*I affirm: Resolved- The United States ought to guarantee universal health care for its citizens.*

1. Aff gets RVI. The AC is always vulnerable to T since the NC is reactive and can run theory on any interp, so aff RVI checks unnecessary theory. Also, aff RVI is key to resolve the theory debate; they claim my interp has skewed substance too much to evaluate it, which means you can’t vote on it. If they don’t allow me to turn theory with an RVI, then I can’t gain offense on the only layer left in the round, making theory itself abusive. Also, if the neg presents a better interp, don’t drop me; adopt theirs and drop my argument to avoid dropping me for marginal abuse on reasonable interps.

2. Aff has a time skew since I only get 4 minutes to answer a 7 minute NC and preempt 6 minutes of negative responses. Also, negs pick their position after hearing the aff, giving them the advantage in the case debate. Also, I have to extend my offense twice, but they only have to do it once, making my offense harder to win. At the point where each side has equal offense, presume aff since I did the same work in less time.

3. Ought statements are evaluations of actions. Evaluations distinguish between good and bad, on the basis of features, and those features constitute our reasons. Having an obligation means that we have the best reason. If there were a better reason, then the obligation would instead apply to that action. All reasons to take or not take an action are evaluated comparatively on the basis of the strength of those reasons. Sufficient strength requires only that the reason be equal to the comparative reasons. If no valid justification exists, then all reasons are sufficient in comparison to the other equally invalid justifications. Therefore, any purported justification would constitute a sufficient reason. As you ought to do what you have sufficient reason to do, you ought to take the action.

4. I do not specify a particular plan or advocacy to implement UHC. If the neg gives theoretical reasons why I should, they must ask me in cross-ex if I will defend a certain system for them to read turns against. I will accept the plan they want me to advocate if it allows reasonable aff ground.

5. The neg may not advocate any counterplan that includes providing universal health care to US citizens. I’d have no unique impacts since they can garner all AC impacts by taking an action not directly outlined by the resolution; every argument in the AC no longer matters and I have to start over in the 1AR with nothing. There’s no limit on what they can change about my advocacy. I have to prep answers to every minor alteration because I don’t know which one they’ll go for. Strat skew is key to fairness since I need to access arguments to win the round.

6. Theory against explicit interps in the AC is not a reason to reject the debater absent an RVI since such arguments are functionally counter-interps with no implicit offensive implication.

I value MORALITY, as “ought” indicates a moral obligation.

Chains of moral reasoning cannot reach valid conclusions without terminating in assertions, and these assertions define the axiomatic values we hold when forming further moral principles. Taylor:  
(Charles Taylor, “Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives”, 1993, pg. 46)

Wittgenstein shows that the **[a] subject** not only isn’t but **[cannot] be aware of** a whole host of issues which nevertheless have direct,l bearing on **the correct application of a rule.** Wittgenstein shows this by raising the possibilities of misunderstanding. **Some outsider**, unfamiliar with the way we do things, **might misunderstand what to us are** perfectly clear and **simple directions**. You want to get to town? Just **[such as] follow the arrow**s. But suppose that what seemed the natural way of following the arrow to him or her was to go in the direction of the feathers, not of the points? We can imagine a scenario: [but] there are no arrows in the outsider’s culture, but there is a kind of ray gun whose discharge fans out like the feathers on our arrows…From the intellectualist perspective, it must be that **somewhere in our mind,** consciously or unconsciously, **a premise has been laid down about how you follow arrows.** From another angle, Once we see the stranger’s mistake, we can explain what he or she ought to do. But if we can give an explanation, we must already have an explanation. SO the thought must reside somewhere in us that you follow arrows this way…There are an indefinite number of points at which, for a given explanation of a rule and a given run of paradigm cases, someone could nevertheless misunderstand, as our stranger did the injunction to follow the arrows. For instance, I might say that by “Moses” I mean the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt, but then my interlocutor might have trouble with the words “Egypt” and “Israelites”. Nor would **these questions would not come to an end when we get down to words like red, dark, sweet.** Nor would even mathematical explanation be proof against this danger…We recognize an obsession of the modern intellectual tradition, from Descartes. It didn’t see this as a problem, because it thought we could find such secure foundations, explanations in terms of features which were self-explanatory or self-authenticating. That’s why the imagined interlocutor placed his hopes in words like red, dark, sweet, **referring to** basic **empirical experiences on which we** can **ground everything else**. The force of Wittgenstein’s argument lies in its radical undercutting of any such foundationalism. Wittgenstein stresses the unarticulated—at some points even unarticulable—nature of this understanding. **Obeying a rule is a practice**”. **Giving reasons for** one’s practice in **following a rule has to come to an end**. “[as] **One’s reasons will soon give out. And then one shall act**, without reasons”. Or later, “If I have exhausted my justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: **‘[and say] This is simply what I do”.**

Language, ethics, and reason cannot be private; there would be no way to judge something as correct or incorrect without public norms. If we all called the contents of our personal boxes “beetle”, we’d have no idea what others meant when they called it the same thing without public meaning. We are not independent norm-makers; justifications for our moral beliefs must arise from social consensus as it is the only coherent way to resolve the infinite regress of asking for reasons for following rules. Moral rules are adapted links between society’s perceptions and consequent judgments. Taylor 2:

**The connections which form our background are** just de facto links, **not susceptible of any justification.** For instance, **justifications are simply imposed by our society; we are conditioned to make them.** They become “automatic,” which is why the question never arises. The view that society imposes these limits is the heart of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Or else they can perhaps be considered as “wired in.” **It’s just a fact about us that we react this way, as it is that we blink when something approaches our eyes, and no justification is in order**…It is his insistence that **as following rules is a social practice**. Granted, this also fits, perhaps, with Kripke’s version of the first view. But I think that, in reality, this connection of background with society reflections an alternative vision, which has jumped altogether outside the old monological outlook which dominates the epistemological tradition. Whatever Wittgenstein thought, this second view seems to me to be right. What the first cannot account for is the fact that **we do give explanations, that we can often articulate** reasons **when challenged. [For example] Following arrows towards the point is an arbitrarily imposed connection**; **it** that **makes sense, granted the way [society has decided] arrows move**. What we need to do is follow a hint from Wittgenstein and attempt to give an account of the background as understanding, **which [in turn] places [the arrow] in social space.**

Misunderstandings of morality can only be reconciled through mutual agreements regulating behavior. This necessitates a contractual view of morality because the only way to reconcile different perceptions is through moral rules based on the unity of people under mutually agreed upon principles. Kelsen:  
**Kelsen** (Hans Kelsen, Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Oct., 1948), pp. 906-914)

**The subjectivistic character of the relativistic theory of knowledge** involves two perils. The one is a paradoxical solipsism; that is, the assumption that the ego as the subject of knowledge is the only existent reality. Such assumption **would involve a relativistic epistemology in a self-contradiction. For if the ego is the only existent reality, it 'must be an absolute reality.** The other danger is a no less paradoxical pluralism. Since the world exists only in the knowledge of the subject, according to this view, the ego is, so to speak, the center of his own world. **If**, however, **the existence of many egos must be admitted,** the consequence seems to be inevitable that **there are as many worlds as there are knowing subjects. Philosophical relativism** deliberately **avoids** solipsism as well as **pluralism**. Taking into consideration-as true relativism-the mutual relation among the various subjects of knowledge, this theory **[and] compensates its inability to secure the objective existence of the one and same world for all subjects by the assumption that the** individuals, as **subjects of knowledge**, **are equal**. This assumption implies that also the various processes of cognition in the minds of the subjects are equal, and thus the further assumption becomes possible that **the objects of knowledge**, as the results of these individual processes, **are in conformity with one another, an assumption confirmed by the external behavior of** the **individuals.**

States are definitionally bound to adhere to their obligations since they are mechanisms that lack private wills. Ripstein:  
Arthur Ripstein, “Force and Freedom”, page 321

**The sovereign cannot exempt itself in pursuit of a private purpose because the sovereign is not a private actor; the sovereign is the omnilateral will, and its only purposes are those inherent in the idea of the original contract.** So **the sovereign has no discretion over the ends** that **it will pursue**, **and** so **does not have means in the way that a private person has means subject to his or her choice** in setting and pursuing ends. To fail to punish, then, would be to treat its coercive power as an instrument to be used for discretionary purposes, and so to do wrong in the highest degree by renouncing its own principle, even in the form of a single exception

Social consensus is expressed in the form of contractual agreements. Agents ought to uphold contracts to respect the invested autonomy of other parties to agreement. Ripstein 2:  
(Ripstein, Arthur, University of Toronto Law Professor. Kant on Law and Justice. Pg. 14)

**A contract is** not understood as a narrow special case of the more general moral obligation of promise keeping14, but as **a** specifically **legal institution [that] govern[s] the transfer of rights**.15 **[The government] transfer[s] [its] powers** to you, **for [its] powers include** both my ability to do certain tasks, such as cutting your lawn, or paying you a sum of money, and my **legal powers to do things**, such as transferring piece of property to you. **If [it] fail[s] to perform as required, [it] wrong[s] you in** pretty much **the same way as I would** have wronged you **had I given** you **something**, either as a gift or in exchange for something else, **and then taken it back.** In a contract, I have given you that thing, as a matter of right, and so if I fail to deliver, I wrong you in the way I would if I took it back. **In cases of contract, one** person **has the use of the other's powers,** as specified by their agreement, **without having possession of the other** person.

Contracts preclude the normativity of other ethical theories. Only contracts dictate action without begging the question of why actors ought to comply since they brought the expectations upon themselves and can’t justify disobeying. Also, questioning an agent’s motives for consenting to a contract does not deny the validity of the agreement but rather appeals to non-contractual moral theories, which is circular. Contractual agreements are justified because the maxim “violate contractual agreements” cannot guide action. Accepting this maxim would prevent anyone from making promises with others, because these promises could be broken at any time.

Thus, the standard is ABIDING BY STATE CONTRACTS.

There are two forms of state contracts: international and domestic. Domestic contracts derive the state’s composition and give states the authority to form further obligations. International contracts are further obligations: those that are formed between multiple states and regulate interstate action. States ought to act according to international contracts since the development of international law mirrors the process states use to justify their domestic authority. Respecting international contracts best represents the pluralistic development of moral norms. Kelsen 2:

This assumption implies that also the various processes of cognition in the minds of the subjects are equal, and thus the further assumption becomes possible that the objects of knowledge, as the results of these individual processes, are in conformity with one another, an assumption confirmed by the external behavior of the individuals. Diametrically opposed to this absolutistic theory of the state is the one which conceives of **the state [is]** as **a specific relation among individuals, established by a legal order** or, what amounts to the same, **as a community of human beings constituted by** this order, **the national legal order.** **In rejecting** the **sovereignty dogma**, this relativistic doctrine considers **the state [is] subject,** **together with all the other states, to the international legal order.** In their subjection to international law,all states are equal and members of the international community constituted by international law. According to this view, **the state is** certainly **a legal authority**; **but not a supreme authority, since it is** essentially **under the authority of international law.** But **this law is created, in a** thoroughly **democratic way**, by custom and treaties, that is, **by the cooperation of the states subjected to it. As a legal community,** **the state exists together with all the other states** within the international community **under international law**, just as private corporations exist within the state under national law. **Thus the state represents** only **an intermediate stage between the international community and the** various **legal communities established under the state in accordance with its national law.**

I contend I Law obligates affirming.

I law obligates the US to provide health care when individuals cannot obtain it themselves. Yamin:  
“The Right to Health Under International Law and Its Relevance to the United States”, Alicia Ely Yamin, JD, MPH Am J Public Health. 2005 July; 95(7): 1156–1161. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/

The right to health has evolved rapidly under international law, and its normative clarification has significant conceptual and practical implications for health policy. The framework that international human rights offers with respect to health shifts the analysis of issues such as disparities in treatment in the United States from questions of quality of care to fundamental matters of democracy and social justice, as well as suggesting avenues for accountability. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW **Under international law, there is a right not merely to health care but to the** much **broader concept of health.** Because rights must be realized inherently within the social sphere, this formulation immediately suggests that determinants of health and ill health are not purely biological or “natural” but are also factors of societal relations.[1](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/#r1),[2](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/" \l "r2) Thus, a rights perspective is entirely compatible with work in epidemiology that has established social determinants as fundamental causes of disease.[3](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7560851)–[6](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/#r6) **The** first notion of a **right to health under international law is found in the** 1948 **U**niversal **D**eclaration of **H**uman **R**ights (hereafter called Declaration), **which was unanimously proclaimed by the UN G**eneral **A**ssembly **as a common standard for** all **humanity.** **The Declaration sets forth the right to a “standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including . . . medical care and . . . the right to security in the event of . . . sickness, disability . . . or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”**[7](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/#r7)(article 25) The Declaration does not define **the components of a right to health**; however, they **both include and transcend medical care.** The Cold War polarized countries’ positions on human rights. In 1966, instead of the indissoluble whole reflected in the Declaration, twin covenants on civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights were promulgated.[8](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/#r8) The right to health was included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). **Article 12 of the ICESCR** explicitly **sets out a right to health and defines steps that states should take to “realize progressively” “to the maximum available resources” the “highest attainable standard of health,”** including “the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child”; “the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”; “the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases”; and “the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.”[9](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449334/#r9)(article 12(2))

Current US policy fails. Only UHC is consistent with I law. Derickson:  
Alan Derickson, Professor Labor Relations, Penn State University, 2005, Health Security for All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America, p. 158-9

The goal of universal health care became ever more distant over the decades following the Carter administration. Since 1980, **the number of uninsured Americans**—the vast majority of whom are members of working families and a disproportionate share of whom are members of disadvantaged minorities—**has risen** almost without interruption. **The revelation that the ranks of the uninsured swelled from 33 million** in 1983, a year of severe recession, **to 37 million** in 1986, a year of buoyant recovery, **underscored** both the immensity of the problem and **the degree to which this problem afflicted the employed as well as the unemployed.** With so may other nations protecting all their citizens, the worsening situation stood out in stark relief. Economist Uwe Reinhardt did not mince words when he appraised the unique limitations of the American system for a congressional panel in 1986: “Canada, France, Germany, Italy – **every other country in the civilized world** – **provides its citizens with the dignity of accessing health care** without having to beg for it.” In subsequent years, the architects of managed care did virtually nothing to bring a modicum of security to the working poor and others lacking health benefits. By the mid-1990s, **the number of uninsured exceeded 40 million. In** 20**02, almost 44 million Americans had no health insurance.**

US commitment to I law is key to solving global scenarios for extinction. IEER:  
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties. May 2002. <http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf>

The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living with**in a global society with a deeply integrated world economy.** In this global society, **the repercussions of** **the** **actions** **of states**, non-state actors, and individuals **are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas[,]** accumulations, **nuclear testing,** the danger of **accidental nuclear war, or the** vast **massacre**s **of civilians** that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. **Multilateral agreements** increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they **articulate global norms, such as** the protection of human rights and **the prohibitions of genocide and use of** **weapons of mass destruction.** **They establish predictability and accountability** in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system offered by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical27 implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments by the United States that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. **When a powerful** and influential **state like the U**nited **S**tates is seen to **treat[s] its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or** of **national interest** alone**,** **other states will see this as** a **justification to** relax or **withdraw from their** own **commitments.** If the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.

States can’t overcome power of insurance companies—only federal implementation solves. Kail:  
Bill Lennox Kail, [Department of Sociology, Florida State University], Can States Lead the Way to Universal Coverage? The Effect of Health-Care Reform on the Uninsured, SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 90, Number 5, December 2009.

**Insurance company influence is more powerful at the state level**. **In many states, insurers have captured the state** insurance **commissioner’s offices that are supposed to be doing the regulating.** These offices have become a revolving door with insurance industry executives often serving as commissioners and then returning to the industry (Bodenheimer, 1990). Further, insurance companies often choose to locate in states where insurance departments are weak or easily captured (Meier, 1988). Smaller insurance bureaucracies are less able to exercise regulatory oversight of the industry because they are incapable of handling the workload associated with enforcing stringent regulations (Stream, 1999). **Even when** price and accessibility **regulations are enacted, the state bureaucracy may lack the capacity to enforce** them.

State funding is unsustainable. Kail 2:

Finally, our results suggest that the idea that states are laboratories of democracy that can lead the way to universal coverage is overstated. It is true that states have reduced the uninsured population, but this has mainly been done by expanding public programs that are jointly funded by the federal government. They have done this by using waiver authority to create innovative approaches that allow them to cover new population groups. There are limits, however, to what a federal-state partnership can achieve. **Some states lack the fiscal capacity to maintain a continuous funding stream, while other states lack the political will to increase the tax base sufficiently to provide a secure revenue source for public programs.**

Coercive redistribution of wealth to help the poor is consistent with Kantian reason. Wood:  
Allen W. Wood, “Kantian Ethics”, pp. 197-198, Cambridge University Press, 2008 http://books.google.com/books?id=adzpa0\_7L1cC&pg=PA198&lpg=PA198&dq=kant+on+taxes&source=bl&ots=fd027VTCR5&sig=NuqZl7pNzCil1Op9CLpaPPCNTcc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WAGwUKPqFdSDqQGE9oCoAg&ved=0CGgQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=kant%20on%20taxes&f=false

Kant’s discussion of the state’s right to tax the wealthy to support the poor occurs immediately following, and in the context of, his discussion of the sovereign (Berherrscher) as the “supreme proprietor” (Obereigentumer) of the land (MS 6:324). This is regarded by Kant as the ground of the state’s right to tax citizens in general, and **Kant understands the state’s role as “supreme proprietor” as guaranteeing it “the right to assign to each what is his”** (MS 6:324). Kant’s doctrine on this point must be further understood in the context of his theory of private property, and especially his crucial distinction between “provisional” and “peremptory” rights of property (MS 6:256-7). Kant treats private property as the foundation of the state to such an extent that he holds that if we do not assume any rights of property that need to be determined and protected, then there would be no command to leave the state of nature and found a civil society coercively protecting rights (MS 6:312). But **the rights of property** presupposed by the command to leave the state of naturehave to be regarded as **[are]** merely **“provisional” in** the sense **that they are neither determinate** as to their content **nor enforceable against others.** **A** determinate **right of property requires** not only the proprietor’s claim over the thing but also **the unanimous declaration of all** others **to respect that claim[,]** (MS 6:255); **and the only** actual **form this declaration can take is the recognition by the general will** of a civil society **of the thing as his** (MS 6:256). Only this makes a person’s property right “peremptory”—that is, actually valid and enforceable against others. This means that **[A]ll peremptory rights of property are held subject to the general will and the legislation made by it, including the laws** (if there be such) **saying that the rich are to be taxed** for the benefit of the poor. **There is** therefore **no natural right of property that anyone could** legitimately **assert against the general will**, or any claim to property rights that could override the law. The point is not merely that the wealthy survive through the protection of the state and that they must therefore be prepared to be taxed to ensure the survival of their fellow citizens. **For Kant,** all property is held by citizens only subject to the laws that have been made by the general will, the will of the sovereign whose right it is “to assign to each what is his”. Laws governing the distribution of wealth, like all laws governing the lives of citizens, are just only by conformity to the idea of the social contract, the criterion that they might without contradiction have been rationally adopted by the unanimous consent of all (MS 6:340, TP 5:297, 304-5). But within this constraint, it would seem that for Kant, **any form of taxation or** economic **redistribution approved in the legislation** made by the people’s representatives **would be just. Those** taxed or otherwise **deprived of property for the benefit of others** could **have no ground for complaint.**

AT Can’t Run Permissibility With Contracts

1. TURN -- More aff ground good—key to checking back neg side bias.

2. Neg still gets prohibition and tons of turn ground. He could win that the status quo or a counterplan is better at meeting the right to health, which would be a reason to reject UHC under Yamin.

3. Drop the argument, not the debater. Dropping the argument makes sure I’m not overly penalized for not having enough time to answer a theory shell I actually meet in the 1AR due to time constraints. Also, extend the number one they conceded at the top of the AC; adopt their interp and drop mine to avoid dropping me for marginal abuse on reasonable interps.

4. Contracts are manifestations of an agent’s freedom—that’s Ripstein 1. The rights guaranteed by a contract have limits; those rights are no longer valid when they interfere with the rights of others. That’s also confirmed by numerous Supreme Court rulings. Contracts have both types of prohibitions for the neg to turn.

5. They assume permissibility rightfully belongs to the neg, but that's just not warranted in the shell. Make them make arguments for it instead of claiming it; that’s what I did. Permissibility ground for aff is consistent with the legitimate philosophical basis of the framework. Only contracts dictate moral norms, so no valid contract means no valid moral norms. That’s key to philosophical education and precedes their ethics claims in the theory shell since we need to know how to evaluate ethical rules before you punish me for applying them correctly.

6. There’s an even 2-2 distribution of ground under my interp. I can prove either that no contract exists mandating the resolution or that there is a contract that mandates affirming. The neg can prove that a contract prohibits UHC or that a contract exists that says we are permitted not to provide UHC.

AT Practical Reason- Framework

Consistency with contractual agreements is the only universalizeable moral theory since we can’t rationally will non-compliance. Promises in contracts are key to respecting autonomy. Engstrom:  
Stephen Engstrom, “The Form of Practical Knowledge”, Harvard University Press 2009. Pg 202-203

**Suppose there were a law of false promising that all persons followed** out of their shared recognition of its validityand hence knew to be a law without needing to discover it through experience of its effects. **Then everyone would** practically **recognize**, in the concrete instance as well as in abstract, **that all persons are to conduct themselves according to this law. Hence everyone** could at least in principle and therefore **would** in the practical cognitively ideal case **recognize** (in accordance with the expectation grounded in their shared practical knowledge) **any false expression of a practical judgment** that might be addressed to them to be the false expression it is **and so** would not-indeed, **could not**-**believe it** (d. 8:426). Now **the possibility of** the addressee's **believing that a practical judgment is being expressed is**, of course, **a condition of the possibility of what is willed in the false promising,** namely **to induce** in the addressee **the false belief that a** certainpractical **judgment has been expressed, which** in turn **is necessary if the latter is to be induced to suppose,** erroneously, **that a genuine agreement** in willing **has been reached. The attempt to will the maxim of false promising as a universal law thus leads to a contradiction,** in that it involves the attempt to will, or to deem it good, that such false beliefs be induced while recognizing that they cannot be.

AT Libertards

Absolute conceptions of freedom lead to oppressive anarchy. Locke:  
**Locke**, Writer for The American Conservative, **05,** (Robert, The American Conservative, “Marxism of the Right,” 3/14, <http://www.amconmag.com/2005_03_14/article1.html>, date accessed: 6/7/08)

**Libertarian[s]** naïveté extends to politics. They often **confuse the absence of government impingement upon freedom with freedom as such. But without a sufficiently strong state, individual freedom falls prey to other more powerful individuals. A weak state and a freedom-respecting state are not the same thing, as shown by many a chaotic Third-World tyranny.** Libertarians are also naïve about the range and perversity of human desires they propose to unleash. They can imagine nothing more threatening than a bit of Sunday-afternoon sadomasochism, followed by some recreational drug use and work on Monday. They assume that if people are given freedom, they will gravitate towards essentially bourgeois lives, but this takes for granted things like the deferral of gratification that were pounded into them as children without their being free to refuse. They forget that for much of the population, preaching maximum freedom merely results in drunkenness, drugs, failure to hold a job, and pregnancy out of wedlock. **Society is dependent upon inculcated self-restraint** if it is not to slide into barbarism, **and libertarians attack this self-restraint.** Ironically, **this often results in internal restraints being replaced by the external restraints of police and prison, resulting in less freedom**, not more.This contempt for self-restraint is emblematic of a deeper problem: libertarianism has a lot to say about freedom but little about learning to handle it. Freedom without judgment is dangerous at best, useless at worst.Yet libertarianism is philosophically incapable of evolving a theory of how to use freedom well because of its root dogma that all free choices are equal, which it cannot abandon except at the cost of admitting that there are other goods than freedom. Conservatives should know better.