**I affirm**

**The value is morality**

**The standard is consequentialism.** There are five justifications.

**1.)** It is the only rational framework for achieving morality since, due to cultural relativism, any other framework is incoherent and illogical

**2.)** Consequentialism is necessary to evaluate foreign policy objectives because politics necessitates consequentialism to achieve political responsibility. A distinction must be made between morality for government and individuals

**Murray 97** (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. of Wales-Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 110)

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [OR HER] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he [OR SHE] will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing that: the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [HER OR] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.

3.) Consequentialism solves the paradox inherent in means-based ethics. When an actor can’t act in a way that doesn’t violates absolute moral laws, this creates a paradox—both action and inaction become immoral. Thus, no actor will be able to even exist without violating morality. A consequentialist framework avoids self-defeating moral theories, allowing real action.

4.) Reject ethical frameworks that don’t allow an escape clause in a catastrophe

Alexander and Moore 07 (Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Deontological Ethics,” November 1, 2007 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>)

The second plausible response is for the deontologist to abandon Kantian absolutism for what is usually called “threshold deontology.” A threshold deontologist holds that deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse consequences; but when the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over (Moore 1997, ch. 17). A may not torture B to save the lives of two others, but he may do so to save a thousand lives if the “threshold” is higher than two lives but lower than a thousand.

5.)When weighing catastrophes, consequentialism is the most moral theory

Kai Nielsen in 72 (prof. emeritus of philosophy @ University of Calgary, Ethics, Volume 82, “Against Moral

Conservatism”, p. 229-230)

Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his 'moral purity' and avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'doublemindedness.'

**Contention 1:** Possession of nuclear weapons by states leads to extinction.

**No Moral Nukes**.

Robert E. **Goodin**. Ethics, Vol. 90, No. 3 (Apr., 19**80**), pp. 417-449. Published by: The University of Chicago Press. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380581>

Others argue more pragmatically that the more we try to keep nuclear technology from the Third World (by, for example, forbidding reprocessing) the more they will try to get it (Rose and Lester 1978). Pragmatism and justice alike seem to indicate that, if anyone is to have a nuclear capacity, then everyone should -and eventually will. If we cannot live with that result, then we must commit ourselves to a world in which no one has a nuclear capacity.

**NEW PROLIFERATION WILL TRIGGER A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE**

Steve **Miller and** Scott **Sagan 2010** (prolif experts) “Alternative nuclear futures” Dædalus (Winter), pg 135

The most disturbing variant of this negative vision for the nuclear future would be one in which the norm against acquisition of nuclear weapons is fractured and new NWS emerge. States that determined for their own self-interested reasons to acquire nuclear weapons could defy or ignore the NPT/IAEA system or simply withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did). In conflict- prone regions in which fuel cycle capabilities exist in multiple states, there arises the possibility of the competitive pursuit of nuclear weapons (as occurred in South Asia between India and Pakistan). If enrichment and reprocessing are more widely distributed across states, acquisition of nuclear weapons by one power could more easily trigger nuclear acquisition by others. In the past, rapid cascades of proliferation–though some- times predicted–have not occurred and are not certain to occur in the future.15 But the dynamic could well be different if the nonproliferation regime is thought to be eroding and more nws possess the latent capability to manufacture nu- clear weapons. The reassuring record of a past era marked by few nws, a sturdy norm against acquisition, a reasonably sound nonproliferation regime, very in-frequent spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and possession of fuel cycle capabilities by only a few states may not be a reliable guide to the future if trends slide in a negative direction. Decades ago, Henry Rowen and Albert Wohlstetter famously worried about the dangers of “life in a nuclear-armed crowd.” Decades hence, we could find ourselves living in that world if unwise choices and unfortunate preferences lead us down an undesirable nuclear path.

**If Iran obtains nuclear weapons nuclear war will break out.**

Cirinione 05,

(Joseph, Senior Associate and Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Proliferation Threats and Solutions,” NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY v. 19, 2005, p. 341.)

The primary danger to the United States and the world from the emergence of new nuclear states is the regional instability that will likely result. If Iran becomes a nuclear state, other states in the region will, for their own geo-political reasons, feel like they have to match the nuclear weapon capability in kind. For example, Egypt might restart the nuclear program that it had in the 1960s. Saudi Arabia, who heavily financed Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, might use their influence in Pakistan and invite Pakistan to station nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. Turkey would consider their nuclear options. A new government in Iraq, if there is a stable government in Iraq at that point, might consider restarting Iraq's nuclear effort. In sum, there would be a chain reaction throughout the region surrounding a new nuclear state. Suddenly, a Middle East with one nuclear power - Israel - would become a region of two, three, or four nuclear powers. This scenario, in combination with existing unresolved tensions, political disputes, and territorial and religious disputes, would be a recipe for nuclear war.

Nuclear winter causes extinction

The Columbia Missourian 6/11/2009 Steven Starr seeks to revolutionize views on nuclear weapons

BY Darren **Milosevich** http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2009/06/11/steven-starr-nuclear-expert/

Nuclear winter is a term used to describe the dramatic global climate change that could follow a nuclear war. According to Starr’s [Web site](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/index2.php?p=warconsequences&menu=fivemilliontonsofsmoke" \t "_blank), a hypothetical nuclear war between India and Pakistan fought with 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons would throw 5 million tons of smoke into the stratosphere, enough to block 10 percent of the sun's rays from reaching the northern hemisphere — shortening growing seasons and causing the lowest temperatures in 1,000 years. After 10 years, 40 percent of that smoke would still be in the stratosphere. The average nuclear warhead today is between eight and 50 times more powerful than the 15 kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima. “Nuclear war is essentially suicide for humanity,” Starr said.

**Contention 2:** Terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons would be catastrophic.

**NATIONS LIKE RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE THE PERFECT CONDITIONS FOR LOOSE NUKES TO GET INTO THE WRONG HANDS.**

**Council on Foreign Relations** January ‘**06** "Backgrounder: Loose Nukes" <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9549/loose_nukes.html>

Mainly in Russia. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since, severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former Soviet countries have fed concerns in the West about loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists, and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russiaʼs nuclear storage sites remains worrisome. The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheads—safely returned their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three countries still have stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also have nuclear power plants the byproducts of which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but might tempt terrorists trying to make a “dirty bomb”— a regular explosive laced with lower-grade radioactive material. Some experts also worry about Pakistan, a relatively recent nuclear power with untested security systems, dozens of nuclear weapons, and no shortage of Islamist militants. The United States recently offered to help Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures, an offer which Pakistan has tacitly accepted since November 2001.

**Nuclear terrorism causes hundreds of millions of deaths.**

**Easterbrook (01)**, Greg, America's New War: Nuclear Threats, CNN, 11/1/20**01**, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html>. 1/1/2009.

Well, what held through the Cold War, when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other, what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were rational. They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn. Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries. And that -- it is very much in the interest the Muslim peoples of the world that atomic weapons be kept out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, in addition to being in our interests.

**ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON HAS VAST IMPACTS ON BIODIVERSITY,**

**THREATENING TO ANNIHILATE THE WORLD**

Frances, **Ferguson**, The Nuclear Sublime, Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism (Summer, 19**84**),pp.410 StableURL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=03007162%28198422%2914%3A2%3C4%3A TNS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Nuclear weapons are weapons to annihilate the world, exempting nothing. A One -Megaton [small] Nuclear weapon poses a significant risk to the extinction of all life forms in the area of an approximate 1000 mile radius, with a reasonable risk extending in a 5000 mile radius. Localized fallout will contaminate the water table within a 1000 mile directly underneath the ground and expecting into any continuous water table. Beyond this we have innumerable secondary effects, many of which remain unknown. Particuarly with regard to global warming, a increase in global temperature from a nuclear detonation is theoretically obvious. However, we cannot estimate the change in the real world.