Moral Nihilism Neg

I negate.

The resolution functions as a truth statement, so the affirmative must prove that the resolution is indeed true, and not simply that the affirmative world is better. The negative burden for this round is then to disprove the affirmative. The affirmative has the burden of proof in regard to the resolution, so if I can show that the affirmative case is false, then I win.

You should prefer a truth testing paradigm because:

1. Truth testing divides the ground equally such that the affirmative may defend anything that proves the resolution true and the negative must prove the affirmative false. Allowing the affirmative to specify an advocacy allows the aff to choose the best ground on the topic and forces the negative to contest that ground, which is unfair because the affirmative is granted the ability to only advocate the best argument on the topic, which makes it more difficult for the negative to win.
2. Truth testing includes ethical theories that deny the truth of normativity. Two implications follow. One, this is educational as it incentivizes people to learn about important moral philosophies such as skepticism. Education is key to debate because the activity would cease to exist without it because schools would not endorse the activity if it isn’t educational. Fairness is also key because we only know who the better cheater is not the better debater without it.
3. Real world claims and decisions include questioning and proving all necessary conditions for a statement. It’s unrealistic to assume the aff meets all the necessary conditions for morality (or whatever value in question) and jump to a discussion of the other potential implications of the aff. This jump in logic is uneducational because it undermines rational and critical thinking that can be applied outside of debate. It’s also unfair because it allows one side to link out of relevant arguments on the position, and I can’t predict which logical step they’ll claim they don’t need to defend.

The topic assumes morality exists when it specifies moral permissibility. If morality doesn’t exist, then clearly nothing can be permissible, so the aff’s statement can’t be true. Morality doesn’t exist because:

First, Recent scientific discoveries prove that free will is an illusion Haggard in 2011

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These data provide perhaps the first opportunity to compare the contributions of several different medial frontal areas to volition. Here, there are some interesting surprises. **For some years, the classical supplementary motor area, located immediately anterior to the medial part of the primary motor cortex, has been divided into pre-SMA rostrally and SMA proper more caudally. The pre-SMA was considered to be involved primarily in movement planning, while the SMA proper was considered an execution area, since it sends axons to the spinal cord (Picard and Strick, 1996).** These arguments lead many researchers to link the pre-SMA both to voluntary action and to the experience of volition itself. Indeed, pre-SMA was activated in an fMRI study of the Libet task (Lau et al., 2004) and was identified as thesource of readiness potentials from subdural recordings(Yazawa et al., 2000).However, Fried et al. [2011]’s data interestingly show a very different pattern. **SMA proper contained relatively more neurons active before [the thought]** W **than did the pre-SMA. In contrast, rather few SMA proper neurons were active in the brief interval between [the thought]** W **and movement onset relative to the pre-SMA. A quick statistical test on the proportions of each type of unit in the two areas shows a significant difference in the distributions** (c2(1) = 4. 13, p = 0.042). Importantly, the difference is in the opposite direction from that suggested by neuroimaging and EEG studies. This finding suggests a revision of how we interpret the W judgment**. It is clearly wrong to think of [a thought]** W **as a prior intention, located at the very earliest moment of decision in an extended action chain.** Rather, [it] W seems to mark an intention in- action, quite closely linked to action execution. **The experience of conscious intention may correspond to the point at which the brain transforms a prior plan into a motor act through changes in activity of SMA proper.**

The implication of this is that no one can ever be held accountable for making the “immoral” decision because they never had the ability to not pick that decision.

Next, there is no right or moral way to do something. Mackie 1 warrants:

**Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence and are hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection** seems to be mainly that way round: it **is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.**

Thus, no one is objectively right in moral disagreements due to biases. This means that moral codes hold no normative value since they’re biased and cannot actually be proven true, so we should reject morality as a valid motivation for action.

Second, morality is flawed due to its overgeneralization. Nietzsche 1 explains:

**Every word** immediately **becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original experience to which it owes its birth, but must at the same time fit innumerable**, more or less similar cases—which means, strictly speaking, never equal—in other words, a lot of **unequal cases.** Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. **No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf" is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions;** and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be "leaf"—some kind of original form after which all leaves have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original form.

Thus, the idea that morality can be universally accepted as “right” is flawed, since it’s an arbitrary abstraction of all of the different moral ideas that exist and are called morality. No moral idea ever wholly equals another; moral ideas are instead subjective in that it differs from person to person. This means that no real objective morality exists.

Third, morality doesn’t fit into our modern, scientific view of the world as we have no reliable faculty to sense it. Mackie 2 furthers:

**If there were objective values,** then **they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.** Correspondingly**, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else**.

Thus, there is a metaphysical problem as to how something like morality can even fit within our concept of the world, as well as an epistemological problem of how we would know about morality even if it did exist.

In addition, even if you don’t believe that morality is false, you would still negate because the way the affirmative accesses morality through the resolution is wrong. In our current world, morality comes mainly from historical and societal influence, which is inherently flawed.

Nietzsche 2 explains:

**A historical phenomenon, purely and completely known and resolved into an object of knowledge, is, for the person who has recognized it, dead. For** in it **that person has perceived the delusion, the injustice, the blind passion, and in general the entire dark temporal horizon of that phenomenon and**, at the same time, **in the process he perceives its historical power. This power has now become for him, as a knower, powerless, but perhaps not yet for him as a living person.**

What Nietzsche says here is that our drive to historicize and make sense of all of the items of knowledge has essentially devalued them by rendering all of the normative weight that they might have had over us in the past “dead” and useless, insofar as they do not hold any sway over us anymore. Our attempts to historicize things then leads to a progression in which a vacuum of knowledge is formed that is lacking all of the values that used to hold power, or at least where the values in the vacuum aren’t meaningful. This means we have to discover our own values which means that all morality is subjective.

My case negates the resolution for three reasons

1. The word ought has no meaning because it suggests a moral obligation exists but there can be no moral truths.
2. Even if morality does exist you cannot look to it since there is no objective way to evaluate the situation.
3. We can never make general claims about the truth of moral facts because it is subjective so you can’t affirm a general sense.
4. The affirmative has the job of proving that a moral obligation exists but the world moral has no meaning so they can’t,

And, presume negative because a statement can be proven false in an infinite number of ways whereas a truth can only be true in one way. Prefer this justification over any technical aspect of debate because it talks about the statements in truth

For these reasons you negate.

A2 you can look at history generally

Nietzsche explains why this is wrong:

**Should a person be in** a position to sniff out and catch the fragrance in many examples of **this unhistorical atmosphere,** in which every great historical event has arisen, **then such a person might perhaps be able, as a knowledgeable being, to elevate himself to a *superhistorical* standpoint, in the way Niebuhr once described it as a possible result of historical observations: “In one thing at least,” he says, “is history, clearly and thoroughly grasped, useful, the fact that one knows**, as even the greatest and highest spirits of our human race do not know, how their eyes have acquired by chance **the way in which they see and the way in which they forcefully demand that everyone see, forcefully, that is, because the intensity of their awareness is particularly great.** Someone who has not, through many illustrations, precisely determined, known, and grasped this point is overthrown by the appearance of a mighty spirit who in a given shape presents the highest form of passionate dedication.”[\*](http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/nietzsche/history.htm#n3)**We could call such a standpoint superhistorical, because a person who assumes such a stance could feel no more temptation to continue living and to participate in history, since he would have recognized the *single*condition of every event, that blindness and injustice in the soul of the man of action. He himself would have been cured from now on of still taking history excessively seriously. But he would have learned,** for every person and for every experience, among the Greeks or Turks, from a moment of the first or of the nineteenth century, **to answer for himself the questions how and why people lived**

Thus, when history is reduced to simple knowledge and you are in this superhistorical standpoint, a vacuum now exists that is free of all the mystery, jargon, and influence that traditional history would force upon us.