**There are extreme disadvantages to universal health care.**

**A single-payer healthcare system would kill pharmaceutical research.**

**Barone ‘9** (Michael Barone, senior writer for US News & World Report and principal coauthor of The Almanac of American Politics 2009, ‘Obama would stifle Military and Medical Creativity’, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2309452/posts>)

We also may be at risk of squandering our high-tech advantage in medicine. As Scott Atlas of the Hoover Institution points out, the top five American hospitals conduct more clinical trials than all the hospitals in all other developed countries. America has outpointed all other countries combined in Nobel Prizes for medical and physiology since 1970. American theoretical health research financed by the National Institutes of Health and by American market-oriented pharmaceutical companies outshines the rest of the world combined. And the rest of the world tends to get the benefits at cut rates. American taxpayers finance NIH, which reports results publicly to the whole world. Pharmaceutical companies that produce benefits for patients and consumers get the profits that support their research disproportionately from Americans, because other countries refuse to spend much more than the cost of producing pills, which is trivial next to the huge cost of research and regulatory approval. Getting these free riders to pay more is, again, Sisyphus's work. The Democratic health care bills threaten to undermine innovation in pharmaceuticals and medical technologies by sending those with private insurance into a government insurance plan that would be in a position to ration treatment and delay or squelch innovation. The danger is that we will freeze medicine in place and no longer be the nation that produces innovations that do so much for us and the rest of the world.

Opponent conceded he advocate a single payer system. 100% link, and he cannot link out.

**A single-payer system would cut billions of dollars from pharmaceutical companies**

Hogberg ‘7 (David Hogberg, Senior Policy Analyst for The National Center for Public Policy Research, 2007, ‘The Myths of Single-Payer healthcare’, <http://freemarketcure.com/singlepayermyths.php#8>)

While it is true that medical research will not "disappear," it will surely decline. Consider what has happened to pharmaceutical research in single-payer systems, where the government imposes price controls on prescription drugs. A [study](http://www.ita.doc.gov/drugpricingstudy) (PDF) conducted by U.S. Commerce Department found that drug price controls in other nations reduced annual investment in pharmaceuticals by $5-8 billion, resulting in 3 to 4 fewer drugs being launched each year. The Boston Consulting Group [found](http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/phRMA/PhRMA%20-%20ANNEX%20D.pdf) (PDF) an even bigger effect of price controls, showing a loss of $17-22 billion annually in pharmaceutical research resulting in the loss of 10 to 13 new drug launches.

The Pharmaceutical Industry is key to preventing bioterrorism

Washington Post ‘1 (Justin Gillis, 2001 "Scientists Race for Vaccines," lexis)

U.S. scientists, spurred into action by the events of Sept. 11, have begun a concerted assault on bioterrorism, working to produce an array of new medicines that include treatments for smallpox, a safer smallpox vaccine and a painless anthrax vaccine.    At least one major drug company, Pharmacia Corp. of Peapack, N.J., has offered to let government scientists roam through the confidential libraries of millions of compounds it has synthesized to look for drugs against bioterror agents. Other companies have signaled that they will do the same if asked. These are unprecedented offers, since a drug company's chemical library, painstakingly assembled over decades, is one of its primary assets, to which federal scientists usually have no access.    "A lot of **people**would **say we won World War II with the help of a mighty industrial base,**" said Michael Friedman, a onetime administrator at the Food and Drug Administration who was appointed days ago to coordinate the pharmaceutical industry's efforts. "**In this new war against bioterrorism, the mighty industrial power is the pharmaceutical industry.**"    One example of the new urgency is an initiative launched by Eli Lilly & Co. One of the company's infectious-disease experts, Gail Cassell, realized during the anthrax scare that her company had three drugs that might work as treatments for smallpox, even scarier than anthrax as a potential terrorist weapon.    In a matter of days Cassell, a Lilly vice president, tore through paperwork that normally would have taken months, put samples of the drugs on a plane and flew them to government laboratories in the Washington area to be tested against smallpox. It's not clear yet whether the drugs will prove effective.    "We all have to think of the situation as being rather urgent," Cassell said. "You're kind of waiting for the next shoe to drop, given the events of the last two months."    **Researchers say a generation of young scientists never called upon before to defend the nation is working overtime in a push for rapid progress.** At laboratories of the National Institutes of Health, at universities and research institutes across the land, people are scrambling.  "This has been such a shock to so many people," said Carole Heilman, a division director at NIH, which is paying for much of the bioterror research. "People aren't sleeping anymore. Everybody is working as much as they possibly can. Bureaucracy is not a word that's acceptable anymore."    **But the campaign, for all its urgency, faces hurdles**both scientific and logistical. The kind of research now underway would normally take at least a decade before products appeared on pharmacy shelves. Scientists are talking about getting at least some new products out the door within two years, a daunting schedule in medical research.    If that happens, it will be with considerable assistance from **the nation's drug companies**. They**are the only organizations in the country with the scale to move rapidly to produce pills and vials of medicine that might be needed by the billions.** The companies and their powerful lobby in Washington have been working over the past few weeks to seize the moment and rehabilitate their reputations, tarnished in recent years by controversy over drug prices and the lack of access to AIDS drugs among poor countries.    The companies have already made broad commitments to aid the government in the short term, offering free pills with a wholesale value in excess of $ 1 billion, as well as other help. The question now is whether that commitment will extend over the several years it will take to build a national stockpile of next-generation medicines.    "**This is a time of crisis,"** Friedman said. "I think **the industry is going to be very patient and going to be making a long-term commitment.**It's the right thing to do."

Biological terrorist attack would cause extinction

Steinbruner, ‘97 (John, Sr. Fellow @ Brookings institution, “Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses”, Foreign Policy, Winter 1997-1998, p. 85-96, JSTOR)

Ultimately the world's military, medical, and business establishments will have to work together to an unprecedented degree if the international community is to succeed in containing the threat of biological weapons. Although **human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction**, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. **Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce** themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. **The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately**. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. **Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout**. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. **The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled**. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback Biological Weapons is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But **for a few pathogens ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use-the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population**. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Further,

**Pharmacuetical companies' research and development is key to solving pandemics in the future.**

**Bandow writes in 2005**, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 3/27/**05** (Doug, “A strong pharmaceutical industry is the best defense against pandemics”,

http://wwww.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050327/news\_lz1e27bandow.html)

**Diseases like SARS and avian flu, which have proved resistant to drugs commonly used to fight influenza viruses, demonstrate how we all benefit from profitable drugmakers and abundant pharmaceutical research.** Although governments have an important role to play in fighting any disease pandemic, **necessary** **for developing any effective treatment and putting into mass production any vaccine or other medicine is private industry.** Indeed, the initial fight against SARS focused on finding an existing medicine that worked. Laboratories screened some 2,000 federally approved and experimental drugs to see if they were useful in fighting SARS. Gurinder Shahi, a doctor in Singapore, explained: "Given how little we know about SARS and the reality that it is killing people, it is justified for us to be daring and innovative in coming up with solutions." **Daring innovation is most likely in a competitive, profit-driven market**. For instance, Pfizer worked with the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to test 350 compounds developed as part of an earlier project to cure the common cold. NIAID also collaborated with the California biotech company Vical Inc. to test a new, experimental vaccine that has protected mice from the disease. Adventis and Merck as well as laboratories around the world began working to develop vaccines. Indeed, **most of today's medicines exist only because there is a bevy of sophisticated pharmaceutical companies devoted to finding drugs to heal the sick.** Progress has been particularly dramatic in recent years. For instance, two decades ago not one drug was available to fight AIDS. Today 74 have been approved and another 83 are in development.

**The impact is Extiction.**

Germann furthers the impact;

Mitigation strategies for pandemic influenza, Published 2006 Timothy C. Germann\*, Kai Kadau\*, Ira M. Longini, Jr.‡, and Catherine A. Macken\*

EpiCast large-scale epidemiological simulation model Timothy C. Germann is in the Physics and Chemistry of Materials Group (T-1) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Tim earned dual Bachelor of Science degrees in Computer Science and in Chemistry from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Chemical Physics from Harvard University in 1995, where he was a DOE Computational Science Graduate Fellow.

**The threat of a global pandemic ultimately leads to the extinction of not only humans, but many other animal species as well. This could occur in as soon as five to ten years, and countermeasures need to be in place to prevent such a global catastrophe. Such an epidemic would be catastrophic, sweeping across all continents in a matter of days. This form of virus could have close to a 100% kill rate, leaving only scattered groups of survivors from all species scattered across separate continents. The chances that the human race could recover from such an event are close to zero.**