# K Gender

## 1NC

**This gendered security discourse causes inevitable violence and war that turns the case. Rejecting the 1AC opens up space for a feminist reconceptualization of security.**

**Shepherd 7** [Laura J., Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, “Victims, Perpetrators and Actors’ Revisited:1 Exploring the Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence,” BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 239–256]

As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True comment, ‘our sense of self-identity and security may seem disproportionately threatened by societal challenge to gender ordering’ (Peterson and True 1998, 17). That is, the performance of gender is immanent in the performance of security and vice versa, both concern issues of ontological cohesion (as illustrated in Table 2). Taking this on board leads me to the conclusion that perhaps security is best conceived of as referring to ontological rather than existential identity effects. Security, if seen as performative of particular configura- tions of social/political order, is inherently gendered and inherently related to violence. Violence, on this view, performs an ordering function—not only in the theory/practice of security and the reproduction of the international, but also in the reproduction of gendered subjects. Butler acknowledges that ‘violence is done in the name of preserving western values’ (Butler 2004, 231); that is, the ordering function that is performed through the violences investigated here, as discussed above, organises political authority and subjectivity in an image that is in keeping with the values of the powerful, often at the expense of the marginalised. ‘Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary’ (ibid.). While Butler refers to the violences undertaken in the protection of the sovereign state—violence in the name of security—the preservation of borders is also recognisable in the conceptual domain of the inter- national and in the adherence to a binary materiality of gender. This adherence is evidenced in the desire to fix the meaning of concepts in ways that are not challenging to the current configuration of social/political order and subjectivity, and is product/productive of ‘the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject’ (Hanssen 2000, 215). However, the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined. They could ‘remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes’ (Butler 1993, 228). The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognising that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state. This is, in short, an appeal to a politics of both/and rather than either/or. Both the state (produced through representations of security and vio- lence) and the subject (produced through representations of gender and violence) rely on a logic of sovereignty and ontological cohesion that must be problematised if alternative visions of authority and subjectivity are to become imaginable. International Relations as a discipline could seek to embrace the investigation of the multiple modalities of power, from the economic to the bureaucratic, from neo- liberal capitalism to the juridical. Rather than defending the sovereign boundaries of the discipline from the unruly outside constituted by critical studies of develop- ment, political structures, economy and law, not to mention the analysis of social/ political phenomena like those undertaken by always-already interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, IR could refuse to fix its own boundaries, and refuse to exercise sovereign power, in terms of authority, over the meanings of its objects of analysis. Future research on global politics could look very different if it were not for the inscription of ultimately arbitrary disciplinary borderlines that function to constrain rather than facilitate understanding. It may seem that there is a tension between espousing a feminist poststructural politics and undertaking research that seeks to detail, through deconstruction, the ways in which particular discourses have failed to manifest the reforms needed to address security and violence in the context of gendered subjectivity and the constitution of political community. In keeping with the ontological position I hold, I argue that there is nothing inherent in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence that necessitated their being made meaningful in the way they have been. Those working on policy and advocacy in the area of security and violence can use the reconceptualisation I offer ‘to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable, but perhaps, ought to be changed’ (Milliken 1999, 244). As a researcher, the question I have grown most used to hearing is not ‘What?’ or ‘How?’ but ‘Why?’. At every level of the research process, from securing funding to relating to the academic community, it is necessary to be able to construct a convincing and coherent argument as to why this research is valuable, indeed vital, to the field in which I situate myself. A discursive approach acknowledges that my legitimacy as a knowing subject is constructed through discursive practices that privilege some forms of being over others. In the study of security, because of the discursive power of the concept, and of violence, which can quite literally be an issue of life and death, these considerations are particularly important. Further- more, as a result of the invigorating and investigative research conducted by exemplary feminist scholars in the field of IR,17 I felt encouraged to reclaim the space to conduct research at the margins of a discipline that itself functions under a misnomer, being concerned as it is with relations inter-state rather than inter- national. As Cynthia Enloe has expressed it, To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It presumes a priori that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so natu- rally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer (Enloe 1996, 188, emphasis in original). If this is the case, I am more than happy to be unreasonable, and I am in excellent company.

## Link – Terrorism

**The fight against terrorism is a fight against the uncivilized, irrational danger—this justifies endless war and intervention to protect the masculine order**

**Wilcox 3** [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them. In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles. The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.