1. Shelters

Shelters solve and combat the underlying societal causes of domestic violence. Chanley:  
SHARON A. CHANLEY University of Illinois at Springfield JESSE J. CHANLEY, JR. HEATHER E. CAMPBELL Arizona State University AMERICAN REVIEWOF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Vol. 31 No. 4, December 2001 393-413 © 2001 Sage Publications PROVIDING REFUGE The Value of Domestic Violence Shelter Services

In addition to the short-term value for individual battered women and their children, **shelter programs** also **act as long**er**-term, community-change agents. Shelter staff** and volunteers **work** closely **with** other **community organizations** and institutions **that** are involved with **respond**ing **to the systemic problem of domestic violence.** For example**, the** shelter **staff works with** local **law enforcement** agencies **to increase** their **awareness of** the dilemmas faced by battered women and **how police** officers **can** more appropriately **respond to calls for help and** adequately **enforce domestic violence laws. The** shelter **staff** may also **work with** local **judges to encourage** their **fair** and adequate **response to battered women seeking** orders of **protection**, for example. In these ways, **the shelter encourages changes** in the community **that benefit battered women beyond those who seek direct services from the shelter** (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 1997).

2. Leaving

The most comprehensive data indicates that battered women do successfully leave abusive relationships. Gottman and Jacobson:  
“When Men Batter Women: New Insights Into Ending Abusive Relationships.” Neil Jacobson and John Gottman, 1998

We have learned that, first of all, **battered women** do **get out**, and they do so **at a very high rate** indeed. John **Gottman’s research** on marriage **shows that the divorce rate in the general population is** typically from **2 to 5 percent over a two-year period. But in our study, the divorce rate was much higher among batterers and their spouses.** So the real answer to the question of why **battered women** stay is that they **do not stay. They are much more likely to leave than women in other unhappy marriages.**

This evidence is fantastic. Jacobson and Gottman accounted for statistics concerning all forms and severities of domestic violence and concluded that, in the majority of cases, the impact of domestic violence was not sufficient to prevent victims from leaving the relationship.

Schwarz gives more empirics.  
Feb. 26, 1998 | Social Science | Health and Medicine. ”It's emotional abuse, not vicious beatings, that often spurs women to leave battering husbands” Joel Schwarz. University of Washington.  
  
Battered women do get out, and they get out at a high rate**,**" explains Jacobson, noting that [The] divorce rate over two years ranges from 2 to 5 percent in the general population. **In the study,** 38 percent of the women married to Pit Bulls had left and divorced their husbands, while none of the women married to Cobras had left their husbands after two years. But **at the end of five years, 75 percent of the women married to [abusers without criminal records]** Pit Bulls **and 25 percent married to [abusers with criminal records]** Cobras **had divorced.**

Violence won’t increase after leaving—outreach programs solve. Hart:  
“Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System.” Barbara J. Hart. 1992.

**Police** departmentsin a few jurisdictions in Washington **have established follow-up systems whereby** patrol **officers** or detectives **make** telephone or house **calls to** apparent **victims of domestic violence in the days** immediately **following the request for** emergency police **assistance.** When contacting the battered woman, **the outreach officer undertakes** further **investigation into** criminal **domestic violence, identifies the risks of** batterer **retaliation** that may suggest particular conditions on bail or release, **and offers women** clarification about **legal options to protect them.** In completing the outreach interview, the officer gives the victim specific contact information should she have further questionsor information to share. Outreach is effective only when responding officers obtain confidential contact information from battered women at the crime scene; contact information should include a telephone number whereby a message can be left for a victim if she cannot be reached in her own home. Some domestic violence programs have adopted outreach efforts whereby they attempt to contact battered women by phone the day following police response to an emergency domestic violence call.Communication by the domestic violence program after the immediate crisis of the criminal incident enables battered women to learn about legal options and community services in a context which is supportive, that fosters an exchange of information, and which engages a battered woman in critical thinking about safety strategies. **Outreach, thus**, often **facilitates victim participation** in **and commitment to the criminal justice process.**

3. Domestic Violence Courts

DV courts solve- empirics prove. Klein:  
Klein, Andrew. US Department of Justice. 2009. "Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research.”

Although relatively new, some research shows that specialized domestic violence courts are associated with decreased reoffending and reabuse. The reduction may be due to reforms of court processes or a corresponding specialization of domestic violence prosecution and/or probation supervision, or all three. A study of Milwaukee‟s federally funded domestic violence court found that the number of arrests were halved for domestic violence defendants sentenced to probation, compared to those sentenced to probation before court reform. The rearrest rate dropped from 8 percent to 4.2 percent. The average number of new arrests also dropped significantly. Researchers posited that one of the prime explanations for the drop was a corresponding rise in the use of incarceration as a sentence. As a result of tight judicial monitoring and enforcement of release conditions, the [average] post-reform probationers spent 13,902 days confined, compared to the 1,059 days probationers spent jailed in the days before court reform.

Klein 2 gives more empirics:

Although domestic violence victims generally rate their court experiences highly, they rate domestic violence courts even more highly. [52, 91, 124] **One study found that if victims were aware [of]** that there was **a domestic violence court, three-quarters of the victims were more likely to report future violence.** [196] One of the reasons that victims may prefer domestic violence courts may be **[because] the court** contacts **provid[es]**ing **increased victim services and referrals to victim advocates, documented in several** of the **studies.** [103, 115, 164] This may be why the District of Columbia domestic violence court was able to report an increased rate of civil protective order retention from 40 to 55 percent. [200] **Domestic violence courts are also** associated with **more efficient** processing of cases.

4. Protective Orders

POs work- empirics prove. Klein:

First, in terms of their effectiveness in deterring repeat abuse, before and after studies suggest that protective orders may deter certain abusers. In Travis County, Texas, **over a period of two years** before and after order issuance, **physical abuse dropped** **from 68** percent **to 23 percent after the orders were obtained,** if victims maintained the order.

Klein 2 furthers:

Nonetheless, the research consistently finds that victims largely express satisfaction with civil orders, even if they are violated by their abusers. [134] In the multisite study in Massachusetts, **86 percent of the women who obtained a permanent order said that the order either stopped or reduced the abuse**, notwithstanding the fact that 59 percent called police to report an order violation. Upon further questioning, the women expressed the feeling that the order demonstrated to the abuser that the “law was on her side.” [182] In a multistate study, victims who obtained orders reported that the orders improved their overall well-being, especially if the abuser had a prior criminal history and were more likely to reabuse. [133] **It may be that**, even though **orders** do not stop abuse, they **reduce the severity of the reabuse.** Alternatively, although they may not affect the extent of reabuse, **protective orders make victims feel vindicated and empowered.**

5. Arrests and No-Drop Policies

Laws are in place now to protect victims. Hagan-Dier:  
DePaul Law Review, 2001, [Jennifer R. Hagan, JD Candidate], Spring, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 919, p. 971-3

Although there is still room for improvement, the realization that domestic violence affects society as a whole, and that there is a need for a solution rather than a quick fix, has spawned incredible growth in the attack on domestic violence. States have acknowledged the need for women to feel protected by the system, both when they first leave the abuser, as well as during the period when they are seeking justice. Accordingly, **every state has enacted civil** protection order **statutes and provisions for emergency** ex-parte **relief for victims** attempting to leave an alleged abuser. **These** protection orders **demand that the alleged abuser stay away from the victim,** her home, her workplace, and her family, **until the outcome of the case** or for a specific duration. The protection statutes also provide support for the victim in her attempt to regain control of her life, providing that the state will charge the abuser criminally if he violates the order. The limit on the state legislative development has been the legislatures' inability to enforce the legislation; this remains the duty of the police and the court system. In this situation, the state legislatures have been proactive, creating legislation that mandates or encourages the state court systems, as well as local jurisdictions, to enforce protective legislation. Since 1994, **all** **fifty** **states have enacted some** sort of **domestic violence arrest policy**, thereby **limiting the** amount of **discretion available to the police**. These policies, **[which] coupled with** further educational programs and domestic violence **training for** both **law enforcement** and court personnel**, ha[s]**ve **begun to make a dramatic difference in the statistics concerning domestic violence.**

Hagan-Dier 2 proves solvency.

**No-drop** prosecution **policies dictate that once charges are brought, the case will proceed regardless of the victim's wishes,** "as long as sufficient evidence exists to prove criminal conduct." Similar to mandatory arrests, no-drop prosecution takes the decision out of the hands of the victim, and some claim it fails to allow victim input and perpetuates her status as a victim. Although this is a valid concern, **[leading to] the increase in domestic** violence **abusers who have been punished** as a result of the no-drop policies **and the corresponding drop in intimate murders** support the continued use of this proactive policy.

Generic

Turn: Most attempts to use defensive force fail, which escalates violence. Saunders:  
Saunders, D.G (1986). When battered women use violence: Husband abuse or self-defense? Violence and Victims, 1, 47-60.

Even though many battered women may aggressively defend themselves from attack and may be legally justified in doing so, **it would be a mistake to assume that aggression works for victims.** Available evidence indicates that **such action will probably make things worse.** In Fojtik’s (1977-1978) survey of help-seeking battered women, **77% of those who tried to defend themselves reported that it escalated the violence.** Bowker (1983) also found that an aggressive response escalated the man’s violence. He found that **the most successful strategies** women used in stopping their husband’s attacks **were threats of divorce or** threats to invoke **criminal justice sanctions.** Bowker concluded that **this method** worked because it **improved the balance of power between the partners.**

Studies prove- status quo mandatory arrest laws solve repeat violence. Mills:Mills [Linda G. Mills, University of California–Los Angeles Published: Criminal Justice & Behavior, 1998, 25, 3, Sept,  306-318]

Early **studies show**ed **mandatory arrest to be the most effective policy in deterring batterers from future violence. Sherman and Berk** (1984a, 1984b) were the first to study mandatory arrest, with numerous studies to follow. They **examined 314 cases of** misdemeanor **assault over six months and found mandatory arrest to be** a **significantly** **more effective** deterrent than either physical separation or officer mediation. Each of the several studies in the United States that replicated Sherman and Berk produced varying results on the efficacy of mandatory arrest. An investigation of the combined data from all the mandatory arrest studies found that the policy's success is tied to whether an offender is "good risk" or "bad risk." (Berk et al., 1992) Good risk batterers are defined as having ties to the community through marriage, employment, etc. (Berk 1993) They are likely to suffer embarrassment and stigmatization as a result of being arrested and are therefore less inclined to reoffend. Bad risk offenders do not possess the same community attachments, are less likely to be embarrassed by detainment, and are prone to future violence. Overall, mandatory arrest studies indicate a need to individualize intervention strategies based on local demographics. Based on their review of mandatory arrest studies, Sherman, Schmidt, and Rogan (1992) suggest jurisdictions replace mandatory arrest policies with mandatory action or police action chosen from a list of possibilities. Such options could include transportation to a shelter, transportation to a detoxification center, victim-driven arrest, and providing counsel for victim protection. Mandatory Prosecution Few studies have examined mandatory prosecution policies. In fact, Ford and Regoli (1993) conducted the only randomized study of no-drop prosecution. They found that the type of prosecution strategy used (drop-permitted versus no-drop) has a significant effect on the future behavior of the batterer. Victims who chose to file charges against the perpetrator under a drop-permitted policy were less likely to experience future violence than were victims whose batterers were prosecuted without their input. However, the opposite was true for victims who chose to drop charges against their batterers; they were more likely to experience abuse again than those dealt with under mandatory prosecution. Ford and Regoli hypothesize that the preventative impact in drop-permitted cases comes from a victim's personal empowerment. They suggest this power derives from women using prosecution as a bargaining chip with their partners, allying with law enforcement, and being provided with a voice in determining sanctions. The Effect of Empowerment on Recidivism Sherman and Berk (1984a) briefly addressed victim empowerment in their examination of mandatory arrest (although the replication studies failed to do so). They found a relationship between police concern and batterer recidivism. When batterers were arrested, victims experienced repeat abuse in 26 percent of the cases. **When batterers were arrested** and the victim perceived the police as concerned and willing to listen, **the repeat abuse rate dropped to nine percent.** Sherman and Berk hypothesized that the rate of recidivism dropped with police concern because victims felt empowered by the interaction.

ALSO, it’s better for victims to not use deadly force in terms of the legal system. If victims use deadly force, then the legal system doesn’t just fail, as they claim it does; it works against them by putting them in prison. This is way worse than allowing domestic violence to continue; I’ll explain why in the DA I’m about to read.

Theory preempts

The negative is allowed to defend the efficacy of multiple alternatives without a specific text as long as they do not simultaneously fiat a change in domestic violence policies. Reading alts are just defense against AC solvency because alts function to prove why deadly force won’t solve abuse. In order for them to be independent offense, they would all need a unique net-benefit, but I’m not garnering any impact from the solvency evidence.