## T

#### 1. We meet - Plan requires human personnel to build and operate the PACS technology – no distinction between humans operating the technology in space or on earth

#### 2. Counter-interpretation: development under the DoD or NASA can be technology or operational technology development

#### GAO 10 – US Government Accountability Office (“United States Government Stewardship Information (Unaudited) for the Years Ended September 30, 2010, and 2009 Stewardship Investments” http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2010/10stew.pdf)

With regard to development, the DOD and NASA had $65.3 billion (84 percent) and $9.1 billion (12 percent), respectively, of total development investments in fiscal year 2010, as shown in Table 11. Development is comprised of five stages: advanced technology development, advanced component development and prototypes, system development and demonstration, management support, and operational systems development. Major outputs of DOD development are: • Hardware and software components, and complete weapon systems ready for operational and developmental testing and field use, and • Weapon systems finalized for complete operational and developmental testing. NASA development programs include activities to extend our knowledge of Earth, its space environment, and the universe, and to invest in new aeronautics and advanced space transportation technologies that support the development and application of technologies critical to the economic, scientific, and technical competiveness of the United States. Some outcomes and future outcomes of this development are: • The Earth Science Research Program improves the capability to document the global distribution of a range of important environmental parameters related to the Earth’s atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, cryosphere, and land surface; to understand the processes that drive and connect them; and to improve our capability to predict the future evolution of the Earth system, including climate, weather, and natural hazards. • Earth Systematic Missions provide Earth observing satellites that contribute to the provision of long-term environmental data sets that can be used to study the evolution of the Earth system on a range of temporal scales. This information is used to analyze, model, and improve understanding of the Earth system. • The Mars Exploration program has been developed to conduct a rigorous, incremental, discovery-driven exploration of Mars to determine the planet’s physical, dynamic, and geological characteristics, investigate the Martian climate in the context of understanding habitability, and investigate whether Mars ever had the potential to develop and harbor any kind of life. • The Cosmic Origins missions explore how the expanding universe grew into a grand, cosmic web of galaxies; how stars and planets formed within the galaxies; how stars created the heavy elements, such as carbon, that are essential for life. Major breakthroughs in our knowledge of the cosmos have already been made with the current suite of missions.

#### 3. Counter-interpretation: Space development is technological progress

Pekkanen and Kallender-Emezu 2010 [Saadia, Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor at the Jackson School of International Studies, and Adjunct Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Washington, with Paul, writer and editor for Stanford University Press, “In Defense of Japan: From The Market to the Military in Space Policy” pg. 33-34]

Over the course of roughly two decades in which there were numerous structural changes in global politics, Japan’s official space policy continued to focus on lofty justifications for a national space program—the exploration of space and the solar system leading to different thinking about the universe, the consequent creation of a new philosophy and culture in an intellectually mature society, and so on. By and large, the Fundamental Policy was concerned with generalities. For example, it mentioned the essential nature of satellites in daily lives and the necessity of establishing a global Earth observation system in harmony with other nations. It also focused on how space development involves sophisticated generic technology, which can integrate various fields of science and technology and which can spill over creatively and propel developments in other fields such as materials, computers, robotics, electronics, communications, and information processing. In addition, it urged that Japan use space development for environmental research and monitoring. None of this is controversial in the least, much less militarized in overtone. Over-all, the basic policy at this early stage of Japan’s space development seemed permeated with two important themes—civilian use and international cooperation.

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### 4. Aff ground – no literature base for expanding human presence – all US space exploration is now done through robots and satellites

#### 5. Inevitable – forcing the aff to defend humans just means the neg has tech counterplans, worse to force the burden on the aff since they can’t rely on generics or answering harms

#### 6. Education – space development isn’t done by humans anymore, they gut education about the future of space flight, comparing tech strategies key to policy education

#### 7. Substantial checks any abuse

#### 8. Reasonability – development means different things – competing interpretations create a race to the bottom

#### 9. Don’t vote on potential abuse – round doesn’t set a precedent

## China

#### Weaponization is inevitable – That’s Panday and Chang

#### Won’t trigger arms race – PACS is covert – no evidence it’s perceived – that’s Page

#### Even if they were detected Klein says a hostile would have no way to respond and we would have an instant “off-switch” to all their space assets disincentivizing escalation—their generic ASAT link doesn’t apply

#### Weaponization won’t escalate and can base cooperation

**Park 07** [Andrew, University of Houston Law Center, received the 2005 Strasburger & Price, L.L.P. Award for Outstanding Comment in International Law for this article, “INCREMENTAL STEPS FOR ACHIEVING SPACE SECURITY” http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28\_3\_871.pdf]

The direct benefits to the United States of implementing space weapons are clear. Not only can space weapons be the primary tool for information warfare, they can also provide an increased capability for stopping “potential aggressors more effectively, with less collateral damage, compared to conventional arms.”166 However, the United States also stands to gain indirect benefits from achieving space dominance. It is possible that U.S. efforts to achieve space weaponization primacy would prevent an arms race in space before it ever starts by establishing “a globally dominant, stabilizing force in space.”167 Also, a space-based weapons system could be the basis of a stabilizing cooperative security regime in outer space that abides by agreed upon rules of the road.168 The fact of the matter is that the world has not fallen apart after sixty years of increasing military activity in space.169 The evolution of the militarization of space has been particularly shaped by pressing national security requirements of the United States, and as many space hawks firmly believe, “this is how it will continue to be.”170 The U.S. quest for space dominance may arguably serve to further selfish military desires, but it can also provide a degree of stability that the current legal regime has been unable to provide.171

## Heg

#### Hegemony prevents great power wars – de-escalates regional conflict and disincentivizes filling the power vacuum – transition causes more instability – collapse support for institutions, trade, and cooperation – that’s Kagan

#### Status quo isn’t a stable transition – aggressive Chinese rise causes all their impacts – that’s Dolman and Yoshida

#### Non-unique – Chinese aggression now – plan key to temper it by demonstrating space control is futile – that’s Dolman and Cooper

#### Doesn’t assume space dominance – prevents escalation of any conflict – US will be militarily invincible which solves aggression by either side – that’s Yoshida

#### Hegemony solves Asian stability

Mcgiffert ‘3 – Fellow CSIS International Security Program China In The American Political Imagination, P 69-70

THROUGHOUT THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA, the most critical U.S. security objective in the Asia Pacific region has been the maintenance of predominant political and military influence across the vast reaches of maritime Asia.' In support of this objective, the United States has sought to maintain the ability to project superior naval, air, and in some cases land power within this region and to sustain close political and diplomatic relations or to establish explicit bilateral se­curity alliances with key states, including Japan, South Korea, Austra­lia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Such American predominance is designed to protect four key in­terests viewed as vital to the safety, prosperity, and beliefs of the American people. First, it is critical to preventing the emergence of a hostile power in the Asia Pacific region that could limit or exclude U.S. political, economic, or military access to the region. During the Cold War, this meant that the United States would act to prevent the expansion of Soviet or Chinese communist power or influence throughout littoral Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has remained committed to the objective of preventing any ri­power from emerging in the region, while also seeking to prevent reemerging regional disputes or rivalries from disrupting ti. and economic development. Second, American predominance is important to ensuring free­ commerce, market access, and strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) throughout the region, thus preventing the emergence of any exclusionary economic associations or the obstruction of free passage by both commercial and military transports. This reflected the view that free market systems with relatively open access to for­eign trade and investment facilitate the global activities of U.S. busi­ness, thereby ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and encouraging democratic development. It also reflected the need to protect critical transportation routes within and across maritime Asia, also viewed as essential to U.S. prosperity and the security of American allies and friends in Asia and beyond. Third, U.S. leadership in Asia is key to defending and encouraging democratic states and processes and preventing the expansion of nondemocratic movements or regimes. Although not always a top priority, the United States encourages the emergence of democratic states whenever possible. This derives from the widely held assump­tion that fellow democracies will resist totalitarian expansion, facili­tate the exercise of U.S. power, and reduce the overall tendency of states to engage in military conflict (which in turn derives from the view that democracies will be less inclined to wage war against one another than nondemocratic states). The protection or expansion of democratic states is also viewed by some elites as an important moral objective of the United States. Finally, U.S. power and access to Asia is viewed as necessary to pre­venting the proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies, and know-how across or into littoral Asia. The importance of this objec­tive has grown over time, as increasingly potent and mobile items as­sociated with weapons of mass destruction or other highly destructive weapons have emerged and become obtainable by both states and nonstate actors.

#### Losing heg won’t stop terrorism but means we can’t respond

Brooks, Professor in Government at Dartmouth, and Wohlforth, Professor in Government at Dartmouth, ‘2 (Stephen & William, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug )

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

## Defense Cuts

#### Space assets are a prerequisite to forward deployed forces

[Shaw and Worden, (Brig. Gen., USAF, ret.) is the center director at NASA Ames Research Center where he leads a staff of nearly 2,500 civil servants and contractors and oversees an annual budget of approx. $800 million providing the critical R&D support that makes NASA’s and the nation’s aeronautics and space missions possible. In just three years, Worden has completely transformed Ames, reinvigorating the center’s workforce and taking a leadership role in important, cost-effective small satellite missions and ,2002 [John E.](http://www.spacedebate.org/author/1451) and [Simon P.](http://www.spacedebate.org/author/1450)” [Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century](https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2002/fairchild/wordenshaw.pdf).” Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, page 135 ]

Most immediate and visible is the necessity for space power in fighting modern war effectively. The expanding power of space capabilities in military engagements points to an increasingly visible reality: Space capabilities are an integral part of a modern war-fighting force. With this reality comes an admonition: We cannot, and must not, take our space capabilities for granted; nor can we ignore the increasing role space capabilities will take in the war-making efforts of our adversaries. With our amazing space war-fighting capabilities -- all kinds of intelligence collection, force navigation and weapons delivery precision, worldwide communication and transmission of information -- we have been paving the road of 21st century warfare. Others will soon follow as potential adversaries seek to develop and leverage these same capabilities. In fact, they are doing it right now.

#### DoD would take money from somewhere else covertly

Michael E. Salla, PhD Center for Global Peace/School of International Service American University, Washington DC 11/23/2003[ The black budget report, http://www.slideshare.net/ProphecyFactory/the-blackbudgetreport-9017285]

Birth of the Black Budget In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) and consolidated the US military into one entity, the Department of Defense (DoD). One of the issues that remained unresolved from the creation and operation of the CIA was the extent to which its budget and intelligence activities would remain a secret. According to Article 1, sec. 9, of the US Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” This constitutional requirement conflicted with the need for secrecy concerning Congressional appropriations for the CIA. The solution was for Congress to pass legislation approving the secrecy over the funding mechanisms used for the CIA and its intelligence related activities. The necessary bill was passed with great haste and minimal debate causing considerable concern among those few Congressmen brave enough to openly challenge the constitutionality of the Act. [3] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York voted for the bill but protested: “If the members of the Armed Services Committee can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot the entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the untouchables? Secrecy is the answer.” [4] Celler, like the majority of Congressmen, passed the CIA Act very much like the wealthy father viewed the birth of an illegitimate child, appropriate care would be taken to provide for the child, but there would be no official admission of patrimony and the responsibility that entails. The 1949 CIA Act comprised additions to those sections of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the creation of CIA. The 1949 CIA Act gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the creation of a ‘black budget’ as the following sections make clear: … any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations [emphasis added]. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred. [5] This section meant that funds could be transferred from the appropriations of other government departments earmarked for specific tasks, “without regard to any provisions of law”. For example, a Congressional appropriation earmarked for housing subsidies to low-income workers by Housing and Urban Development (HUD), could be legally transferred either to the CIA for covert intelligence activities or through the CIA to a DoD associated intelligence agency for a classified program. Thus HUD employees might find that their relevant housing programs were lacking the necessary funds for relief efforts even though Congress had appropriated these funds for this purpose. Any HUD official unfortunate enough as to enquire into the location of the missing funds would be deterred from pursuing the issue, and if these officials persisted, they could be summarily dismissed, and then exposed to a variety of CIA activities to silence them. [6] Despite its legal authority to transfer funds from other federal agencies regardless of what their Congressional appropriations were for, the conventional wisdom was that the major source of appropriations for the CIA came through the DoD. This is apparently what President Truman had in mind when he approved that the "operating funds for the organization [CIA] would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead of directly from Congress." [7] This funding arrangement ostensibly assured that the CIA would be subordinate to the Secretaries of Defense and State who would be in a better position to influence its covert activities. Four years after passage of the 1949 CIA Act, the following categories and sums in the relevant defense force appropriations apparently provided the bulk of the black budget funding of the CIA.

#### We solve the terminal impact – Yoshida and Dolman say that controlling space is the biggest internal link to heg

#### Current maneuverable microsats prove data is secure—default to specificity on the question of what is classified or not

Atkinson 2009 (Nancy, NASA/JPL Solar System Ambassador, Universe Today's Senior Editor, “More Top Secret in Space: Inspecting a Crippled Defense Satellite” http://www.universetoday.com/24037/more-top-secret-in-space-inspecting-a-crippled-defense-satellite/]

Two small, covert inspection satellites capable of maneuvering around in geosynchronous orbit are being used by the U.S. Defense Department to inspect a $400 million missile warning satellite that failed in 2008. This is the first time this type of operation has been done, demonstrating a new ability by the U.S. military. “There is not much we do in space any more that is really new, but this is really new,” said John Pike, who heads the military think tank GlobalSecurity.Org, in an article by Craig Covault in Spaceflightnow.com. Pike went on to say that although this operation is being used to obtain data on a failed U.S. spacecraft, such inspections of especially potential enemy spacecraft, is something the Pentagon has wanted to do since the start of the space age. And what implications would this type of spacecraft have for NASA’s ability to monitor and repair satellites and orbiting spacecraft in the future? The U.S. Air Force/Northrop Grumman Defense Support Program DSP 23 missile warning satellite was launched successfully in 2007, but failed shortly after in 2008. It was the first launch of the Delta 4-Heavy booster, which was recently used again to launch a military satellite on January 17, 2009. The satellites are about 40,230 km (25,000 miles) above the Earth. The Orbital Sciences and Lockheed Martin “Mitex” inspection spacecraft are part of a classified Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) technology development program. When they were launched in 2006, the project involved maneuvering around and inspecting each other in geosynchronous orbit. But no data is available to indicate whether the two spacecraft may have secretly paid visits to one or more non-U.S. spacecraft in the geosynchronous: everything about these spacecraft is classified. The small Mitex spacecraft are unusually small — only about 500 pounds each. Most all geosynchronous satellites are much larger. Officials from Union of Concerned Scientist’s Global Security Program. Said that the Chinese will complain about the operations to the international community in Geneva, Switzerland, as they are concerned about the implications of these satellites’ capabilities, but also about how the U.S. is always complaining about the need for transparency in Chinese space operations, but now the U.S. is conducting secret operations.

#### Hegemony is key to solve for trade and the economy

Zhang and Shi 2011 (Yuhan, is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin, independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

## Kritik

#### Our interpretation is that the aff should be able to weigh our advantages against specific instances of the link

#### 1. Key to fairness—erasing the 1AC makes debating impossible—even if our assumptions of framing prior to the round are arbitrary our impacts are a justification for why it deserves evaluation and specific comparison to the alt

#### 2. Clash—not having to answer our best offense, the 1AC, destroys the incentive for clash--biggest impact since it’s the only way pre-round research translates into in-round education

#### 3. Reciprocity—if they get to tie us to overarching structures they criticize we should be able to tie them to a coherent alternative that they must defend the implications of, including failure to address the aff’s scenarios

#### “ State and securitization “ is good – absent the plan Chinese aggression and global instability are inevitable – guarantees conflicts around the world that escalate to nuclear use

#### Causal chains in the 1AC verify our truth claims – assumptions about the world are validated by the results of our research and analysis – our form of knowledge does not produce value claims it is the result of validated value claims\*\*\*

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38

Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39

Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### Permutation do the plan – and not worship the state it solves all their offense

#### Perm: Only calling on the state can solve the impact to their criticism – Individual behavioral choices are shaped by the institutions around them

Korten, Visting Prof at Harvard Business, 2000—David, visiting professor at Harvard Graduate School of Business, Creating a Post-Corporate World]

Korten 2k—(David, visiting professor at Harvard Graduate School of Business, Creating a Post-Corporate World Institutional Evil )

The corporation is more than a collection of people. Though our institutions are ultimately all human creations and in fact have no real existence outside of our minds, they have enormous power to shape our collective behavior in ways that no one may actually intend. Indeed, they can take on a character and purpose wholly independent of the values and purpose of any individual. As Matthew Fox observes in his book Sins of the Spirit, Blessings of the Flesh, “Institutions can exhibit an unbridled desire, a greed that can actually swallow up the earth and its health and the future of its children and that knows no national, ethical, or legal boundaries.” In short, institutions have a capacity for evil. From time to time, those of us who have enjoyed comfortable and sheltered middle-class lives are jolted by stories of the human capacity for extreme violence against life—for extreme evil—even against one's fellow humans. In our own time the mere mention of the Holocaust, Kosovo, or the ruthless massacres in Uganda and Cambodia evoke horrifying images and a sense of ultimate evil. Our tendency is to attribute these experiences to the madness of a depraved leader—a Hitler, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, or Slobodan Milosevic. Yet these horrors were not just isolated acts of a rogue individual, a crazed serial killer senselessly acting out some personal fantasy or vendetta. Nor can they be attributed simply to a momentary social breakdown expressed in mob violence. In many cases they are highly organized, in the example of the Nazi death camps even methodical, and enlist the enthusiastic participation of thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of people who in other settings might be models of civility. **Such cases lead to the recognition that violence, pathology, and evil can be afflictions of institutions** as well as of individuals and that institutions have the ability to act with evil intent beyond the intent of any of the individuals who act on their behalf as their agents. Institutions are collections of rules, rewards, and cultural beliefs that shape the behavior of their participants. They are an essential feature of any clan, tribe, or society that melds individuals into coherent social units with capacities for survival and creative achievement beyond those of their individual members. Institutions are by nature empowering, in that they extend the capacities of the individual, and at the same time coercive, in that they place constraints on the behavior of their participants. Healthy institutions, which are an essential foundation of healthy societies, curb our tendencies toward violence while nurturing and enhancing our capacities for love and creativity. Pathological institutions, on the other hand, are capable of evoking a form of collective madness of sufficient power to lead whole societies down the path of self-destruction. Perhaps the ultimate example is the global capitalist economy, which is indeed consuming the natural, human, social, and institutional capital of the planet—the foundation of all real wealth—in order to make more money for the already rich. A more profound example of institutional evil is difficult to imagine. To pick up on the theme of Andy Kimbrell’s lecture this morning, theirs is often a cold evil, based on the passionless calculations of global finance. If humanity is to steer a collective course toward a more hopeful future, we must recognize that we are dealing with inherently pathological or evil institutional forms. We must come to understand the sources of this pathology and set about eliminating those sources from society.

#### No prior questions—focus on critical theory makes it impossible to describe the world and act

David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,  Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is notwholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, itis not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### For the latest generation of Chinese military leadership, the United States is the enemy. Threat construction goes both ways.

Wines, China bureau chief for The New York Times, in 10

[Michael, “U.S. Alarmed by Harsh Tone of China’s Military”, New York Times, October 11]

The Pentagon is worried that its increasingly tense relationship with the Chinese military owes itself in part to the rising leaders of Commander Cao’s generation, who, much more than the country’s military elders, view theUnited States as the enemy. Older Chinese officers remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 set relations back, when American and Chinese forces made common cause against the Soviet Union. The younger officers have known only an anti-American ideology, which casts the United States as bent on thwarting China’s rise. “All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of China’s military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. “And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.”

#### And, a world without political enmity becomes a terrifying system without an exterior. Enemies will reappear in the form of internalized struggles that are put down with constant police action and inevitable biopolitical violence.

Prozorov in 6 /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/

[Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed. Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the 3: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world

#### The aff slves the impact to the Kritik

#### Our Engagement in Scenarism Overcomes the Trap of Threat Construction

**Liotta and Somes 03P.H., Jerome E. Levy Cahir, Economic Geography and National Security, Naval War College Timothy E., Professor Emeritus, “The Art of Perceiving Scenarios and the Future,” NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 56 n. 4, Autumn 20,** [**http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm**](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/cy1-a03.htm).

Finally, the scenarios we are talking about are not the limited threat-based planning scenarios common in defense planning. Threat-based scenarios,generally based on assessments of current or postulated threats or enemy capabilities,determine only the amount and types of force needed to defeat an adversary.(Similarly, capabilities-based planning seeks to avoid the perceived limits of threat-derived scenarios.)6In contrast, the scenarios we want to consider should look well beyond current evaluations of threats. If future military force capabilities are derived from the kind of scenarios we are discussing, they must encompass the full range of possibilities, with a commensurate weighing of benefits, costs, and risks. Accomplishing this is a difficult but essential challenge, if decision makers are to come to any informed, perceptive conclusions for the future.In Wack’s words, “Scenarios serve two purposes. The first is protective—anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurial—discovering strategic options of which one was previously unaware.”7 Often, and probably naturally, decision makers prefer the illusion of certainty to understanding risk and realities. But the scenario “builder” and analyst should strive to shatter the decision maker’s confidence in his or her ability to look ahead with certainty at the future. Scenarios should allow a decision maker to say, “I am prepared for whatever happens,” because we have thought through complex choices with a knowledgeable sense of risk and reward.8

#### The alternative links to the kritik – institutions still exist in the alternative

#### Fear over extinction is a rational fear that incites action – prevents inevitable catastrophe and solves paralysis

Wink, Professor Emeritus of Biblical Interpretation at Auburn Theological Seminary, ‘1 (Walter, October 17, “Apocalypse Now?” Christian Century, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_28_118/ai_79514992>)

Positive apocalyptic, by contrast, calls on our every power to avert what seems inevitable. "Nothing can save us that is possible," the poet W. H. Auden intoned over the madness of the nuclear crisis; "we who must die demand a miracle." And the miracle we got came about because people like the physician Helen Caldicott refused to accept nuclear annihilation. But she did it by forcing her hearers to visualize the consequences of their inaction. Imagination, says Anders, is the sole organ capable of conveying a truth so overwhelming that we cannot take it in. Hence the bizarre imagery that always accompanies apocalyptic. Optimists want to believe that reason will save us. They want to prevent us from becoming really afraid. The anti-apocalyptist, on the contrary, insists that it is our capacity to fear which is too small and which does not correspond to the magnitude of the present danger. Therefore, says Anders, the anti-apocalyptist attempts to increase our capacity to fear. "Don't fear fear, have the courage to be frightened, and to frighten others too. Frighten thy neighbor as thyself." This is no ordinary fear, however; it is a fearless fear, since it dares at last to face the real magnitude of the danger. And it is a loving fear, since it embraces fear in order to save the generations to come. That is why everything the anti-apocalyptist says is said in order not to become true.If we do not stubbornly keep in mind how probable the disaster is and if we do not act accordingly, we will not be able to prevent the warnings from becoming true. There is nothing more frightening than to be right. And if some amongst you, paralyzed by the gloomy likelihood of the catastrophe, should already have lost their courage, they, too, still have the chance to prove their love of man by heeding the cynical maxim: "Let's go on working as though we had the right to hope. Our despair is none of our business."

#### Embrace compassion because it’s difficult and fraught with risk

**Frazer 6**

The Review of Politics (2006), 68: 49-78 Cambridge University Press

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Assistant professor – HARVARD

There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but wealso risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination,that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement.

By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet, or psychologist—the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life,

and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche's protagonist warns againstthose who unduly oppose compassionas well as those who unduly celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of human flourishing.

#### And, the alt fails - Rejection of action or doing nothing corrupts their criticism

Solomon, Quincy Lee Centennial Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, ’90 (Robert, “Nietzsche as Postmodernist” p 291-292)

It has too long been fashionable to dismiss Nietzsche for his hyperbole and crypto-fascists remarks, but now Nietzsche seems to be subjected to an equally devastating mode of dismissal which turns him into a mere metaphilosopher and ignores the very "dangerous" substantial issues he raises for (against) us. Indeed, the jargon of postmodernism is even used to deny the existence of "substantial issues"—easy enough in the ethereal comfort of the seminar room but not even plausible while reading the newspaper. It ignores Nietzsche's insis­tence on the need for ideals and the need to take a stand. Indeed, it defends the importance of not taking a stand. What troubled Europe for so much of this century and awakened so many bright undergrad­uates was not Nietzsche's metaphilosophy but his uninhibited accusa­tions and invitations to a boldness in thinking about our lives that had all but disappeared from philosophy. I would like to think that this is what postmodern philosophy is all about—moving beyong the for­mulaic and overly technical academic dogmatism of the recent past to personal involvement and a pluralism that is concerned with how a particular philosophy contributes to a particular life rather than how a jargonized essay fits into the latest professional fashion. There is currently a widespread suspicion that much of postmodernism is an excuse not to believe in anything, to avoid both personal and political involvement and take refuge in apathy, despair, or mere ambition. But it seems to me that Nietzsche stood for a postmodernism that involved far more. I am reminded of a statement that Peter Schjeldahl made some years ago, commenting on the artist Mark Rothko as a precursor of postmodernism: "He was too early to know that believing in something is always risky; we have the edge on him." So, too, one forms the impression, reading so many postmodern authors and commen­tators, that anything can be said, without responsibility, without any risk at all. But the Nietzschean conclusion to be drawn from that postmodern observation should not be retreat; it invites engagement. Postmodernism is nothing but an unusally hysterical reaction to the quickening historical process of evolution and change. It is, in that sense, the very opposite of that attitude of amor fati, which Nietzsche opposed to ressentiment and tried so hard to make his own. In this bold sense, amor fati is not resignation but the willingness to throw ourselves into our projects and into history. But this willingness seems to me to be the dominant urge of modernism, not postmodernism, and if Nietzsche is a postmodernist in this sense, he resembles Marx far more than he does Derrida (though the aims of the revolution are obviously quite opposed). There are many Nietzsches, and only one of them is the Nietzsche who anticipated the worst features of modern European history. I find it disturbing that this Nietzsche is today being resurrected and celebrated as "postmodern."

#### Their own ethics demands an evaluation of bodily harm

**Nussbaum 94**

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We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of "external goods" in the good human life. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is no philosopher in the modern Western tradition who is more emphatic than Nietzsche is about the central importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures. Again and again he charges Christian and Platonist moralities withmaking a false separation between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw the conclusion that is naturally suggested by his position: that human beings need worldly goods in order to function. In all of Nietzsche's rather abstract and romantic praise of solitude and asceticism, we find no grasp of the simple truth that a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks shelter, basic health care, and the basic necessities of life, is not likely to become a great philosopher or artist, no matter what her innate equipment. The solitude Nietzsche describes is comfortable bourgeois solitude, whatever its pains and loneli- ness. Who are his ascetic philosophers? "Heraclitus, Plato. Descartes, Spi- noza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer"—none a poor person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive. And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions, he does not understand what the democratic and socialist movements of his day were all about. The pro-pity tradition, from Homer on, understood that one functions badly if one is hungry, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of one's faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern development of democratic-socialist thinking. Since Nietzsche does not get the basic idea, he docs not see what socialism is trying to do. Since he probably never saw or knew an acutely hungry person, or a person performing hard physical labor, he never asked how human self-command is affected by such forms of life. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live front day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the "higher men" doing all the day long? The reader docs not know and the author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsche's life contained and the sort we find if we examine the lives of truly impov- erished and hungry people. We might say. simplifying things a bit, that there are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might call bourgeois vulnerabil- ity—for example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains that are painful enough but still compatible with thinking and doing philosophy—and what we might call basic vulnerability, which is a deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired or not developed. Nietzsche, focuv ing on the first son of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.\*® The second sort. I claim, he simply ne- glects—believing, apparently, that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.5"