#### The affirmative re-entrenches status quo binaries- the mobile able body and the disabled immobile body. Infrastructure is a guise for increased state control over deviant populations

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Barnes et al (1999, page 121), for instance, note that UK households with a disabled person are half as likely as those without to own a car (also, see OPCS, 1993). In addition, most cars are designed for standardised bodies and few mobility-impaired or ambulant impaired disabled people are able to get into one. Specially adapted cars are expensive, and insurers regard disabled people as a risk and charge high motor insurance pre miums. These experiences are connected to the domination of medical discourses which are infused with conceptions of the incapacitated and immobile body, or the body which is malfunctioning due to a loss of functional capacity. Disabled people are portrayed as less than whole and as a population requiring particular forms of regulation, discipline, and control by state programmes and policies. Indeed, Levi-Strauss (1955) refers to modern societies as anthropoemic or, as Young (1999, page 56) defines it, societies that ``vomit out deviants, keeping them outside of society or enclosing them in special institutions''.

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments. The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994) Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 604) argue, ``the information that animates the world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of carnality which excludes as it constructs''. These send out specific signals or codes which favour the corporeal status of nonimpaired people, or at least do little to facilitate the independent ease of movement of people with physical and mental impairments. (5) This, for Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 606), is indicative of ``a subtle interplay of micro and macro relations of power'', where specific design features, for example, prioritise forms of movement based on the bodily needs of the neutered body (which is devoid of physical and mental impairments). In this sense, intercorporeal encounters between the hegemonic world of the mobile body and disabled people tend to reinforce the former's sense of presence and the latter's sense of absence, in other words a recognition of disabled people being there but being unable to interact with the social or physical structures which surround them. It is, in Leder's (1990) terms, a projection of the absent body or bodies which ``dys-appear'' when confronted with the embodied norms of everyday life [see Paterson and Hughes (1999) for an amplification of these points].

The dys-appearance of disabled people's bodies is not unconnected to the work of transportation planners and operators who, as Whitelegg (1997, page 14) notes, make ``decisions about what kinds of travel are important and which journey purposes and destinations are to be favoured''. In particular, the impaired body is largely invisible in transportation planning and policy or, as Law (1999, page 566) notes, ``bodies appear in conventional transportation models as discrete entities with independent trajectories''. As Whitelegg (1997) suggests, this leads to the provision of transportation infrastructure which tends to prioritise the movement and mobility of ``productive bodies'' between a limited range of destinations (also, see Marshall, 1999). Thus, mobility policies largely revolve around the provision of commuter networks between home and the workplace, seeking to facilitate movement which is limited to specific social, geographical, and temporal ranges. (6) The effect is, as Huxley (1997, page 2) observes, one of reducing mobility to ``predictable, purposeful trips, origins and destinations'' rather than seeking to conceive of mobility as ``a messy, unpredictable, diverse and changeable reality''.

#### This medicalization of life is the root cause of conflict—wars are fought and life is exterminated because of the biopolitical commitment to eugenic violence

Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/2002 [“The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary, <http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf>]

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention "at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race" (VS, 197; WK, 149). 37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76). 38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques. A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The "biological continuum of the human species" is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes, 39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that "the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue' or ‘white' blood and breeding among aristocracies." 40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: "A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races." 41 But it is a more subtle distinction than [End Page 147] that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts. 42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one's enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: "The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I—not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate." The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). "The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population" (VS, 180; WK, 136). "If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism" (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: [End Page 148] Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux—understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136)

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s politics of mobility. Transportation planning’s reliance on universalism only perpetuates discrimination

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Disabled people's mobility and movement are highly circumscribed by sociocultural attitudes, practices, and the related design of the built environment. From the micro architecture of urban streetscapes, to the discontinuous nature of transportation infrastructure and networks, one can agree with Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 605) who suggest that it is ``hegemonic bodies that are culturally formative of the codes and idioms'' which condition the norms of movement and mobility (also, see Corker, 1998; 1999; Hughes, 1999). Such norms revolve around conceptions of the bodily incompetence of people with physical and mental impairments, while propagating welfare policies and procedures which seek to discipline disabled people into a state (and status) of nonimpaired carnality. For disabled people, then, their immobility is their own fault or the consequences of a deviant corporeality which requires medical care and rehabilitation or, failing that, the application of charitable works. Law (1999, page 583) suggests that an excavation of the ``practices and meanings related to mobility should not detract us from the politics of mobility''. For disabled people, a politics of mobility is, however, not divisible from broader challenges to, and reformulations of, the hegemonic values and practices of a society which, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 609) note, serves to maintain a hierarchy of identities. Such hierarchies essentialise conceptions of disability (as impairment of a particular type), with the effect that the complexities of disabled people's corporeality and experiences (of mobility and movement) are rarely described, acknowledged, nor understood (see, for example, Corker, 1998; 1999; Gleeson, 1999; Hine, 1999; Hine and Mitchell, 2001; Imrie, 1996; 2000b). Not surprisingly, as some respondents intimated, the shifting, indeterminate, and incoherent corporealities of disability are often at odds with the static categories and practices of, for example, producers and providers of transportation services. Such services treat disabled people as `different' and `special' or even as `burden some'. As Corker (1998, page 82) suggests, the ascription of ``difference'' to disabled people is often used to distinguish them ``as persons who can justifiably be treated unequally''. For Corker (1998, page 82), the unequal treatment of (disabled) people, in relation to ``the distribution of benefits and burdens, and in the absence of any justification, is a paradigm of injustice''. Arguably, these injustices require a politics of mobility in which liberal conceptions of mobility and freedom are reassessed to destabilise the efficacy of `the mobile body'. Given liberalism's abstract universality and individualism, and its preoccupation with the sameness of treatment of subjects, alternative frameworks are required, so some argue, which seek to develop ``a recognition of difference and responsiveness to individuated needs, as well as the protection of the rights of difference'' (Gould, 1996, page 180). A politics of movement and mobility, then, ought to enable us to think about, and respond to ``the diversity of mobility, networks and access required by diverse groups in their daily lives'' (Huxley, 1997, page 2). These ideas are core to a politics of disability which is premised on the eradication of ascribed needs, or processes whereby policy experts and professionals assess disabled people's needs and ascribe the relevant policy prescriptions (for example, the provision of special transport or equipment to facilitate mobility). For Oliver (1990), ascribed needs reinforce the power of professional experts, such as transportation planners, to determine the quality of disabled people's lives. This, according to Oliver, maintains disabled people's dependence on others and does little to create the conditions for disabled people's self-determination. In contrast, Oliver (1996) notes that a politics of disability ought to work from a position of self-defined needs as a basis for rights claims (also, see Handley, 2000). As Oliver (1996, page 74) suggests, ``it is rights to appropriate their own self defined needs that disabled people are demanding, not to have their needs defined and met by others''.