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## Off

#### Obama winning- best models predict- prefer it to polls

Nate Silver, 9-18-2012 <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/sept-17-electoral-college-may-not-help-obama/>

The FiveThirtyEight presidential forecast for Monday was essentially unchanged, with President Obama having a 74.8 percent chance of winning another term. Taken on the whole, Monday’s data was consistent with the current “story” the forecast model is telling about the race, which is that Mr. Obama’s polls have declined slightly from their post-convention highs, but are also still slightly better than his preconvention polls. If you look hard enough, of course, you can find polls where Mr. Obama’s convention bounce has evaporated completely — or others in which it hasn’t declined at all. But the forecast model, whatever its strengths or weaknesses, is pretty good at determining what the consensus of the data says at any given time.

#### Independent voters are key to the election- new spending kills support for Obama causing them to vote republican

Douglas Schoen, pollster for President Clinton, 2-8-2012, The Forgotten Swing Voter, Politico, p. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=7ED8592F-2122-4A55-AA3B-C5460134BE4A>

Neither party focuses on issues that matter most to people: reviving the economy, promoting job creation, balancing the budget, reducing debt and taking on entitlements. Both Republicans and Democrats are virtually ignoring the concerns of swing voters, now close to 20 percent of the electorate, and independents, now at least 40 percent of the electorate and, according to Gallup, the single largest voting bloc.¶ These two groups share similar interests. And both give Republican and Democratic leaders net negative ratings.¶ Independents disapprove of how Obama is doing his job, 52 percent to 37 percent, according to a recent New York Times/CBS poll. Just 31 percent had a favorable opinion of Obama, with two-thirds saying he has not made progress fixing the economy. Six in 10 independents say Obama does not share their priorities for the country.¶ The president’s improved standing in the recent Washington Post poll has probably been overstated and has more to do with Romney’s weakness than with some dramatic turnaround in Obama’s own numbers. A majority of independents still disapprove of his job performance and a clear majority of the electorate disapproves of his handling of the economy, his performance in creating jobs and his efforts to balance the budget.¶ Independents have similar negative impressions of leading GOP presidential candidates Romney and Gingrich, according to a recent Washington Post poll. Independents look unfavorably on Romney, 51 percent to 23 percent, and have an unfavorable impression of Gingrich, 53 percent to 23 percent.¶ Another ominous sign for Romney, still the presumed nominee, is that voter turnout decreased about 15 percent in Florida’s primary from four years ago, and almost 40 percent of the voters said they were not satisfied with the current field.¶ It’s crucial the GOP candidates address these voter concerns. A recent national survey I conducted sheds light on who the swing voters are and what they want from government — which meshes closely with the independents’ policy preferences.¶ I isolated swing voters by looking at those voters who supported Bill Clinton in an imaginary trial heat against Romney but didn’t support Obama in a trial heat against Romney. This came to 15 percent of the electorate.¶ In a two-way race for president between Clinton and Romney, an overwhelming majority prefers Clinton, 60 percent to 24 percent. Meanwhile, between Obama and Romney, voters split almost evenly — with Obama at 45 percent and Romney at 43 percent.¶ A detailed assessment of swing voters shows that they are not liberal Democrats. Over three-quarters (76 percent) are moderates or conservatives, and close to two-thirds (65 percent) are Republicans or independents. Slightly less than half (49 percent) are Southerners.¶ This data underscore the voters’ desire for politicians who advocate for bipartisanship and coalition-building in a polarized country. The substantial degree of support for Clinton versus Romney shows that the more bipartisan, centrist and fiscally conservative the appeal, the broader the support.¶ A Third Way survey conducted after the midterms supports my findings. Sixty percent of voters who supported Obama in 2008, but voted Republican in 2010, feel that Obama is too liberal. About 66 percent say that Obama and the Democrats in Congress tried to have government do too much.¶ A USA Today/Gallup Poll released late last year also shows that the electorate believes Obama is too far left ideologically. Americans were asked to rate their own ideology as well as that of the major presidential candidates on a 5-point scale. Most rated themselves at 3.3 (slightly right of center), and Obama at 2.3 (left of center) — further away than all other major presidential candidates. A majority of Americans, 57 percent, see Obama as liberal, while only 23 percent see him as moderate.¶ Indeed, recent polling shows that independents want to rein in the size and scope of government. Gallup reports that 64 percent of independents say Big Government is the biggest threat to the country. Which may be one reason for Santorum’s growing support. Three-quarters are dissatisfied with the size and power of the federal government, while just 24 percent are satisfied.¶ Other polling shows that these voters want policies that emphasize economic growth and budget reduction. In the wake of the crippling economic downturn, 82 percent believe it is extremely or very important to expand the economy, according to recent Gallup polling. Seventy percent say the federal budget deficit should be cut by a combination of spending cuts and modest tax increases — with many polls showing these voters feel spending cuts are key.¶ Independents do not support more government spending. My polling last year shows independents believe government should refrain from spending money to stimulate the economy, given the large deficit we face, 62 percent to 24 percent.¶ Independents, according to Gallup, are looking for government to expand the economy (82 percent), and promote equality of opportunity (69 percent). They are not looking for government to promote equality of outcome, since just 43 percent say they want to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. By 50 percent to 47 percent, they say the divide between the rich and the poor is an acceptable part of the economic system.¶ So it’s clear what these voters are looking for, and also that neither party is addressing their concerns. To be sure, independent voters want conciliation and compromise. Some are more conservative and market-oriented. Others are ready to accept government stimulus spending for our economic recovery. But all share the desire for economic growth, job creation and a path to fiscal stability.¶ The two parties cannot continue to ignore swing voters. Without them, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to win in November. Moreover, to win without addressing their concerns will almost certainly promise four more years of the same gridlock.

#### Vote could still shift – recent Obama clip about redistribution proves

Adler, 9/19 – Blogger at the Nation

(Ben, the Nation, “Conservative Media Try to Save Romney's Campaign,” <http://www.thenation.com/blogs/ben-adler>, 9/19./2012)

Mitt Romney sure is lucky that major media outlets exist to serve his interests. After a video came out on Monday afternoon in which Romney denigrates the nearly half the country that did not pay federal income taxes last year as irresponsible and entitled, it seemed he was in quite a political pickle. The comments were unlikely to endear him to swing voters who perceive Romney as an out-of-touch elitist. But since Romney got the idea that 47 percent of the country are lazy Democratic moochers from movement conservatives, he could not repudiate his own remarks. At first, Fox News had no idea how to respond. They simply ignored the story, even as it dominated coverage on other networks, all through their primetime lineup on Monday. Finally, when Romney gave a press conference after 10 pm, in which he admitted to having made poor word choices but not a substantive error, they showed it. On Tuesday, the Fox Business network hosted Romney for a softball interview with Neil Cavuto. Fox was determined to avoid covering the story except to help Romney burnish his self-defense. Alas, Romney himself did not have much of a defense, other than to say that he had simply been acknowledging that he will not win a landslide victory. But then, Providence struck. On Tuesday afternoon the Drudge Report released an audio recording from 1998 in which Barack Obama says, “I actually believe in redistribution.” Drudge splashed the phrase in a banner headline across his front page as if it were earth shattering news. Since then, according to Huffington Post media reporter Michael Calderone, Fox has played the audio clip twenty-two times. The Romney campaign immediately seized on the clip as a way of shifting their defense of Romney’s unappealing rhetoric into more friendly terrain. Speaking to Cavuto, Romney said: There is a tape that just came out today where the president is saying he likes redistribution. I disagree. I think a society based upon a government-centered nation where government plays a larger and larger role, redistributes money, that’s the wrong course for America…. The right course for America is to create growth, create wealth, not to redistribute wealth. Romney’s campaign sent out the quote as part of a press release. They followed up shortly with another press release that lists their usual litany of depressing economic indicators as proof that “Obama’s redistribution plan…didn’t work.” What is missing is any proof, besides a fourteen-year-old quote, that Obama actually pursued a redistribution plan once in office. By Wednesday, the Romney campaign had regained its footing. Reporters were being inundated with statements using the redistribution quote as a hook for all their usual talking points. For example, they released a statement headlined, “Obama’s Redistribution Didn’t Work For Small Businesses.” “Mitt Romney understands that opportunity and free enterprise create jobs and grow our nation’s small businesses—not government redistribution,” said Romney campaign spokesperson Andrea Saul. The campaign also worked the phrase into their stump speeches. Paul Ryan told a Virginia audience that, Obama is “going to try and distract and divide this country to win by default.” Then he asserted: President Obama said that he believes in redistribution. Mitt Romney and I are not running to redistribute the wealth. Mitt Romney and I are running to help Americans create wealth. Efforts that promote hard work and personal responsibility over government dependency are what have made this economy the envy of the world. As Slates Dave Weigel points out, it is ridiculous to blame Obama for distracting and dividing the country, and then attack Obama for something he said fourteen years ago. Conservative pundits, though, are cheering on the Romney/Ryan campaign’s silliness. After Romney’s appearance on Cavuto, Fox panelist and Weekly Standard writer Stephen Hayes said of the attack on Obama’s quote, “[It’s] good, [he should] make the argument. Going back to 1998 shows the president has believed this for a long time.” That’s a specious argument. If you go back to 1998 and look at anything Mitt Romney said, it may be diametrically opposed to what he believes today. Generally, the older the quote, the less relevant it is. Certainly that’s the standard Hayes would use if it were Romney who long ago said something Hayes considers damaging.

#### Obama key to global climate change – only way to solve

Leber 12 - Think Progress research assistant

(Rebecca, Think Progress, “Report: Future of Global Climate Deal Dependent On 2012 Election,” <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/01/05/398600/report-future-of-global-climate-deal-dependent-on-2012-election/>, 1/5/2012)

World leaders struck a deal last month during the Durban United Nations conference that sets a path to a global climate deal by 2015 — a precarious agreement including major developing countries like China and India. However, a report by the research branch of the HSBC bank predicts a deal would be trashed if President Obama is not reelected. With climate denial and opposition to emissions limits rampant in the GOP field, HSBC finds a global deal would be “almost impossible” if a Republican wins the White House: [The] prospects for a new global climate deal in 2015 depend considerably on the election of a pro-climate action president. The election of a President opposed to climate action will not only damage growth prospects for low-carbon solutions in the USA itself, but will make the hard task of negotiating a new global agreement by 2015 almost impossible. If Obama is re-elected with support in both houses, we expect modest measures to introduce a federal clean energy standard for electricity; a stripped down cap and trade programme could re-emerge building on the regional scheme on the West and East coasts. Though some GOP contenders haven’t always positioned themselves as climate zombies, everyone from Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich, to Jon Huntsman have doubted climate change science leading up to the primaries. Frontrunner Romney opposes carbon emissions limits and a cap and trade program, despite having supported pollution limits as Massachussets governor. Of course, the future of energy policy also hinges on political developments worldwide. The report also notes that elections worldwide, particularly France, will be an “important test of the resilience of pro-nuclear policies” in a post-Fukushima world.

#### Warming is the only existential threat – causes extinction

Deibel, 7 - professor of IR at National War College

(Terry, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2, 2007)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to get the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

## Off

**Transportation infrastructure is facilities – that’s distinct from vehicles**

**Rietveld 94** – professor in transport economics at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, and a fellow at the Tinbergen Institute (Piet, Spatial Economic Impacts of Transport Infrastructure Supply, 7/94, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice Volume 28, Issue 4, Pages 329–341)//EM

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As a definition for transport infrastructure we use those **immovable** capital goods for transport which are characterized by a considerable degree of economies of scale so that it is usually supplied as a collective input into production. As a consequence, the government has a high degree of control on the level of supply, price, and/or quality. Transport infrastructure includes facilities such as railway lines, railway stations, highways, canals, seaports, and airports. As indicated in Table l, transport infrastructure investments have both temporary and nontemporary effects on the economy. A major temporary effect concerns the stimulation of employment and income during the construction phase via the demand side.

**Vehicles are distinct from transportation infrastructure**

**CFST 06** – Campaign for Sensible Transportation, collection of organizations for better transportation in the Santa Cruz area (“Aboard Transportation”, 2006, http://www.cfst.org/transportation.html)//RD

Transportation or transport is the carrying of people and goods from one destination to another. The term comes from the Latin trans meaning “across” and *portare* meaning “to carry”. **Transportation can be divided into three distinct fields**:

1. **Infrastructure -** When we refer to infrastructure it includes **our transport networks such as roads, railways, airways, canals, and pipeline**. This also includes the terminals or nodes such as **airports, railway stations, bus stations, and seaports.**

2. **Vehicle – These comprises of the vehicles that we regularly ride in the networks** for instance automobiles (buses, cars, taxis, and etc.), trains and airplanes.

3. Operations – They are the control of the whole transport system including traffic lights/signals on roads, ramp meters, railroad switches, air traffic control, and etc.

**Violation – they’re vehicles**

**CFDA No Date** – Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, provides a full listing of all Federal programs available to State and local governments (“Federal Ship Financing Guarantees”, no date given, https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=068c899a15935e2d7198406c2852dca2)

Federal Ship Financing Guarantees

Title XI

Number: 20.802

Agency: Department of Transportation

Office: Maritime Administration (MARAD)

PROGRAM INFORMATION

Authorization (040):

Federal Credit Reform Act, 46 U.S.C 537.

Objectives (050):

To provide competitive financing through the issuance of guarantees of debt issued for the purpose of financing or refinancing the construction, reconstruction or reconditioning of vessels built in United States shipyards and guarantee obligations for advanced shipbuilding technology and modern shipbuilding technology of a general shipyard facility located in the United States to stimulate commercial ship construction for domestic and export sales, encourage shipyard modernization, and support increased productivity.

**That’s a voting issue**

**There’s an unlimited number of vehicles that the aff could build – that prevents the neg from adequately preparing for each aff**

**Kills neg ground – they’d just say other vehicles non-unique our disads**

## Off

#### The 1AC’s enframing of strategic and technical reason reifies an ontology and epistemology of violence—their technological worldview reduces all beings to standing-reserve and guarantees extinction

Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being.

#### The judge should take on the role of the intellectual – vote negative to exchange the ontology of being for one of becoming—this free relationship to technology entails a questioning that can break free from technological thought and re-imagine the world from outside the political space

Burke 7—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

## Off

#### The United States federal government should provide an investment in the United States Maritime Administration Title XI Loan guarantee funding for short sea transportation exclusively to areas in which private actors guarantee at least one-third of the funding upfront for a minimum of twenty years. In negotiating these partnerships, the United States federal government should open infrastructure plans to modification, including the possible transfer of project ownership to private actors. The United States federal government should make all necessary regulatory changes to encourage greater public-private partnerships in short sea transportation, and provide necessary technical assistance for implementation.

#### This solves

Puentes, 8/23/10 - Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute (Robert, “New Partnerships for Accelerating Infrastructure Investments,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes>)

So as Congress continues to develop its plans for the reauthorization of the nation’s surface transportation law it should support metro areas that raise their own revenue for the long term. Though a new partnership, the federal government should provide incentives to metropolitan areas that secure long-term and substantial regional funding sources approved for a minimum of 20 years and that equal a significant (one-third to one-half) portion of the annual federal transportation funding received. As to the incentives, a possible menu of options might include: more direct funding to metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), more flexible “mode neutral funding,” more streamlined planning processes, more direct reporting to federal agencies, and reduced bureaucracy.[[7]](http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/08/23-los-angeles-puentes" \l "note7)

#### The net benefit is infrastructure accountability

#### Public investment is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates aff benefits and causes massive cost overruns, and means better projects lose out

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This situation may need some explication, because it may sound to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be agreed that project managers and other professionals involved in major infrastructure provision ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in their work. It is even stated in the Project Management Institute (PMI)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006, pp. 4, 5) that project managers should ‘provide accurate information in a timely manner’ and they must ‘not engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others’. Economists, engineers, planners, and others involved in major infrastructure provision have similar codes of conduct. But there is a dark side to their work, which is remarkably underexplored in the literature (Flyvbjerg, 1996).¶ On the dark side, project managers and planners ‘lie with numbers’. as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. They are busy not with getting forecasts and business cases right and following the PMI Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for a project. ‘The most effective planner,’ says Wachs (1989, p. 477), ‘is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientiﬁc or technical rationality.’ Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to PMI’s ruling that project managers should ‘make decisions and take actions based on the best interests of society’ (PMI, 2006, p. 2).¶ Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate beneﬁts have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difﬁcult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002).¶ In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances that would give managers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a focus on transparency and accountability is necessary.¶ As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability deﬁne liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with signiﬁcant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.

#### Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case

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In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project-approval stage to present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with beneﬁts emphasized and costs and risks de-emphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local ofﬁcials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to beneﬁt from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of beneﬁts, costs, and risks. National bodies, such as certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003) and UK Department for Transport (2006). Wachs (1986, 1990) found similar results for transit planning in the USA. Taken together, the UK and US studies both account well for existing data on cost underestimation and beneﬁt overestimation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organizational pressure the underestimation of costs and overestimation of beneﬁts is caused by non-intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to secure approval and funding for their projects: underestimated costs + overestimated beneﬁts = funding Using this formula, and thus ‘showing the project at its best’ as one interviewee said above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e the survival of the unﬁttest. It is not the best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and beneﬁt overestimates, other things being equal. But the larger the cost underestimate on paper, the greater the cost overrun in practice. And the larger the overestimate of beneﬁts, the greater the beneﬁt shortfall. Therefore the projects that have been made to look best on paper in this manner become the worst, or unﬁttest, projects in reality, in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, and risks of non-viability. They have been designed like that, as disasters waiting to happen.

#### The counterplan solves by doing less than the plan – the only projects that will be built are those that can secure private sector capital. This increases accountability in infrastructure design and reduces overall costs

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In order to achieve accountability via competition and market control, the following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced by the relevant institutions. The decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the willingness of private ﬁnanciers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one-third of the total capital needs. 7 This should be required whether projects pass the market test or not—that is, whether projects are subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private lenders, shareholders, and stock-market analysts would produce their own forecasts or conduct due diligence for existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be added pressure to produce realistic forecasts and reduced risk to the taxpayer. Forecasters and their organizations must share ﬁnancial responsibility for covering cost overruns and beneﬁt shortfalls resulting from misrepresentation and bias in forecasting. The participation of risk capital would not mean that government reduces control of major infrastructure projects. On the contrary, it means that government can more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely as the ordinary citizen’s guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, environment, risk, and a proper use of public funds. Whether infrastructure projects are public, private, or public–private, they should be vested in one and only one project organization with a strong governance framework and strong contract-writing skills. The project organization may be a company or not, public or private, or a mixture. What is important is that this organization has the capacity to (i) set up and negotiate contracts that will effectively safeguard its interests, including in equity risk allocation, and (ii) enforce accountability vis-a-vis ` contractors, operators, etc. In turn, the directors of the organization must be held accountable for any cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, faulty designs, unmitigated risks, etc. that may occur during project planning, implementation, and operations. Experience with contract writing is a much-neglected topic, but is particularly important in developing and managing major infrastructure projects. This is because a fundamental asymmetry in experience with and resources allocated to contract writing often applies in the client– contractor relationship for such projects. Clients who decide to do major infrastructure—for instance, a city council deciding to build a new subway or toll road—do so relatively rarely, often only once, or never, in the lifetime of the individual city manager and council member. Learning is therefore impaired for clients, and if you do not know what your interests are, it is difﬁcult to safeguard them. Contractors, on the other hand, who bid for and build such projects, do so all the time. Contractors, therefore, typically know much more than clients about the ins and outs of projects and contracts, including the many risks and pitfalls that apply, plus which lawyers, bankers, and consultants to hire to safeguard their interests most effectively. This asymmetry has brought many a client to grief. A possible way to bring more symmetry into the client–contractor relationship would be for government to establish a central contract-writing unit at the state or national level, which would be in charge of negotiating, on behalf of local and other branches of government, the types of major contracts they do too infrequently to gain real experience. This would concentrate a larger number of contracts in one place, allowing experience—and the negotiating power that comes with it—to accumulate. Fortunately, better governance along the lines described above has recently become stronger around the world. The Enron scandal and its successors have triggered new legislation and a war on corporate deception that is spilling over into government with the same objective: to curb ﬁnancial waste and promote good governance. Although progress is slow, good governance is gaining a foothold also in major infrastructure project management. For example, in 2003 the Treasury of the United Kingdom required, for the ﬁrst time, that all ministries develop and implement procedures for major projects that will curb what the Treasury calls—with true British civility—’optimism bias’. Funding will be unavailable for projects that do not take into account this bias, and methods have been developed for how to do this (HM Treasury, 2003; Flyvbjerg and COWI, 2004; UK Department for Transport, 2006). In the Netherlands in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Infrastructure Projects for the ﬁrst time conducted extensive public hearings to identify measures that will limit the misinformation about large infrastructure projects given to the Parliament, public, and media (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004). In Boston, the government has sued to recoup funds from contractor overcharges for the Big Dig related to cost overruns. More countries and cities are likely to follow the lead of the UK, the Netherlands, and Boston in coming years; Switzerland and Denmark are already doing so (Swiss Association of Road and Transportation Experts, 2006; Danish Ministry for Transport and Energy, 2006, 2008). Moreover, with private ﬁnance in major infrastructure projects on the rise over the past 15–20 years, capital funds and banks are increasingly gaining a say in the project development and management process. Private capital is no panacea for the ills in major infrastructure project management, to be sure (Hodge and Greve, 2009). But private investors place their own funds at risk, as opposed to governments who place the taxpayer’s money at risk. Capital funds and banks can therefore be observed not to automatically accept at face value the forecasts of project managers and promoters. Banks typically bring in their own advisers to do independent forecasts, due diligence, and risk assessments, which is an important step in the right direction. The false assumption that one forecast or one business case (which is also a forecast) may contain the truth about a project is problematized. Instead project managers and promoters are getting used to the healthy fact that different stakeholders have different forecasts and that forecasts are not only products of objective science and engineering but of negotiation. Why is this more healthy? Because it is more truthful about our ability to predict the future and about the risks involved. If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infrastructures continued to implement, embed, and enforce such measures of accountability effectively, then the misrepresentation in cost, beneﬁt, and risk estimates, which is widespread today, might be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to continue, and the allocation of funds for major infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful, unethical, and sometimes even unlawful.

## Off

**Upholding life as inherently valuable forces us into ontological slavery – instead we should embrace the liberation of sacrifice**

**Baudrillard 02** (Jean, “The Spirit of Terrorism: Hypotheses on Terrorism”, pg. 68-70)[]

All the same, we should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect for human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in oneself, something other than, and more than, life (existence isn’t everything, it is even the least of things): a destiny, a cause, a form of pride or of sacrifice. There are symbolic stakes which far exceed existence and freedom - which we find it unbearable to lose, because we have made them the fetishistic values of a universal humanist order. So we cannot imagine a terrorist act committed with entire autonomy and ‘freedom of conscience’. Now, choice in terms of symbolic obligations is sometimes profoundly mysterious - as in the case of Romand, the man with the double life, who murdered his whole family, not for fear of being unmasked, but for fear of inflicting on them the profound disappointment of discovering his deception. 3 Committing suicide would not have expunged the crime from the record; he would merely have passed the shame off on to the others. Where is the courage, where the cowardice? The question of freedom, one’s own or that of others, no longer poses itself in terms of moral consciousness, and a higher freedom must allow us to dispose of it to the point of abusing or sacrificing it. Omar Khayyam: ‘Rather one freeman bind with chains of love than set a thousand prisoned captives free.’ Seen in that light, this is almost an overturning of the dialectic of domination, a paradoxical inversion of the master-slave relationship. In the past, the master was the one who was exposed to death, and could gamble with it. The slave was the one deprived of death and destiny, the one doomed to survival and labour. How do things stand today? We, the powerful, sheltered now from death and overprotected on all sides, occupy exactly the position of the slave; whereas those whose deaths are at their own disposal, and who do not have survival as their exclusive aim, are the ones who today symbolically occupy the position of master.

**Attempts to prevent suffering miss the boat – instead we should embrace it and give it meaning, only then will suffering cease to be suffering, but sacrifice** **– any attempt to avoid suffering fails to acknowledge its necessary role.**

**Wrisley, 10** George Wrisley, Professor @ University of Iowa, “Nietzsche and Suffering—a Choice of Attitudes and Ideals,” <http://georgewrisley.com/Nietzsche%20and%20Suffering--A%20Choice%20of%20Attitudes%20and%20Ideals.pdf> Accessed 7/7/12 BJM

II Suffering as a Constituent of Life

“To live is to suffer”: this is only contentious if we thereby mean that to live is only to suffer. If we say that suffering pervades life, that need not mean that there are no pleasures in life. Even still, is it true that for every individual, life will involve suffering? Other than those who are born and die a quick, painless death shortly thereafter, the answer is surely going to be yes. However, before we rightfully answer whether life automatically means suffering, we should say what is meant by suffering. If we look at suffering as a genus, we can say that psychological suffering and physical suffering are its species. It is easy to think of examples of both kinds. Under mental suffering we find depression, anxiety, fear, unsatisfied desires (perhaps even desire itself before it is satisfied), loneliness, loss, anguish, grief, separation, lamentation, distress, dissatisfaction, rejection, failure, hopelessness, stress, boredom, ennui, angst, weltschmerz, existential malaise, and so on. While all of the above admit to degrees, one could argue that any degree of any of them constitutes suffering. Physical suffering presents more of a variety of clear and unclear cases of suffering due to degrees. There is pain—really the paradigm of physical suffering —in its various degrees (passing a kidney stone to a mild, dull, almost unnoticed ache), hunger, which can range from mild discomfort to actual pain, itching in its various degrees (most of one’s body covered in a rash to the itch one offhandedly scratches), degrees of being too hot or too cold, being tickled until one cannot stand it, and so on. One becomes acquainted with more kinds of suffering the longer one lives. But even a very young sheltered child has experienced many of the above kinds of suffering. At the very least, any child will experience hunger and unsatisfied desires; in all likelihood, however, a child will experience much more suffering. When we consider the full range of possible human suffering, it is hard to deny that to live is to suffer, as long as we do not mean that to live is only to suffer. However, it is not so clear that we can say that to live is to experience joy. For it seems quite clear from my experience, and that related to me by others, that it is far easier to suffer than to find joy, peace, or happiness. III An Important Complication to Suffering In section II, I listed many kinds of psychological and physical suffering; to those kinds of suffering we can add another: the suffering we experience due to our suffering. In its simplest form this might just be the lamentation of not being able to walk around as one would because of the pain from a sprained ankle. Such complications and additional suffering are important; however, a more pressing problem is the way we feel when we cannot find a purpose or meaning for our suffering. Nietzsche writes that man’s problem, “was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I suffer?’…The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far—” Lack of such meaning creates a suffocating void, opening the door to suicidal nihilism. In Man’s Search For Meaning, Viktor E. Frankl writes, “In some way, suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning, such as the meaning of a sacrifice….That is why man is even ready to suffer, on the condition, to be sure, that his suffering has a meaning.” So, in addressing what our attitude toward suffering should be, we need to take into consideration the problem of meaning for our suffering. As we will see, Nietzsche thinks that until he arrived the ascetic ideal was the only means whereby suffering could be given meaning. As Leiter does, I will argue that Nietzsche provides an alternative to the ascetic ideal. What the ascetic ideal and its Nietzschean alternative are will be the focus of our inquiry into what our attitude toward suffering should be. IV What Should Our Attitude Toward Suffering Be? How should we comport ourselves to the suffering we find in our lives? When touching a hot stove or confronted with danger, our natural reactions are to pull back, to flee, to find safety. In general it seems that we naturally shy away from discomfort and pain—suffering of all types. The child laments his boring afternoon and the adult fears the impending death of a parent and the subsequent anguish the loss will bring, hoping and wishing they will never come. Suffering, it seems, is quite rightly seen as undesirable. However: When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear. So, should we seek to abolish suffering as far as we can by removing its cause, or should we attempt to change our attitude toward suffering such that it is no longer seen as (always) undesirable? Taking Nietzsche seriously when he says that it is the meaning of our suffering that has been the problem, I will attempt to indirectly answer this question by looking at two possibilities found in Nietzsche for giving meaning to our suffering. The first possibility concerns a religious ethic that, according to Nietzsche, views suffering as undesirable, but which ultimately uses mendacious and deleterious means to provide a meaning for human suffering. The second possibility concerns the extent to which we can say Nietzsche endorsed the idea of giving meaning to suffering through acknowledging its necessary role in human enhancement and greatness. Since the religious ethic sees suffering as undesirable and thus something ultimately to be avoided (being itself the paradigmatic means for easing suffering), and the means it uses to give suffering meaning are ultimately mendacious, I will argue that if Nietzsche is significantly correct in both his attack on religious morality and his alternative ideal, we can take this as evidence that the avoidance of suffering is not the proper attitude. Unfortunately, I will not be able to address the question of whether Nietzsche is significantly correct in this paper. Secondly, given Nietzsche’s positive alternative—one that embraces the necessary role suffering has for the enhancement of human life—I will argue that we can take this as evidence that it is our attitude toward suffering that needs to be modified, i.e., we should modify so that we no longer see suffering as something to be avoided. Because of this, the middle position of avoiding suffering when possible and then seeing its positive attributes when it does occur does not recommend itself. That is, since it will be argued that suffering has a positive and necessary role to play, to seek to avoid it as far as possible and then to acknowledge its positive aspects when it does occur, is not really to acknowledge and accept suffering’s positive and necessary role. However, as we will see, all of this is complicated by the issue of the order of rank as found in Nietzsche’s writings.

## Economy

**War with Russia is not an existential threat**

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Extinction risks constitute an especially severe subset of what could go badly wrong for humanity. **There are** many possible **global catastrophes that would** cause immense worldwide damage, maybe even the collapse of modern civilization, yet **fall short of terminating the human species. An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States** might be an example of a global catastrophe that **would be unlikely to result in extinction.** A terrible pandemic with high virulence and 100% mortality rate among infected individuals might be another example: if some groups of humans could successfully quarantine themselves before being exposed, human extinction could be avoided even if, say, 95% or more of the world's population succumbed. What distinguishes extinction and other existential catastrophes is that a comeback is impossible. **A non-existential disaster** causing the breakdown of global civilization **is**, from the perspective of humanity as a whole, **a** potentially **recoverable setback**: a giant massacre for man, a small misstep for mankind.

**Increasing US competitiveness can’t solve hegemony – it can’t rebuild our edge**

**Pape.09** Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago [Robert A. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago specializing in international security affairs. “Empire Falls” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/empire-falls-2952> Jan/Feb 2009. The National Interest]

And of courseAmerica needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard's Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America's environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America's new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive.To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. **There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon.** Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment **in the economy,** trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma**. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The** UnitedStatesis **not just** declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments. Since 2000, a systemic change has been occurring in the economic foundations of America's relative power, and it may fall even further in the foreseeable future. None of the dramatic consequences for U.S. grand strategy is likely to be immediate, but neither are those effects easily avoidable. For nearly two decades, the United States has experienced tremendous latitude in how it chooses to conduct itself in the world. But that latitude is now shrinking, and American policy makers must face facts. With the right grand strategy, however, America can mitigate the consequences of its relative decline, and possibly even reverse it.

#### There’s no correlation between hegemony and stability

**Fettweis, ’10**

**[Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, 52:2, 59-82, March 25th 2010,** [**http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603**](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603)**]**

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that **world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.**

**Econ collapse doesn’t cause war**

**Bazzi and Blattman 11**

Samuel Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher Blattman (assistant professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November 2011 “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices” <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet **we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues**. **Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly** 22 **lower the risk and length of conflict.** Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 **Our main political economy models may need a new engine.** Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. **Moreover, other** time-varying **variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes** (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). **Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously**. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—**Ultimately**, however, the fact that commodity **price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets**, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that **political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed**. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. **If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock**. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, **these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on** commodity **shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability.** Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that **a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these.** Most worryingly, **almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks**. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, **the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones**.20

**US would detect and stop Iran before they even finished mining the strait**

**O’Neil 09, former official in Office of SecDef,**

Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz William D. O’Neil International Security, Volume 33, Number 3, Winter 2008/09, pp. 190-198 William D. O’Neil is an author and consultant who formerly served as an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as a naval officer, as well as a defense industry engineering and analysis executive.

the geographic situation and mining In figure 1, the 25-meter depth contours (the line between the clear and vertically hatched regions) mark the approximate limits of feasible navigation for large tankers.2 They are separated by nearly 30 nautical miles in the throat of the strait and fan out slowly for a considerable distance to the west into the Persian Gulf. To the southeast, the Gulf of Oman broadens out rapidly, and water too deep for effective mining is reached quickly. Thus **the region** from the strait proper **west**ward **in**to **the Persian Gulf presents problems** distinctly different from those in the Gulf of Oman. Specific **shipping lanes are laid out in** parts of **this region, but there are other waters deep enough to permit passage of large ships if necessary.** Talmadge posits **a closure scenario involving minefields to deny transit, with antiship missiles in overwatch.** She gives Iran considerable capacity to lay the necessary fields and to sustain a missile threat. In both respects, she **exaggerates** the seriousness of **the threat Iran can pose.** The analogies Talmadge employs to analyze the mining issues have little relevance to this case. The Dardanelles, Wonsan, and Iranian cases she cites were all defensive fields, in waters under the control of the state that laid the fields and not subject to observation by would-be intruders. The Dardanelles case, nearly a century ago, and the Wonsan case, more than fifty years ago, involved dense fields in narrow waters. **The Iranians would be attempting to lay** offensive **fields in** broad **waters not under their control,** and moreover presumably **under constant active surveillance by U.S. forces.** Talmadge has the Iranians **attempting to close a strait** more than **25** nautical **miles wide** with fewer than 1,000 mines laid by submarines and surface craft. She does not provide a precise timeline, but given that **at least eight separate sorties would be required** of just two submarines, **it could not take less than a week. Iran’s** Kilo-class **submarines** stand about 25 meters high from the keel to the top of the sail. To **operate** submerged in these waters, they must pass under the keels of numerous tankers but stay clear of the bottom. Even given extremely skillful depth- keeping by highly trained and well-practiced crews, this is **only** possible **in waters at least 60 meters deep** (as the cross-hatching in agure 1 shows**). Surface craft would** have to **lay all** of the **other mines.** Most critically, the vertically hatched region lying south of the deeper water and closer to Arab than to Iranian shores would have to be sown from the surface. **How long would nearby U.S. forces remain unaware of the significance of this activity?** In Talmadge’s scenario the mine laying occurs at night, but **darkness would provide little shielding against modern surveillance systems.** The surface craft may be observed by radar or infrared systems day or night. Even if the **submarines** managed to lay their mines covertly, their **frequent trips** back to their base at Bandar Abbas to reload **would** very likely **be noticed**. In effect, Talmadge’s scenario assumes that either the U.S. forces are especially negligent or the Iranians are phenomenally lucky. Otherwise **the conflict could start before Iranian preparations had been completed, with important areas** yet **unmined**.

**Straits of Hormuz is too big to close AND alternate routes check disruptions**

**Ghoiz 09, associate prof @ UT-Austin**

Copyright Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Sep/Oct 2009 Why Iran can't cut off your oil. By Eugene Ghoiz Foreign Policy

Supertankers carry about 90 percent of Persian Gulf oil «(ports through the Strait of Hormuz each day, satisfying some 20 percent of worldwide demand. For maximum safety, the International Maritime Organization suggests that the huge, difficult-to-maneuver ships travel within a designated channel while in the strait, but that channel is only a few miles wide. With such a narrow passage, many experts fear that an attacker (read: the Iranian military) could "close the strait." The Iranians appreciate the concern: Explicit threats to the strait are a key component of their foreign policy. Alternate routes could only carry a fraction of the oil, so a disruption could cause a major price spike that would severely threaten the global economy. But the **conventional wisdom may be wrong** Regardless of how we assess the credibility of Iran's threats, we should also assess Iran's capabilities. **Iran**ian military exercises apparently **emphasize** three weapons in the strait: small **suicide boats,** mobile **antiship cruise missiles, and** sophisticated **sea mines**. Using these tools, **how hard would it be for Iran to disrupt the flow of oil?** **The answer** turns out to be: **very hard. Iran would have to disable many of the 20 tankers that traverse the strait each day - and then sustain the effort. Iran cannot rely on the psychological effects of a few hits**. Historically, after a short panic, commercial shippers adapt rather than give up lucrative trips, even against much more effective blockades than Iran could muster today. **Shippers didn't stop trying during World War I. Nor did the oil trade in the Gulf seize up during the 1980s Tanker War**, when both Iraq and Iran targeted oil exports. **Instead, tankers** tend to **move around dangers. The strait is deep enough that even laden supertankers can pass safely through a 20-mile width of good water, not just the 4-mile-wide official channel. Tankers already take other routes when it is convenient; during a conflict, they would** surely **scatter**, as they did in the 1980s. Although **the strait** is narrow compared with the open ocean, it **is** still **broad enough to complicate Iran's effort to identify targets for suicide and missile attacks. The area is too large to cover with a field of modern mines dense enough to disable a substantial number of tankers, especially given Iran's limited stockpile.**

**Declining oil dependence crushes the entire Russian economy**

**Dashevsky 11 Managing Director of Dashevsky and Partners (Steven, “The Russian Economy and Its Oil,” May 24,** <http://rt.com/business/news/russia-economy-oil-rpice/>**,)**

RT: **High oil prices have helped Russia’s budget** but is the country too dependent on energy exports? SD: “Well the dependence has declined greatly in recent years, but I think t**he sad truth remains that, to a very significant degree, Russia’s budget revenues and** overall fiscal health **is still** very dependent **on the level of oil prices**.” RT: How does the energy sector shape the Russian investment climate? SD: “Well, there are many ways how the events happening in **the oil and gas sector influence what is happening in the broader economy**. On the one hand **this is the** biggest source of cash **flow generation in the country**, so in a sense it’s the biggest source of investment funds, both for the companies, and for the government and also because oil companies invest very significant amounts of money every year, so **the ability of Russian oil companies to spend money affects really** the entire Russian economy – from transport companies to oil service companies to catering companies to local airlines – so it is still, despite the significant efforts to diversify the economy, it’s a very important source of investment funds.That’s kind of one angle, and another angle is what is happening in the Russian oil and gas sector, **since it is the biggest sector in the economy, affects the general investment climate**, from the kind of sentiment perspective.So, **when something good happens like potentially was going to happen**, BP-Rosneft deal, or if there are good events happening, **new fields are being developed, new pipelines are being brought on-stream, that gives investor additional confidence that the economy is progressing very well, and people are investing money in it, and** the whole country is open for business. **Vice versa, if things are not going well**, if deals are breaking up, if instead of going to work people going to courts against each other, **that clearly creates a big drag on the investors sentiment for** all of the Russian economy**, not just oil and gas**.”

**Russian economic collapse causes accidental nuclear war**

**FORDEN 2001** (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis, May 3)

Because of that need, Russia’s continuing economic difficulties pose a clear and increasing danger to itself, the world at large, and the United States in particular. Russia no longer has the working fleet of early-warning satellites that reassured its leaders that they were not under attack during the most recent false alert—in 1995 when a scientific research rocket, launched from Norway was, for a short time, mistaken for a U.S. nuclear launch. With decaying satellites, the possibility exists that, if a false alert occurs again, Russia might launch its nuclear-tipped missiles.

**That causes extinction and global disease spread**

**FORROW ET AL 98** (Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis, et al, Author Affiliation: From the Division of Gencral Medicine and Primary Care, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School, (L.F.); the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (B.G.B.); Physicians for Social Responsibility, (I.H.); Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (G.L., TP); the Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Montefiore Medical Center and Albert Einstein College of Medicine, (VS.); Barry S. Levy Associates and Tufts University School of Medicine, (B.S.L.); the Department of Radiology and the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, (H.A.); and Mount Sinai School of Medicine; New England Journal of Medicine, April 30)

A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense.31 We have chosen to analyze a scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-missile submarine, for two reasons. First, the safeguards against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.27,32,33 Delta-IV submarines carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea.34,ss These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military installations.36 Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16 missiles failed to reach their destinations because of malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume that the targets have been selected according to standard military priorities: industrial, financial, and transportation sites and other components of the infrastructure that are essential for supporting or recovering from war. Since lowaltitude bursts are required to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks, concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground facilities, most if not all detonations will cause substantial early fallout. Physical Effects Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are determined primarily by the area of the "superfires" that would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city. Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter, coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds and average air temperatures above the boiling point of water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching 100 percent.3' For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly 100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles), the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles), which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used Census CD to calculate the residential population within these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for areas where circles from different warheads overlapped.38 In many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the casualties, would be much higher. Fallout The cloud of radioactive dust produced by lowaltitude bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable, because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour (15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles) long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600 rad within six hours.39 With radioactive contamination of food and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely.40 Deaths Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas, with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile, it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms. Medical Care in the Aftermath Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources.1-5,41 Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied).42 The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived.41 FROM DANGER TO PREVENTION Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

**the strait is too wide to be obstructed**

**Eisenstadt 2006**

[www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil)

Senior Fellow Director Sec’ty Studies Washingotn Institute Near East Policy

*Staying the hand on the world’s oil jugular*. **Iran's conventional offensive options are limited. It does not pose a ground threat** to any of its neighbors, **due to** the **small size and limited capabilities** of its ground forces, although it could launch limited air, or rocket and missile strikes into neighboring countries (as it did in Iraq on several occasions during the past decade). The main conventional threat from Iran is in the naval arena, specifically: the threat it poses to the flow of oil from the region, and the ability of the United States to project power in the Gulf. **Iran’s force of mines, missiles, small boats, and submarines**, could temporarily disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz**. It could not**, however, **block the strait (as it claims), which is too wide and too deep to be obstructed.** Moreover, although **the Gulf is a significant barrier to major acts of aggression** against the southern Gulf states, Iran could conduct limited amphibious operations to seize and hold lightly defended islands or offshore oil platforms in the Gulf. Its naval special forces could sabotage harbor facilities, offshore oil platforms and terminals, and attack ships while in ports throughout the lower Gulf, disrupting oil production and maritime traffic there.

## Shipbuilding Industry

**No deterrence impact**

**Marvin, 11** [Taylor, Prospect Journal of International Affairs UCSD, CUTTING US DEFENSE SPENDING IS NOT A THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY, <http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/index.php/2011/09/cutting-us-defense-spending-is-not-a-threat-to-american-security/>]

However, **US** military **spending** far exceeds the level necessary to deter foreign aggression, even against peripheral US interests. Some of this excess is justified: if America wishes to fight long foreign wars and lead international humanitarian military interventions the Pentagon budget must support these missions. Despite this, American defense spending is ultimately vastly disproportionate to its core requirements. The US Navy is a good example of this excess. **America** **currently fields eleven aircraft carriers**. **Russia possesses one**, a Cold War relic vastly less capable than its American counterparts. **Despite Chinese naval ambitions** **in the** western **Pacific**, **China has struggled to refit an abandoned Soviet carrier,** the ex-Varyag, **for combat**, and the introduction of modern indigenous Chinese carriers is likely decades off. It is not unreasonable to suppose that America’s deterrence value would not be diminished if budget cuts forced the Navy to reduce the US carrier fleet. **While a reduction in the number of US carrier battle groups would significantly reduce the number of theaters the US could exert military control over at any given time,** this would likely not make US military threats less credib**le**; **that is**, **China would not be marginally more likely to invade Taiwan if** **the US fielded only seven six billion dollar supercarriers**. **Because the capabilities of all US military branches are so far beyond the minimum necessary to maintain** **an effective deterrence even if the US government dramatically reduced the defense budget America’s overall security and** ability to project power on a global scale would remain far in excess of any potential rivals.

**They obviously don’t solve, ships are over budget, we don’t have money for, and we need to increase the Naval budget which is getting cut and they don’t do that – their evidence is all in the context of giving the Navy more money, new infrastructure doesn’t give us the money needed**

**Naval budget cuts external to fleet size extirpate naval readiness and prove no threshold exists for their deterrence impact**

**Eaglen, 12** [Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow at AEI, Obama's Shift-to-Asia Budget Is a Hollow Shell Game

<http://defense.aol.com/2012/03/15/crafty-pentagon-budget-showcases-marquis-programs-while-masking/>

**Pentagon plans now retire seven cruisers and two dock landing ships** **at the same time as the Navy is revising downward its 30-year shipbuilding plan.** Military leaders have been quick to point to the ten ships planned for construction over the next fiscal year. The problem is that this figure, as it appeared in the FY 2012 budget, was supposed to be thirteen, not 10. In fact, in the 2012 budget, the Navy requested 57 ships from 2013-2017. The new 2013 budget cuts this to 41 ships. It's hard to see how these dramatic cuts in fleet size fit into the administration's pivot to Asia. **Naval research and development do not fare much better.** While the Navy is to be commended on a getting some research initiatives right -- such as breaking out a new account for Future Naval Capabilities focusing on advanced research and prototypes, increasing funding for the Littoral Combat Ship, and increasing funding for the Marine Corps' Assault Vehicles -- **many of the Navy's RDT&E decisions do not appropriately resource the rhetorical emphasis on the Pacific.** **The budget slices the Power Projection Applied Research account by nearly 15%, affecting programs like precision strike and directed energy weapons**. Similarly, **Force Protection Applied Research dropped by 27%, cutting innovation in anti-submarine warfare and hull assurance**. **A 28% cut in Electromagnetic Systems Applied** **Research affects initiatives such as electronic attack**, **surface-based anti-cruise and ballistic missile defenses**, and the Surface Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP, which uses electronic warfare to disarm incoming missiles. Other R&D cuts impact separate initiatives on anti-submarine warfare, undersea weapons, cyber security, electronic warfare, sensing, SATCOM vulnerabilities, missile defense countermeasures, S and X-band radar integration, and radar defenses against electronic attack. These programs form important parts of the Navy's next-generation arsenal, especially when it comes to the Pentagon's evolving AirSea Battle concept. **They are exactly the type of programs the Pentagon should be protecting if it is serious about emphasizing the unique challenges of the Asia-Pacific.** The fact that R&D money declined for these particular Navy programs is a disturbing sign for the overall coherence of the administration's budget. While the Navy received a $4 billion increase in O&M funding from 2012, it could not come soon enough. **The Navy has been stretched past the breaking point in terms of operational readiness, with nearly one quarter of its ships failing their annual inspection in 2011 and cracks in the aluminum superstructure of every cruiser in the Navy's inventory. The naval readiness crisis was so bad in 2011 that Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy told the** **House** Armed Services **Committee that, "we're not good to go**." Increased O&M funding for the Navy helps, but more needs to be done in order to [fix the fleet](http://blog.american.com/2012/02/u-s-navy-readiness-continues-its-decline-amidst-the-pivot-to-asia/). It certainly does not help that the Navy is forced to pay nearly $900 million to retire ships early while the fleet size is already too small. **Various defense officials and military chiefs have testified recently that the services are sacrificing size of the force for either readiness or quality. Given the rapidly rising levels of risk associated with the latest defense budget cuts,** it is likely both readiness and quality will decline despite the Chiefs' best efforts**.**

**There are multiple reasons the aff can’t produce effective shipping**

**Perakis and Denisis 08** – Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, University of Michigan (Anastassios N. Perakis and Athanasios Denisis, “A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA”, Maritime Policy and Management, December 2008, <http://www.maritimeadvisors.com/pdf/Survey%20of%20SSS%20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf> | AK)

6. Obstacles hindering the implementation of SSS in the US Despite the wide acceptance of SSS among transportation stakeholders as an environmentally friendly alternative, **there are various administrative, legal, operational and financial obstacles that delay the expansion of short sea services**. These obstacles are: **1. Additional handling costs. SSS adds extra nodes or transhipment points in the transportation chain**. Instead of trucks carrying the cargo directly from origin to destination, **short sea vessels take over the longer haulage, and trucks make only the local pick-up and final delivery**. At the transfer points or intermodal terminals, **there are additional handling costs for the loading and unloading of the cargo**. **2. Image problem**. Traditionally**, SSS has the image of a slow, unreliable and obsolete mode of transportation**. Therefore, **shippers are currently reluctant of using this new mode**. Several surveys revealed that on-time reliability is the most important priority for shippers. Therefore, SSS should provide a high level of service in terms of on-time reliability, in order me is to alter that image by effectively promoting the advantages of SSS to the shippers and facilitating the c-operation among transportation modes. **3. Harbour Maintenance Tax** (HMT). **The HMT is assessed as a 0.015% ‘ad valorem’ fee on the value of the commercial cargo**, which is transported on vessels using the US ports. Therefore, **it is applied on both domestic and international containers that are been transported by vessels, but not on the cargo that is transported by trucks or rail**. **This is a major impediment to SSS, since it is applied on every transhipment point**. Many transportation industry stakeholders are calling on the waiver of HMT for the domestic SSS transportation. The recent repeal of the HMT in the Great Lakes is a major support for SSS. **4. Jones Act**. In the US, as elsewhere, **one of the major impediments to the development of coastal shipping is the restrictions of ‘cabotage’ laws**. Certain provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as Jones Act, **which requires that any vessel operating between two US ports must be US-built, US-owned, and manned by US citizens, significantly increases the capital and the operating costs for any short sea operation**. Thus, **it makes SSS more expensive and less competitive**. A study in 1993 suggested that **the net cost of the Jones Act to the US economy is $4.4 billion US per year** [47]. As the idea of SSS is gaining ground, the debate over the Jones Act has been reignited. Defenders of the Jones Act claim that it is way to revitalize the domestic shipbuilding industry, by providing financial incentives for shipowners to build in the US. Shipyard owners claim that they can be competitive for smaller standardized vessel designs with a shipbuilding program for a series of ships to be constructed over the next 15–20 years. On the other hand, **shipowners argue that they can purchase SSS vessels from the international ship market for a fraction of what they cost in the US**.

**Too many deficits to solvency**

**Hilburn, 6** – Associate Editor at Seapower Magazine, Navy League of the United States (Matt Hilburn, “Resurgence”, Navy League of the United States, May 2006, ProQuest | AK)

**Though the business climate seems set for a short-sea shipping boom, there are many barriers to those entering the market**. **Costs are a concern**. Armstrong said one way to lower costs is to keep short-sea shipping away from the deepwater, international ports, which historically have very high labor costs. Smaller ports that are less deeply dredged and do not have the overhead and union contracts scaled toward international cargo. These ports, he said, should be made to look more like a truck terminal "so it's a quick roll-on, roll-off, get the trucks out of there. No warehousing, none of those kind of things, no complicated customs or fancy gates." Armstrong said that during the next four to five years, Massachusetts would be investing $35 million-$40 million to upgrade ports at New Bedford and Fall River, a small chunk of the $300 million the state is authorized to spend on maintaining and upgrading ports. "Now is that totally for short sea? No," he said. "There are other things going on, but it is a commitment to make these terminals available and efficient for what we believe is going to happen no matter what. There's just no more room on the highways." **Financing is also an issue. Shortsea ships could cost $25 million-$150 million, and raising that kind of capital is no easy feat.** According to Mark Yonge, managing member of the consulting firm Maritime Transport & Logistics Advisors, Fort Lauderdale, FIa., **Title XI loans, which provide small- and medium-sized ship owners with a federal guarantee of their commercial bank loans for the construction of commercial ships in the United States, are currently not readily available via the Maritime Administration**. **The Harbor Maintenance Act is another factor discouraging shortsea shipping. Effectively, it means that a ship making stops at, for example, several East Coast ports, would be taxed at each port visited**. **The problem**, said U.S. Rep. Dave Weldon R-Fla., **is that ships on short-sea routes are "subject to the Harbor Maintenance Tax each and every time" they stop as they service ports along the costs. This precludes many vessels "from going to many American ports in a sequential fashion**," he said in a release. Weldon is sponsoring legislation that would eliminate the tax for short-route ships but not affect larger, ocean-going vessels. Some **advocates of short-sea shipping claim the Jones Act is an obstacle to success. The law requires that all vessels being used to transport cargo and passengers between ports in the United States be owned and manned by U.S. citizens and built at U.S. shipyards. However, few ships meet those criteria**. Armstrong doesn't foresee any changes to the Jones Act, and thinks that short-sea shipping, once proven viable, will be a spark to American shipbuilding. However, he favors federal waivers to the Jones Act as a means to "get the services under way and tested" before shipping companies commit to the construction of new ships. **There are also technological hurdles to overcome. If short-sea shipping is to be viable, ship designers will have to develop more rapid means for loading and unloading ships, said Suva. Vacuum mooring systems, which allow a ship to moor quickly utilizing large vacuum pads resembling suction cups, would eliminate the need for lines and line handlers, increasing the speed at which a ship could dock, and get underway**. Sil**va would also like to see ships equipped with bow and stern thrusters, which allow ships to maneuver more easily while docking, reducing dependency on tugs for assistance**.