# Transportation Infrastructure

## T Military

**We meet – public means provided by the government**

**OED 12** (Oxford English Dictionary, “public,” http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american\_english/public?q=go+public#public\_\_11, mrs)

Of or provided by the government rather than an independent, commercial company

**We meet – ITV is transportation infrastructure**

**TRANSCOM 11** (August 18, US Transportation Command, “Defense Transportation Regulation Part VII: Human Remains Movement,” http://www.transcom.mil/dtr/part-vii/dtr\_part\_vii\_toc.pdf, mrs)

The Defense Transportation System is that portion of the worldwide transportation infrastructure that supports Department of Defense (DOD) transportation needs in peace and war. The Defense Transportation System consists of two major elements: military (organic) and commercial resources. These resources include aircraft, assets, services, and systems organic to, contracted for, or controlled by the Department of Defense. The Defense Transportation System infrastructure, including ports, airlift, sealift, railway, highway, intransit visibility, information management systems, customs, and traffic management that the Department of Defense maintains and exercises in peacetime, is a vital element of the Department of Defense capability to project power worldwide. It provides for responsive force projection and a seamless transition between peacetime and wartime operations.

**We meet – we’re not only military – public companies use military ITV**

**Mongeon 11** – President and CEO of Defense and Government Services at Agility Logistics (Dan, Agility Logistics, “Total Asset Visibility,” http://www.agilitylogistics.com/EN/DGS/Pages/Agility\_DGSProducts\_TotalAssetVisibility.aspx, mrs)

Agility provides cutting-edge supply chain visibility with our customized MicroTransport application and Eagle Eye technology. MicroTransport facilitates total fleet and shipment management capacity throughout Agility’s transportation and supply chain solutions. MicroTransport can be powered by regional AVL (Automated Vehicle Locators) or global CSD (Container Security Devices) – both with GPS and GIS mapping – and tightly integrated with our Warehouse Management and Ordering Systems. MicroTransport monitors physical product flow and secures the supply chain while identifying even the smallest business process or supply chain deviations. As the only commercial company authorized to interface with the GTN (Global Transportation Network) and ITV (In-Transit Visibility) systems of the U.S. Army, we employ the latest and most trusted technology to track supply chains down to the details. For Agility, embracing innovation allows us to bring new facets of personal service, while ensuring your operation stays on route and on time.

MicroTransport: Dynamic Total Asset Visibility Tool for Global Supply Chains

MicroTransport is an intermodal Total Asset Visibility (TAV) tool that interfaces with SAS400 for warehouse management, MicroClear for customs clearance and select government systems through EDI messaging. The deployed system includes the intelligent Global Sentinel™ and a seamless back-end infrastructure providing data and graphical user interfaces.

**Counterinterpretation – transportation infrastructure is road, rail, terminals, harbors, airports, and control systems**

**Chamber of Commerce 10** (September 23, Let’s Rebuild America Series, “Transportation Performance Index – Summary Report,” http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/lra/files/LRA\_TPI%20\_Summary\_Report%20Final%20092110.pdf, mrs)

Step 1 – Definition: Transportation Infrastructure

It is important to establish a definition of transportation infrastructure in order to establish the scope of the index.

General Definition: Moving people and goods by air, water, road, and rail.

Technical Definition: The fixed facilities―roadway segments, railway tracks, public transportation terminals, harbors, and airports―flow entities―people, vehicles, container units, railroad cars―and control systems that permit people and goods to traverse geographical space in a timely, efficient manner for an intended purpose.

Note that pipeline infrastructure is not included in this definition. For purposes of the Infrastructure Performance Index it is considered an element of energy infrastructure.

**We meet that – ITV is a control system**

**DOD 10** (September 22, Department of Defense, “Afghanistan In-Transit Visibility Joint Task Force: Implementation Plan,” https://wss.apan.org/1600/Document%20Library/BAR%20Reference%20Documents/Theater%20Enterprise%20Mvmt%20Control%20System/Afghan\_ITV\_Implementation\_Plan\_FINAL\_10-07-10.pdf, mrs)

The ITV JTF evaluated ITV in Afghanistan under the broader context of movement control, which is the overarching umbrella of processes, procedures, and technology that ultimately enables ITV. The JTF relied heavily on the findings and recommendations of the Joint Surface Assessment Team (JSAT), a multiservice and agency team that was deployed to Afghanistan for more than 30 days, studying the movement control and ITV situation. The JSAT produced a detailed report that identified multiple problems that were negatively impacting ITV in the Combined Joint Operational Area–Afghanistan (CJOA-A). Based on that report and additional information obtained from personnel familiar with the CJOA-A situation, the JTF diagrammed the current as-is movement control and ITV processes in Afghanistan. This effort identified different processes and procedures for each type of movement; i.e., commercial trucks, military trucks, and military air. A total of 10 separate flow charts document the “as-is” processes.1 1 With those flow charts as a starting point, the JTF began identifying the gaps and obstacles in ITV capability and putting together recommendations for near-term improvement.

**Investment is defined as capital expenditure – that’s IER 4**

IER 4 (Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Ukraine, “How to Improve Public Investment Efficiency in Ukraine?”, February, http://www.osteuropa-institut.de/ext\_dateien/how%20to%20improve.pdf)

1. Definitions and recent trends

1.1. Definitions

Throughout the paper public investment is defined as capital expenditure financed out of the central or local budgets, in the Treasury definition. This comprises purchases of fixed assets including repairs and reconstruction, the creation of state reserves, purchases of land and intangibles, and capital transfers to enterprises, other levels of government, the population, or abroad. This differs from Derzhkomstat’s definition of public capital investment, also used in this paper.1

**So only upgrades are topical**

**Law Depot 8** (“Capital Expenditure”, 2-6, http://wiki.lawdepot.com/wiki/Capital\_Expenditure)

Definition of "Capital Expenditure"

Capital expenditure is money spent to acquire or upgrade (improve) long term assets such as property, buildings and machinery. Capital expenditure does not include the cost to merely repair such assets.

**They make no aff topical – infrastructure is all dual use**

**10 US Code § 2644** – ( 10 USC § 2644 - CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN TIME OF WAR, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2644)#SPS

In time of war, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, may take possession and assume control of all or part of any system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and equipment, or for other purposes related to the emergency. So far as necessary, he may use the system to the exclusion of other traffic.

**Military education is good – only way to shape military doctrine to prevent war**

**Hanson 2007** (Victor Davis Hanson, Professor of Classics at CSU Fullerton, “Why Study War?” City Journal, Summer)

It’s no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict’s outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject. This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever. I came to the study of warfare in an odd way, at the age of 24. Without ever taking a class in military history, I naively began writing about war for a Stanford classics dissertation that explored the effects of agricultural devastation in ancient Greece, especially the Spartan ravaging of the Athenian countryside during the Peloponnesian War. The topic fascinated me. Was the strategy effective? Why assume that ancient armies with primitive tools could easily burn society antithetical to serious thinking about war. Government, the military, business, religion, and the family had conspired, the new Rousseauians believed, to warp the naturally peace-loving individual. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. To assert that wars broke out because bad men, in fear or in pride, sought material advantage or status, or because good men had done too little to stop them, was now seen as antithetical to an enlightened understanding of human nature. “What difference does it make,” in the words of the much-quoted Mahatma Gandhi, “to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?” The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles. The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank’s 88mm cannon, for instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they same margin. General George S. Patton may have been uncouth, but he wasn’t wrong when he bellowed, “Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser.” The American public turned on the Iraq War not because of Cindy Sheehan or Michael Moore but because it felt that the battlefield news had turned uniformly bad and that the price in American lives and treasure for ensuring Iraqi reform was too dear. Finally, military history has the moral purpose of educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security. If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosun, the crosses in our military cemeteries are just pleasant white stones on lush green lawns. They no longer serve as reminders that thousands endured pain and hardship for our right to listen to what we wish on our iPods and to shop at Wal-Mart in safety—or that they expected future generations, links in this great chain of obligation, to do the same for those not yet born. The United States was born through war, reunited by war, and saved from destruction by war. No future generation, however comfortable and affluent, should escape that terrible knowledge. What, then, can we do to restore the study of war to its proper place in the life of the American mind? The challenge isn’t just to reform the graduate schools or the professoriate, though that would help. On a deeper level, we need to reexamine the larger forces that have devalued the very idea of military history—of war itself. We must abandon the naive faith that with enough money, education, or good intentions we can change the nature of mankind so that conflict, as if by fiat, becomes a thing of the past. In the end, the study of war reminds us that we will never be gods. We will always just be men, it tells us. Some men will always prefer war to peace; and other men, we who have learned from the past, have a moral obligation to stop them.