ST. Mark’s TS Criticisms (1/8/12)

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## 1NC Gender K

**The politics of space are deeply gendered – these masculine hierarchies inform policy-making**

**Griffin 9** (Penny, Senior Lecturer - Convenor, MA International Relations, ‘The Spaces Between Us: The Gendered Politics of Outer Space’, in Bormann, N. and Sheehan, M. (eds), Securing Outer Space. London and New York: Routledge, pp.59-75.)

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about. 'Outer space' as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a 'sex' that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The poli¬ tics of outer space exploration, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviours, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety.1 The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configutes and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a heteronormative discourse of conquest that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (re)produces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavour and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize heterosexualiry as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest ,re)produce both heterosexuality as 'unmarked' (that is, thoroughly normal¬ ized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices and behaviours. As the introduction to this volume highlights, the exploration and utilization of outer space can thus far be held up as a mirror of, rather than a challenge to, existent, terrestrially-bound, political patterns, behaviours and impulses. The new possibilities for human progress that the application and development of space technologies dares us to make are grounded only in the strategy¬ obsessed (be it commercially, militarily or otherwise) realities of contemporary global politics. Outer space is a conceptual, political and material space, a place for collisions and collusions (literally and metaphorically) between objects, ideas, identities and discourses. Outer space, like international relations, is a global space always socially and locally embedded. There is nothing 'out there' about outer space. It exists because of us, not in spite of us, and it is this that means that it only makes sense in social terms, that is, in relation to our own constructions of identity and social location. In this chapter, outer space is the problematic to which I apply a gender analysis; an arena wherein past, current and future policy-making is embedded in relation to certain performances of power and reconfigurations of identity that are always, and not incidentally, gendered. Effective and appropriate behaviour in the politics of ourer space is configured and prescribed in particularly gendered forms, with heteronormative gender regulations endowing outer space's hierarchies of technologically superior, conquesting performance with theif everyday power. It is through gender that US techno-strategic and astro-political discourse has been able to (re)produce outer space as a heterosexualized, masculinized realm.

**Vote negative to re-imagine social reality through a non-androcentric lens – this exercise of agency can disrupt the patriarchal value systems that make extinction inevitable**

**Nhanenge 7** (Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf)

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust

**OR**

**This gendered security discourse causes inevitable violence and war that turns the case. Rejecting the 1AC opens up space for a feminist reconceptualization of security.**

**Shepherd 7** [Laura J., Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, “Victims, Perpetrators and Actors’ Revisited:1 Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence,” BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 239–256]

As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True comment, ‘our sense of self-identity and security may seem disproportionately threatened by societal challenge to gender ordering’ (Peterson and True 1998, 17). That is, the performance of gender is immanent in the performance of security and vice versa, both concern issues of ontological cohesion (as illustrated in Table 2). Taking this on board leads me to the conclusion that perhaps security is best conceived of as referring to ontological rather than existential identity effects. Security, if seen as performative of particular configura- tions of social/political order, is inherently gendered and inherently related to violence. Violence, on this view, performs an ordering function—not only in the theory/practice of security and the reproduction of the international, but also in the reproduction of gendered subjects. Butler acknowledges that ‘violence is done in the name of preserving western values’ (Butler 2004, 231); that is, the ordering function that is performed through the violences investigated here, as discussed above, organises political authority and subjectivity in an image that is in keeping with the values of the powerful, often at the expense of the marginalised. ‘Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary’ (ibid.). While Butler refers to the violences undertaken in the protection of the sovereign state—violence in the name of security—the preservation of borders is also recognisable in the conceptual domain of the inter- national and in the adherence to a binary materiality of gender. This adherence is evidenced in the desire to fix the meaning of concepts in ways that are not challenging to the current configuration of social/political order and subjectivity, and is product/productive of ‘the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject’ (Hanssen 2000, 215). However, the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined. They could ‘remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes’ (Butler 1993, 228). The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognising that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state. This is, in short, an appeal to a politics of both/and rather than either/or. Both the state (produced through representations of security and vio- lence) and the subject (produced through representations of gender and violence) rely on a logic of sovereignty and ontological cohesion that must be problematised if alternative visions of authority and subjectivity are to become imaginable. International Relations as a discipline could seek to embrace the investigation of the multiple modalities of power, from the economic to the bureaucratic, from neo- liberal capitalism to the juridical. Rather than defending the sovereign boundaries of the discipline from the unruly outside constituted by critical studies of develop- ment, political structures, economy and law, not to mention the analysis of social/ political phenomena like those undertaken by always-already interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, IR could refuse to fix its own boundaries, and refuse to exercise sovereign power, in terms of authority, over the meanings of its objects of analysis. Future research on global politics could look very different if it were not for the inscription of ultimately arbitrary disciplinary borderlines that function to constrain rather than facilitate understanding. It may seem that there is a tension between espousing a feminist poststructural politics and undertaking research that seeks to detail, through deconstruction, the ways in which particular discourses have failed to manifest the reforms needed to address security and violence in the context of gendered subjectivity and the constitution of political community. In keeping with the ontological position I hold, I argue that there is nothing inherent in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence that necessitated their being made meaningful in the way they have been. Those working on policy and advocacy in the area of security and violence can use the reconceptualisation I offer ‘to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable, but perhaps, ought to be changed’ (Milliken 1999, 244). As a researcher, the question I have grown most used to hearing is not ‘What?’ or ‘How?’ but ‘Why?’. At every level of the research process, from securing funding to relating to the academic community, it is necessary to be able to construct a convincing and coherent argument as to why this research is valuable, indeed vital, to the field in which I situate myself. A discursive approach acknowledges that my legitimacy as a knowing subject is constructed through discursive practices that privilege some forms of being over others. In the study of security, because of the discursive power of the concept, and of violence, which can quite literally be an issue of life and death, these considerations are particularly important. Further- more, as a result of the invigorating and investigative research conducted by exemplary feminist scholars in the field of IR,17 I felt encouraged to reclaim the space to conduct research at the margins of a discipline that itself functions under a misnomer, being concerned as it is with relations inter-state rather than inter- national. As Cynthia Enloe has expressed it, To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It presumes a priori that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so natu- rally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer (Enloe 1996, 188, emphasis in original). If this is the case, I am more than happy to be unreasonable, and I am in excellent company.

## 1NC Normativity K

**There is no reason to vote affirmative - there's no link between their proposal and practical worldly effects due to misrepresentation of agent**

**Schlag 90** Professor Of Law@ Univ. Colorado, 1990 (Pierre, Stanford Law Review, November, http://spot.colorado.edu/~schlag/SchlagSLR.pdf, chm )ellipses in original

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle [FN31] into effect, or to restructure \*179 the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should . . . . " When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students--persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

**This misrepresentation assumes the agency of the judge to act as a position of power - this doesn't exist**

**Schlag 91** (Pierre, Colorado Law Prof. 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.801, April, “Normativity and the Politics of Form”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3312375.pdf?acceptTC=true, jstor chm )

Many legal thinkers understand this dramatic conflict in terms of an opposition between the "realities" of practice and the "ideals" of the legal academy. For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. (And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implica- tion. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitor- ing-they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent them- selves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

**Their rhetorical performance cedes control of agency - this ensures a spectator mentality that prevents genuine action and guarantees pain and suffering—rather than help the starving person we think “The usfg should help him”**

**Delgado 91** (RICHARD, COLORADO LAW PROFESSOR, 139 PA. L. REV. 933, APRIL, chm)

But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero-as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself.82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition.83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the side- walk.84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people.85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid.86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claim.