

Fuck the Queen NC

I Negate

Definitions:

**Justified**: **to prove or show to be just, right, or valid**

(Mariam-Webster Dictionary 2013, Justified, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justify)

**Lieblich explains that intervening in the internal political processes of a country**

(Eliav Lieblich, Visiting Scholar, Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law, Tel

Aviv University Faculty of Law, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol.29:337, 2010, “Intervention and Consent: Consensual forcible interventions in internal armed conflicts as international agreements”, http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/international/volume29n2/documents/Lieblich-finalpdf.pdf)

Intervention in the physical (or descriptive) sense **takes place whenever Party C engages in a conflict between opposing parties A and B. Thus, whenever a state engages parties to an internal armed conflict—using forcible or non-forcible measures, legally or illegally—it intervenes physically in the conflict. However, the term intervention encompasses an additional, separate meaning connoting the unlawful, coercive interference or encroachment upon the territorial integrity or internal political affairs of another state**

**Human Rights Abuses will be defined contextually in the case**

Observation #1: The United States cannot justify its own actions in the international community by itself or else this just leads to a Blind Loyalty fallacy, or the idea of relying on authority to justify an action.

Observation #2: The Affirmative must justify both intervening in the internal political processes of other states and also human rights as a necessary and just component for that intervention. For example, if an Evil Scientist decided to use a hammer to build a doomsday device, would we say that the use of the hammer is justified. Though the hammer may be the best tool available for the job, the fact that it is being used to an unjustifiable end makes it unjustifiable.

Value: Welfare of other Nations (Or Co-Opt their Value)

In order to actually obtain any notion of welfare or morality we have to first respect the self-determinism of other nations to create their own welfare. I, thus, value the sovereignty of other nations to decide that notion of welfare.

Value Criterion: Rejecting the Racial Contract

While the theory of human rights is drafted in rhetoric of egalitarian morality, the application has always been one of whites dominating non-whites in an exploitative contract. This exploitation contract is called the Racial Contract. The negative shall adopt the criterion of rejecting the Racial Contract

**Charles Mills explains that:**

(Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Cornell Press, 1997. p. 11)

**The Racial Contract is that set of** formal or informal **agreements** or meta-agreements (higher-level contracts about contracts, which set the limits of the contracts' validity**) between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated** by (shifting) “racial” (phenotypical/genealogical/cultural) criteria C1, C2, C3... **as “white,” and coextensive** (making due allowance for gender differentiation) **with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite” and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing** in the white or white-ruled polities the whites either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aliens with these polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with one another do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form (depending in part on changing historical circumstances and what particular variety of nonwhite is involved), but in any case **the general purpose of the contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them.** All whites are *beneficiaries* of the Contract, though some whites are not *signatories*.

Further, Locke's Social Contract, Kant's Categorical Imperative, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man all fall victim to the Racial Contract.

**Mills 2 continues:**

(Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Cornell Press, 1997. pp. 16-17)

The character of this objective moral foundation is therefore obviously crucial. For the mainstream of the contractarian tradition, it is the *freedom and equality of all men in the state of nature*. As Locke writes in the *Second Treatise*, “To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, *a State of Perfect Freedom* to order their Actions. . . . A *State* also *of Equality*, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.” For Kant, similarly, it is our equal moral personhood. Contractarianism is (supposedly) committed to moral egalitarianism, the moral equality of all men, the notion that interests of all men matter equally and all men must have equal rights. Thus, **contractarianism is also committed to a principled and foundational opposition to the traditionalist hierarchical ideology of the old feudal order, the ideology of inherent ascribed status and natural subordination. It is this language of equality which echoes in the American and French Revolutions, the Declaration of Independence, and the Declarations of the Rights of Man. And it is this moral egalitarianism that must be retained in the allocation of rights and liberties in civil society. When** in a modern Western society **people insist on their rights and freedoms and express their outrage at not being treated equally, it is to these classic ideas that**, whether they know it or not, **they are appealing. But** as we will see in greater detail later on, **the color-coded morality of the Racial Contract restricts the possession of this natural freedom and equality to *white* men. By virtue of their complete nonrecognition,** or at best inadequate, myopic recognition, of the duties of natural law, **nonwhites are appropriately relegated to a lower rung on the moral ladder** (the Great Chain of Being). **They are designated as born *un*free and *un*equal.** A partitioned social ontology is therefore created, a universe divided between persons and racial subpersons, *Untermenschen*, who may variously be black, red, brown, yellow-slaves, aborigines, colonial populations—but who are collectively appropriately known as “subject races.” And these subpersons—niggers, injuns, chinks, wogs, greasers, blackfellows, kaffirs, coolies, abos, dinks, googoos, gooks—are biologically destined never to penetrate the normative rights ceiling established for them below white persons. Henceforth, then, whether openly admitted or not, it is taken for granted that **the grand ethical theories propounded in the development of Western moral and political thought are of restricted scope, explicitly or implicitly intended by their proponents to be restricted to persons, whites. The terms of the Racial Contract set the parameters for white morality as a whole, so that competing Lockean and Kantian contractarian theories of natural rights and duties, or later anticontractarian theories such as nineteenth-century utilitarianism, are all limited by its stipulations**

**Therefore, given that we speak of justifying intervention in the internal political processes of a nation, we see that the United States is not justified in intervening to attempt to stop human rights violations for the intervention is rife with the racial contract. Because of their construction, imposing a western-centric view of human rights on the nations it’s intervening in the internal political processes is the guise for imperial domination and can never be justified objectively.**

**My sole contention is that the Racial Contract exists and is harmful; embracing it in the form of justified intervention would be unjust.**

**Subpoint A – The notion of human rights was created by imperialist European Powers to cement their dominance.**

**Anthony Pagdan explains**

(Pagden, Anthony. “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe's Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) pp. 172-173)

**In 1947, the Saudi Arabian delegation to the committee drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protested that the committee had "for the most part taken into consideration only the standards recognized by Western civilization," and that it was not its task "to proclaim the superiority of one civilization over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the countries of the world." Since then similar complaints have become commonplace. The widespread Islamic objection to the concept of "human rights" has been joined by appeals on the parts of Asian despots, and in particular Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, for the recognition of the existence of a specific set of "Asian Values" which supposedly places the good of the community over those of individuals. The concept of "human rights" has also been denounced from within the Western, predominantly liberal, academic establishment as overly dependent upon a narrow, largely French, British, and American, rights tradition.**3 Until very recently, and still in some Utramontane quarters, the Catholic Church has also been a source of fierce opposition to what it saw as the triumph of lay individualism over the values of the Christian community

**This is further proven by the fact that rights stem from Roman tradition and are seen in no other cultural doctrines, rendering the “universality” of rights suspect.**

**Pagdan 2 continues**

(Pagden, Anthony. “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe's Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 2003) pp. 172-173)

**What all of these criticisms have in common is their clear recognition of and objection to the fact that "rights" are cultural artifacts masquerading as universal, immutable values. For whatever else they may be, rights are the creation of a specific legal tradition-that of ancient Rome,** and in particular that of the great Roman jurists from the second to the sixth centuries, although both the concept and the culture from which it emerged were already well established by the early Republic. **There is no autonomous conception of rights outside this culture.** This may be obvious. But whereas those who are critical of the idea take it to be the self-evident refutation of the possibility of any kind of universal or natural human entitlement, champions of rights, in particular of "human rights," tend to pass over the history of the concept in silence.

**Uniform standards for the world are an insult to the long and cultured histories of sovereignties around the world, and would truly unravel the very fabric of our societies.**

**Subpoint B- The Racial Contract is real. Those who reject it are victims of an epistemology of ignorance.**

**Mills 3 explains**

(Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Cornell Press, 1997. p. 110)

**Nonwhites have always (at least in first encounters) been bemused or astonished by the invisibility of the Racial Contract to whites, the fact that whites have routinely talked in universalist terms even when it has been quite clear that the scope has really been limited to themselves.** Correspondingly, nonwhites, with no vested material or psychic interest in the Racial Contract—objects rather than subjects to it, viewing it from the outside rather than inside, subpersons rather than persons—are (at least before ideological conditioning) able to see its terms quite clearly. **Thus the hypocrisy of the racial polity is most transparent to its victims. The corollary is that nonwhite interest in white moral and political theory has necessarily been focused less on the details of the particular competing moral and political candidates (utilitarianism versus deontology versus natural rights theory; liberalism versus conservatism versus socialism) than in the unacknowledged Racial Contract that has usually framed their functioning.** The variable that makes the most difference to the fate of nonwhites is not the fine- or even coarse-grained conceptual divergences of different theories themselves (all have their *Herrenvolk* variants), but *whether or not the subclause invoking the Racial Contract, thus putting the theory into* Herrenvolk *mode, has been activated.* The details of the moral theories thus become less important than the *meta*theory, the Racial Contract, in which they are embedded. The crucial question is whether nonwhites are counted as full persons, part of the population covered by the moral operator or not. (110)

**Subpoint C:**

**By its nature, the Racial Contract is an exploitation contract: meaning that upholding universal rights entrenches the exploitation of nonwhites. (Extend my Criterion Mills Evidence) The United States is not justified exploiting third world nations around the world, thus a just government would not embrace universal human “rights.”**

**Implications of the Case:**

**1: My Case Operates as a turn on their case**

**2: If the Affirmative rejects in the 1AR that their main goal is to help the other country and try to leverage the benefits for the United States against the harms of the other country they become non-topical insofar as the recognize that they are not intervening to stop human rights abuses, but for their own benefit.**

**Underview:**

**Under a consequentialist framework, there is no way to fully evaluate the intervention as "justified" until after it has been completed. This operates as a side constraint for the Affirmative as the resolution is asking for a "pre-intervention" justification. The resolution clearly states to “attempt to stop human rights abuses”, thus the resolution is begging a question to the motives of intervention not the consequences. The United States has intervened plenty of times in the internal political processes of countries and caused far more humanitarian rights violations than they tried to prevent. This only proves that a consequentialist reason for how evaluating the success of intervention is arbitrary and contingent upon the given intervention.**

**Noam Chomsky gives the US involvement in Indonesia and East Timor during the 1970s to the 1990 as an example**

(Noam Chomsky, Professor @ MIT, Le Monde diplomatique, October, 1999, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199910--.htm)

Success was indeed considerable. Moynihan cited reports that within two months some 60,000 people had been killed: "10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the second world war". A sign of the success, he added, was that within a year "the subject disappeared from the press." So it did, as the invaders intensified their assault. **Atrocities peaked in 1977-78. Relying on a new flow of advanced military equipment from the Carter Administration - with its emphasis on human rights - the Indonesian military carried out a devastating attack against the hundreds of thousands who had fled to the mountains, driving the survivors to Indonesian control. It was then that highly credible Church sources in East Timor sought to make public the estimates of 200,000 deaths - long denied, but now at last accepted. As the slaughter reached near-genocidal levels, Britain and France joined in, along with other powers, providing diplomatic support and even arms.**

**If they just assume that intervention will work they link even harder to the Neg case as their preconceived notion that Humanitarian Intervention will always succeed in its goals is once again only entrenching the racial contract as the United States creates a very loose definition of human rights that sometimes is used to justify mass atrocities like East Timor. This is a clear example that the Racial Contract is alive and well as our loose construction of who is violating human rights will never be used against us as we dominate international politics.**