**I negate**

**The value is morality**

**The standard is consequentialism.** There are five justifications.

**1.)** It is the only rational framework for achieving morality since, due to cultural relativism, any other framework is incoherent and illogical

**2.)** Consequentialism is necessary to evaluate foreign policy objectives because politics necessitates consequentialism to achieve political responsibility. A distinction must be made between morality for government and individuals

**Murray 97** (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. of Wales-Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 110)

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [OR HER] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he [OR SHE] will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing that: the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [HER OR] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.

3.) Consequentialism solves the paradox inherent in means-based ethics. When an actor can’t act in a way that doesn’t violates absolute moral laws, this creates a paradox—both action and inaction become immoral. Thus, no actor will be able to even exist without violating morality. A consequentialist framework avoids self-defeating moral theories, allowing real action.  
  
4.) Reject ethical frameworks that don’t allow an escape clause in a catastrophe

Alexander and Moore 07 (Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Deontological Ethics,” November 1, 2007 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/)

The second plausible response is for the deontologist to abandon Kantian absolutism for what is usually called “threshold deontology.” A threshold deontologist holds that deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse consequences; but when the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over (Moore 1997, ch. 17). A may not torture B to save the lives of two others, but he may do so to save a thousand lives if the “threshold” is higher than two lives but lower than a thousand.

**5.)** When weighing catastrophes, consequentialism is the most moral theory

Kai Nielsen in 72 (prof. emeritus of philosophy @ University of Calgary, Ethics, Volume 82, “Against Moral Conservatism”, p. 229-230)

Surely we must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable, more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be avoided? That is, where there is no avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die? Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his 'moral purity' and avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called 'doublemindedness.'

**My thesis and sole contention** is that the possession of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent for types of war that have larger systemic implications.

**A)** Nuclear proliferation deters large scale conventional conflicts in the most volatile regions of the world. The systemic nature of conventional war is responsible for the death of millions within the last century. This impact is infinitely more quantifiable than supposed accounts of nuclear war.

**Karl, 97** (David Karl, Ph.D. International Relations at the University of Southern California, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security, Winter, 1996/1997, p. 90-91)

Although this school bases its claims upon the U.S-Soviet Cold War nuclear relationship, it admits of no basic exception to the imperatives of nuclear deterrence. Nothing within the schoolʼs thesis is intrinsic solely to the superpower experience. The nuclear “balance of terror” is seen as far from fragile**. Nuclear-armed adversaries, regardless of context, should behave toward each other like the superpowers during the Cold Warʼs “nuclear peace.”** The reason for this near-absolute claim is the supposedly immutable quality of nuclear weapons**: their presence is the key variable in any deterrent situation, because fear of their devastating consequences simply overwhelms the operation of all other factors.ʼ**Martin van Creveld alleges that **“the leaders of medium and small powers alike tend to be extremely cautious with regard to the nuclear weapons they possess or with which they are faced—the proof being that, to date, in every region where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared.**” Shai Feldman submits that **“it is no longer disputed that the undeclared nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have helped stabilize their relations in recent years. It is difficult to see how escalation of the conflict over Kashmir could have been avoided were it not for the two countriesʼ fear of nuclear escalation**.” The **spread of nuclear weapons technology is** thus viewed by optimists as **a positive development**, so much so that some even advocate its selective abettance by current nuclear powers.ʼ

**B)** Nuclear proliferation deters the use of biological and chemical weapons, the use of which would be more devastating than any conflict that has occurred in recorded human history.

**Payne, 98** (Dr. Keith B. Payne, April 1998 “Why We Must Sustain Nuclear Deterrence,” http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Op%20Ed%203\_20\_98.pdf)

A single illustration of the lethality of biological weapons will clarify why the U.S. capability to deter regional challengers is of paramount importance: **a single undeterred attacker employing as little as 20 kilograms of dispersed anthrax drifting downwind could, under the proper conditions, cause the deaths of 50 percent of the unprotected population in an area of more than 150 square miles. Such a biological attack against the unprotected populations of ten large U.S. urban areas could kill on the order of 20 million Americans.** To risk understatement, **deterrence is not less important in this post-Cold War period. In the absence of a revived great power competition, the most taxing likely role for U.S. deterrence policy will be deterring the use of WMD by hostile regional powers**. What is the future role for nuclear weapons in regional deterrence? There are numerous recent confident assertions by prominent persons that U.S. conventional forces can reliably replace nuclear forces for deterrence of all but nuclear threats. Consequently, they conclude that nuclear weapons are largely unnecessary for regional deterrence. Such assertions ring hollow; they are speculative and unsupported by actual evidence. The evidence that does exist, including recent history, suggests strongly that when a challenger is highly motivated, and cost- and risk- tolerant, nuclear weapons can be essential to deterring WMD attacks. What, for example, was the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the Gulf War? By **Iraqi accounts, nuclear deterrence prevented Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could have inflicted horrendous civilian and military casualties on us and our allies. Senior Iraqi wartime leaders have explained that while U.S. conventional threats were insufficient to deter, implicit U.S. nuclear threats did deter Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological weapons.** As the then-head of Iraqi military intelligence, Gen. Waffic al Sammarai, has stated, Saddam **Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war, "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high."** Immediately following the Gulf War many prominent U.S. military commentators, such as former Secretary of Defense McNamara, claimed that nuclear weapons were "incredible" and therefore "irrelevant" to the war.1 This assessment-that U.S. nuclear weapons are irrelevant to regional challengers-is at the heart of the various nuclear disarmament proposals; it also is gravely mistaken**. The continuing proliferation of CBW can only increase our need for nuclear deterrence. The United States has given up chemical and biological weapons, and has thus given up the option of deterring chemical and biological threats with like capabilities**. In some tough cases conventional forces alone are likely to be inadequate to deter CBW threats. Consequently, as CBW proliferates our nuclear capabilities become more, not less important for regional deterrence.

**C)** Nuclear conflict is a fiction. The impacts of the affirmative case are empirically denied.

**Tepperman, 09** (Jonathan Tepperman. “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb.” Newsweek, Vol. 154, No.10. (Sep., 2009).)

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. **The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction** didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it **did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war,** despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that **on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.**