# Round 1

# 1NC

## Politics

**Plan unpopular – kills capital**

**Anderson 11 –** Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) (A. Paul, “testimony of A. Paul Anderson Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) for the Record of the united States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment Hearing: “The Economic Importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?””, October 26, 2011,  [<http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Anderson.pdf>)//MM](http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Darcy.pdf)/MM)

The great disconnect. Seaports have never been especially high on the federal government’s list of visionary investments. For some reason, it has rarely resonated with our leadership that the roots of this nation are firmly grounded in seafaring and our economy is inescapably linked to our waterways and international trade. Perhaps that’s because spending money on modernizing docks and equipment, maintaining the nation’s waterways and digging deeper to accommodate today’s larger ships seems like so much housekeeping. Certainly, on the surface, it doesn’t sound as forward thinking as spending $53 billion on a high‐speed rail system. Or perhaps it’s because the individual lawmaker’s constituent, the average American consumer, gives little thought to how products move to the shelf at their local supercenter or mega grocery or mom and pop; how the item we need is ready for purchase as we dash in to grab that container of coffee or computer part or whatever necessity of modern life is absolutely essential at that very moment. And on top of it all, we select from an assortment of products, price points and bells and whistles; so much variety – delivered daily courtesy of the nation’s seaports – that it staggers the mind.

**Hagel will be confirmed but political capital is key to locking it in—**

**Kane 1-15**-13 Paul, Washington Post “Hagel’s nomination as defense secretary gains momentum” By Paul Kane,January 15, 2013 [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-15/politics/36385713\_1\_senator-hagel-senate-democrats-confirmation/2]

Despite all the sound and fury before and after his nomination, Chuck **Hagel** began his bid to lead the Pentagon as a favorite to win Senate confirmation. And he **seems only to be gaining momentum.** For sure, the Republican former senator from Nebraska made his share of enemies during his two terms in the Senate, which now must consider his nomination as defense secretary, but he began with two key advantages.One is traditional senatorial courtesy, which has almost always meant a relatively smooth confirmation process for any current or former senator chosen for a Cabinet or ambassadorial post.More important, almost every failed nomination of the past three decades has stemmed from key defections within the president’s own party, and **so far Hagel’s opposition has come almost entirely from fellow Republicans.** The prospect of **significant Democratic defections grew more unlikely** Tuesday when a pair of influential Senate Democrats who had been cagey about their support for Hagel came out in support of his confirmation. Many of Hagel’s critics accused him of being hostile to Israel’s interests. But on Tuesday, Sens. Charles E. **Schumer** (N.Y.) **and** Barbara **Boxer** (Calif.), **two of the most influential Jewish Democrats, issued lengthy testimonials to Hagel’s credentials to lead the Pentagon and accepted his assurances** that he would support the Obama administration’s policy of vigorously opposing Iran’s bid to obtain nuclear weapons. “Senator Hagel could not have been more forthcoming and sincere,” Schumer said Tuesday in a 676-word statement that covered every possible controversy of Hagel’s nomination. “Based on several key assurances provided by Senator Hagel, I am currently prepared to vote for his confirmation. I encourage my Senate colleagues who have shared my previous concerns to also support him.”“I needed comprehensive answers,” Boxer told reporters Tuesday in a conference call, explaining that she demanded that Hagel follow up their phone discussion with a letter documenting his answers on Israel and Iran as well as issues related to gay rights and female soldiers’ access to reproductive services. **Hagel’s confirmation is still not a certainty. He has only just begun the traditional process of making the rounds for face-to-face meetings with key senators, and on Tuesday the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee announced his opposition.** “Unfortunately, as I told him during our meeting [Tuesday], we are simply too philosophically opposed on the issues for me to support his nomination,” said Sen. James M. Inhofe (Okla.). Inhofe said he was concerned about looming Pentagon spending cuts: “Senator Hagel’s comments have not demonstrated that same level of concern about the pending defense cuts.” **The** committee has yet to schedule a **confirmation hearing**, which **is certain to be a lengthy session that could resemble the combative querie**s that former senator John D. Ashcroft (R-Mo.) faced in January 2001 after he was nominated as attorney general. Ashcroft’s confirmation hearings, fueled by questions about racial sensitivity, lasted three days, unusually long for a former senator.In the modern era of televised hearings, just two former senators have failed to win confirmation after being nominated. John G. Tower, a Texas Republican, lost his bid to become defense secretary in 1989 over accusations of improper drunken behavior, receiving just 47 votes. In 2009, Thomas A. Daschle, the former Democratic majority leader from South Dakota, withdrew his nomination to be secretary of health and human services after it was revealed that he had failed to pay more than $100,000 in taxes on limousine service provided to him as a member of an investment firm.As of now, Hagel’s opponents have not leveled any accusations of questionable ethical behavior and instead have focused on his past statements and votes about Middle East policy. Conservative activists rejected his statements to Schumer and Boxer as just a “confirmation conversion,” and senior Republicans promised tough questioning.“No closed-door White House meeting with a single Senator or a letter can erase a problematic 12-year Senate record and many troubling public statements from Sen. Hagel,” Sen. John Cornyn (Tex.), the No. 2 GOP leader, said in a statement. “Retractions of long-held positions raise serious questions about where Sen. Hagel stands on critical issues of national defense.”Some observers have questioned whether Republicans would mount a filibuster of Hagel, requiring a 60-vote threshold, **but the nominee’s deepest critics** — Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) — **have in the past been reluctant to support filibusters of presidential nominees except in extraordinary circumstances.** While Democrats opposed Ashcroft 12 years ago, he was confirmed with 58 votes. That’s why defeating a nominee often comes down to defections within the president’s party. Tower’s nomination fell apart when Paul Weyrich, an influential social conservative, testified against the nominee and questioned his “moral character.”In 2009, after similar revelations about Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner’s taxes, Senate Democrats privately voiced concern about looking the other way on Daschle’s taxes. In 2005, President George W. Bush nominated a top staffer, Harriet E. Miers, to the Supreme Court, only to encounter a conservative Republican revolt. **White House officials, keenly aware of this history, moved quickly to win the backing of Schumer.** While Boxer spoke by phone with Hagel last week, Schumer made an unannounced trip to the West Wing on Monday for a 90-minute huddle with the nominee, Hagel’s first face-to-face meeting with a senator.

**Hagel’s key to restraint that prevents unsustainable U.S. power---the alternative is Flournoy who would lock in a neocon foreign policy**

Kelley Beaucar **Vlahos 12-25**, longtime political reporter for FoxNews.com and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine, 12/25/12, “Give Us Chuck Hagel for Christmas,” <http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2012/12/24/give-us-hagel-for-christmas/>

Now a Democratic President is reportedly mulling him for defense secretary and the same Republican automatons and neoconservative harpies are pulling no punches to thwart it. They complain about his allegedly insufficient support of Israel (massaged, cajoled and translated for full-effect into charges of anti-Semitism), driven in part by his unwillingness to impose harsh economic sanctions or use of force against Iran. He also voted against designating Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and has encouraged open relations with Hamas in hopes of reanimating the corpse of the Middle East pace process. Furthermore, Hagel’s flagrant disdain for the runaway MIC (military industrial complex), preemptive war, and senseless foreign occupation is such an aberration to the Washington establishment that when the bunker busters in Congress, American Israel supporters and rightwing 101st Keyboard Brigade heard he might be nominated, their attack was so immediate and vicious it’ll likely serve as a model for smear efficiency for years to come. If the U.S. Army had deployed these superlative tactics in say, Afghanistan, they might have actually won the so-called “war of perception” over the Taliban 10 years ago. Too bad most of Hagel’s critics prefer calling the shots from over here, rather than putting their rear-ends in harm’s way over there. The War Against Hagel has hardly been decisive, however, at least as we near the end of the year, leaving some space for his supporters to mount a proper defense, which of this writing, is increasingly vigorous. There seems to be a common theme to every blog post and op-ed penned for his purpose: the man is a welcome independent thinker in the Era of the Borg — and he’s no phony, else he would have safely buzzed off with the rest of the political hive long ago. The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, usually quite scornful of Realist foreign policy arguments — especially concerning Iran — said Thursday he worries about rightwing developments in Israel even more than Hagel’s purportedly soft approach on Iran, and suggested quite baldy that Hagel’s independence would be a help not a hindrance where it counts: What we need are American officials who will speak with disconcerting bluntness to Israel about the choices it is making…Maybe the time has come to redefine the term “pro-Israel” to include, in addition to providing support against Iran (a noble cause); help with the Iron Dome system (also a noble cause); and support to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (ditto), the straightest of straight talk about Israel’s self-destructive policies on the West Bank. Maybe Hagel, who is not bound to old models, could be useful in this regard. Many of us see Hagel’s impact in much broader terms than just the Israel question. We’ve had too many armchair generals and dutiful yes men at the levers of power, cleaving to an unsustainable post-9/11 orthodoxy that has militarized our foreign policy and politicized our military. The neoconservatism of the Bush years has bled literally into the so-called humanitarian interventionism of the Obama era, and for the first time, there is an opportunity to check that with the presence of a known Realist who, as Harvard’s Stephen Walt says, is “opposed to squandering U.S. power, prestige, and wealth on misbegotten crusades,” and is immune to the “threat inflation” both sides routinely engage in to justify lining the pockets of the defense industry. After nearly 12 years of constant war, Hagel’s references to Iraq and Afghanistan as a meat grinder to which we’ve wastefully sent too many of our own children, and his belief that he is the “the real conservative” because he actually calls for restraint, should be a refreshing prospect, and not feared by Americans conditioned to accept there is a military solution for every problem. “In a town dominated by often-unexamined conventional wisdom, the appointment of Hagel to DoD would be a welcome relief,” wrote Michael Cohen for The Guardian last week. Reached on the phone, Cohen told me that Hagel would be a “transformational pick,” but acknowledged that the challenges loom large for a non-conformist now squared against not only members of his own party, but neoconservatives wielding their “long knives,” and the pro-war wing of the Democratic establishment, too. “Look, he is not one of them,” Cohen said, “he’s not a neoconservative nor a liberal hawk, he thinks there should be limits on American power.” Although President Obama has, so far, not said a word about Hagel, the former senator who quietly spent the last four years chairing the moderate Atlantic Council, is enjoying an enthusiastic defense from myriad commentators across the mainstream, including Andrew Sullivan, Steve Clemons, Peter Beinart — even Jim Judis at The New Republic. Several ambassadors — including Bush-era Nick Burns and Ryan Crocker and three Israel representatives — signed on to a letter encouraging his nomination. Meanwhile, The National Journal and The Washington Post have published biographical sketches emphasizing Hagel’s Vietnam War record and its impact on his post-war career and personal philosophy (this hardly makes up, however, for the Post’s incoherent broadside published by its editorial page on Dec. 19). And of course, The American Conservative’s Daniel Larison and Scott McConnell, not to mention our own Justin Raimondo, are astutely swatting away the haters at every turn of this increasingly torrid offensive. Michele Flournoy But while many of us here at Antiwar would like a Hagel nomination for Christmas, the biggest concern (aside from his Swift Boating) is that we might find Michele Flournoy under the tree instead. For those who never heard of her, she founded the Center for a New American Security in 2007 in anticipation of a new Democratic White House. The think tank was designed to promote a more muscular Democratic military policy, which meant its top people supported Hillary Clinton for president as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, known then as the Petraeus Doctrine. Once Obama won, it became the go-to policy shop for the White House and a revolving door to the Pentagon and State Department for its senior fellows. Flournoy went on to take Doug Feith’s position as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the No. 3 job at the Pentagon. What she actually did in the fabled “E-Ring” to advance policy or to help extricate the military from an increasingly disastrous war in Afghanistan, is anyone’s guess. But the “hot policy wonk” and top COINdinista apparently made all the right friends and greased all the right skids, and is now the favored pick by the neocons, who see a kindred soul where Hagel is just heartburn ready to happen. So buttressed is Flournoy by the Washington elite that people like Paul Wolfowitz, who in all reality should be ignored completely for his role in one of the worst war blunders in American history, are rolling out to defend her (in Wolfowitz’s case, maybe he should have cooled his wheels at home). After admitting he’s “not deeply familiar with Michele Flournoy’s record at the Defense Department or with her overall qualifications to be Secretary of Defense,” he says the fact 3,500 Afghan security forces have died this year (compared to 307 Americans) is proof enough she knows what she is doing. I say it’s proof enough that nothing has really changed since the Bush administration, except there are more troops in Afghanistan now (about 68,000) and the U.S. casualty count was much lower then —- 117 in 2007 to be exact. When liberal flak Eleanor Clift wrote about the prospects of the “first female defense secretary” back in November, all she could muster in her favor was Flournoy’s Oxford pedigree, a stint in the lackluster Clinton Pentagon policy shop and quotes like these from former colleagues: “she has spent a great deal of time thinking how to deploy our military instruments economically and effectively.” Glad she was thinking about it before she left her post in February. Not much came out of if, however, if today’s accounts of continuing bloat, waste and mission creep are any indication. Frankly, one hears a lot about Flournoy the “team player” but very little about her vision, ideas or actual accomplishments. The fact is, “the team” has been on a losing streak in Afghanistan since Obama took office, while her think tank, of which she continues to serve on the board of directors, has reaped all the benefits and influence as a conduit between the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, the White House and greedy defense industry. “She’s a safe pick, she will carry the water — if you pick Hagel it would be saying ‘I want to push the envelope a little bit on foreign policy,’” said Cohen, “pushing it in a more realist direction than we have in the past.” Perhaps that is why so many of us here are excited about the prospect. There are some areas where Hagel and the readers on this page might diverge, particularly on domestic issues. He’s a solid pro-life social conservative. He voted for the Patriot Act (he later fought for broader constitutional safeguards, saying he took an oath to protect the constitution, not “an oath of office to my party or my president”). We don’t know yet where he would stand on the controversial detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). We have no idea whether he would stanch the flow of U.S. personnel and weapons into Africa or how he would deal with a newly inherited drone war. As for the Pentagon labyrinth itself, as University of Texas professor (and expert COIN critic) Celeste Ward Gventer tells me, “the problems are systemic and largely exceed the decision or personality of one man, even if he is at the apex.” Still, if a Flournoy pick would signal an endorsement of the status quo, a Hagel nod would serve to challenge it. This inclination to question policy is quite attractive to observers like us who are tired of living in a fake candy cane marshmallow bubble world when it comes to foreign policy and national security. As a senator, Hagel often addressed these issues realistically, with no regard to how it might hurt his chances for a presidential nomination, which turned out to be short-lived as a result (quite sad, considering the parade of ham-n-egger Republicans who ended up running, and losing, in the last two elections).

**Restraint’s key to the legitimacy of U.S. power---avoids great power war and prevents hostile China rise**

Kevin **Fujimoto 12**, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>

With a **credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order**, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very **institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct** of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in **regional instability** and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in **significant conflict** if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and **building legitimacy through multilateralism**. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the **principal catalysts of future global conflicts.**11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. **Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct** requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “**preemptive war**, democratization, and **U.S. primacy of unilateralism**,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies **worldwide**. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must **reject military unilateralism** as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and **the struggle between liberty and evil**.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and **reject military primacy** in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in **countering China's increasing hegemonic influence**.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to **offset China's imperial dominance** in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may **overcome all other factors and lead to conflict**.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the **legitimacy** and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

**Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war**

C. Dale **Walton 07**, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

## K

**The 1AC’s enframing of strategic and technical reason reifies an ontology and epistemology of violence—their technological worldview reduces all beings to standing-reserve and guarantees extinction**

**Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)**

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.

**The judge should take on the role of the intellectual – vote negative to exchange the ontology of being for one of becoming—this free relationship to technology entails a questioning that can break free from technological thought and re-imagine the world from outside the political space**

**Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)**

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

## T

#### The Department of Transportation agrees – investment means they have to build a structure

DOT 03 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, "Transportation Investment-Concepts, Data and Analysis," draft, compiled based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), "Fixed Assets and Consumer Durables," and personal communications with BEA; and USDOC, U.S. Census Bureau, "Value of Construction Put in Place Statistics," Detailed Construction Expenditure Tables, available at http://www.census. gov, as of February 2003. http://www.bts.gov/publications/transportation\_statistics\_annual\_report/2003/html/chapter\_02/figure\_109.html

Investment in transportation infrastructure includes the purchase or construction value of transportation facilities and structures. Data on state and local transportation investment are not available separately. For rail infrastructure, only state and local investment from 1993 to 2000 are included. Government investment in pipeline infrastructure and federal investment spending on railroads are not covered due to lack of data. Investment in rolling stock consists of government outlays for motor vehicles only. Government spending on other rolling stocks (e.g., aircrafts, vessels, and boats) and other machinery and equipment used by federal, state, and local DOTs are not counted in the estimates due to lack of data. All dollar amounts are expressed in chained 1996 dollars, unless otherwise specified. Current dollar amounts (which are available in appendix B of this report

**Violation – they don’t build infrastructure**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They destroy limits – they could invest in anything, remove barriers, repeal laws, provide data, or do dozens of other actions that are related to infrastructure that the neg could never predict**

## CP

**The United States federal government should provide a substantial investment in expedited port deepening projects in the United States exclusively to areas in which private actors guarantee at least one-third of the funding upfront for a minimum of twenty years. In negotiating these partnerships, the United States federal government should open infrastructure plans to modification, including the possible transfer of project ownership to private actors. The United States federal government should make all necessary regulatory changes to encourage greater public-private partnerships in ports and port deepening projects, and provide necessary technical assistance for implementation.**

**This solves**

**Puentes**, 8/23/**10** - Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute (Robert, “New Partnerships for Accelerating Infrastructure Investments,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes>)

So as Congress continues to develop its plans for the reauthorization of the nation’s surface transportation law it should support metro areas that raise their own revenue for the long term. Though a new partnership, the federal government should provide incentives to metropolitan areas that secure long-term and substantial regional funding sources approved for a minimum of 20 years and that equal a significant (one-third to one-half) portion of the annual federal transportation funding received. As to the incentives, a possible menu of options might include: more direct funding to metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), more flexible “mode neutral funding,” more streamlined planning processes, more direct reporting to federal agencies, and reduced bureaucracy.[[7]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes" \l "note7)

**The net benefit is infrastructure accountability**

**Public investment is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates aff benefits and causes massive cost overruns, and means better projects lose out**

**Flyvbjerg**, **10** - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

This situation may need some explication, because it may sound to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be agreed that project managers and other professionals involved in major infrastructure provision ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in their work. It is even stated in the Project Management Institute (PMI)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006, pp. 4, 5) that project managers should ‘provide accurate information in a timely manner’ and they must ‘not engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others’. Economists, engineers, planners, and others involved in major infrastructure provision have similar codes of conduct. But there is a dark side to their work, which is remarkably underexplored in the literature (Flyvbjerg, 1996).¶ On the dark side, project managers and planners ‘lie with numbers’. as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. They are busy not with getting forecasts and business cases right and following the PMI Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for a project. ‘The most effective planner,’ says Wachs (1989, p. 477), ‘is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientiﬁc or technical rationality.’ Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to PMI’s ruling that project managers should ‘make decisions and take actions based on the best interests of society’ (PMI, 2006, p. 2).¶ Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate beneﬁts have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difﬁcult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).¶ In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances that would give managers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a focus on transparency and accountability is necessary.¶ As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability deﬁne liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with signiﬁcant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.

**Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case**

**Flyvbjerg**, **10** - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project-approval stage to present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with beneﬁts emphasized and costs and risks de-emphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local ofﬁcials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to beneﬁt from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of beneﬁts, costs, and risks. National bodies, such as certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003) and UK Department for Transport (2006). Wachs (1986, 1990) found similar results for transit planning in the USA. Taken together, the UK and US studies both account well for existing data on cost underestimation and beneﬁt overestimation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organizational pressure the underestimation of costs and overestimation of beneﬁts is caused by non-intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to secure approval and funding for their projects: underestimated costs + overestimated beneﬁts = funding Using this formula, and thus ‘showing the project at its best’ as one interviewee said above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e the survival of the unﬁttest. It is not the best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and beneﬁt overestimates, other things being equal. But the larger the cost underestimate on paper, the greater the cost overrun in practice. And the larger the overestimate of beneﬁts, the greater the beneﬁt shortfall. Therefore the projects that have been made to look best on paper in this manner become the worst, or unﬁttest, projects in reality, in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, and risks of non-viability. They have been designed like that, as disasters waiting to happen.

**The counterplan solves by doing less than the plan – the only projects that will be built are those that can secure private sector capital. This increases accountability in infrastructure design and reduces overall costs**

**Flyvbjerg**, **10** - Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, “Survival of the unﬁttest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, Oxford Journals Online)

In order to achieve accountability via competition and market control, the following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced by the relevant institutions. The decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the willingness of private ﬁnanciers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one-third of the total capital needs. 7 This should be required whether projects pass the market test or not—that is, whether projects are subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private lenders, shareholders, and stock-market analysts would produce their own forecasts or conduct due diligence for existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be added pressure to produce realistic forecasts and reduced risk to the taxpayer. Forecasters and their organizations must share ﬁnancial responsibility for covering cost overruns and beneﬁt shortfalls resulting from misrepresentation and bias in forecasting. The participation of risk capital would not mean that government reduces control of major infrastructure projects. On the contrary, it means that government can more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely as the ordinary citizen’s guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, environment, risk, and a proper use of public funds. Whether infrastructure projects are public, private, or public–private, they should be vested in one and only one project organization with a strong governance framework and strong contract-writing skills. The project organization may be a company or not, public or private, or a mixture. What is important is that this organization has the capacity to (i) set up and negotiate contracts that will effectively safeguard its interests, including in equity risk allocation, and (ii) enforce accountability vis-a-vis ` contractors, operators, etc. In turn, the directors of the organization must be held accountable for any cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, faulty designs, unmitigated risks, etc. that may occur during project planning, implementation, and operations. Experience with contract writing is a much-neglected topic, but is particularly important in developing and managing major infrastructure projects. This is because a fundamental asymmetry in experience with and resources allocated to contract writing often applies in the client– contractor relationship for such projects. Clients who decide to do major infrastructure—for instance, a city council deciding to build a new subway or toll road—do so relatively rarely, often only once, or never, in the lifetime of the individual city manager and council member. Learning is therefore impaired for clients, and if you do not know what your interests are, it is difﬁcult to safeguard them. Contractors, on the other hand, who bid for and build such projects, do so all the time. Contractors, therefore, typically know much more than clients about the ins and outs of projects and contracts, including the many risks and pitfalls that apply, plus which lawyers, bankers, and consultants to hire to safeguard their interests most effectively. This asymmetry has brought many a client to grief. A possible way to bring more symmetry into the client–contractor relationship would be for government to establish a central contract-writing unit at the state or national level, which would be in charge of negotiating, on behalf of local and other branches of government, the types of major contracts they do too infrequently to gain real experience. This would concentrate a larger number of contracts in one place, allowing experience—and the negotiating power that comes with it—to accumulate. Fortunately, better governance along the lines described above has recently become stronger around the world. The Enron scandal and its successors have triggered new legislation and a war on corporate deception that is spilling over into government with the same objective: to curb ﬁnancial waste and promote good governance. Although progress is slow, good governance is gaining a foothold also in major infrastructure project management. For example, in 2003 the Treasury of the United Kingdom required, for the ﬁrst time, that all ministries develop and implement procedures for major projects that will curb what the Treasury calls—with true British civility—’optimism bias’. Funding will be unavailable for projects that do not take into account this bias, and methods have been developed for how to do this (HM Treasury, 2003; Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004; UK Department for Transport, 2006). In the Netherlands in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Infrastructure Projects for the ﬁrst time conducted extensive public hearings to identify measures that will limit the misinformation about large infrastructure projects given to the Parliament, public, and media (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004). In Boston, the government has sued to recoup funds from contractor overcharges for the Big Dig related to cost overruns. More countries and cities are likely to follow the lead of the UK, the Netherlands, and Boston in coming years; Switzerland and Denmark are already doing so (Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts, 2006; Danish Ministry for Transport and Energy, 2006, 2008). Moreover, with private ﬁnance in major infrastructure projects on the rise over the past 15–20 years, capital funds and banks are increasingly gaining a say in the project development and management process. Private capital is no panacea for the ills in major infrastructure project management, to be sure (Hodge and Greve, 2009). But private investors place their own funds at risk, as opposed to governments who place the taxpayer’s money at risk. Capital funds and banks can therefore be observed not to automatically accept at face value the forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction. The false assumption that one forecast or one business case (which is also a forecast) may contain the truth about a project is problematized. Instead project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders have different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of objective science and engineering but of negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it is more truthful about our ability to predict the future and about the risks involved. If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infrastructures continued to implement, embed, and enforce such measures of accountability effectively, then the misrepresentation in cost, beneﬁt, and risk estimates, which is widespread today, might be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to continue, and the allocation of funds for major infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful, unethical, and sometimes even unlawful.

## T

**Interpretation - Transportation investment must be new infrastructure**

**Collenette 99** Hon. David M. Collenette, P.C., M.P. Minister of Transportation of Canada Transportation in Canada 1999 annual reporthttp://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/T1-10-1999E.pdf BK

Whether made by business or government, “transport investment” can be defined as both **new infrastructure construction** and purchases of new machinery and equipment. Investment **excludes** repair and maintenance expenditure, which are expenditures on **existing infrastructure**, machinery and equipment.

**Violation – they change current infrastructure**

**That’s a voting issue**

**Ground- There is no links to existing projects or repairs because the programs have already been passed**

**Limits- this topic is already huge, allowing for maintenance allows for every infrastructure to be used**

## Free Trade Adv

**Trade is resilient – no protectionism**

**Beattie** **10** (Alan, World Trade Editor for the Financial Times, “Pantomime villain fails to materialize,” June 25, Financial Times, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033254/en)

The analogies between the (still substantial) unemployment lines of today and the mass joblessness of the 1930s have become mercifully less frequent. And one area in which the drawing of parallels has dropped away almost completely is that of protectionism. In the months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008, a precipitous collapse in the volume of world trade had observers reaching for their history books, noting that the drop-off in commerce was, if anything, faster than during the 1930s. With protectionist rhetoric becoming increasingly prevalent, there was real concern that the world could soon see a return to the out-and-out protectionism of the Great Depression. In particular, worrywarts kept repeating to each other, we could be on the brink of repeating the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930. This raised trade barriers in the US and set off a flurry of tit-for-tat retaliation around the world. Just as the protectionism of the 1930s undid much of the liberalisation of trade during the “Golden Age” of globalisation from 1880 to 1914, the fear went, so the protectionism of the new Great Recession might reverse the rapid integration of markets in goods, services and capital since the end of the Cold War. But **despite** – or perhaps because of – all **the eyes trained on the wings, the pantomime villain of protectionism signally failed to appear. Monitoring projects were set up** by the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and other bodies**. But they recorded only modest increases in** the use of traditional forms of trade **barriers** – import tariffs and emergency so-called “anti-dumping” measures and “countervailing duties” used against imports deemed to be unfairly priced or subsidised by the exporting country's government. A study by the World Trade Organisation and other official agencies commissioned by the G20 and published earlier this lyear was sanguine, saying that **at most 0.4 per cent of world trade had been affected by import barriers** imposed during the previous six months. “The trade and investment policy response to the global recession has so far been relatively muted,” the study said. “Most **G20 members continue to manage successfully the political process of keeping domestic protectionist pressures under control**, despite a difficult environment for some of them where employment levels and new job opportunities are shrinking.” Meanwhile, **trade itself rapidly recovered, and** on current trends **is likely to be back to pre-crisis levels** by the end of next year. Whether the lost years of growth will ever be made up is another matter, but policymakers in the dark days of late 2008 would have been mightily relieved if they had known today's outcome in advance.

**Our economic model is resilient, no breakdown of trade.**

**Zakaria 09, Phd in PoliSci and Editor of Newsweek**

(Fareed, “The secrets of stability,” Newsweek, December 12, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html)

Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the **end of the Cold War** had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was **left** with a sole superpower but also **a single workable economic** **model—capitalism**—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means **everyone is invested in the same system**. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, **no one is suggesting** that **they abandon free-market capitalism** and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even **in the midst of** this **downturn**, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. **Center-right parties** have instead **prospered** in recent elections throughout the West. The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability. Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today **the information revolution** has **created a** much more **deeply connected** **global system**. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world. This **diffusion of knowledge** **may** actually **be** **the most important reason for** the **stability** of the current system. The **majority of the world's** **nations** have **learned** some **basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation**. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking **citizens** around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They **are** even **cautious about** the appeals of **hypernationalism and war**. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

**They don’t fund ALL ports, only what they deem necessary, their 1AC evidence says that creates super ports that handle all the business which is what their evidence says is bad and collapses the economy**

**Economic collapse doesn’t cause war.**

**Deudney 91, PhD and Prof PoliSci @ Johns Hopkins**

Daniel, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, Google Books

Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, **economic decline does not** necessarily **produce conflict**. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And **as people get poorer**, **they** may **become less willing to spend scarce resources for military** forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930’s, increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. POWER WARS A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by **altering** the relative **power of states**; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs further. But such alterations **might not lead to war** as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because **economic** power **and military power are not** as **tightly coupled as in the past.** The economicpower **positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly** since World War II, but these changes have **not** been **accompanied by war** or threat of war. **In the contemporary world**, whole **industries** rise, **fall**, and relocate, **causing** **substantial fluctuations in** the **economic well-being of regions** and peoples **without producing wars**. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very great. **Among the first casualties** in such a country **would be** the **capacity to wage war. The poor** and wretched of the earth **may be able to deny** an outside aggressor an easy **conquest, but** they **are** themselves **a minimal threat** to other states. Contemporary **offensive military operations require** complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products, and **surplus wealth**. In today's world everything is connected, but not everything is tightly coupled. Severe **regional disasters may produce scarcely a ripple in the rest of the world**. For example, Idi Amin drew Uganda back into savage darkness, the Khmer Rouge murdered an estimated two million Cambodians, and the Sahara has advanced across the Sahel without much perturbing the economies and political systems of the rest of the world.

**Trade doesn’t solve war.**

**Keshk et al** **10** (Omar M.G., The Ohio State University, Rafael Reuveny, Indiana University, and Brian M. Pollins, The Ohio State University, “Trade and Conflict: Proximity, Country size, and Measures,” Conflict management and Peace Sciecne, Volume 27, Issue 1)

Table 8 presents an overarching look at our 36 tests. In Panel A, conflict reduces trade in all the 36 tests, the liberal prediction holds in eight tests, the neo-Marxist and neo-realist prediction holds in 10 cases, and the classical realist prediction holds in 18 tests. When inter-capital distance is excluded from the conflict equation (Panel B), conflict reduces trade in all the tests. Meanwhile, the liberal case holds in two out of 1.8 tests. Both of these cases utilize the Gleditsch trade data set that sets by assump‑ tion about 18% of the cells to zero and another 15% to other values (Table 3).When distance is included in the conflict equation (Panel C), the neo-Marxist/neo-realist prediction holds in one case and the classical realist prediction holds in 11 tests. The liberal prediction holds in six out of 18 tests, four of which utilize the Gleditsch trade data, all of which do not exclude the zero trade values (Tables 2 and 4), and none of which include the sizes of both nations in a dyad (Tables 5 and 6). Integrating all of these findings, one may argue our results do not fully overrule the liberal prediction, for eight out of the 36 cases support it. One may also decide to ignore the 28 cases that reject the liberal prediction, choosing to believe those results that match with some ideology. We find both of these approaches troubling. When we started this project, our goal was not to reject or affirm any view; all the competing theories for the effect of trade on conflict seem plausible. Further evaluation of these theories, therefore, required empirical testing. When using empirical methods, we believe it is best to adhere to three principles. First, theory should not be problematic, as in the case of distance. Second, the empirics should strive to represent the theory; **if trade affects conflict because conflict affects trade, the two causal directions need to be modeled together**. Third, the empirical data should be actual, not generated by the analyst. Our theoretical discussion illustrated problems associated with including inter‑ capital distance in the conflict equation and suggested that it is a good idea to include the sizes of both nations in the dyad separately. **Our empirical results show that to be supported by the data**, the **liberal prediction requires** that (1) inter-capital distance will be included in the MID equation; (2) the national sizes will not be included in the MID equation; (3) about 33% of the trade data cells will be created using Gleditsch's assumptions; and (4) about 18% of the trade data cells will be set to zero. Not only are these **conditions theoretically problematic**, as we discussed, but **remove any one of them** (with one exception) **and** **the liberal result vanishes**.' In all, **any signal** that **"trade brings peace" remains weak** and inconsistent, regardless of the way proximity is modeled in the conflict equation. The signal that conflict reduces trade, in contrast, is strong and consistent. Thus, international politics are clearly affecting dyadic trade, while it is far less obvious whether trade systematically affects dyadic politics, and if it does, whether that effect is conflict dampening or conflict amplifying. This is what we have termed in KPR (2004) "The Primacy of Politics." 7. Conclusion This study revisited the simultaneous equations model we presented in KPR (2004) and subjected it to four important challenges. Two of these challenges concerned the specification of the conflict equation in our model regarding the role of inter‑ capital. distance and the sizes of both sides in a dyad; one questioned the bilateral trade data assumptions used in the treatment of zero and missing values, and one challenge suggested a focus on fatal MIDs as an alternative indicator to the widely used all-MID measure. The theoretical and empirical analyses used to explore proposed alternatives to our original work were instructive and the empirical results were informative, but there are certainly other legitimate issues that the trade and conflict research com‑ munity may continue to ponder. For example, researchers may continue to work on questions of missing bilateral trade data, attempt to move beyond the near‑ exclusive use of the MIDs data as we contemplate the meaning of "military conflict," and use, and extend the scope of, the Harvey Starr. GIS-based border data as one way to treat contiguity with more sophistication than the typical binary variable. The single greatest lesson of this study is that future work studying the effect of international trade on international military conflict needs to employ a simultaneous specification of the relationship between the two forces. The results we obtained under all the 36 SEM alternatives we estimated yielded an important, measurable effect of conflict on trade. Henceforth, we would say with high confi‑ dence that **any study** of the effect of trade on conflict **that ignores this** reverse fact **is** practically **guaranteed to produce** estimates that contain **simultaneity bias**. Such studies will claim that "trade brings peace," when we now know that in a much broader range of circumstances, **it is "peace that brings trade**." Our message to those who would use conflict as one factor in a single-equation model of trade is only slightly less cautionary. They too face dangers in ignoring the other side of the coin. In one half of the 36 permutations we explored, the likelihood of dyadic military conflict was influenced by trade flows. In most tests where this effect surfaced, it was positive, that is, trade made conflict more likely. But the direction of this effect is of no consequence for the larger lesson: trade modelers ignore the simultaneity between international commerce and political enmity at their peril. They too run no small risk of finding themselves deceived by simultaneity bias. Our empirical findings show clearly that international politics pushes commerce in a much broader range of circumstances than the reverse. In fact, we could find no combination of model choices, indicators, or data assumptions that failed to yield the result that dyadic conflict reduces dyadic trade. Liberal claims regarding the effect of dyadic trade on dyadic conflict simply were not robust in our findings. They survived in only 8 of the 36 tests we ran, and failed to hold up when certain data assumptions were altered, and were seriously vulnerable to indicator choices regarding inter-capital distance, conflict, and national size. To our colleagues from the liberal camp we would like to say that we still believe there are limited circumstances in which more trade may help lead countries to more peaceful resolutions of their differences, particularly if they are already at peace. However, it is past time for academics and policymakers to look beyond the naive claim that the cultivation of trade ties will always and everywhere pro‑ duce a more peaceful world. We can be confident that peace will bring trade, but whether trade will bring peace is subject to specific, limited circumstances condi‑ tions which we should all now set out in earnest to discover.

**No transition wars from economy or heg decline**

**MacDonald and Parent 11**

**MacDonald, Asst Prof. of PoliSci @ Williams College and Parent, Asst Prof. PoliSci @ U of Miami, 2011**

Paul and Joseph, “Graceful Decline?”, International Security, 35.4, Project MUSE

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. **We examine eighteen cases of** acute relative **decline** since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and declining **great powers** face powerful incentives to contract their interests **in** a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative **economic decline** explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline **are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized** interstate **disputes. Faced with diminishing resources**, great **powers moderate** their **foreign** policy **ambitions and offer concessions** in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. Great **powers** are able to **rebalance** their **commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: **they** seek to **adopt policies** **that maximize security given available means**. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position

## Navy Adv

**No warming or ice thaw**

**Happer 12** (William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

**Zero risk of Russia war.**

**Graham 07** - Senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, Thomas, " The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness”, Russia in Global Affairs, July, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “**Russia has** at different times **been** **demonized** or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come **at a time when Russia is** arguably **less** **threatening** to the West, and the United States in particular, **than** it has been at **any time since the end of the** **Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology** intent on our destruction, **its** **military poses no threat** to sweep across Europe, its **economic growth depends on** constructive **commercial relations** with Europe, **and its strategic arsenal** – while still capable of annihilating the United States – **is under** more **reliable control** than it has been in the past fifteen years and **the threat of a strategic** **strike approaches zero probability**. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**Empirics prove they doesn’t cause stability**

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

¶ Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. ¶ First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.¶ In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.¶ Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.¶ The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

**No Arctic War – 1950’s and South Pole disprove**

**Bartsch 12** (Golo, Associate at Ecologic Institute, “Arctic Security”, 7/30, http://arcticsummercollege.org/sites/default/files/Security%20Policy%20Brief\_Arctic%20Summer%20College\_July%2030%202012\_0.pdf)

As the Russian flag was planted underneath the North Pole in 2007, media predicted an uncontrolled “gold rush” or even a “new Cold War” in the region. This interpretation of military presence in the North, in combination with diminishing sea ice and territorial and resource claims of the riparian nations, created the image of imminent conflict. In fact, the probability of armed conflict in the North was not significantly higher during the last years than it was from 1990 to 2007. The nations involved, especially the Arctic Five, are affiliated with several overlapping international institutions, such as the United Nations or the Arctic Council, which provide arenas for peaceful conflict management. Furthermore, all those nations are aware that any armed escalation is counterproductive to their future interests and to exploitation of Arctic resources. In the official Northern strategies or White Papers of the Arctic Five, the commitment to peaceful cooperation and compliance with international law is a common and fundamental element. The current deployment, modernization, and reorganisation of the military in the Arctic takes place mostly to support the constabulary functions of those forces: Due to the harsh conditions of weather and terrain, it is foremost the military which has the equipment and personnel capacities to operate in the North at all. This includes not only the sovereign rights of border patrolling, coast guarding, and air policing, but also the provision of Search-and-Rescue (SAR) capabilities. Since an SAR agreement has been negotiated through the Arctic Council during the Conference of Nuuk in 2011, this task is of particular importance.

**No impact to the navy**

**Marvin, 11** [Taylor, Prospect Journal of International Affairs UCSD, CUTTING US DEFENSE SPENDING IS NOT A THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY, <http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/index.php/2011/09/cutting-us-defense-spending-is-not-a-threat-to-american-security/>]

However, **US** military **spending** far exceeds the level necessary to deter foreign aggression, even against peripheral US interests. Some of this excess is justified: if America wishes to fight long foreign wars and lead international humanitarian military interventions the Pentagon budget must support these missions. Despite this, American defense spending is ultimately vastly disproportionate to its core requirements. The US Navy is a good example of this excess. **America** **currently fields eleven aircraft carriers**. **Russia possesses one**, a Cold War relic vastly less capable than its American counterparts. **Despite Chinese naval ambitions** **in the** western **Pacific**, **China has struggled to refit an abandoned Soviet carrier,** the ex-Varyag, **for combat**, and the introduction of modern indigenous Chinese carriers is likely decades off. It is not unreasonable to suppose that America’s deterrence value would not be diminished if budget cuts forced the Navy to reduce the US carrier fleet. **While a reduction in the number of US carrier battle groups would significantly reduce the number of theaters the US could exert military control over at any given time,** this would likely not make US military threats less credib**le**; **that is**, **China would not be marginally more likely to invade Taiwan if** **the US fielded only seven six billion dollar supercarriers**. **Because the capabilities of all US military branches are so far beyond the minimum necessary to maintain** **an effective deterrence even if the US government dramatically reduced the defense budget America’s overall security and** ability to project power on a global scale would remain far in excess of any potential rivals.

# 2NC

## Trade

### K

#### Trade as peace economizes the process of life rendering inefficient ways of life superfluous and expendable.

Sachs, Fellow – Institute for Cultural Studies 1992, The Development Dictionary ed. Sachs

With a naivete hardly distinguishable from deception, the prophets of development polished up a Utopia envisioned as long ago as the 18th century, as if time had stopped and neither capitalism nor imperialism had ever appeared on the scene. After Montesquieu, the Enlightenment had discovered commerce as a means of refining crude manners. In this view, trade would spread rational calculation and cold self-interest, precisely those attitudes which make the passion for war or the whims of tyrants appear self-destructive. Trade creates dependence and jdependence tames. This is the logic which runs from Montesquieu through the UN down to the present-day integration of Eastern Europe and the USSR since the collapse of bureaucratic socialism there following the upheavals of 1989. And indeed, as the European Community and the Pax Americana after World War Two suggest, economic dominions have largely replaced military dominions. The conquest of foreign territories by bellicose states has given way to the conquest of foreign markets by profit-seeking industries. Global order, after World War Two, was conceived in terms of a unified world market One of the most highly praised virtues of the world market is increased interdependence. The network of interests created is supposed to knit the nations togethi r, for better or worse. From that perspective, the Pearson Report exhorteil the industrialized nations in 1969: There is also the appeal of enlightened and constructive self-interest. . . .The fullest possible utilization of all the world's resources, human and physical, which can be brought about only by international co-operation, helps not only those countries now economically weak, but also those strong and wealthy.3 in the Brandt Report: Whoever wants a bigger slice of an international economic cake cannot seriously want it to become smaller. Developing countries cannot ignore the economic health of industrialized countries.4 But the ideology of mutual interests could not hide its major fallacy for long the playing out of these interests takes place under unequal terms.- The economists' doctrine of comparative advantage had it that the general; well-being would increase if each nation specialized in doing things at which nature and history had made it most proficient — raw sugar from Costa Rica,for example, in exchange for Pharmaceuticals from Holland. But the flaw in this reasoning is that, in the long run, the country which sells the more complex products will grow stronger and stronger, because it will be able tointernalize the spin-off effects of sophisticated production. Pharmaceuticals' stimulate research and a host of technologies, while sugar cane doesn't! The alleged mutual interest in free trade endsup cumulatively strengthening the one and progressively weakening the other. And when the richer country countries end up with high tech innovations that render the products of the weaker country obsolete, as with natural sugar being replaced by bio-engineered substitutes, then mutual interest withers away to the point where the weaker country becomes superfluous. Apart from its built-in tendencies to discrimination and inequality, however, is the obsession with the market as the medium of unification for the whole world is rapidly pushing all countries into a tight spot. The world market, once brandished as a weapon against despotism, has itself turned into a closet dictator under whose dominion both rich and poor countries tremble. The fear of falling behind in international competition has seizedgovernments North and South, East and West. Not to lose ground in the economic arena has become an obsession which dominates politics down to the local level. This overruling imperative drives developing countries further into self-exploitation, for the sake of boosting exports, and industrial countries further into the wasteful and destructive mania of accelerated production, for the sake of protecting their markets.

## Navy

### K

#### A. Fear of weakness results in endless cycles of antagonistic violence

Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2003, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World, pg 174-178

The world's only superpower is haunted by a fear of weakness. From psychiatric experience with individuals, we know that underneath expressions of megalomania and claims to omnipotence there tend to be profound feel­ings of powerlessness and emptiness. Feelings on that order may affect our leaders' projections of world control. These could take the form of fear of the political frag­mentation of our society, with accompanying death anx­iety related not just to 9/11 but to the potential collapse of the superpower entity itself. Underneath our leaders' arrogant certainties concerning the world, there may lie profound doubts about our own social and national inte­gration, about America's control of itself. Fear of being out of control can lead to the most aggressive efforts at total control of everyone else. Helping to overcome such fear is the claim to transcen­dent American virtue, to providing beneficent and liber­ating service to the world. That sense of a mission both altruistic and sacred can generate a surge of power that, in turn, suppresses feelings of powerlessness and weakness. Fear of weakness is, of course, bound up with related feelings of vulnerability, with a superpower's sense of being a very visible target, and with its unrealizable requirement of omnipotence. The world's only superpower has become a target not just because it is so dominant but because its recent policies and attitudes, emerging from superpower syndrome, have antagonized just about everyone. Its unre­alizable omnipotence has caused its leaders to embark on an aggressive quest for absolute security via domination, which is another form of entrapment in infinity. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, coming out in support of the Bush administration, made a case for invading Iraq based on a principle of "ultimate national security." But as the political scientist David C. Hendrickson pointed out at the time, Kissinger seemed to have forgotten his own earlier criticism of the "absolute security" sought by revolutionary powers, noting then that "the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others." In this sense and in the way that the present administration has sought to overthrow world diplomatic procedures and restraints on war-making, the United States has certainly become a "revolutionary power" in pursuit of absolute security and absolute invulnerability. But the fear of weakness will not go away.

#### B. We will force the end before we give up our dream

Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2003, Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World, pg 27-29

But the phenomenon has hardly disappeared from our world. The hubris of “forcing the end” periodically expresses itself in militant apocalyptic movements. It may be at the heart of any grandiose claim to the ownership of death. All this is part of the universal human struggle with death and the continuity of life. Hence, the grandiose killing project of forcing the end is all too much part of the human psychological repertoire. Throughout most of history, apocalyptic sects rarely have moved from dreaming of or prayed for the end of time to forcing that end. Part of the reason was that the human means to force such an end did not seem to be at hand. But in our time, the means to force the end have caught up with apocalyptic dreams. Now those dreams are being married to apocalyptic weaponry (or at least the vision of obtaining it), and the idea of acting immediately to force the end is increasingly taking hold in apocalyptic movements. A compelling theology—or in secular terms, theory—with a world-ending narrative has been required to activate this human potential. That theology must forcefully divide the world into good and evil, and prescribe the necessary world destruction and renewal, all the while infusing believers with powerful currents of revitalization. All religions can provide such stories of cosmic redemption, but the Christian Armageddon narrative has had particular appeal—and not just in Christian hands—in its concreteness and simplicity, in its high-action rendering of death-and-rebirth mythology. Even secular movements like the Nazis have followed a version of the Armageddon script. Hitler’s followers sought to destroy much of what they saw as a racially polluted world by means of a vast biological purification program. Despite being murderously anti-Jewish and significantly anti-Christian as well, the Nazis drew upon what was most apocalyptic in both of those traditions. The Nazis came to empitomize the apocalyptic principle of killing to heal, of destroying vast numbers of human beings as therapy for the world.

### A2: Heg Inev

**Policymakers won’t hold on to heg**

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

## K

### FW - Substance

#### Rethinking has to come before policy deliberation to ensure the new politics of the alt are effective

McDonald ’12 – Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Political Science and International Studies @ University of Queensland, Australia (Matt, “Security, The Environment, and Emancipation: Contestation over Environmental Change”, Routledge, p.24)

By way of a conclusion to this discussion of security as a social construction, it is worth reiterating that security is understood as constructed in the sense that it is understood by different political communities in different ways in different contexts, and is a site of inter-subjective negotiation and contestation. And while it is appropriate to focus on how security is given meaning through the articulation and designation of threat, it is also important to move beyond this concern to point to how referent objects themselves, and the values in need of protection, are given meaning. Crucially, these different understandings have different implications for policy and action. The central determinant of how an issue is dealt with politically is not whether it is included on security agendas, but the way in which a group's core values, the threats to those values, and the means of preserving or advancing them are understood regarding that issue. I have also suggested here that, in approaching security as a social construction, we should be concerned not only with the designation of threat, but also with the meaning of security. Such an approach requires contesting the logic of security presented by the Copenhagen School and others, in which security is the realm of emergency, exclusion and 'panic politics'. The remainder of this chapter sets out where we might begin to look for, and make sense of, security discourses in political practice if not limiting ourselves to the designation and depiction of threat. Looking for security If the meaning of security is context-specific, and if this meaning is a crucial determinant of how issues are addressed in practice, it is clearly important to elaborate on where we might look for security discourses and how we might go about doing this. Here, I outline a framework for understanding both the nature of significant security 'interventions', and the means through which we might go about analysing these interventions and locating them in broader frameworks of meaning. It proceeds in two stages. The first outlines the role of language, defined in terms of spoken representations and texts, as the central (although not only) form of representation in the discursive construction of security. The second outlines the type of representation that delineates answers to core constituent questions of security (whose security, from what threats, and also by what means and by whom should it be advanced?). Here I advance the argument that we should focus on both the invocation and evocation of security: the former involving the direct articulation of particular visions of 'referent', 'threat', 'means' and 'agent'; and the latter involving the indirect articulation of such visions through representations of sovereignty and identity. This section also briefly addresses the question of how we might look at these representations through the application of discourse-analytical methods. Language and the construction of security Lene Hansen has argued: "language is ontologically significant: it is only through construction in language that 'things' - objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material -tinctures - are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity'.74 Beyond the role of language in defining security discourses and constituting reality more broadly, language - in text and especially speech - is central to dynamics of contestation and negotiation about security. As Pierre Bourdieu has argued, actors are engaged in constant competition through language to position their own account as most consistent with 'reality' and with a group's core values, in the process attempting to marginalize alternatives narratives of reality and community.75 And successful actors strategically use language that has particular symbolic power in given contexts (such as 'security', 'threat' or 'national interest') to render their own accounts of security convincing and others less so. As noted, international relations theorists such as Mattern, Krebs and Jackson have pointed to the ways in which successful speakers often attempt to locate narratives in powerful discourses of reality and community in order to maximize resonance and coerce/compel political opponents to accept the speaker's account of a contested story lest they be seen as unpatriotic, for example.76 The call to 'support our troops' that accompanied the deployment of military personnel to Iraq in 2003 in states such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia may be seen as an example. Such a call arguably undermined the extent to which opponents could contest the intervention in Iraq without also being seen to target those who would be risking their lives, thus limiting the space for legitimate opposition.'7 Similar examples are replete in the case studies that follow, not least in the denigration of international opponents of deforestation in Brazil, and in domestic opposition to the Australian government's position on climate change cooperation. Language, in short, constitutes the principal means through which meaning is given to security in the contexts I address here. Of course, language is not the only means through which meaning is given or communicated, and discourses of security are not reducible to linguistic representations of security and threat. A range of theorists have pointed convincingly to the important role of visual representations as 'security' representations,78 for example, with examples ranging from depictions of tortured inmates in the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq to Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed that sparked global unrest in 20 05.79 And at a more fundamental level, discourses are composed of both linguistic and non-linguistic practices. This is especially true of dominant discourses, which become established in and practised through a wide range of processes, practices and institutions. The post-2001 'war on terror' discourse in the American context, for example, was composed of, and constituted by, linguistic representations of the terrorist threat by President Bush, but also through security processes at airports, the Department of Homeland Security's threat advisory images, and of course the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security itself. It was also articulated and furthered across American society, from the level of political elite to cultural media such as films and television programmes.80 While recognizing that language (through both speech and text) is therefore only one form through which meanings of security are composed and communicated, my focus here is on the role of language, for two principal reasons. First, language is the site of the most direct and important form of engagement with security, directly delineating answers to core questions such as 'whose security, from what threats, by what means?' Such representations, as Weldes et al. argue, provide the vehicle for the construction of social categories that, in turn, serve to underpin the production (through linguistic and non-linguistic practices) of social facts.81 Second, and related to this, a focus on language allows greater recognition of security as a site of contestation between actors with competing visions of what security means and how it might be realized. While dominant discourses are indeed institutionalized in a range of processes and dynamics within (and crucially on behalf of) particular communities, marginal discourses are necessarily less evident in the official institutions, rituals and fora of a particular community. Indeed, these marginal frameworks of meaning and the actors articulating them are regularly actively marginalized from these processes. As such, a focus on language provides the best means of identifying multiple security discourses. The following analysis examines how dominant security discourses come to be accepted and institutionalized, in turn underpinning the most important forms of action on behalf of a particular community regarding particular instances of environmental change. A final point to note here in suggesting that we can best look for security discourses (and the competition between discourses) in linguistic practices is that analysing these practices has both analytical and normative implications, providing a basis for progressive change in three central ways. First, analysing discourses generally allows us to 'make strange' the most powerful discourses: frameworks of meaning that are necessarily partial but are represented and accepted as common sense. This is a claim articulated powerfully by Gramsci, Foucault and Bourdieu, among many others. Second, analysing the linguistic composition of discourses allows us to recognize possibilities for the most powerful forms of contestation of these discourses, which tend to orient around practices of immanent critique. While this is elaborated in chapter two, particularly important here is the broad claim that language enables but also constrains, providing justifications for action that can effectively be contested and contrasted with the outcomes of that action. Finally, a focus on language also allows us insight into those actors whose voices are able to be heard, and those who are marginalized or, indeed, silenced. While the latter often occurs through the nature of the official institutions, rituals and fora of a particular community that are the product of dominant security dis-courses, a focus on language draws our attention to the vital question of which actors can and do 'speak for' particular communities, reminding us in the process of those unable to have their voices heard. Types of security representation As I have suggested, security is a site of contestation and negotiation, one that takes on particular importance given the political significance of security, in particular as the central concern for the central actors in world politics: states. It should hardly be surprising, then, that attempts to define and redefine security -and to lay the groundwork for these visions to resonate - are relatively ubiquitous in contemporary politics. I suggest here that attempts to delineate answers to core constituent questions of security - 'referent', 'agent', 'threats' and 'means of response' - can be found in a range of different types of representation beyond the direct designation of security and threat. This section outlines the broader view adopted here of the types of representation that serve to engage with, and define, security. It asks: to what extent can particular representations be viewed as security representations? To reiterate an earlier point, the key to answering this question lies in the extent to which particular representations engage with the preservation of a group's core values, delineating answers to questions such as: who is the referent object and agent of security; who or what threatens this referent object and its core values; and what means should be employed to advance or preserve the values of this particular community? For approaches to security that take any account of the role of representation and language in constructing or positioning security, it is not controversial to argue that invocations of 'threat' and 'security' can be viewed as security representations. The former - as noted - is a particularly prevalent theme in post-aructural and Copenhagen School research on the construction of security. The dual argument here in justifying this focus is that security is denned primarily in oppositional terms - we define what needs to be secured by designating that which threatens it - and that engaging with the question of the designation of threat takes us to the heart of the politics of security.82 The designation of threat is, for these approaches, therefore the most important security 'move' in simultaneously telling us who or what needs to be protected, and from whom or what it needs protecting. It also potentially enables particular types of political response and the actors undertaking them, chiefly associated with the logic of exceptionalism.83 In my analysis, I accept the importance of these articulations of threat and danger to the construction of security, even while broadening the terms of analysis to include other (less dramatic or obvious) forms of security representation.

#### It’s the result of group think that’s the root cause of violence and strips life of all meaning—this is an independent reason to vote negative

Shaffer 7 (Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>)

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

### Perm

#### Complete rejection is critical

Neocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re afﬁrming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

### Amaon Defo – D

**The Amazon is recovering and even if it were destroyed, there’s no impact**

**New York Post, 05** (Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)

"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years. That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests. And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science," Moore says.

**decomposition solves the lack of rainforests**

**Lomborg, 01** (Bjorn, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre and a former director of the Environmental Assessment Institute in Copenhagen, The Skeptical Environmentalist, p. 115)

There are two primary reasons for viewing the tropical forests as a vital resource. In the 1970s we were told that rainforests were the lungs of the Earth. Even in July 2000, WWF argued for saving the Brazilian Amazon since “the Amazon region has been called the lungs of the world.” But this is a myth. True enough, plants produce oxygen by means of photosynthesis, but when they die and decompose, precisely the same amount of oxygen is consumed. Therefore, forests in equilibrium (where trees grow but old trees fall over, keeping the total biomass approximately constant) neither produce nor consume oxygen in net terms. Even if all plants, on land as well as at sea, were killed off and then decomposed, the process would consume less than 1 percent of the atmosphere’s oxygen.

### Species XT – D

**Empirically denied and alternate causality – hundreds of thousands of species die annually**

**Paltrowitz, 01** (JD Brooklyn Journal of I-Law, 2001 (A Greening of the World Trade Organisation”)

However, the panel did not take into account the practical reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably harmed as time passes. n105 For instance, one scholar has reported [\*1807] that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000 species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day, and three every hour and up to seventy percent of the world's fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploitation." n106 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which are on the endangered species list. n107 Yet, even for the dolphin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna purse seines then their numbers could become seriously depleted to the point where they may be put on the endangered species list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of trade values at the expense of environmental values. Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble rang hollow when it stated: " . . . that the provisions of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies." n108

**2. Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable**

**Doremus 2K** (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

# 1NR

## CP

### OV

1. **Cost overruns lead to misallocation of resources and destabilization of policy planning**

**Flyvbjerg, 05** - Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, winner of the Fulbright Scholarship, (Bent, “Policy and planning for large infrastructure : projects problems, causes, and cures, World Bank Publications” January 2005, Google Scholar)

Cost overruns and benefit shortfalls of the frequency and size described above are a problem for the following reasons: They lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation of resources, i.e. waste. They lead to delays and further cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. They destabilize policy, planning, implementation, and operations of projects. The problem is getting bigger, because projects get bigger. Let’s consider each point in turn. First, and argument often heard in the planning of large infrastructure projects is that cost and benefit forecasts at the planning stage may be wrong, but if one assumes that forecasts are wrong by the same margin across projects, cost-benefit analysis would still identify the best projects for implementation. The ranking of projects would not be affected by the forecasting errors, according to this argument. However, the large standard deviations show in tables 1 and 2 falsify this argument. However, the large standard deviations shown in tables 1 and 2 falsify this argument. The standard deviations show that cost and benefit estimates are not wrong by the same margin across projects; errors vary extensively and this will affect the ranking of projects. Thus we see that misinformation about costs and benefits at the planning stage is likely to lead to Pareto-inefficiency, because in terms of standard cost-benefit analysis decision makers are likely to implement inferior projects.

1. **Benefit shortfalls grow in projects - threatens economic collapse**

**Flyvbjerg, 05** - Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, winner of the Fulbright Scholarship, (Bent, “Policy and planning for large infrastructure : projects problems, causes, and cures, World Bank Publications” January 2005, Google Scholar)

Finally, as projects grow bigger, the problems with cost overruns and benefit shortfalls also grow biggerand more consequential (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2004: 12). Some megaprojects are becoming so large in relation to national economies that cost overrunsand benefit shortfalls from even a single project may destabilize the finances of a whole country or region. This occurred when thebillion-dollar cost overrun on the 2004 Athens Olympics affected the credit rating of Greece and when benefit shortfalls hit Hong Kong’s new $20 billion Chek Lap Kok airport after it openedin 1998. The desire to avoid national fiscal distress has recently become an important driver in attempts at reforming the planning of large infrastructure projects, as we will see later.

### A2: PDCP

**Should requires certainty and immediacy**

**Summer 94** (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16)  ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. IV CONCLUSION Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in a manner which gives effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court's due. A rule - that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order's efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., "and the same hereby is" - is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial of reasons and tend to undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti order overruling Dollarsaver's motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition. in error was not filed within 30 days of May 18, the appeal is untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee's motion to dismiss.[21](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn21)  Footnotes: [1](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn1) The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE /18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for judgment N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge [2](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn2) The turgid phrase - "should be and the same hereby is" - is a tautological absurdity. This is so because "should" is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling - one that is couched in "a present indicative synonymous with ought." See infra note 15.[3](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn3) Carter v. Carter, Okl., [783 P.2d 969](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=10645), 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., [681 P.2d 757](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=9677), 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., [655 P.2d 1040](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5345), 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., [645 P.2d 471](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=5225), 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., [630 P.2d 772](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=4989), 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl. 151, [90 P.2d 656](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=13059), 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). [4](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn4) "Recordable" means that by force of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on file." The pertinent terms of [12 O.S. 1991 § 24](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=93563&date=11/8/94) are: "Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file: cont…  
Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

**Counterplan allows for extensive private modification to the plan – severs the certainty of the Plan and allows them to add extra-topical parts to the Plan**

**Dornan 07** - Senior Consulting Manager AECOM Consult, Inc. (Daniel, “Case Studies of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships in the United States”, Report prepared for the Federal Highway Administration, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/us_ppp_case_studies_final_report_7-7-07.pdf)>

¶ Public-private partnerships are defined by the US DOT as follows.¶ ³A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement formed between public¶ and private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than¶ is traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting¶ with a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage¶ a facility or system. While the public sector usually retains ownership in the¶ facility or system, the private party will be given additional decision rights in¶ determining how the project or task will be completed.´¶ 1¶ This definition emphasizes that with a PPP the public and private sectors share responsibility for the delivery of the project and/or its services. By expanding the private sector role, the public¶ sector is better able to avail itself of the technological, managerial, and financial resources to¶ leverage scarce public funds and expedite the delivery of a project and/or services in a more costeffective manner and with reduced risk to the public agency sponsor. As noted above, the public¶ sector bore most project delivery, financial, and operational risks. By sharing responsibility and¶ resources for the delivery of a PPP project, both public and private sectors share in the potential¶ risks and rewards from the delivery of the facility or service relative to what they retain¶ responsibility for.¶ 2

**Substantial means unconditional and certain**

**Words and Phrases 64** (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

**Resolved means certain**

**AHD 06** (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or express by formal vote.

### Solvency

**P3’s solve better and P3’s can work for the government**

Stephen J. **McBrady 09** is a Government Contracts attorney in the Washington, DC office of Crowell & Moring LLP, March 2009, “Funding America’s Infrastructure Needs: Public Private Partnerships May Help Close Infrastructure Gap”, http://www.crowell.com/documents/funding-americas-infrastructure-needs\_construction-briefings.pdf;

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) differ from traditional U.S. public procurements in several key aspects, including financing, operation, and procurement. PPPs are organizational structures by which the private sector finances, builds, rehabilitates, maintains, and/or operates specific public sector activities in exchange for a contractually specified stream of future returns. PPPs can include, for instance, private sector-financed development and operation of infrastructure, whereby a private company builds and operates infrastructure and/or provides services in exchange for commuter fees (such as toll revenue) or a significant share of the revenue stream; or, alternatively, a partnership for private sector-financed rehabilitation and operation of a hospital, prison, airport or energy facility, which is then operated by the private entity and “leased” to the appropriate federal, state or local government authority for a negotiated fee.

**P3s solve port deepening and modernization – raises revenue and innovation**

**Feigenbaum 2012** [Baruch transportation policy analyst with Reason Foundation |“New Deepening Option Vital for Port of Savannah: Improving Vital Infrastructure Without Burdening Taxpayers” ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION April 6th 2012 | <http://reason.org/news/show/new-deepening-option-vital>)

The Port of Savannah needs hundreds of millions of dollars to deepen its harbor and take advantage of the Panama Canal expansion. That expansion is expected to double its capacity and accommodate ships carrying three times as much cargo. Bigger cargo ships will help businesses move goods more quickly, especially from China, and could lower the prices that consumers pay. But with the federal debt and deficit soaring, there is little taxpayer money available for harbor deepening at American ports.¶ Deepening the Port of Savannah is expected to cost $650 million. The state is contributing $252 million and hopes the federal government will pay the rest. But Georgia’s leaders need to be realistic about the funding shortfalls.¶ The port netted just $600,000 in President Barack Obama’s budget last year, $2.5 million in supplemental 2012 funds, and the president just proposed giving $2.8 million to the port in his 2013 budget. At this rate, it will take decades to finish the deepening project.¶ Georgia needs another way to permanently deepen harbors. One solution is public-private partnerships, which deliver needed infrastructure including ports, raise new sources of capital for modernization, shift risks away from taxpayers and onto investors, and encourage innovation.¶ The Port of Savannah could team with a private company, which would pay for and perform the initial deepening and future maintenance of the channel. To recoup this investment, the company would manage the port and generate revenue from the shipping companies that use it. Three possible rental-lease types include a fixed annual payment to the state, a variable payment or a partial lease.¶ Maryland is showing how successful these partnerships can be. In 2010, the state signed a 50-year lease with Ports America to operate the Port of Baltimore. The company, Ports America, will invest $500 million in the project and provide another $140 million to fund highway, bridge and tunnel improvement projects near the port. The state received a $105 million payment upfront and gets annual lease payments of $3.2 million. Maryland also can cancel the agreement if certain performance metrics related to the construction and management of the port aren’t met.

**Flyvbjerg Prodict**

**Flyvbjerg’s data is the most comprehensive study and confirmed by multiple other studies**

**Poole and Samuel, 11** – \* director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation, also an MIT-trained engineer AND \*\*senior fellow at the Reason Foundation (Robert and Peter, “Transportation Mega-Projects and Risk”, <http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/planning/tysons_docs/090711transportation_mega_projects_risk_big_dig.pdf>)

First, Flyvbjerg and colleagues cite studies showing that this is hardly a new problem, nor is it unique to a few countries. One of the most comprehensive studies (from Aalborg University) covers 258 highway and rail projects ($90 billion worth) in 20 countries. 16 Nearly all (90%) suffered cost overruns, with the average rail project costing 45% more than projected, the average highway project 20% more. Traffic forecasts were also far from accurate, with rail projects generating an average of 39% less traffic than forecast (though highway projects averaged a 9% under-estimate of traffic). Flyvbjerg concludes that the “cost estimates used in public debates, media coverage, and decisionmaking for transport infrastructure are highly, systematically, and significantly deceptive. So are the cost-benefit analyses.” Many other analysts have reached similar conclusions. Flyvbjerg goes on to explain why this comes about. First, he cites two MIT researchers’ conclusion that “the incentives to produce optimistic estimates of viability are very strong and the disincentives weak.” And the reason for that is a lack of accountability of the parties involved, not a lack of technical skills or insufficient data.

### P3s = Good

**The counterplans’ possibility for modifications are key to solving, explicitly conditioning the Plan on private lenders ensures accountability**

**Flyvberg et al 03** – Professor of Major Programme Management at [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University)'s [Saïd Business School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sa%C3%AFd_Business_School" \o "Saïd Business School) and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at [Aalborg University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aalborg_University), [Denmark](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denmark) and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at [Delft University of Technology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delft_University_of_Technology), The Netherlands (Bent, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition, p. 120)

In principle, the most important issue from an accountability point of view is the actual decision on whether to undertake the investment in a megaproiect or not. Given that the size of the investment is in the¶ multibillion-dollar range and that the uncertainties involved are substan-¶ tial, it seems self-evident that it must be possible to hold accountable¶ those who take the decision. Experience from Great Belt, Oresund and other projects shows that government in itself is not sufficiently effective¶ when it comes to enforcing accountability with respect to specific issues such as decisions on major infrastructure investments (see Chapters 2-4). A more effective way of achieving this is, in our judgement, to let the decision to go ahead with a project - given that the project satisfies agreed public interest objectives - be conditioned by the willingness of private financiers to participate in the project without a sovereign guarantee. This means that at least part of the capital, which will have to be mobilised¶ for a given project, should be genuine risk capital. In other words, only if this risk capital can be mobilised will the project be built. By requiring that a substantial commitment in the form of risk capital is made, the ordinary citizen will not be required to carry any, or only limited, risks. The common practice, followed at Oresund and Great Belt, of transferring the costs of risk to those who are in the weakest position to protect¶ themselves is thereby, if not eliminated, at least significantly reduced.22

**70 years of Transportation infrastructure proves – failure to establish performance measures before ENSURSES the plan will be a cost-overrun – Cost underestimation will not stop unless it comes with a consequence**

**Flyvbjerg et al 02** (Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm, and Søren Buhl. Flyvbjerg is a professor of planning with the Department of Development and Plan- ning, Aalborg University, Denmark. He is founder and director of the university’s re- search program on transportation infra- structure planning and was twice a Visiting Fulbright Scholar to the U.S. His latest books are Rationality and Power (University of Chicago Press, 1998) and Making Social Science Matter (Cambridge University Press, 2001). He is currently working on a book about megaprojects and risk (Cambridge University Press). Holm is an assistant pro- fessor of planning with the Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg Uni- versity, and a research associate with the university’s research program on transpor- tation infrastructure planning. Her main in- terest is economic appraisal of projects. Buhl is an associate professor with the De- partment of Mathematics, Aalborg Univer- sity, and an associate statistician with the university’s research program on transpor- tation infrastructure planning. “Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?” Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 68, No. 3, Summer 2002, http://www.industrializedcyclist.com/Flyvbjerg02.pdf)

Figure 3 shows a plot of the differences between actual and estimated costs against year of decision to build for the 111 projects in the sample for which these data are available. The diagram does not seem to indicate an effect from time on cost underestimation. Statistical analyses corroborate this impression. The null hypothe- sis that year of decision has no effect on the difference between actual and estimated costs cannot be rejected (p=0.22, F-test). A test using year of completion instead of year of decision (with data for 246 projects) gives a similar result (p=0.28, F-test). We therefore conclude that cost underestimation has not decreased over time. Underestimation today is in the same order of magnitude as it was 10, 30, and 70 years ago. If techniques and skills for estimating and forecasting costs of transportation infrastructure pro- jects have improved over time, this does not show in the data. No learning seems to take place in this important and highly costly sector of public and private decision making. This seems strange and invites speculation that the persistent existence over time, location, and project type of significant and widespread cost underestimation is a sign that an equilibrium has been reached: Strong incentives and weak disincentives for underestimation may have taught project promoters what there is to learn, namely, that cost underestimation pays off. If this is the case, underestimation must be expected and it must be expected to be intentional. We examine such speculation below. Before doing so, we compare cost un- derestimation in transportation projects with that in other projects.