## T – Democracy Assistance (Development)

### 1) We Meet: Plan in a vacuum increases civil society and good governance in Yemen – their interpretation assumes foreign direct investment which is not our aff

### 2) Cross apply 1AC Ward 09 - the plan boosts participatory and local and governance of water

### 3) Democracy assistance includes advocacy groups, corruption, and decentralization [ONLY READ IF THEY DO NOT READ A SIMILAR INTERP]

Carothers ’09 vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Thomas, “Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance the challenge of USAID,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/21802142/Revitalizing-U-S-Democracy-Assistance-The-Challenge-of-USAID

U.S. democracy aid has made and is making many positive contributions to democracy’s global fortunes. It contributes to the ￼strengthening, reform, or empowerment of judiciaries, prosecutors, police, legislatures, local governments, human rights activists, election commissions, election monitors, political parties, independent media, civic educators, anticorruption commissions, labor unions, business associations, citizen advocacy groups, reform-oriented think tanks, and many other actors in more than 100 countries. Such assistance is not a driver of political events, notwithstanding the energetic complaints by the Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan governments, among others, about putatively Western-manufactured “color revolutions.” Rather, it is a helping hand, facilitating the efforts of political societies and systems to reform themselves. It is an invaluable complement to the “high policy” level of democracy promotion, the diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks the U.S. government sometimes employs to encourage democratic reform in other countries. And where the United States does not pursue a pro-democratic “high policy” because of the existence of countervailing U.S. interests, it nevertheless sometimes pursues democracy aid efforts quietly but consistently, with useful long-term effects.

### 4) We Meet - 1AC ZEITOUN et al. - water user groups check back corrupt governance and empower local advocacy

### 5) 1AC CEDARE 2006 – Water user groups are democracy assistance under good governance and conflict prevention

### 6) RTI and NDI provide water aid is topical

RTI 2011 (Stabilization, Governance, and Economic Growth Projects: Yemen

Yemen Responsive Governance Project (2010-2015), Client/Agency

United States Agency for International Development

http://www.rti.org/page.cfm?objectid=CEBE2D43-D26C-7A89-A758CEB017F68104)

Description

RTI is assisting Counterpart International in strengthening the public policies and institutions that drive instability in Yemen. The Yemen Responsive Governance Project (RGP) is a collaborative effort funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development that will work until 2015 to improve government accountability.

RTI works with government ministries in the capital of Sana'a to improve policy and services in areas such as education, health, water, and economic growth.

To begin the capacity building process, a third partner, National Democratic Institute, facilitates public dialogues that include input from citizens, civil society organizations, and local government representatives. RTI analyzes and prioritizes the issues raised in these dialogues to determine those most important to citizens.

After identifying the top priority policy issues, RTI engages the corresponding ministries at the central level to identify the challenges to policy formulation.

Within each targeted ministry, RTI identifies the root causes behind current limitations to design the capacity building program so that policymakers can utilize tailored methods to develop and implement effective, fair, and transparent policies.

RTI further supports citizens by incorporating community input in designing service delivery policies, strengthening links between officials and community groups, creating a standard performance monitoring model for service delivery, establishing mentoring programs for new government employees, and modernizing government communications to enhance transparency.

### 7) Plan is decentralization

USAID June 2009 “Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook” http://www.usaid.gov/our\_work/democracy\_and\_governance/publications/pdfs/DDPH\_09\_22\_09\_508c.pdf

Decentralization as a strategy for democratization is of obvious salience to programmers where the overarching country goal is the deepening of democratic institutions. The link between decentralization and democratization points to a host of related principles and concepts that decentralization is expected to engender in relations between public officials and citizens, and in the electorate itself: participation, accountability, good governance, policy innovation and experimentation, and proximity or closeness to the people. As with most of the other areas, the empirical evidence does not confirm the most enthusiastic assumptions, but is rather more mixed, sounding a cautious note for USAID officers at the early stages of program design. Recent work shows that decentralization’s advantages relative to democracy depend significantly upon local actors and their incentives, since local elites may prove as susceptible to poor governance practices—such as corruption and social exclusion—as those at the national level. 3.0 DECENTRALIZA TION AND SECTORAL APPROACHES A key characteristic of decentralization reform involves its implications and applications for multiple sectoral areas. Several of the sectoral areas of primary interest to USAID feature their own perspectives on decentralization—with much of the literature written under the auspices of major international organizations, NGOs, and bilateral aid agencies. USAID programming specialists in specific sectoral areas thus have the option of reading literatures in their own respective fields to educate themselves on the possible benefits of decentralization reforms. Sectoral literatures on decentralization to some extent share a similar focus across sectors, with each emphasizing the possible relationship between decentralization and various qualities of interest to USAID programmers: capacity, efficiency, and the interrelated concepts of accountability, participation, and transparency. Of course, the sectoral literatures also differ in content. In Education (E), there is an emphasis on the decentralization of curriculum design, for instance, while decentralization in Health (H) will focus on such issues as the importance of local or regional variations in health problems and corresponding delivery systems. Other leading sectors where decentralization may be beneficial are Infrastructure (I) and Natural Resource Management (NRM). In each of these areas, the suggested readings will encourage sectoral specialists to envision how decentralization can allow programmers to better achieve their goals locally and nationally, all with a view toward improving the quality and coverage of public services.

**Standards**

### 1) They over-limit the topic, if our aff is not topical no Yemen affirmative are, WATER is THE political issue of yemen’s

### 2) The topic is neg biased, Carothers says Demo-assistance is the “quiet” side of democracy literature

### 3) We are predictable and they have ground – Every article on Yemen includes analysis of corrupt water policy

### 4) Brightline – their interp is not exclusive of our affirmative or interpretation

### 5) Prefer our interp – they are from democracy experts and demo-assist. NGOs

### 6) Good is good enough – competing interpretations leads to a race to the bottom, that promotes lazy debate, and avoids substantive discussions of the topic.

## ADV 2-A2: Al Alwaki

**Awlaki’s killing just means AQAP will strike sooner and harder**

**Kohlmann 9/30** – independent U.S. terrorism consultant (Evan, “Analysts view: Spotlight on Awlaki killing,” http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44731274/ns/world\_news-mideast\_n\_africa/#.ToXsp-znOVo)

EVAN KOHLMANN, INDEPENDENT U.S. TERRORISM CONSULTANT

"It's a big deal, but I'm worried what the **backlash** will be. This guy has some **very devoted and very radical** followers. Many of them live in Western countries, and they may see this as the dinner bell calling them to **strike out violently**. The other problem is that awlaki will continue to live on in his recorded sermons such as "constants on the path of jihad." He may be **as much trouble dead as alive**. As far as AQAP... Awlaki never held a formal position in AQAP, so there isn't any good reason to believe that group will be directly impacted **in terms of its military capabilities**."

## A2: No Nukes

**Even if they don’t have the weapons, it’s perceived as a nuclear attack**

**Kimery 11** – Homeland Security Today's senior reporter and online editor (Anthony, W. Scott Malone, multiple Emmy and Peabody award-winning investigative journalist and former senior editor of NavySEALs.com. He runs the website's counterterrorism newsletter spin-off, “BlackNET Intelligence Channel,” 05/12, “Al Qaeda Could Try to Replicate Fukushima-type Meltdowns,” http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/al-qaeda-could-try-to-replicate-fukushima-type-meltdowns/aa96292934d83bb8c9f97fd9d685f32b.html)

"I consider Al Qaeda, now being pushed by Anwar Al Awlaki [the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, and a possible heir to Bin Laden], in the position to begin planning for a new '9/11 style' attack using a **w**eapon of **m**ass **d**estruction ... not to say they will not continue their recruiting of 'lone wolf' types - I do believe the long term goal of Al Qaeda 2.0 to be a spectacular attack to the US infrastructure that would cause significant and permanent damage to a significant portion of the continental US," Homeland Security Today was told by former Army Special Forces Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, author of, Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan - and the Path to Victory.

A successful attack resulting in a reactor meltdown could potentially cause hundreds of thousands of deaths from cancer, at a minimum.

The ensuing panic would probably be the most immediate danger.

Besides the immense clean-up costs and potential environmental damage, the economic blow to the nuclear power industry would be devastating worldwide.

It’s no secret that US authorities have uncovered numerous efforts by Al Qaeda to obtain nuclear weapons and radiological materials over the years.

“Although we know from their own statements as well as intelligence and security success in blocking a number of efforts, Al Qaeda has been determined to acquire deliverable weapons of mass destruction [WMD], including nuclear, for a long time,” veteran CIA operations officer and Islamist jihad expert, Clare Lopez, told Homeland Security Today.

The new intelligence brief pointed out that “the disaster in Fukushima may have provided the knowledge Al Qaeda needs to carry out such an operation” in lieu of possessing “a prepositioned [nuclear] weapon.”

"While the Al Qaeda organization may, or may not, possess either a nuclear device or radiological material," the brief stated, "the pressure on the organization to fulfill that threat is now enormous. If Al Qaeda does possess such a weapon, the danger is obvious. If, however, there is no such device or material in Al Qaeda’s control, then it is likely that Al Qaeda and [Bin Laden’s] supporters may attempt an attack comparable in scale that will at least be **perceived** as a ‘nuclear’ response to Bin Laden’s death.”

“Surely, the determination to strike, and especially now after the killing of [Bin Laden], remains intense,” Lopez said.

## EU CP

### Perms-

Perm do both-EU and US work together all the time, ex counterterrorism

### SQ-Turn on CP

Bodine 2010 3rd card in case, SQ corruption would not be solved by EU, its an American problem. Leads to Instability

### PULL from case:**Yemeni instability causes Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy wars**

Bipartisan Policy Center 2011

### Cant Claim ADV-1 or 2

-Both are centered on the US, first is ADV on US leadership, 2nd is based off of COIN centered on US image, we will still be there with a neg image if US isn’t admin in case.

### **Solvency- On CP**

### **Pull-US has the best working relations with NGO’s and civil society groups**

Burke 10-we solve better

EU doesn’t solve – administrave hurdles, opposing interests, and chain of command issues ensure the counterplan fails

Patz ’10 [Ronny Patz, “Journalistic: Does EU democracy assistance fail?”, 8 November 2010, http://polscieu.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/11/08/journal-istic-does-eu-democracy-assistance-fail/]

[I]n democracy assistance the EU **starts with a relatively big plan and ends up with a particularly small outcome** I was surprised to find this kind of statement in a scientific journal; it sounds so nicely down to earth that I was really interested in finding out how Federica Bicchi had come to this conclusion The article is titled “Dilemmas of Implementation: EU democracy assistance in the Mediterranean” (issue 5/2010 of the journal “Democratization“) and the author has looked at a number of EIDHR microprojects planned and implemented between 2001 and 2006/7. The countries concerned were Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunesia, summing up a total of 24 calls for microprojects in the years between 2002-2007, from 0 in Tunesia to 5 in Palestine. The total amount of micro-projects covered was 130. Probably the main argument made by Bicchi is the following: The chain of command for the microprojects, from decision making to implementation, was **particularly long**, and EU attempts to ‘co-own’ projects further increased its length. […] Temporally, organizationally and spatially, **the distance from** **formulation to implementation of** EIDHR micro**projects** **was substantial**. She argues that this **long chain of command** leaves **too much room** for the (**re-)interpretation** by the many individuals on that chain on how to understand democracy promotion and the purpose of the projects. The many little decisions taken then move away the implementation from the original intention, not on purpose but **by design of the administrative process**. The most important deviations were brought by the Commission delegations in the countries where the projects were to be implemented. These deviations ranged from decisions not to have calls at all under the EIDHR scheme to decisions re-defining the priorities of possible projects under the calls, involving both up- and downgrading of objectives. One particular issues mentioned by Bicchi was the removal of the fight against torture in some of the calls, e.g. in Algeria, Israel or Libanon. After the calls had been issued, it became obvious that in countries with the highest need for such assistance – Syria, Tunesia, Algeria – no projects were actually brought to an end. And most of the projects approved in other countries were not in the field of democracy promotion but under the human rights campaigns, promoting in particular those human rights that are not very relevant for the promotion of democracy and political rights. In the end, from a budget of about 15 million Euros of EIDHR money approved for the area between 2001-05, only about 11.2 million Euros had been spent, most of the unspent money apparently accounting for democracy-related activities (in particular in Algeria and Lebanon). Bicchi thus concludes as follows: The EU clearly delivered a fraction of what it originally intended through the EIDHR. […] It could be argued that there seems to be an **across-the-board**, if silent, **consensus against democracy assistance** and most of the decisions **taken served to confound such an objective**. That is a pretty tough conclusion, and although slightly weakened down afterwards by pointing to the non-deliberate nature of this consensus, the findings raise at least **serious questions** about the nature of the EU as a self-proclaimed actor promoting democracy around the world and in particular in its neighbourhood.

### Leadership turn

1. Yemen is low on Global donor lists

Juneau 2010 (Thomas, Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies” Volume 17, Issue 3, pages 134–152, Fall 2010)

To begin, Yemen is in crucial need of more development assistance. The country has traditionally been low on the priority list of donors. In 2005, it received $335 million in assistance, which corresponded to 2.2 percent of GDP or $16 per capita. The Palestinian Territories by contrast received $303 per capita.50 In the wake of the failed December 2009 attack, a number of countries, including the United States, announced increases in assistance.51 GCC states had promised over $4 billion at a donor conference in 2006, but as of early 2010 had disbursed less than 15 percent of this sum. They committed again to respect those pledges in January 2010.

Second, a major effort should be undertaken in the realm of institution-building, in particular with the development of a more professional and competent bureaucracy better able to deliver services. Much energy should be geared towards the health and education sectors, to try to buttress the legitimacy of the central government. To achieve this, Yemen would require both financial and technical support from donors. Despite numerous challenges, donors should take a tough line in the fight against corruption, while also supporting the development of civil society.

### **U.S. leadership is key to international donor support and improving the fight against AQAP**

Gude et al. 2011 (Ken is the Managing Director of the National Security and International Policy Program, Ken Sofer is the Special Assistant, and Aaron Gurley is an intern at American Progress. “Secretary Clinton Should Go to Yemen U.S. Should Openly Lend Diplomatic Support to Country’s Vice President” <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/secretary_clinton_yemen.html>)

The United States must also do a better job convincing Yemenis that our actions in Yemen are designed to help them and not simply protect our own interests. The political crisis has put one of the most water-poor countries on the planet on the brink of disaster. Most Yemenis don’t have access to running water, fuel prices have increased by 900 percent, 7 million of Yemen’s 21 million citizens go hungry every day, and rolling blackouts have kept many of the country’s hospitals from properly functioning. While the United States already provided $45 million in relief assistance this year, a vocal, public push by USAID head Raj Shah to mobilize the international community to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen can have a real impact on the lives of perhaps millions of Yemenis and go a long way to achieving all U.S. objectives in that country. Security forces that were targeting AQAP were redeployed from the south to Sana’a to protect the Saleh family and regime since protesters became a threat to the regime in February. AQAP was thus given room to maneuver, and it capitalized on the opportunity by expanding activities in a number of key cities in southern Abyan province and exerting control over local populations. This is what prompted the uptick in American drone strikes trying to fill the void left by the departed Yemeni security forces. The problem is that drones are not a sustainable way to check AQAP’s advances—only a stable government that is capable of responding to the needs of its people can accomplish that. The world saw last Friday the impact U.S. officials can have when U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford visited Hama, the city at the heart of the uprising against Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, which bolstered the protest movement in the face of a government crackdown. Sending Hillary Clinton and Raj Shah to Sana’a could be a way to break the deadlock and push the various factions in Yemen toward the political settlement that is needed so that the next Yemeni government can tackle the multiple serious challenges it faces.

### **This means the plan leads to the implementation of the counterplan – the EU and middle eastern nations will follow the U.S. lead in stabilizing and rebuilding Yemen**

### **No U.S. USAID leadership in Yemen undermines international investment commitment leading to a failed state –PULL BODINE IN 2010 from CASE**

Bodine May 2010 (Barbara K., “Ambassador (Ret.) Barbara K. Bodine is Lecturer and Diplomat-in-Residence at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Yemen: Primer and Prescriptions” PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 43-58

To focus disproportionately on immedi- ate military and security capacity-building is shortsighted. If our concerns about the threats from Yemen are sufficient to fund $120 million in security assistance and an implicit under- standing that development of credible security structures is a long-term investment, then our interest in keeping Yemen on the good side of the failure curve (recognizing that it may never be wholly prosperous) warrants an equal commitment to civilian capacity-building over a similar long haul. We need to do more than invest in extending the authority of the state. We must invest as well in the legitimacy and capacity of the state and society. We cannot grant “legitimacy,” but we can assist in the development of those elements of the state that provide services to the citizens, and the development of a society strong enough to be partners to its state. The “we” here is the U.S. Government, the international com- munity, and the regional neighbors. The 2006 donors’ conference was generous, but its pledges remain unfulfilled. The 2010 London Conference made all the right noises about coordination and sustained engagement, but it will take more than a conference to con- vince the average Yemeni that there has been a credible shift in resources, philosophy, or commitment to governance and development, to a preconflict whole-of-government, and to governments plural. And Yemenis will have to be convinced that this will not all evaporate in the face of excuses and other priorities.

The perception of many Yemenis, includ- ing our friends, is that in recent years the U.S. policy aperture has narrowed to security only or security first—and to security as we define it. We need to reopen that aperture. We learned that lesson in Iraq late in the game. We are attempt- ing to apply those lessons in Afghanistan. We have progressed from conventional military to counterinsurgency to the “3Ds” (defense, diplo- macy, and development) to manage postconflict situations. We have the opportunity to apply the basics of those lessons preconflict and pre- failure in Yemen.

A sustained, comprehensive, and coordinated strategy must be based on civilian-led and civilian-focused diplomacy and development upfront, early, and long term. Our involvement in state and human capacity development needs to equal if not exceed our commitment to building a military and police capability.

### **Yemeni Failure likely now – an increase in U.S. donor leadership is key to prevent a collapse**

Juneau 2010 (Thomas, Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay, “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure - Implications and Remedies” Volume 17, Issue 3, pages 134–152, Fall 2010)

For decades, Yemen and its predecessors have been fragile states repeatedly labeled as candidates for failure. Despite this decades-long resilience, however, the convergence of an array of growing pressures, ranging from unrest in the South and the Huthi conflict in the North to the rapid depletion of natural resources and booming demographics, leads to the assessment that state failure is highly likely in the coming years. Such an outcome would have serious implications for regional and international security. It could provide AQAP with a freer hand to use the country as a launching pad for regional and international operations, while maritime security around Yemen and the regional proliferation of small arms would be negatively affected.That said, failure can still be averted. The international community, led by Washington and Riyadh, is already working with Sanaa to prevent the failure of Yemen from becoming reality. The failed December 2009 terrorist strike on an airliner near Detroit, however, served as a reminder that the situation is deteriorating, not improving. Much more can be done to slow down and hopefully reverse the gradual erosion of the Yemeni state’s authority, and therefore mitigate or avoid some of the consequences of a failed Yemen. If, unfortunately, such measures prove insufficient or if the will to adopt and implement them proves to be lacking, another, parallel set of initiatives would be needed to contain the instability seeping out of a soon-to-be failed Yemen.

### **The US must take the lead to embolden international support during the transition-Pull from case**

Sanderson 2011 (Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State For Near Eastern Affairs, “Sen. Bob Casey Holds A Hearing On U.S. Policy In Yemen” July 19, 2011 Tuesday)

I have to, however, flag the fact that when there is this transition, this political transition, the needs of the Yemeni people, I think, are going to become much greater. And the international community, of which the United States is, obviously, a leading player, is going to have to step up and help the Yemenis in this new political environment move forward.

COONS: Thank you, (inaudible).

CAPOZZOLA: Thank you.

To reiterate what my colleague has said, our resources were stepped up last year in fiscal year 2010 quite significantly. In terms of development and humanitarian assistance, they more than doubled to -- compared to fiscal year 2009.

So we're stepping up our game and using, as was said, of variety of -- of creative mechanisms to extend our reach throughout the country, get into more communities in more areas, do more community level investments, the kinds of things we can do in this environment, where we -- we may not have the type of partnership we need at the central level to tackle some of the fundamental development challenges -- for example, water, OK?

So we're doing a lot of local level water with these increased resources and, I think, sending a very strong message to the Yemeni people about U.S. support for this situation. On the other hand, we can't address the long-term water challenges that Yemen faces right now until attention can be turned to that in the center on key policies and engagement with the broader international community to bring the kind of investment together that will -- will tackle those sorts of challenges.

## A2: SAUDI DA

1. Non-unix-We have been actively promoting democracy in the region for years and our relationship has never triggered relations backlash, ex Iraq, Kuwait ect…
2. Non-unix-Egypt was the most recent American interventionism and we have not seen the Impact.
3. No brink-we have no idea if a small water case for Yemen will trigger link.
4. No timeframe-we win the timeframe debate, we gain adv as soon case passes relations could take months even years to spillover and cause DA.

### Relations low now – all of their impacts are inevitable

Rachel **Bronson**, Vice President, Programs and Studies at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Saudi Arabia’s Intervention in Bahrain: a Necessary Evil or a Strategic Blunder?” March 20**11** <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.bronson.saudiarabia.html>

The **Saudi deployment**, undertaken one day after U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates traveled to the region and urged reform, marks **a new low point in U.S.-Saudi relations**. As David Ignatius of the Washington Post describes it, **today’s unwelcomed** **situation is “the most important U.S.-Saudi disagreement in decades,**” and it leaves the U.S. with few good options. **Washington and Riyadh are now publically squared off on issues of political representation, violence and stability**. **A U.S./Saudi diplomatic clash would further challenge shaken oil markets**. **It would also leave Saudi Arabia exposed internationally**, as its primary international partner distances itself. **China and Russia remain as possible future partners, in addition of course to local Arab states**, but Saudi Arabia has benefited from America’s partnership. For the U.S., the risks of a Saudi-U.S. split are also profound. There is no more likely way to create a true clash of civilizations than having the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on opposite sides of a political divide. An antagonized U.S.-Saudi relationship could empower the radicals inside the Kingdom rather than bolster more moderate forces. **The Saudis have put at risk some of the considerable gains they have made both internationally and domestically by ensuring a U.S.-Saudi spat**.

## Link Defense

### Democracy is irrelevant - Saudi-US relations stable and enduring – Iran is the threat

Gause 2011 (F. Gregory, III teaches political science at the University of Vermont, “Is Saudi Arabia really counter-revolutionary?“ Foreign Policy, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/09/is\_saudi\_arabia\_really\_counter\_revolutionary)

Would the monarchs of the Holy Alliance have supported a democratic uprising anywhere in Europe in 1820? Would Prince Metternich have backed nationalist movements in 1848? Of course not. But their supposed reactionary analogue in the Arab upheavals of 2011, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, has now come out, forcefully if indirectly, for a regime change in Syria. That makes the third time during this Arab spring that Saudi Arabia, the supposed champion of the status-quo, has thrown an Arab leader under the bus. Bashar al-Asad now joins Muammar al-Qaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh in the club of Arab leaders Saudi Arabia can do without. The immediate reaction to the Saudi recall of its ambassador to Damascus in many news outlets (including the BBC, the New York Times and the Washington Post) emphasized the incongruity (and the hypocrisy) of an absolute monarchy that had sent troops to Bahrain to put down popular protests calling on a fellow dictator to stop oppressing his people. But that is the wrong frame in which to understand Saudi Arabia's regional policy during this time of Arab upheaval. The right frame is the regional balance of power battle between Riyadh and Tehran. In that context, the Saudi move against the Asad regime makes much more sense. Syria is Iran's most important and longest-standing Arab ally. Under Bashar's father, Hafiz al-Asad, Damascus was able to sustain good relations with Riyadh while also cultivating the Persian connection. But the son has proven less nimble in balancing his regional relations. Syrian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon (and assumed Syrian involvement, if not directly then indirectly, in the assassination of Saudi ally Rafiq al-Hariri) alienated Riyadh. Bashar even publicly insulted the Saudi king and other Arab leaders over their stance during the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006. King Abdullah was hesitant to break fully with Damascus, as demonstrations against the regime accelerated over the past five months, given the importance of Syria in regional politics. But the escalating violence of the past week, coming at the beginning of Ramadan, seemed to seal the issue. Dealing Iran a blow in regional politics trumps the risks of greater instability. While public opinion is hardly a major factor in Saudi foreign policy decisions, on the break with Syria the King was following, not leading, his people. The Saudi media and Saudi-owned pan-Arab media has been vehemently opposed to Asad's crackdown and sympathetic to the protestors. This is where the Ramadan timing comes into the picture. During the holy month religious feelings are heightened. The sectarian element of the Syrian confrontation, with an ostensibly secular and Alawite Shiite dominated regime brutally suppressing the Sunni Muslim majority, becomes a more prominent element in how the overwhelmingly Sunni Saudis, population and leadership, view events. The sectarian factor, never absent, is now becoming a more open element in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The Saudi and Gulf commentary on events in Bahrain was openly sectarian. While the Saudi leaders do not explain their policies in sectarian terms and tend to view the region more in balance of power terms, they have always thought that sectarianism was their hole card in the confrontation with Iran. There are more Sunnis in the region than Shiites. They know it and the Iranians know it. But playing up the sectarian element of regional conflict will blow back on the Saudis sooner rather than later. Heightened sectarian tension provides fertile ground for extremist salafi jihadist movements like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to sell their anti-Shiite ideas and recruit new members. The Saudi leadership believes it has the AQAP threat under control, but their current actions could be providing a safety net for an organization that, like its parent, has suffered serious reverses in recent years. The "sectarianization" of regional balance of power conflicts should concern the United States as well. The United States has an interest in a stable Iraq, a stable Lebanon, a Syria that does not implode into all-out civil war, and a Bahrain that overcomes the bitterness of its government's recent brutal crackdown on its citizens. Heightened sectarian feelings work against all those interests. While the Saudis are correct that there are more Sunnis than Shiites in the Muslim world, privileging sectarian identity gives the Iranian regime an entry into the politics of many Arab states. Riyadh would be better served by encouraging a common Arab identity that overcomes sectarian differences and emphasizes the foreignness of Iran in the Arab world while marginalizing sectarian extremists like al Qaeda and its sympathizers. While the sectarian issue should be a concern for the United States, in the immediate term the Saudi move against the Asad regime places Riyadh squarely on the side of Washington yet again. Even those not particularly friendly to the Saudis call for the United States to join the kingdom in upping the pressure on Damascus. This points to the bankruptcy of another popular "Arab spring" trope -- the supposed crisis in Saudi-U.S. relations. It is certainly true that the two countries have ended up on opposite sides of some regional issues, like the fall of Hosni Mubarak and the Bahraini crackdown. A U.S. veto of a Palestinian statehood resolution in the Security Council will also highlight their differences. But on a number of issues the Saudis and the United States have lined up together -- Libya, Lebanon, containment of Iran -- and even cooperated directly as in Yemen. U.S. arms sales to and military training missions in Saudi Arabia continue apace. The Saudi-U.S. relationship is complicated and changing, but it is hardly on the brink of divorce.So where do the Saudis stand as the Arab spring undergoes a hot summer and an uncertain fall? Saudi Arabia is against regime change in allied states. It supports its fellow monarchs both out of concern for its own domestic regime security, ideological solidarity, and balance of power politics. It might not like democracy much, and certainly not at home, but that does not mean it will oppose all democratic movements. Its support for the March 14 anti-Syrian coalition in Lebanon in the last two Lebanese elections was crucial. When leaders, even leaders with whom it has had decent relations in the past, no longer can get the job done, the Saudis will help usher them out the door. They will deal with their successors in a pragmatic way (as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt, the deposers of Saudi ally Hosni Mubarak, quickly realized). They will oppose leaders and groups that they think are allied with Iran, whether it is Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Asad regime in Syria, or Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq. Their focus is on checking and rolling back Iranian influence in the Arab world. That is what drives their policy, not some imagined notion of anti-revolutionary dictatorial solidarity. Let's understand Saudi regional policy for what it is, and let Prince Metternich rest in peace.

### Impact Turn – Democracy and HR

### Severing ties with Saudi Arabia is the only way to promote human rights credibility and democracy

Jim **Lobe,** The Washington Bureau Chief, InterPress Service, Bahrain: U.S. Keeps Quiet over Repression, April 13, 20**11** <http://theglobalrealm.com/2011/04/15/bahrain-u-s-keeps-quiet-over-repression/>

**Finally, Washington’s failure to strongly denounce the repression and its apparent efforts to appease the Saudis undermine its pose as a champion of human rights and democracy in region, exposing it instead as a cynical player of realpolitik,** according to Chris Toensing, director of the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). **“There is a strong and rising current of disgust in the region at the Saudi role** in the season of Arab revolts where, at every turn, they have encouraged the harshest repression possible,” he said. “And, if you look at the timing of Gates’s past two trips (to the region), **people assume that the U.S. is being solicitous of its strategic partner and acquiescing in Saudi efforts to mount counter- revolutions.” “There’s a strong suspicion that at least tacit consent was given to the Bahrainis and Saudis to do their worst in exchange for Arab League support for the no-fly zone in Libya,” he added.**

## CHINA BASHING

Obama has no political capital

Chicago Tribune, 10/12/11, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-oped-1012-page-20111012,0,4347142.column>

Sure, **Obama barnstormed the country, pitching his American Job**s Act, casting himself once again as a man alone against the [Grand Old Party](http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics/parties-movements/republican-party-ORGOV0000004.topic)'s stubborn congressional leaders. But to put real pressure on the House Republican majority, he needs the [Senate](http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics/government/u.s.-senate-ORGOV0000134.topic) to pass some version of the bill. **Unfortunately, his political capital on Capitol Hill is running out as lawmakers face re-election races of their own. And some of Obama's allies in the Congressional Black Caucus and the left-progressive activist communities continue to grumble that he's treating them like a stand-by date** — a reliable companion for Saturday night, only to be forgotten for the rest of the week. Left-progressive activists, including his former White House green jobs adviser Van Jones, hardly mentioned Obama's name at their Take Back the American Dream Conference, an annual gathering of liberal activists in [Washington, D.C.](http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/us/washington-dc-PLGEO100101200000000.topic) **Obamamania has dimmed as Obama, in the words of one activist leader, has become "too cautious" and "pre-compromised**."

### Uniqueness overwhelmes – Boehner’s veto mean’s he will never let China bashing legislation through.

### No reason why Boehner needs political capital – can veto it…

### Boehner is not key, he’s punting the football to Obama

Reuters Oct 25, 2011 4:19pm EDT http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/25/usa-china-idUSN1E79O13120111025 "I think it's a very dangerous policy," House Speaker John Boehner, the top Republican in Congress, told a news conference. "The fact is the president of the United States ought to stand up and take a position." Boehner's opposition could derail a bill that has strong rank-and-file support. Republicans control the House while Obama's fellow Democrats control the Senate. Echoing Boehner, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp urged the Obama administration to tell Congress what it "should and should not do" to address concerns about Chinese trade and currency practices. "Some in Congress focus on legislation to address currency manipulation as if it were a silver bullet," Camp said. "In doing so, they miss the many issues we have with China." Camp cited a long list of U.S. concerns that included theft of U.S. intellectual property, lavish domestic subsidies, discriminatory regulation and curbs on exports of scarce raw materials such as rare earth minerals. Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis told the panel the Obama administration was "working day and night" to address concerns about Chinese economic policies. "Many of these troubling policies reflect China's strengthening of state control over its economy and a retreat from its initial strong push to liberalize markets in the first years after its World Trade Organization accession," he said. While Obama has stopped short of endorsing the currency legislation, he has said he believes China is "gaming" international trade by holding down the value of the yuan to give Chinese firms an competitive price advantage. YUAN CALLED 'MISALIGNED' Obama will host Asia-Pacific leaders, including Chinese President Hu Jintao, at a summit aimed at boosting trans-Pacific trade next month. Protectionist U.S. legislation would undercut Obama's efforts to open markets, analysts say. A senior U.S. Treasury official told the committee the yuan needs to rise faster to correct a "misaligned" exchange rate, although that would not eliminate the U.S. trade deficit. "Renminbi appreciation on its own will not erase our trade deficit," said Lael Brainard, undersecretary for international affairs, using another name for the yuan. She told lawmakers the administration would continue to stand up to what she called China's unfair and discriminatory trade and investment practices but also continue to "engage and encourage China" to pursue reforms. The Treasury has given the bill a lukewarm reception, saying that while it shares the goals of the legislation, there are concerns it may not be consistent with world trade laws. "Aspects of pending legislation ... do raise concerns about consistency with our international obligations and we are discussing these issues with members (lawmakers)," Brainard said. Brainard said despite the yuan's 7 percent increase against the dollar since June 2010, China's continued rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the declining share of consumption in its economy "indicate that the real exchange rate of renminbi remains misaligned despite recent movement, and a faster pace of appreciation is needed." Representative Sander Levin, the top Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, accused Republicans of taking a "hands off" approach to China trade at a time when the American people are demanding that Congress "act to end a variety of China's predatory trade practices," including currency manipulation.

The bill to crack down on China currency practices now has 230 co-sponsors in the House, more than enough to win approval if Boehner allows it to come up for a vote, he said.

"Because currency is not China's only predatory and trade-distorting policy, that cannot be an excuse for refusal to act on it. Nor does it mean not acting on other key issues," Levin said.

### Obama is focused on jobs

Aronoff 9/26 [Roger Aronoff, “Obama’s Charade Exposed”, Monday, September 26, 2011, http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/40733]

There was a very revealing segment on The Chris Matthews Show on Sunday. The discussion was about President Obama’s recent focus on **jobs, jobs, jobs**. Obama gave his much ballyhooed speech in Congress, right after everyone returned from their August recess. You will recall that Obama first tried to schedule it up against a long-planned Republican presidential debate, the first day Congress was back, but that was rejected in what was treated by the media as a show of disrespect. The President agreed to speak the next night, and had to carefully schedule it so as not to conflict with the opening game of the National Football League season.

### 2AC: China Bashing

### Obama not involved, won’t be introduced in the House, jobs thumps.

The Hill 9-28-11.

The bill would crack down on what critics contend is China’s policy of manipulating currency to give its companies a trading advantage. The Obama administration is not eager to confront China over its currency policy, but congressional Democrats are eager to tackle it — especially politically vulnerable Democratic incumbents in Midwestern states. They include Sens. Sherrod Brown (Ohio), Debbie Stabenow (Mich.) and Bob Casey Jr. (Pa.), whose states’ economies have suffered because of a steady outflow of manufacturing jobs to China. Some Senate Democrats have described the president’s position as “eerily silent.” And that’s how they want it to stay, knowing that opposition from Obama would hurt their cause. The China measure has long been a top priority for Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), one of Reid’s top deputies. The then-Democratic-controlled House last year passed a China currency bill, 348-79, a month before the elections, but the top three Republicans in the House — Speaker John Boehner (Ohio), Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Va.) and Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (Calif.) — voted no. This year, 200 House lawmakers have co-sponsored companion legislation, including 56 Republicans. Many Republican freshmen made taking a tough stand on China a prominent theme in their 2010 campaigns. However, it’s unlikely to hit the House floor any time soon. That would give Reid and Schumer an opportunity to bash Boehner for refusing to act on a bipartisan jobs bill, countering criticism from the GOP that the Senate is a graveyard for a slew of House-passed bills. Boehner’s office did not comment for this article. Obama has made a $447 billion jobs package his top legislative priority. Earlier this month, Obama urged Congress to pass his jobs bill “now.” Three weeks later, Reid has not yet scheduled a vote.

## Orientalism

### Link -

### We don’t link – nothing in our account portrays the “orient” as the same

### 2. Turn – we prevent USAID from its current focus which our Bodine evidence says is insufficiently responsive to local differences, and instead implement a plan that is necessarily responsive to those things – because the local peoples make the solutions themselves. They’re reading an advantage to case.

### 4. They are the only ones that link to any sort of racism - Their monolithic account of Western imperialism reverses the error and links them to their own criticism

Rotter 2K

(Andrew J., Professor of History – Colgate University, “Saidism Without Said: Orientialism and U.S. Diplomatic History”, The American Historical Review, 105(4), p. 1207)

The criticism first. Orientalism is a sprawling book. It treats the development of an elaborate system of thought, an “imaginative geography,” over two centuries and three nations. Actually, the book ranges even further than that, discovering antecedents of Orientalism in classical Greece, describing Orientalist features of philosophy, history, literature, and travelers’ accounts, taking note of :he politics of European imperialism, and quoting, sometimes in English, an assortment of luminaries including Aeschylus, Dante, Gustave Flaubert, Antonio 5ramsci, and Henry Kissinger. Reviewing Orientalism for the Journal of Asian Studies, David Kopf accused Said of “distorting historical reality,” perhaps because he “tried to include too long a span of years in such a brief book.” “Telescoping historical periods with hasty descriptions is always misleading,” Kopf wrote. Said also confiated the European and American experiences of Orientalism and imperialism. Orientalism was, Said wrote, a “system of ideas that . . . remain[ed] unchanged as teachable wisdom” from 1840s Europe to the United States in the 1970s. Said’s “starting point” was the “British, French, and American experience of the Orient taken as a unit,” for “the American Oriental position has fit—[ think quite self-consciously—in the places excavated by the two earlier European powers.” Since 1945, the “American imperium has displaced” the French and British, not altered it. And so on. It is one thing to point out that Americans are naïve or deluded to think that they do not have an empire. To allege that the American empire is little more than an inheritance from Europeans is to commit Occidentalism, a monolithic approach to “the West” that some Western historians, at least, find simplistic.4

### Alt

### 6. And the Alt can't solve-failure to identify specific policy changes prevents any change in the world.