ST. Mark’s TS Criticisms (1/23/12)

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## 1NC Framework

**Resolved is legislative**

**Army Officer School 4** (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**USFG should means the debate is only about government policy**

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**The resolution is the key stasis point of discussion—their interpretation is arbitrary**

**O’Donnell 4**—Dr. Tim O'Donnell, Director of Debate at Mary Washington, 2004 (Blue Helmet Blues: United Nations Peacekeeping and the United States, Ed. Stefan Bauschard & Jean-Paul Lacy, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm, PhD at Pittsburgh)

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point. How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

**This presumptively outweighs**

**Shively 2k** – Ruth, professor of political science at Texas A&M University, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, ed: Portis, p. 181-182)

In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will some­thing "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti­democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy. SAYING "YES" TO PERSUASION The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest--that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect--if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

**First, switch side debate—it’s key to emancipatory change**

**Andrews, 6** (Peter, Consulting Faculty Member at the IBM Executive Business Institute in Palisades, New York, Executive Technology Report, August, www-935.ibm.com/services/us/bcs/pdf/g510-6313-etr-unlearn-to-innovate.pdf)

High stakes innovation requires abandoning conventional wisdom, even actively unlearning things we “know” are true. As science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke said, “The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible.” 1 Venturing into the impossible carries many risks: discouragement, failure, loss of reputation and even ridicule. The trials of innovators – those who had the courage to be disruptive – are the stuff of legends. But their contributions have changed our world. Not everyone aspires to innovations that are high impact. Small but profitable innovations are welcome and essential contributors to the growth and well-being of corporations and societies. But, even if your goal is modest, a look at unlearning can be of value since taking even a few steps at unlearning can lead to fresh ideas. In an article, William Starbuck of New York University said, “learning often cannot occur until after there has been unlearning. Unlearning is a process that shows people they should no longer rely on their current beliefs and methods.” But, how do we unlearn? Five steps seem to be essential. We need to: 1) Create space for thinking 2) Play with ideas 3) Dare to believe that the impossible ideas might be true 4) Adapt the ideas to useful contexts 5) Take action, despite objections of experts and authorities. Create space for thinking A classic Far Side cartoon shows a student raising his hand, asking to be excused because his brain is full. In these days of information overload, most of us have the same problem. We have been exposed to huge numbers of ideas, often at a rate that makes analysis and selection difficult. How do we put these aside? One technique is to list what we “know” about a subject. Then challenge each one. What happens if you exaggerate the statement? What are the drawbacks? Does it become absurd? What does the world look like if the opposite is true? Conventional wisdom at many levels – from the humors theory of disease to the inevitability of slavery, to the spoke and hub design of airlines – has been successfully challenged. The unthinkable has become thinkable, and then the world has changed. The purpose of questioning is both to clear away clutter and create doubt. Starbuck focuses on this and suggests that we stop thinking of things – theories, products and processes – as finished. He says we should “start from the premises that current beliefs and methods are ‘not good enough’ or ‘merely experimental’.” 3 This is an emancipating concept, but there is still work to do. What can be put into the empty space that was created? This is where popular tricks for generating ideas can be valuable. Play with ideas The classic technique for idea generation is a freewheeling, nonjudgmental brainstorming session. And, bringing in people with different knowledge and perspectives can help push the limits. To push even further, the process can be made competitive, using Red Team approaches (Red Teams assume the role of the outsider to challenge assumptions, look for unexpected alternatives and find the vulnerabilities of a new idea or approach).

**And, investigating policy implications are necessary to test theory—a legitimate proposal must describe the consequences of implementing specific change because rhetorical criticism can make the world worse—the impact is education and it turns the case**

**FEAVER, 1** – Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University (Peter, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

**And, their rejection of switchside debate is simply dogmatism masquerading as revolution—kills the progressive potential of their project**

**Keller, et. al, 01** – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnis-Dittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives. The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to stimulate critical thinking by shaking students free from established opinions and helping them to appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

**The terminal impact is extinction**

**Stannard 6** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decisionmaking—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological "experts," the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position. Where we need creativity and openness, we find rigid and closed non-solutions. Where we need masses of people to make concerned investments in their future, we find (understandable) alienation and even open hostility to political processes. The dominant classes manipulate ontology to their advantage: When humanity seeks meaning, the powerful offer up metaphysical hierarchies; when concerned masses come close to exposing the structural roots of systemic oppression, the powerful switch gears and promote localized, relativistic micronarratives that discourage different groups from finding common, perhaps "universal" interests. Apocalyptic scenarios are themselves rhetorical tools, but that doesn’t mean they are bereft of material justification. The "flash-boom" of apocalyptic rhetoric isn’t out of the question, but it is also no less threatening merely as a metaphor for the slow death of humanity (and all living beings) through environmental degradation, the irradiation of the planet, or the descent into political and ethical barbarism. Indeed, these slow, deliberate scenarios ring more true than the flashpoint of quick Armageddon, but in the end the "fire or ice" question is moot, because the answers to those looming threats are still the same: The complexities of threats to our collective well-being require unifying perspectives based on diverse viewpoints, in the same way that the survival of ecosystems is dependent upon biological diversity. In Habermas’s language, we must fight the colonization of the lifeworld in order to survive at all, let alone to survive in a life with meaning. While certainly not the only way, the willingness to facilitate organized democratic deliberation, including encouraging participants to articulate views with which they may personally disagree, is one way to resist this colonization.

**Second, the affirmatives project abandons state based reforms and causes fascism—turns the case**

**Giroux 4**—cultural studies, McMaster U (Henry, Public Pedagogy and the Politics of Neo-liberalism: making the political more pedagogical, http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=2&issue=3&year=2004&article=5\_Giroux\_PFIE\_2\_3-4\_web, AMiles)

Neo-liberalism has become one of the most pervasive and dangerous ideologies of the twenty-first century. Its pervasiveness is evident not only in its unparalleled influence on the global economy, but also by its power to redefine the very nature of politics and sociality. Free-market fundamentalism rather than democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world. It is a market ideology driven not just by profits, but also by an ability to reproduce itself with such success that, to paraphrase Fred Jameson, it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of neo-liberal capitalism.[4] Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neo-liberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values. Under neo-liberalism, everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit: public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; what public services have survived the Reagan–Bush era are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations (or line their pockets through no-bid contracts, as in the infamous case of Halliburton); entire populations, especially those of color who are poor, are considered disposable; schools more closely resemble either jails or high-end shopping malls, depending on their clientele; and teachers are forced to get revenue for their schools by hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties. Under neo-liberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations. Gone are the days when the state ‘assumed responsibility for a range of social needs’.[5] Instead, agencies of government now pursue a wide range of ‘“deregulations”, privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy’.[6] Deregulation, in turn, promotes ‘widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation’s basic productive capacity’.[7] As neo-liberal policies dominate politics and social life, the breathless rhetoric of the global victory of free-market rationality is invoked to cut public expenditures and undermine those noncommodified public spheres that serve as the repository for critical education, language, and public intervention. Spewed forth by the mass media, right-wing intellectuals, religious fanatics, and politicians, neo-liberal ideology, with its merciless emphasis on deregulation and privatization, has found its material expression in an all-out attack on democratic values and social relations – particularly those public spheres where such values are learned and take root. Public services such as health care, childcare, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Social relations between parents and children, doctors and patients, and teachers and students are reduced to those of supplier and customer, just as the laws of market replace those non-commodified values capable of defending vital public goods and spheres. Forsaking the public good for the private good and hawking the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only source of sound investment, neo-liberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor.[8] In its capacity to dehistoricize and naturalize such sweeping social change, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neo-liberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism. Social Darwinism, with its brutalizing indifference to human suffering, has risen like a phoenix from the ashes of the nineteenth century and can now be seen in full display on most reality television programs and in the unfettered self-interest that now drives popular culture and fits so well with the spirit of neo-fascism. As social bonds are replaced by unadulterated materialism and narcissism, public concerns are now understood and experienced as utterly private miseries, except when offered up on The Jerry Springer Show as fodder for entertainment. Where public space – or its mass-mediated simulacrum – does exist, it is mainly used as a highly orchestrated and sensational confessional for private woes, a cut-throat game of winner takes all replacing more traditional forms of courtship as in Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire? or as an advertisement for crass consumerism, like MTV’s Cribs. Conscripts in a relentless campaign for personal responsibility, Americans are now convinced that they have little to hope for – and gain – from the government, non-profit public spheres, democratic associations, public and higher education, or other non-governmental social forces. With few exceptions, the project of democratizing public goods has fallen into disrepute in the popular imagination as the logic of the market undermines the most basic social solidarities. The consequences include not only a weakened social state, but also a growing sense of insecurity, cynicism, and political retreat on the part of the general public. The incessant calls for self-reliance that now dominate public discourse betray an eviscerated and refigured state that neither provides adequate safety nets for its populace, especially those who are young, poor, or racially marginalized, nor gives any indication that it will serve the interests of its citizens in spite of constitutional guarantees. In fact, as the state is being reconfigured, it is increasingly becoming a punitive state more concerned with punishing and policing than with nurturing and investing in the public good. Situated within an expanding culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. When coupled with a media-driven culture of panic and hyped-up levels of insecurity, surviving public spaces are increasingly monitored and militarized. Recent events in New York, New Jersey, and Washington, DC provide an interesting case in point. When the media alerted the nation’s citizenry to new terrorist threats specific to these areas, CNN ran a lead story on the impact on tourism – specifically on the enthusiastic clamor by tourist families to get their pictures taken among US paramilitary units now lining city streets, fully flanked with their imposing tanks and massive machine guns. The accouterments of a police state now vie with high-end shopping and museum visits for the public’s attention, all amid a thunderous absence of protest. But the investment in surveillance and containment is hardly new. Since the early 1990s, state governments have invested more in prison construction than in education, and prison guards and security personnel in public schools are two of the fastest growing professions. Such revolutionary changes in the global-body politic demand that we ask what citizens are learning from this not-so-hidden curriculum organized around markets and militarization. As that syllabus is written, we must ponder the social costs of breakneck corporatization bolstered by an authoritarianism that links dissent with abetting terrorism; for instance, as neo-liberalism feeds a growing authoritarianism steeped in religious fundamentalism and jingoistic patriotism, encouraging intolerance and hate as it punishes critical thought, especially if it is at odds with the reactionary neo-conservative and political agenda being pushed by the Bush administration. Increasingly dissent in the academy is viewed as unAmerican and potential grounds for dismissal. The recent firestorm over Ward Churchill provides a case in point. In particular, I want to read a comment made by Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House, who referring to Churchill argued, ‘We are going to nail this guy and send the dominoes tumbling. And everybody who has an opinion out there and entire disciplines like ethnic studies and women's studies and cultural studies and queer studies that we don't like won't be there anymore.’[9] In short, private interests now trump social needs, economic growth becomes more important than social justice, and the militarization and commercialization of public space now define what counts as the public sphere, if not what counts as the meaning and purpose of education itself. Within neo-liberalism’s market-driven discourse, corporate power marks the space of a new kind of public pedagogy, and one in which the production, dissemination, and circulation of ideas emerge from the educational force of the larger culture. Public pedagogy in this sense refers to a powerful ensemble of ideological and institutional forces whose aim is to produce competitive, selfinterested individuals vying for their own material and ideological gain. Corporate public pedagogy culture largely cancels out or devalues gender, class-specific, and racial injustices of the existing social order by absorbing the democratic impulses and practices of civil society within narrow economic relations. Corporate public pedagogy has become an all-encompassing cultural horizon for producing market identities, values, and mega-corporate conglomerates, and for atomizing social practices. Politics becomes increasingly privatized and commercialized and, as such, utterly banal. For example, some neo-liberal advocates argue that the health care and education crises faced by many states can be solved by selling off public assets to private interests. The Pentagon even considered, if only for a short time, turning the war on terror and security concerns over to futures markets subject to online trading. Neo-liberalism utterly privatizes politics and offers absurd solutions to collective problems, such as suggesting that the problem of water pollution can be solved by buying bottled water. Thus, non-commodified public spheres are replaced by commercial spheres as the substance of critical democracy is emptied out and replaced by a democracy of goods available to those with purchasing power and the increasing expansion of the cultural and political power of corporations throughout the world. Under neo-liberalism, the dominant public pedagogy, with its narrow and imposed schemes of classification and limited modes of identification, uses the educational force of the culture to negate the basic conditions for critical agency. What becomes clear in the new information age of what Zygmunt Bauman calls ‘liquid modernity’ [10] is that the power of the dominant order is not just economic, but also intellectual – lying in the realm of knowledge, information, beliefs, and ideas. Matters of agency become even more crucial to viable democratic politics as those spaces capable of producing critical modes of agency increasingly disappear into the black hole of commercialized space. This is all the more reason to take seriously Hannah Arendt’s claim that: ‘Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance.’[11] And it is precisely within such a realm that individuals are socialized into forms of individual and social agency in which they learn how to govern rather than be governed. Politics often begins when it becomes possible to make power visible, to challenge the ideological circuitry of hegemonic knowledge, and to recognize that ‘political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world’.[12] But another element of politics focuses on where politics happens – how proliferating sites of pedagogy bring into being new forms of resistance, raise new questions, and necessitate alternative visions regarding autonomy and the possibility of democracy itself.

**Change requires negotiating politics and appealing to the public—radical proposals make themselves irrelevant. The aff is a protest that ignores political context—this is alienating, not liberating.**

**Isaac 2** (Jeffrey, Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Dissent, “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, ebsco)

POLITICS IS ABOUT ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics. The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the "riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies. What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweatshops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. BUT WHAT IS absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "anti-imperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jurgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all-too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left's alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that "the United States Government is the world's greatest terror organization," and suggest that "homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government" engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any "disloyalty." Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The "peace" demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks--in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role--were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers' lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn't really happened. Whatever one thinks about America's deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of "solidarity" with certain oppressed groups--Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans--and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

**Extinction**

**Boggs 97** (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America”, December, Volume 26, Number 6, http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here – localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people’s lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 75

**Third, discussion about space policy can provide for the future of human generations**

**Huntley 10** (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; “Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space,” Space Policy 26)

The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological and political dimensions of expanding human space activities complicates this task. Herein lies the value of ‘‘realistic visions’’. Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in the context of dynamic change. Among other things, such visions can explore how alternative futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and exploratory development of space presume increasing international integration and collaboration. A future in which space becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human presence embodied in today’s growing commercial and exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for the human presence in space may depend upon choices among alternative futures for life on Earth as well. The following section reviews the potential for scenariobuilding techniques to inform these choices by providing rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the most important uncertainties. The resulting plausible, integrated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that demonstrably enable current policy making to be more farsighted. Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term questions. The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and integrated analysis among diverse experts, leading to the development of a productive ‘‘epistemic community’’25 addressing the full scope of future human space activities. Vision development is only one aspect of long-term planning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for policy making are also required. But vision development is currently the least well advanced. All global policy debate, including US national security policy making, can benefit from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assessments of long-term prospects from which to draw.

**Finally, this round can’t and won’t change the debate community—the idea that it does crushes their project**

**Atchison and Panetta 9** – \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

## 1NC “Fuck” K

**The affirmative’s use of the word “fuck” engages in a culture of violence—vote negative to rethink language and its relation to violence**

**Schwyzer 9**—community college history and gender studies professor. DPhil, Berkley (Hugo, “Penetrate” v. “Engulf” and the multiple meanings of the “f” word: a note on feminist language, 4 November 2009, http://hugoschwyzer.net/2009/11/04/penetrate-v-engulf-and-the-multiple-meanings-of-the-f-word-a-note-on-feminist-language/, AMiles)

In every women’s studies class I’ve taught here at PCC, and in many guest lectures about feminism I’ve given elsewhere, I use the “penetrate” versus “engulf” image to illustrate a basic point about the way in which our language constructs and maintains male aggression and female passivity. Even those who haven’t had heterosexual intercourse can, with only a small degree of imagination required, see how “envelop” might be just as accurate as “enter”. “A woman’s vagina engulfs a man’s penis during intercourse” captures reality as well as “A man’s penis penetrates a woman’s vagina.” Of course, most het folks who have intercourse are well aware that power is fluid; each partner can temporarily assert a more active role (frequently by being on top) — as a result, the language used to describe what’s actually happening could shift. Except, of course, in our sex ed textbooks and elsewhere, that shift never happens. If the goal of sex education is to provide accurate information to young people before they become sexually active, we do a tremendous disservice to both boys and girls through our refusal to use language that honors the reality of women’s sexual agency. We set young women up to be afraid; we set young men up to think of women’s bodies as passive receptacles. While changing our language isn’t a panacea for the problem of sexual violence (and joyless, obligatory intercourse), it’s certainly a promising start. As another part of my introductory lecture on language, I talk about “fuck”. I first dispell the urban legends that it’s an acronym (I’m amazed at how persistent the belief is that the word stands for “for unlawful carnal knowledge” or “fornication under the consent of the king”; I have students every damn year who are convinced the word is derived from one of those two sources.) I then ask at what age young people in English-speaking culture first encounter the word. Most of my students had heard the word by age five or six; many had started using it not long thereafter. I then ask how old they were when they realized that “fuck” has multiple meanings, and that its two most common uses are to describe intercourse and to express rage. There’s a pause at this point. Here’s the problem: long before most kids in our culture become sexually active, the most common slang word in the American idiom has knit together two things in their consciousness: sex and rage. If “fucking” is the most common slang term for intercourse, and “fuck you” or “fuck off” the most common terms to express contempt or rage, what’s the end result? A culture that has difficulty distinguishing sex from violence. In a world where a heartbreakingly high percentage of women will be victims of rape, it’s not implausible to suggest that at least in part, the language itself normalizes sexual violence. I challenge my students. I don’t ask them to give up all the satisfactions of profanity; rather I challenge them to think about words like “fuck” or “screw” and then make a commitment to confine the use of those words to either a description of sex (”We fucked last night”) or to express anger or extreme exasperation (”I’m so fucking furious with you right now!”) but not, not, not, both. Rage and lust are both normal human experiences; we will get angry and we will be sexual (or want to be) over and over again over the course of our lives. But we have a responsibility, I think, to make a clear and bright line between the language of sexual desire and the language of contempt and indignation. Pick one arena of human experience where that most flexible term in the English vernacular will be used, and confine it there. Words matter, I tell my students. We’re told over and over again that “a picture is worth a thousand words” — but we forget that words have the power to paint pictures in our minds of how the world is and how it ought to be. The language we use for sexuality, the words we use for rage and longing — these words construct images in our heads, in our culture, and in our lives. We have an obligation to rethink how we speak as part of building a more pleasurable, safe, just and egalitarian world.

## 1NC Gender K

**The politics of space are deeply gendered – these masculine hierarchies inform policy-making**

**Griffin 9** (Penny, Senior Lecturer - Convenor, MA International Relations, ‘The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space’, in Bormann, N. and Sheehan, M. (eds), Securing Outer Space. London and New York: Routledge, pp.59-75.)

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about. 'Outer space' as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a 'sex' that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The poli¬ tics of outer space exploration, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviours, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety.1 The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configutes and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a heteronormative discourse of conquest that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (re)produces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavour and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize heterosexualiry as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest ,re)produce both heterosexuality as 'unmarked' (that is, thoroughly normal¬ ized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviours. As the introduction to this volume highlights, the exploration and utilization of outer space can thus far be held up as a mirror of, rather than a challenge to, existent, terrestrially-bound, political patterns, behaviours and impulses. The new possibilities for human progress that the application and development of space technologies dares us to make are grounded only in the strategy¬ obsessed (be it commercially, militarily or otherwise) realities of contemporary global politics. Outer space is a conceptual, political and material space, a place for collisions and collusions (literally and metaphorically) between objects, ideas, identities and discourses. Outer space, like international relations, is a global space always socially and locally embedded. There is nothing 'out there' about outer space. It exists because of us, not in spite of us, and it is this that means that it only makes sense in social terms, that is, in relation to our own constructions of identity and social location. In this chapter, outer space is the problematic to which I apply a gender analysis; an arena wherein past, current and future policy-making is embedded in relation to certain performances of power and reconfigurations of identity that are always, and not incidentally, gendered. Effective and appropriate behaviour in the politics of ourer space is configured and prescribed in particularly gendered forms, with heteronormative gender regulations endowing outer space's hierarchies of technologically superior, conquesting performance with theif everyday power. It is through gender that US techno-strategic and astro-political discourse has been able to (re)produce outer space as a heterosexualized, masculinized realm.

**Vote negative to re-imagine social reality through a non-androcentric lens – this exercise of agency can disrupt the patriarchal value systems that make extinction inevitable**

**Nhanenge 7** (Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf)

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust

**OR**

**This gendered security discourse causes inevitable violence and war that turns the case. Rejecting the 1AC opens up space for a feminist reconceptualization of security.**

**Shepherd 7** [Laura J., Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, “Victims, Perpetrators and Actors’ Revisited:1 Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence,” BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 239–256]

As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True comment, ‘our sense of self-identity and security may seem disproportionately threatened by societal challenge to gender ordering’ (Peterson and True 1998, 17). That is, the performance of gender is immanent in the performance of security and vice versa, both concern issues of ontological cohesion (as illustrated in Table 2). Taking this on board leads me to the conclusion that perhaps security is best conceived of as referring to ontological rather than existential identity effects. Security, if seen as performative of particular configura- tions of social/political order, is inherently gendered and inherently related to violence. Violence, on this view, performs an ordering function—not only in the theory/practice of security and the reproduction of the international, but also in the reproduction of gendered subjects. Butler acknowledges that ‘violence is done in the name of preserving western values’ (Butler 2004, 231); that is, the ordering function that is performed through the violences investigated here, as discussed above, organises political authority and subjectivity in an image that is in keeping with the values of the powerful, often at the expense of the marginalised. ‘Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary’ (ibid.). While Butler refers to the violences undertaken in the protection of the sovereign state—violence in the name of security—the preservation of borders is also recognisable in the conceptual domain of the inter- national and in the adherence to a binary materiality of gender. This adherence is evidenced in the desire to fix the meaning of concepts in ways that are not challenging to the current configuration of social/political order and subjectivity, and is product/productive of ‘the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject’ (Hanssen 2000, 215). However, the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined. They could ‘remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes’ (Butler 1993, 228). The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognising that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state. This is, in short, an appeal to a politics of both/and rather than either/or. Both the state (produced through representations of security and vio- lence) and the subject (produced through representations of gender and violence) rely on a logic of sovereignty and ontological cohesion that must be problematised if alternative visions of authority and subjectivity are to become imaginable. International Relations as a discipline could seek to embrace the investigation of the multiple modalities of power, from the economic to the bureaucratic, from neo- liberal capitalism to the juridical. Rather than defending the sovereign boundaries of the discipline from the unruly outside constituted by critical studies of develop- ment, political structures, economy and law, not to mention the analysis of social/ political phenomena like those undertaken by always-already interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, IR could refuse to fix its own boundaries, and refuse to exercise sovereign power, in terms of authority, over the meanings of its objects of analysis. Future research on global politics could look very different if it were not for the inscription of ultimately arbitrary disciplinary borderlines that function to constrain rather than facilitate understanding. It may seem that there is a tension between espousing a feminist poststructural politics and undertaking research that seeks to detail, through deconstruction, the ways in which particular discourses have failed to manifest the reforms needed to address security and violence in the context of gendered subjectivity and the constitution of political community. In keeping with the ontological position I hold, I argue that there is nothing inherent in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence that necessitated their being made meaningful in the way they have been. Those working on policy and advocacy in the area of security and violence can use the reconceptualisation I offer ‘to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable, but perhaps, ought to be changed’ (Milliken 1999, 244). As a researcher, the question I have grown most used to hearing is not ‘What?’ or ‘How?’ but ‘Why?’. At every level of the research process, from securing funding to relating to the academic community, it is necessary to be able to construct a convincing and coherent argument as to why this research is valuable, indeed vital, to the field in which I situate myself. A discursive approach acknowledges that my legitimacy as a knowing subject is constructed through discursive practices that privilege some forms of being over others. In the study of security, because of the discursive power of the concept, and of violence, which can quite literally be an issue of life and death, these considerations are particularly important. Further- more, as a result of the invigorating and investigative research conducted by exemplary feminist scholars in the field of IR,17 I felt encouraged to reclaim the space to conduct research at the margins of a discipline that itself functions under a misnomer, being concerned as it is with relations inter-state rather than inter- national. As Cynthia Enloe has expressed it, To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It presumes a priori that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so natu- rally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer (Enloe 1996, 188, emphasis in original). If this is the case, I am more than happy to be unreasonable, and I am in excellent company.

## 1NC Greed K

**Greed, not capitalism is the root cause – misguided anti-capitalist revolutions fail to eliminate greed and internal link turn their impacts**

**Aberdeen 3** – activist and founder, Aberdeen Foundation (Richard, The Way, http://richardaberdeen.com/uncommonsense/theway.html, AG)

A view shared by many modern activists is that capitalism, free enterprise, multi-national corporations and globalization are the primary cause of the current global Human Rights problem and that by striving to change or eliminate these, the root problem of what ills the modern world is being addressed. This is a rather unfortunate and historically myopic view, reminiscent of early “class struggle” Marxists who soon resorted to violence as a means to achieve rather questionable ends. And like these often brutal early Marxists, modern anarchists who resort to violence to solve the problem are walking upside down and backwards, adding to rather than correcting, both the immediate and long-term Human Rights problem. Violent revolution, including our own American revolution, becomes a breeding ground for poverty, disease, starvation and often mass oppression leading to future violence. Large, publicly traded corporations are created by individuals or groups of individuals, operated by individuals and made up of individual and/or group investors. These business enterprises are deliberately structured to be empowered by individual (or group) investor greed. For example, a theorized ‘need’ for offering salaries much higher than is necessary to secure competent leadership (often resulting in corrupt and entirely incompetent leadership), lowering wages more than is fair and equitable and scaling back of often hard fought for benefits, is sold to stockholders as being in the best interest of the bottom-line market value and thus, in the best economic interests of individual investors. Likewise, major political and corporate exploitation of third-world nations is rooted in the individual and joint greed of corporate investors and others who stand to profit from such exploitation. More than just investor greed, corporations are driven by the greed of all those involved, including individuals outside the enterprise itself who profit indirectly from it. If one examines “the course of human events” closely, it can correctly be surmised that the “root” cause of humanity’s problems comes from individual human greed and similar negative individual motivation. The Marx/Engles view of history being a “class” struggle ¹ does not address the root problem and is thus fundamentally flawed from a true historical perspective (see Gallo Brothers for more details). So-called “classes” of people, unions, corporations and political groups are made up of individuals who support the particular group or organizational position based on their own individual needs, greed and desires and thus, an apparent “class struggle” in reality, is an extension of individual motivation. Likewise, nations engage in wars of aggression, not because capitalism or classes of society are at root cause, but because individual members of a society are individually convinced that it is in their own economic survival best interest. War, poverty, starvation and lack of Human and Civil Rights have existed on our planet since long before the rise of modern capitalism, free enterprise and multi-national corporation avarice, thus the root problem obviously goes deeper than this.

**Capitalism channels greed into economic competition – the alternative causes greed to be expressed through genocidal domination**

**Wilson 97** – Professor of Government, Harvard (James, The Morality of Capitalism, http://w2.byuh.edu/academics/posc/tsmith/Classes/Philosophy/Morality%20of%20Capitalism.doc, AG)

Capitalism also has another advantage that was pointed out by the late great British anthropologist, Ernest Gellner, who died a year or two ago. Gellner in reflecting on the failure of European communism observed that no society can avoid finding a way to channel the desire men have to advance themselves. In traditional and in statist societies, the way to attain wealth is first to attain power, usually by force. But in market societies, ‘production becomes a better path to wealth than domination.’ Critics of capitalism argue that wealth confers power, and indeed it does, up to a point. Show people the road to wealth, status, or power, and they will rush down that road, and many will do some rather unattractive things along the way. But this is not a decisive criticism unless one supposes, fancifully, that there is some way to arrange human affairs so that the desire for advantage vanishes. The real choice is between becoming wealthy by first acquiring political or military power, or getting money directly without bothering with conquest or domination. If it is in man’s nature to seek domination over other men, there are really only two ways to make that domination work. One is military power, and that is the principle upon which domination existed from the beginning of man’s time on this earth to down about two hundred years ago, when it began to be set aside by another principle, namely the accumulation of wealth. Now you may feel that men should not try to dominate other men – although I do not see how you could believe this in Australia given the importance attached to sports. You may like to replace man’s desire to dominate other men, and in a few cases it is prevented by religious conversion or a decent temperament. But as long as the instinct persists, you only have two choices, and if you choose to compete economically you will reduce the extent to which one group of men will tyrannise over another by the use of military might or political power.

**Capitalism channels greed into a social benefit – this allows more individuals to pursue their life’s value**

**Nash 2** – philosophy professor (Ronald and James Gills, Government is too Big and It's Costing You!, http://www.oneida-abate.org/legislative/Articles/Government%20is%20too%20big.htm, AG)

The alternative to free exchange is coercion and violence. Capitalism allows natural human desires to be satisfied in a non-violent way. Little can be done to prevent human beings from wanting to be rich, Shenfield says. That's the way things often are in a fallen world. But capitalism, through the natural desire of man to succeed, channels that drive into peaceful means that benefit many, not just those who wish to improve their own situation or status in life. The alternative to serving other men's wants," Shenfield concludes, "is seizing power of them, as it always has been. Hence it is not surprising that wherever the enemies of capitalism have prevailed, the result has been not only the debasement of consumption standards for the masses but also their reduction to serfdom by the new privileged class of Socialist rulers."

**Capitalism is the only means of democratizing greed – the alternative is extinction**

**Revel 93** – French philosopher (Jean-Francois, Democracy Against Itself, p 258-9, AG)

There have been natural cataclysms in history, epidemics, droughts, earthquakes, and cyclones, and they have killed millions, destroyed cities and crops, annihilated artistic and intellectual treasures, devastated the infrastructures of nations. Yet these plagues are nothing compared to those that have been caused by human action. The most destructive catastrophes are man-made, and above all statesman-made. They come from his appetite for conquest and domination, from the dead-end political systems he thinks up, his uncountable religious or ideological fanaticisms, and, especially, his obsessive need to reform societies instead of letting them change at their own pace. Democracy blocks, or at least slows down, this disastrous – and wicked – human propensity. Twentieth-century history is clear on two points: only capitalism engenders economic development; only democracy can correct the worst political abuses and errors. This is why humanity faces a stark choice: democratic capitalism or extinction. I would revise Michael Novak's term to read: democratic and liberal capitalism. For capitalism can be illiberal – protectionist and closely associated to the state. In this case, it is not as much of an obstacle to development and individual liberty as is socialism, but it hinders them and creates incentives for the corruption of political leaders. Liberal democratic capitalism is not the best system: it is the only one [that works]. The parrots who keep telling us about its imperfections are right, it is imperfect. But the only prohibitive vice for a system, is not for it to be without vices, but to be without qualities. And what we know about all the tested alternatives to liberal democratic capitalism is that they are without qualities. It deserves plenty of criticism, but these should not lead to the temptation of returning to collectivism or even milder forms of state control. Of course democratic capitalism has its share of sins; but as Robert Nozick put it, socialism does seem to be an excessively heavy punishment for them. And anyway it has been tried already.

## 1NC Normativity K

**There is no reason to vote affirmative - there's no link between their proposal and practical worldly effects due to misrepresentation of agent**

**Schlag 90** Professor Of Law@ Univ. Colorado, 1990 (Pierre, Stanford Law Review, November, http://spot.colorado.edu/~schlag/SchlagSLR.pdf, chm )ellipses in original

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle [FN31] into effect, or to restructure \*179 the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should . . . . " When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students--persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

**This misrepresentation assumes the agency of the judge to act as a position of power - this doesn't exist**

**Schlag 91** (Pierre, Colorado Law Prof. 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.801, April, “Normativity and the Politics of Form”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312375.pdf?acceptTC=true, jstor chm )

Many legal thinkers understand this dramatic conflict in terms of an opposition between the "realities" of practice and the "ideals" of the legal academy. For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. (And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implica- tion. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitor- ing-they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent them- selves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

**Their rhetorical performance cedes control of agency - this ensures a spectator mentality that prevents genuine action and guarantees pain and suffering—rather than help the starving person we think “The usfg should help him”**

**Delgado 91** (RICHARD, COLORADO LAW PROFESSOR, 139 PA. L. REV. 933, APRIL, chm)

But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero-as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself.82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition.83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the side- walk.84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people.85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid.86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claim.