## Interventionism Good

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### Making war seem clean is key to hege- otherwise the public won’t sustain it- their criticism of interventionism causes U.S. withdrawal which sparks arms races and nuclear conflict

Rosen, Professor National Security Harvard, ‘3 (Stephen Peter, Spring, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It” The National Interest, lexis)

The other unique aspect of American empire today

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that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

### US hegemony plays an overwhelmingly stabilizing role – democratic constrains on hegemonic excess mean that even if there are some examples of US intervention the longer term trend is peace

Ikenberry – IR, Princeton - ‘1

G. John, Getting Hegemony Right, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_2001\_Spring/ai\_72345245/

A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is the character of America itself. The United States is indeed a global hegemon, but because of its democratic institutions and political traditions it is--or can be--a relatively benign one. Joseph Nye's arguments on "soft power" of course come to mind here, and there is much to his point. But, in fact, there are other, more significant aspects of the American way in foreign policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness. When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it, the fact that it is an open, stable democracy matters. The outside world can see American policymaking at work and can even find opportunities to enter the process and help shape how the overall order operates. Paris, London, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo and even Beijing--in each of these capitals officials can readily find reasons to conclude that an engagement policy toward the United States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, as it sought to rebuild the postwar world and to counter Soviet communism. In the late 1940s, in a pre-echo of today's situation, the United States was the world's dominant state--constituting 45 percent of world GNP, leading in military power, technology, finance and industry, and brimming with natural resources. But America nonetheless found itself building world order around stable and binding partnerships. Its calling card was its offer of Cold War security protection. But the intensity of political and economic cooperation between the United States and its partners went well beyond what was necessary to counter the Soviet threat. As the historian Geir Lundestad has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century after World War II was in important respects an "empire by invitation." [5] The remarkable global reach of American postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of Europe an and Asian governments to harness U.S. power, render that power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional insecurities. The result has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build longterm, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies--policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array of investigatory and decision-making bodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy, outside states are more willing to work with the United States--or, to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called "voice opportunities"--that is, opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington's power is exercised. In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the supposedly scandalous ways in which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo's commercial interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving-door lobbyists working to ensure that the interests of America's partners are not overlooked. Looked at from the perspective of the stable functioning of America's hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States. A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is the web of multilateral institutions that mark the postwar world. After World War II, the United States launched history's most ambitious era of institution-building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT and other institutions that emerged provided a more extensive rule-based structure for political and economic relations than anything seen before. The United States had been deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states and about allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet menace was critical in overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built that--paradoxically--made U.S. power both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable. In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order. But in doing so, these institutions also bound the United States to other states and reduced--at least to some extent--Washington's ability to engage in the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power. Call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington's policy autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. America's partners also had their autonomy constrained, but in return were able to operate in a world where U.S. power was more restrained and reliable. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelled out the terms of the bargain in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965: We are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of .... We have more than 4,300 treaties and international agreements, two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.... Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty going into these agreements. But Rusk argued that these agreements also create a more stable environment within which the United States can pursue its interests. "Law is a process by which we increase our range of freedom" and "we are constantly enlarging our freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do." [6] The United States gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners. There have been many moments when Asian and European allies have complained about the heavy-handedness of U.S. foreign policy, but the open and institutionalized character of the American order has minimized the possibilities of hegemonic excess over the long term. The untoward implications of sharp power asymmetries are reduced, cooperation and reciprocity are regularized, and the overall hegemonic order is rendered more legitimate and stable. The bargain--on both sides--remains intact.

### Hegemony is sustainable if the U.S. holds onto its allies

Kagan Sr. Assoc. Carnegie 10-30-‘8 (Robert-, Washington Post, “Still No. 1”, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/30/ST2008103002048 .html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/30/ST2008103002048%20.html))

One hopes that whoever wins next week will

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would take a dim view if he tried.

### **Focus on security through deterrence is inherently reflexive- learning to understand our enemies helps us broaden our world view**

Lupovici 8 – Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto (Amir, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,”  [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf" \t "_blank)

 Since deterrence can become part of the

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and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

### Global violence decreasing – civilization has become more moral

Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor at Harvard University, ‘7 (Steven, March 19, “A History of Violence” The New Republic, lexis)

In sixteenth-century Paris, a popular

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to know what, exactly, it is.

### Opposing all military intervention on the basis of peace is an illusion – the US is not the only regime that kills but it is the only regime with the ability to stop killing

Willis, Professor of Journalism & Director of Concentration in Cultural Reporting and Criticism at NYU, ‘2 (Ellen, “Why I'm not for peace,” Radical Society, April)

DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA, IN AN

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facile temptation to declare peace and go home.

### Perceptions of weakness causes enemies to miscalc- they’ll be overly aggressive and the U.S. will crackdown harder than it would otherwise

Heisbourg ’00 (Francois-, Chairmen of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, fmr. Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Winter (99-00), Survival, “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad”, Vol. 41 #4; Jacob)

The last perception is that of the US

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one cannot be too sanguine on this score.

### No mindless intervention

Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

MANDELBAUM:  I think it is, Richard

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, unwanted and expensive task of nation building.

Nation building has never been popular.  The

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And that unit has come to an end.

### Realism inevitable – structure of the international system

Mearsheimer ‘1 (John J., Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ U. Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, P. 1-4)

Many in the West seem to believe that

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democratic China to promote peace around the globe.

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### The public supports military engagement abroad

World Public Opinion, ‘7 (August 3, “US Role on the World” http://www.americans-world.org/digest/overview/us\_role/general\_principles.cfm)

Americans show strong support for the US maintaining

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it as having a negative effect.[14b]

### Public ignorance decreases opposition to aggressive foreign policy

Astore 10 (William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), taught for six years at the Air Force Academy, a TomDispatch regular, he currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology, "The New American Isolationism: The Cost of Turning Away From War's Horrific Realities," November 1, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-j-astore/the-new-american-isolatio_b_777149.html>)

A new isolationism is metastasizing in the American

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our troops,” but otherwise to look away.

### Media coverage doesn’t mobilize antiwar movements – it shields war’s costs

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Mainstream media coverage of our wars has

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and eroding our country’s standing in the world.

### War short-circuits the transition to new forms of politics

Linklater ’89 (Andrew-, Beyond Realism and Marxism, P. 32; Jacob)

These theoretical disagreements with Marxism generate major differences

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of emancipation through the extension of human community.

### Decline of US military primacy provokes global nuclear conflict

Zhang, Researcher Carnegie, and Shi, Consultant for Eurasia Group and World Bank, ’11 (Yuhan and Lin, January 22, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry” East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)

Over the past two decades, no other

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will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

### Economics and past interventions limit US imperialism

Ben Ami, VP of Toledo International Centre for Peace, ’11 (Shlomo, July 1, “Arab Spring, Western Fall” Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/benami55/English)

The old vocation of what Rudyard Kipling called

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guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea.”