St. Mark’s TS – Case Arguments (1/11/12)

## Shameless Plug

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## Note

**It would be really hard to post all the case arguments we’ve read throughout the year. If you want anything specific, please feel free to email either Milan or Meyer. Thanks for understanding!**

Greenhill Round 6 – Damien PS PACS

## Covertness Argument

**You can’t be secret**

**Hagt, director at WSI, 6**—M.A. in international policy and China studies at UC Berkeley, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute (Eric, 2006, “Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities in Space,” Issue No 2. http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china\_security2.pdf, RBatra)

Alternatively, China may be determined to develop, test and deploy a full range of defensive measures, both active and passive, but is attempting to keep it secret for fear of antagonizing the United States. An 'active defense,' as some analysts in the United States have concluded, may be merely an offensive strategy in sheep’s clothing. This has been a suspicion regarding China's overall defense strategy, but it applies equally, if not more so, to the realm of space. A guardian or body-guard satellite, to take an example, would also have ASAT capabilities. Nevertheless, a dedicated yet secretive space weapons program, however defined, is unlikely as such an effort would be difficult, if not impossible, to keep concealed. More importantly, the political fallout for China if caught at this game makes this scenario highly implausible.

## Heg Defense

**Weaponization is not inevitable**

**a) New Obama policies**

**Lake 11**—contributing editor of The New Republic and national security correspondent for The Washington Times (Eli, “U.S., EU eye anti-satellite weapons pact,” January 27th, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/27/us-eu-eye-anti-satellite-weapons-pact/?page=1)

The Obama administration is negotiating with the European Union on an agreement limiting the use of anti-satellite weapons, a move that some critics say could curb U.S. development of space weapons in general. Three congressional staffers told The Washington Times that Pentagon and intelligence analysts said in a briefing Monday that the administration is looking to sign on to the European Union’s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The briefing followed the completion of an interagency review that recommends the United States sign on to the document with only a few minor changes to its language, according to two administration officials familiar with the review. That recommendation is awaiting final approval from the National Security Council. “The United States is continuing to consult with the European Union on its initiative to develop a comprehensive set of multilateral TCBMs, also known as the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, said Thursday at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. TCBM stands for “transparency and confidence-building measures.”

**b) Nobody wants an ASAT race – new talks have come**

**Hitchens 7** – Director @ Center for Defense Information Theresa, director of the World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information, and manages CDI’s Space Security Project in concert with Secure World Foundation, 2007, “An ASAT Arms Race: The Slippery Slope to Space Weaponization?,” http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?view=article&catid=60%3Adt2007summer&id=51%3Adt2007summerHitchens&option=com\_content&Itemid=2

With most of the world’s major space-faring powers teetering on the brink of an ASAT arms race, what can be done to stop a full-scale slide to space weaponization? Somewhat ironically, a glimmer of hope for a first step away from the brink has arisen from China’s ASAT test. The massive debris cloud resulting from the test stunned observers around the world and highlighted the serious threat space debris poses. A space war resulting in mass quantities of debris would be in no space power’s interest. Further, all space-faring nations, including China, have recently agreed to voluntary measures to mitigate debris under the auspices of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Thus, there now is elevated potential for international discussions regarding either a voluntary or treaty-based agreement to bar the testing and use of ASATs. While such an approach would not immediately address the larger issue of space weaponization, it nonetheless might serve as a foundation that could be subsequently built upon; the current lack of diplomacy regarding military space is a key factor in heightened threat perceptions, therefore any engagement on the issue could do nothing but good. Given that 160 nations are on record as supporting international negotiations on a treaty to ban space weapons (only the United States is opposed), it would seem reasonable that a number of governments might be willing to support such a first step. The option to ignore the threat from ASATs now seems firmly off the table; one can only hope nations can muster the political will to counter the threat. And perhaps with the realization that what any one actor does in space affects all, space-faring powers will become more motivated to find ways to prevent space weaponization that will endanger them all.

**No impact to a space attack**

**Forden, 7** – writer for Arms Control Today (Geoffrey, “After China's Test: Time For a Limited Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons. Arms Control Today, April 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_04/Forden)

On the other hand, an attacker would have to destroy a considerable number of satellites in order to have an immediate effect on military operations. There are on average about 10 GPS satellites visible at any given time and point on the Earth's surface even though a high positional accuracy requires only six. An attacker would have to destroy at least six satellites to affect precision-guided munitions even momentarily because other GPS satellites would soon appear as their orbits took them into view. A country would need to disable nearly one-half of the United States' 24 NAVSTAR/GPS satellites currently in orbit to eliminate the ability to employ precision-guided munitions for more than a few hours each day.[9] Likewise, the United States has a number of alternatives for communications satellites in the short term. Other space assets, such as weather and mapping satellites, although important in the long term, are not as time critical.

**And there are inherent checks on weaponization**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM) Note: These paragraphs are from a section addressing common misconceptions about space. Thus, the opening sentence “Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal” is a statement the author is attempting to refute.

2. Space is already so militarized that weaponizing it won’t be a big deal. This is a political matter: it’s consequently true only if people believe it • Like it or not, the norm of space sanctuary is real. The second misconception is that the transition from space not being weaponized to being weaponized may be a gray, indistinct thing. It is not true that it is not going to be a big political deal when it happens, even if we don’t know exactly what form it will take. People with engineering backgrounds in the space weapons community have a tendency, I think, to say, “Space is already so weaponized and so militarized because we use GPS for the guidance of many of our weapons, or because in the 1980s there were anti-satellite systems, or because ICBMs cross space on their way to targets, that we have al-ready crossed the weaponization frontier. Stop talking to me about it.” I would liken them to the people who on December 31, 1999 were running around saying, “We shouldn’t have these big parties tonight! The millennium doesn’t start for another year; it starts in 2001, not 2000.” That may be technically correct, but it is totally irrelevant because this is about what the public believes. The party is tonight and you can go or not, it’s up to you. There is a norm of space sanctuary that exists and that is largely because of the behavior of the United States over the last forty or fifty years. The United States could take steps to convince people that the millennium was actually in 2001 instead of 2000 or convince people that it already had weaponized space or convince people that GPS is a weapons system. However, there are a number of reasons why we haven’t done that to this point and why we might not want to do that in the future. I don’t want to suggest that because everybody thinks it is so means that it is immutably the case, but for the time being, space weaponization would be a big deal. So it is something that needs to be ad-dressed in political terms as well as technological terms.

**Their terrestrial analogies are wrong**

**Mueller, 6** (Karl, PhD and Political Scientist @ RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408, EMM)

Another big argument: military use of space is evolving just the way air power and sea power did. The flag-follows-trade argument fits into this. Navies were developed to protect merchants and commerce from predation by pirates. Air power evolved observation platforms in World War I, then fighters and bombers. Therefore we know the same thing is going to happen to space. It ties into the “weaponization is inevitable” argument. The problem is that air power and sea power evolved in very different ways and space power doesn’t match either one of them. There are interesting illustrative parallels; his-tory rhymes even though it doesn’t repeat itself. These historical precedents provide us with some interesting notions about what might happen next, but they definitely don’t tell us what will happen next. Space is different in so many ways from the other places where we have operated before that we are basically starting from a blank sheet of paper.

**Even if weaponization is inevitable, weaponizing later is better**

**Coffelt, 5** – Lt. Colonal; thesis to the school of advanced air and space studies (Christopher A, “THE BEST DEFENSE: CHARTING THE FUTURE OFUS SPACE STRATEGY AND POLICY.” A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies For Completion of the Graduation Requirements SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. June 2005.)

Sputnik’s launch bestowed the honor and prestige of being first in orbit upon the Soviet Union, but was fortuitous for United States policy makers, as well. Whether or not the soviets beat the United States outright or the United States allowed the soviets to go first is irrelevant. The critical point is the soviets did go first. In one stroke, Sputnik solved the complicated, politically charged overflight issue that us policy makers grappled with and could not resolve. This enabled the United States to pursue its space reconnaissance program free from the legal and policy quagmire that accompanied launching first, and avoided appearing as an aggressor. Responding to the soviet capability fueled and legitimized the United States’ spending on its space program, 291 and garnered unprecedented public support. Robust funding complemented by international legitimacy and public support provided the united states space program a significant advantage. If, as some argue, weaponization of space is truly inevitable, the United States should manage risk, research and develop in secret, allow an adversary to cross the weapons in space threshold first, and reap the sputnik-like rewards of being a close second. In spite of the apparent advantages this strategy offers, it is likely much easier said than done. Advocating or supporting any second-follower strategy would be an extremely difficult position for an elected official or military officer, considering the US’ clear, longstanding preference for positive action and offensive solutions.

**They can’t degrade GPS**

**Perera 8** (David, “'Space Pearl Harbor' overstated,” Government Computer News, 2/22,

http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1\_no1/45866-1.html?topic=geospatial#)

The Navy’s use of an anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a falling U.S. satellite Feb. 20 did not inaugurate a new era of vulnerability for high-bandwidth military communications, said David Mosher, a Rand Corp. senior policy analyst specializing in issues related to the militarization of space and ballistic missile defense.

Any concern “about a space Pearl Harbor is way overstated,” Mosher told Defense Systems in an interview Feb. 21.

As the military edges closer to achieving its network-centric vision of warfare, it is becoming more dependent on high-bandwidth communications routed through satellites. That makes satellites an increasingly attractive target despite a near-universal condemnation of the militarization of space.

Defense Department officials said this week’s satellite operation was not a show of force or a response to China’s destruction of one of its own weather satellites in January 2007.

However, even if the United States should find itself fighting an enemy with the will and capacity to destroy U.S. satellites, high-bandwidth communications would continue to operate, Mosher said.

“The key here is not to protect satellites. The key is to protect the function,” he added. That could be accomplished many ways, including ensuring that satellite systems are robust enough to survive the loss of some of their units.

A prime example is the Global Positioning System, which consists of at least 24 satellites in medium Earth orbit. “It would take a whole lot to significantly degrade GPS,” Mosher said. “You’d have to shoot a lot of satellites.”

Increased use of transoceanic fiber-optic cables could also make the military less dependent on satellites. Such cabling has already proven to be reliable and has done a great deal to reduce satellite use in the private sector, Mosher said.

In any event, if a satellite-shooting war occurs, air vehicles with sensors and routers located lower in the atmosphere than satellites would already be active. “That just makes sense in regional warfare anyway,” he said.

A shot-down satellite would be a loss because alternatives would not perfectly compensate for the missing capacity, “but it’s not the end of the world,” Mosher said.

**ASATs are unnecessary – US satellites are not in jeopardy and weaponization only accelerates arms races**

**O’Hanlon, 7** – senior fellow at Foreign Policy (Michael, Brookings, “A Space Weapons Race is Not the Answer for America.” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0122defense\_ohanlon.aspx)

Worrying though this is, the US must not overreact. Rushing into a space weapons competition would not serve American strategic interests. But neither are sweeping controls on the military uses of space plausible or desirable. To develop an effective space policy, the US and its allies must bear several principles and realities in mind. First, the US increasingly uses space for military purposes, particularly for tactical war-fighting. Real-time data links and GPS-guided bombs are only the latest manifestations of this trend. The dependence on reconnaissance, targeting and communications satellites will surely grow. Second, although the US in particular has militarised space in such ways, space has yet to be weaponised. That is, hardly any weapons have been put into orbit or deployed to attack satellites. The Chinese test works against this generalisation, of course, but does not yet repudiate it. Third, those countries that rely on space systems cannot expect them to remain almost invulnerable. The nuclear powers already have ballistic missiles that have latent anti-satellite capabilities. The US, in particular, is also pursuing several ballistic missile defence programmes that also could be modified for anti-satellite weapon purposes; other countries may soon have similar, if less technically advanced, capabilities. For US armed forces, inherent vulnerabilities in low-altitude imaging satellites are of particular concern. They could be attacked by the type of weapon China has just tested, or microsatellites or lasers. While regrettable, the Chinese anti-satellite test is a partially understandable step by a rising military power. China's test was more blatant than America's ongoing efforts in space but, if one can forgive the pun, it has not occurred in a vacuum. Fourth, other countries will gradually become more able to use space for offensive military purposes. In particular, they are likely to gain the capacity to find and target large mobile assets such as ships and big formations of ground forces. Basic technological and strategic realities support the argument for a moderate and flexible US military space policy. These realities also refute the extreme positions that have been espoused by prominent US policymakers in recent years. The late 1990s report of the Commission on Outer Space, for instance, warned of a possible space "Pearl Harbor". It implied that the US needed rapidly to take many steps - including offensive ones - to address such a purportedly imminent threat. Most US satellites are not vulnerable to attack today nor are they likely to be in the years ahead. Thereafter, threats may often be handled through relatively passive measures and through redundant systems rather than an all-out space weapons competition. The Chinese anti-satellite test does put lower-altitude reconnaissance systems in greater jeopardy, but not higher-altitude communications and targeting satellites. By racing to develop its own space weapons, the US would cause two unfortunate consequences. Militarily, it would legitimate a faster space arms race than is otherwise likely - something that can only hurt a country that nearly monopolises military space activities today. Second, it would reinforce the current prevalent image of a unilateralist US, impervious to the stated will of other countries (as reflected in the huge majority votes at the United Nations in favour of negotiating bans on space weaponry). For all its popularity, a wide-ranging ban on space weaponry is unjustified. Such an accord would be generally unverifiable and unable to reverse the simple fact that many ballistic missile defence systems can be transformed into anti-satellite weapons with relatively modest adjustments. So the right policy for the US in space remains hedging and going slow. Extreme solutions can be more rhetorically appealing. But they fail to address the technical and strategic realities of the day and should not be adopted. That said, a few more such Chinese tests and we may have little choice.

**No risk to hegemony – terrestrial back-up systems are providing the same benefits as satellites**

**Morgan 10** - defense policy researcher working in RAND Corporation's Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Morgan served a 27-year career in the U.S. Air Force (Forrest, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space,”

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522541&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Another approach to reducing an adversary’s benefits in attacking space systems would be to provide redundant capabilities using terrestrial backups. Indeed, such solutions are currently being pursued. Undersea cables and other terrestrial links already provide reach-back communication from well-established forward areas of operation, although they are vulnerable to sophisticated attackers (or accidents, such as the recent Mediterranean fiber cut). High-altitude lighter-than-air craft and long-endurance unmanned aircraft systems offer possibilities to supplement space-based platforms for some ISR and communication missions. The type of assets currently being developed would not be survivable in areas where an adversary could challenge friendly control of the airspace, but long-endurance aerial surveillance could, to some extent, supplement space capabilities on the periphery of an area of operations, and platforms flown in secure airspace could be used to relay some links inside the battlespace, thereby reducing the payoff an aggressor might yield in attacking satellites supporting parallel missions. Such options merit further exploration and development.

## China Defense

**No risk of Chinese attack- 15 reasons and their literature is biased**

**Hagt, MA international policy and China studies, 8** (2008, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, Eric, China’s Military Space Strategy, “Mirror-imaging and Worst-case scenarios,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330801899512, mat)

How does Tellis know Beijing is committed to such an expansive military strategy or will challenge US military dominance? The evidence is inconclusive at best. China’s policies do not state such goals, but to avoid the debate over their reliability, let us leave government rhetoric aside. Chinese analysts, on balance, certainly argue against this paradigm and the US scholarly community is divided over the validity of such assumptions. That leaves individual interpretation of China’s strategic calculations; Tellis’s is imbued with a highly realist zero-sum framework. He cites the military component of China’s strategic interests as being ‘preventive’, ‘protective’ and ‘defensive’ in nature. Though these terms are fairly accurate, they only support the claim applied to specifically defined goals, which he concurs are, in the near term, ‘to defeat any US expeditionary force that might be committed in support of [Taiwan]’. From this point, however, he moves to a far more expansive strategy: ‘the capabilities thus obtained are intended to mutate gracefully into servicing other, more ambitious geostrategic aims’. In this way Tellis subtly, though assertively, leaps from ascribing to China a defensive posture to one that seeks to challenge and even rival US military power. The literature is not nearly so definitive. Such theorising of China’s strategic intent is highly speculative. Tellis uses a number of examples of American–Soviet competition to support his thesis that China will inevitably seek to confront US military dominance. Meanwhile, he declines to entertain the notion that China’s incentives and actions vis-à-vis the United States may be shaped by strategic values and interests outside his framework. In fact, China’s strategic considerations toward the United States are influenced and constrained by factors beyond a direct militarily antagonistic relationship. They range from China’s profound domestic development challenges; its precarious geopolitical relations with regional players; and its deep dependence on global commercial and energy markets. China also has a unique set of historical experiences (colonialism, foreign occupation, border wars) as well as the lessons learned from current events, not the least of which is the US quagmire in Iraq. These point to conditions for China and an international environment significantly different than were extant during the Cold War. Even if one assumes that some form of challenge to US hegemony is inevitable, China has a growing kit of tools at its disposal to wield nonmilitary influence. China now has clout in financial, trade and even softpower terms, all of which could bring to bear considerable economic and political pressure on a potential adversary or strategic competitor. This is not to suggest China would forgo its military options in a conflict with the United States. But it should, at the very least, give pause to consider alternative strategic modalities by China. Tellis doesn’t mention any of these, much less figure them into China’s counterspace strategy. Tellis brings that strategy within his broader framework of China’s goals to challenge and rival the United States. China’s best shot at accomplishing these expansive strategic goals, Tellis writes, is to have a ‘riposte against [America’s] Achilles heel’, its space dominance. Tellis overstates both China’s ability and its incentives to use space in a conflict with the United States. He draws the analogy of Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the United States: ‘neither side had an incentive to attack the other’s space systems, even though both developed modest instruments for this purpose, because the costs to each individually far outweighed the benefits’. The unstated implication is that China does have the incentive to attack America’s disproportionately vulnerable space assets. He is partly right; the United States is arguably now more vulnerable to asymmetric ASAT weapons that China could employ. But concluding that China has the incentive to act on this advantage removes the ‘battle’ of space out of the context of the larger conflict that such a battle would either be a part of, or would most probably escalate to. It wrongly isolates space from the US capabilities that could be brought to bear on a much inferior China in the dynamic of any military conflict. The United States has overwhelming military superiority over China. Besides vastly outnumbering China’s conventional and nuclear forces, other key elements include the dramatic advantage the United States has accrued in the past decade in precision-strike conventional weapons. These may even be capable of taking out even hardened nuclear silos in certain circumstances, thus comprising a new threat to China’s nuclear deterrence. 1 There is also the developing US multi-layered missile defence system with boost-phase components based in space that threaten China’s missile force. Even considering space alone, US capabilities and programmes far exceed those of China: for example micro- or nanosatellites, such as the XSS-10, XSS-11, DART, MiTex, Orbital Express and the new DARPA TICS and F6 programmes. There are also laser weapons: MIRACL, the ABL and its COIL, various solid-state HEL and FEL programmes, and the Starfire adaptive optics range, all of which have powerful ASAT capabilities. 2 All this means that even if the United States is currently vulnerable in space, China would have little incentive to attack American space assets because the risk of escalation to generalised conflict – a conflict China would have no chance of winning – is far too great, as Tellis admits. Failing to incorporate this into China’s strategic calculus leads to a narrow reading of what China is capable of, to say nothing of what its intentions may be. China’s own investment and interests in commercial and civilian space are also rapidly increasing, serving as a further check on any bellicose use of space. There is, of course, one plausible scenario where China could have incentive to attack US assets in space, despite its military disadvantage: a conflict over Taiwan. Kinetic-energy ASATs or other asymmetric counterspace weapons could very well be used if the United States employed its own space assets in a confrontation over the island. But this would be only in extreme circumstances, an act of desperation or selfpreservation, since China understands such a scenario could very well bring down the full force of US military might on China. The possibility of China making this calculation is far from certain, however, since to avoid escalation (possibly to nuclear exchange) or outright failure, China would need to reduce US military might to a level relative to its own (a formidable task even without space assets). Just diminishing US military dominance will not suffice if America remains powerful enough to prevail in a conflict. China may one day have the counterspace capability to achieve this goal, but one ASAT test does not get it there. For a successful kinetic-energy ASAT capability alone, China would have to conduct more tests, to say nothing of the other capabilities that would need to be devel oped and deployed to effectively disable US space assets. Furthermore, all this assumes that the United States is indeed highly vulnerable in space, an assumption scarcely borne out by current Chinese ASAT capabilities and inherent redundancy of US space assets. 3 This more narrowly defined scope for China’s counterspace capabilities fits within its overall strategic parameters and defined goals. And Tellis’s judgement that the potential conflict in space will ‘likely persist whether or not the Taiwan conflict is resolved’, is entirely possible if the United States and China find new strategic terms to compete over, but that outcome is speculative and is an entirely separate issue from China’s rivaling US space dominance writ large. A note on sources is also in order, since Tellis uses only secondary material to make sweeping assumptions about China’s military and counterspace strategies. The discussion of source material often comes up with the subject of China because of the difficulty in deciphering the vast body of literature, often of questionable reliability and predominantly in Chinese. Tellis remains undaunted, however, and cites secondary Western publications analysing this literature that primarily support his hawkish version of China’s space ambitions while giving scant mention to other more moderate positions. A selection of the provocative statements and ambitions on the American side would present a similarly distorted picture of US policy and intentions. A comprehensive reading of the Chinese literature is highly inconclusive with regard to both China’s policies and intentions as well as its programmes and capabilities. All this would matter little if it were not employed to support Tellis’s dim prognosis that space arms control is futile: ‘the threat posed by this Chinese effort cannot be neutralised by arms-control agreements’. His rejection of an arms-control regime for space is assured, yet it rests on speculations and opinions about China’s intentions, none of which have any conclusive backing. Even his language often belies a degree of uncertainty. For example, ‘it should not be surprising that Chinese leaders … have tasked their military forces to develop means to defeat the power-projection capabilities of the United States’. Such a development may not be surprising to Tellis, but that is not proof it is true. Tellis is mirror-imaging his own strategic logic onto China. In any case, to conjecture about worst-case scenarios is one thing, but it is dangerous to conclude that any hope of extricating ourselves from a deadly space rivalry is pointless. Tellis refuses to entertain any willingness by China to negotiate a space arms-control regime: ‘the implications are devastating for arms-control theorists who believe that Chinese counterspace investments are primarily bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime’. First, where is the recent historical precedent to support this claim? China has negotiated a number of wide-ranging arms-control agreements in the past. The NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most obvious, though not the only, example. Tellis’s pronouncements might be justified with solid proof, but not even talking to the Chinese and calling their bluff is illogical and unwise. What is sorely missing in Tellis’s paper is ‘the other side’ of the problem, namely that there are initiatives that the United States (and others) can take to seek to calm the Chinese drive for counterspace capabilities. The report repeatedly details how US military posturing is driving China to invest in and plan counterspace technologies, yet it fails to propose what could be changed to stop and reverse those trends. In reality, it will cost the United States very little (with the potential to gain a significant measure of international support and goodwill) to explore the possibilities for space arms control, notwithstanding the difficulties of definitions and verifiability. Tellis also brushes aside with no analysis whatsoever the value and potential effect of ‘rules of the road’ arrangements to limit or regulate space weapons and operations in space, or space-debris mitigation agreements or the confidence-building measures of reaching agreement on banning specific debris-creating ASAT tests. He does recommend talking with the Chinese to better understand their space programme, a wise suggestion if done seriously and comprehensively with a view to long-term cooperation. Beyond that, however, he proposes surprisingly little to alter the security dynamic in space, concluding that the worst case is probably inevitable and the United States should simply counter with military means. Here, Tellis makes no mention of the critically important debate over whether an unrestricted ‘offence–defence arms race’ in space is something that the United States, or any country, can ‘win’.

**The PLA being separate means nothing and won’t last for long**

**Day, Ph.D., 9**—Ph.D. in political science with an emphasis on space policy from George Washington (Dwayne, 9 March 2009, “Phasing Dragon,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1322/1, RBatra)

Another misperception may also be gestating, the view that China's Tiangong is focused on military goals. The Chinese human spaceflight program is managed by the People’s Liberation Army, and Western observers have interpreted this to mean that the program has military objectives. However, the reality is that the PLA is one of the few technically competent government institutions in China and its management of the human spaceflight program may have more to do with technical capabilities than military objectives. During a discussion about China’s space program in Washington last October, one speaker noted that the Chinese themselves have begun to recognize that PLA management of many parts of their civilian spaceflight program may be getting in the way of cooperation with foreign partners and they may be considering a new structure that separates civil and military space management, just like in the United States.

**No China War**

**Walt 1/16**, Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University [“What I told Al Jazeera About China,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/14/what\_i\_told\_al\_jazeera\_about\_china]

1. Is there a new Cold War between the United and China? In my opinion, no. There is growing concern about the relationship in both countries, and I think there is likely to be a rising security competition between the two, especially in Asia. But it's a far cry from the Cold War struggle between the United States and Soviet Union. That was really a battle to the death, where both states actively wanted to bring the other down. Nothing like that is occurring between the United States and China these days. The Cold War was also an intense ideological competition, where each side saw the other's political system as not merely different, but as the embodiment of evil. There are some differences in values between the United States and China, but it's not at nearly the same level as the Cold War. Lastly, the United States and USSR did not interact very much: trade and investment were quite low and there wasn't a lot of personal or cultural exchange between the two states. Again, the situation with China and the United States today is very different: there is a lot of trade and investments, thousands of students going back and forth every year, and and fairly high degree of elite engagement too. So while there is an emerging rivalry that I expect to become more intense, it isn't what I'd call a "Cold War." 2. Is President Obama's Asia policy a success? On balance, yes. Despite having allowed itself to get distracted by events elsewhere, I think the administration has done a fairly good job. President Obama's trip to Asia last year was quite successful. The security partnership with India is deepening, and the United States has managed relations with traditional allies such as Japan well. It has backed South Korea effectively in its delicate relationship with North Korea, and restored closer ties with Indonesia. Relations with Singapore are strong, and Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton have made it clear that the United States intends to remain closely engaged in Asia for many years to come. Overall, they've done much better in East Asia than they have in Central Asia (Afghanistant/Pakistan) or the Middle East. 3. What are China's aims? China's objectives are not really that hard to understand. First, they want to continue to grow economically, because doing so is critical to the welfare of the Chinese people and to the stability and legitimacy of the government. Second, like any other country, China wants to maximize its security. It doesn't want to be vulnerable to events elsewhere, or to pressure from other major powers. This means it wants reliable access to raw materials, to energy, and to the world markets on which its prosperity increasingly depends. Over the long term, that means it would like to reduce the American role in Asia, because its leaders will feel they are safer if there isn't any major military adversary with a strong position in Asia. Americans wouldn't be happy is some world power had an array of alliances in the Western hemisphere; by the same logic, Beijing cannot be delighted by America's close ties with many Asian countries (not to mention Taiwan). This view isn't a sign of innate Chinese expansionism or aggressiveness; for a realist, it's how any great power would view this situation. Whether Beijing will achieve its various aims, of course, is another matter.

**No risk of attack- US can take out ASATs**

**Shachtman 8** (Noah, 1/10/2008, Wired, “How China loses the Coming Space War, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin, mat)

If China was to attack the strategically important deep-space satellites it would give the United States at least an indication of the impending attack two or more weeks prior to launch as it assembled its Long March rockets on their launch pads. There could be few other reasons for China to assemble so many rockets at its satellite launch centers for near-simultaneous launches. The US could, if it wished to initiate hostilities, destroy the rockets before they were launched using either stealth bombers or cruise missiles. Alternatively, it could wait and use its National Missile Defense interceptors—which have an inherent ASAT capability—to shoot down the first group of deep space ASATs as they wait for D-day in their parking orbit.

**Already enough redundancy now to deter an attack on Taiwan**

**Shachtman** **8** (Noah, 1/10/2008, Wired, “How China loses the Coming Space War, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin, mat)

If all goes as planned, China would have launched between 12 and 16 ASATs, each capable of destroying a strategically important deep-space satellite. However, the United States military has many, many more deep space satellites. There are, as of December 2007, 32 functioning GPS navigation satellites even though the original design calls for only 24. [See above, left] In addition, the US has 23 military communications satellites, six early warning satellites that observe missile launches, and six surveillance satellites—most of which detect and monitor electronic transmissions of potential adversaries but one, apparently capable of photo-reconnaissance—in geostationary orbit. These satellites are reinforced by a private network of 90 commercial communications satellites, owned and operated by US corporations, that presumably could be used to replace destroyed military communications satellites. (Eighty-four percent of the space communications to military forces in the Iraqi theater of operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom used commercial satellites.) On top of that, there are 75 civilian and the 64 military/civilian communications satellites in low Earth orbit— although they do not have the same transmission capacity as the geostationary satellites. The United States may be the country most dependent on space for its military activities. But it is also the least vulnerable, because of the tremendous redundancy of its space assets. Of course, China does not have to destroy all these satellites to seriously hamper US military efforts in the Taiwan Straits. It would only have to destroy those satellites that have a direct line of sight to the conflict: this includes eight military and 22 US civilian communications satellites in geostationary orbits. Nevertheless, China would have to choose between attempts to destroy the satellites that guide US precision guided bombs and those satellites which relay the orders to drop those bombs. It simply cannot launch enough ASATs to destroy both systems. But does China have enough to wipe out even a single set of American satellites? Let’s examine the possibilities: Attacking Navigation Satellites You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. This really restricts China’s offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites, it could destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16 satellites still working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than those satellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from the interceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks before additional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any given time. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America’s use of precision-guided munitions—for a few hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellation’s other 23 satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still only interrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage would certainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs – it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships. US casualties might increase , with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours – and conduct some of the "dull, dirty, and dangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It’s a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would not be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends on GPS. Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the satellites over the conflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on just four different rockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China could destroy four GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45 minutes after that, and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the satellites visible over the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate or even significantly degrade the US’s ability use precision-guided munitions..

**Economic ties prevent war**

**Ackerman 5/10** – quoting former admiral Timothy Keating, the official blog of the Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association (Robert, 5/10/11, War Between China, U.S. Not Likely, http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

**Economic interdependence checks war**

**Doctoroff 10**—MBA at the University of Chicago, North Asia Area Director of JWT advertising firm (Tom, 28 November 2010, “Standing Up to China, the Obama Way”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-doctoroff/standing-up-to-china-the\_b\_788704.html, RBatra)

Third, and fortunately, China knows its ascent will not continue without Western complicity. No matter how successful the central government is in rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption, exports to Western markets, which have fueled more than 60% of economic expansion since 1990, will determine growth rates for decades to come. Even the military acknowledges armed conflict with the United States would strike a fatal blow to China's "peaceful rise." Importantly, China has always productively engaged with other societies -- from Indian Buddhism to American capital markets, absorbing new influences and applying them in Chinese contexts. After the Great Leap Backwards -- thirty years of economic and social disaster triggered by post-Liberation isolation -- it knows walls, at least outside cyberspace, are counterproductive. As one street smart sixty-year-old confided, "We're afraid of not having any friends." In China, there is no desire, even amongst reactionary military factions, to become divorced from global forces of progress.

**No space race – China won’t and can’t threaten US dominance**

**Bao, 7** – senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute (Winter 2007, Shixiu, China Security, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/Issue5full.pdf, Sawyer)

Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China's space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China's entrance to a space weapons race. Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets. So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries.

**China is solely reactionary – US action would spark dangerous counterbalancing**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”

**No motive to start a war**

**Bremmer 10** – president of Eurasia Group and author (Ian Bremmer, “China vs. America: Fight of the Century,” Prospect, March 22, 2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/, ZBurdette)

China will not mount a military challenge to the US any time soon. Its economy and living standards have grown so quickly over the past two decades that it’s hard to imagine the kind of catastrophic event that could push its leadership to risk it all. Beijing knows that no US government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already by offering Taiwan’s business elite privileged investment opportunities.

**China’s peaceful**

**Bao, 8** – senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute (2/26/08, Shixiu, Survival, “China’s Military Space Strategy; An Exchange – ‘Clearing up a Misunderstanding,’” Vol. 50, No. 1, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf, Sawyer)

History is history, but the situation is always changing. China’s leaders have asserted repeatedly that China is not superpower, nor will it ever become one. China does not seek hegemony or world dominance. In fact, China is sticking to peaceful development; concentrating efforts on economic construction and endeavouring to build a well-to-do society; pursuing a independent and peaceful foreign policy; and persevering in efforts to safeguard and promote a peaceful and stable international environment. China fights for and takes advantage of a stable international milieu for development and in turn promotes world peace and progress through that development. China does not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of or threaten other countries. China is not interested in challenging the United States’ space goals short of weaponisation or related capabilities that impinge on China’s core national interests. That is the real picture of China’s ambitions in the new century.

DEFENSE

## Lunar Colonization Defense

**Lunar colonies fail and are unnecessary**

**JÄRVSTRÅT 02** (2002, NIKLAS JÄRVSTRÅT Phd, Department of tech, math, computer sci at university west, “ Lunar colonization: why, how & When we start talking seriously about space colonization, excitement is bound to grow.”, http://moon-isru.com/information/AdAstra2002.pdf, nkj)

But it apparently is not yet fashionable to speak about a lunar colony. The concepts proposed are invariably of small-scale, temporarily manned outposts, similar to arctic bases on Earth. If this preoccupation with short-term scientific exploration and even more short-term commercial gain continues, the interest of the general public will quickly wane. Sending probes and bold explorers to Mars will not help much either — red rocks are only faintly more interesting than grey rocks, however far away. When we seriously start talking about space colonization, however, excitement is bound to grow. If you have ever thought about humans in space, the image of cities on other planets and spaceships travelling between them must have flashed through your mind. This is a powerful vision, and although it may be considered unrealistic, unnecessary or perhaps even heretical, most people will not help but find it intriguing. Consequently, any reasonably realistic effort to establish a lunar colony will receive a great deal of publicity, which could attract an increasing number of commercial investors.

**Colonization’s impossible**

**Harris 09** (1/1/09 James W. Harris served as Director of the Test Systems at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. He was responsible for planning, directing and coordinating all directorate activities, including the development, operation and maintenance of specialized range, simulation, and telecommunications facilities and the design, construction, upgrade and maintenance of related infrastructure. Harris joined NASA in 1999 as chief engineer of the Western Aeronautical Test Range at Dryden. He has also served as the chief of Range Engineering Branch, the range manager and Deputy Director of Test Systems before being advanced to Director of Test Systems in January 2008. Prior to joining the civil service ranks, Harris served as the chief of the Research Aircraft Integration Facility / Flight Loads Laboratory Support Branch for Sparta, Inc., a contractor at NASA Dryden in 1998. “Is colonizing the moon possible?” http://jameswharris.wordpress.com/2009/01/01/is-colonizing-the-moon-possible/, nkj)

What Does Colonizing Mean? Explorers are brave women and men who go places no one has gone before – but they go back home when they’re done exploring. Scientific missions are like our bases in Antarctica. Scientists go to live and work in distant lands for long periods but they eventually return home. Colonization is like the people on the Mayflower, they left with no intention of ever going home. The trouble with colonizing the Moon is it will be very hard. Harder than anyone can imagine. Maybe even impossible. People need air, food, water and shelter just to minimally survive. A self-sufficient colony means that at some point the colonists can survive on their own without resupply from Earth. The Moon is essentially airless, but it’s rocks are full of oxygen. There’s a chance of ice being on the Moon. That’s more oxygen, and hydrogen. Something to drink and the basis of creating energy and rocket fuel. Then we need to look for carbon, nitrogen and all the other elements, and rebuild what we have here on Earth. No small task, and we have to face the fact that it might be impossible. It’s a fantastic challenge. But look around you at everything you see that’s manufactured. Think of the mining, industry and manufacturing that went into those products. All those enterprises will have to be built on the Moon for colonization to work. Some people will point out that all nations trade with other nations and no nation lives completely self-sufficient. That’s true on Earth, but what if the Earth was hit by a giant comet and was destroyed? Wouldn’t you, and the future Lunar colonists, want the Moon colony to be able to carry on without Earth? The most important value of a self-sufficient colony on the Moon and Mars is life insurance for our species. There might be huge number of intelligent beings in the universe, or we might be the only one. Either way, it would be a shame for us to go extinct.

OFFENSE

## Heg Bad

**Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch**

**Layne 10** (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_7060/is\_5\_9/ai\_n54223596/)

China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the "Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending." Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.

**Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world**

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.) AK

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.

**Heg leads to aggressive Sino-Russian counterbalancing- causes nuclear war**

**Roberts 7** Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig, “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”, http://www.antiwar.com/roberts/?articleid=11422)

This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. Today, America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's.

**Unipolarity creates incentives for prolif and makes countering it impossible – only a multipolar world can solve- we control empirics**

**Weber 7** [Steven Weber, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, et al., with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue 158, January/February,]

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. It didn’t need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It’s often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden.

**Prolif guarantees nuclear and biological war**

**Utgoff 2** (Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, established the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, an in-house think-tank for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, former senior member of the National Security Council Staff. “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, V. 44, Summer)

First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.