### Generic

#### Wind is unpopular, 1NC Maxwell says key environmental groups hate Wind because of fears they will kill wildlife.

**Turnout is key- Incumbency elections prove**

Galston ’12

William is an election analyst for Brookings, “Six Months to Go: Where the Presidential Contest Stands as the General Election Begins,” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/5/10%20obama%20campaign%20galston/where%20the%20presidential%20contest%20stands.pdf>

**Despite the structural similarities of general elections involving incumbents, they are not the same. Some begin with relatively high levels of undecided “swing” voters, while others fight over much smaller** pools of voters who might change their minds. 1992 is an example of the former, 2004 of the latter. **When swing voters are a large share of the electorate, campaigns must focus their strategy on persuading them to support their respective candidates**. When most voters have made up their minds, the emphasis shifts to mobilizing supporters. In a recent survey, Pew usefully places the 2012 election in the context of recent contests with incumbents running for reelection: 43

May 1992 July 1996 June 2004 April 2012

Certain Democrat 34 39 39 39

Certain Republican 35 34 40 37

Swing voter 31 27 21 23

**It appears that 2012 will be more like 2004—a classic mobilization election**—than

either 1992 or 1996. Like George W. Bush, Barack **Obama has turned out to be a**

**polarizing president who has induced many voters to choose sides very early** in the

process. **So the enthusiasm of core supporters—their motivation to translate their**

**preferences into actual votes—will make a big difference**.

#### Environmental turnout outweighs. 1NC Lehrer says they make up 19% of the electorate and the shock of Obama passing an expansion of wind disillusions them swinging the election to Romney.

#### Wind unpopular- Not in my backyard

Maxwell ’12

Veery is a third-year law student at UC Hastings, “Wind Energy Development: Can Wind Energy Overcome Substantial Hurdles to Reach the Grid,” West Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 18 W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol’y323, lexis

A critical barrier to entry for wind energy development is local hostility. While the American public is very supportive of wind energy in theory, not many people want large turbines in their neighborhood. n34 This social phenomenon is commonly referred to as NIMBY-ism ("Not In My BackYard"), and is a growing problem for wind energy developers. Citizens have attempted to block wind farms, complaining the turbines are a visual blight, are too noisy, and create odd flutter shadows. n35 These complaints have resulted in lawsuits, and at times halted, delayed, or dramatically limited proposed projects. n36¶ The fundamental grievance with wind farms in the United States is siting. The turbines are large, the site construction is invasive, and the projects are often built in relatively rural areas. The turbines look very [\*329] industrial, and therefore present a jarring contrast to the pleasant agricultural landscape they regularly occupy.¶ According to Robert Kahn, a siting expert, "Americans put a high value on wilderness and open space. Sparks fly when lands seen as public viewscapes (even if they are not publicly owned) appear threatened. Unfortunately, these lands are where developable renewable resources are to be found." n37 Renewable resources like wind and solar power tend to be easiest to capture in large open areas, which can overlap with scenic areas and parklands. In order to lessen local opposition, wind developers have attempted to mitigate the negative impacts of their projects. Some companies have even gone so far as to hire artists to try and make the turbines look "artsy' instead of industrial. n38

#### Wind is unpopular- seen as too big

Takashi 6-6

Patrick is Director Emeritus of the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute at the University of Hawaii and co-founder of the Pacific International Center for High Technology Research, “Why is Wind Power Suddenly Unpopular,” <http://planetearthandhumanity.blogspot.com/2012/06/why-is-windpower-suddenly-unpopular.html>

In Hawaii, across the nation and throughout the world, it seems like wind energy conversion systems have suddenly become an issue on the level of new coal and nuclear facilities. In the 50th State, "Big Wind" is roundly being criticized and even Donald Trump is warning about the evils of windpower, as related to China, tourism and Scotland. There were protesters about him being a windbag. Hey, give him a break, as he's having other more important problems, like with Miss Pennsylvania at his Miss USA pageant. Worse, the U.S. Congress, as broken as it is, seems currently negative on the production tax credit, the one piece of legislation that will make or break this technology. So what is really happening? Nothing much new. For one, when the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute advocated this form of renewable electricity a third of a century ago, we were criticized by the Audubon Society (incidentally, they've since gotten smarter about this) for killing birds, resorts (in Kahuku) spoke against this option at hearings for fear their investment would suffer from image problems, noise protesters were always present, more than a few felt that these ugly machines would affect their aesthetics and a few more depicted at the left protest (this was in Canada in April). I might add that wind energy (with geothermal and hydroelectric) is the ONLY "new" sustainable option somewhat competitive with coal and nuclear. Solar PV remains three times the cost of wind. Let's look at the matter of bird kills, for, apparently, the figure in Massachusetts is 100,000 murdered birds/year. Here is the reality:¶ - glass windows: at least 100 million, and, perhaps up to a billion bird deaths/year¶ - house cats: 100 million/year¶ - vehicles: 50 million to 100 million¶ - electric transmission lines: 174 million¶ - hunting: more than 100 million¶ Ever seen any protests against glass windows, cats.....? Oh, by the way, there could well be around 400 billion birds in the world. Nothing about energy is perfect.

#### No Risk of a link turn- Independents vote Prospectively based on what can be accomplished, Wind would be off the table for them

Tomz & Houeling ‘07

Michael is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Robert P. Van is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkley, “The Misfoundations of Voting,” <http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzVanHouweling-2007-08a.pdf>

We contribute to existing theoretical and empirical analyses in three ways. First, we¶ formally derive the complete set of conditions under which the theories lead to distinct predictions about how people vote. Second, we use the formal results to develop a statistical¶ 1model for estimating the prevalence of each voting rule in the electorate. Finally, we systematically test all three theories by conducting experiments that are tailored to our statistical¶ model. The experiments, embedded in public opinion surveys, avoid problems of endogeneity¶ and measurement that have impeded previous research.¶ We estimate the proportion of a nationally representative random sample of adults whose¶ choices about federal health care policy are consistent with each of the three issue-voting¶ logics. We Önd that voters typically employ proximity-based decision rules; they either choose¶ the closest candidate or select the one who, in their estimation, will bring policy nearest to¶ their ideal point. More precisely, 57.7 percent of respondents in our study behave as if¶ they they are following a pure proximity rule. Another signiÖcant proportion, 27.6 percent,¶ discount the announced positions of candidates by taking into account the location of the¶ status quo when voting. Finally, 14.7 percent of respondents appear to follow directional¶ logic.¶ We also found that discounting is more common, and directionalism less common, among¶ ideological centrists and non-partisans. This suggests that centrist voters, who often found¶ themselves choosing between polarized candidates (Fiorina 1995), make relatively sophisticated judgments aimed at bringing policy outcomes in line with their preferences. Overall,¶ our study both supports and qualiÖes the foundational assumptions in models of democratic¶ politics. It also demonstrates the promise of combining formal analysis, statistical modeling,¶ and experiments to answer previously intractable questions about democracy.

#### Public would hate plan- thermostatic response

Sides ’10

John is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown, “The Public is a Thermostat,” <http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2010/06/22/the_public_is_a_thermostat/>

David Brooks sees the public as largely opposed to the policies of the Obama administration and the Democratic majorities in Congress. He believes that this reflects a miscalculation on the Democrats’ part: the public is not that liberal.¶ Some Kool-Aid sippers on the left say the problem is that Republicans have better messaging (somehow John Boehner became magically charismatic to independents). Others say the shift to the right is a product of bad economic times. But Dr. Faustus saw a deeper truth. Moderate suburban voters do not see the world as liberals do, even in the most propitious circumstances, and never will.¶ But there is another possibility: the public is simply a thermostat. When government spending and activism increases, the public says “too hot” and demands less. When spending and activism decreases, the public says “too cold” demands more. Here is Christopher Wlezien in a 1995 paper (gated):¶ We observe that the signals the public sends to policymakers, in the form of preferences for “more” or “less” spending, react to changes in policy…[T]here is negative feedback of spending decisions on the public’s relative preferences, whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward when appropriations increase, and vice versa.¶ Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, writing in chapter 9 of The Macro Polity, refer to “the governing system as a thermostat.” Erikson et al. show that the public’s “mood”—a general measure of the policies it desires—moves in the opposite way as policy:¶ The correlation between policy innovation in one administration and before-after mood change is a strongly negative -0.76…The more liberal the policy stream, the more conservative is the change in mood. Notably, the most liberal presidency (Johnson’s full term ending in 1968) is associated with the greatest public reaction in the conservative direction. Similarly, the conservative presidencies of Reagan and Eisenhower moved the public in a liberal direction.¶ Brooks is wrong to assume that the public’s reaction to Democratic policies indicates a enduring ideological disjuncture or a failure of public relations. The public may not be more conservative. It may simply be saying “too hot.” As Matt put it in his email to me:¶ Current trends would not show that Democrats have been unusually unsuccessful in moving public opinion but that policy ideology in public opinion typically moves against the direction of policymaking. The public requests liberal policies, gets them, and then moves in the other direction; they then get more conservative policies and move against them.¶ Brooks wants to score this moment as a victory or defeat for someone—in this case, a defeat for liberalism and the Democrats. But If policy and thermostatic public opinion is cyclical, then any victory or defeat is temporary. The ebb and flow is the more important dynamic.

### AT Cuomo Stuff

#### War fuels structural violence, not the other way around

Goldstein 2001. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### AT We solve root cause

#### This is a joke – they don’t change Romney’s foreign policy because of wind farms

#### The alternative locks in the war system – infinite number of non-falsifiable ‘root causes’ means only incentive theory solves

Moore ’04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms.

In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

### Generic

#### Evaluating political costs and understanding tradeoffs key to prevent genocide

Lanz 8

(David, Mediation Support Project for Swisspeace, “Conflict Management and Opportunity Cost: the International Response to the Darfur Crisis”)

There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. The fi rst is that resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan. We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective. The second lesson is that actors working in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.”30 Also, those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict Darfur must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world. Indeed, moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere.

#### You should evaluate our politics DA. Their dogmatic refusal to consider political process implications is grounded in the same destructive blindness the aff criticizes.

David **Chandler**, Centre for the Study of Democracy - University of Westminster, **‘3**

(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5.3, “Rhetoric without responsibility”)

The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of left and right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of legitimacy or moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an **unequivocal** moral stance, which helps to **mitigate** **awkward** **questions** of government mission and **political** **coherence** in the domestic sphere. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or **policy** **outcomes** has made selected high-profile examples of ethical foreign policy-making a **strong card** for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home.

#### Ignoring political tradeoffs is totalitarian

Dean Richard **Villa**, Political Theory – UC Santa Barbara, **‘96**

(*Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, p. 246-7)

Arendt appropriates Heidegger’s genealogy of the technical sense of action in order to highlight the tradition’s persistent attempt to overcome plurality, the politically most relevant expression of the finitude of the human condition. Subjecting *praxis* to the rule of an end-representing reason makes it possible to exchange the nonsovereign freedom of **plural political actors** for the **command** **and** **control** exercised by the artisan. The Platonic “translation” of acting into the idiom of making established the pattern for deriving action from first philosophy or theory, a pattern that offered an escape from the irreducible relativity which besets the realm of human affairs. The substitution of making for acting initiates a paradigm of correspondence that, as Lyotard notes, delimits the Western tradition of political philosophy. Within the tropological space opened by this substitution, politics is viewed as the means or techné by which “the **‘fashioning’ of a people according to the** idea or **ideal** of just being-together” is accomplished.27

So long as political philosophy sees its task as the articulation of first principles with which actions, peoples, and institutions must be brought into accord, it reiterates the Platonic schema; moreover, it perpetuates the idea that politics resembles a plastic art. Arendt’s critique of the “Platonic” tradition reveals the drive to conflate political and artistic categories at the core of Western political theory, underlining the stubborn persistence of the state as artwork/politics as *techné* tropes. The strength of these figures is measured by the fact that the closure of the tradition barely shakes the logic of justification institutionalized by the Platonic separation of theory and practice. Western political theory, as Schürmann points out, has always demanded that action be grounded in some extrapolitical first (the cosmic order, natural or divine hierarchy, Reason and natural right, History, the greatest good for the greatest number, the emancipatory interest of the discursive community).28 As a result, it never really abandons the view that politics is a kind of **plastic art**, the “fashioning,” more or less **violent**, of a people in conformity with an ideal. The persistence of this trope is explained by its **efficacy for** **reducing plurality and difference**, and by its ability to represent violence and coercive power as “right.”29

Arendt’s theory of nonsovereign, agonistic action smashes this figure, breaking the circuit of justification through the liberation of action from the rule of grounding principles and pregiven ends.30 The essentially normative function of political theory – that is, the theoretical specification of the conditions for the legitimate exercise of power – is suspended.31 In its place Arendt develops a phenomenology of action and a narrative approach to the closure of the public realm in modernity, an approach designed to keep the memory of an agonistic public sphere alive. With this bracketing of the legitimation problematic, a new appreciation of spaces and practices not typically viewed as political becomes possible.32 Moreover, the Arendtian liberation of action throws the antipolitical, not to say the *inhuman*, consequences of the tradition’s conflation of artistic and political categories into sharp relief.

The teleocratic concept of action may be seen as the primary and most enduring expression of this conflation. With the collapse of transcendental grounds for the political, the logic of correspondence and justification built into this concept turns inward. The result is that the fashioning or “fictioning” of the community in conformity with an ideal of Justice is transformed into an exercise in self-production.33 And with this transformation, the threshold of modernity is traced.

We can see this transformation at work in the emergence of the Hobbesian problematic: the construction of the “Leviathan” needed to overawe its subjects is the work of those very subjects, in their “natural,” presubjected, and radically dissociated state.14 The example of Hobbes clearly demonstrates how, once the “art” of politics is deprived of its natural ground (once *techné* can no longer be seen as the completion or accomplishment of *physis*), a paradoxical and impossible logic asserts itself. The conundrum is simply put: the people, who do not yet exist *as a people*, must somehow always already be enough of a subject in order to author or fashion themselves *qua* community. The answers to this riddle proposed by the social contract tradition – Hobbes’s pact of association, which is simultaneously a transfer of power to a designated sovereign; Locke’s presupposition of what Laslett has called “natural political virtue”; the Rousseauian mechanism of the total alienation of individual rights and powers by which a communal, sovereign power is formed – have all been unconvincing, to say the least.35 Romanticism can be seen as the attempt to escape this paradox by radicalizing it. Instituting what Jean-Luc nancy has

called an “immanentist” logic of communal self-formation, romanticism elides the distinction between process and end: the subject is redefined as work in the double sense of self-formative activity *and* product.36 As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe notes, in the romantic vision the community at work creates and works *itself*, thereby accomplishing the “subjective process *par excellence*, the process of self-formation and self-production.”37 The aim of the community of beings becomes “in essence to produce their own essence as community.”38

With this move, a peculiarly *modern* version of the traditional conflation of art and politics is created. The *organicity* of the political, origincally laid down by Plato’s *Republic*, takes a new and extreme form: the figure of the subject who is simultaneously artist *and* work absorbs that of the aesthetically integrated state. This subjectivization of the state as artwork trope culminates in the **totalitarian** **will** **to self-effectuation**: the will to the self-creation of a people characterized by full actualization, complete self-presence.39 The only community capable of achieving such self-presence is one from which plurality, difference, mediation, and alienation have been **expunged**: a community, in other words, that is not a *political* community at all.

### Impact

**Romney will destroy US-Russian relations – hardline & won’t compromise**

**Larison 6-27**

Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

**Putin doesn’t** actually **want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S.** **because he believes** that the **Bush** administration **behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion** in the previous decade, **and U.S.-Russian relations improved** as much as they did **because the current administration seemed to be more reliable**. U.S.-Russian **relations reached their lowest poin**t in the last twenty years in no small part **because of a “more active U.S. policy**” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since **Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.**

**Nuclear war**

**ALLISON 11**

Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the **U**nited **S**tates from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized**, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war**. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and

### Picking Winners

#### Picking winners is bad—that’s de Rugy—they distort the market, reducing money for viable alternatives and siphoning away private capital.

#### Independently causes market crowd-out by forcing direct competition for capital between the government and private firms—deters innovation in favor of profit margins.

#### Prefer this—she’s a senior research fellow AND indicts the methodology of their mechanism—federal decision makers have worse info and are prone to inaccuracy because they’re insulated from risks.

#### Turns the aff OR is a status quo CP because better, non-political projects which solve the aff are coming online and necessarily lose out.

#### Means they don’t solve the aff because wind farms won’t get developed so we can’t expose vulernability

#### Regardless of plan, Chinese mercantilism ruins everything—Solyndra proves it causes domestic backlash and locks in inferior tech world-wide.

Matthew Stepp and Robert Atkinson June 2012 (Clean Energy Policy Analyst/Fellow at the Breakthrough Institute, President of Information Technology and Innovation Foundation/PhD, "Green Mercantilism: Threat to the Clean Energy Economy" "www2.itif.org/2012-green-mercantilism.pdf)

And we’re starting to see this type of reaction from U.S. policymakers. U.S. federal policy has historically been the main driver of breakthrough technology development, which includes high-profile investments in the development of the Internet, the jet engine, and the microchip to name a few. And the federal government’s investment in breakthrough clean energy innovation has been no different. From 2009 through 2014, the federal government will have invested $150 billion in the research, development, scale-up, and deployment of clean energy. But green mercantilism is resulting in significant political backlash for continuing these vital investments. For example, China’s green mercantilist practices allowed its manufacturers to capture significant market share at the expense of U.S. industries, contributing to high-profile bankruptcies like Evergreen Solar and Solyndra. These bankruptcies have become the focus of opposition to U.S. clean energy policy, including vital clean energy innovation programs like the ARPA-E and publicprivate research partnerships through the National Labs. This opposition is resulting in stagnant or declining budgets at a time when the United States should be doubling down on investments in innovation. Combining the effects of green mercantilist-protected firms’ lack of incentive to innovate with its impact on foreign clean energy investments, green mercantilism could potentially lock-in inferior clean technologies while limiting the development of next-generation clean energy technologies. Without strong and consistent incentives to innovate, the clean energy industry will not see the necessary levels of investment required to develop and deploy cost-competitive clean energy that isn’t reliant on subsidies and guide the world to drastically lower carbon emissions. Clean energy policy experts Melanie Hart and Kate Gordon concur: “The long-term result [of Chinese subsidization] is that a small number of heavily subsidized Chinese manufacturers could dominate the global solar market. That may make Chinese leaders happy, but if those firms are not producing the best solar technologies—for example, if their solar panels are not as efficient as they need to be to compete with traditional fossil fuels—that can slow solar-market development worldwide. As a result, this leaves policymakers and consumers with a choice: cheaper existing clean tech that is reliant on government subsidies or cheaper next-generation clean technologies that are competitive on their own through innovation. A green mercantilist approach not only continues the former but makes the latter much more difficult, both substantively and politically. As more-advanced firms lose market share, and less-advanced mercantilist-backed firms grow, the pace of clean energy innovation is likely to slow, with inferior technologies potentially even being locked-in while emerging technologies are blocked either through a lack of investment in innovation or an unfair playing field due to subsidized existing technologies. As a result, green mercantilism threatens to limit the growth of the clean technology the planet needs.

#### Biopower is key to nuclear deterrence

Bogard 1991. William Bogard, professor at Whitman College, 1991 [Social Science Journal, Vol. 28 Issue 3 p. 325]

Although there are many places in the History of Sexuality that might indicate what Foucault had in mind was indeed what we commonly mean by “deterrence,” the general context remains one of discipline, expanded to encompass the issues of bio-power and the control over life. But there are a number of reasons to believe that such developments raise problems for the economy of power relations that, while related to those of discipline, are nonetheless conceptually distinct. The following appear to me to be the most relevant of those distinctions. With discipline, the problem of power is that of producing and finalizing functions within a human multiplicity, to maximize utility through the strategic ordering of spatial and temporal relations, ultimately to foster or disallow life itself. With deterrence, on the other hand, we might say that the problem is one of reintroducing an asymmetry between opposing forces which have evolved too close to a point of equivalence or parity, or to a saturation point where it is no longer possible to increase their respective utilities. <continued…> Where discipline sets forces in motion, deterrence indefinitely postpones the equivalence of forces. Here again, the case of nuclear deterrence serves as a paradigm, but this is only because it is the most concentrated and extreme form of a whole multiplicity of tactical maneuvers—of postponement, disinclination, destabilization, etc.—that, like the disciplines in the 1 8th century, have evolved into a general mechanism of domination, and which today pervades the most diverse institutional settings.

#### Biopower does not result in genocide – it must be combined with racism and sovereign exceptionalism

Mika Ojakangas, 2005 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki, “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://wlt-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf

It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that biopolitical societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can “justify the murderous function of the State”.89 However, racism can only justify killing – killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in biopolitical societies: “Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.”90 Racism is, in other words, a discourse – “quite compatible”91 with biopolitics – through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to “exercise the old sovereign right to kill”, even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a “demonic combination” of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agamben’s thesis, according to which biopolitics is absolutized in the Third Reich.93 To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means – it was a state in which “insurance and reassurance were universal”94 – and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people -- but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that “unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life” throughout the “entire social body”, as Foucault puts it.95 It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich – as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the Nazi Germany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some present day welfare states – but rather the sovereign power: “This power to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.96” The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life – at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: “The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.”97