# Transportation Infrastructure Shell

**The modern society of enjoyment perpetuates the idea that through constant motion we can eliminate the gap inherent to subjectivity**

**McGowan 04** [Todd McGowan. “The End of Dissatisfaction?” State University of New York Press. 2004.] AP

For Kushner, our failure to address the AIDS crisis results from an inability to confront the Real and from the use of motion and speed in order to deny distance. To acknowledge what AIDS represents would mean acknowledging the inevitable failure of motion and acknowledging that something (i.e.,thepower of AIDS) remains a transcendent beyond. There can be no American tragedy—no proper response to the AIDS crisis—because tragedy is impossible in a society of constant motion, which American society has become. The genesis of this motion, as Harper recognizes near the end of Part II, is an experience of dissatisfaction. She says, “Devastation. That’s what makes peo-ple migrate, build things. Heartbroken people do it, people who have lost love.” As Angels shows, movement has become the fundamental ethos of contemporary American society; we must keep moving in the face of any dissatisfaction in order that we might escape it. Motion allows us to conceive of devastation—and the dissatisfaction it produces—as something we might leave behind, provided we move fast enough. The enjoyment that so many Americans derive from driving their cars on the open road—“leaving their cares behind”—exemplifies this idea. While moving rapidly, one can readily imagine that one can overcome all distance and eliminate the gap that distance creates. This conception of the fast-moving car as a way of escaping dissatisfaction gets played out in almost every “road movie” that Hollywood produces. In Ridley Scott’s Thelma and Louise (1991),for instance, Thelma (Geena Davis) and Louise(Susan Sarandon) take to the road after Louise shoots a man who attempted to rape Thelma. Even though the police finally catch up to them, the movement of the car provides a sense of respite for both Thelma and Louise, a sense of respite that lasts for as long as they remain moving. This movement prompts Thelma to tell Louise that, for the first time in her life, she feels “awake.” To be “awake” is to be enjoying oneself, and the movement in the car makes it possible for Thelma to enjoy in a way she never has before. The ending of the film illustrates this even further: cornered by the police, Thelma and Louise decide to drive their car into the Grand Canyon—to die in motion—rather than to allow the police to put a stop to their movement by arresting them. In their attempt to escape dis-satisfaction through motion, Thelma and Louise exemplify contemporary subjectivity. This impulse to move, to eliminate distance, makes it impossible to recognize the crisis of the AIDS epidemic, which represents a Real that movement cannot outrun. The failure to experience the Real of the AIDS crisis, the failure to experience the AIDS crisis as the trauma of human existence itself, reaches its apotheosis in the most memorable figure in Kushner’s play—the character of Roy Cohn. We first see Roy, in the second scene of Millennium Approaches, sitting at his desk and yet, at the same time, in an exaggerated state of motion. As Kushner’s stage directions indicate, “Roy conducts business with great energy, impatience and sensual abandon: gesticulating, shouting, cajoling, crooning, playing the phone, receiver and hold button with virtuosity and love.” Completely committed to nonstop movement and activity, he tells Joe, “I wish I was an octopus, a fucking octopus. Eight loving arms and all those suckers”(1:11).More arms means more possibility for activity and motion. All of this frenetic activity—and all of Roy’s connections to the activity of them powerful in the country—is driven by Roy’s avoidance of dissatisfaction. Insofar as he keeps moving, Roy can convince himself that dissatisfaction plagues other people, not him. He knows that there is dissatisfaction in existence—as he tells Joe, “Life is full of horror”(1:58)—but he believes that he (and a cer-tain few) can outrun it. This becomes even more apparent in Roy’s response to the news that he has AIDS. Power, for Roy, means being plugged in to a movement that can remove him from any dissatisfaction that he encounters. When he learns that he has AIDS—that is, when he learns that he is going to die very soon and, much more importantly, that his homosexuality may become public—Roy immedi-ately invokes his connections to power in order to deny this. In the most famous line of the play, he tells Henry, his doctor, “AIDS is what homosexu-als have.I have liver cancer”(1:46),thereby fleeing the dissatisfaction that he associates with the disease and with homosexuality. Roy believes that through nonstop motion he can eliminate all sense of lack. Whereas Louis flees lack via his own personal movement, Roy does so through his identification with the movement of history itself. This kind of identification acts as a bulwark against his own mortality (i.e., his own failure to enjoy).He proclaims to Ethel Rosenberg, “I’m immortal. Ethel.[...] I have forced my way into history. I ain’t never gonna die”(1:112,Kushner’s emphasis).Entering into the greatmotion of history itself—what Roy sees himself doing here—represents theethos of perpetual motion taken to its endpoint. When one enters into the nonstop motion of history, one enters into eternal enjoyment: distance no longer infects one in this domain. In a society of enjoyment, subjects work to avoid anything that erects a barrier to enjoyment. This is why, as Roy Cohn recognizes, contemporary America has no use for those who are sick or aged. He tells Ethel Rosenberg: The worst thing about being sick in America, Ethel,is you are booted out of the parade. Americans have no use for sick. Look at Reagan: He’s so healthy he’s hardly human, he’s a hundred if he’s a day, he takes a slug in his chest and two days later he’s out west riding ponies in his PJ’s.I mean who does that? That’s America. It’s just no country for the infirm.(2:62) America “is no country for the in firm ”because infirmity indicates a failure of enjoyment. To be sick is thus to be guilty. The sick illustrate the persistence of dissatisfaction and distance within the society of enjoyment. In acknowl-edging the sick,one acknowledges lack as well. Hence, like Roy Cohn, we opt instead for nonstop motion, for trying to eliminate the distance that the sick would introduce into the contemporary world. Through this focus on Roy Cohn (clearly the most compelling character in Angels), Kushner demonstrates the power and appeal of the ethos of motion: it allows us to cover over the experience of dissatisfaction, to imagine ourselves in a state of complete enjoyment.

The impact is violence – as the fantasy fails the only option is to find an external enemy to blame in order to sustain our internal conception of totality

Stavrakakis 99 [Yannis Stavrakakis, member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. “Lacan & the Political.” Routledge.] AP

In the light of our theoretical framework, fantasy can only exist as the negation of real dislocation, as a negation of the generalised lack, the antagonism that crosses the field of the social. Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production. Yet any promise of absolute positivity—the construction of an imaginarised false real—is founded on a violent/negative origin; it is sustained by the exclusion of a real—a non-domesticated real—which always returns to its place. Sustaining a promise of full positivity leads to a proliferation of negativity. As we have already pointed out, the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. Since the realisation of the utopian fantasy is impossible, utopian discourse can remain hegemonically appealing only if it attributes this impossibility—that is to say, its own ultimate impossibility—to an alien intruder. As Sartre has put it ‘the anti-Semite is in the unhappy position of having a vital need for the very enemy he wishes to destroy’ (Sartre, 1995:28). The impossibility of the Nazi utopia cannot be incorporated within utopian discourse. This truth is not easy to admit; it is easier to attribute all negativity to the Jew: All that is bad in society (crises, wars, famines, upheavals, and revolts) is directly or indirectly imputable to him. The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be found to be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonising and infinite responsibility. Thus he localises all the evil of the universe in the Jews. (Sartre, 1995:40)12 As Jerrold Post has pointed out, we are always bound to those we hate: ‘We need enemies to keep our treasured—and idealised—selves intact’ (Post, 1996:28–9). And this for ‘fear of being free’ (Sartre, 1995:27). The fantasy of attaining a perfect harmonious world, of realising the universal, can only be sustained through the construction/localisation of a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated but, instead, has to be eliminated. There exists then a crucial dialectic between the universal fantasy of utopia and the particularity of the—always local—enemy who is posited as negating it. The result of this dialectic is always the same: The tragic paradox of utopianism has been that instead of bringing about, as it promised, a system of final and permanent stability, it gave rise to utter restlessness, and in place of a reconciliation between human freedom and social cohesion, it brought totalitarian coercion. (Talmon, 1971:95)

**The alternative is to engage in the Act – in the face of the decision of action presented by the 1AC, we instead make the impossible Third choice to disengage from the moment and reorient ourselves in terms of the problem – only then can we disengage from fantasy**

**Zizek 06** [Slavoj Zizek. “The Parallax View.” MIT Press. February 17, 2006.] AP

The universe of cartoons obeys two opposing rules, both of which violate the logic of our ordinary reality. First, a cat is walking above the precipice, with no ground beneath its feet, but it falls down only when it looks down and realizes that there is no firm ground beneath its feet. Second, a character witnesses an act which goes against his interests (someone is driving along in his stolen car, and so on); he smiles benignly, even waves at the passerby, becoming aware only when it is already too late that the car is his own—at that point only, the smile changes into consternation. . . .What these two opposing gags share is the temporal delay: the body falls down only when it becomes aware of its lack of ground; the character notices too late that the process going on in front of him affects him. . . .The role of awareness, however, is inverted: the first case is similar to the one of quantum physics, since taking note of it, registration, being aware of-it, is the condition of the event’s actualization—it actually happens only when one becomes aware of one’s situation; in the second case, awareness comes too late, after the thing has already taken place—not behind the subject’s back, but in full view—and the comic effect occurs when we see the subject clearly seeing what is going on in front of him (someone driving his own car) without being aware of what this means, of how it affects him, of how he is involved in it. Although the two procedures seem surreal, even ridiculous, in both of them a real-life situation reverberates. Is it not true that when a political system is in deep crisis, it drags on only because it doesn’t notice that it is already dead—the moment when those in power (as we usually put it) “lose faith in themselves,” stop believing in themselves, admit that the game is up, is crucial. And there is always a temporal gap between this awareness that “the game is up” and the actual loss of power—those in power can prolong their desperate hold on it; battles can go on, with lots of blood and corpses, even if the game is already up. This same political process of disintegration of a power structure also provides the case of the second process in which consciousness is out of sync with the actual state of things: those in power are not aware that their time is over, that the process they are watching is their own funeral, so they smile and wave like the idiot who waves at the guy driving away his own car. . . . The two opposing procedures can thus be united in a single process: a catastrophic X occurs, but the affected agent remains unaware of it and goes on with life as usual; only when it registers/perceives its state is the catastrophe actualized, does it strike with full force.1 Is this not also the ultimate lesson of Benjamin Libet’s famous experiment (on which more below)?2 Consciousness is in itself deprived of any substantial role, merely registering a process that goes on independently of it—yet this registration is crucial if the “objective” process is to actualize itself. Toward the end of Spielberg’s Minority Report,3 there is a moment which stages something like an ethical act proper. John Anderton (Tom Cruise) finally confronts the man who, six years before, was supposed to have raped and killed his little son;4 when he is on the verge of shooting the killer (as he was predetermined to do, according to the vision of the three “precognitives”), he stops, blocking the execution of his decision, arresting his gesture—does he not thereby confirm Libet’s “Hegelian” insight into how the elementary act of freedom, the manifestation of free will, is that of saying no, of stopping the execution of a decision? At its most elementary, freedom is not the freedom to do as you like (that is, to follow your inclinations without any externally imposed constraints), but to do what you do not want to do, to thwart the “spontaneous” realization of an impetus. This is the link between freedom and the Freudian “death drive,” which is also a drive to sabotage one’s inclination toward pleasure. And is this not why Freud was so fascinated by Michelangelo’s Moses? He read the statue as depicting the moment when, full of rage and intending to smash the tablets containing the Decalogue, Moses summons up the strength to stop his act in the midst of its execution. So when Daniel Wegner,5 in a very Kantian way, claims that “[a] voluntary action is something a person can do when asked,” the implication is precisely that we thus obey an order which goes against our spontaneous inclination. Here, Badiou is wrong: the elementary ethical gesture is a negative one, the one of blocking one’s direct inclination. This free act fundamentally changes the coordinates of the entire situation: Anderton breaks the closure of future/past possibility. The idea that the emergence of a radically New retroactively changes the past—not the actual past, of course (we are not in science fiction), but past possibilities, or, to put it in more formal terms, the truth value of the modal propositions about the past—was first explored by Henri Bergson. In “Two Sources of Morality and Religion,” Bergson describes the strange sensations he experienced on August 4, 1914, when war was declared between France and Germany: “In spite of my turmoil, and although a war, even a victorious one, appeared to me as a catastrophe, I experienced what [William] James spoke about, a feeling of admiration for the facility of the passage from the abstract to the concrete: who would have thought that such a formidable event can emerge in reality with so little fuss?”6 The modality of the break between before and after is crucial here: before its outbreak, the war appeared to Bergson “simultaneously probable and impossible: a complex and contradictory notion which persisted to the end”;7 afterward, all of a sudden it become real and possible, and the paradox resides in this retroactive appearance of probability: I never pretended that one can insert reality into the past and thus work backwards in time. However, one can without any doubt insert there the possible, or, rather, at every moment, the possible inserts itself there. Insofar as unpredictable and new reality creates itself, its image reflects itself behind itself in the indefinite past: this new reality finds itself all the time having been possible; but it is only at the precise moment of its actual emergence that it begins to always have been, and this is why I say that its possibility, which does not precede its reality, will have preceded it once this reality emerges.8 Such experiences show the limitation of the ordinary “historical” notion of time: at each moment of time, there are multiple possibilities waiting to be realized; once one of them actualizes itself, the others are cancelled. The supreme case of such an agent the solar parallax: the unbearable lightness of being no one of historical time is the Leibnizian God, who created the best possible world: before creation, he had in his mind the entire panoply of possible worlds, and his decision consisted in choosing the best one among these options. Here, possibility precedes choice: the choice is a choice among possibilities. What is unthinkable within this horizon of linear historical evolution is the notion of a choice/act which retroactively opens up its own possibility.9 This is exactly what Anderton does with his negative act: he breaks the closed circle of determinism which legitimizes preemptive arrests, and introduces the moment of ontological openness.10 It does not simply “change the future”; it changes the future by changing the past itself (in the Bergsonian sense of inserting a new possibility into it).

# 2NC Links

## 2NC Link – Disabilities

**There are two links –**

**First is castration – subjects deny the fact of their symbolic castration by inscribing the relic of the Real onto the disabled body**

**Wilton 03** [Robert D. Wilton, School of Geography and Geology, McMaster University. “Locating physical disability in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis: problems and prospects.” Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 2003] AP

However, the denial of castration takes place not just through displacement on to female bodies, but also through projection on to other bodies. Lacan makes frequent reference to the corporeal cost of subjectivity as ‘the bloody scrap’ or ‘the pound of flesh’ that is cut from the body as a condition for entering the symbolic. The following excerpt is from a discussion concerning the creation of the desiring subject (also Lacan 1977b): This moment of cut is haunted by the form of a bloody scrap—the pound of flesh that life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of signifiers, which it is impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost phallus of the embalmed Osiris. (1977a: 265) In one sense these terms function as metaphors to describe the toll exacted by symbolic alienation, but in another sense the ‘cut’ is also inscribed on to the body. While the female genitalia figure as one site of the cut, the loss is not conceptualized exclusively in terms of the penis. In fact, any number of body parts could stand in for the ‘bloody scrap’ (Dean 2000: 49). For this reason, bodies that are culturally constructed as ‘incomplete’—we might think of bodies with amputated limbs as a literal manifestation of the ‘cut’, but also other bodies that are deemed lacking—may serve collectively as a repository for what is lost to the speaking subject. Silverman, in her analysis of the character ‘Homer’ in The Best Years of Our Lives whose hands were amputated due to war wounds, argues that the hooks which replace his hands are positioned, like the female genitals, as a sign of intolerable absence or loss. She continues: Homer’s lack is localized at the level of the body, and because it manifests itself in the guise of stunted limbs and physical helplessness, it also situates him in the position usually reserved for the female subject within classical cinema. (1992: 121) In addition, Hevey (1992) in his analysis of post-war disability imagery contends that although frequently absent from mainstream exhibits, when disabilities were included, they typically came to stand for loss, chaos and disorder. Lacanian theory suggests that physically disabled bodies, like female bodies, are positioned as inferior because of what they supposedly lack. At the same time, the phallic male, non-disabled body is symbolically and materially positioned as necessary for the achievement of power and mastery in both sexual and social terms. Popular images of disability as loss/lack are concomitantly reproduced through the material deprivation and social exclusion that many disabled people face in everyday life.

**Second is death – the disabled subject is created as a projection of the lack – we attempt to avoid death through the construction of the abled-body**

**Wilton 03** [Robert D. Wilton, School of Geography and Geology, McMaster University. “Locating physical disability in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis: problems and prospects.” Social & Cultural Geography, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 2003] AP

Lacanian castration and the death drive The preceding analysis has been concerned primarily with symbolic castration and its relation to the phallus as penis. However, shifting attention from the phallus toward a consideration of the spectre of mortality may allow us to suggest additional meaning for the privileged signifier in its relation to the disabled body. For Lacan, as for Freud, death and the death drive play a central role in life (Ragland 1995). Life is characterized by loss, but it is this loss—a product of symbolic alienation—that paradoxically allows the subject to exist. Lacan uses the concept of a ‘second death’, as distinct from animal death, to describe this experience of loss. In this formulation: ‘a palpable void lies at the heart of language, being, and body’ (Ragland 1995: 87). Humans strive to fill this void, pursuing objects within symbolic reality for the sake of fantasy. Concomitantly, they strive for a: ‘consistency of meaning that protects the imaginary body from encountering the holes where the pain of the real … enters thought’ (1995: 99). This consistency of meaning is designed to avoid confrontation with the death/loss that is a defining characteristic of human existence. The implications of this formulation for the cultural construction of disability can be explored by suggesting that the avoidance of death/loss is made possible in part through the ‘illusory plenitude’ of the able-body. In this sense, the privileged signifier is inscribed on to/possessed by the physically fit and aesthetically pleasing body—the body that is in great shape because it bears no signs of decay. And yet there is also a denial here. As we saw earlier, the body’s growth and development is at the same time its inexorable march toward death. In the introduction to Lacan’s Feminine Sexuality, Rose argues that: ‘as the place onto which lack is projected and through which it is simultaneously disavowed, woman is a “symptom” for the man’ (1983: 48). This same formula, with its medical theme, is well suited to thinking about the positioning of the disabled body as a ‘symptom’—a site on to which the knowledge of the body’s ultimate loss is projected. In this sense, two losses—castration and death—may intersect in the cultural construction of disabled bodies. Yet what produces anxiety here, unlike the Freudian formulation, is not what is missing, but precisely the opposite. The supposed integrity of the able-body, like the illusory wholeness of the phallic male, is sustained by the localization of the lack in the body of an-Other.

## 2NC Link – Deterrence

**You misread deterrence theory – the threat of the failure of MAD is precisely it’s function – we must reject deterrence as a linear theory and instead embrace it as way to touch the Real**

**Zizek 03** [Slavoj Zizek. “Gerhard Schroeder's Minority Report and Its Consequences.” Frankfurter Rundschau. January 03. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/zizek-gerhard-schroeders-minority-report-and-its-consequences/>] AP

The paradox is here a very precise one: the MAD strategy works not because it is perfect, but on account of its very imperfection. That is to say, a perfect strategy (if one sides nukes the other, the other will automatically respond, and both sides will thus be destroyed) has a fatal flaw: what if the attacking side counts on the fact that, even after its first strike, the opponent continues to act as a rational agent? His choice is now: with his country mostly destroyed, he can either strike back, thus causing total catastrophy, the end of humanity, or NOT STRIKE BACK, thus enabling the survival of humanity and thereby at least the possibility of a later revival of his own country? A rational agent would choose the second option… What makes the strategy efficient is the very fact that we cannot ever be sure that it will work perfectly: what if a situation spirals out of control for a variety of easily imaginable reasons (from the »irrational« aggressivity of the one part to simple technological failures or miscommunications)? It is because of this permanent threat that both sides do not want to come even too close to the prospect of MAD, so they avoid even conventional war: if the strategy were perfect, it would, on the opposite, endorse the attitude »Let's fight a full conventional war, since we both know that no side will risk the fateful step towards a nuclear strike!« So the actual constellation of MAD is not »If we follow the MAD strategy, the nuclear catastrophy will not take place,« but: »If we follow the MAD strategy, the nuclear catastrophy will not take place, expect for some imprevisible incident.« And the same goes today for the prospect of the ecological catastrophy: if we do nothing, it will occur, and if we do all we can do, it will not occur, expect for some imprevisible accident. This “imprevisible factor” is precisely the remainder of the Real which disturbs the perfect self-closure of the »time of the project« – if we write this time as a circle, it is a cut which prevents the full closure of the circle (exactly the way Lacan writes l'objet petit a). What confirms this paradoxical status of e is that, in it, possibility and impossibility, positive and negative, coincide: it renders the strategy of prevention effective precisely insofar as it hinders its full efficiency. It is thus crucial not to perceive this »catastrophist strategy« in the old terms of linear historical causality: it does not work because today, we are faced with multiple possibilities of future, and, within this multitude, we chose the option to act as to prevent a catastrophy. Since the catastrophy cannot be »domesticated« as just another possibility, the only option is to posit it as real: »one has to inscribe the catastrophy into the future in a much more radical way. One has to render it unavoidable.«[23]

## 2NC Link – Economy

The ideal market is impossible – their fantasy constructions fail to confront the role of desire within our constructions of economics, turning the aff

Schroeder 98 [Jeanne L. Schroeder. “The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 112, No. 2. December 1998. JSTOR.] AP

Confronting what I have called the erotic origins of market theory causes us to blush with the same shame we feel when forced to consider our own erotic origins in the parental marriage bed. In both cases, we fear to gaze into the abyss. Why? I believe the answer lies in the psychoanalytic nature of the perfect market. The ideal of the perfect market is located in the Real, while actual markets are located in the intersubjective order of the "Symbolic." The perfect market is therefore the death of the actual market. The perfect market is an extraordinary world with no differentiation, no time, no space, no desire, no exchange, no objects - no subjectivity. Consequently, we cannot bear to contemplate the ideal of the perfect market directly, even as we cannot resist our desire for it. Instead, we erect in the "Imaginary" unthreatening fantasy images of the market that seem more satisfying than actual markets, yet less terrifying than perfect markets. Indeed, being Real and neither Imaginary nor Symbolic, the perfect market is not merely impossible, it is literally unimaginable and unspeakable. In order to continue to create, we must follow our desire. Yet we will lose the object of desire if we try to confront the fantasies we erect to stand in its place, as Orpheus found out when he tried to embrace Eurydice. Moreover, . The ideal of the perfect market can never be achieved because to do so would destroy the actual market and our freedom. We dare not give way to our desire. What I am suggesting is that scholars may resist confronting their own ideal of the perfect market because they unconsciously fear that if they do so, they will have to abandon their fantasy structure. I argue that a close examination of the "perfect market" reveals that it is not merely empirically, but also theoretically, impossible. As such, it is not merely a poor tool for the study of actual markets - it may also impede that study. One might suggest that the impossibility of the perfect market is irrelevant to economic analysis. All ideals, this argument would posit, are impossible. And yet, it would continue, this does not mean that we should not strive to be as close to the ideal as possible. Although a more sophisticated analysis may be of some interest, this specific simplistic analysis is inept. First and foremost, I agree that one should not necessarily give up an ideal one has adopted for logical, religious, or other grounds-such as freedom, justice, grace, or whatever - just because it is em-pirically impossible. Rather, such ideals serve as one's inspiration even if they are not reasonable aspirations. My complaint about this strain of law and economics is not the empirical impossibility of the ideal, but the failure of economists to consider the implications of having a theoretically impossible ideal. This failure can lead to the incorrect conclusions that the goal has already been reached or is within sight, or that one's policy recommendations will result in the achievement of something close to the ideal, which can in turn result in complacency.

## 2NC Link - Equity

**The liberal concept of distributive justice assumes an impossible rational subject that can withdraw from the coordinates of the system – we instead must interrogate the false connection between desire and the “true interests” of the community**

**Zizek 93** [Slavoj Zizek. “Tarrying with the Negative.” 1993. http://www.revalvaatio.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/%EF%BF%BDi%EF%BF%BDek-tarrying-with-the-negative.pdf] AP

What truly disturbs liberals is therefore enjoyment organized in the form of self-sufficient ethnic communities. It is against this background that we should consider the ambiguous consequences of the politics of school busing in the U.S.A., for example. Its principal aim, of course, was to surmount racist barriers: children from black communities would widen their cultural horizons by partaking in the white way of life, children from white communities would experience the nullity of racial prejudices by way of contacts with blacks, etc. Yet, inextricably, another logic was entwined in this project, especially where school busing was externally imposed by the "enlightened" state bureaucracy: to destroy the enjoyment of the closed ethnic communities by abrogating their boundaries. For this reason, school busing -- insofar as it was experienced by the concerned communities as imposed from outside -- reinforced or to some extent even generated racism where previously there was a desire of an ethnic community to maintain the closure of its way of life, a desire which is not in itself "racist" (as liberals themselves admit through their fascination with exotic "modes of life" of others). 15 What one should do here is to call into question the entire theoretical apparatus that sustains this liberal attitude, up to its Frankfurt-school-psychoanalytical pièce de résistance, the theory of the so-called "authoritarian personality": the "authoritarian personality" ultimately designates that form of subjectivity which "irrationally" insists on its specific way of life and, in the name of its self-enjoyment, resists liberal proofs of its supposed "true interests." The theory of the "authoritarian personality" is nothing but an expression of the ressentiment of the left-liberal intelligentsia apropos of the fact that the "non-enlightened" working classes were not prepared to accept its guidance: an expression of the intelligentsia's inability to offer a positive theory of this resistance. 16 The impasses of school busing also enable us to delineate the inherent limitation of the liberal political ethic as it was articulated in John Rawls's theory of distributive justice. 17 That is to say, school busing fully meets the conditions of distributive justice (it stands the trial of what Rawls calls the "veil of ignorance"): it procures a more just distribution of social goods, it equalizes the chances for success of the individuals from different social strata, etc. Yet the paradox is that everyone, including those deemed to profit most by busing, somehow felt cheated and wronged -- why? The dimension infringed upon was precisely that of fantasy. The Rawlsian liberal-democratic idea of distributive justice ultimately relies on "rational" individuals who are able to abstract their particular position of enunciation, to look upon themselves from a neutral place of pure "metalanguage" and thus perceive their "true interests." Such individuals are the supposed subjects of the social contract which establishes the coordinates of justice. What is thereby a priori left out of consideration is the fantasy-space within which a community organizes its "way of life" (its mode of enjoyment): within this space, what "we" desire is inextricably linked to (what we perceive as) the other's desire, so that what "we" desire may turn out to be the very destruction of our object of desire (if, in this way, we deal a blow to the other's desire). In other words, human desire, insofar as it is always already mediated by fantasy, can never be grounded in (or translated back into) our "true interests": the ultimate assertion of our desire, sometimes the only way to assert its autonomy in the face of a "benevolent" other providing for our Good, is to act against our Good. 18

## 2NC Link – Hegemony

The myth of hegemony merely plays into the fantasy of wholeness – the world can never be mastered by one power

Stavrakakis 99 [Yannis Stavrakakis, member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. “Lacan & the Political.” Routledge.] AP

Fantasies of mastery, especially mastery of knowledge, have direct political significance. Thomas Richards, in his book The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of the Empire, explores the importance of fantasy in the construction of the British empire. There is no doubt that no nation can close its hand around the whole of the world. In that sense an empire is always, at least partly, a fiction. Absolute political control is impossible due to a variety of reasons, such as the lack of information and control in distant parts of the imperial territory. This gap in knowledge (in the symbolic constitution of the empire) and control, was covered over by the fantasy construction of the imperial archive, ‘a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of state and empire’. In that sense ‘the myth of imperial archive brought together in fantasy what was breaking apart in fact’ and was thus shared widely; it even had an impact in policymaking (Richards, 1993:6). This imperial archive was not a real museum or a real library, it was not a building or a collection of texts, but a fantasy of projected total knowledge: it constituted a ‘collectively imagined junction of all that was known or knowable, a fantastic representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal point for the heterogeneous local knowledge of metropolis and empire’ (Richards, 1993:11). In this utopian space, disorder was transformed to order, heterogeneity to homogeneity and lack of political control and information to an imaginary empire of knowledge and power. It is this constitutive play which can help illuminate a series of political questions and lead to a novel approach to political analysis. As an illustration let us examine a concrete problem of political analysis. How are we, for example, to account for the emergence and the hegemonic force of apartheid discourse in South Africa? Is this emergence due to a positively defined cause (class struggle, etc.)? What becomes apparent now, in light of the structural causality of the political, is that the reasons for the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s are not to be found in some sort of ‘objective’ conditions (Norval, 1996:51). Apartheid can be traced back to the dislocations that conditioned the emergence of this Afrikaner nationalist discourse (associated, among others, with the increasing capitalisation of agriculture, the rate of urbanisation and events such as the Great War). The articulation of a new political discourse can only make sense against the background of the dislocation of the preceding socio-political order or ideological space. It is the lack created by dislocation that causes the desire for a new discursive articulation. It is this lack created by a dislocation of the social which forms the kernel of the political as an encounter with the Lacanian real. Every dislocatory event leads to the antagonistic articulation of different discourses that attempt to symbolise its traumatic nature, to suture the lack it creates. In that sense the political stands at the root of politics, dislocation at the root of the articulation of a new socio-political order, an encounter with the real moment of the political at the root of our symbolisation of political reality. Underlying Lacan’s importance for political theory and political analysis is his insistence on the split, lacking nature of the symbolic, of the sociopolitical world per se. Our societies are never harmonious ensembles. This is only the fantasy through which they attempt to constitute and reconstitute themselves. Experience shows that this fantasy can never be fully realised. No social fantasy can fill the lack around which society is always structured. This lack is re-emerging with every resurfacing of the political, with every encounter with the real. We can speak about the political exactly because there is subversion and dislocation of the social. The level of social construction, of human creativity, of the emergence and development of socio-political institutions, is the level in which the possibility of mastering the real makes itself visible but only to be revealed as a chimera unable to foreclose a moment of impossibility that always returns to its place. Given this context, the moment of the political should be understood as emerging at the intersection of our symbolic reality with this real, the real being the ontological horizon of every play between political articulation and dislocation, order and disorder, politics and the political.2

## 2NC Link – Humanitarianism

**Humanitarian rhetoric masks the false neutralization of the situation – the world can never be framed into an object to be fixed by a neutral third party – leads to the worst forms of intervention and ignores the actual problem**

**Zizek 97** [Slavoj Zizek. “The Plague of Fantasies.” Verso. 1997.] AP

The fifth feature: on accounpofits temporal loop, the phantasmic narrative always involves an impossible gaze, the gaze by means of which the subject is already present at the act of his/her own conception. An exemplary case of this vicious cycle in the service of ideology is an anti-abortion fairy-tale written in the 1980s by a right-wing Slovene nationalist poet The tale is set on an idyllic South Sea island where aborted children live together without their parents: although their life is nice and calm, they miss parental love and spend their time in sad reflection on how it is that their parents preferred a career or a luxurious holiday to themselves ... The trick, of course, lies in the fact that the aborted children are presented as having been born, only born into an alternative universe (the lone Pacific island), retaining the memory of parents who 'betrayed' them - in this way they can direct at their parents a reproachful gaze which makes them guilty/\* Apropos of a phantasmic scene, the question to be asked is thus always: for which gaze is it staged? Which narrative is it destined to support? According to some recently published documents, the British General Michael Rose, head of the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, and his special team of SAS operatives, definitely had a 'hidden agenda' in Bosnia: under the pretence of maintaining a truce between the so-called 'warring factions', their secret task was also to place the blame on the Croats, and especially the Muslims (soon after the fall of Srebrenica, for example, Rose's operatives suddenly 'discovered', in northern Bosnia, some Serb bodies allegedly slaughtered by the Muslims; their attempts to 'mediate' between Muslims and Croats actually inflamed the conflict between them, etc); these diversions were intended to create the perception of the Bosnian conflict as a kind of 'tribal warfare', a civil war of everybody against everybody else in which 'all sides are equally to blame'. Instead of a clear condemnation of the Serb aggression, this perception was destined to prepare the terrain for an international effort of 'pacification' which would 'reconcile the warring factions'. From a sovereign state, the victim of aggression, Bosnia was suddenly transformed into a chaotic place in which 'power-mad warlords' acted out their historical traumas at the expense of innocent women and children... Lurking in the background, of course, is the pro-Serbian 'insight' according to which peace in Bosnia is possible only if we do not 'demonize' one side in the conflict: responsibility is to be equally distributed, with the West assuming the role of the neutral judge elevated above local tribal conflicts. The key point for our analysis is that General Rose's pro-Serb 'secret war' on the terrain itself was not trying to change the relations between military forces but, rather, to prepare the ground for a different narrative perception of the situation: 'real' military activity itself was here in the service of ideological narrativization.1\* And, incidentally, the key event which functioned as a kind of point decaption in turning the held perspective on the Bosnian war hitherto upside down, and brought about its depoliticized renarrativization as a 'humanitarian catastrophe', was Francois Mitterrand's visit to Sarajevo in the summer of ipp2. One is even tempted to postulate that General Rose was sent to Bosnia in order to realize Mitterrand's vision of the conflict on the ground. That is to say: until Mitterrand's visit, the predominant perception of the Bosnian conflict was still a political one: in dealing with Serb aggression, the key problem was the aggression of ex-Yugoslavia against an independent sate; after Mitterrand left, the accent shifted towards a humanitarian aspect - down there, a savage tribal war is going on, and the only thing the civilized West can do is to exert its influence to assuage the inflamed passions and help the innocent victims with food and medicine. Precisely through his display of compassion towards the suffering people of Sarajevo, Mitterrand's visit dealt the crucial blow to Bosnian interests - it functioned as the key factor of political neutralization in the international perception of the conflict Or as vice-president of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ejup Ganic put it in an interview: 'First we were glad to receive Mitterrand, hoping that his visit signals a true concern of the West All of a sudden, however, we grasped that we are lost' However, the key point is that this gaze of the external innocent observer for whom the spectacle of tribal warfare in the Balkans' was staged, has the same 'impossible' status as the gaze of the aborted children born into a different reality in the Slovene anti-abortion fairy-tale: the gaze of the innocent observer is also in a way nonexistent, since this gaze is the impossible neutral gaze of someone who falsely exempts himself from his concrete historical existence - that is, from his actual involvement in the Bosnian conflict The same operation is easily discernible in the abundant media reports on the 'saintly activities of Mother Teresa in Calcutta, which clearly rely on the phantasmic screen of the Third World. Calcutta is regularly presented as a Hell on Earth, the exemplary case of the decaying Third World megalopolis, full of social decay, poverty, violence and corruption, with its residents caught in terminal apathy (the facts are, of course, rather different: Calcutta is a city bursting with activity, culturally much more thriving than Bombay, with x successful local Communist government maintaining a whole network of social services). Into this picture of utter gloom, Mother Teresa brings a ray of hope to the dejected with the message that poverty is to be accepted as a way to redemption, since the poor, in enduring their sad fate with silent dignity and faith, repeat Christ's Way of the Cross... The ideological benefit of this operation is double: in so far as she suggests to the poor and terminally ill that they should seek salvation in their veiy suffering, Mother Teresa deters them from probing into the causes of their predicament - from politicizing their situation; at the same time, she offers the rich from the West the chance of a kind of substitute-redemption by making financial contributions to her charitable activity. Again, all this works against the background of the phantasmic image of the Third World as Hell on Earth, as a place so utterly desolate that no political activity, only charity and compassion, can alleviate the suffering.20

## 2NC Link – Natives

**The view of Native America as foundationally distinct from Euro-America is a romantic view by which violence is enacted against Native American populations as the object in opposition to our subjectivity**

**Carriere 94** [Jean Louise Carriere, Associate Professor of Law at Tulane, “ARTICLE: Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act,” Iowa Law Review, March 1994]

During the decade immediately preceding passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, [n2](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n2) a two-edged image of Native Americans, [n3](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n3) typified by McGeorge Bundy's remark, prevailed in the United States. On the one hand, Native American tribes were viewed as transmitters of distinctive cultural values that could rekindle a burnt-out Euro-Americanethos. Popular culture used Native American themes both to condemn Euro-American's rugged individualist vision and its consequences and to offer a refuge from them. [n5](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n5) The best-selling history Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee described a pageant of national violence in the name of right that reinforced the daily message of Vietnam, while satisfying the craving for heroism by pointing to the self-sacrifice of Native American tribal leaders. [n6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n6) An emerging film genre, termed the "Indian Western," [n7](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n7) depicted nineteenth century brutalizations of Native Americans as precursors to the [\*588] massacre at My Lai. [n8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n8) Tribal life, in contrast, was represented as nurturing and tolerant, as in the film Little Big Man, [n9](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n9) and as holding out, in A Man Called Horse, [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n10) the hope of inclusion and transformation to non-Native Americans. In his series of murder mysteries, Tony Hillerman began depicting a Navajo reservation as a harmonious landscape where his Native American detectives restore order by relying on their community's ancient sense of the interrelationship of things and people. [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n11) Native American social characteristics were wistfully viewed by popular culture as the lost chance for an America in which the problems of the age -- from environmental abuse to competitive angst -- would never have occurred.[n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n12) Though the cultural differences that represented Native American constituted both an indictment of and a utopia to Euro-American, Euro-American culture regarded these same differences as perpetuating the disadvantages that Native Americans suffered. [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n13) According to the popular image, the same heritage that formed Native American's principal appeal defeated its efforts to escape the unhappy status described by Bundy. [n14](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n14) Tribal traditionalists retreated into stoic passivity, valuing collective reaction over individual initiative. [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n15) Even Native Americans who succeeded in making the transition to the relative social isolation of nontribal life off the reservations could not escape this characterization. Majoritarian culture represented them as likely to abandon personal achievement in order to return to the group. [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n16) The effects of generations of persecution seemed [\*589] intensified in Native American culture, which, "[f]rom the viewpoint of what makes a modern civilization work," appeared "hopelessly irrelevant." [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n17) The romantic landscape of Native America was inhabited by equally romantic characters, heroic and doomed. Uncritical acceptance of this representation of the Native American is dangerous; it enables Euro-American culture to avoid evaluating the role of its own domination in creating the subordinate culture's disadvantaged status. Euro-America's version of Native America illustrates a phenomenon characteristic of relationships between dominant cultures and subordinate ones: The dominant culture constructs the subordinate culture as the source of its own and its members' subordination. Subordination then appears inevitable unless the members of the subordinate culture desert it. [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n18) In this fiction, the majoritarian culture represents its actions not as self-serving, but instead as saving the subordinate culture from itself, and its members from it. [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n19) In the majoritarian view, dominance becomes not only inevitable, but also the right thing to do. Law displaces weapons as the means of accomplishing dominance, but the goal and its effect remain the same. [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n20)This Article explores how the cultural construction of the Native American operates in the emerging law of concurrent jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and perpetuates the subordination of Native American culture, families, and individuals -- a subordination that the Act ostensibly counters. Examining the influence of cultural construction provides an understanding of the limitations on concurrent jurisdiction under the Act, and illuminates the larger issue of the operation of cultural domination through law. The publicly avowed purpose of the ICWA was to end forced acculturation of Native American children into Euro-American society by recognizing a predominantly tribal jurisdiction over tribal child welfare cases. Close examination of the Act's application in [\*590] the area of concurrent jurisdiction reveals the limits on the dominant culture's willingness to abandon its own representation of the subordinate culture and its control over it. This Article is not about Native Americans; it is about how Euro-Americans think of Native Americans and how that thinking shapes one area of Native American rights law. In Part I, this Article sets forth Euro-American law's representation of the Native American in terms of the subject-object binary in culturalist literary theory. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n21) The remainder of the Article examines concurrent jurisdiction cases in light of the subject-object theory in order to arrive at an understanding of the operation of the ICWA's concurrent jurisdiction provision and to suggest a remedy for its limitations. Part II demonstrates that the personal and cultural destructiveness of objectifying the Native American created the child welfare crisis in Native American culture. Congress, through the ICWA, attempted to solve the crisis by ensuring the recognition of Native American subjectivity. But Euro-American cultural baggage made the instrument through which recognition of subjectivity was to be achieved -- sovereignty over child welfare cases -- inadequate to perform the task. Part III of this Article examines the self-destructive operation of the ICWA's concurrent jurisdiction provision contained in section 1911(b). It commands state courts to transfer certain Native American child custody cases to tribal courts in the absence of good cause to the contrary. First, this part examines the equation of good cause with the "best interests of the child" standard, which is so embedded in Euro-American law and culture that according it a privileged position in cases falling under the ICWA prevents a Native American subjectivity from emerging. Second, Part III explores section 1911(b)'s good cause language in terms of the procedural concept of forum non conveniens to show that this definition of good cause inevitably produces results inconsistent with a Native American subjectivity. This Article concludes by suggesting an approach for harmonizing the provision for concurrent jurisdiction with the need to engage with, rather than objectify, minority cultures. I. CULTURAL CRITIQUE AND THE ICWA A. The Theory of the Subject The concepts of subject and object in culturalism, a branch of literary criticism, are useful tools for exposing the operation of Euro-American representation of Native American culture. [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview#n22) Theorists do not use the [\*591] terms subject and object uniformly. [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n23) This Article adopts subject, or subject-position, [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n24) to refer to the inaugurator of action and meaning. [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n25) The subject, whether an individual or a group, constitutes the "I" of the sentence for the discourse and is empowered to act and speak in it. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n26) The discourse thus constitutes the subjectivity of those that participate in it. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n27) Though linked with empowerment and identity, the subject is not totally autonomous, but emerges through interaction. According to psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan, the subject develops through "lack"[n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n28) (or, in more political, less psychoanalytic terms, struggle). [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n29) That is, the subject defines itself by encountering that which it perceives as different from it, the Other, and by enunciating the perceived difference. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n30) It can authorize tyranny over those who are different to the extent that it views them as objects, excluded from participation in the discourse, rather than as subjects. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n31)The Native American frequently emerges in Euro-American discourse not as a subject, but as the object of Euro-American knowledge; not as speaking, but as spoken about by a Euro-American subject; not as self-defining, but as defined. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n32) The dominance of Euro-American culture [\*592] meant that once it imputed characteristics to the Native American, he had them, for he had neither the voice to speak for himself, nor the power to act for himself. As Edward W. Said observed concerning the knowledge of a colonized culture, "To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for 'us' to deny autonomy to 'it' . . . since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it." [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n33)The examples of Euro-American culture in the decade prior to the 1978 passage of the ICWA indicate that the culture constituted its members as subjects in various aesthetic and sociological discourses oppositionally. That is, it defined them in contrast to the view of Native Americans; the Native American became a conventionalized foil for Euro-America's self-image. The power of the subject over the object was used to confirm Euro-American identity: The Native American lacked the independence and drive for achievement perceived as normal and necessary not only for success, but even for survival. This view of Native American tribalism confirmed Euro-American independence while simultaneously revealing negative opposites in Euro-American subjectivity: excessive individualism and rapacious materialism. Because according to Lacan, the discovery of lack led the subject to desire completeness, [n34](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n34) characterizing the Native American as an object profoundly different from the Euro-American created a dissonance in Euro-American culture; its simultaneous desire for and fear of the values that it attributed to the Native American led to a conflict in its cultural expressions. Euro-American society could have resolved this conflict in one of two ways. It could have denied the value of the Native American that it objectified by denying either the authenticity of Native America's values or the existence of Euro-America's problems. It did not choose either option. In spite of isolated attempts in this direction, [n35](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.macalester.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.673553.2873579885&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1235602865603&returnToKey=20_T5885115878&parent=docview" \l "n35) Euro-American culture in the early 1990s has increased its romanticization of the Native American.

## 2NC Link – Project/Performance Affs

The affirmative’s impossible demands only perpetuate the status quo – they play the role of radicals while reaping the benefits of the system that they criticize so that they can avoid confronting the object of their true desire

Zizek 02 (Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis,  *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates*, “Passions of the Real, Passions of Semblance”, p. 59-61)

In a strict Lacanian sense of the term, we should thus posit that 'happiness' relies on the subject's inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desire. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we 'officially' desire. Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: it is the happiness of dreaming about things we do not really want. When today's Left bombards the capitalist system with demands that it obviously cannot fulfill (Full employment! Retain the welfare state! Full rights for immigrants!), it is basically playing a game of hysterical provocation, of addressing the Master with a demand which will be impossible for him to meet, and will thus expose his impotence. The problem with this strategy, however, is not only that the system cannot meet these demands, but that, in addition, those who voice them do not really want them to be realized. For example when, 'radical' academics demand full rights for immigrants and opening of the borders, are they aware that the direct implementation of this demand would, for obvious reasons, inundate developed Western countries with millions of newcomers, thus provoking a violent working-class racist backlash which would then endanger the privileged position ofthese very academics? Of course they are, but they count on the fact that their demand will not be met - in this way, they can hypocritically retain their clear radical conscience while continuing to enjoy their privileged position. In 1994, when a new wave of emigration from Cuba to the USA was on the cards, Fidel Castro warned the USA that if they did not stop inciting Cubans to emigrate, Cuba would no longer prevent them from doing it - which the Cuban authorities in effect did a couple of days later, embarrassing the USA with thousands of unwanted newcomers.... Is this not like the proverbial woman who snapped back at a man who was making macho advances to her: 'Shut up, or you'll have to do what you're boasting about!' In both cases, the gesture is that of calling the other's bluff, counting on the fact that what the other really fears is that one will fully comply with his or her demand. And would not the same gesture also throw our radical academics into a panic? Here the old '68 motto 'Soy0ns realistes, demandons l'impossible!' acquires a new cynical and sinister meaning which, perhaps, reveals its truth: 'Let's be realists: we, the academic Left, want to appear critical, while fully enjoying the privileges the system offers us. So let's bombard the system with impossible demands: we all know that these demands won't be met, so we can be sure that nothing will actually change, and we'll maintain our privileged status!' If someone accuses a big corporation of particular financial crimes, he or she is exposed to risks which can go right up to murder attempts; if he or she asks the same corporation to finance a research project into the link between global capitalism and the emergence of hybrid postcolonial identities, he or she stands a good chance of getting hundreds of thousands of dollars.

**Their movement is integrated into hegemonic ideological system – any possibility of radical revolution are transformed into non-challenging limits**

**Zizek 02** [Slavoj Žižek, Critical Inquiry, Winter 2002 (<http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-a-plea-for-leninist-intolerance.html>)]

Habermas designated the present era as that of a neue Undurchsichtlichkeit, the new opacity.' More than ever, our daily experience is mistifying. Modernization generates new obscurantisms; the reduction of freedom is presented to us as the arrival of new freedoms. In these circumstances, one should be especially careful not to confuse the ruling ideology with ideology that seems to dominate. More than ever, one should bear in mind Walter Benjamin's claim that it is not enough to ask how a certain theory (or art) declares itself to stay with regard to social struggles. One should also ask how it effectively functions in these very struggles. In sex, the effectively hegemonic attitude is not patriarchal repression but free promiscuity; in art, provocations in the style of the notorious "Sensation" exhibitions are the norm, an example of art fully integrated into the establishment. One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx's eleventh thesis: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul de sac of debilitating impossibility, leaving one to ask, What can one do against global capital?) but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space; it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who "really want to do something to help people" get involved in (undoubtedly honorable) exploits like Doctors without Borders, Greenpeace, feminist and antiracist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly enter economic territory (say, denouncing and boycotting companies that do not respect ecological conditions or that use child labor). They are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. Let us take two predominant topics from today's American radical academia, postcolonial and queer studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, postcolonial studies tends to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' right to narrate their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms that repress otherness, so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. Thus the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas. The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included, up to a point), but conceptual: notions of European critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of cultural studies chic. With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise; they, at least, play their game in a straight way and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates in contrast to the pseudoradical academic leftists who adopt the attitude of utter disdain toward the Third Way, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture that obliges no one to anything determinate.

## 2NC Link – Racism

**The racialized subject is constructed as a threat to the unified Oedipal family – we must analyze racism from the lens of the unconscious in order to actually deconstruct racial boundaries**

**Nast 2k** [Jeidi J. Nast. “Mapping the “Unconscious”: Racism and the Oedipal Family.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 90, No. 2. June 2000. JSTOR.] AP

Pieterse (1992) and others (e.g., Doty 1996; McClintock 1995,1994; Brantlinger 1986) have explored how blackness in imperializing contexts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was representationally linked into constrictions of the bestial, the incestuous, and that which is filthy, uncivilized, uncontrollable, sinful, or evil. The deployment of blackness as a cultural means of expressing all that is negative is simi-larly remarked upon by contemporary film theo-rist Richard Dyer (1988:45), who notes how blackness is associated with nothingness while whiteness is seen to embody everything and all possibility. Playing off these and other works, I bring "unconscious" desires into theories of landscape production, making the unconscious a strategic effect and device of racist familial constnictions and sociospatial oppressions. I do so by thinking through how blackness has been geographically threaded through, and structurally integrated into, normative sociospatial constructions of the ideal modern oedipal family in the U.S. The word oedipal is key here and refers to both the nuclear family idealized in terms of the triad Fa-ther-Mother-Son, and the ways in which Freud uses the Sophocles's drama Oedipus Rex to repre-sent universal propensities and dangers that fol-low when the triad implodes incestuously upon itself. The context into which Freud reinscribed the classical tragedy was not the extended family of ancient Greece, however, but the idealized nuclear one, a family formed within the structures of industrial capitalism.5 Industrial capitalisms and the nuclear family emerged coincidentally with colonizations throughout Asia and Africa. McClintock (1995) suggests that British colonization in Africa was linked in part to a nostalgic desire to rescue the remnants of a monarchical order in decline, the colonial royal subjects now structurally infan-tilized through "race," their lands deemed anal-ogously underdeveloped (Doty 1996). Thus, lands could be seized from without and run in a feudal way. Similar delusions of aristocratic status informed white supremacy in the U.S. South, a phenomenon especially problematic since there had never been an aristocracy to rescue (Roper 1997: 38, fn.89). It might also be ar-gued that the colonial order set up opportunities for white patriarchs to create families as fictively "nuclear," despite an initial absence of kinship lines with the colonized. Fictive kinship was implied sociospatially in a number of ways, for ex-ample, in the creation and naming of colonial "boys quarters" and, in many colonial plantation contexts, the denial to black men of pater-nal homesteads or positions in their own fami? lies, in the systematic separation of black fathers from their families, and in the placement of black families in quarters behind, but dependent upon, the symbolic big (white) house. The creation of fictive familial dependents undoubtedly shored up the symbolic capital and powers of the (white) father, in turn facilitating the decenter-ing of paternal powers associated with the monarchies to which white-settler communities may have been attached. In the symbolic context of the oedipal family, the white maternal is the symbolic linchpin, whiteness symbolically embodying a (nonincestuous) purity set up structurally in need of pro-tection, geographically and bodily, from incestuous blackness or nonpurity. In this case, embodied geographical rescue is structured to obtain only through a law implicitly white and heteropaternal. Anxieties related to incestuous blackness per se are "unconscious" to the extent that the circumscribed desires are unacknowl-edged and disarticulated from the larger mate-rial achievements that they allow (such as the sociospatial control of black bodies, including the nurturing work of black mammies and mothers). The nineteenth-century demise of slavery in the U.S. saw an intensification of the infantilization of black men and the associated "blackening" of incest in terms of male filial desire, effectively justifying post-Civil War segregationary practices of racial containment. Racially encoding incest justified violently em-bodied spatial forms of white supremacist discipline. Racistly essentializing incest made blackness deserving of spatial isolation, exploitation, and control. Black bodies were, and still are, vilified and controlled through their symbolic positioning as that which opposes civilization and order. Analytically linking white supremacy to formations of the idealized white oedipal family makes plain the material usefulness of white heteropaternal law at many scales. For exam-ple, lawful protection of white familial life requires creating and domesticating the white female as iconic of pure motherhood (cf., Hall 1983:335-36). At the same time, blackness is created as that which threatens the white, pure, and loving (see Frankenberg 1993:81). By racistly opposing white mother and black son, the law keeps both in their lawful place. (White) mother and (black) son are thus effects of what the law is meant to work through and contain in larger political and economic contexts (cf., Pieterse 1992: 172-87). Linking the material usefulness of the oedipal family in various nineteenth- and twentieth-century contexts to unconsciously racialized constructions of incest, makes racism integral to everyone's spatial and psychical life, to the extent that racist colonial practices of some sort historically or presently obtain (see below). In this sense, anti-racist change can not be accomplished singularly through mass movements waged "out there" in places beyond, but in concerted archaeologies of embodied geographical interiorities within which racistly exploitative pasts unconsciously repose, informing individual and collective presents and futures (see Frankenberg 1993).

**Your construction of race presumes its attachment at the level of the Real, rather than the function of the Symbolic—assuming race to be part of the system of visibility makes the impacts to the case inevitable**

**Seshadri-Crooks 2000** [Kalpana, Asst prof English, boston college, Desiring Whiteness, NYC: Routledge, 29-30]

In order to take up in earnest the question of the body and of its constitution as raced, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the ego as body image and racial visibility. First, one must repudiate the notion that race is merely a process of specular identification, where a pre-discursive and pre-raced entity assumes a racial identity on the basis of certain familial others whose image it identifies with in a mirror relation. Such a notion is based on a simplified account of Lacan's concept of the imaginary and the mirror stage. I undertake the following discussion of the imaginary for two reasons: to suggest that insofar as the symbolic underwrites the imaginary, race must be understood as a symbolic phenomenon. It is a logic of difference inaugurated by a signifier, Whiteness, that is grounded in the unconscious structured like a language. This signifier subjects us all equally to its law regardless of our identities as "black," "white," etc. Racial visibility is a remainder of this symbolic system. Second, the process of becoming racially visible is not coterminous with the organization of the ego or the acquisition of the body image. In other words, the visibility of the body does not necessarily have to be a racial visibility. It is important that one disarticulate the two processes; otherwise racial visibility will seem to be an ontological necessity that is a universal verity of subjective existence as such.

## 2NC Link – Security/Threat Construction

**The security threat is always externalized to the immoral Neighbor – this logic is ultimately the root cause of the violence they try to prevent, turning the case**

**Zizek 05** [Slavoj Žižek. “Give Iranian Nukes a Chance” *In These Times*, August 11th, <http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm>]

Every power structure has to rely on an underlying implicit threat, i.e. whatever the official democratic rules and legal constraints may be, we can ultimately do whatever we want to you. In the 20th century, however, the nature of this link between power and the invisible threat that sustains it changed. Existing power structures no longer relied on their own fantasmatic projection of a potential, invisible threat in order to secure the hold over their subjects. Rather, the threat was externalized, displaced onto an Outside Enemy. It became the invisible (and, for that reason, all-powerful and omni-present) threat of this enemy that legitimized the existing power structure's permanent state of emergency. Fascists invoked the threat of the Jewish conspiracy, Stalinists the threat of the class enemy, Americans the threat of Communism-all the way up to today's "war on terror." The threats posed by such an invisible enemy legitimizes the logic of the preemptive strike. Precisely because the threat is virtual, one cannot afford to wait for it to come. Rather, one must strike in advance, before it is too late. In other words, the omni-present invisible threat of Terror legitimizes the all too visible protective measures of defense-which, of course, are what pose the true threat to democracy and human rights (e.g., the London police's recent execution of the innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes). Classic power functioned as a threat that operated precisely by never actualizing itself, by always remaining a threatening gesture. Such functioning reached its climax in the Cold War, when the threat of mutual nuclear destruction had to remain a threat. With the "war on terror", the invisible threat causes the incessant actualization, not of the threat itself, but, of the measures against the threat. The nuclear strike had to remain the threat of a strike, while the threat of the terrorist strike triggers the endless series of preemptive strikes against potential terrorists. We are thus passing from the logic of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to a logic in which ONE SOLE MADMAN runs the entire show and is allowed to enact its paranoia. The power that presents itself as always being under threat, living in mortal danger, and thus merely defending itself, is the most dangerous kind of power-the very model of the Nietzschean ressentiment and moralistic hypocrisy. And indeed, it was Nietzsche himself who, more than a century ago, in Daybreak, provided the best analysis of the false moral premises of today's "war on terror": No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather, the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. Is not the ongoing "war on terror" proof that "terror" is the antagonistic Other of democracy-the point at which democracy's plural options turn into a singular antagonism? Or, as we so often hear, "In the face of the terrorist threat, we must all come together and forget our petty differences." More pointedly, the difference between the "war on terror" with previous 20th century worldwide struggles such as the Cold War is that the enemy used to be clearly identified with the actually existing Communist empire, whereas today the terrorist threat is inherently spectral, without a visible center. It is a little bit like the description of Linda Fiorentino's character in The Last Seduction: "Most people have a dark side ... she had nothing else." Most regimes have a dark oppressive spectral side ... the terrorist threat has nothing else. The paradoxical result of this spectralization of the enemy is an unexpected reflexive reversal. In this world without a clearly identified enemy, it is the United States, the protector against the threat, that is emerging as the main enemy-much like in Agatha Christie's Murder on the Orient-Express, where, since the entire group of suspects is the murderer, the victim himself (an evil millionaire) turns out to be the real criminal.

## 2NC Link – Soft Power/Coalitions

**Attempts at coalition building obey the structure of the forced choice—that is, others are free to join us, as long as they choose to join us—the logic of hegemony justifies pre-emptive strikes and the foreclosure of the future that they endorse**

**Zizek 04** [Slavoj Zizek, The Iraqi Borrowed Kettle. <http://www.lacan.com/zizekkettle.htm>. 2004]

Here, then, we have the first practical demonstration of what does the Bush doctrine of preventive strikes means, a doctrine now publicly declared as the official American "philosophy" of international politics (in the thirty-one page paper entitled "The National Security Strategy," issued by the White House on September 20, 2002)? Its main points are: American military might should remain "beyond challenge" in the foreseeable future; since the main enemy today is an "irrational" fundamentalist who, in contrast to Communists, lacks even the elementary sense of survival and respect of his own people, America has the right to preemptive strikes (i.e., to attack countries which do not already pose a clear threat to the U.S., but MIGHT pose such a threat in the foreseeable future); while the U.S. should seek ad hoc international coalitions for such attacks, it should reserve the right to act independently if it does not get sufficient international support. So, while the U.S. presents its domination over other sovereign states as grounded in a benevolent paternalism which takes into account the interests of other nations and their people, it reserves for itself the ultimate right to DEFINE its allies' "true" interests. The logic is thus clearly formulated: even the pretense of a neutral international law is abandoned, since, when the U.S. perceives a potential threat, they formally ask their allies to support them, but the allies' agreement is optional. The underlying message is always "we will do it with or without you" (i.e., you are free to agree with us, but not free to disagree). The old paradox of the forced choice is reproduced here: the freedom to make a choice on condition that one makes the right choice. The "Bush doctrine" relies on the violent assertion of the paranoiac logic of total control over FUTURE threats, justifying preemptive strikes against these supposed threats. The ineptness of such an approach for today's universe, in which knowledge circulates freely, is patent. The loop between the present and the future is closed: the prospect of a breathtaking terrorist act is evoked in order to justify incessant preemptive strikes now. This closed loop was perfectly formulated in a TV debate in February 2002, when the actor and ex-Congressman Fred Thompson said, in defense of President Bush's Iraq politics: "When anti-war protesters say 'But what did Iraq effectively DO to the US? It did not attack us!', one should answer it with the question 'And what did the terrorists who destroyed the Twin Towers effectively DO to the U.S. before September 11? They also did nothing!'" So, in short: in the same way that, if we had known of the plans for 9/11, we would have been fully justified in attacking the terrorists before the act, we now have the right to attack Iraq... The problem with this logic is that it presupposes that we can treat the future as something that, in a way, already took place. The ultimate paradox is that the very strategy of preemptive strikes will contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When US attacked Iraq and not North Korea, the underlying logic was clear: once a "rogue" state crosses the critical limit and already acquires substantial nuclear weapons, one cannot simply attack it because one risks a nuclear backlash killing millions on our side. This, precisely, was the lesson North Korea drew from the attack on Iraq: the regime sees nuclear weapons as the only guarantee of its survival; in their view, the mistake of Iraq was to accept in the first place the collaboration with the UN and the presence of international inspectors. This, then, is what the Bush doctrine effectively means: first you attack, then you look for reasons to justify it. The problem with today's US is not that it is a new global Empire, but that it is NOT, i.e., that, while pretending to be, it continues to act as a Nation-State, ruthlessly pursuing its interests. And this fact also provides the background that the above-mentioned inconsistent argumentation conceals and, simultaneously, cannot but point towards. What were the actual ideological and political stakes of the attack on Iraq? Here, one is tempted to propose the hypothesis that the US-Iraq war was, as to its actual socio-political content, "the first war between the US and Europe." Today, the united Europe is the main obstacle to the New World Order the Us want to impose, and the reasons that move the US are again triple: (1) naive ideology (the sincere believe that the US are ready to act, to fight for democracy and human rights, while Europe is caught in the old Munich 38 syndrome of indefinite postponement); (2) the need to brutally impose the US hegemony; (3) economic interests (the safe access to oil supply is the condition for the US to win in the forthcoming competition with the united Europe).

## 2NC Link – Stimulus

**Stimulus is self-fulfilling – fantasy structures attempt to control desire and render it compatible within the discourse of Keynesianism, justifying uncontrolled government control**

**Madra & Ozselcuk 10** Yahya Madra is an economics professor who holds a Ph.D. from University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Ceren Özselçuk is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology of Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, “Enjoyment as an economic factor: Reading Marx with Lacan” http://www.communityeconomies.org/site/assets/media/yahyamadra/Subjectivityv2b.pdf

Nevertheless, if we are to define neoliberalism, following Foucault, as the art of governance of society through economic incentives, then it is necessary today to also consider the New Keynesian (or new information) approach as another position within the theoretical horizon of contemporary neoliberal creed. The central tenet of the new information economics is that information, regarding the quality of goods delivered, is asymmetrically distributed among contracting agents. This imperfect availability of information creates opportunities for rational economic agents to exploit them to their benefit, and most importantly, this endemic “opportunism” prevents markets from reaching mutually agreeable (hence optimal) outcomes (see, for instance, Stiglitz, 1994). Accordingly, for New Keynesians, markets in themselves are not capable of governing greed. The government, with the help of economic experts, should actively intervene in the market by designing and implementing incentive compatible (opportunism-proof) institutions with the aim of supplementing the price mechanism and regulating its “excessive” consequences (e.g., corruption, speculation, price gouging). Nevertheless, since opportunistic economic agents always try to find new ways of sidestepping regulations, regulators always need to design new institutions that would address these “market failures”. In other words, for New Keynesian economists, since markets will always fail to govern the excesses of self-interested behavior, they always need to be supplemented by ever-smarter regulation (Madra and Adaman, 2010). Even though New Keynesian “designers” differ from the “Chicago boys” in the way they parse out the questions of when greed becomes a problem and how to govern it, they share the foundational figure of homo economicus as the working assumption regarding the behavior of individuals. Moreover, New Keynesians concede that competitive behavior, if regulated in the correct manner through incentive-compatible institutions, will lead to social welfare and harmony. Both of these two contesting “scientific” discourses within the neoliberal horizon **15** are structured like fantasy formations. While they differ in the way they conceptualize the theoretical location of excessive gain-seeking, both discourses use it as that which legitimize their role as experts who will be able to perpetually produce an answer to the question “What is to be done?”. In presenting themselves as the correct Science of the economy, these discourses vie with each other for the position of agent in what Lacan called the discourse of the university (Lacan, 2007 [1991], Zizek, 1998, 2006, Zupancic, 2006). In Lacan’s formula of the university discourse, S2 designates the so-called neutral knowledge of experts (economics) and is conceived to be directed toward the object cause of desire (object a) which needs to be integrated, domesticated, and appropriated (Zizek, 2006, p. 107) by rendering the economy compatible with the postulated positivity of interests. While the underlying truth of the so-called neutral expert knowledge is the perpetuation of the social order under the direct rule of experts as the new masters of our times, the product of this social link is a population reduced to a bio-political object of governmentality.

## 2NC Link – Terrorism

**The terrorist threat is constructed to legitimize power structures – the externalization onto the terrorist Other causes the worst forms of totalitarianism**

**Zizek 05** [Slavoj Žižek. “Give Iranian Nukes a Chance” *In These Times*, August 11th, <http://www.lacan.com/zizekiranian.htm>]

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## 2NC Link – Warming/Environment

**The affirmative attempts to impose a retroactive image of harmony upon the world, functioning as a phantasmatic repression of the inherent chaos in the universe**

**Zizek '93** [Slavoj Zizek. *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993, 37-8]

The young Hegel proposed as a possible definition of man a formula that today, in the midst of the ecological crisis, acquires a new dimension: “nature sick unto death.” All attempts to regain a new balance between man and nature, to eliminate from human activity its excessive character and to include it in the regular circuit of life, are nothing but a series of subsequent endeavors to suture an original and irredeemable gap. It is in this sense that the classic Freudian thesis on the ultimate discord between reality and the drive potential of man is to be conceived. Freud's claim is that this original, constitutive discord cannot be accounted for by biology, that it results from the fact that the “drive potential of man” consists of drives that are already radically denaturalized, derailed by their traumatic attachment to a Thing, to an empty place, that excludes man forever from the circular movement of life and thus opens the immanent possibility of radical catastrophe, the “second death.” It is here that we should perhaps look for the basic premise of a Freudian theory of culture: all culture is ultimately nothing but a compromise formation, a reaction to some terrifyingly, radicallly inhuman dimension proper to the human condition itself. This also explains Freud's obsession with Michelangelo's Moses: in him, Freud recognized (wrongly, of course, but this does not really matter) a man who was on the brink of giving way to the destructive fury of the death drive, but who nonetheless found strength to master his fury and to refrain from smashing the tablets on which God's commandments were inscribed. Confronted with catastrophes rendered possible by the incidence of the discourse of science upon reality, such a Mosaic gesture is perhaps our only hope. The basic weakness of the usual ecological response is thus its obsessive libidinal economy: we must do all in order that the equilibrium of the natural circuit will be maintained, in order that some horrifying turbulence will not derail the established regularity of nature's ways. To rid ourselves of this predominant obsessive economy, we must take a further step and renounce the very idea of a “natural balance” supposedly upset by the intervention of man as “nature sick unto death.” Homologous to the Lacanian proposition “Woman does not exist,” we should perhaps assert that Nature does not exist: it does not exist as a periodic, balanced circuit, thrown off its track by man's inadvertance. The very notion of man as an “excess” with respect to nature's balanced circuit has finally to be abandoned. The image of nature as a balanced circuit is nothing but a retroactive projection of man. Herein lies the lesson of recent theories of chaos: “nature” is already, in itself, turbulent, imbalanced; its “rule” is not a well-balanced oscillation around some constant point of attraction, but a chaotic dispersion within the limits of what the theory of chaos calls the “strange attractor,” a regularity directing chaos itself.

The idea that science can complete our understanding of the world is merely a fantasy – only by recognizing the necessary uncertainty in our subjectivity can we begin to recognize the limits of language

Stavrakakis 99 [Yannis Stavrakakis, member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. “Lacan & the Political.” Routledge.] AP

I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacan’s text ‘Science and Truth’ (it is the opening lecture of his 1965–6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, nonreducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science à la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is ‘encountered’ face to face (Fink, 1995a:140–1). It is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which ‘as everybody knows…was historically proved in the end to be a failure’ (VII: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacan’s view, it constitutes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such…. Invention is always without a model and without warranty. But indeed

# 2NC Overview (Short)

**The affirmative attempts to fill the Lack that we all attain when we become subjects and learn language by constructing fantasies to project an internal version of wholeness on the world. This is how violence arises because when the fantasy inevitably fails we will lash-out out against an Other so that the fantasy can be sustained. Our alternative is engage in the Act. Instead of engaging in the problems of the 1AC we make the Third choice to reorient ourselves in terms of the problems. While the Lack is inevitable, the alternative allows us to escape the fantasies that we use to cover it up.**

# 2NC Overview (Long)

**The affirmative attempts to fill the Lack – what Lacan understood to be the inherent distance between what we can articulate and understand in the world of language and how everyone else perceives the world. Instead of accepting the inevitability of this gap, the affirmative attempts to cover it up with fantasies of a utopian world order. This only causes violence because they will have to find an external enemy to blame and exterminate when the fantasy crumbles around them. Our alternative is engage in the Act – we reject the linear nature of history and instead of saying “yes” or “no” to the problems of the 1AC we reorient ourselves to the problems themselves, adding a new possibility of existence into the present moment so that we can confront the root of the fantasies.**

# 2NC Link Overview – Transportation

**Now the link debate –**

**First is transportation – 1NC McGowan says that we facilitate transportation through the plan with the assumption that the faster we go the more dissatisfaction we escape – yet this Lack is inevitable and always-already in front of us**

# 2NC Impact – Serial Policy Failure

**The structure of policy around fantasy is cyclical and bound to fail – try or die for the alt**

**Fotaki 10** [Marianna Fotaki. “Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction,” Organization 2010 17: 703. <http://org.sagepub.com/content/17/6/703.full.pdf+html>] AP

So far, I have suggested that health **policies often fail because the fantasmatic foundations of the policy-making process are not acknowledged as such**. Using the example of patient choice, I have also suggested that the reasons for its re-introduction into the UK health care system and through-out Europe, despite limited success in the past, might be better understood through applying the psychoanalytic conception of subjective fantasy. In exploring the limits and possibilities of one particular policy, my aim was to demonstrate how powerful social fantasies are created and how their splitting from organizational reality enables the idealization of the health task. Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanalysis were drawn upon to put forward the article’s key arguments and to further the understanding of the less tangible processes present in public policy making. I have brought together the mental processes that Klein has described and which were then used extensively to explain organizational phenomena, with my central argument about the (unrecognized) role of the imaginary aspects of the policy-making process. Both theories in their own unique ways highlighted the role of fantasy as a necessary stimulant for policy development but also as an impediment to its realization. I have combined the idea of fragmented subjectivity taken from Lacan’s work and socially sanctioned defences from object relations theory, to offer an alternative conception of public policy formation and to explore the reasons behind frequent policy failures. **The Lacanian ontology of the subject was used to highlight the role of fantasy as an enabler of social projects. Having its roots in unconscious mental life, fantasy becomes the stimulant driving forward public policies** such as patient choice, **even though many of these policies are bound to fail as is the case for all imaginary projects**. But failure is not necessarily seen as an adverse outcome, but rather as an opportunity to rethink the ideas of purposefulness and teleology in the context of organizations and social endea-vours more generally. **The Lacanian perspective introduces the productive element held in the recognition of the inevitability of failure, by unveiling the imaginary nature of striving for idealistic policies and the liberating potential of accepting loss**. His conception of loss is so much more radical than in object relations theory, where mourning can bring some sort of reparation and make up for it. In Lacan’s work loss originates in the longings of the individual psyche for completeness, which is unattainable, and yet this is what sustains us as desiring subjects. If we lacked loss there would be nothing to desire. Human desire, for Lacan, is a constitutive aspect of human subjectivity and is not driven by rational considerations, as economists would like us to believe. If anything the subject is enmeshed in its imaginary constructs in order to deflect the reality of the human condition. Nor is it a desire for the promised outcome only, but rather (or also) for the symbol that the outcome stands for. Put differently, the incessant search in the subject is for the signified meaning and not for the signifier itself. **I have suggested that many public policies are intrinsically idealistic as they are instigated by way of setting desire in motion**. So in the case of individual choice in health, the underlying fantasy that drives this policy is the fantasy of freedom (of choice), and by extension the fantasy of control over the uncontrollable. **While its stated aim is to achieve diverse (and potentially conflicting) public policy objectives, the policy reflects the contradictions of human subjectivity on a societal level as well**. In other words, the patient choice paradox is that it overtly ignores the unconscious motivations implicit in the everyday reality of patient–doctor encounter (for example, by assuming that rationality over-rides patients’ fears and vulnerabilities), and yet takes (unwittingly) account of the fantasy, which is illusory but is also an indispensable aspect of our existence. The analysis moved then towards the thesis that policy tends to be idealistic because it is not meant to withstand an immediate reality test but to express mythical, imaginary and arguably unrealizable societal aspirations and longings. In this sense the discrepancies and discontinuities present in patient choice policy are but an expression of the contradictions that sustain the lack, fragmentation and splitting of the subject, and so are the unspoken, conflicting and often impossible societal tasks performed by public institutions. **I have also argued that by distancing itself from operational reality, public policy making expresses societal strife and desire on a fantasy level**, whilst health organizations are left in the position of a dependent subject, having passively to reflect it without being able to implement unworkable policies. For this reason, **the stated objectives that choice policy is expected to achieve (such as equity and efficiency for example), may be used to deflect attention away from the need to admit the deeper defensive role of** health care **policy** (see also Fotaki, 2006). **Yet because the tacit and unspoken functions of** health **policy related to death anxiety and inexorable facts of life are relegated to the unconscious, they give rise to all kinds of defensive policy rhetoric by policy makers who identify with the ideals they proclaim and then feel obliged to justify them**. While policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects. The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes. **The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires**’ (Moi, 2004: 869). Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But **where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail? More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized?** These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that **socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter. Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms (of choice for all), originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are.** **If, on the other hand, we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society.** **The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginar**y (Leeb, 2008). The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis on the other hand, lies in its power to highlight (and dispel) the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects. But psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies. More crucially it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena. In so doing, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors. The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead it is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality that policy makers, politicians, professionals and users of services rely on to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanlaysis drawn upon in this article imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so **we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an acknowledgement and acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation. In addition to political and financial constraints, policies are simultaneously driven (and limited) by the ambiguity and non-unified subjectivity of those who design them and the users/beneficiaries who are themselves split, enigmatic and multi-dimensional subjects**. Such a policy, which is reflective of its context and of itself, would not easily be drawn into seeking simplistic ‘solutions’ reflecting the fantasies of the ego. It would also not become the mirror showing our deepest socially sanctioned desires/fantasies, that we are then encouraged to enact mindlessly. As I have shown, the rhetorical pronouncements of ‘Choice for All’ for example, stand for an injunction to exercise and enjoy (choice) even if it involves the experience of being ill or cared for. The call for the recognition of the fantasmatic structuration of the policy process does not however suggest a blank slate authorization of policies designed without thought as to how they can (not) be implemented in a complex multi-organization such as the National Health Service. As I have argued, when policies are conceived at ‘a distance’ from organizational reality, they cannot relate to patient requirements and cannot be translated into organizational realities. This brings me to my second and more important point, about the necessity of re-considering policy-making processes, as an inclusive process involving those who are concerned with policy implementation: health professionals, and users of services. **By engaging users and providers in decision-making and the co-production of services as self-aware subjects rather than as constituencies whose fantasies can be manipulated, there might be a possibility to break through the cycle of policy repetition and blame apportioning. More importantly, reconciling failure as an opportunity that keeps desire alive rather than an outcome to be avoided might create an opening for more realistic policy formation**. **This in itself is a depressing process as one must also give up the idealized objects, accepting the impossibility of ever attaining them**. Yet only by accepting the necessity of Samuel Beckett’s injunction to: ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (Beckett, 1983: 7) may the process of un-encumbering oneself from the ideals that bind our ego begin. **A participative policy making process that bridges fantasy and reality is a first step in such a direction. It would foster an engagement of self-aware subjects accepting the burden of their subjectivity and taking responsibility for their ontological predicament without surrendering to it, rather than a responsibilization of individual users of services or professional**s. **By re-considering the very idea of policy as grounded in an imaginary projection of a soon to be perfect world, we would have to learn to stop demanding such perfection of our politicians, and they would have to stop believing that they could deliver** it. The comprehensive interpretation of policy-making at a societal level and through the lens of organizational defences suggested in this article might contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of developing patients’ autonomy, beyond normalizing the ‘man-agement of expectations’**. It will also challenge a linear model of policy-making and policy analysis, which separates design from its implementation, showing it to be inadequate**. But **for this to happen, the unconscious motivations that create and undo policies will have to be appreciated. Taking into account the inevitability of fantasy in policy-making and the inevitability of its failure, may not free us once and for all from the tyranny of imaginary pursuits. It might, however, enable a journey towards the discovery of new ways of desiring, engaging and being in organizations and society.**

# 2NC Framework

**Counterinterpretation – the affirmative’s impacts can only be evaluated if they can justify the methodology whereby they come to those impacts – prefer our interpretation**

**a) Most real world – scientists and policymakers have to defend the method for a study or policy all the time – nobody can go around making extinction claims without a justification**

**b) logical prior question - our argument is that your affirmative is based in a problematic set of assumptions, it makes no sense to evaluate how a policy would be implemented if the basis for deciding your policies is problematic—the affirmative essentially asks what we should do about a problem before establishing the existence of that problem**

**c) Education – we don’t exclude any type of politics or engagement, we are just forcing them to engage in the founding questions of their discipline**

**d) No infinite frameworks – the affirmative should be able to defend their epistemology and methodology – the negative should get advocacies that test the legitimacy of the 1AC on its productive and assumptive levels**

**Transportation infrastructure planning must be framed in questions of desire – causal relationships are a step short of allowing us to understand our engagement with the world**

**Gunder and Hillier 09** [Dr. Michael Gunder is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Professor Jean Hillier is Chair of Town and Country Planning at Newcastle University, UK. “Planning in Ten Words of Less.” Ashgate. July 28, 2009.] AP

Perhaps one reason for planning's diverse and\*,contestable meanings is its Complex historical evolution. Planning largely evolved out of the art of architectural design and the science ff civil engineering in the built environment; It was initially deployed largely to address issues of public health and housing to- "offset the adverse impacts of industrialisation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with a general aim to produce a rational and progressive city (Ashworth 1954; Boyer 1983; Sandercock 1990). Its early adherents, if professionally qualified at all, were generally master design practitioners (Brooks 1988). However, the positivistic social science model tended to dominate planning after the Second World War, especially in the United States (Banerjee 1993; Dagenhart and Sawicki 1992; Perloff 1957). For many planning practitioners, academics, or commentators, in the mid-20th century, planning was a scientific engagement with place making, often predicated on instrumental rationality and positivistic physical and/or social science (Faludi 1973; Friedmann' 1987; Hopkins 2001).,This scientific rationality still tends to dominate spatial planning education and practice in many parts of the world, although this worldview has come under challenge increasingly since the 1980s (Healey 1997; Hillier 2002,2007; Sandercock 1998,2004). We agree with this challenge to purely predictive scientific planning for we argue that spatial planning can never be just about the facts which constitute empirical science - what we know, to be true — because facts in science must be inherently observable and measurable. Facts must always inherently reside in the present and 3 a philosophical system recognising only material facts and observable phenomena, the past, not in the future. Yet, we contend that planning is ultimately about what will, or might be, the future. Planning thus incorporates components of human values, desires and aspirations at its core. Analytical science's conceptualisations of causal relationships cannot fully engage with such intangibles. Intangibles, by. their very nature,, are unable to guarantee predictability to 'allow planners to propagate principles and laws across an undulating and often resistant social landscape' (Beauregard 2001,437). Science has limited predictive power when it comes to human hope, ambition and values (Flyvbjerg 2001). We argue, therefore, that science and the application of facts have a definite, but limited application in planning-practice, no matter how much we might wish" to rely on universally applicable scientific techniques. Spatial planning practitioners, we suggest, also need to engage with other means of understanding when attempting to shape the world.

**Descriptive claims of reality can only be understood in the context of understanding desire and our relation to the object—we must bracket the assumptions of external “reality” to adequately address these questions**

**Blomfield 02** Bill Blomfield, founding member of the Australian Psychoanalytical Society “The essentials of psychoanalysis,” Psychoanalysis Downunder, April 2002 (<http://www.psychoanalysisdownunder.com/downunder/backissues/issue2/304/essentials>)

Ricoeur joins Lacan in observing that "... absence is not a secondary aspect of behaviour, but the very place in which psychoanalysis dwells." He fills out this statement: "For the analyst, behaviour is a segment of meaning. That is why the lost object and the substitute object are the constant theme of psychoanalysis... the absent object, the lost object, the substitute object are misunderstood by any reformulation of the metapsychology that does not take its start from what occurs in the analytic dialogue" [7, p.369]. Although instincts are the sources of behaviour, psychoanalysis is concerned only with how "they enter into the meaningful but distorted history that comes to be told in the analytic situation" [7, p.370]. Thus the point is made that psychoanalytic reality is not the one found by the experimental psychologist but is "... the true meaning the patient is to reach through the obscure maze of fantasies; reality takes on meaning in a conversion of meaning of fantasies ... The possibility of transference resides in the intersubjective texture of desire... It is because wishes are a demand on another person, a speaking to another ... that they can enter into a “psychosocial” field where there are refusals, prohibitions, taboos - that is, frustrated demands. The transition to the symbolic occurs at this crossroads, where desires are demands but unrecognized as such. The entire Oedipus drama is lived and enacted within the triangle of demand, refusal, and wounded desire; its language is a lived rather than a formulated language, but at the same time it is a short meaningful ... drama in which arise the main signifies ... of existence" [7, p.371-2]. A psychoanalyst must "bracket", in Husserl's sense, the "reified ideals" of existing society for there is a false relationship between the profession of idealised beliefs and the reality of social interaction [7, p.373].

**The role of the judge is an analyst into the psychological investments of the affirmative – this is a prior question to their advantage and solvency claims – It’s not about what the neg does but about what they need to do better**

**Zizek 2k** [Slavoj Zizek. “Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.” 124-127]

Now I can also answer the obvious counter-argument to this Lacanian notion of the act: if we define an act solely by the fact that its sudden emergence surprises/transforms its agent itself and, simultaneously, that it retroactively changes its conditions of (im)possibility, is not Nazism, then, an act par excellence? Did Hitler not ‘do the impossible', changing the entire field of what was considered `acceptable' in the liberal democratic universe? Did not a respectable middle-class petit bourgeois who, as a guard in a concentration camp, tortured Jews, also, accomplish what was considered impossible, in his previous ‘decent’ existence and acknowledge his ‘passionate attachment’ to sadistic torture? It is here that the notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’, and - on a different level - of transforming the constellation that generates social symptoms becomes crucial. An authentic act disturbs the underlying fantasy, attacking it from the point of `social symptom' (let us recall that Lacan attributed the invention of the notion of symptom to Marx!). The so-called `Nazi revolution', with its disavowal/displacement of the fundamental social antagonism ('class struggle' that divides the social edifice from within) - with its projection/externalization of the cause of social antagonisms into the figure of the Jew, and the consequent reassertion of the corporatist notion of society as an organic Whole - clearly avoids confrontation with social. antagonism; the ‘Nazi revolution’ is the exemplary case of a pseudo-change, of a frenetic activity in the course of which many things did change – ‘something was going on al1 the time’ - so that, precisely, something.- that which really matters - would not change; so that things would fundamentally 'remain the same'. In short, an authentic act is not simply external with regard to the hegemonic symbolic field disturbed by it: an act is an act only with regard to some symbolic field, as intervention into it. That is to say: a symbolic field is always and by definition in itself 'decentred', structured around a central void/impossibility (a personal life-narrative, say, is a bricolage of ultimately failed attempts to come to terms with some trauma; a social edifice is an ultimately failed attempt to displace/obfuscate its constitutive antagonism); and an act disturbs the symbolic field into which it intervenes not out of nowhere, but precisely from the standpoint of this inherent impossibility, stumbling block, which is its hidden, disavowed structuring principle. In contrast to this authentic act which intervenes in the constitutive void, point of failure - or what Alain Badiou has called the 'symptomal torsion’ of a given constellation - the inauthentic act legitimizes itself through reference to the point of substantial fullness of a given contellation (on the political terrain: Race, True Religion, Nation...): it aims precisely at obliterating the last traces of the 'symptomal torsion' which disturbs the balance of that constellation. One palpable political consequence of this notion of the act that has to intervene at the `symptomal torsion' of the structure (and also a proof that our position does not involve `economic essentialism') is that in each concrete constellation there is one touchv nodal point of contention which decides where one 'truly stands'. For example, in the recent struggle of the so-called `democratic opposition' in Serbia against the Milosevic regime, the truly touchy topic is the stance towards the Albanian majority in Kosovo: the great majority of the `democratic opposition' unconditionally endorse Milosevic’s anti-Albanian nationalist agenda, even accusing him of making compromises with the West and `betraying' Serb national interests in Kosovo. In the course of the student demonstrations against Milosevic's Socialist Party falsification of the election results in the winter of 1996, the Western media which closely followed events, and praised the revived democratic spirit in Serbia, rarely mentioned the fact that one of the demonstrators' regular slogans against the special police was `Instead of kicking us, go to Kosovo and kick out the Albanians!'. So - and this is my point - it is theoretically as well as politically wrong to claim that, in today's Serbia, 'anti-Albanian nationalism' is simply one among the `floating signifiers' that can be appropriated either by Milosevic's power bloc or by the opposition: the moment one endorses it, no matter how much one 'reinscribes it into the democratic chain of equivalences', one already accepts the terrain as defined by Milosevic, one - as it were - is already `playing his game'. In today's Serbia, the absolute sine qua non of an authentic political act would thus be to reject absolutely the ideologico-political topos of the Albanian threat in Kosovo. Psychoanalysis is aware of a whole series of `false acts': psychotic-paranoiac violent passage a l'acte, hysterical acting out, obsessional self-hindering, perverse self-instrumentalization – all these acts are not simply wrong according to some external standards, they are immanently wrong since they can be properly grasped only as reactions to some disavowed trauma that they displace, repress, and so on. What we are tempted to say is that the Nazi anti-Semitic violence was `false' in the same way: all the shattering impact of this large-scale frenetic activity was fundamentally `misdirected', it was a kind of gigantic passage a l'acte betraying an inability to confront the real kernel of the trauma (the social antagonism). So what we are claiming is that anti-Semitic violence, say, is not only `factually wrong' (Jews are `not really like that', exploiting us and organizing a universal plot) and/or ‘morally wrong’ (unacceptable in terms of elementary standards of decency, etc.), but also `untrue’ in the sense of an inauthenticity which is simultaneously epistemological and ethical, just as an obsessional who reacts to his **[sic]** disavowed sexual fixations by engaging in compulsive defence rituals acts in an inauthentic way. Lacan claimed that even if the patient's wife is really sleeping around with other men, the patient's jealousy is still to be treated as a pathological condition; in a homologous way, even if rich Jews `really' exploited German workers, seduced their daughters, dominated the popular press, and so on, anti-Semitism is still an emphatically `untrue', pathological ideological condition - why? What makes it pathological is the disavowed subjective libidinal investment in the figure of the Jew – the way social antagonism is displaced-obliterated by being 'projected' into the figure of the Jew. So - back to the obvious counter-argument to the Lacanian notion of the act: this second feature (for a gesture to count as an act, it must 'traverse the fantasy') is not simply a further, additional criterion, to be added to the first ('doing the impossible', retroactively rewriting its own conditions): if this second criterion is not fulfilled, the first is not really met either - that is to say; we are not actually `doing the impossible', traversing the fantasy towards the Real.

# 2NC A/T – Case Outweighs

They say case outweighs –

1. No impact – we all are going to die at some point – they don’t articulate any differential in the 2AC – reject new 1AR arguments – there’s only a risk that the alternative allows us to bring meaning our subjective understanding which is the only important thing – that’s Blomfield

2. Straight turn – we are already dead – the alt is key to being alive

Zizek 03 [Slavoj Zizek. “The Puppet and the Dwarf.” The MIT Press.] AP

Insofar as “death” and “life” designate for Saint Paul two existential (subjective) positions, not “objective” facts,we are fully justified in raising the old Pauline question: who is really alive today?1What if we are “really alive” only if and when we engage ourselves with an excessive intensity which puts us beyond “mere life”? What if, when we focus on mere survival, even if it is qualified as “having a good time,” what we ultimately lose is life itself? What if the Palestinian suicide bomber on the point of blowing himself (and others) up is, in an emphatic sense, “more alive” than the American soldier engaged in a war in front of a computer screen hundreds of miles away from the enemy, or a New York yuppie jogging along the Hudson river in order to keep his body in shape? Or, in terms of the psychoanalytic clinic, what if a hysteric is truly alive in her permanent, excessive, provoking questioning of her existence, while an obsessional is the very model of choosing a “life in death”? That is to say, is not the ultimate aim of his compulsive rituals to prevent the “thing” from happening—this “thing” being the excess of life itself? Is not the catastrophe he fears the fact that, finally, something will really happen to him? Or, in terms of the revolutionary process, what if the difference that separates Lenin’s era from Stalinism is, again, the difference between life and death? There is an apparently marginal feature which clearly illustrates this point: the basic attitude of a Stalinist Communist is that of following the correct Party line against “Rightist” or “Leftist” deviation— in short, to steer a safe middle course; for authentic Leninism, in clear contrast, there is ultimately only one deviation, the Centrist one—that of “playing it safe,” of opportunistically avoiding the risk of clearly and excessively “taking sides.” There was no “deeper historical necessity,” for example, in the sudden shift of Soviet policy from “War Communism” to the “New Economic Policy” in 1921— it was just a desperate strategic zigzag between the Leftist and the Rightist line, or, as Lenin himself put it in 1922, the Bolsheviks made chapter 4 “all the possible mistakes.” This excessive “taking sides,” this permanent imbalance of zigzag, is ultimately (the revolutionary political) life itself—for a Leninist, the ultimate name of the counterrevolutionary Right is “Center” itself, the fear of introducing a radical imbalance into the social edifice. It is a properly Nietzschean paradox that the greatest loser in this apparent assertion of Life against all transcendent Causes is actual life itself. What makes life “worth living” is the very excess of life: the awareness that there is something for which we are ready to risk our life (we may call this excess “freedom,” “honor,” “dignity,” “autonomy,” etc.). Only when we are ready to take this risk are we really alive. So when Hölderlin wrote: “To live is to defend a form,” this form is not simply a Lebensform, but the form of the excess-of-life, the way this excess violently inscribes itself into the life-texture. Chesterton makes this point apropos of the paradox of courage: A soldier surrounded by enemies, if he is to cut his way out, needs to combine a strong desire for living with a strange carelessness about dying. He must not merely cling to life, for then he will be a coward, and will not escape. He must not merely wait for death, for then he will be a suicide, and will not escape. He must seek his life in a spirit of furious indifference to it; he must desire life like water and yet drink death like wine.2 The “postmetaphysical” survivalist stance of the Last Men ends up in an anemic spectacle of life dragging on as its own shadow. It is within this horizon that we should appreciate today’s growing rejection of the death penalty: what we should be able to discern is the hidden “biopolitics” which sustains this rejection. Those who assert the “sacredness of life,” defending it against the threat of transcendent powers which parasitize on it, end up in a “supervised world in which we’ll live painlessly, safely—and tediously,”3 a world in which, for the sake of its very official goal—a long, pleasurable life— all real pleasures are prohibited or strictly controlled (smoking, drugs, food. . .). Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan is the latest example of this survivalist attitude toward dying, with its “demystifying” presentation of war as a meaningless slaughter which nothing can really justify—as such, it provides the best possible justification for Colin Powell’s “No-casualties-on-our-side” military doctrine. On today’s market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol. . . . And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics, up to today’s tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances, and has an ecologically sound, holistic approach to reality, while features like wifebeating remain out of sight)? Virtual Reality simply generalizes this procedure of offering a product deprived of its substance: it provides reality itself deprived of its substance, of the hard resistant kernel of the Real—just as decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like real coffee without being the real coffee, Virtual Reality is experienced as reality without being so.

# 2NC A/T – Cede the Political

**1. No link – we don’t exclude political engagement, just rethink the way we interact with politics**

**2. Straight turn – politics is already ceded to the right – psychoanalysis is key to revival**

**Butler and Stevens 06** [Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, Lecturers at U of Queensland, “Play Fuckin Loud: Zizek vs. the Left,” The Symptom, Issue 7, Spring 2006 (http://www.lacan.com/symptom7\_articles/butler.html) ]

Here, we might say, in a nutshell is everything Zizek writes against. And it is just at this point that the true distinctions – because they are the hardest, the most unpopular, the most difficult – need to be made. It is just at this moment that Zizek breaks with a “well-wishing” Left in the name of a proper Hegelio-Marxist critique. To begin with, Zizek absolutely takes a distance from the classical model of the philosopher giving meaning to events, providing a solution to problems – the philosopher as Big Other bringing about narrative and conceptual closure. (Ironically, in another post from her website, Dean even admits that one of the things at stake in Zizek’s work is the doing away with the Big Other like this.) Giving meaning, providing solutions, bringing about closure: this is what French politicians from the Centre-Left like Dominique de Villepin (who criticised the French State) to the Right like Nicolas Sarkozy (who blamed the rioters) rushed to do in the days immediately following the riots. It is what innumerable media critics and commentators, both in France and abroad, scrambled to do in order that there was no empty air time in which actually to think. How flimsy, how pathetic, how desperate they all sounded, when we know that, within the current configuration of the French State within capitalism, there can be no solution.[2](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn2#_edn2) (The same point might even be made of the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina: for all of the criticisms made of the Bush Government for acting too slowly in response to the crisis, this is again to assume that the problem was only natural, that everything could be made right by the timely intervention of the State, when in fact it is the State itself that is the problem.) In both cases, there is no “solution”, and therefore no meaning, no closure to events. And it is just *this* that Zizek is trying to think in his essay – admittedly, with great difficulty, against the “best wishes” of his supporters. More than this, Zizek is accused in Dean’s essay not only of not providing the meaning of the French riots to us, but also to the rioters themselves. In the most traditional conception of philosophy, he is expected to speak for others, bears a responsibility for “articulating the violence”. But the real point here is that, if these riots are to constitute a real “event”, they must provide *their own meaning*. And it is the failure of the rioters to do this, to make of what happened an event, that Zizek indicates by the simple “mathemic” repetition of his previous work (mostly passages of *Ticklish Subject*) in response to them.[3](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn3#_edn3) The riots do not provide an occasion for new thought; they merely play out an existing impasse. But, again, it is just this – this lack of any wider meaning, the present inability of the rioters, of all of us, to formulate an authentic utopian moment, to make of what happened a “universal” – that Zizek attempts to think in his refusal to clutch at “solutions”, to suggest possible alternatives, to issue philosophical nostrums from some higher place, not “mired in the situation”. Perhaps the only true equivalent to Zizek’s authentic ethical stance here, his refusal to offer placebos, his taking of the time to think, strangely enough, was the response of French President Jacques Chirac, who several days after the riots – and he too was criticised for his delay – put forward an equally mathemic decree: “The French State will not concede to the rioters”. We sense behind his words here, as with Zizek, a frank admission that the riots did not constitute an authentic event, that the only true crisis (for Capital) will be that of Capital itself… So what, then, is Zizek attempting to do in ‘Some Politically Incorrect Reflections’? What is the role for philosophy he proposes there? What does he mean by saying that the philosopher’s task is “not to propose solutions, but to reframe the problem itself”? If we can begin by answering these questions in a slightly programmatic way, the role of philosophy is to provide space for us and the protestors to *think*. It is to enable us to reflect upon the fact that the rioters are able to propose no solution, and to make of this problem the beginning of a solution itself. It is the rush to judgement, the proposing of solutions without seeing the prior problem, that Zizek is seeking to avoid.[4](http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html#_edn4#_edn4) And it is this time of thinking that we call his “patience”, and that is variously theorised in his work as “separation”, “uncoupling” “aggressive passivity” and Bartleby’s “I prefer not to”. It is to stop before acting and to ask why all of the available alternatives are insufficient, merely different versions of the same thing. (In the full-length version of the essay, posted on Lacan.com, Zizek makes a crucial distinction between two different responses to capitalism and the separation it enforces between truth and meaning: on the one hand, there are “conservative [but we would also say pseudo-Leftist] reactions to re-enframe capital within some field of meaning”; and, on the other, there is the attempt to raise the question of the “real of capitalism with regard to its truth-beyond-meaning (what, basically, Marx did)”. It is absolutely this distinction that is at stake in Zizek’s attempt to tear the events of the French riots away from their various commentators, both Left and Right, in thinking their “truth-outside-meaning”.) And this is why, finally – we see it again in this misunderstanding between Zizek and his blogger – we can say that philosophical thinking as such is always political, is not to do nothing. This is why we can say that thinking, truly thinking – and here we are reminded of Dylan’s insistence that all of his songs are protest songs, even when they do not take up the topical issues of the day – is that rarest of events, and constitutes the only real resistance to what must be called the “complicity” of the well-meaning Left, which in its desire for immediate results is indistinguishable from its hated rival (the narcissism of small differences), neo-liberalism.

Comparative evidence – conservative takeover less threatening than ignorance toward enjoyment.

**Jodi** Dean, **Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges,** 2006**. [*Zizek’s Politics.* Pp. 43-4]**

When the concept of enjoyment is a category of political theory, our conception of the challenges of contemporary politics changes. The central political problem today is not the fundamentalism that opposes the unfolding of freedom in the world—despite the odd fact that radical, pluralist democrats and mainstream neoconservatives and neoliberals are united in the conviction that it is. Instead, insofar as this unfolding is tied to the expansions of global capitalism, it relies on nuggets of enjoyment; it reintroduces sites and objects of fixity. Thus, the central problem is how we are to relate to enjoyment, how we can escape (traverse) the fantasies that provide it, even as we acknowledge enjoyment as an irreducible component of what it is to be human. This is a mighty problem indeed, for confronting enjoyment requires that we disrupt our place, that is, that we refuse to accept imaginary and symbolic reassurance and undergo subjective destitution.

# 2NC A/T – Perm Do Both

The perm isn’t net-beneficial – it has to include the plan text and the entirety of the 1AC discourse – we are reading a disad to this discourse which means the perm still links - any attempt get out of this is severance which is a voter because it allows them to moot our ground and the effectiveness of our 1NC strategy

The idea of the permutation links to the kritik – they attempt to combine everything into a utopian world to escape negativity – that links directly into the Stavrakakis scapegoating evidence

The permutation gets reoccupied and tanks alt solvency

Stavrakakis 99 [Yannis Stavrakakis, member of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. “Lacan & the Political.” Routledge.] AP

As Ernesto Laclau has put it, by ‘reoccupation’ we mean a process by which certain notions, linked to the advent of a new vision and new problems, ‘have the function of replacing ancient notions that had been formed on the ground of a different set of issues, with the result that the latter end up imposing their demands on the new notions and inevitably deforming them’ (Laclau, 1990:74). What I want to suggest is that in Homer’s schema psychoanalytic politics ‘reoccupies’ the ground of traditional fantasmatic politics. The result is that this fantasmatic conception of politics ends up imposing its demands on the psychoanalytic part of the argumentation. Thus, this latter part is necessarily deformed: if it is not recognised in its radical constitutivity, the impossibility of society, the irreducibility of the real within the social, loses all its power. In that sense, the ultimate consequence of Homer’s argumentation is the following: the absorption of Lacanian political theory by radical quasi-utopianism will offer left-wing radicalism the hegemonic appeal entailed in the articulation of one more signifier (‘psychoanalysis’) in its signifying chain, but psychoanalytic political theory has nothing to gain beyond its own deformation. Well, it doesn’t sound like a very good deal. In fact, articulating Lacanian theory with fantasmatic politics is equivalent to affirming the irrelevance of Lacanian theory for radical politics since this articulation presupposes the repression of all the political insights implicit in Lacan’s reading and highlighted in this book. The alleged irrelevance of Lacan for radical politics is also the argument put forward by Collier in a recent article in Radical Philosophy. Collier’s argument is that since it is capitalism that shatters our wholeness and disempowers us (as if without capitalism we would be on the road to utopia; obviously, capitalism occupies the structural position of the antichrist in this sort of leftist preaching), then Lacan’s theory is, in fact, normalising capitalist damage, precisely because alienation is so deep for Lacan that nothing can be done to eliminate it (‘Lacan is deeply pessimistic, rejecting cure or happiness as possible goals’, my emphasis).19 Thus Lacan has nothing to offer radical politics. Something not entirely surprising since, according to Collier, psychological theory in general has no political implications whatsoever. The conclusion is predictable: ‘Let us go to Freud and Klein for our psychotherapy [Lacan is of course excluded] AP and to Marx and the environmental sciences for our politics, and not get our lines crossed’ (Collier, 1998:41–3). Surprisingly enough this is almost identical with Homer’s conclusion: Lacanian theory is OK as an analytical tool but let us go back to Marx for our ideological seminar and our utopian catechism! It is clear that from a Lacanian point of view it is necessary to resist all such ‘reoccupations’ of traditional fantasmatic politics. At least this is the strategy that Lacan follows on similar occasions. Faced with the alienating dimension of every identification, Lacan locates the end of analysis beyond identification. Since utopian or quasi-utopian constructions function through identification it is legitimate, I think, to draw the analogies with the social field. If analysis resists the ‘reoccupation’ of the traditional strategy of identification—although it recognises its crucial, but alienating, role in the formation of subjectivity—why should psychoanalytic politics, after unmasking the crucial but alienating character of traditional, fantasmatic, identificatory politics, ‘reoccupy’ their ground? This rationale underlying the Lacanian position is not far away from what Beardsworth articulates as a political reading of Derrida. For Beardsworth, deconstruction also refuses to implicate itself in traditional politics, in the ‘local sense of politics’ in Beardsworth’s terminology: In its affirmative refusal to advocate a politics, deconstruction forms, firstly, an account of why all political projects fail. Since the projection of any decision has ethical implications, deconstruction in fact generalizes what is meant by the political well beyond the local sense of politics. In this sense it becomes a radical ‘critique’ of institutions. (Beardsworth, 1996:19) Similarly, the radicality and political importance of the Lacanian critique depends on its ability to keep its distance from fantasmatic politics, from politics in the traditional sense; which is not the same as saying that psychoanalysis is apolitical: in fact, it becomes political precisely by being critical of traditional politics, exactly because, as argued in the previous chapter, the political is located beyond the utopian or quasi-utopian sedimentations of political reality.

# 2NC A/T – Perm Double Bind

**They say perm double bind - this argument is like saying that if you have to clean your room you might as well shit on the floor first – if they aren’t winning a net benefit to the permutation and we are winning that it’s not as good as the alternative than we should win**

# 2NC A/T – Perm All Other Instances

**They say perm all other instances**

**1. There are no other instances – the judges jurisdiction is only in evaluating this one affirmative**

**2. It’s not intrinsic – they are appending onto the 1AC advocacy – that’s a voter because it kills switch side debate in that the affirmative never has to engage in substantive arguments but instead stick to meaningless perms**

**3. Still links to reoccupation – there is never just one more instance - that’s 1NC Zizek and the Zizek evidence in framework – every action within the system necessarily perpetuates these fantasies – also triggers the footnoting disad from above**

# 2NC A/T – Robinson (Conservatism)

**Robinson misdiagnoses Lacanian politics as conservatism – it doesn’t precluded any social progress, just the universalizability and guarantee of progress as complete**

**Thomassen 04** [Lasse Thomassen, Department of Government, University of Essex, THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, November 2004, v. 6 n. 4, p. 558, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1]

(3) According to Robinson, Lacanian political theory is inherently conservative. ‘Lacanians’, Robinson writes, ‘urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these’ (p. 260). And, about Mouffe, he writes that, ‘as a Lacanian, Mouffe cannot reject exclusion; it is, on a certain level, necessary according to such a theory’ (p. 263). Such assertions are only possible if we believe in the possibility of opposing exclusion to a situation of non-exclusion, which is exactly what post-structuralists have challenged. Moreover, the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view does not necessarily preclude the removal of any concrete exclusion. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the constitutivity of exclusion shifts the focus from exclusion versus non-exclusion to the question of which exclusions we can and want to live with. Nothing in the poststructuralist (and Lacanian) view thus precludes a progressive politics. Of course, this is not to say that a progressive politics is guaranteed—if one wants guarantees, post-structuralist political theory is not the place to look. There are similar problems with Robinson’s characterisation of Zizek’s ‘nihilistic variety of Lacanianism’: ‘the basic structure of existence is unchangeable ... Zizek’s Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed’ (p. 267). This, according to Robinson, ‘reflects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism’ (p. 268). Again, the constitutivity of exclusion and violence does not necessarily mean that ‘the new world cannot be better than the old’ (p. 268). The alternative to guaranteed progress is not necessarily conservatism or nihilism, and the impossibility of a perfect society does not exclude attempts at improvement—with the proviso that what counts as improvement cannot be established according to some transcendental yardstick.

# 2NC A/T – Robinson (No Lack)

**They say no lack –**

**1. Take the Pepsi challenge – this card doesn’t have a warrant to why the lack doesn’t exists – if they cannot prove the complete wholeness of the world than we only need to win a 1% risk of the lack because if we’re right than it’s try or die for the alt to solve the root cause of violence – also we don’t need the lack to win because our kritik just provides a solution to the psychological defaults whereby we approach the world**

**2. The lack is real – we see it in are attempts to understand everything through language – we might call them terrorists but they call themselves freedom fighters – we are different subjects and thus we necessarily see the world differently – our inability to understand these differences is why we can never be whole – this is the lack**

**3. The lack exists – new scientific developments prove**

**Berlin 09** [Heather A. Berlin, neuroscientist focusing on brain-behavior relationships affecting the prevention and treatment of psychiatric disorders and Christof Koch. “Defense Mechanisms: Neuroscience Meets Psychoanalysis.” April 13, 2009. <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=neuroscience-meets-psychoanalysis>]

Advances in technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging permit scientists to directly measure brain activity. This ability has led to a revival and reconceptualization of key psychoanalytic concepts, based on the idea of inner forces outside our awareness that influence our behavior. According to psychodynamic theory, unconscious dynamic processes defensively remove anxiety-provoking thoughts and impulses from consciousness in response to our conflicting attitudes. The processes that keep unwanted thoughts from entering consciousness are known as defense mechanisms and include repression, suppression and dissociation. Suppression is the voluntary form of repression proposed by Sigmund Freud in 1892. It is the conscious process of pushing unwanted, anxiety-provoking thoughts, memories, emotions, fantasies and desires out of awareness. Suppression is more amenable to controlled experiments than is repression, the unconscious process of excluding painful memories, thoughts and impulses from consciousness. If you are grieving over the death of a loved one or the breakup of a relationship, you may consciously decide to suppress thinking about the situation to get on with your life. Or, in another example, you may have an impulse to tell your boss what you really think about him and his abysmal behavior, but you suppress this thought because you need the job. In both cases, the desire is conscious but is thwarted by the exercise of willpower resulting from a rational decision to avoid the action. The impulse or drive may display itself in other ways, however: you may develop a nervous cough around your boss even though you are not sick. Or a suppressed sexual desire may resurface in a careless phrase or slip of the tongue. In general, “forgotten” thoughts, memories and urges can influence behaviors, conscious thoughts and feelings and can express themselves as symptoms or even as mental illness. Although some claim that suppression is a psychoanalytical myth with no scientific support, fMRI data suggest otherwise. Psychologist Michael C. Anderson, now at St. Andrews University in Scotland, and his colleagues carried out what they call a “think/no-think” experiment to explore the brain basis of memory suppression. Two dozen volunteers had to memorize 48 word pairs (for example, ordeal-roach or steam-train). Subsequently, while lying in a scanner, subjects were shown the first cue word and had to either recall the second, associated word (called the respond condition) or prevent it from entering consciousness (suppress condition). Actively suppressing the matched word while lying in the scanner had the effect of reducing recall of the word afterward (as compared with the respond condition); this result is not just simple forgetting that occurs with the passage of time. The imaging data that Anderson and his colleagues collected showed that the volunteers suppressed the words by recruiting parts of the brain involved in “executive control,” namely, areas in the prefrontal cortex, to disengage processing in sectors of the brain important for memory formation and retrieval, in particular the hippocampus. This finding is noteworthy because earlier experiments showed that the amplitude of activity in the hippocampus is proportional to memory recall—the stronger the activity, the higher the likelihood of remembering. A second intriguing observation is that the brain is more active when avoiding recalling a memory than during recall itself. People suppress unwanted memories by exerting willful effort that can be tracked in the nervous system in ways only dreamed of by Freud—who was, after all, a neuroscientist by training.

# 2NC A/T – Non-Falsifiable

**They say non-falsifiable -**

**1. No impact – even if you can’t prove us wrong doesn’t disprove our warrants - we are saying that if you adopt the paradigm of the truth of our arguments that you can solve for forms of violence and that’s good**

**2. Most social sciences are non-falsifiable – under their interpretation the only thing we could debate about is physics and chemistry – they don’t meet either**

**3. We are falsifiable – scientific studies prove**

**Berlin 09** [Heather A. Berlin, neuroscientist focusing on brain-behavior relationships affecting the prevention and treatment of psychiatric disorders and Christof Koch. “Defense Mechanisms: Neuroscience Meets Psychoanalysis.” April 13, 2009. <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=neuroscience-meets-psychoanalysis>]

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# 2NC A/T – Realism

**They say realism -**

**1. No impact to realism**

**2. You’re not realist**

**3. We are impact turning realism through our Stavrakakis scapegoating evidence**

**4. Realism is wrong and a self-fulfilling violent prophecy**

**Grondin 04** [David Grondin. “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War.” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

In explaining national security conduct, realist discourses serve the violent purposes of the state, as well as legitimizing its actions and reinforcing its hegemony. This is why we must historicize the practice of the analyst and question the “regimes of truth” constructed by realist discourses. When studying a given discourse, one must also study the socio-historical conditions in which it was produced. Realist analysts are part of the subfield of Strategic Studies associated with the Cold War era. Even though it faced numerous criticisms after the Cold War, especially since it proved irrelevant in predicting its end, this subfield retains a significant influence in International Relations – as evidenced, for instance, by the vitality of the journal International Security. Theoretically speaking, Strategic Studies is the field par excellence of realist analyses: it is a way of interpreting the world, which is inscribed in the language of violence, organized in strategy, in military planning, in a military order, and which seek to shape and preserve world order (Klein, 1994: 14). Since they are interested in issues of international order, realist discourses study the balancing and bandwagoning behavior of great powers. Realist analysts believe they can separate object from subject: on this view, it would be possible to abstract oneself from the world in which one lives and studies and to use value-free discourse to produce a non-normative analysis. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth assert, “[s]uch arguments [about American moderation and international benevolence that stress the constraints on American power] are unpersuasive, however, because they fail to acknowledge the true nature of the current international system” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 31). Thus it would seem that Brooks and Wohlforth have the ability to “know” essential “truths”, as they “know” the “true” nature of the international system. From this vantage point it would even be possible “to set aside one’s own subjective biases and values and to confront the world on its own terms, with the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends the limits of such personal determinants as one’s own values, class, gender, race, or emotions” (Klein, 1994: 16). However, it is impossible to speak or write from a neutral or transcendental ground: “there are only interpretations – some stronger and some weaker, to be sure – based on argument and evidence, which seems from the standpoint of the interpreter and his or her interlocutor to be ‘right’ or ‘accurate’ or ‘useful’ at the moment of interpretation” (Medhurst, 2000: 10). It is in such realist discourse that Strategic Studies become a technocratic approach determining the foundations of security policies that are disguised as an academic approach above all critical reflection (Klein, 1994: 27-28). Committed to an explanatory logic, realist analysts are less interested in the constitutive processes of states and state systems than in their functional existence, which they take as given. They are more attentive to regulation, through the military uses of force and strategic practices that establish the internal and external boundaries of the states system. Their main argument is that matters of security are the immutable driving forces of global politics. Indeed, most realists see some strategic lessons as being eternal, such as balance of power politics and the quest for national security. For Brooks and Wohlforth, balance of power politics (which was synonymous with Cold War politics in realist discourses) is the norm: “The result — balancing that is rhetorically grand but substantively weak — is politics as usual in a unipolar world” (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002: 29). National security discourses constitute the “observed realities” that are the grist of neorealist and neoclassical realist theories. These theories rely upon U.S. material power (the perception of U.S. relative material power for neoclassical realists), balance of power, and the global distribution of power to explain and legitimate American national security conduct. Their argument is circular since they depict a reality that is constituted by their own discourse, in addition to legitimizing American strategic behavior.

# 2NC A/T – Vague Alts

**They say vague alts –**

**a) It’s just as vague as the plan – you don’t specify every person or mechanism that goes into implementing the 1AC**

**b) we’re not vague – our actor is the judge and they partake in the Act – literature checks abuse**

**c) Cross-x checks – we could’ve explained it more**

# 2NC A/T – No Root Cause

**They say no root cause -**

**1. This argument doesn’t make any sense – saying that there is no root cause of violence implies that they know what the root cause of violence is - it’s circular**

**2. Even if violence is proximately caused, Lacanian theory applies to every instance because it relates to all subjects – that’s 1NC Stavrakakis – we’ll still win the impact calculus even if they can point out an outlier because we access the vast majority**

# 2NC A/T – Utilitarianism

**They say utilitarianism –**

**a) The consequences of the k will outweigh those of the plan – we are winning both the root cause of violence and serial case turns**

**b) Focus on utilitarian calculus without an understanding of the underlying role of desire replicates the case harms**

**Gaete 2K** [Rolando Gaete, “ARTICLE: Law & The Sacred: Desecration, Law and Evil,” Law/Text/Culture, 2000, p. lexis]

This is the terror that Burke wrote about, "terror of a 'there is nothing', which threatens without making itself known" (Lyotard 1990: 32). But meaninglessness can produce a different kind of understanding. The understanding of Kant when looking at the stars above and at his heart inside. The fundamental insight into the sacred is that of meaningless, the glimpse of a purposeless Universe which does not follow a pre-designed plan or which is not there to reach a pre-designed goal. It is sacred because it makes it impossible to think of it in the way one thinks about a thing, existing within the framework of the Universe, which has no value, plan or goal -- like a stone in a desert or a broken washing machine on a rubbish dump. The analogy to useless play, whose purpose is to play the play, is better (Fink 1966: 235; Gadamer 1979: First Part, II, 1). The withdrawal of meaning opens a clearing for the experience of the sacred, the terrifying modern experience of being before the absence of a rational God, an experience that Pascal and Kierkegaard explored (Bataille 1988). This experience and the effort to confront and understand it may be painful. But a banalisation of human existence that reduces all human phenomena to a utilitarian calculation can lead to even more painful consequences. [\*394]  Challenged by the development of fascistic communities that ground a seductive culture of hatred on a perverted sense of the sacred, we are presented with a hard choice between either paying 'the unbearable price of freedom' which censors all forms of censorship, or engaging in a comparative calculation of harms which can never provide clear guidelines. These approaches will not help us to identify the point at which legal intervention becomes necessary unless we confront and increase our understanding of the drives and desires that were at play in the Nazis' structures of motivation. "What is not confronted critically does not disappear; it tends to return as the repressed" (La Capra 1992: 126).

# 2NC A/T – Owen

**They say no prior questions – but Owen concludes neg – interrogating method is a prior question**  
**Owen 2** [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3]  
The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory- construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

# 2NR Overview

**First the overview – the affirmative is structured around the logic of fantasy that makes violence inevitable and turns the case – I’ll do the main link work below but basically the founding tenant of the kritik is that we will always face negativity which is inherent to subjectivity – they try to cover this Lack up through fantasy but the fantasy can never solve because the Lack is inherent to us being subjects and interacting with other subjects who see the world differently – when the affirmative sees the fantasy failing they will have to find someone to blame and exterminate which is the root cause of all instances of violence in history.**

**Our alternative is to engage in the Act and insert a new possibility of the future into the present – instead of saying either yes or no to the problems presented in the 1AC we make the radical Third Choice to reorient ourselves towards the problems themselves – that’s our 1NC Zizek evidence – we don’t try to fix the Lack because it is inevitable but we can recognize its existence and structure a progressive world that isn’t fantasy-based -but we don’t have to win the alternative to win – our Zizek evidence on framework frames says that even if we don’t have a perfect alternative we still have to reject their problematic assumptions because they are the root of all violence.**

**The affirmative has made a few concessions that are going to very damning at the end of this debate –**

**a) Methodology– the entirety of the link to our kritik is based on the affirmative’s methodology and they are conceding multiple reasons why it’s a prior question. Blomfield says that we cannot act or assume existent truth in the external world because everything is filtered through our psychological investments in that world, which means we have to resolve the role of desire before we evaluate the function of the plan. The implication is that all of their impact claims are second to methodology so you must evaluate the kritik before you even think about looking at the 1AC. They will get up and make a bunch of case outweighs arguments but you still vote negative because the basis of their affirmative makes violence inevitable.**

**b) Root Cause and Solvency takeout – violence will always exist within the world of fantasy because these fantasies can structurally never work to fill the Lack – there’s only a risk that the alternative can resolve violence because our Stavrakakis evidence from the 1NC indicates that the only reason violence arises is because we find somebody to blame for the failure of our fantasies and exterminate them to maintain our vision of wholeness – this means it’s try or die for the alternative, which is an attempt to escape the dominant ideology of fantasy.**

# 2NR Perm

**The permutation fails because of the reoccupation disad – our 2NC Stavrakakis evidence says that when we combine Lacanian analysis with the politics of fantasy our method just becomes one more empty signifier within their world– this is bad because in order for psychoanalysis to work it must be recognized in its irreducibility – the permutation necessarily footnotes our kritik and reoccupies it into the realm of fantasy which turns the effectiveness of the alternative and retrenches the links to the 1AC – this is a 100% conceded disad which means you should reject any 2AR skew on it**

# 2NR Links

## 2NR – Transportation

**The idea that transportation can solve our problems is based on the assumption that if we go faster and faster we can escape our problems – Thelma and Louise die while driving because inside their car they don’t have to worry about the bad parts of their lives – our McGowan evidence says that this speed is just an attempt to bridge the Lack but since the lack is inevitable can’t allow us to escape from any negativity – instead they are only distancing themselves from the Real when we attempt to escape dissatisfaction through speed**

## 2NR – Disabilities

**The fundamental assumption of their affirmative is that if we change the way we think about people who are disabled externally to us than we can solve for violence – they have conceded both pieces of Wilton evidence which indict this claim – the “dis-Abled” person is not someone who exists in external reality but is instead constructed from within the mind of the subject – when we realize that we are lack then we try and find an-Other to project that problem onto so that we can remain whole – the attempt to maintain the perfect abled body means that we see others who are different than us and deem them to be disabled**

**Two implications – first is a solvency takeout – the affirmative falls short in analyzing where violence comes from which means that the alternative is the only way to access the case impacts because we are the only ones who attempt to understand our relationship with disability and not just cover it up– second is a case turn – Stavrakakis says that we scapegoat violence onto the other which means that the fantasy that the affirmative has projected onto the necessity of the disabled other will fail and they will have to find someone else – like people of a different race or belief – that sustains the fantasy**

## 2NR – Deterrence

**The affirmative assumes that deterrence is some kind of contract – that state actors are somehow bound by deterrence as part of a capital-L Law – our Zizek evidence says that deterrence doesn’t exist because of its perfection every time but because it is imperfect – that by some reason it could fail and somebody WOULDN’T pull the trigger in order to save the population – this event is precisely the uniqueness for the alternative – at that point the nature of the fantasy crumbles and we gain access to the Real - their attempt to cover the function of deterrence only makes the catastrophe necessary to reinscribe their theory**

## 2NR – Economy

**The fundamental assumption of the economy advantage is that if we can always somehow fix our economy to a point where we have the perfect economic structure – however, our Shroeder evidence says that this perfect economy cannot exist because when we enter into the economy as subjects we necessarily act as disruptions to its flow – the internal impact is that as the affirmative moves us closer and closer to that point where every subject and their freedom will necessarily have to be erased to augment market function which means totalitarianism becomes necessary– this also means you reject all of their solvency claims on the econ flow because Shroeder says that until we engage in a psychoanalytic lens of economics that all of their predictions will be based off of a flawed model in which we conflate policies to strive for some impossible structure**

## 2NR – Equity

**The affirmative’s investment in the liberal idea of distributive justice is based on some terminally-flawed assumptions – our Zizek 93 evidence says that when the affirmative gets up and acts as some external bystander to the problems of separation in our country they ignore their role within the social contract of justice - this is precisely the fantasy formation that we are indicting – our conception of justice is not some universal ideal but instead necessarily intertwined with our desire to fulfill the Other’s desire – the primary example of this is desegregation through busing – when we forced students to attend integrated schools we project our false fantasy of justice onto them but in reality the communities they were from only rebelled and were left more isolated than before**

## 2NR – Hegemony

**Their hegemony advantage is the quintessence of the fantasies that we are kritiking – they assume that the world is a place to be dominated when in reality there is never such thing as complete control – the difference in everyone’s subjectivity proves that there is always a gap in the way that we see the world and there will always be someone out of their hegemonic reach – this not only takes out their solvency because total hegemony is impossible but gives us a hard link into our 1NC Stavrakakis evidence – they will always find an enemy outside the hegemonic sphere that needs to be exterminated in order to make world domination a reality – that’s the root of all violence and hatred**

## 2NR – Humanitarianism

**They’ve conceded the masking link - the affirmative’s humanitarian rhetoric is not neutral – they are always engaged with the dominant ideology of fantasy – their approach to the humanitarian crises that are external to their subjectivity are skewed so that they fit the fantasmatic model of what it means to be the Third World or in need of intervention. Zizek 97 outlines the tragic case of the Bosnia intervention, in which international forces went in shifted the blame onto the Croats so that violent pacification could be inflicted on the “inhuman tribes” that were inciting conflict. This failure to acknowledge the role of subjectivity within the international realm justifies endless violence in the name of controlling the Other.**

## 2NR – Natives

**The basis of the methodology that they use to interact with Native America is based on a flawed Eurocentric model in which we construct the Native American populations in harmony and as individuals who only want the good of the “tribe” – this is Carriere from the 2NC - this posits Native America not as an independent aggregate of subjects but instead as objects contexualized to our own desire – that makes subordination inevitable because we will always place the subject above the object but it also eliminates the value-aptness from the worse forms of genocide that we enact against Native populations to fulfill internal pleasure because the populations can only be framed as means to the ends within our subjectivity**

## 2NR – Racism

**Our link to the case functions on two levels –**

**First is the Oedipal family – Lacan says that subjectivity functions in terms of the Oedipal family – we all have a desire to fuck the mother but are constrained by the capital-L law imposed by the father – our Nast evidence says that the black other is constructed externally to the Oedipal family in order to reinforce the whiteness and purity inside of it – this means that what we perceive as Blackness always has to be exterminated to maintain the fantasy formation of the family – they don’t access this as the root cause of the White/Black dichotomy which means that it’s try or die for Lacan – it also triggers our scapegoating impact because we will always find somebody to fill the role of the other even if they solve racial discrimination**

**Second is Visibility – they assume race to be a function of body image – this twists race into some ontological necessity instead of a function of the realm of the Symbolic – the implication is that they engage in a fantasy formation in which they construct the image of the perfect racial subject and that subject can achieve everything up until they reach what we construct as their potential and then when they want more we tell them to go fuck themselves**

## 2NR – Security/Threat Construction

**The 1ar has not done enough work on the security link from the block – extend Zizek 05 – they’ve got the idea of threat construction backwards – instead of threats acting externally to the state and then the state jumping in and solving it, the power of the state is instead legitimized through the fantasy formation of the moral self vs. the immoral other – in order to sustain our military and be the good guy in the world we have to find people who are the bad guys and are always out to fight us – this only causes the wars they try to stop because we will always somebody to pre-emptively attack because we think that they might be a threat in the future.**

## 2NR – Soft Power

**The 1AR has conceded the soft power link – that’s Zizek 04 – their coalitions internal link is based on the doctrine of false choice – other countries have the choice to join the United States, but it’s in their “true” and “right” interests to do so and if they it reject then they become the enemy and something to be destroyed – this logic closes the loop between the past and the future because they have already determined what the “right” thing is to do – this causes the worst forms of violence in preemption to some imaginary future threat and makes war and aggression inevitable – only the alternative can break this close linearity of history – that’s 1NC Zizek**

## 2NR – Stimulus

**The basis for Keynesian economics is precisely the form of fantasy that Stavrakakis says causes violence – our Madra & Ozselcuk evidence says in order for government stimulus to be a success we have to assume that people will always fuck the economy up in necessitate intervention– this is not only a self-fulfilling prophecy but will always fail because the Lack makes harmony impossible – the impact is that they will just push government intervention to the extreme world where they can eliminate and mobilize populations in the name of economic revival, justifying the worst forms of biopolitical violence**

## 2NR – Terrorism

**Next on the terrorism link – Extend Zizek 05 – the AFF has it the wrong way around – terrorists don’t exist outside of the dominant power structure but are always decentered within it – the AFF cannot claim to know the existence or location or intent of the terrorism, but the State has to insist that it does in order to identity an enemy to be destroyed – this necessitates the scapegoating that our 1NC Stavrakakis evidence outlines – their logic of preemption makes lash-out genocide and violence inevitable to take-out the constructed terrorist threat**

## 2NR – Warming/Environment

**The aff understands the environment backwards – they’re caught up in the fantasy that there is some natural order – that there is some balance in nature that we as humans have ruptured and now have some obligation to restore – this is fundamentally premised in a fantasy to close-up some antrhropocentric gap – but our Zizek 93 evidence indicts their connection to nature and the way that they come to understand it – this subsumes all of their empirics and science claims because we are just indicting their subjective interpretation – nature is chaotic and crazy and lacks all balance – only in their fantasy does it gain some semblance of order – but they have conceded that this is impossible because they have been severed from ever understanding the function of capital-N nature, which exists in the Real – the impact is the worst forms of retroactive environmental destruction – the aff will interminably force nature to abide by the fantasy, which turns the case – that’s our Stavrakakis evidence**