**Iran Prolif**

**Iranian prolif solves regional stability.**

**Madson 06** [Peter N. Madson, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Master’s degree in National Security Affairs, 3-6, “The Sky is Not Falling: Regional Reaction to a Nuclear Armed Iran,” http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA445779]

Despite this security, nuclear states must be cautious. Professor Waltz examines both superpowers and smaller unpredictable states. In all cases, nuclear weapons, with their extreme destructive power, induce caution.18 Even at the height of its revolutionary zeal, an Iran with nuclear weapons would face the very real condition that if it employed its weapons, it would risk a devastating retaliation. Since the Iranian regime is now pursuing the status-quo, the possibility that Tehran would risk such destruction is highly unlikely. Professor Waltz is not alone in his theory. Additional study has been made on the stabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation. Professor Peter Lavoy from the Naval Postgraduate School has predicted that nuclear weapons will prevent future wars between India and Pakistan.19 Although these two states have had minor conflicts that risked escalation to nuclear warfare, nuclear weapons provided a safety net that helped prevent escalation to general war. Both Martin van Creveld of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Shai Feldman of Brandeis University maintain a nuclear-armed Middle East will stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict.20 Israel will resist regional nuclear proliferation; however, as outlined in Chapter II, there is significant evidence showing direct military attacks against a state’s nuclear program does not deter it. Quite the contrary, such attacks only further motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons.

**And, empirics go our way – even if leaders talk of nuclear war they won’t ever actually do it**

**Hagerty, 96** – Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Sydney (Devin, “Nuclear Deterrence and the 19990 Indo-Pakistan Crisis, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer 1996, p. 184, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

First, the senior U.S. leader who most forcefully expressed his reservations about going on the offensive during the Gulf War was none other than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cohn Powell, whose advocacy of offensive operations was considerably more reluctant than many of his civilian bosses’. Second, in a region of particular interest to me, none of the three Indo-Pakistani wars was instigated by military leaders whose enthusiasm for the offensive exceeded that of their civilian colleagues. In 1947—48, India and Pakistan’s military leadership still consisted of *British* officers whose main concern was, of course, to keep the two new states *out* of war. Blame for the 1965 conflict can be placed squarely on the shoulders of Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian, who goaded President Ayub Khan into a reckless preventive war against India. Similarly, responsibility for the 1971 Bangladesh war belongs mainly to three civilians: Bhutto, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and Bengali nationalist Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Furthermore, Pakistan was far less dis­posed to challenge India under the leadership of General Zia ul-Haq from 1977 to 1988, in part because he had been a first-hand witness to defeat at the hands of superior Indian forces and realized that provoking India into war was good for neither the Pakistan Army nor the country at large. Indeed, more than a few Indian leaders have quietly admitted that dealing with a Pakistan under Zia’s finn control was less vexing than managing relations with their neighbor’s unpredictable civilian rulers. To support his contention that military organizations are more favorably disposed toward offensive operations, Fetter notes that U.S. military officers planned, considered, and recommended preemptive nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union. For the logic of nonproliferation, the fact that such strikes were even contemplated is evidence of danger; for the logic of nuclear deterrence, the fact that they were never ordered is evidence of their implausibility. Military officers plan for every imaginable contingency, but the vast majority of their plans are never implemented. Empirical support for our hypotheses lies not in planning documents, but in the actual decisions that were made about which plans to choose. To date, leaders of nuclear weapon states have eschewed preemptive nuclear strikes and there is little reason to expect that this will change.

**Small second strike forces solve use or lose em mentality**

**Goldstein, 2K** – David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania (Avery, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, 2000, p. 277, KONTOPOULOS)

Second, nuclear optimists suggest that the “use’em or lose’em” con­ern may simultaneously understate the inhibitions against nuclear use (choosing to risk suicide for fear of death) and overstate the difficulty of fielding nuclear forces whose survivability is strategically adequate. Creative deployment and concealment of actual weapons and decoys, an approach reflected in China’s handling of its relatively small, vulnerable arsenal during the Cold War, can instill uncertainty about target cover­age in the mind of an adversary contemplating a preemptive first strike whose expected effectiveness must approach 100 percent to be a realistic option against a nuclear-armed state. Evenin what is often believed to be the more dangerous case of confrontation between relatively poor and small regional nuclear rivals, first-strike uncertainty mitigates the vulnerability problems that pessimists emphasize. As Jordan Seng has argued, such states have more limited reconnaissance capabilities for locating and targeting the adversary’s nuclear forces and a lower thresh­old for unacceptable retaliatory damage.

**Their claims ethnocentric and epistemologically suspect**

**Karl 98** [David, president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, a consultancy based in Los Angeles, and a lecturer in international relations at the University of Southern California, “Prolif Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers” JSTOR, SM]

Second, the contrasts that pessimists have drawn between the logic and behavior patterns in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear experience and those of other states, particularly in the Third World, have often been so stark that it seemed hard to acquit them of the **ethnocentric bias** with which their critics charge them.18 This is especially true of arguments that the virulent ethnic and relig-ious hatreds in Third World regions may not yield to fears of nuclear retali-ation, or that leaders of Third World regimes possess personal value structures predisposing them to capricious and illogical acts from which not even threats of nuclear retaliation can dissuade them.

**Their ev is racist – Iran understands destructive value of nukes and is deterrable.**

**Sadr, 2005** [Ehsaneh Sadr, graduate student at the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, Middle East Policy, the most cited, peer reviewed academic journal in the field, “The Impact of Iran’s Nuclearization on Israel,” MEP, 12.2 (Summer 2005): p58(15))]

The first reason is that Iran's leaders are unlikely to understand the subtle theoretical arguments and paradoxical principles of the MAD doctrine. Richard Russell argues, for example, that "[t]he Iranian clerics are not well schooled in the ins and outs of the elaborate Western strategic literature formulated during the Cold War." (38) Similarly, George Perkovich has said that "[p]olitical leaders like Khamenei and Rafsanjani see nuclear weapons as an almost magical source of national power and autonomy. These men are political clerics, not international strategists or technologists." (39) The implication is that Iran's leaders have an undeveloped appreciation for nuclear strategies and doctrines and that this deficit leaves them dangerously incapable of rationally calculating the risks of actually using nuclear weapons. Such an argument is problematic for at least two reasons. First of all, whether Rafsanjani and Khamenei currently understand the details of various nuclear doctrines is less important than whether they can grasp them fairly quickly after joining the nuclear club**. Unless we are to succumb to suspiciously ethnocentric even racist--assumptions regarding the ability of Iranians to learn, there is relief to be found in the example of all the other nuclear states, in which the development of doctrine followed the development of weapons**. (40) Second, it is far from clear that a thorough grasp of "the elaborate Western strategic literature" is necessary. Indeed, the most important principle of deterrence requires only a very basic, even primitive, understanding that the launching of nuclear weapons against a nuclearized enemy is sure to be followed by the destruction of one's own cities. The belief that only complicated strategic doctrines can deter the initiation of nuclear warfare may stem more from the scholar's vanity than the policy maker's need.

**Iran nuclearization gives the U.S. the negotiating ability to solve oil prices and create regional stability – solves the impact to the aff**

**Lowther 10**

[Adam, defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Feb. 8, op-ed in NYT, “Iran’s Two-Edged Bomb.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/opinion/09lowther.html?_r=1&ref=opinion>] CMR

First, Iran’s development of nuclear weapons would give the United States an opportunity to finally defeat violent Sunni-Arab terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Here’s why: a nuclear Iran is primarily a threat to its neighbors, not the United States. Thus Washington could offer regional security — primarily, a Middle East nuclear umbrella — in exchange for economic, political and social reforms in the autocratic Arab regimes responsible for breeding the discontent that led to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Until now, the Middle East autocracies have refused to change their ways because they were protected by the wealth of their petroleum reserves. A nuclear Iran alters the regional dynamic significantly, and provides some leverage for us to demand reforms. Second, becoming the primary provider of regional security in a nuclear Middle East would give the United States a way to break the OPEC cartel. Forcing an end to the sorts of monopolistic practices that are illegal in the United States would be the price of that nuclear shield, bringing oil prices down significantly and saving billions of dollars a year at the pump. Or, at a minimum, President Obama could trade security for increased production and a lowering of global petroleum prices. Third, Israel has made clear that it feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear program. The Palestinians also have a reason for concern, because a nuclear strike against Israel would devastate them as well. This shared danger might serve as a catalyst for reconciliation between the two parties, leading to the peace agreement that has eluded the last five presidents. Paradoxically, any final agreement between Israelis and Palestinians would go a long way to undercutting Tehran’s animosity toward Israel, and would ease longstanding tensions in the region.

**Solving nuclear prolif causes a shift to bioweapons**

**Zilinskas, 00** [Raymond A., Former Clinical Microbiologist and Dir. – Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies of Monterey Institute of International Studies, in “Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense,” Ed. Raymond A. Zilinskas, p. 1-2, Google Print]

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of biological weapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, **as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.** Before beginning a consideration of the implications of molecular biology for biological warfare (BW) and defense, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of microbiology. It has passed through two eras, and we presently are in its third era. The first was the “pre-Pasteur” era; when the underlying science of fermentation was unknown, so microbiology was applied strictly on an empirical basis. Although undoubtedly any fine beers and wines, as well as breads and other fermented foods, were produced through the use of empirically developed fermentation techniques, no finely controlled production of chemicals was possible. During this era, BW was also empirically based. Common tactics included contaminating water sources with bloated animal carcasses and catapulting infected cadavers into citadels (Poupard and Miller, 1992).

**Extinction**

**Horowitz, 05**- Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard (Does Proliferation Matter? Assessing the Empirical Impact of Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons on International Security, p. 19)

Though biological weapons are difficult to deliver, Steinbrunner (1997) argues the consequences of their use are almost unlimited. Given the new possibilities for genetic manipulations made possible by modern science, biological weapons could threaten the future of human civilization. The Office of Technology Assessment, while cautioning that the probability of effective use is much lower than for nuclear weapons, concluded in 1993 that, pound for pound, biological weapons might be more devastating for human populations than nuclear weapons (OTA 1993, 52). Even though the probability of effective use is low, the enormous magnitude may instantly make the use of biological weapons a credible threat. United States policy makers certainly take the threat seriously. In an oft-repeated statement on the risk of biological warfare, the Office of Technology Assessment also noted that the distribution of 100kg of anthrax in the air over a city could kill up to three million people (BBC 1998). As with chemical weapons, while defensive measures can mitigate the terminal impact of use, in cases of asymmetric capabilities, the threat to use biological weapons could be especially credible. Also similarly to chemical weapons, it is the fear of the impact of biological weapons, even more than a rational cost-benefit analysis that makes them important for international politics. The possibility of mass disease in the homeland or among troops deployed abroad, is frightening (Mauroni 2003, XV). This alternative view of chemical and biological weapons leads to the following hypothesis.

**Prolif makes miscalc less likely and rational self-interest solves preemption**

**Woods, 02** – Ph.D. from the University of Nottingham (Matthew, "Reflections on nuclear optimism: Waltz, Burke and proliferation", Review of International Studies, 2002, July 14th 2010, Vol. 28, Issue 1, p. 5-6, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Optimism appears in four waves. It arises in Europe during the 1950s as a response to Europe’s perceived vulnerability to Soviet aggression and its unsettled post-war relationship with America. Gallois says the destructiveness of nuclear weapons **transforms states** and alters both immediate and extended deterrence.18 Existing under the prospect of annihilation gives self-interested states a reason to constrain their activity and a **universal standard against which to assess the rationality of their behaviour**. This transformation enhances immediate deterrence by rendering threats to retaliate with nuclear arms at once more credible and **less susceptible to misinterpretation**.19 Gallois writes that when: ‘the evaluation of the risks to be taken is made by leaders who have all learned to calculate according to the same measuring system [nuclear annihilation], a major error of interpretation is less and less plausible and … the dangers inherent in the policy of dissuasion grow less and less likely.’20 On principle, nuclear-rational states are secure from attack. Yet the inspiration for this argument also leads Gallois to view the extended deterrent threats and collective security arrangements meant to protect non-nuclear allies in a nuclear world as unworkable.21 When the risk of nuclear war confronts states **motivated by**

**self-interest and survival, nuclear retaliation for attacks upon others is untenable**. Moreover, this reasoning undermines even the uncontroversial commitments accorded allies by denuding the notion of ‘limited nuclear war’ and bolstering the threat of ‘escalation’.22 There is only one solution to this problem, contends Gallois, the intentional proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**History disproves all their warrants for war**

**Sechser, 08** – Assistant Professor at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Todd S., "Nuclear Weapons", University of Virginia, December 30th 2008, July 14th 2010, p. 1, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

The idea that the United States should aggressively pursue nuclear nonproliferation rests in part on a widespread belief that the spread of nuclear weapons would destabilize international relations. But this pessimistic view confronts one incontrovertible fact: nuclear weapons proliferated to thirteen states1 during the six decades since the dawn of the nuclear age, yet the world has not witnessed a single **preventive or preemptive nuclear war, accidental nuclear attack, or instance of nuclear terrorism.** Motivated by this striking observation, scholars known as “proliferation optimists” have suggested that nuclear proliferation may, in fact, exert a stabilizing force on international politics. They argue that nuclear states new and old will be highly motivated to **avoid** taking actions that might risk nuclear conflict. The core of the optimists’ position is that the cost of a nuclear war would be so grave that even the world’s most risk-prone leaders will find themselves reluctant to risk fighting one. As one prominent optimist, Kenneth N. Waltz, has argued, nuclear states quickly recognize that engaging in aggressive or risky behavior that could prompt nuclear retaliation is “obvious folly” (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 154). Because a nuclear conflict could place a state’s **very** **survival** **at risk**, national leaders have powerful incentives to manage their arsenals with care and caution. Moreover, according to this view, even a few nuclear weapons constitute such a powerful deterrent to aggression that they obviate the need for high levels of spending on conventional arms. According to the optimists, then, the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to deter large-scale wars, restrain conventional-arms races, and produce greater international stability.