In addition, he is trying to enter the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea through the back door, by committing our Navy to follow its terms even though the Senate refuses to consider it. Other presidents have tried to comply with international agreements without Senate approval. Bill Clinton bypassed the Senate when he signed the International Criminal Court Treaty and regarded the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as binding even after Senate rejection. Even Ronald Reagan adhered to the 1979 strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, but not under the delusion that international law required it. And after seeing evidence of Soviet cheating, Reagan ceased American compliance in 1986. The Obama administration has characterized its policies as voluntary compliance with European standards, not a legal agreement. While such subterfuges allow presidents to ignore selected parts of unratified agreements, the Obama administration’s objective is precisely the opposite. When they were academics, several of his current advisers loudly proclaimed that simply signing treaties without the Senate’s consent helped form binding “customary international law.”

#### Weaponizing now is the only way to prevent an arms race and maintain US primacy – space is key

Dolman, ‘10 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony ofUS dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition,has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-beingthan the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadershipposition. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis andits cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the immediate demise of theextantinternational system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure that any other stateor group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to entrench itself in spaceand readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all,would opt not to counter US deploymentsdirectly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—is remote.

#### Control of space and secure defense assets key to conventional warfighting capabilities

Dolman and Cooper 11 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems of the DOD and Chairman of High Fronteir, a non-profit organization studying issues of missile defense and space, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>)

Space weapons are expensive; alternatives are cheaper and just as effective. This is the first argument against space weaponization, although it is an easy one to set aside. Of course space weapons are expensive—very expensive, though not necessarily more expensive than terrestrially based systems that may accomplish the same objectives, not to mention objectives that cannot be met otherwise—but so are all revolutionary technologies, particularly those that pioneer a new medium. Furthermore,the state that achieves cutting-edge military technology first has historically been the recipient of tremendous battlefield advantage, and so pursuit of cut-ting-edge technology continues— despite the enormous cost. Moreover, the cultural and economic infrastructure that allows for and promotes innovation in the highest technologies tends to remain at the forefront of international influence. All empires decline and eventually are subsumed, but it has not been their search for the newest technologies or desire to stay at the forefront of innovation that causes their declines. Rather, it has been the policies of those states, generally an overexpansion of imperial control or an economic decision to freeze technologies, that result in their stagnation and demise. Space and space technology represent both the resources and the innovation that can keepa liberal and responsible American hegemony in place for decades, if not centuries, to come; furthermore,unless America maintains this technological edge, it willlikelylose its preeminence.

#### Hegemony stops great power wars and creates global stability

Kagan, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 3-14-’12 (Robert, “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” CNN,<http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c1>)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadershipafter World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinelypost-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an openinternational economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine thatAmerican predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported willdecline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or intodisorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

#### Questions of sustainability are moot – US space dominance creates permanent American hegemony and solves terrorism

Yoshida, B.C. Director of the Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003 (Adam, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, <http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003_10_01_archive.html> )

If all goes according to plan on October 15th the Peopleâ€™s Republic of China will become the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to independently launch a man into space. The craft, named Shenzhou (or â€˜Divine Vesselâ€™) 5, along with its occupant is scheduled to remain in space for nearly a full day, orbiting the earth fourteen times. This is a critical step in Communist China’s plan to establish itself as dominant in space. It must be recalled that just seven years passed between John Glennâ€™s fight space flight and the American landing on the Moon. During that time the United States was required to develop virtually all of the technology involved in the process. Much of that technology is today readily available, as a result the time between China’s first manned space launch and China’s (already-planned) trip to the Moon could be much shorter.Present plans would see a Chinese Lunar base by the year 2010.This is a serious threat to the national security of the United States and that of all free people. In the military sphere space is the ultimate high ground. Whoever controls the stars shall control the destiny of the earth. The Military Dimensions of Space:  Already, as it stands today, we are dependent upon space for reconnaissance, communications, and the global positioning system. The capabilities provided in these areas by space-based assets are irreplaceable. Were somebody able to destroy those assets the American military would be essentially crippled. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles and JDAM bombs would not be able to be targeted. Communications systems would be severely disrupted. Nuclear early-warning systems would not function. US intelligence, both the type garnered via both direct observation and signals intelligence would be inoperable. In other words, absent-space based systems, the US military would lack all capacity for offensive operationsof any serious sort.The Chinese mean to establish military superiority over the United States. Unlike the American movement into space, which was a mostly civilian affair, the Chinese are moving with an obvious military purpose. Once they establish their ability to reliably move people into space, they will rapidly produce manned orbital space stationsand, unlike the bizarre International Space Station, these Chinese stations will have a military purpose. They will almost certainly becovertly armed with anti-satellite weapons. This will allow the Chinese to contest the United States for control of space, thereby negating the greatest of American advantages in any future conflict with China. All of this, I might add, fails to take into account the future military utility of space. Not only will many of the more effective anti-missile weapons be deployed in space (lasers, â€˜brilliant pebbleâ€™ mines, and such), but space also offers serious possibilities for attacks against targets upon the Earth. Space-based nuclear weapons could hit targets seconds after their launch. Rocks dropped from space could prove to be devastatingly effective kinetic-energy weapons. All of this leads to two natural conclusions. First, America must maintain and expand its presence in the stars, if only because it is essential to the future dominance of the American military upon the Earth. Second: measures, even extreme measures, must be taken to prevent the emergence of a competitor in space.Countering  Chinese Extraterrestrial Expansionism: The fight against the Chinese in space must move on two fronts. Not only must the United States bring its space program back into gear- but it also must take steps to slow down and, where possible, halt the Chinese space program. I will begin with the latter. Fighting to stop the Chicom program will take resolve, daring, and a cold willingness to kill where necessary. Great amounts of money can be used to induce some Chinese scientists to defect. Others can be blackmailed through the uncovering and use of personal peccadilloes. Those bought off or threatened into compliance can be used to sabotage the program both through deliberately delaying research and, occasionally, through direct action. The experience of NASA shows that any number of small errors can lead to the loss of a craft and a crew. It hardly strikes me as impossible that, with the right sort of threat or inducement, some people might not be convinced to deliberately create such errors during Chinese launches, thereby increasing the natural rate of loss in both equipment and personnel. The more Chinese astronauts who die and the more craft which explode or crash the better it will be for the forces of freedom. This would be especially desirable because, after one or two such losses, the Chinese would (rightly) attribute those losses to sabotage and descend upon with a blanket of scrutiny which would serve to cripple the development and planning of future missions. If possible, it might also be worthwhile to arrange a few losses of Chinese craft in flight. Perhaps a few satellites could be launched, ostensibly for some civilian purpose, and equipped to allow them to collide with a Chinese capsule in mid-flight. Such losses could, presumably, be blamed on Chinese incompetence. However, disrupting the Chicom program is simply part of the answer. In order to fully meet the challenge America must be ready to go back into space. More than that, the renewed American interest in space must be of a much more militaristic character than previous forays. The most obvious answer is to strip NASA of its primary responsibility in this area. NASA does fine work- but it’s a civilian agency with a civilian mission. The new American duty in space is not to simply explore, to visit the Moon, dispatch probes to Mars, or study far-distant stars. It is now a classically military mission. US forces must safeguard US assets in space and threaten the assets of others. American forces in space require the ability to kill stuff and break things. This is not a mission for any one of the services. It is a mission for all of them. Small craft, akin to those used by the Air Force, will be required. As, eventually, will larger ships, such as those that the Navy is familiar with. Ground troops will be needed to defend various extra-terrestrial installations. The United States Space Force: The unique mission in space, combined with the need for a solid focus on the area, calls for the establishment of an entirely new branch of the Armed Forces. This branch, which would be designated as the ˜Space Force” would have a dedicated budget and a single mission, thereby avoiding the problems created where space is only part of the mission of a service and it is thereby forced to take a secondary priority to more Earth-bound concerns. The Space Force would have control of all military missions in space- including ballistic missile defense (perhaps even control over ABM systems could be turned over to the service). Most important, by launching an independent Space Force with a relatively large budget (perhaps $20 billion a year to begin) and entrusting that budget to skilled military officers (who would, hopefully, be given very wide latitude to experiment) the advancement of space technology would become self-perpetuating. Over time the mission of the Space Force would evolve. Initially its tasks would be confined to the Earth’s orbit: attacking enemy satellites, shooting down ballistic missiles, and protecting vital orbital installations. However, in a relatively short amount of time, that role would evolve to include more offensive missions. Weapons would be built to attack targets upon the Earth. Orbital weapons would be required to intercept enemy hypersonic bombers and, perhaps, protect American ones. Advanced military spacecraft might be launched from orbit to attack Earth-based targets. The advent of the first military spacecraft would lead to the creation of more advanced platforms from which to launch them and ships from which to attack those platforms. In other words, merely beginning to move down this road will set off a revolution in military technology. The development of advanced weapons will, inevitably, lead to the development of other, even more advanced weapons and the further spread of technology. As ship drives and weapons speed improve, the area of militarized space would increase, thereby giving humanity further reason to expand outwards from the Earth. Manifest Destiny: My final suggestion is going to sound absurd, but I mean it sincerely. The United States ought to immediately withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty, a Cold War relic, hinders the United States in two areas. First, it bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, thereby preventing the deployment of useful military weapons in this sphere. Second, the treaty states that, Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means? In effect, this prohibits any nation which is a party to the treaty from annexing any territory beyond the Earth. This is a serious impediment to any future plans for the development of space, essentially placing all lands beyond the Earth under a sort of nebulous international administration. The United States should, as is provided for in Article Sixteen of the Treaty, provide notice to all other signatories that the United States is withdrawing from the treaty. One year to the day later, as provided for under the treaty, the United States Government should declare, citing the fact that Americans were the first humans to set foot on the Moon, that it is now the sovereign territory of the United States of America. Efforts should be made to rapidly send human expeditions to Mars and Saturn’s moon of Titian, the two other most valuable planets in the Solar System, to make a claim on similar grounds.Why, you might ask, would anyone want the Moon? There are several answers. By some accounts the Moon may contain vast quantities of hidden water or other resources which might be valuable either on the Earth or in fueling further spaceward expansion. The proximity of the Moon would allow for the construction of a large base, free of the Earth’s atmosphere, for the staging of further operations (using rockets, it would be much easier to launch a mission to Mars from the Moon than from the Surface of the Earth), for the training of astronauts (imagine a zero-g boot camp!) and for military operations elsewhere in the Solar System (or even in Earth orbit). More than that, the acquisition of the Moon and other planets would help to promote patriotism and generate enthusiasm for spaceflight. While, at present, trips beyond the atmosphere of the Earth are grossly expensive, who is to say that they will remain that way forever? We might find, a few decades hence, that the Moon will, with regular support from the Earth, be a popular vacation spot capable of sustaining a large permanent population. The possibilities are limitless. A Flight to a Better Future:Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order. An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, militarily invincible.How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that America’s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs. China, I think, understands all of this. That is why they are now rushing forwards on their own space program. Space is an untested area, one where American domination is less than absolute. They must be stopped. Everything that will follow depends upon it.

#### Terrorism causes extinction

Morgan, Professor Foreign Studies Hankuk University, ‘9 (Dennis Ray, December, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race” Futures, Vol 41 Issue 10, p 683-693, ScienceDirect)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question "Is Nuclear War Inevitable??" [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they've figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian "dead hand" system, "where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed," it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States" [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal "Samson option" against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even "anti-Semitic" European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.

#### Advantage 2 – China

#### China is intent on taking over space – weaponization efforts will accelerate, guaranteeing war with the US

Chang, USCC Research Fellow Military and National Security Affairs at US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 4-5-’12 (Amy, “Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization” http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/China-Indigenous-Military-Developments-Final-Draft-03-April2012.pdf)

China’s repeated calls for peaceful use of space and expressed concerns regarding space debris indicated opposition to counterspace and space deterrence programs; however, Chinese technical papers and the 2007 ASAT test proved that its intentions were otherwise. 71 The 2007 ASAT test, therefore, was a political “surprise” to those who accepted the PRC’s official position at face value, but it was not unexpected by the U.S. intelligence and policy community. The ASAT test brought to public attention the fact that China could execute capabilities that undermine or complicate U.S. access to space in the event of a conflict. However, U.S. government analysts were tracking Chinese ASAT development at least as early as 2003: the Department of Defense’s annual report on Chinese military power for that year acknowledged that China was developing and planned to field a direct‐ascent ASAT system. 72 Subsequent DoD annual reports have noted China’s capability to “destroy or disable satellites…by launching a ballistic missile or space‐launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon.” 73 The 2006 report described China as pursuing an “offensive anti‐satellite system” and ground‐based ASAT weapons systems. 74 Between September 2004 and January 2007, China conducted a total of four direct‐ascent ASAT tests, all of which were known to U.S. analysts. 75 DoD annual reports released after the 2007 ASAT test indicated an increased focus on the possibility of future Chinese tests, as well as on the military and counterspace applications of ASAT technology. 76 While the United States was aware of Chinese technological and aerospace development (with potential application to ASAT weapons), due to China’s stated official stance on outer space, U.S. decisionmakers may not have focused on ASAT developments as closely until after the successful 2007 test. 77 In 2007, Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) testified to Congress that the ASAT test would allow China “to eventually deploy an ASAT system that could threaten U.S. satellites.” 78 Later, in 2009, LTG Maples acknowledged that China is developing systems and technologies targeting “U.S. space‐based navigation, communication, and intelligence collection capabilities.” He argued that China “will continue to deploy more advanced satellites through the next decade,” including “developing jammers and kinetic and directed‐energy weapons for ASAT missions.” LTG Maples also indicated China’s dual use of civilian aerospace technologies to improve “its ability to track and identify satellites—a prerequisite for anti‐satellite attacks.” 79 Others, such as Lieutenant General Wallace Gregson (USMC, ret.), then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, have testified that these moves are “just one element of China’s military modernization effort[s] to develop and field disruptive military technologies.” 80 With the growing importance of space assets for China’s burgeoning military C4ISR infrastructure, the possibility of future ASAT tests is not unexpected. However, it would elicit great international concern for potentially damaging space debris and has immense strategic implications for U.S. space capabilities. The reliance of the United States on space assets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communication; navigation; and positioning creates a particular vulnerability to attacks, and thus the potential consequences of another test or even an offensive strike are grave. It seems likely, however, that the United States will develop its own deterrents to China’s newfound counterspace capability. 81 In any case, it now seems clear that China’s intended approach is to continue to develop ground‐based kinetic kill vehicles (e.g., the SC‐19 ASAT), as well as lasers and a variety of jammers and other electromagnetic spectrum disruption hardware. It is also simultaneously attempting—sometimes in concert with Russia—to limit the space power of the United States and other potential competitor nations by repeatedly proposing arms control agreements that would limit the “weaponization of and an arms race in outer space” by restricting space‐based platforms, but that would not regulate ground‐ based anti‐space platform capabilities. 82 Factors Affecting Analysis on the Development of the Anti‐Satellite Missile System Challenge #1: Strategic Deception and Misleading Messages The U.S. government did not underestimate China’s potential to field ASAT capabilities, nor was it caught off guard by the January 2007 test. However, it is possible that western commentators outside of government (e.g., Hitchens et al.) may have been misled by China’s public statements concerning the use of weapons in space. 83 China’s diplomatic stance and official rhetoric, juxtaposed with its reluctance post‐January 2007 to engage with the United States and other foreign countries on addressing military uses of space, created separate “public” and “behind‐the‐scenes” stances on space militarization. In its white papers up until 2006, China espoused that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it was opposed to any militarization of space, including the development of anti‐satellite weapons. The papers emphasized utilizing “an international legal instrument” in preventing the weaponization of space. 84 By the publication of its 2006 white paper, however, the “legal instrument” aspect was not mentioned, hinting at possible ASAT development. By the 2008 Defense white paper, however, the term reappeared, which raised questions among the analytical and intelligence community about the motives behind China’s words and actions. 85 When questioned by the international community in early 2007 regarding its ASAT test, PRC spokespersons provided contradictory responses from different branches of its government (i.e., Foreign Ministry as compared to the PLA), which led some observers to speculate that the incident revealed either a rift in policy coordination, or an active effort to deceive the rest of the world regarding China’s programs for space weapons. 86 Scholars who observe China’s historical and military philosophy have identified strategic deception as an oft‐practiced tactic to manipulate an opponent’s strategic assessment process and influence the “highest military authorities responsible for formulating strategic decisions.” 87 Perception management, on the other hand, is broadly defined as presenting misinformation with the intent “to influence how other nations perceive Chinese interests and actions.” 88 The secretive and nontransparent nature of the Chinese government leaves outside observers unsure as to what extent government pronouncements on China’s military modernization should be accepted prima facie. 89 The selective dissemination of information is a strategy that is also rooted in the “institutional culture and accustomed practices of the Chinese Communist Party,” which has “a deeply ingrained tendency toward secretiveness and a long history of proactively using information to promote the party’s objectives while suppressing information deemed harmful to its interests.” 90 The opaque nature of today’s Chinese government and military often makes it difficult to ascertain trends and breakthroughs on military technology and hardware development. China restricts most military and defense‐related information from the public, and “many aspects of China’s national security policy, including its motivations, intentions, and decision‐making processes, remain secret.” 91

#### Even if China is bluffing, current weaponization ensures miscalculation and crisis instability that incentivizes conflict

MacDonald, 11 - Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace (Bruce, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA”, 5/11, lexis)

One characteristic of too many wars in the last century is that they are the result of miscalculation that ignites the tinder of fundamental geopolitical tensions. Averting major power conflict requires skillful management of tensions by senior leaders of the major powers. China has become much more internationally sophisticated, though with important exceptions, in its dealings with the rest of the world than has been true in the past, and this is reflected in its civilian leadership. Unfortunately, the PLA's senior officer corps trails its civilian counterparts in this respect. They have much less interaction with foreign official and travel abroad much less frequently than their U.S. counterparts. This means that the PLA overall views world events from a less knowledgeable and sophisticated perspective, a danger in this increasingly complex world, and could explain, for example, the political "tonedeafness" of the PLA in the manner they conducted their 2007 ASAT test.This PLA problem becomes more serious when one realizes that the PLA is organizationally separate from the rest of the Chinese government, and reports only to the Central Military Commission, currently chaired by President Hu Jintao. President Hu, and his likely successors, have no significant military background, and the majority of the CMC's members are top PLA officers, suggesting that civilian oversight of major military decisions and consideration of their larger implications are not as carefully reviewed as in the U.S. government. Normally this would not be too great a concern, but in a crisis this could be dangerous. Add to this the fact that China has no equivalent of our National Security Council, a critically important body for coordinating our security decisionmaking, and one comes away concerned about the relative insularity of the PLA in the Chinese power structure. In a crisis, the PLA probably cannot be counted on to show as sophisticated a sense of judgment as one would hope any country's military leaders, even an enemy's, to show. All these problems and many more pose potential threats to internal political stability andCommunist Party control, providing ample opportunity for crisis and conflict in the years ahead. Overview of The Strategic Landscape of Space Space assets, and the communications and cyber links that enable them to function, are the means by which essential national security information is either generated, transmitted, or both. This information is the lifeblood of U.S. conventional military superiority and plays a key role in U.S. strategic nuclear posture as well. As such, these space related assets represent extraordinarily appealing targets in any future conflict, and their relative vulnerability can provide dangerously attractive incentives in a crisis to preempt, escalating to war. Resisting this temptation to attack may be morally virtuous but could be strategically unwise: going first in a space conflict with a nearpeer space adversary appears to offer many advantages, while absorbing such a strike, with all its attendant destruction of military capabilities, and then responding to the attack against an opponent fully expecting such a response, appears to be militarily and strategically quite undesirable. As technology advances, the ways of interfering with, disrupting, or destroying information streams in space or supporting space systems will likely increase, as will U.S. and others' dependence upon such systems. Providing defensive options for U.S. space assets should be pursued where appropriate, but most space observers believe that offense has the advantage in space over defense, as General Cartwright observed last May. Cartwright also noted that the challenging issues that space poses has made the Space Posture Review "the most difficult of all the defense reviews" the Obama Administration has undertaken. The overall U.S. goal in space should be to shape the space domain to the advantage of the United States and its allies, and to do so in ways that are stabilizing and enhance U.S. and allied security. The United States has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of its space assets so that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies. This need not mean that China and others must perforce be disadvantaged by such an arrangement - there should be ample opportunity for many countries to benefit and prosper from a properly crafted system of space management. There is an inherent risk of strategic instability when relatively modest defense efforts create disproportionate danger to an adversary, as with space offense. And there is a serious risk of crisis instability in space when "going first" pays off - destroying an adversary's satellites before he destroys yours. We don't know what would happen in a crisis, but the potential for space instability seems high and likely to grow.

#### Chinese attempts at space dominance cause the US to pre-emptively strike, causing war over Taiwan

Lewis 2004 (Jeffrey, postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program @ the Center for Inter- national and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, “What if Space Were Weaponized?” http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf]

Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and the threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that “China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability.”22 The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, “the PLA wouldattempt toweaken U.S. or other third party’s resolve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk – or actually striking – high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adversary’s superiorities.”23 These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the communications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. If the United States were to deploy space-based missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard a space maneuver vehicle like NASA’s X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as well. This situation would essentially put the United States on “hair trigger” alert in space. A Chinese military exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise attack. With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack. Such an attack could be very large or very small. The United States might attempt to use CAVs, aided by guidance from space-based radar systems, to attack Chinese command and control systems, disable the arsenal of Chinese ballistic missiles or merely attack the sites of suspected Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Missile defense, using space-based sensors and perhaps intercep- tors, would be used to discourage the Chinese from attempting any retaliation. It is not clear whether even a very large American first strike would completely neutralize the 75 to 100 Chinese nuclear weapons that the CIA anticipates will be capable of reaching the United States in the next 10 to 15 years.24 Controlling escalation, however, appears dicey – if the United States succeeded in severely degrading the Chinese command and control system, Chinese leaders might not even know that the original attack had been confined to conventional weapons. Those who say this scenario is far fetched may be surprised to learn that it happened – in a war game sponsored by the Naval War College.25 In that game, which was held August 14-25, 2000, a large Asian nation with over a billion people called Red (China) was conducting large-scale military exercises that the Blue Team (the United States) believed were a prelude to an attack on a U.S. ally located in region, designated Brown. During these exercises, the commander of Blue Forces became concerned that Red might use ground-based lasers against U.S. satellites. Fearing the loss of such important assets, he ordered a limited preemptive strike – using a fleet of CAVs that he had deployed in space – against suspected ground-based laser sites deep inside Red’s country. At the same time, he refrained from striking other targets “rationalizing that the preemptive strike was only protecting high-value space assets, not initiating hostilities.”26 The Blue Team was stunned when Red viewed the strike on targets deep inside its territory as an act of war and retaliated – causing a general war. One flabbergasted participant, sounding not completely convinced of what had just hap- pened, reportedly explained: “We thought these preemptive strikes might very well have stopped the crisis situation. But there were some who had a different point of view – that the strikes may have been provocative.”27 It is important to note that the Chinese don’t even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen. The Pentagon’s assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence – a Hong Kong news- paper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that “specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified” and that press reports of a so-called “parasitic” microsatellite “cannot be confirmed.”28 Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on “unambiguous warning” of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system – or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch – would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding – as he did with Iraq – that “we cannot wait for the final proof– the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”29

#### Space is key – conflict between the US and China there is the most likely scenario for coming war

Dolman 2010 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576)

The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. The stakes are high. The side that prevails will have a clear path to domination of the international system. Although its effects will be far-reaching, the conflict itself will not be visible to those looking up into the night sky. It will not be televised. Most will not even be aware that it is occurring. It may already have begun. And yet, this new kind of remotely-controlled proxy war will not be so different that it is unrecognizable. The principles of war and the logic of competition remain as they always have. Only the context has changed. When perceived through this mind-set, via the tenets of traditional realist and geopolitical theories that have survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is that the United States and the People’s Republic of China are on a collision course for war.Such determinist theory is quickly countered by those who find its implications abhorrent. Inevitability is a crass and unsubtle divination. Because a thing has always happened does not mean that it always will. Nor does the reverse hold—because a thing has never happened does not mean that it cannot be so. The realist paradigm of power politics does not have to hold sway. The cruelly consistent narrative of history need not be eternally retold. Nothing is inevitable, counter the idealists. The world can be made different, the world today is different. The power of possibility is tantalizing, but the brusque strength of probability, for a decision maker, usually holds sway. The past foreshadows the future—and it is the calculation of probability over time combined with risk that is more persuasive than platitudes. If an event is likely, its outcome perceptible, and its influence measurable, the prudent state must make preparations to mitigate its effects. If an event is unlikely, even if its impact is serious, actions necessary to mitigate it are often deferred to the future—though this form of political gambling tends to magnify the deleterious effects of the event when it eventually comes to pass. If the state’s sovereignty is at risk, however, no matter how unlikely the event, it must be dealt with directly. On the surface, it may seem as though geopolitical forces are currently in dynamic balance. The US is the overwhelming sea and air power, offensively oriented and favoring maneuver and precision strike for advantage in war. The PRC is potentially the greatest land power the world has ever known, defensively established and reliant on masses of infantry as its core strength. Neither has a globally significant advantage vis-à-vis the other. There is no plausible near-term scenario in which the US could invade and sustain an occupation of the Chinese mainland. Likewise, the US is currently impervious to any invasion and occupation by Chinese forces. Neither state’s sovereignty appears in doubt due to actions by the other. At the level of grand strategy neither mass or maneuver, offense or defense, has a transformational advantage. From this perspective, war, inevitable though it may be, is not imminent. Less venerable theories of conflict and cooperation are more favorable toward long-term peace. Economically, the US and PRC are tightly bound. Chinese markets are opening and the productivity of PRC manufacturing has allowed the US to move into a post-industrial economy. Trade is increasing substantially, and much of America’s foreign debt is held by China, to the point that it is not to either state’s fiscal advantage to engage in a conflict that will sever or (even just weaken) these ties. Culturally and historically, the Chinese and American people are inclined toward mutual admiration and respect. Despite the political differences between Chinese Communism and Western Liberal Democratic Capitalism, human connections and government rapprochement are valued by both sides. An appreciation of American technological innovation and Chinese work and spiritual ethics imbues the still-developing relationship. Both sides seem willing to work together and sustain a world system in which each nation-state has its place and its independence. In every sphere but one, it seems, the two great powers are building toward peace. In every sphere of competition, with one exception, there is room for negotiation and mutually beneficial outcomes. That one incompatible, uncompromising realm is outer space. A Twenty-First Century Great Wall in Space: No state relies on space power and space support more than the US. Since at least the mid-1980s, its armed forces have undergone a radical transformation. Space intelligence and observations, high bandwidth communications, and navigation support have created the most deadly combat force in history. America can engage targets anywhere in the world, in all weather, day or night, with extraordinary precision and lethality, and with a minimum of collateral damage. The progress of this transformation has been stymied with the continuing emphasis on ground forces occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the American military is operating more effectively and efficiently today with the smallest percentage of its population actively engaged in military service since the post-WWII demobilization. Just over two years ago—and perhaps again earlier this year as part of a ballistic missile defense system test—China successfully engaged one of its own derelict satellites in space. This was an extraordinarily provocative action. The United States simply has no defense against such a capability, and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test was intended to remind the world of this weakness. Moreover, its use of an MRBM (which the PRC produces in mass) to propel the kill vehicle indicates a potential ASAT weapons capability sufficient to target the entire US low-earth orbit inventory. The US responded in kind, engaging and destroying one of its own de-orbiting satellites with a modified surface-to-air missile interceptor launched from an Aegis cruiser. While this response demonstrated an enhanced American capability to engage low-earth orbiting (LEO) satellites from a mobile platform, the message sent was straight-forward. There is no current defense against a satellite attack, and the only option available to US or PRC strategists is retaliation. If deterrence fails, LEO will become a global no-fly zone. Both sides will engage and destroy any and all satellites within range, cheaply and effectively.

#### Loss of satellite capabilities causes war over Taiwan

Easton 2009 (Ian, specialist in Chinese aeronautics at the Washington-based Project 2049 Institute,“The Great Game in Space”

http://project2049.net/documents/china\_asat\_weapons\_the\_great\_game\_in\_space.pdf

Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could quickly escalate to a dangerous level. According to two experts on the subject, “if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century, our crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process.”38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards fielding ASAT weapons could have.

#### China will escalate the conflict—perception of rational escalation ensures US gets drawn into a broader nuclear conflict

Glaser 2011 (Charles, Political Science Professor @ George Washington University, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China-whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan couldfairlyeasily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Curbing Chinese aggression key to prevent regional counterbalancing that escalates to war

Brzezinski, Former US National Security Advisor, ’12 (Zbigniew, January/February, “After America” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america)

China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

#### Asian war escalates to full nuclear use – nuclear asymmetry and complex security dynamics make de-escalation impossible

Twomey, Professor National Security at Naval Postgraduate, ’11 (Christopher, January, “Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers” Asia Policy, No 11, ProjectMuse)

Implications Each element of complexity raises its own problems, which are summarized in this section. In general, most of these effects increase the challenges facing national security elites throughout the region, increase the prospect for dangerous security competition, heighten potential for miscalculation, and destabilize the region. Beyond that, the implications of these three individual elements will tend to interact, as discussed in a later section. The First-Order Effects of Proliferation The simple quantitative increase in the number of nuclear arsenals has several effects. The most obvious effect is the increase in the number of potentially unstable dyads. Perhaps historically rare reasons restrained the intense rivalry of the Cold War, preventing it from degenerating into an intense nuclear war. Those factors, however, may not hold in other cases. For instance, there is strong evidence that some dyads in Asia do not share the [End Page 67] Table 2. Perceptions on the Utility of Nuclear Weapons in Asia [End Page 68] same characteristics as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Paul Kapur argues that the stability-instability paradox that may have held during the Cold War in Europe does not hold in South Asia today. Instead, Pakistan views instability at the nuclear level as beneficial to its bargaining leverage.49 The Cold War did not center on territory claimed as sovereign homeland, whereas the Taiwan issue serves to complicate Sino-U.S. relations. The Sino-Russian border is long, and the two sides' strategic arsenals are located more closely to each other than the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were in the Cold War. Additionally, no Soviet leader was ever as novice to international politics as Kim Jong-un in North Korea is, and the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet Union was never under as much stress as that of the Communist Party in China or the North Korean regime today. These and dozens of other issues highlight potentially salient points of contrast with the Cold War. Some scholars highlight the difficulties in attribution, not only in substate terrorism cases but also in multipolar rivalries.50 Yet the attribution of state-led attacks, though technically challenging, seems less likely to be a concern in reality, given that most surprise attacks occur at times of heightened tension. Still, the difficulty in identifying attackers might complicate issues in some circumstances. More problematic is the inherent instability of rivalries among three or more players, a point not systematically evaluated in the existing literature on Asia.51 Game theorists characterize a "truel" as a duel to the death between three actors. These theorists have reached several conclusions about the likely outcomes of such contests. First and foremost, in contrast to stylized duels, truels are highly vulnerable to the specific assumptions about the sequence of shooting, quality of weapons, size of arsenals, knowledge, and range of strategies chosen.52 This makes generalizing hard for mathematicians but has a very clear implication for policy analysts: the simplicity of a bilateral world is gone. Slight changes in weapons or strategy can have large effects on the perceived—and actual—balance.53 [End Page 69] One manifestation of this is heightened competition due to uncertainty about potential adversary coalitions. In a series of studies, Stephen Cimbala used straightforward modeling to emphasize that states in Asia will be pressured to choose risky alert statuses and force postures out of such defensive concerns.54 More relaxed postures, such as launch after attack, could leave countries with greatly reduced arsenals. Of course, riding out a first strike is always dangerous. But in a multipolar context, states must be concerned about deterring, or retaliating against, multiple adversaries after an attack. The number of adversaries a state might face is also uncertain. In a crisis, the existence of multiple potential enemies will heighten a state's incentive to not absorb a first strike because doing so will reduce an arsenal that would need to deter not only its primary, current adversary but also any other adversaries who might be tempted to enter the conflict soon thereafter. Both these scenarios are worse than the bilateral rivalry in the Cold War and will tend to catalyze more dangerous force postures. Thus, even if the optimists are right about their characterization of the Cold War, these dynamics are new and negative in the post–Cold War environment. Modernization across the board paints something of a mixed picture. The development of a secure second-strike capability for any nation would reduce dangerous mobilization spirals. Thus, such a capability is likely to be stabilizing in some contexts involving the United States and China. However, a second-strike capability gives China substantial advantages in competition with India, which previously might have been characterized by a two-sided minimal deterrent posture. Russia had hoped to balance conventional difficulties with nuclear preeminence in its relationship with China and others, but will be less able to do so the more secure and robust China's second-strike capability is. Furthermore, in other contexts the development of secure second-strike capabilities makes coercive strategies much riskier: consider, for example, the United States and North Korea or China and India.

#### Plan: The United States Department of Defense should develop and deploy microsatellites tasked with inspection, surveillance, maintenance, protection, and propulsion capabilities to facilitate a Parasitic Attitude Control System.

#### Solvency

#### The best covert seizure of space would be deployment of micro-satellites in the form of a Parasitic Attitude Control System to hack and dismantle enemy capabilities without debris or negative perception

Page 2006 (Joseph, Assistant flight commander and ICBM combat crew commander (Squadron Command Post) at the 741st Missile Squadron, 91st Space Wing, Minor AFB, North Dakota, “Stealing Zeus's Thunder” Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2006 pg. 29-31)

The idea of covertly supplanting a satellite's ACS is technologically feasible and may become a desired, mature capability when conflict arises in space. The Orbital Recovery Group is working on a life-extension package for high-interest geosynchronous satellites such as high-revenue-generating 29commercial communication satellites. Discussion of Orbital Recovery's technical plan concentrate, on the topic of refueling communication satellites, but the key focus for space warfare remains on the intent of the system: to help extend the life of aging geosynchronous satellites by additional ACS.For space control, the actions remain remarkably similar to refueling, but the intent of the user differs markedly. The space-control angle of the additional ACS (hereafter referred to as space-controlPACS [SC PACS])involves controlling an enemy satellite by supplanting its original ACS and negating the satellite’s mission with the PACS. An SC PACS can control a satellite in numerous ways,incorporated within the five Ds of OCS:Depleting the satellite's primary ACS fuel until the satellite is drifting (denial/ disruption). Once a satellite runs out of maneuvering fuel to counter drifting, it is considered dead. Stressing and straining the satellite bus until body-part separation occurs from changes in angular-momentum spin rates (destruction). Assuming the satellite is three-axis stabilized, enough rotational velocity would put tremendous stress on the solar panels/ deployed1 antennae. Application of enough stress and strain will separate the appendages, depending upon the rate of spin applied to the satellite bus.” Realigning C2/payload antennae for friendly-force intelligence collection by moving the directional antenna's "footprint" away from hostile ground-station coverage areas and towards space-based signals-intelligence satellites or simply aiming the antennae into deep space, away from Earth (deception/ denial). Although such movement will not directly affect omnidirectional antennae due to their 360-degree orientation, their altered pickup patterns will result in less collected signal strength. "Pushing the satellite into transfer orbit for atmospheric reentry or physical capture destruction/ denial/degradation/disruption). Deliberatemovement of the satellite out of its expected orbital plane would allow the PACS controller full, positive control over the satellite'sdesignated path. Physical capture by friendly spacecraft and crews becomes possible by bringing the satellite down to an acceptable orbital altitude. If the plan calls for its physical destruction, lowering the satellite's altitude and speed can allow atmospheric friction to heat up and structurally weaken or burn up the satellite bus and payload. Concerns about Orbital Debris The purpose of SC PACS is to create an ASAT capability with a low probability of destruction. Pieces may break off the satellite bus when torqued, but the system seeks to minimize orbital debris, unlike the kinetic-kill ASM135 or nuclear-tipped Program 437 ASATs. 7 Designers planned for early ASATs to destroy hostile satellites with a kinetic kill (i.e., an explosion on or 30near the target spacecraft), but these produced too much dangerous orbital debris, affecting other friendly systems. Early satellite experiments such as West Ford, a communications program, (lumped hundreds of thousands of small copper needles in near-Earth space, much to the chagrin of research scientists and military space planners.' Paint flecks impacting on the space shuttle's window have shown us how dangerous space debris can become." SC PACS renders orbital debris negligible; however, secondary effects may occur with intentional physical damage to the satellite (bending and twisting around the center of gravity). Military/intelligence Functions of a Space-Control Parasitic Attitude Control System The military functions of SC PACS offer a great leap in terms of legitimate space-control ability for any nation that possesses it. The advantage of physically removing a problem from the situation without destroying it lends a "kinder, gentler" approach to warfare operations and may earn the user some respect in the eyes of the world community. When dealing with hostile nations and their space operations, the United States must contend with eavesdropping intelligence satellites that monitor activities around the globe: high resolution imagery satellites that photograph troop movements or buildup operations (similar to the buildup (luring Operation Iraqi Freedoin in the Middle East in 2003). Following the Air Force's five Ds, SC PACS offers many avenues of approach to neutralize enemy satellites without necessarily obliterating them

#### Even if it was detected, PACS renders countermeasures or escalation pointless

Klein 2006 [Commander John - United States Navy, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (Space Power and Politics) Pg. 77]

Perhaps the best defensive position is obtained by taking station where the enemy would not dare risk attacking.This would be achieved by locating space systems in close vicinity to high-value or national assets of a neutral or enemy state. For example, parasitic microsatellites could be physically attached to each of the satellites in a positioning, navigation, and timing constellation. If offensive weapons were used against these parasitic satellites, the positioning satellite would also be likely to suffer irreparable harm, thus rendering it useless.In such a situation involving the GPS constellation, the United States may be reluctant to destroy the enemy microsatellite for fear of destroying its own GPS satellite. This example demonstrates that, if a position of advantage is taken, the defense is indeed the stronger form of warfare.If an attack is subsequently launched against the parasitic satellites, the attacking systems can be more readily located and targeted for counterattack, since the application of force often gives the attacker's position away. Such locating and targeting to support a counterattack need not be done withspace-based assets, but can employ any combination of land, sea, and air assets to accomplish this as well.So a counterattack to a space-based attack need not be in kind. Once the location of the attacking system is determined, the enemy can await the most opportune moment to conduct his counterattack, thus taking advantage of the benefits coming from defensive strategy.

#### Microsat defense systems are the best and ONLY way to protect current satellites and stay covert until necessary

Schendzielos 2008 (Kurt, Director, 13th Air Force Commander's Action Group at US Air Force, “Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites” http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada485553.pdf

An inherent advantage of microsats and nanosatsis the capability to renew or repopulate constellations quickly. Additionally microsats and nanosatsenjoy a reduced acquisition and production cycle. Updated microsats could be built and launched within a few months using the latest technology available ensuring that satellite defense keep pace with emerging threats. 129 Because microsats are a relatively proven concept, and additional applications are constantly emerging, the costs of the program, once mature, would be reasonably lessened by the bulk acquisition of components. Conceptually the basic components remain the same and the mission equipment changes;drastically shortening the test and development timelines. 130 Microsats could be clustered on today’s larger boosters or be placed one or two at a time on smaller launching systems, such as a modified AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile converted to place a microsat in LEO. 131 A secondary advantage of using smaller boosters like an AIM-7 is that launches would be indistinguishable from regular aircraft missile tests providing a means for covertly placing microsats into orbit and denying an adversary the knowledge that the bodyguards are there, if such an action were warranted. 132 Lastly, the biggest advantage of bodyguard satellites is that they can be sent to protect a satellite that is already on orbit. It is, therefore, the only means available to protect satellites launched three years ago. Other satellite self-defense measures will have to be included during manufacture on the ground, and will, for the most part, not be able to be added once the satellite is orbiting.

#### And, PACS is the most effective microsat technology—cohesive with anti-ASAT capabilities and easily developed

Page 2006 (Joseph, Assistant flight commander and ICBM combat crew commander (Squadron Command Post) at the 741st Missile Squadron, 91st Space Wing, Minor AFB, North Dakota, “Stealing Zeus's Thunder” Air & Space Power Journal Summer 2006 pg. 27-28)

If the United States were able to develop a means of effective OCS that performed most or all of the five Ds, what impact would it have? How would the world react to it? More importantly, would US space forces use this technology to full advantage? Even though the answers to these questions seem to lie in the realm of policy and strategy, a commercial system currently in the research-and-development phase has the potential to turn ASAT war fare and the concept of space control on its head. New Way of Thinking The five Ds of OCS exist as ways to hamper the enemy's ability to use space to his advantage-an effect easily attained through satellite control. US space forces' control of enemy satellites by means of an additional attitude control system (a PACS) would all but assure exerciseof the five Ds. Supplementing or supplanting a satellite's integrated ACS allows control of the orientation of payload and bus (the structural shell that houses the mission performing payload). Most work on the PACS has dealt with topics of extending the life of satellites on a particular mission, primarily communications. Previous research dealt with refueling satellites in orbit and using a 27 satellite's own control system, but the PACS concept disregards the integrated ACS and provides control through an add-on system. Depleted fuel tanks no longer mean the end of a satellite's mission life-with the PACS, the mission extends until PACS fuel runs out or the payload fails. The control result remains the same when one uses a PACS on a normally operating satellite for space-control purposes. The controller of the PACS has ultimate power in moving the satellite, not only by primary use of its thrusters to throw it out of control but also by making changes in the moment of inertia for spinning satellites or in the center of gravity for three-axis-stabilized satellites. Since payload-pointing accuracy depends heavily on stabilization of the satellite bus, additional thrusters that cause unwanted movement or stabilization changes will affect the target satellite's mission performance. Whatever the technique or intention, the PACS allows control over a satellite by using means other than its original attitudeand-orientation subsystems, an extraordinary capability in the realm of space control and space warfare.