# Advantage Counterplans

## CP Agriculture

**Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in international agricultural programs and Collaborative Research Support Programs to $34 Million.**

**Expanding investment solves US agriculture exports and the impact**

**APLU, 2** – The Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, research and advocacy organization of public research universities, land-grant institutions, and state university systems with member campuses in all 50 states, U.S. territories and the District of Columbia. The association is governed by a Chair and a Board of Directors elected from the member universities and university systems. President Peter McPherson directs a staff of about 45 at the national office in Washington, D.C. (Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities, “International Development Agricultural Coordinating Committee” 3/31/2002, APLU, <http://www.aplu.org/page.aspx?pid=628)//GP>

Investment in global agriculture creates new markets for US exports: The US food sector accounts for approximately 16% of all employment. About 20% of food production is exported, accounting for between 3 and 4% of all US employment. Of all US food exports, over 50% go to lower income countries. Our private sector seeks new markets internationally. These new markets are increasingly located in countries making the transition to the "middle class" of nations. By stimulating development we create wealth that turns the poor into customers for US goods and technologies. We help ourselves by helping others. Goals: Increase funding for international agricultural programs and Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs) beyond the current level. CRSPs should be funded at $34 million. CRSPs are particularly important, as they directly partner universities with local institutions in the developing countries. They conduct pioneering research critical to international development and develop human capacity in developing countries. Human capacity is the fundamental creator of the knowledge, innovation, and technology that drives economic growth in the sector and speeds the transition to industrial growth.

## CP Okinawan Engagement

**CP text: The United States federal government should engage in public diplomacy with Japan that includes reviving efforts to revitalize Okinawa’s economy with foreign investment, educational aid and exchanges, and infrastructure improvements and implement programs to educate the public of Japan about the Alliance.**

**Engagement solves the root cause of the basing conflict**

**Kliman, political science Ph.D., 10**—Daniel, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Ph.D. from Princeton University, studied political science and economics, was a Japan Policy Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an Adjunct Research Associate with the Institute for Defense Analyses, AND Abraham Denmark, MA in International Security, History and Political Science at the University of Northern Colorado, and Denmark is a Fellow with the Center for a New American Security-directs the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Award for Excellence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (05/21/2010, http://www.cnas.org/node/4528, “WITH CLINTON IN JAPAN, A CHANCE TO SHOW THE ALLIANCE’S STRENGTH”, ZBurdette)

Washington can also do more to strengthen the foundations of the alliance, primarily via direct engagement of the people of Okinawa. It is time for the United States to revive long-dormant efforts to revitalize Okinawa’s economy with foreign investment, educational aid and exchanges, and infrastructure improvements. Okinawa is Japan’s poorest prefecture, and its resentment of its disproportional basing burden should not be a surprise. Further, a major public diplomacy effort in Okinawa – one that explains the purpose of US bases, listens to local concerns, and can be effective in addressing them – is in order. With a more robust and forthright engagement of Okinawa, the US can begin to address some of the local challenges that has made a basing agreement so difficult to conclude.

# Aff-Specific Counterplans

## CP Coast Guard Modernization

**Text: the United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in cost guard modernization and intelligence, early warning, domestic counterterrorism, and border and early action transportation security programs, and adopt a seabasing strategy for relevant naval operations.**

**Counterplan is way more useful than the aff**

**Carafano 5** (James Jay Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Homeland Security Dollars and Sense #2: Misplaced Maritime Priorities”, Heritage foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/02/homeland-security-dollars-and-sense-2-misplaced-maritime-priorities?renderforprint=1)

Appropriators must ensure that funding is directed toward programs that provide the greatest contribution to the most critical missions in homeland security. Getting the "biggest bang for the buck" is a worthwhile criterion to guide these spending decisions. Nowhere is this more important than in the area of maritime security. Maritime commerce is essential to America's economic vitality. Most goods that enter and leave our shores travel by sea. But this economic lifeline also offers terrorists vast opportunities to exploit or attack ships, ports, and waterways. Nowhere should the need for strategic spending be more apparent. Yet, nowhere is it more apparent that Congress has failed to target spending where it could provide the most security. Owners and operators of the nation's more than 350 ports have made shrill demands for increased federal grants in support of port security. Indeed, estimates for enhancing security at America's ports run into the billions of dollars. The Administration proposed limiting port grants in FY 2005 to $50 million. Lobbying efforts pushed for dramatic increases-as much as $400 million per year. In the end, Congress settled on tripling funding to $150 million. Is that a victory for enhancing maritime security? Not at all. The Administration was prudent to ask for more limited spending. The U.S. port infrastructure is so vast that providing resources for other than the most critical needs makes little sense. Spreading $150 million across the nation won't come close to plugging all the security gaps at ports. It is akin to locking the door in a house without windows. On the other hand, grant programs have proven far more effective when federal money has been used to fund vulnerability assessments and to encourage public-private partnerships that adopt sustainable and effective port-security programs. To address the considerable vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure, the greater

share of federal dollars might be more effectively used to invest in effective intelligence and early warning, domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security programs-efforts that would keep terrorists out of the ports to begin with. Congress should ensure that Coast Guard modernization is fully funded before it even thinks about dumping more federal dollars into port grants for state, local, and private sector projects that contribute marginally to the overall security of the maritime domain. The Administration and Congress should refrain from increasing port security grants in the FY 2006 budget

# Topic Generic Counterplans

## CP Privatization – Evacuation

**Text: The United States federal government should**

**- removes barriers to private involvement in disaster relief**

**- cease involvement in disaster relief operations**

**- provide access to relevant information to private companies**

**- offer tax incentives for companies willing to substantially increase evacuation transportation infrastructure in Louisiana.**

**The affirmative obviously didn’t learn their lesson from Katrina- the government fails but the private sector solves**

**Anderson 10** William L. Anderson associate professor of economics at Frostburg State University New Orleans: Victim of Government Neglect? Or just of government? Posted September 01, 2010

Five years ago Hurricane Katrina, a massive Category 3 storm, hit the Gulf Coast region, destroying property, killing nearly 2,000 people, and leaving damage that still dots the landscape. Although the brunt of the storm hit the Mississippi coast, Katrina is best-known for the flooding of New Orleans, which happened when levees created to keep out the floodwaters burst and drowned the city. The standard tale one still hears from the mainstream media is that the Bush administration, driven by racism and antigovernment, free-market sentiment, simply neglected New Orleans when Katrina hit and failed to send enough help. Recently, President Obama declared that the government has not forgotten the city and that federal help still is on the way. The “I’m from the government and I am here to help you” line supposedly was missing after Katrina, according to the pundits. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Paul Krugman declared: [T]he federal government’s lethal ineptitude wasn’t just a consequence of Mr. Bush’s personal inadequacy; it was a consequence of ideological hostility to the very idea of using government to serve the public good. For 25 years the right has been denigrating the public sector, telling us that government is always the problem, not the solution. Why should we be surprised that when we needed a government solution, it wasn’t forthcoming? Yet, as Daniel Rothschild pointed out two years later in an article in Reason, the Gulf Coast, including New Orleans, did not suffer from government neglect. Instead, it suffered from government involvement — or better put, interference — in the daily affairs of people trying to clean up the mess and rebuild. He wrote: The most effective solutions are being found locally, mostly in spite of government efforts, not because of them. The real problem, as economists Sanford Ikeda and Peter Gordon suggest, is not that political leaders aren’t doing enough, it’s that they’re doing too much, and doing it poorly. There’s too much centralized control preventing people from finding the solutions that best fit their own communities. John Stossel wrote in a similar vein: When Hurricane Katrina struck, private citizens wanted to help, but often the government got in the way. The doctors who wanted to heal people in New Orleans, but were told to fill out tax forms instead, experienced just one of many horror tales. Government seemed to have declared a monopoly on helping people — but then its insane bureaucracy made certain it did a lousy job helping. Because New Orleans was tagged for special government help, that also meant that any clearance or rebuilding had to be approved by officials, which meant waiting days for bureaucrats to sign the appropriate forms. The deadening effect of such red tape cannot be underestimated. As Rothschild noted: The commonly held notion that post-Katrina recovery effort has been hampered by a lack of leadership is true only if “leadership” refers only to political leadership. There, there’s not only a lack of leadership, but a stifling bureaucracy that’s smothering real progress. Across the Gulf Coast, there are real people taking real risks, trying to buck the obstacles thrown in their way, and many are seeing real results. Governments at all levels have spent billions of dollars on New Orleans, yet the city still lags. The stories of government bungling and outright interference with common sense are abundant and contrast dramatically with private efforts. Governments also slapped down price controls, which slowed economic adjustment, which in turn meant a slower recovery. One can only wonder what might have happened had the federal government spent no money at all. We never will know, but I suspect that the Crescent City very well might have been much better off. A few months after the disaster economist Richard Ebeling predicted that government efforts to rebuild New Orleans would be disastrous and that it would be better to let the free market work.

**The funding for the aff is coercively obtained -- the government uses its strength to force citizens to finance projects**

**Rothbard, 2**—dean of the Austrian School of economics (Murray N., “The Nature of the State”, excerpted from The Ethics of Liberty ch. 22-25, 2002, http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard160.html)//EM=

. In particular, the State has arrogated to itself a compulsory monopoly over police and military services, the provision of law, judicial decision-making, the mint and the power to create money, unused land ("the public domain"), streets and highways, rivers and coastal waters, and the means of delivering mail. Control of land and transportation has long been an excellent method of assuring overall control of a society; in many countries, highways began as a means of allowing the government to move its troops conveniently throughout its subject country. Control of the money supply is a way to assure the State an easy and rapid revenue, and the State makes sure that no private competitors are allowed to invade its self-arrogated monopoly of the power to counterfeit (i.e., create) new money. Monopoly of the postal service has long been a convenient method for the State to keep an eye on possibly unruly and subversive opposition to its rule. In most historical epochs, the State has also kept a tight control over religion, usually cementing a comfortable, mutually supportive alliance with an Established Church: with the State granting the priests power and wealth, and the Church in turn teaching the subject population their divinely proclaimed duty to obey Caesar. But now that religion has lost much of its persuasive power in society, the State is often willing to let religion alone, and to concentrate on similar if looser alliances with more secular intellectuals. In either case, the State relies on control of the levers of propaganda to persuade its subjects to obey or even exalt their rulers. But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State's control of the use of violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts – the locus of ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts. Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing and assuring all of the State's other powers, including the all-important power to extract its revenue by coercion. For there is one crucially important power inherent in the nature of the State apparatus. All other persons and groups in society (except for acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers) obtain their income voluntarily: either by selling goods and services to the consuming public, or by voluntary gift (e.g., membership in a club or association, bequest, or inheritance). Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming. That coercion is known as "taxation," although in less regularized epochs it was often known as "tribute." Taxation is theft, purely and simply, even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale which no acknowledged criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory seizure of the property of the State's inhabitants, or subjects. It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical reader to try to frame a definition of taxation which does not also include theft. Like the robber, the State demands money at the equivalent of gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay his assets are seized by force, and if he should resist such depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should continue to resist.

**D-rule**

**Petro 74**

[Sylvester, Professor of Law at NYU, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html]

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

**Knowledge is fragmented and the attempted to use the government only lead to the oversimplification of an unknowable body of information**

**Crowley, 1** (Brian, Montreal Economic Institute, Montreal Economic Institute Paper, “The Man Who Changed Everyone’s Life: The Ubiquitous Ideas of F. A. Hayek (Conclusion),” 4-16-2001, www.iedm.org/library/crowlerB\_en.html, JMP)

The synoptic delusion TO THE MODERN MIND, OF COURSE, HAYEK'S ATTACK ON SOCIAL SCIENCE MAY appear to be a kind of know-nothingism. After all, modern civilization clings to few prejudices more tenaciously than the belief that nothing is beyond the grasp of human understanding and control. And science and reason, through their many apparent marvels and miracles, have given us little reason to doubt their power. Perhaps ironically, Hayek's mission in life was to use reason to convince humanity of the limits of reason. He thought that, whatever our impressive information-gathering and processing tools, we are all unavoidably human and therefore subject to the weaknesses of the human condition. Heading the list of these weaknesses is our main instrument for understanding and interpreting our impressive scientific knowledge: the human mind. For all the wonders that the collective human mind has accomplished within the context of culture and society, the individual human mind remains a remarkably limited instrument. This was a subject of enduring fascination for Hayek, the early student of psychology, who in the 1950s wrote a seminal work in the field called The Sensory Order. Research demonstrates, for example, that each of us is capable of having an astonishingly limited number of ideas in our mind at any moment — ideas available to the disciplined imagination for reflection, juxtaposition, and manipulation. This "channel capacity," as it is known, is limited in the average person to between 5 and 10 ideas at a time and has changed little over the course of human civilization. It is humbling, but instructive, to compare this pitiful channel capacity with the quantity of information that exists about the social, economic, and physical world. Human knowledge is exploding at an unprecedented rate. In cutting edge fields, such as computer science, the total amount of knowledge doubles approximately every 18 to 24 months, while the whole body of human knowledge doubles every 15 years. Each of us is thus pushed to an ever greater degree of specialization in an ever narrower field. Put another way, our relative ignorance grows faster than we can ever hope to educate ourselves because our ability to acquire and reflect on information is relatively fixed, while our collective knowledge is expanding exponentially. Neither of the two coping strategies usually trotted out by aspiring planners can in fact overcome this disability. The first such strategy relies on technology: If we build impressive enough computers and cram them with comprehensive enough data, we can process the information artificially, bypassing the constraints of the human mind. Alas, they forget that computers know no more than the humans that program them, and that many of the pieces of information on which the economy depends are often not known by anybody at all or are inextricably linked to a particular place and time, or their importance is ill understood by humans, including those who program computers. Nor is the stock of knowledge itself a constant, as technical and other innovations — combined with changes in people's needs and preferences — regularly reshape the intellectual landscape of society and the economy. For example, a man in rural Nova Scotia had a little business making and selling highland paraphernalia, such as sporrans, daggers, and belt buckles. One day, his eye fell on a newspaper ad calling for tenders for the making of aircraft parts. He quickly realized that, with the equipment he possessed, he could easily make the parts described, and he submitted a bid. He is now successful in both lines of work. Note, however, that no planner sitting in Halifax or Ottawa would have included this man in their inventory of aircraft parts makers, because he did not know himself that he possessed this capacity. By the chance act of reading the ad, he learned something about himself, and transformed the tiny part of the economy of which he is the centre. The economy as a whole is composed of billions of such individuals whose true circumstances are never fully known to themselves, let alone to distant planners. The other strategy social planners trot out for overcoming their ignorance is to claim that they don't need to know the details, but only the grand outlines — that they can simplify complex social processes down to large statistical aggregates. But in the Hayekian view, this is the "synoptic delusion," like mistaking a two-dimensional map for the real three-dimensional world. Maps are useful for getting around or for seeing key data in relation to one another, but can accomplish this only by stripping the world of its messy complexity, and distorting its real shape to fit on a piece of paper. Because most people's idea of the Earth is shaped by maps based on Mercator's projection, they think Greenland is roughly the same size as South America, whereas in reality the southern continent is 11 times larger. Since people live in a complex reality, not crude pictures, those who try to plan the world on the basis of maps or statistical aggregates only end up sounding like they come from another planet, which, in a sense, they do. All our vast ability to satisfy human wants and needs is created by our knowledge of how to do things, but that knowledge is — and must be — widely dispersed and locked in the minds and experiences of billions of individuals. With minds so limited, and knowledge so vast, variegated, and incapable of comprehensive statement, we are condemned to growing specialization as individuals and, the corollary of that, to a growing dependence on others similarly specialized in their fields. Hayek's Viennese contemporary, and LSE colleague, the philosopher of science Karl Popper, put it this way: "Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite." AS HAYEK NEVER TIRED OF REMARKING, OUR INTERDEPENDENCE IS BOTH THE chief fact of economic life and the chief obstacle to successful social planning. If the knowledge on which individuals, corporations, governments, and societies depend is not only widely dispersed, but is necessarily so, how can this knowledge be called forth and put in the service of the people who need it? This casts economics in a new light, as the study of a massive coordination challenge.

**Faith in central planning is dangerous -- turns solvency, and makes nuclear war inevitable.**

**Rockwell, 3** (Llewellyn H. Jr., president of the Mises Institute, The Free Market, The Mises Institute Monthly, “The Hayek Moment,” May 2003, vol. 21, no.5, www.mises.org/freemarket\_detail.asp?control=439&sortorder=articledate, JMP)

The relevance of Hayek in our times extends beyond just business cycle analysis. In later years, Hayek turned his attention to other matters concerning the methods of science (he decried the "pretense of knowledge" affected by social scientists) and the uses of power in society. His Road to Serfdom warned that the regimentation of totalitarian societies can only come to Britain and the US through central planning. What is at stake, he wrote, is not just productive economies but freedom itself. In our time, that freedom is threatened by intervention in every aspect of economic life but also through the use of military power. Government not only claims it is smart enough to manage the economy, fix up our communities, run our schools, but also to decide which foreign politicians deserve to be protected and which deserve to be destroyed. The implicit assumption is always that government knows more and better than the rest of us, and that this knowledge is sufficient to give it rights the rest of us do not have. It is often said that knowledge is power. In the case of government, however, its power vastly exceeds its knowledge. When Alan Greenspan of the Fed (a branch of government in every important respect) testifies before Congress, legislators listen attentively to find out what he knows about the state of the economy, as if he has some privileged access to high-level data not reported elsewhere. It is further assumed that he knows precisely how to act on it. It is this knowledge that allows him to operate the gears and levers of the economy, so it is believed. The same assumptions are made about many aspects of government. Many people who have backed war with Iraq assume that the government must know something awful about Saddam that it cannot share with the general public. It's true, they admit, that Saddam does not have nuclear weapons and that there is not public information that suggests he is plotting the destruction of America as we know it. But surely the White House must know something we do not, and know what to do about it, else why would the administration be so intent on removing him from power? The belief that powerful people know more than the rest of us is a main source of their power. It's true only to this extent: powerful people are likely to know when they are telling the truth and when they are not. The rest of us are put in a position of having to guess or dig to verify their claims point by point. Experience teaches that politicians often lie. But there's an even more important point: because government activity takes place outside the framework of the market economy, government has no idea how to use the information it does have to achieve social good. Think of all the bits of information the government had been collecting to assess the likelihood of a terrorist incident. A few warnings among tens of thousands of tips did not suffice to prevent this destructive attack. The accumulation of information has grown steadily more voluminous. The government is in no better position to make judgments about it today than it was two years ago. In contrast, insurance companies are in the business of assessing risk all the time, and they do this by means of a system of profit and loss, which Mises demonstrated is essential to a rationally organized society. Government, on the other hand, just collects piles of data and is completely at a loss on how to assess the relative likelihood of any particular scenario, or what to do about it. Remember this winter's now-famous announcement that Americans should stock up on duct tape to protect themselves from chemical warfare. People rushed to the stores and cleaned out the shelves. Later it turned out that duct taping windows can be very dangerous and even cause asphyxiation. Not only that: the tip concerning the coming bio-terrorism was a hoax. The "high alert"—as if that means anything to regular people—that government told Americans to be on was not justified. In contrast, the private sector enhances security through peaceful and normal means. Home insurance companies give premium breaks for people who install alarm systems. Health insurers charge more for people who live dangerously. Premiums go up when risk is high and they fall when it is low. Through this mechanism, people are encouraged to adopt safe ways of living or pay the difference if they choose not to. Those who contract to provide security face competition and have the incentive and means to provide what they promise. What a contrast to the chaotic and fumbling ways of government security provision! But failure does not deter the state. Indeed, we are now asked to believe that the White House is not only omnipotent but omniscient as well. These people in government presume to make definitive judgments about the entire Iraqi ruling class, even going so far as to say that they know the secret hostility of a huge range of people toward Saddam, which thus qualifies them (who just happen to have essential technical knowledge) to help in administering the country. They can't possibly know this. That they believe they can, or they believe we will believe their claims to know, is incredible and frightening. The alarming reality brings to mind Hayek's Nobel Prize lecture in 1974. With great courage, Hayek spoke of the tendency of economists to presume that they know things about human behavior that they do not and cannot know. They do this because they try to apply the models of the physical sciences to explain human action, always with an aim toward controlling the outcomes of human choice. In truth, human action is too complex and subjective to be accessed by social scientists, and the attempt will always lead to abysmal failure. Hayek went on to explain how his critique of positivist economic modeling applies more broadly to anyone who would attempt to imitate the form while missing the substance of scientific procedure. "But it is by no means only in the field of economics that far-reaching claims are made on behalf of a more scientific direction of all human activities and the desirability of replacing spontaneous processes by 'conscious human control'." He mentions that the point applies to sociology, psychiatry, and the philosophy of history. Hayek was raising an objection not to the idea of omniscience but of the possibility of accessing even mundane knowledge. No small group in government, much less a single person, can accumulate and sort through the kinds of information necessary to administer society, much less destroy and reconstruct one, as the Bush administration proposes to do throughout the Gulf region and the Middle East. The attempt to assemble such a list is an act of power, not intelligence. We are being asked to make an enormous leap of faith that the Bush administration has somehow solved the great problem that afflicts us all: the limits of human comprehension. Because of those limits, we are right to try to limit the ability of men to exercise power over their fellows, at home or abroad. Thus does Hayek's point apply to politics, especially to politics, even more especially to the politics of the military machine. The social scientist who believes he has the master plan to run the world is enough of a menace. But the politician who believes this, and is contemplating war, can bring about massive amounts of destruction and death. In these nuclear days—and let us say what we don't like to contemplate but which is nonetheless true—he can bring about the end of the world as we know it. As Hayek notes, a tyrant who carries the pretense of knowledge too far can become "a destroyer of civilization." "If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order," said Hayek, "he will have to learn that . . . he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible." To believe otherwise is foolhardy and dangerous. "The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society."

**Only the counterplan can solve**

**Emmott, 3** (Bill, independent writer, speaker and consultant on international affairs, 20:21 Vision: Twentieth-Century Lessons for the Twenty-first Century, JMP)

Those points about science and religion are worth keeping in mind for the next time someone says that we are living in a “knowledge economy,” a phrase that has been especially common during the past decade. To be told this is disturbing for two reasons: first, because it is outdated, in that the economic and social shift of emphasis from manpower to brainpower has been going on for more than a century; but second, because it is so inappropriate. Sir John Maddox’s argument with regard to science also applies more widely: the most important knowledge that has been gained is of the scope of our ignorance. Perhaps most of all, this applies to economics. Depressions have been created by overconfident economists and their followers, as have inflations, hyperinflations and unemployment. The notion that economics is a science, in the sense that it can accurately map human behavior and then predict and manage the consequences of a given action, is scorned in the common speech of most politicians and many economists. Yet the actions of those same politicians and economists when in government, both in the capitalist and communist worlds, have often belied that scorn. Governments run their economies as though they could be certain about the outcomes, and have mostly been proved wrong. What economists and all other policymakers need most is humility—the same sort of humility that, in the rest of humanity, lies behind the resilience of religious observance. Calls to utopia are dangerous, but so are assumptions of omniscience in the face of social, economic and political complexity. That, in turn, is the case for the philosophy of liberalism: the belief in tolerance, freedom and experimentation rather than in the imposition of solutions from above. The liberal presumption in favor of the market, of capitalism and indeed of freedom itself, is driven by intellectual humility: the acceptance that a process of constant experimentation, involving the freely expressed views and actions of millions of people, is likely to produce a better, more adaptable outcome than one involving a committee of economists, politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen or even journalists, drawing up a grand blueprint. This presumption is humble because it acknowledges the extent of our ignorance. Liberalism involves, or should involve, an awareness that science cannot have all the answers, and that technological change will not inevitably make things better. Humbly, it should realize that there is no one right way to manage an organization, and no one right way to arrange social relationships, whatever a sociologist or psychologist may claim. Above all, the humble liberal has to be aware of a paradox: that when we think we have come up with a series of solutions to political or practical problems, the thing that should scare us most is the idea that someone might be able to assemble the power actually to implement them all. Famously, Lord Acton, a nineteenth-century liberal, observed that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” What is generally remembered is the second half of that phrase, especially as the twentieth century had so many cases of the horror of absolute power. But the first half is, if anything, more important. And the point it contains, that holders of power will, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, exploit it for their own ends, lies behind the liberal’s suspicion not only of government—even in democracies—but also of big business, trade unions, pressure groups and all others who accumulate power. Man is not perfectible, but neither is government or any other big group. That is one of the biggest reasons why, along with the justified optimism about economic, social and scientific possibilities which we should take with us into first decades of the twenty-first century, we must keep by us that winemaker’s paranoia. Things can go wrong, not just because of the acts of chance or God that vex the viticulturalist, but also because of the many acts of man that, deliberately or in error, threaten our liberties and our freedom of choice, that are liable through false claims of certainty to send us in new and dangerous directions, even in the most mature democracies. Frank Baum’s Emerald City of Oz was shown to be full of humbug and false claims of certainty. In the end, the fact that many such humbugs were exposed towards the end of the twentieth century, and that liberalism then began to spread its influence more widely, is a good foundation for optimism about the twenty-first century. The hunt for humbugs is one of the basic purposes of journalism, the quintessentially paranoid profession. The hunt must go on.

## CP Privatization – JARC

**Text: The United States federal government should**

**- removes barriers to private involvement in transportation infrastructure**

**- cease involvement in transportation infrastructure**

**- provide access to relevant information to private companies**

**- offer tax incentives for companies willing to substantially increase transportation infrastructure.**

**Privatization solves**

**AAPD 12** American Association of People with Disabilities, the country's largest cross-disability membership association, organizes the disability community to be a powerful force for change – politically, economically, and socially [“Equity in Transportation for People with Disabilities” http://www.civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/transportation/final-transportation-equity-disability.pdf SS]

Private transportation is an important alternative that should be considered to increase access for people with disabilities. A pressing issue in the disability community is the dearth of accessible taxis. Taxis are an important mode of transportation for people with disabilities. Many people with disabilities who cannot drive or afford a car utilize taxi services. Taxis can provide greater flexibility and independence than relying on public transportation systems, especially for those for whom mass transit is either unavailable or inaccessible.

Moreover, taxis can provide a cost-effective alternative to paratransit service. Public transit operators could save money by employing taxi services for people with disabilities, and taxi fare is less expensive than providing paratransit. Furthermore, health care-related travel could be provided more cheaply and effectively by accessible taxis than by privately operated ambulettes or public paratransit systems. This ultimately is a savings not only to transit but to taxpayers as well. However, only a very small percentage of taxis nationwide are accessible, and people with disabilities still face an enormous amount of discrimination from taxi services. Some cities have accessible taxi programs. Chicago’s program has been a model due to effective enforcement. Other cities such as Boston, Las Vegas, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland also have made progress. The ADA requires accessibility only in van-style taxis, not for sedan- style taxis. However, when local governments regulate taxis, they must be careful not to discriminate against people with disabilities in violation of the ADA. In New York City, a recent landmark court case ruled that the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission’s (TLC) operation of an inaccessible taxi fleet illegally discriminated against people with disabilities.4 The availability of accessible taxis has long been an issue in New York City, the country’s most populous city. Taxis there are regulated by the city and only those that receive medallions from the TLC can provide “street hail” service. Despite the ADA’s prohibitions on discrimination by public entities in the provision of public services, the TLC has not required accessibility in taxis, and historically less than 2 percent of New York City taxis have been accessible. In 2011 several disability groups joined together to sue the TLC, charging it with “failing to provide yellow taxis that men, women and children who use wheelchairs are able to access.” The court agreed that the TLC’s policies resulted in discrimination against people with disabilities and that the city must provide “meaningful access” to wheelchair users.

**The funding for the aff is coercively obtained -- the government uses its strength to force citizens to finance projects**

**Rothbard, 2**—dean of the Austrian School of economics (Murray N., “The Nature of the State”, excerpted from The Ethics of Liberty ch. 22-25, 2002, http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard160.html)//EM=

. In particular, the State has arrogated to itself a compulsory monopoly over police and military services, the provision of law, judicial decision-making, the mint and the power to create money, unused land ("the public domain"), streets and highways, rivers and coastal waters, and the means of delivering mail. Control of land and transportation has long been an excellent method of assuring overall control of a society; in many countries, highways began as a means of allowing the government to move its troops conveniently throughout its subject country. Control of the money supply is a way to assure the State an easy and rapid revenue, and the State makes sure that no private competitors are allowed to invade its self-arrogated monopoly of the power to counterfeit (i.e., create) new money. Monopoly of the postal service has long been a convenient method for the State to keep an eye on possibly unruly and subversive opposition to its rule. In most historical epochs, the State has also kept a tight control over religion, usually cementing a comfortable, mutually supportive alliance with an Established Church: with the State granting the priests power and wealth, and the Church in turn teaching the subject population their divinely proclaimed duty to obey Caesar. But now that religion has lost much of its persuasive power in society, the State is often willing to let religion alone, and to concentrate on similar if looser alliances with more secular intellectuals. In either case, the State relies on control of the levers of propaganda to persuade its subjects to obey or even exalt their rulers. But, above all, the crucial monopoly is the State's control of the use of violence: of the police and armed services, and of the courts – the locus of ultimate decision-making power in disputes over crimes and contracts. Control of the police and the army is particularly important in enforcing and assuring all of the State's other powers, including the all-important power to extract its revenue by coercion. For there is one crucially important power inherent in the nature of the State apparatus. All other persons and groups in society (except for acknowledged and sporadic criminals such as thieves and bank robbers) obtain their income voluntarily: either by selling goods and services to the consuming public, or by voluntary gift (e.g., membership in a club or association, bequest, or inheritance). Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion, by threatening dire penalties should the income not be forthcoming. That coercion is known as "taxation," although in less regularized epochs it was often known as "tribute." Taxation is theft, purely and simply, even though it is theft on a grand and colossal scale which no acknowledged criminals could hope to match. It is a compulsory seizure of the property of the State's inhabitants, or subjects. It would be an instructive exercise for the skeptical reader to try to frame a definition of taxation which does not also include theft. Like the robber, the State demands money at the equivalent of gunpoint; if the taxpayer refuses to pay his assets are seized by force, and if he should resist such depredation, he will be arrested or shot if he should continue to resist.

**D-rule**

**Petro 74**

[Sylvester, Professor of Law at NYU, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html]

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

**Knowledge is fragmented and the attempted to use the government only lead to the oversimplification of an unknowable body of information**

**Crowley, 1** (Brian, Montreal Economic Institute, Montreal Economic Institute Paper, “The Man Who Changed Everyone’s Life: The Ubiquitous Ideas of F. A. Hayek (Conclusion),” 4-16-2001, www.iedm.org/library/crowlerB\_en.html, JMP)

The synoptic delusion TO THE MODERN MIND, OF COURSE, HAYEK'S ATTACK ON SOCIAL SCIENCE MAY appear to be a kind of know-nothingism. After all, modern civilization clings to few prejudices more tenaciously than the belief that nothing is beyond the grasp of human understanding and control. And science and reason, through their many apparent marvels and miracles, have given us little reason to doubt their power. Perhaps ironically, Hayek's mission in life was to use reason to convince humanity of the limits of reason. He thought that, whatever our impressive information-gathering and processing tools, we are all unavoidably human and therefore subject to the weaknesses of the human condition. Heading the list of these weaknesses is our main instrument for understanding and interpreting our impressive scientific knowledge: the human mind. For all the wonders that the collective human mind has accomplished within the context of culture and society, the individual human mind remains a remarkably limited instrument. This was a subject of enduring fascination for Hayek, the early student of psychology, who in the 1950s wrote a seminal work in the field called The Sensory Order. Research demonstrates, for example, that each of us is capable of having an astonishingly limited number of ideas in our mind at any moment — ideas available to the disciplined imagination for reflection, juxtaposition, and manipulation. This "channel capacity," as it is known, is limited in the average person to between 5 and 10 ideas at a time and has changed little over the course of human civilization. It is humbling, but instructive, to compare this pitiful channel capacity with the quantity of information that exists about the social, economic, and physical world. Human knowledge is exploding at an unprecedented rate. In cutting edge fields, such as computer science, the total amount of knowledge doubles approximately every 18 to 24 months, while the whole body of human knowledge doubles every 15 years. Each of us is thus pushed to an ever greater degree of specialization in an ever narrower field. Put another way, our relative ignorance grows faster than we can ever hope to educate ourselves because our ability to acquire and reflect on information is relatively fixed, while our collective knowledge is expanding exponentially. Neither of the two coping strategies usually trotted out by aspiring planners can in fact overcome this disability. The first such strategy relies on technology: If we build impressive enough computers and cram them with comprehensive enough data, we can process the information artificially, bypassing the constraints of the human mind. Alas, they forget that computers know no more than the humans that program them, and that many of the pieces of information on which the economy depends are often not known by anybody at all or are inextricably linked to a particular place and time, or their importance is ill understood by humans, including those who program computers. Nor is the stock of knowledge itself a constant, as technical and other innovations — combined with changes in people's needs and preferences — regularly reshape the intellectual landscape of society and the economy. For example, a man in rural Nova Scotia had a little business making and selling highland paraphernalia, such as sporrans, daggers, and belt buckles. One day, his eye fell on a newspaper ad calling for tenders for the making of aircraft parts. He quickly realized that, with the equipment he possessed, he could easily make the parts described, and he submitted a bid. He is now successful in both lines of work. Note, however, that no planner sitting in Halifax or Ottawa would have included this man in their inventory of aircraft parts makers, because he did not know himself that he possessed this capacity. By the chance act of reading the ad, he learned something about himself, and transformed the tiny part of the economy of which he is the centre. The economy as a whole is composed of billions of such individuals whose true circumstances are never fully known to themselves, let alone to distant planners. The other strategy social planners trot out for overcoming their ignorance is to claim that they don't need to know the details, but only the grand outlines — that they can simplify complex social processes down to large statistical aggregates. But in the Hayekian view, this is the "synoptic delusion," like mistaking a two-dimensional map for the real three-dimensional world. Maps are useful for getting around or for seeing key data in relation to one another, but can accomplish this only by stripping the world of its messy complexity, and distorting its real shape to fit on a piece of paper. Because most people's idea of the Earth is shaped by maps based on Mercator's projection, they think Greenland is roughly the same size as South America, whereas in reality the southern continent is 11 times larger. Since people live in a complex reality, not crude pictures, those who try to plan the world on the basis of maps or statistical aggregates only end up sounding like they come from another planet, which, in a sense, they do. All our vast ability to satisfy human wants and needs is created by our knowledge of how to do things, but that knowledge is — and must be — widely dispersed and locked in the minds and experiences of billions of individuals. With minds so limited, and knowledge so vast, variegated, and incapable of comprehensive statement, we are condemned to growing specialization as individuals and, the corollary of that, to a growing dependence on others similarly specialized in their fields. Hayek's Viennese contemporary, and LSE colleague, the philosopher of science Karl Popper, put it this way: "Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite." AS HAYEK NEVER TIRED OF REMARKING, OUR INTERDEPENDENCE IS BOTH THE chief fact of economic life and the chief obstacle to successful social planning. If the knowledge on which individuals, corporations, governments, and societies depend is not only widely dispersed, but is necessarily so, how can this knowledge be called forth and put in the service of the people who need it? This casts economics in a new light, as the study of a massive coordination challenge.

## CP States – HSR

**Text: The United States federal government should narrowly delegate authority over national inter-city and inter-state high-speed passenger rail to state governments, appropriate territories, and multi-state compacts related to corridors and hub networks. The state governments, appropriate territories, and multi-state compacts related to corridors and hub networks should substantially increase investment in a national network of inter-city and inter-state high-speed passenger rail – including dedicated shared fund agreements that collectively matches the total of Affirmative allocations.**

**States solve best – key to HSR effectiveness**

**Chicago Tribune 1** (“Let states drive high-speed train,” Dec 24, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-12-24/news/0112240192\_1\_high-speed-rail-investment-high-speed-train-high-speed-rail)

Amtrak--the money-losing operation that poses as a national passenger railroad in the U.S.--is taking the lead in the development of a high-speed train network in the Midwest, comparable to the European trains that zoom by at more than 150 m.p.h. High-speed rail service in the Midwest is an interesting prospect--the market, as well as environmental, energy conservation and other concerns, may justify it. But putting Amtrak in charge and expecting the feds to pay for most of it certainly is a recipe for waste and bad planning. For the Midwest, at least, a frequent, comfortable and reliable high-speed rail system would be a new concept. It ought to be designed and operated as such, according to market demand, with a rigorous bottom-line approach. In other words, everything Amtrak is not. According to plans being circulated in Congress and promoted by several local groups, Chicago would be the hub of a series of high-speed rail lines zipping out to Minneapolis-St. Paul, Detroit, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Cleveland and other major urban areas, with stops at some smaller cities like Springfield, Ill., and Madison, Wis. New trains would run on upgraded freight tracks at estimated speeds of 110 m.p.h. The initial phase would be funded by approximately $4 billion, the Midwest's share of the $12 billion High Speed Rail Investment initiative, under consideration by Congress. Individual states have pledged smaller amounts to the effort, including Illinois' $50 million. A reverse logic animates this project: Instead of determining there is urgent demand--and then seeking funding--Midwestern supporters seem to be saying, "The pot of money is there, so we might as well get our share." That's not the way to build a new railroad, but to extend Amtrak domain which, torn by the incompatible demands of politics, public service and profitability, has evolved into anything but an efficient train system. States ought to take the lead in the high-speed rail effort, and contribute a substantial amount of the money. Perhaps the federal government could pay for the start-up infrastructure improvements, as it did to build the original interstate highway system in the 1950s. Then an independent multi-state agency could purchase the trains and turn over operations to a private concern. Such high stakes and strong participation by the states would lead to a far tougher analysis of what service is needed than the pinata-style planning at play here. Built modestly and incrementally, high-speed rail could work and even make money, at which time full privatization would be the next step. A Chicago-to-St. Louis line, running on relatively underutilized freight tracks through Normal and Springfield, could be a key test. Run efficiently, it could compete favorably with airlines on speed of downtown-to-downtown service, and certainly on roominess and comfort. Regional high-speed service has caught on in California and in the Northwest, and it may well do so here. Although Amtrak's math is complicated, the agency projects that, when fully operational, its high-speed Acela line on the Northeast will make about $180 million in annual profit Are there enough commuters and are they willing to give up their cars or airline seats in favor of high-speed trains? If it's their own money on the line, state officials, planners--and taxpayers--would make sure the project makes sense before any money is invested. High-speed train service in the Midwest is a prospect worth investigating, on the right terms.

**Multi-State compacts specifically solve for HSR**

**OPA 3** (Office of Public Affairs – US Department of Transportation – FACT SHEET , The Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act of 2003 – http://www.dot.gov/affairs/Passenger%20Rail%20Fact%20Sheet.htm)

\* The Administration believes that states, not Amtrak, are best equipped to decide where rail service is important. States should be empowered to choose the rail service provider of their choice, whether it's Amtrak, a private company or a public transit agency. Following a transition, the Administration's proposal would allow states to submit proposals for passenger rail capital investment to the U.S. Department of Transportation, as they have successfully done for highway and transit capital investments. \* Amtrak would transition into three companies: \* A private passenger rail company that would operate trains under contract to states and multi-state compacts - just as the current Amtrak operates trains under contract to commuter rail agencies; \* A private rail infrastructure company that would maintain and operate the infrastructure on the Northeast Corridor under contract to a multi-state Northeast Corridor Compact. Title to Amtrak's current tracks, stations and other infrastructure on the Northeast Corridor will be held by the federal government and leased to the Northeast Corridor Compact; and \* The National Passenger Rail Corporation, which would continue as a government corporation that would retain Amtrak's current right to use the tracks of the freight railroads, and the Amtrak corporate name. Both the track-access rights and the Amtrak brand would be provided under contract to states and multi-state compacts for qualifying passenger rail service they sponsor. \* Separating train operations and infrastructure ownership is not a new concept. Train operations and infrastructure ownership have for decades been split in the United States. Amtrak operates trains over more than 22,000 miles of track in the United States, but owns only 730 miles of track (mostly on the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C. and Boston, and in Michigan). All other tracks are owned either by freight railroads or by the states. \* Multi-state compacts are not new. Multi-state coalitions are already operating intercity rail services, and some are planning for future high-speed rail operations. The Administration believes these cooperative partnerships between the states, the federal government and freight railroads, will improve the efficiency of intercity passenger rail service as a viable alternative to air and highway travel in some corridors.

**These Multi-State compacts already exist and can create dedicated funding pools**

**Puentes 10** (Robert Puentes is a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program where he also directs the Program's Metropolitan Infrastructure Initiative. “Intermetropolitan Passenger Rail: Considerations for State Legislatures” – April 9th – http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2010/04/09-rail-transportation-puentes)

Note: “ARRA” stands for “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009”. It was the initial wave of Obama’s “stimulus” package.

The next point is that if a particular corridor extends beyond individual state borders, close coordination—both formal and informal—with your neighbors is essential. More than just backroom deals, these are lengthy relationships that bear real fruit in the form of finalized plans, environmental reviews, and dedicated shared funding agreements. This appeared to have been a significant advantage for those who received ARRA funding and a hindrance for those who did not as, by design, several of the award-winning corridors involved multi-state compacts. For example, the eight-state Midwest Regional Rail Initiative was established as far back as the mid-1990s. In consultation with the federal government, the states worked to develop a rail plan that was released in 1998 and updated in 2004. Last summer, the eight governors, along with the mayor of Chicago, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in anticipation of joint applications for ARRA funding that laid out plans for collective high-speed rail priorities and planning. Partly as a result, the projects in and around the Chicago hub received nearly as much funding ($2.16 billion) as did California ($2.34 billion.) Similarly, the Virginia-North Carolina Interstate High-Speed Rail Commission, created in 2001, agreed to recommend to its respective parent legislatures the enactment of an interstate rail compact. Both state legislatures passed laws establishing the Compact in 2004. The North Carolina—Virginia corridor received a total of $620 million spread among three investments.