PART ONE IS FRAMEWORK.

The notion of value to life gives their impacts meaning. The aff story is predicated upon the idea that life has some inherent value making it worthy of protection and improvement, so your ballot is a mechanism to foster value to life and endorse the ideals and policy options that do so. Their framework prescribes an ethical value like morality or justice without telling you why we care about these notions of truth in the first place; the only function of ethics is to give meaning and value to life.

PART TWO IS LINKS.

SUBPOINT A IS THE TOPIC.

*The rehabilitative model of the criminal justice system advocates a nihilistic deference to the state to solve suffering. Raynor:  
Peter Raynor (Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Swansea University) and Gwen Robinson (Senior Lecturer in Criminal Justice, Sheffield University). “WHY HELP OFFENDERS? ARGUMENTS FOR REHABILITATION AS A PENAL STRATEGY.” European Journal of Probation, University of Bucharest. Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp 3 – 20. http://www.ejprob.ro/uploads\_ro/677/PRGR.pdf*

*As Garland (1985) points out, the early part of* ***the 20th century was already seeing the emergence of a ‘penal-welfare complex’ which****, among other developments,* ***began to involve the State*** *as a key actor* ***in*** *the business of* ***rehabilitating offenders. No longer was the offender*** *to be* ***rehabilitated to save a soul for God; instead, he or she was*** *to be* ***helped towards ‘competence****, character* ***and usefulness’ in the service of*** *the proper* ***collective goals*** *of a secular State – a good citizen rather than merely a good person. This was to emerge most clearly around the middle of the century, when two major wars separated by an economic crisis had led to the development, particularly in Europe and the United States, of forms of government which practised a high degree of intervention in the economic and social life of citizens. Those citizens had learned to work together in the common (national) interest, and increasingly expected Governments to develop collective solutions to social problems. The dominance of the machinery of government, and the dominant economic role of government expenditure which had developed during the war years, were turned in the 1940s to the new task of social reconstruction through the development of Welfare States (Sullivan, 1996), and the construction of the citizens of the future through publicly funded education. The criminal justice system was only a small part of the system of Government but was also touched by this reformist vision, in which new models and methods for the rehabilitation of offenders were enthusiastically advocated and practised. A good example is provided by the work of Herman Mannheim, a refugee from Nazi Germany who brought his experience of German jurisprudence and continental criminology with him to Britain and, in turn, became one of the pioneers of British criminology (Hood, 2004). In one of his books, ‘Criminology and Social Reconstruction’ published in 1946, he sets out a programme for the development of the criminal justice and penal systems in the ‘reconstructed’ post-war societies. Along with a chapter on making the administration of criminal justice ‘more democratic’, he provides a set of recommendations for making it ‘more scientific’.* ***The aim****, firmly in the Utilitarian tradition,* ***is a penal system which will have the best effects for society as a whole. The transformation of offenders into*** *decent and* ***useful members of the community*** *by the most efficient means, whether that involves reducing the reach of the criminal law or changing the behaviour of offenders,* ***is a project in the*** *best* ***Utilitarian tradition****, which always attempted to apply clear principles to the practical business of social administration (Bentham, 1823). It also offers a clear justification for rehabilitative efforts: they are undertaken in the interests of society as a whole, to maximise the availability of ‘decent and useful members of the community’ (Mannheim, 1946, p. 62) for the collective task of social reconstruction.*

SUBPOINT B IS THE CASE.

Suffering and antagonism are inescapable conditions of human existence. The aff’s focus on eliminating instability and vulnerability to suffering fosters a constant state of ressentiment in which we abandon the real conditions of life in favor of conforming existence to the ascetic ideal. Their attempt to order the world within a problem-solution framework binds our existence to utopian ideals and reveals their futile attempt to escape humanity’s fate. If that fate is death and suffering, so be it. We must embrace it. Life is amoral - anyone who denies this is naïve and too fearful to engage life. The aff’s fixation with righting the world is a delusion that masks the true nature and meaning of suffering. Kain:  
**Kain**, Phillip J. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Santa Clara); *Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence*; *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*; 20**07**

**The** third vision takes the **cosmos** to be alien. It **was not designed for human beings** at all**; nor were they designed for it.** We just do not fit. **We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all.** It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.[5](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v033/33.1kain.html%20\%20FOOT5) **For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress** (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, **we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will** simply **weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less.** It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). **If we look deeply into** the essence of things, into **the horror of existence,** Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet **we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things** (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "**a profound illusion** . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . **can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it.** This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. **Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering**, suffering for no reason at all, **we cannot** handle**. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion.**

By attempting to minimize suffering, the aff’s addiction to security creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the unpredictability of the world becomes a threat to humanity. This redirects our perpetual ressentiment against the unknown which triggers inexplicable hatred for our fate and mortality. The aff’s will to power constructs a false sense of rationality in which our fear of suffering reflexively justifies our false ideals. They subjugate any affirmative value to the nihilism of security that fosters refusal to engage life. Der Derian:  
James(Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts and the Institute Research Professor of International Studies at Brown University); *The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard*; Cianet: http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html;19**98**

**[Nietzsche’s] method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.** 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. **It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.** Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of selfpreservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 **The will to power**, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, **produce[s] a reactive and resentful longing for** only **power, leading**, in Nietzsche's view, **to a triumph of nihilism.** But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. **Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life**, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism[.] in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But **[T]he denial of this permanent condition, the effort** to disguise it with a consensual rationality or **to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are** all **effects of this suppression of fear.** The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown.Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 **The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces.** The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable.In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes identified as evil,** and evil provokes hostility--**recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity,"** as Nietzsche puts it, **creates a people who** are willing to **subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security**: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

*The aff’s refusal to inflict harm upon wrongdoers is the product of their weakness and pity for the other. Ethics that tell us to “turn the other cheek” when we are wronged are an invention of weak humans who are unable to exact retribution against stronger humans who have wronged them, fostering weakness and passivity. Punishment is an expression of anger and lack of pity; we punish not because of some higher authority dictating guilt or to protect others from suffering, but because we wish to create reciprocal harm to those who have wronged us and restore our power to the balance of power the criminal violates.*

PART THREE IS IMPACTS.

In succumbing to the ascetic ideal, they negate the ability to have value in life and foster resentment towards life. Deleuze:

Gilles Deleuze [Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Paris VIII]. “Nietzsche and Philosophy”. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. 1962.

From the speculative position to the moral opposition, from the moral opposition to the ascetic contradiction . . But the ascetic contradiction is, in turn, a symptom which must be interpreted.What does **the man of the ascetic ideal** want? The one who repudiates life **is** also **the one who wants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power and triumph, the triumph and contagion of reactive forces.** At this point reactive forces discover the disturbing ally that leads them to victory: nihilism, the will to nothingness (GM III 13). The will to nothingness which can only bear life in its reactive form. **The will to nothingness** is the one that **used reactive forces as a way of ensuring that life must contradict, deny and annihilate itself.** The will to nothingness from the beginning, inspires all the values that are called "superior" to life. This is Schopenhauer's greatest error: he believed that the will is denied in all values superior to life. In fact, it is not the will which is denied in superior values, **it is the superior values that are related to a will to deny, to annihilate life. This will to deny defines "the value" of superior values. Its weapon is to hand life over to the domination of reactive forces in such a way that the whole of life slips further and further away**, separated from what it can do, getting smaller and smaller, **towards nothingness,** towards the poignant feeling of his nothingness" (GM III 25). The will to nothingness and reactive forces, **these are the** two **constituent elements of the ascetic ideal.**

Suffering is inevitable regardless of the AC. Their claims to solve for some instances of suffering ignore that even if affirming is good in the short term, its overall effect will be irrelevant in the project of giving meaning to our existence and foster unwillingness to engage in this project of value-finding. We must embrace suffering and better ourselves by overcoming, not avoiding, its challenges. Kain 2:

**Even if we could show** that **it** will be **possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is** very **unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is** not **better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it.** But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (*TL* 1, 79). **Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering**, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it **may all amount to nothing more than a brief** and accidental **moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will** finally **confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not** so much **about the quantity of suffering** that we can expect to find in the world **but, rather, its nature.** For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. **For Nietzsche,** even if we can change this or that, **even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life.** The very nature of things, **the very essence of existence**, **means suffering**. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering **for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.**

Their pity for the criminal fuels their narcissistic obsession with asserting their dominance over the other and reveling in one’s own freedom from suffering. We take comfort in our comfort; we assuage the suffering of others to remind ourselves how great out world appears and immerse ourselves in the delusion that the world is now free of suffering. Ure:   
Ure 6 (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09)

Of course, the corollary of Schopenhauer’s position is that although the visible signs of envy may disappear with the misfortune of others, the paranoid-schizoid position that fuels envy remains even more firmly entrenched. For rather than curing envy, this kind of **pity** merely **serves to satisfy the envious need for others to be diminished so that one can feel whole and complete**. Though by this means pitiers pleasurably assuage their narcissistic wound, it is, as Nietzsche underscores, a damaging and enervating means of doing so **because it creates an addiction to finding pleasure in themselves through enviously spoiling the other.** According to Nietzsche, the tonic effect of envy is outweighed by its harmful effects on not only the envied but the envier. The psychological consequence of this addiction to envy is melancholia: that is to say, not only do **we attack and spoil the other’s joy, but inevitably this spoiling constructs a world in which we feel that our own joy may similarly become the object of attack**.38 If Schopenhauer’s analysis of the moral psychology of pity is correct, then the others’ return to joy must make them strangers to our hearts and excite our envy, and with this envy must also come the return of the menace of Schadenfreude. Nietzsche makes just this point regarding the disjointed rejoicing of pity: “The compassionate Christian.—The reverse side of Christian compassion for the suffering of one’s neighbour is a profound suspicion of all the joy of one’s neighbour, of his joy in all that he wants to do and can” (D 80). In other words, within the framework of Schopenhauer’s ethics of pity we can regard others as of equal worth only so long as they suffer equally. Suffering thus bridges the gulf among egos—but not, as we have seen, because as pitiers we mysteriously enter into or participate in the condition of others but, rather, because their demise brings them down to our level and thus appeases the envy we feel at the sight of their self-sufficient happiness (see D 138). The sight of others’ suffering, in short, makes their independence more palatable to us because in this debased state they no longer arouse in us painful feelings of deprivation or the anxiety that we may be abandoned. To recall Rousseau on this latter point, the suffering of others is a pledge of their affection for us. As Schopenhauer’s analysis implies, taking pleasure in the other’s suffering is a tonic for restoring damaged narcissistic self-affection. It is for this reason, Nietzsche believes, that when persistent feelings of envy threaten to attenuate our self-affection we pursue social or intersubjective means for reviving the pleasant feeling of Schadenfreude. In other words, **when we enviously spoil others we** surreptitiously **restore** to ourselves **our narcissistic self-affection.** Our envy does so **by enabling us to construct ourselves as** those who, by comparison with the spoiled object, are **exempt from suffering**, need, and loss. **Through envy we aim to make the other** abject or **pitiable so that we no longer** feel or **experience our own abjection.**

The aff’s attempt to order the world and reduce suffering denies humankind the ability to better itself and discover the meaning in existence. This obsession with avoiding suffering makes death, suffering, and extinction desirable by forcing humanity to remain stuck in its state of imperfection, avoidance, and reactivity. We must engage suffering and allow it to unveil the value to life lest we lose meaning to our existence. Nietzsche:  
**Nietzsche**, Friedrich; *Beyond Good and Evil*; aphorism #225: p. 342; 18**86**

Whetherhedonism, or pessimism, or **utilitarian**ism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these **ways of thinking**, which measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, **are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which** everyone who knows about creative forces and **an artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion.** Compassion for yourself[,]—that is, of course, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us—even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom." **Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making himself smaller**, how you make him smaller**—and there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want**, if possible—and there is no wilder "if possible"—**to do away with suffering.** What about us? It does seem that **we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well being**, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that **looks like an end, a condition which** immediately **makes human beings laughable and contemptible,** something **which makes their destruction desirable!** The culture of suffering, of great suffering, **don't you realize that** up to this point **it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up?**

PART FOUR IS THE ALTERNATIVE.

Embrace our fate and affirm the eternal recurrence of our life. Live according to the knowledge that suffering and death are inevitable and do what you would will yourself to spend eternity doing over and over again. Suffering just happens; we are not responsible for it and we can’t change it. Without suffering, our life project becomes meaningless. Eternal recurrence is the only way to reject the ascetic ideal and solve our resentment of life. Kain 3:

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. **Eternal recurrence**, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (*WP* 55). It **implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is** no plan, **no purpose, no reason for it.** Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, **we must see that there is meaning here—**it is just that **it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself,** meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, **suffering for no reason at all.** But **[A]t the** very **same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering.** That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. **Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt.** There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (*TI* "Errors" 8; *HH* 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. **This** itself **could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt.** Eternal recurrence brings the Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. **Eternal recurrence** gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It **fills the void**. With what? It fills it **with** something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with **one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but** (given the horror of existence) **suffering cannot be avoided** anyway, **and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of** sin, punishment, or **guilt.**

The alternative must be absolute—accepting their framing of suffering and guilt in any instance plunges ethics back into the depths of the ascetic ideal. Only an authentic embracing of one’s fate produces change in ethics and thought. Kain 4:

I think we are now in a position to see that for eternal recurrence to work, **for it** to have the effect that it must have **for Nietzsche,** we must accept without qualification, we must love, every single moment of our lives, every single moment of suffering. We cannot allow ourselves to be tempted by what might at first sight seem to be a much more appealing version of eternal recurrence, that is, a recurring life that would include the desirable aspects of our present life while leaving out the undesirable ones. To give in to such temptation would be to risk losing everything that has been gained. To give in to such temptation, **I suggest,** would allow the suffering in our present life to begin to reassert its psychological stranglehold. We would start to slip back into subjugation. We would again come to be dominated by our suffering. We **[End Page 57]** would spend our time trying to minimize it, or avoid it, or ameliorate it, or cure it. We would again become slaves to it. For the same reason, I do not think it will work for us to accept eternal recurrence merely because of one or a few grand moments—for the sake of which we are willing to tolerate the rest of our lives. Magnus holds that all we need desire is the return of one peak experience.21 This suggests that our attitude toward much of our life, even most of it, could be one of toleration, acceptance, or indifference—it could even be negative. All we need do is love one great moment and, because all moments are interconnected (Z IV: "The Drunken Song" 10; WP 1032), that then will require us to accept all moments. This would be much easier than actually loving all moments of one's life—every single detail. The latter is what is demanded in Ecce Homo, which says that amor fati means that one "wants nothing to be different" and that we "[n]ot merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it**" (EH "Clever" 10, emphasis added [except to love]). We want "a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering. . . .** Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable **. . ." (EH "BT" 2).** If we do not love every moment of our present life for its own sake, those moments we do not love, those moments we accept for the sake of one grand moment, I suggest, will begin to wear on us.**22** We will begin to wish we did not have to suffer through so many of them, we will try to develop strategies for coping with them, we will worry about them, they will start to reassert themselves, they will slowly begin to dominate us, and pretty soon we will again be enslaved by them. Our attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, or reduce it—or it will again begin to dominate us. **Indeed, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says that he had to display a "Russian fatalism." He did so by tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed—than rebelling against them. Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to annoy me mortally—and it actually was mortally dangerous every time. Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself "different"—that is in such cases great reason itself. (EH "Wise" 6)** Eternal recurrence **is an attempt to deal with meaningless suffering. It is an attempt to do so that** completely rejects an approach to suffering that says, Let's improve the world, let's change things, let's work step by step to remove suffering—**the view of liberals and socialists whom Nietzsche so often rails against.** If it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering in the world, as Nietzsche thinks it is, then to make it your goal to try to do so is to enslave yourself to that suffering.

PART FIVE IS ROLE OF THE JUDGE.

The standards we’re used to say we can affect or reflect the real world by using vacuous normative language to promote self-righteousness and educate the masses. This conception of thought is ridiculous. Our role as debaters and judges is to improve our systems of thought— to think about thinking. A reworking of debate discourse is necessary to preserve the intellectual value and integrity of our activity. Any other model means sacrificing the potential for real effectiveness in favor of empty platitudes. This isn’t micropolitical or pre-fiat; this is the real “real world”. Schlag:  
Pierre Schlag, University of Colorado Law Professor, “Normative and Nowhere to Go”, 1990, Stanford Law Review

**Normative legal thought cannot wait** to enlist epistemology, semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its own ethical-moral argument structures about the right, the good, the useful, the efficient (or any of their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot wait **to reduce world views**, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations, **and thought itself, to norms**. In short, **it cannot wait to tell you** (or somebody else) **what to do**. In fact, **normative legal thought** is so much in a hurry that it **will tell you what to do even though there is no**t the slightest **chance that you might** actually **be in a position to do it**. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle into effect, or to restructure the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? “In the future, we should ….” When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn’t seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet **despite its** obvious **desire to have worldly effects**, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned thatfor all practical purposes, **its only consumers are** legal academics and perhaps a few law students – **persons who are** virtually **never in a position to put any of its** wonderful **normative advice into effect.** If there’s no one in charge at the other end of the line, why then is normative legal thought in such a hurry to get its message across? And why, particularly, is it always in such a hurry to repeat the same old boring moves? There is an edge to these questions. And the edge comes in part from our implicit assumption that normative legal thought is a kind of that and that, as thought, it is in control of its own situation, its form, its own rhetoric. But it isn’t so. **If normative legal thought keeps repeating itself**, **and** if it **is incapable of understanding challenges to its own** intellectual **authority, that is because it is not** simply or even fundamentally **a kind of thought.** Normative legal thought **[it] is** in part **a routine** – our routine. It is the **highly repetitive, cognitively entrenched, institutionally sanctioned**, and politically enforcedroutine of the legal academy – a routine **that** silently **produces our thoughts and keeps our work channeled within the same** old **cognitive** and rhetorical **matrices**. Like most routines, **it has been so well internalized that we repeat it automatically, without thinking**. And like most routines, it remains unseen and unobserved – which is why it is so powerful. It is an aspect – a significant aspect – of the unnoticed and untroubled overarching epistemic economy within which (virtually) all contemporary legal thought is produced. In terms somewhat misleading but more familiar to legal thinkers, normative legal thought is the latest incarceration of the Langdellian legacy, the latest variation on formalism – normative formalism.

There’s a difference between rationalizing and thinking rationally. Only discussions about our systems of thought can have meaningful impacts on how we view and enact the affirmation of our lives. The value of thought lies not in making our actions affirmative, but of making our thought about life affirmative. You can’t pass the advocacy through Congress, but you have the power to promote the type of thought and critical engagement necessary for all of us to gain an understanding of how we define the value of our lives. Deleuze 2:

Gilles Deleuze [Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Paris VIII]. “Nietzsche and Philosophy”. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. 1962.

When knowledge becomes a legislator, the most important thing to be subjected is thought. Knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason. The instinct for knowledge is therefore thought, but thought in its relation to the reactive forces which seize and conquer it. For rational knowledge sets the same limits to life as reasonable life sets to thought; life is subject to knowledge and at the same time thought is subject to life. **Reason** sometimes **dissuades and** sometimes **forbids us to cross certain limits: because it is useless** (knowledge is there to predict) because it would be evil (life is there to be virtuous), **because it is impossible** (there is nothing to see or think behind the truth). 2' — But does not critique, understood as **critique of knowledge** itself, **express[es] new forces capable of giving thought another sense,** a thought that would go to the limit of what life can do, **a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can do, a thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life. Life would be the active force of thought, but thought would be the affirmative power of life.** Both would go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity. **Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life.** "There are lives with prodigious difficulties; these are the lives of the thinkers. And we must lend an ear to what we are told about them, for here we discover possibilities of life the mere story of which gives us joy and strength and sheds light on the lives of their successors. There is as much invention, reflection, boldness, despair and hope here as in the voyages of the great navigators; and to tell the truth, these are also voyages of exploration in the most distant and perilous domains of life. What is surprising in these lives is that two opposed instincts, which pull in opposite directions, seem to be forced to walk under the same yoke: the instinct that leads to knowledge is constantly constrained to abandon the ground where man habitually lives and to throw itself into the uncertain, and the instinct that wills life is forced to grope ceaselessly in the dark for a new place to establish itself' (PTG). In other words**, life goes beyond the limits that knowledge fixes for it, but thought goes beyond the limits that life fixes for it.** Thought ceases to be a ratio **y**26\* life ceases to be a reaction. **The thinker** thus **expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirmative.**