# Ports Security Affirmative

## Inherency

#### Current security fails—3% of containers scanned now

Hahn 12 (Congresswoman Janice Hahn, Congressional Documents and Publications, May 9, 2012, “Congresswoman [Laura Richardson](http://w3.nexis.com/new/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T14683658970&returnToId=20_T14683673387&csi=247474&A=0.13662523131856086&sourceCSI=162599&indexTerm=%23PE000A0V6%23&searchTerm=Laura%20Richardson%20&indexType=P) Asks GAO to Examine Port Security Vulnerabilities”; Rep. [Laura Richardson](http://w3.nexis.com/new/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T14683658970&returnToId=20_T14683673387&csi=247474&A=0.13662523131856086&sourceCSI=162599&indexTerm=%23PE000A0V6%23&searchTerm=Laura%20Richardson%20&indexType=P) (D-CA) News Release, <http://richardson.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2948&Itemid=500261>)

Congresswoman Janice Hahn’s bill, H.R. 4005 “Gauging American Port Security Act” or Gaps Act, today successfully passed by a unanimous vote in the Homeland Security Committee. H.R. 4005 directs the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a comprehensive classified examination of remaining gaps in port Security and prepare a plan to address them. “Pretending a threat doesn’t exist does not make it go away,” Rep. Hahn said. “The lesson of 9/11 is to be vigilant and proactive in seeking out and preventing our country’s most pressing threats. More than a decade after 9/11, our ports remain possible points of entry for terrorists and their weapons. Ports are also a key part of our economy. If an attack were ever to occur, it would cause a catastrophic loss of jobs and damage to our economic recovery. This situation requires a legislative solution and I hope that the resulting blueprint will guide Congress in creating effective legislation to help guard our ports.” Ships make 50,000 calls a year on U.S. ports, carrying two billion tons of freight and 134 million passengers. Each day our ports move both imports and exports totaling some $3.8 billion worth of goods through all 50 states. Additionally, ports move 99.4 percent of overseas cargo volume by weight and generate $3.95 trillion in international trade. Unfortunately less than 3% of cargo coming into the country is scanned, giving terrorist opportunities to smuggle themselves or their weapons into the United States with little risk of detection. An attack on the Port of Los Angeles complex, for example, would cost billions to the regional economy and put thousands of port employees out of work and cause the demise of hundreds of local businesses.

#### Stable federal funding stream key to success and competitiveness

**MAR 12** (Maritime Activity Reports, online news filter for maritime activity, “Ports Urge Congress to Support Port Security Grants” 3/7/12. <http://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-security-support342938.aspx>)

At two separate Congressional hearings, representatives of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels. Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and U.S. international competitiveness. As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water. Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. “The fiscal year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated. “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans, and fund federal mandates, such as installation of TWIC readers.”

## Plan Text

Plan: The United States federal government should increase investment in the Port Security Grant Program.

## Contention 2 Trade

### Scenario 1 is Economy

#### Ports ARE the target – gaps in security infrastructure make devastating attacks imminent

PR Newswire, 2011 (“10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports”, The Maritime Executive, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports-128888213.html>)

Among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden's Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Given ongoing threats such as these, the seaport industry is asking Congress and the Administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. AAPA is strongly in favor of reauthorizing the SAFE Port Act to ensure that U.S. port facilities and cargoes remain secure. One such bill, S. 832, was introduced in April by Sens. Susan Collins (R-ME) and Patty Murray (D-WA), which would authorize $300 million a year for five years for the Port Security Grant Program and reauthorizes, among other aspects of the original bill, the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT and the Automated Targeting System to identify high-risk cargo. Since 9/11, the Port Security Grant Program has received about $2.6 billion in funding for 11 rounds of grant awards. AAPA commends Congress and the Administration for these allocations and will continue to recommend the federal government commit $400 million a year for a separate and dedicated program to help port facilities enhance their physical security. The association supports a risk-based evaluation process that allows all facilities that are required to meet MTSA regulations to apply. “Clearly, America’s ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate,” remarked Mr. Nagle. “There’s no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed. All parties—the ports, terminal operators, the various government agencies, and the Administration and Congress—must do their part in undertaking and funding these enhancements. Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will America’s seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions as trade gateways, catalysts for job creation and economic prosperity, and important partners in our national defense.”

#### Port security is critical to maintain the stability of trade *internationally* and billions of dollars in contributions from port-employment annually─

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

The criticality of today's Maritime Transportation System (MTS) for the continued health and dynamism of the American economy can not be underestimated. Internationally, there are nearly 600 major container ports, over 7,000 container ships, and many millions of shipping containers in operation and use. The USCG and DOT recognizes 361 commercial ports in the United States of which 55 are considered major port operations. MARAD and DOD have co-designated 14 of these as Strategic Ports necessary for military logistic support operations. In addition to these designated major ports are hundreds of other small harbors that support commercial and sport fishing operations as well as private marinas that represent potential infiltration and operational support hubs for possible terrorist or other criminal activities. Under this possible scenario, there are 110,000 licensed commercial fishing vessels and more than 17 million private recreational watercraft in the United States that could be used as vessels of opportunity in support of terrorism. There are 13 million American citizens employed in domestic shipping related activities tied directly to the MTS and contributing at least $740 billion to the U.S. economy every year. More than 8,000 foreign flag vessels make more than 22,000 U.S. port calls annually, delivering 24,000,000 containers transporting everything from food stuffs to soccer balls. Over 95% of international trade and 25% of domestic trade shipments move by water through US ports and on the inland and Great Lakes waterways. In 2005, more than 134 million passengers transited U.S. waters by ferry, cruise ship, and floating casinos. These figures do not account for bulk liquid, bulk solid and break bulk cargoes which contribute significantly to the level of waterborne commerce.

#### Attacks on ports now are more likely than on any other critical infrastructure assets

Nadler et al, 2012 (Jerrold, Edward J. Markey, Bennie G. Thompson, “Cargo; the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse”, The International Herald Tribune, June 28, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/)

Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers.¶ The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is ''far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.''¶ But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable.¶ An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more.¶

#### Attacks will have catastrophic ripple effects throughout the economy decimating trade, employment, commodity prices, and nearly every sector of economic activity because ports are the KEY NEXUS POINT through which all goods travel

Allen, 2008 (Admiral Thad, U.S. Coast Guard, “Friend or Foe? Tough to Tell”, U.S. Naval Institute, [www.pacnwest.org/docs/friendorfoe.pdf](http://www.pacnwest.org/docs/friendorfoe.pdf))

Some Americans take for granted how the shelves remain stocked at Target, Wal-Mart, and their local grocery store. More than 80 percent of the world’s trade is transported by merchant vessels.2 The United States Marine Transportation System (MTS), a complex combination of waterways, ports, terminals, inter-modal connections, vessels, people, and support services that intertwines the public and private sectors is the lifeblood of our national economy. Since the United States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20 percent of the annual ocean-borne overseas trade, our MTS also fuels the global economy.3 As the MTS has grown in global importance, its inherent vulnerabilities have also increased. Nearly 700 ships arrive in U.S. ports each day, and nearly 8,000 foreign flag ships, manned by 200,000 foreign mariners, enter U.S. ports every year.4 Annually, the nation’s 326 ports handle more than $700 billion in merchandise while the cruise line industry and its passengers contribute another $35 billion in spending.5 Overall, the MTS supports a global chain of economic activity that contributes more than $700 billion to our national economy each year.6 This enormous level of activity results in the MTS operating within extremely tight tolerances, and with limited ability to deal with disruptions. When the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach closed because of a labor dispute in 2003, the cost to the American economy was approximately $1 billion per day for the first five days with the price tag rising sharply thereafter.7 To safeguard the MTS, the Coast Guard has worked with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components to produce the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS). The Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) The SVSS was built on prior research efforts and combined with private sector input from the 256 attendees at the June 2007 National Small Vessel Security Summit held in Arlington, Virginia. It uses a risk-based approach by first considering the vulnerabilities, likelihood, and consequences of a small vessel attack in a specific port. Once the risk is determined, appropriate resources can be allocated and security measures can be implemented. The SVSS engenders a spirit of international as well as public and private sector cooperation. It also creates a framework to enhance our maritime security posture and increases our level of awareness to that already achieved by much of the international community. Immediately after 9/11, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) focused on regulating cargo containers and enhancing the security of large commercial vessels (over 300 gross tons on international voyages) and port facilities. To meet this challenge, the United States was a major proponent of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code that revolutionized maritime security protocols. In 2004 148 nations approved the ISPS Code. Recognizing that a security gap still existed within the maritime domain, our nation, in conjunction with representatives from the United Kingdom and Japan, presented a small vessel threat briefing to the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 2007. This briefing addressed vessels not covered by the ISPS. To ensure a robust analysis, the briefing specifically included the private-sector input collected during the Small Vessel Security Summit. The committee appointed an international Correspondence Group, comprised of 38 voluntary member governments and 8 nongovernmental associations, to study small vessel security and submit proposed guidelines. The unprecedented number of participants underscored the seriousness of global concern. The Coast Guard has been an integral part of the Correspondence Group, and we expect the guidelines to be adopted at the MSC’s next session in November 2008. Even though the guidelines are voluntary, they reflect international consensus on small vessel security practices. Nations that follow the guidelines raise their status as favorable trading partners, so it will encourage self- correcting behavior. Once the guidelines are approved, the Coast Guard will work with DHS to incorporate them into an implementation plan for the United States. Not content to wait, some nations have already implemented their own safeguards. Singapore, home of one of the world’s busiest ports, is adjacent to two of the most heavily trafficked waterways in the world; the Singapore and Malacca straits. More than 1,000 vessels per day transit these two natural shipping choke points, making them both essential to the global supply chain and a nearpefect setting for a small vessel attack. To reduce that threat, Singapore has required all non-SOLAS-covered vessels within its port to carry a low- cost transponder that transmits the vessel’s identification and intended movement. By combining AIS data with information gleaned from the small vessel transponders, Singapore estimates it will be able to monitor 98 percent of the vessels within its waterways.8 While this type of monitoring heightens privacy concerns, the added situational awareness allows law enforcement agencies to identify high-risk vessels and detect anomalies in shipping patterns, two key aspects of a risk-based approach to maritime security. Based on lessons from previous incidents and security efforts throughout the international community, the SVSS addresses four key risk scenarios from small vessels: • Domestic use of WBIEDs; • Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including WMDs); Conveyance for smuggling terrorists; and • Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack, e.g. man-portable air-defense system (ManPADS). More Eyes and Ears A small vessel attack can range from a simple improvised explosive device to a weapon of mass destruction. A WMD would have obvious catastrophic implications but even a garage-built bomb or a small-arms attack could force a port to shut down and have long-term economic and security ramifications. A small vessel could also be used to smuggle terrorists into the country. In 2007, approximately 5,000 illegal immigrants success- fully arrived on our shores and most were transported via small craft. There are a variety of threats from small vessels to our security, so we need a fresh approach to risk mitigation. Our Economic Lifeblood We rely on our Marine Transportation System to keep the shelves stocked at Target, Wal-Mart, and our local grocery store. An attack on a vessel in one of our ports, such as Los Angeles/Long Beach, could result in the port shutting down and spreading anxiety throughout the global financial marketplace.

#### Even though recent economic dips have occurred without massive impact, port attacks would cause a uniquely QUICK and IRRECOVERABLE economic collapse

Flynn, 2003 (Stephen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, “The Fragile State of Container Security”, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate, <http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730>)

A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.

#### Their generic economy impact defense is a non-starter – it assumes recession-induced dips, not total GRIND-TO-A-HALT shutdown

Bakir, 2007 (Niyazi Onur, Postdoctoral Research Associate at University of Southern California Center for Homeland Security, “A Brief Analysis of Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Maritime Domain”, published 1/1/2007 by CREATE Research Center, pg. 9)

Seaports are arguably the most critical nodes in the global supply-chain and hence have a central role in business continuity. They make a huge contribution to the US economy by facilitating trade and tourism, providing jobs, and supplementing the energy need. 95% of overseas trade by weight and 75% by value moves through US seaports. Many critical coastal targets, including petroleum tank farms, hazardous material storage facilities and factories are located around the ports. Besides, several major US cities lay in close proximity to waterways and seaports. Therefore, a well organized attack at a major US port is likely to inflict high number of casualties and cause grave nationwide economic damage. Estimates of the economic impact of a major terrorist attack at a US seaport vary. Earlier studies predicted that a port closing could cost the economy as high as $1 trillion [27]. A more recent study by Gordon et al. [18] puts this figure around $45 billion for a dirty bomb attack. For a potential nuclear attack, partially due to higher level of uncertainty, experts are able to state a wider range for potential consequences. In a 2003 study [1], direct trade losses were calculated to be around $100-200 billion whereas property damage is expected to lie between $50 and $500 billion. A more disturbing figure is the estimated indirect costs to the economy ranging from $300 billion to $1.4 trillion. On the casualty side, the study group judges that the number should be between 50,000 and 1,000,000. Port security has been increasingly intertwined with the security of containerized cargo in the public and the media. While containers are arguably the “Trojan Horses” of the modern era, failure to recognize other vulnerabilities may leave the US homeland unguarded for another surprise attack. In this paper, port security is analyzed under four headings: cargo security, access to secure areas, cruise lines, and security around the port perimeters. Most of the discussion centers around the cargo security as monitoring the contents of containers without interrupting the flow of trade poses tremendous challenges to both public and private stakeholders. However, as will be evident in the discussion, there are other forms of weaknesses in port security that are equally important because any attack on the port facility may trigger a slowdown of cargo processing and inflict casualties.

#### Economic decline causes war

Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” *Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives*, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. ¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. ¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) ¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. ¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. ¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

### Scenario 2 is Trade

Maritime security is key to international trade—keeps trade leadership

Joseph J. **Cox**, President, Chamber of Shipping of America, 10/2/**01**, “RAILROAD AND MARITIME SECURITY”, Senate Hearing 107-1033 From the U.S. Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg89457/html/CHRG-107shrg89457.htm>

Chamber of Shipping of America–International and Domestic Responsibilities CSA traces its roots back to 1917 and the development of the first international treaty on maritime safety. Since that time, the U.S. has had extensive dealings with the international community on maritime matters. We mention this because it is critical to recognize two very important points: the maritime industry is the basic tool of international trade and the U.S. has been one of the leaders in the development of policies for this industry for decades. At the same time, we have an extensive trade in our waters among U.S. companies. The needs of the U.S. for a secure waterfront will have an impact on our ships and the ships of our trading partners. We should recognize that ships are the critical mechanism for the United States in its world trade leadership. Ships are the lifelines of trade from other nations to the U.S. and from the U.S. to the rest of the world. Types of Ships CSA represents all types of ships that carry cargo. These include container ships, tankers, both crude and product tankers, roll-on roll- off ships, integrated tug-barge units and large coastwise barges. Our members are involved in operating ships, chartering ships, arranging for crew and pilotage, government inspections, insurance surveys, complying with laws and regulations, responding to customer requests and generally keeping the maritime commerce of the country on the move.

#### U.S. strength in international trade is key to free Trade and US leadership

**Panitchpakdi 4** ( Secretary general for the UN conference on trade and development “ American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?” http://www.wto.org/english/news\_e/spsp\_e/spsp22\_e.htm)

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives.

#### Threats are real—US Leadership solves every single war scenario

**Thayer 06** (Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, "In Defense of Primacy", lexis)

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. **U**.S. primacy --and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influencein international politics , **allowing the U**nited **S**tates **to shape the behavior of states and international institutions**. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States . They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power**.** China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. **Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power**--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly**.** As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War,U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists , most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned --between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why: democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, **the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network** characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. **The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states** in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. **The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world.**

#### Protectionism is the alternative to free trade

**Posen, 09** – Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, 2009, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” *Global Power Revisited*, pp. 11-14, http://www.alfred-herrhausen-gesellschaft.de/downloads/FS\_USA\_09\_GlobalPowerRevisited.pdf)

Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country's detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.

#### Protectionism Means Extinction

**Panzner, 08** – New York Institute of Finance (Michael J., 2008, *Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,* pp. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and **protectionism will bring** about ever more heated arguments and **dangerous confrontations** over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or **nuclear weapons will** vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to **cause widespread destruction**. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies **as the beginnings of a new world war**.

#### Free trade creates structural disincentives for war through interdependence

**Griswold, 11** – Director, Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute (Daniel, 2011, “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” *Hayek Society Journal* Vol. 9 (2011), http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

## Terrorism

#### It’s only a matter of time—terrorist attack inevitable absent the plan

**The Providence Journal 2006** (“Neglecting port security puts U.S. in economic peril” Providence Journal/Evening Bulletin 9/24/06 ProQuest 6/20/12)

Now, five years after al-Qaida took down the World Trade Center, security gaps at 361 ports on U.S. coasts remain the biggest holes in the country's safety net. Plans to fill those holes have been bogged down in a yearlong squabble in Congress. The debate has broken down into bipartisan bickering over which party, the Democratic or the Republican, will keep you safer and who's to blame for blocking progress. Meanwhile, the ports stay porous. "It's just a question of time before terrorists with potentially more destructive weapons breach the superficial security measures that have been put in place to protect the ports, the ships and the millions of intermodal containers that link global producers to consumers," Stephen Flynn, a former White House official and terrorism expert, told Congress. Flynn, and other experts and researchers from around the world, will discuss port security tomorrow and Tuesday at the first international conference on port security and marine transportation, which will be held at the University of Rhode Island. One of the focuses will be the effect a terrorist attack on a U.S. port would have on world trade and the U.S. economy. "The global supply chain requires security at every step of the way," said Thomas Grigalunas, a co-chairman of the conference and a URI professor of natural-resource economics. He said the complex network of ports, trade routes and shipping companies connects suppliers from around the world with consumers of goods from Wal-Mart, General Motors, CVS and others. Annually, U.S. ports handle 2 billion tons of cargo, with 7,500 commercial vessels unloading 7 million cargo containers making 51,000 annual calls. There are 400,000 port workers who in 2003 handled $807 billion worth of goods. That system is linked to ports worldwide because the United States is the world's largest importer and exporter, accounting for 20 percent of all ocean-borne trade. Even a small disruption at U.S. ports would ripple through the economy. A tragedy would be devastating. Remember when Hurricane Katrina closed the Port of New Orleans and cargo ships, oil tankers and trailer trucks were bottled up, disrupting the shipment of goods worldwide? Despite those concerns, only a fraction of the big-box cargo containers that move through U.S. ports get fully inspected. Port security authorities have limited staffs and budgets to coordinate strategy and credential port workers. Ten days ago, the U.S. Senate finally passed a bill that authorizes $5.5 billion for port security over six years. There's money for 1,000 customs and border officers and radiation detectors for 22 larger ports. There are new procedures to encourage shippers and ports worldwide to improve guarding containers against stowaway weapons. The House has passed a similar bill. The differences have to be ironed out and President Bush has to sign the legislation before changes can be made. As the ports wait for resources to tighten the security net, the evidence gets stronger that al-Qaida attacked the World Trade Center for three reasons: to kill Americans, to take down a symbol of Western capitalism and culture, and to disrupt the financial center of the world's economy. The terrorists plan more attacks. Economic disruption remains one of their goals. New York is the major port on the East Coast and supplies most of the goods that fuel New England's economy. Rhode Island's ports at Quonset/Davisville, where cars and fish are unloaded, and Providence, where oil, natural gas, diesel fuel, jet fuel and other materials are shipped and stored, are not major players in the region's or U.S. economy. But remember this: Lightning or static electricity last summer is believed to have sparked a huge fire at the port in Providence, severely damaging a pier and disrupting fuel deliveries. Think of what a targeted, manmade tragedy could do.

#### Anonymity of containers means every container is a potential threat—increasing risk

Keefer, Campbell Law Review, 2012 (Wendy, March 3rd, “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”, Campbell Law Review)

As will become apparent, not only are foreign entities already heavily invested in United States port operations, but the cooperation of private and governmental interests in other countries is crucial to securing, among other things, container shipments into United States ports. Rather than foreign investment, the real security issue surrounding shipping containers is the anonymity of those involved with the shipment and of the cargo actually contained inside. Regardless of any opposition to marine terminal or other port facility operations, "ports are vulnerable to the entry of terrorists or illicit weapons because of the large number of containers that enter U.S. territory, regardless of who manages them. '5

#### Ports are vulnerable to terrorist attack – threatens biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare

Allam , May 9, 2012 (Zaheer Allam is senior vice president of Telecom Products and Operations for Polaris Wireless, Government Technology, “3 Ways Machine-to-Machine Tech Can Assist Governments”, http://www.govtech.com/technology/3-Ways-Machine-to-Machine-Tech-Can-Assist-Governments-.html)

According to the RAND Corporation, the U.S. maritime port infrastructure consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. U.S. ports handle approximately 20 percent of the maritime trade worldwide, and are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack and sabotage. As a result, the security cost to protect ports has skyrocketed, with state and local port authorities sharing a significant portion of this burden. A major fear is that terrorists will infiltrate cargo somewhere along the transit route and smuggle in a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon.

### Scenario 1 is Nuclear Terrorism

#### Terrorists already have nuclear materials—only a matter of time before attack

Mimi Hall 10 , staff writer for USA Today, 4/12/2010, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit\_N.htm

Obama said "the single biggest threat" to U.S. security is the possibility of a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. "If there was ever a detonation in New York City, or London, or Johannesburg, the ramifications economically, politically and from a security perspective would be devastating," he said Sunday before meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma, who is attending the summit. Also attending: presidents, prime ministers and kings from countries such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Jordan. Obama continues one-on-one meetings with leaders today, and on Tuesday, the group will sign a "high-level communiqué" that recognizes the seriousness of the threat and outlines efforts to secure or eliminate vulnerable stockpiles, according to Gary Samore, the White House senior adviser for non-proliferation. The summit is "intended to rally collective action," White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes says. The meetings will present their own security challenge for the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies because there will be so many world leaders at one time in Washington. Samore says several countries will announce plans to eliminate or better protect their stockpiles. Securing nuclear material is a challenging but necessary job "because the global stockpile of nuclear weapons materials is large enough to build 120,000 nuclear bombs (and) because Osama bin Laden considers it his religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States," says Alexandra Toma of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a 40-member coalition dedicated to securing nuclear material. Five countries — the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France — are internationally recognized nuclear powers and have signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which pledges to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. India, Pakistan and North Korea also have nuclear weapons, and Israel is suspected of having warheads, according to the non-partisan Arms Control Association. Israel does not admit or deny having them. The United States and Russia hold the overwhelming majority of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the material that could be used to build a crude but devastating bomb. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nuclear-security group run by former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, there is no comprehensive inventory of the world's nuclear material. But 672 research reactors have been built worldwide and 272 operate in 56 countries, most at universities or other research centers where security is lax, the group says. "Much of the nuclear materials that are potentially vulnerable or could be used for nuclear weapons are actually in the hands of private industry, so government regulation is a very important component," Samore says. Some of the material already has been stolen, according to Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, author of Securing the Bomb. "Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry," he says. "It's an ongoing reality." The International Atomic Energy Agency, a watchdog arm of the United Nations that monitors the use of nuclear power and technology, has documented 18 cases involving the theft or loss of plutonium or weapons-grade uranium, mostly occurring in the former Soviet Union. The IAEA says a majority of these cases have not had a pre-identified buyer and "amateurish character" and "poor organization" have been the hallmark of some of the cases involving unauthorized possession of materials. In Prague last year, Obama said, "Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound." Government efforts have been made to secure nuclear material in recent years. Last week, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) worked with officials in Chile to remove nuclear material from reactors near Santiago and transport it to the USA. The agency has removed all significant amounts of highly enriched uranium from 18 countries, helped convert 60 reactors in 32 countries to the use of safer, low-enriched uranium and closed seven reactors. The NNSA also has secured highly enriched uranium in more than 750 buildings worldwide and safely stored 2,691 kilograms of nuclear material. Despite those efforts, in 2008, the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction warned, "Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack" by 2013.

A port attack is the most likely risk of nuclear terrorism

Konkel 05 (Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2005, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” <http://irps>.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf)

In one of his final interviews before leaving office, former Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the greatest danger facing the United States in the war on terrorism is the possibility that al Qaeda or a sympathetic terrorist group could obtain a nuclear bomb.56 Security experts from the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and a multitude of think tanks have repeatedly identified the maritime cargo transportation system as the most likely means by which terrorists might bring a nuclear weapon into the United States. Despite these warnings, current measures to defend against a container-borne nuclear attack remain terribly inadequate.

Nuclear terrorism ensuresplanet-ending great power nuclear war—Draws in Russia and China and kills environment

Dennis Ray Morgan 9, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693

Years later, in 1982, at the height of the Cold War, Jonathon Schell, in a very stark and horrific portrait, depicted sweeping, bleak global scenarios of total nuclear destruction. Schell’s work, The Fate of the Earth [8] represents one of the gravest warnings to humankind ever given. The possibility of complete annihilation of humankind is not out of the question as long as these death bombs exist as symbols of national power. As Schell relates, the power of destruction is now not just thousands of times as that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; now it stands at more than one and a half million times as powerful, more than fifty times enough to wipe out all of human civilization and much of the rest of life along with it [8]. In Crucial Questions about the Future, Allen Tough cites that Schell’s monumental work, which ‘‘eradicated the ignorance and denial in many of us,’’ was confirmed by ‘‘subsequent scientific work on nuclear winter and other possible effects: humans really could be completely devastated. Our human species really could become extinct.’’ [9]. Tough estimated the chance of human self-destruction due to nuclear war as one in ten. He comments that few daredevils or high rollers would take such a risk with so much at stake, and yet ‘‘human civilization is remarkably casual about its high risk of dying out completely if it continues on its present path for another 40 years’’ [9]. What a precarious foundation of power the world rests upon. The basis of much of the military power in the developed world is nuclear. It is the reigning symbol of global power, the basis, – albeit, unspoken or else barely whispered – by which powerful countries subtly assert aggressive intentions and ambitions for hegemony, though masked by ‘‘diplomacy’’ and ‘‘negotiations,’’ and yet this basis is not as stable as most believe it to be. In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In otherwords, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek selfdetermination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely thatmany, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

### Scenario 2 is Bioterrorism

#### **Ports are the only way Bio weapons could enter the United States—attack would be a worst case scenario.**

Frittelli 05 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” May 27, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

Security experts are concerned about a variety of terrorist threat scenarios at U.S. ports. Among other things, they are concerned that terrorists could: ! use commercial cargo containers to smuggle terrorists, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, components thereof, or other dangerous materials into the United States; ! seize control of a large commercial cargo ship and use it as a collision weapon for destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront; ! sink a large commercial cargo ship in a major shipping channel, thereby blocking all traffic to and from the port; ! attack a large ship carrying a volatile fuel (such as liquefied natural gas) and detonate the fuel so as to cause a massive in-port explosion; ! attack an oil tanker in a port or at an offshore discharge facility 19 so as to disrupt the world oil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage; ! seize control of a ferry (which can carry hundreds of passengers) or a cruise ship (which can carry more than 3,000 passengers, of whom about 90% are usually U.S. citizens) and threaten the deaths of the passengers if a demand is not met; ! attack U.S. Navy ships in an attempt to kill U.S. military personnel, damage or destroy a valuable U.S. military asset, and (in the case of nuclear-powered ships) cause a radiological release. ! use land around a port to stage attacks on bridges, refineries located on the waterfront, or other port facilities. Some of these scenarios (or similar ones) have already come to pass elsewhere. For example, in October 2002, the French oil tanker Limberg appears to have been attacked by a bomb-laden boat off the coast of Yemen, killing one crewman aboard the tanker, damaging the ship, and causing an oil spill. 20 In October 2001, Italian authorities arrested on terrorism charges an Egyptian-born Canadian citizen found with high-tech equipment (including a satellite phone and a computer) and other personal possessions in a cargo container in an Italian port. 21 In October 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a bomb-laden boat during a refueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors, injuring 39 others, and causing damage to the ship that cost about $250 million to repair. 22 In 1985, terrorists seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean and held its passengers hostage, killing one of them.

#### Only 7% of cargo is screened for biological threats

**Seaport security news,11-23- 2010 ”**Port Security Is A Global Issue” <http://www.seaportsecuritynews.com/?p=212>

**Only 7-10% of the cargo that enters U.S. ports is scanned for illegal drugs or chemical, nuclear or biological agents, Homeland Security Department officials say**. But they are quick to add that all cargo is “screened,” using a variety of cooperative programs and technologies, prior to reaching port.

#### Inadequate port security makes bioterror inevitable

Barry **Ritholtz**, October 23, 20**11**, (chief executive of FusionIQ, a quantitative research firm) Washington Post, The public investment we need to make now, for our competitiveness, our jobs and our safety, Lexis

Ports. We are checking too little of the cargo coming into the United States. Since 9/11, we simply have not upgraded our **port** **security** sufficiently, and we remain vulnerable to attack by a dirty bomb or biological weapon. As long as we are discussing security, our chemical plants and petroleum processing centers could use a good security upgrade as well.

#### Current proliferation of biological weapons makes bioterrorism likely

Koblentz 04 (Gregory Koblentz, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, he is an Associate Faculty at the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, and he is a Research Affiliate with the Security Studies Program at MIT, at the time he was a doctoral candidate in political science at MIT, Winter 2003/04 “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare” <http://belfercenter>.hks.harvard.edu/files/koblentz.pdf)

Preventing the spread of biological warfare capabilities to dis satisfied actors seeking a means to challenge the status quo is extremely difªcult. The proliferation of biological weapons is facilitated by the dual-use nature of biotechnology, which also complicates verification of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological weapons.41 It does not include provisions for veriªcation. In 2001, negotiations to develop a protocol to strengthen the BWC were halted after the United States announced that it would not accept the draft protocol. According to U.S. ofªcials, the proposed protocol was not intrusive enough to detect clandestine biological weapons activities, yet it was too invasive to adequately safeguard proprietary and classiªed information.42 Actors pursuing biological weapons are motivated by a variety of factors.43 The secrecy that shrouds biological weapons programs and the lack of reliable information regarding decisions to develop such programs, however, complicate efforts to study their motivations more thoroughly.44 Nevertheless, an examination of the characteristics of biological weapons strongly suggests that they are attractive primarily to dissatisfied actors—whether states or terrorists. Biological weapons have military utility across the spectrum of conflict, rely on surprise, and do not destroy property. These characteristics favor the use of such weapons in offensive operations and asymmetric strategies against stronger opponents. The outlaw status of biological weapons renders them undesirable to status quo states interested primarily in self-defense. In addition, the relative ease of accessibility, high levels of potency, and potentially huge psychological impact combine to make biological weapons attractive to extremist religious terrorist groups **i**nterested in maximizing casualties and fear. In sum, dis satisfied actors—both states and terrorists—have the opportunity and motivation to acquire these weapons.

#### Bioterror is the most likely risk for human extinction – even a minor risk means the plan is key

Matheny 07 **(**Jason Matheny research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment – particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, he is a Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” <http://physics>.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney\_extinction.pdf)

More recent predictions of human extinction are little more optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britain’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it would be “misguided” to assume that the probability of extinction is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30% probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The “Stern Review” for theU.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some explanations of the “Fermi Paradox” imply Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction 1337 a high probability (close to100%)of extinctionamong technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4 Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures. We already invest in some extinction countermeasures. NASA spends $4 million per year monitoring near-Earth asteroids and comets (Leary, 2007) and there has been some research on how to deflect these objects using existing technologies (Gritzner&Kahle, 2004; NASA, 2007). $1.7 billion is spent researching climate change and there are many strategies to reduce carbon emissions (Posner, 2004, p. 181). There are policies to reduce nuclear threats, such as the Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as efforts to secure expertise by employing former nuclear scientists. Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

Biological terrorism in a port would cause the world economy to collapse and cause extinction through diseases

Abt et. al. 03 (Clark C. Abt, Ph.D., William Rhodes, Ph.D., Rocco Casagrande, Ph.D., Gary Gaumer, Ph.D.5/9/03, “The Economic Impacts of Bioterrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability” http://abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic\_Impacts\_of\_Bioterrorist\_Attacks.pdf)

Our investigation of the economic impacts of bioterrorist attacks on U.S. seaport-based container freight transportation systems yielded a disturbing finding: The freight transportation systems vital to the U.S. economy are vulnerable to attack by biological weapons. Indeed, bioterrorism presents an urgent danger not just to these systems and the seaport cities in which they are located, but to the entire population of the United States. In our view, the threat of bioterrorism today rivals the nuclear threat that has overshadowed this country for the last fifty years. Furthermore, we believe that the deterrent strategies that have held the nuclear threat at bay for half a century are unlikely to be as effective against the threat of bioterrorism. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatized the risk and demonstrated the consequences of the U.S. transportation system being recruited to serve terrorist aims. The U.S. government response to those events—to blockade its own sea- and airports for a week—may have incurred losses as great as the estimated $50 billion World Trade Center direct costs themselves. Airlines and airfreight companies lost billions of dollars. Container shipping fared worse, losing a billion dollars a day during months spent disentangling freight traffic. Imagine the even greater costs of a self-imposed shutdown of all forms of transportation—road and rail as well as sea and air—in response to a bioterrorist attack, especially one involving a deadly and highly contagious disease. We began to see our original research mandate in the context of a much larger, grimmer vision of the entire world economy held hostage by this emerging form of deadly global biological warfare.

**Even the smallest bioterror attack would collapse the economy and cause a nuclear WW3**

**Kerpen 08, President of American Commitment** [Phil, president of American Commitment, From Panic to Depression?, October 28 2008, <http://www.philkerpen.com/?q=node/1>, June 25 2012]

It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors — not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.

Port security solves bioterror—Chemical Sensors

Staples 04 (Edward J. Staples has a Ph.D. in solid-state physics and electronics from Southern Methodist University and is a co-inventor of the zNose, April 2004, “Chemical Profiling Cargo with an Ultra-High Speed Gas Chromatograph, Olfactory Images, and Virtual Chemical Sensors” www.estcal.com/tech\_papers/papers/Security/Cargo\_Container\_Odors.pdf)

Ultra-high speed gas chromatography is a powerful analytical method for analysis of odors, fragrances, and chemical vapors produced by explosives, chemical and biological weapons, contraband, and hazardous industrial materials. A portable chemical profiling system incorporating an ultra-high speed chromatography column, a solid-state sensor, a programmable gate array microprocessor, and an integrated vapor preconcentrator is described. Using ultra-high speed chromatography, chemical vapors within containers can be speciated and their concentration measured in less than 10 seconds with picogram sensitivity using a SAW sensor with electronically variable sensitivity. Odor concentration and intensity are measured directly with an integrating GC sensor. The solid-state sensor produces high resolution 2-dimensional olfactory images unique to many complex odors. Examples involving odors from explosives, contraband drugs of abuse, hazardous chemicals, and even biological life forms are presented. An important requirement for a chemical profiling system is that it must recognize odors and fragrances based upon their full chemical signature. Unlike a trace detector, it must see everything and miss nothing. A library of retention time indices for chemicals allows for the creation of hundreds of specific virtual chemical sensors. Virtual chemical sensors combined with odor profiling can be an effective method for recognizing the presence of hazardous materials. Chemical libraries and electronic odor profiles allows users to quickly distribute signatures of hazardous materials or new threat vapors of any kind

**Plan solves terrorism—increased security deters all terrorist attacks**

**RAND 09**, The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world., 20**09,** a chapter in the series of New Ideas produced by rand found at, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security”, page 1 [www.rand](http://www.rand).org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP281.pdf

Deterrence is a central concept in counterterrorism security, yet it is not well understood or measured. Without effective deterrence, counterterrorism security may simply be impractical, as noted by the Transportation Research Board (2002, p. 34): “[T]he impracticality of elimi- nating all transportation vulnerabilities means that efforts to deter must be a key part of trans- portation security strategies.” Deterrence is also a major factor in the cost-effectiveness of many security programs. For instance, even if a radiation-detection system at ports never actually encounters weapon material, if it deters would-be attackers from trying to smuggle such mate- rial into the country, it could easily be cost-effective even if associated program costs are very high. On the other hand, if smugglers can merely shift their operations to smaller ports or land routes, then the benefits of the program may be slight in spite of its narrow deterrent effect. Indeed, a recent National Research Council (2009) review of one such port radiation-detection program, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program, recommended that development of the program be discontinued until questions about deterrent effects, deflection (or risk-shifting) effects, and related factors central to cost-effectiveness are better understood. This paper builds on a growing literature examining terrorist decisionmaking to examine the role of deterrence in counterterrorism strategy for homeland security. It discusses deter- rence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and considers adaptations that would-be attackers are likely to make in response to U.S. security efforts. It also discusses the related and nettlesome connection between deterrence and risk transfer, including the possibility that some successful deterrent actions can increase the level of danger. The paper then suggests a simple analytic framework for evaluating the relative value of deterrent actions. Such a framework is necessary for ensuring that counterterrorism security investments are efficient and effective. Prior studies and observation of terrorist-group behavior make it clear that terrorists respond dynamically to the security measures they encounter or suspect they will encoun- ter (Jackson et al., 2007). Therefore, to optimize security strategies, the United States needs to understand how such strategies are likely to affect terrorists’ decisions about whether and what to attack (Jackson, 2009a; 2009b). Ideally, deterrence and risk-displacement effects are “designed in” so that security measures manipulate terrorist decisionmaking in ways that pro- duce net security benefits. We explore this possibility by building on an economics literature that began with Becker’s 1968 analysis of crime and its management and has more recently been extended to investigate terrorist and security-manager decisionmaking, often in the con- text of economic game theory. In the next sections, we propose a general conceptual model for how security measures affect terrorists who plan attacks. We discuss this model’s implications for understanding both deterrence and the risk-displacement effects of security measures, as well as for counterterrorist security planning more generally. Finally, we propose a framework for evaluating alternative security measures that takes into account the possibility that deterrence merely results in risk displacement. Terrorist Decisions—The Targets of Deterrence Despite occasional uncertainty and periodic controversy on the point, it is by now conven- tional to assume that terrorists pursue their objectives rationally. Although determined terror- ists—both as individuals and organizations—may be willing to risk everything to achieve their objectives, they do not wish to waste their own lives or other resources on missions that are doomed to fail or unlikely to achieve their intended results. This insight has led to a growing game-theory literature examining how to optimize security investments given the assumption that terrorists are guided by principles of expected utility theory (e.g., Bier, 2005; Golany et al., 2009; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Major, 2002; Phillips, 2009; Zhuang and Bier, 2007, 2009; Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009). The distinction between terrorists as individuals and terrorist groups as organizations is important for understanding the deterrent effects of security measures. The example of indi- vidual suicide terrorists is often invoked to illustrate why security measures that threaten the safety of operatives may have less of a deterrent effect than those aimed against criminals or other attackers who want to live to see another day. Even if an individual suicide terrorist is prepared to die for a minor victory, however, this may not be true for the organization that dispatches the operative. Both may be sensitive to measures that affect the successful outcome of the operation, but the group might also be sensitive to measures that both threaten the life of the operative and provide security forces with information that could compromise the group. In our discussion, we chiefly focus on deterring organizations. From this perspective, individuals are deterred when their actions would produce unacceptable harm to their organi- zations. See Radlauer (2006) for a discussion of the two different targets of deterrence. Examples of terrorists’ sensitivity to operational risks abound. Hoffman (1997), for instance, quotes George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine as saying, “The main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured.” Although hyperbolic, the quote illustrates sensitivity to risks. In the doctrine of groups like the Provisional Irish Repub- lican Army, requirements for operational planning include explicit consideration of how pre- attack surveillance can be used to manage and reduce operational risks. Similarly, in a docu- ment captured from the Islamic State of Iraq/al Qaeda in Iraq (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008, p. 6), a group member laments the deleterious effects on potential suicide bombers when they suspect that poor planning may result in their lives being wasted on low- value targets: The brother . . . starts hearing stories and episodes of previous suicide bombers who carried out their attacks in the air or against walls. He hears also that the brothers will be sending him to an easy target that can be dealt with by a security or military operation. One of the brothers will inform the suicide bomber that the target will be against two police cars or one of the apostate leaders; as result [sic], his morale will deteriorate as he was hoping to cause huge damage to the apostate group, and devilish thoughts and depression crawls [sic] to his heart. The problem will increase when he hears about more suicide bombers who were captured while carrying out their operations, since the car did not explode or as a result of failure of the booby trapped vehicle. Rapid changes in terrorist tactics in response to effective security countermeasures—such as the decline in aircraft hijacking attempts after magnetometers were introduced as a routine part of passenger screening or a group’s decision to use indirect weapons, such as mortars and rockets, to attack targets protected by security barriers—also implicitly demonstrate terrorists’ sensitivity and rational adaptation to operational risks posed by security measures (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Jackson et al., 2007). Because terrorists are sensitive to the risk posed by their operations but also highly moti- vated to achieve operational objectives or the intended payoff, they must at least implicitly undertake a kind of cost-benefit analysis of the available alternative operations. Indeed, explicit prescriptions for this sort of rational decisionmaking can be found in contemporary writings by al Qaeda strategists. For example, in The Management of Savagery, Naji (2006, p. 107) directs planners to weigh the “benefit and harm” of different actions they might undertake, directly echoing this sort of cost-benefit thinking. Other groups have made similar statements, either with respect to individual acts or to violent action overall. The previously cited document captured from the Islamic State of Iraq/al Qaeda in Iraq parallels this argument while criti- cizing some of the group’s midlevel emirs for not performing such analyses appropriately and therefore wasting operatives and resources in attacks that failed to properly weigh operational risks against probability of success (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008). In this case, risky actions are seen by the perpetrators themselves as taken not “irrationally” but out of incompetence.

## Solvency

#### The Port Security Grant Program is severely underfunded – the plan is key to fill critical infrastructure gaps and ensure effective port security

Kimery, 2012 (Anthony, Staff Writer for the Homeland Security Today website, “Security, Port Authorities Associations Urge DHS To Reconsider Port Allocations” published 3/9/2012, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/grants-funding/single-article/security-port-authorities-associations-urge-dhs-to-reconsider-port-allocations/8e5771ad69aa40aed3ae590bf914477d.html)

This week the Security Industry Association (SIA), along with the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano urging her to reconsider grant allocations assigned to the Fiscal Year 2012 Port Security Grant Program, or to offer waivers on cost share agreements of previously awarded grants**.** The letter was sent in response to DHS grant guidance issued on February 17, 2012 in which DHS slashed the Port Security Grant Program by 59 percent.   “Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department,” SIA and AAPA said in their letter to Napolitano. “The recently announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act.”   Continuing, the two organizations stated that “this allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card.”The two groups said that, “while we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.”   “We are certain there are other options available, and we would encourage your office to think through those options to help us as we help secure our ports**,” the groups’ joint letter to Napolitano concluded.   “Every agency has to do more with less; we understand that,” said Marcus Dunn, Director of Government Relations at SIA. “However, what is difficult to understand is the allocation made by DHS.”** Many ports have applied for - and have been granted - funding for critical security components. Unfortunately, those grants have been tied to matching grants, the two organizations noted in a statement. They added that “given the state of the economy, some ports are unable to meet the matching amount, leaving those dollars unclaimed and leaving critical security projects unfinished.”   “If the matching amounts were waived, we would really be looking at a budget-neutral situation,” Dunn said in a statement. “Many of these projects are scalable and ready to be implemented now.”

#### Bolstering security infrastructure at ports via the PSGP is key to solve

Holmes, 2012 (John M., Deputy Executive Director of Operations Port of Los Angeles, Testimony Before The United States House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, “Budget Hearing - Federal Emergency Management Agency –Director and State & Local Witnesses” <http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf>)

Since 9/11, port security has become a top priority for U.S. ports, including the Port of Los ¶ Angeles. Safe and secure seaport facilities are fundamental to protecting our borders and ¶ moving goods. Protecting the people and freight that move through seaports and ¶ surrounding communities is essential to keeping seaports safe and open for business. ¶ With 99.6 percent (by volume) of overseas trade flowing through U.S. ports, a terrorist ¶ incident at a port could have a drastic impact on the U.S. economy. In the decade since 9/11, a key component of our nation’s effort to harden the security of ¶ seaports has been the Port Security Grant Program, currently managed by FEMA. The ¶ Port of Los Angeles alone has spent more than $250 million to upgrade its security, over ¶ $100 million of which was provided through grant funding. These upgrades would not ¶ have been possible if it were not for the Port Security Grant Program.¶ As is the case in Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funds have helped port facilities and ¶ port areas to strengthen facility security and work in partnership with other agencies to ¶ enhance the security of the region. In the Port of Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funding ¶ has been used to procure equipment such as vessels and vehicles, install detection ¶ systems such as cameras and sensors, and provide equipment maintenance for the ¶ systems recently installed. Port Security Grant funds have also been used to harden port ¶ IT infrastructure, and most recently this funding has been used to fill a serious training gap ¶ -- Maritime Security Training for State and Local police officers.¶ Under the SAFE Port Act, the Port Security Grant program is authorized at $400 million. ¶ Unfortunately, in the last few years, the funding for this program has decreased, currently ¶ standing at a dangerously low level. The current level of $97.5 million is 75 percent less ¶ than the authorized level, and it is currently at one of the lowest funding levels ever for this ¶ program. As costs of systems, maintenance and equipment continue to rise, this level of ¶ funding will bring into question the sustainability of the protection levels we have worked so ¶ hard to build over the last decade.¶ As you know, for FY 2012, this Committee decided to bundle all FEMA State and Local ¶ grant programs, cut the combined programs by 40 percent, and give DHS the authority to ¶ determine funding levels for individual programs. AAPA has long been wary of efforts to ¶ bundle programs, fearing that traditional homeland security grants would be given a higher ¶ priority. DHS was given the authority to make the funding decisions, and last month, our ¶ fears became reality. The FY 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior ¶ year and 75 percent less than the authorized level. This will harm our ability to expand ¶ protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans and fund ¶ federal mandates such as installation of TWIC readers.¶ In a constantly changing threat environment, this level of funding will make it difficult to ¶ maintain our current capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles, much less meet new and ¶ emerging concerns in such areas as infrastructure protection, continuity of services such ¶ as power and water, protection of our information technology capabilities and response to ¶ the ever-growing cyber threat. At the Port of Los Angeles, Port Security Grant funding has ¶ been a critical component in our efforts to build a resilient port, and we would hate to see a ¶ degradation of these efforts as a result of grant funding reductions.

#### USFG is key - states require the federal government for effective port upgrades because of interstate competition and a failure to share solutions

Puentes 5/23/2011 (Robert Puentes, Senior Fellow and director of Metropolitan Policy at Brookings, former Director of Infrastructure at the Intelligent Transportation Society of America, “Move It: How the U.S. Can Improve Transportation Policy”; http://www.brookings.edu-/research/opinions/2011/05/23transportation-policy-puentes)

The country needs to become more export-oriented for the future health of the economy. But right now there's no way to make sure that the nation's ports, border crossings and roadways are set up to accomplish that goal. For one thing, there's far too little attention paid to making sure that traffic at border crossings moves swiftly. Our crossings into Mexico and Canada are routinely clogged, interrupting the flow of trade. Consider the challenges facing Detroit—part of the largest binational trading corridor on the planet, linking the U.S. and Canadian auto industries and other sectors with highly integrated, transport-dependent, "just in time" supply chains and their smaller, more frequent shipments. Canada is our nation's largest trading partner, and Detroit's Ambassador Bridge is the No. 1 border point for commerce between the two countries. It's a crucial corridor—but there are relatively few border crossings because of the Great Lakes. So traffic piles up at bridges and tunnels, with freight competing with passenger cars to get through tightened security checkpoints. Trucks also clog the roads of Detroit as they shuttle freight between ports and large distribution centers and warehouses. The export problem isn't just a matter of insufficient infrastructure. States and cities routinely compete against one another for shipping activity instead of coming up with joint efforts that might benefit all the terminals in the region. Without an overall strategy, there's a duplication of efforts and a duplication of subsidies that hurts the economy, given scarce resources. Collaboration is needed—between the federal government, states, metro areas, freight industry and shippers. We need to come up with a comprehensive plan that identifies the best ways to help the flow of freight. The plan might identify the most important corridors for freight, for instance, and then target investments to improve safety, relieve bottlenecks and provide better access to ports. That might mean new roads leading to ports or, in some instances, truck-only lanes on existing roads. Similarly, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico should also come together to study infrastructure needs at the land borders and along the corridors that link the two borders together. For now, some states are coming up with innovative solutions on their own—solutions that could and should become widespread under a national transportation policy. Back in Detroit, for instance, the national governments of the U.S. and Canada, along with lawmakers in Michigan and Ontario, are trying to build a new bridge across the Detroit River to help keep trade flowing—a plan that's awaiting final legislative approval. Meanwhile, the World Trade Bridge in Laredo, Texas, has introduced tags for electronic toll collection to speed traffic and reduce wait times. Then, of course, there's the issue of competition between ports for shipping business. One way to ease that problem: Tell states their ports won't get any federal aid unless they work with their neighbors to boost business in the whole region. And those agreements need to be carefully structured and policed to make sure they don't collapse—which happens all too easily. Consider the current mess involving Jasper Ocean Terminal on the Savannah River, the border between South Carolina and Georgia. In 2007, the two states agreed to develop the terminal together, and create a special entity to own and operate it. That's good. But what came later wasn't. After the governors who signed the deal left office, the terminal became a point of contention between the states. What happened? Georgia decided it wanted to deepen another one of its own harbors, a move that South Carolina sees as a challenge to its own facilities. So, South Carolina has stopped funding the Jasper facility unless the Georgia dredging plan is scrapped. Now, I ask you: How does any of this help get us closer to our national goals?