#### And, scientific, rationalism is key to policymaking on energy and the environment. To be impactful, their social arguments should be mediated by our policymaking focus; not the other way around.

Fullwiler et. Al. 2k9

[scott t., wolfram elsner and tara natarajan, “the social fabric matrix approach to policy analysis: an introduction” in Institutional Analysis and Praxis: The Social Fabric Matrix approach”, 29-20,

Policymaking explains “an approach to policy analysis and planning that will allow us to¶ capture the complexity of the world around us and be consistent with modem science”¶ (p. 1; emphasis added). Thus, past and even current ongoing failures notwithstanding,¶ the premise here is that we know enough, care enough, and have adequate resources and¶ technology to solve our social, economic, and environmental problems. Or. stated differ-¶ ently, this book is optimistic by current standards of cynicism and pessimism. Our knowledge base is sufficient to do the research to understand our problems, our will is more than adequate, our work ethic is strong, our resources are abundant, and people are sufficiently educated to carry out the tasks in a technological society, (p. 2)¶ The shortcoming heretofore has been that “we have not had the analytical means necessary to meld our will, knowledge, and institutions into a policy paradigm that allows us to obtain success” (p. 2).¶ It is no small feat to design a method with such broad applicability as the SFM-A¶ has already demonstrated, particularly since to do so also requires a significant break¶ from previous dominant analytical paradigms that relied heavily upon reductionism and¶ determinism (i.e., noncomplexity). Instead, Hayden argues that, a new approach, if it is to be successful, must integrate modem science with an instrumentalist philosophy:¶ because we no longer believe that life—as structured in an institutional and ecological¶ milieu—is one dimensional, our measures and analytical tools cannot be one dimensional.¶ Because we no longer think that beliefs and values can be ignored, if for example, we want¶ successful irrigation systems or health care plans, an approach is needed to integrate what¶ sociologists and anthropologists know about beliefs and values with the expertise of engineers,¶ ecologists, agronomists, economists, physicians, and other expertise as needed for the problem¶ at hand. This integration can no longer be the kind that has persons working with different¶ expertise working in isolation, and their independent work then placed under one cover. The¶ analysis needs to be guided by a common model, or. to use Einstein’s term, a common frame.¶ 'The engineer’s work must be guided by belief criteria, the sociologists’ analysis should be¶ consistent with the relevant technology, the economists’ models need to be non-equilibrium¶ systems, policymakers’ actions are the results of integrated modeling, and so forth, (p. 1)¶ The editors and contributors to this volume suggest that the SFM-A provides not¶ only a powerful framework for policy research but also a framework that is com-¶ prehensive and adaptable to a wide variety of socioeconomic and policy issues.¶ Moreover, policy success obtained without such a complexity-reflecting analytical¶ approach will be coincidental.¶ In this chapter, we introduce the SFM-A by first discussing its theoretical under-¶ pinnings, then the SFM itself, and finally its larger paradigm for policy analysis.

### AT Think Tanks

#### Policy analysis is flexible and allows other perspectives to flourish – it is necessary for social transformation and critical practice to exist in the first place.

Torgerson, ‘97

(Trent University Political Studies & Environmental Studies Professor, Spring, Polity, Vol. XXIX, No. 3)

Thus **there is a clear propensity to view** the moderate or **reform** elements of a movement **as being in complicity with the hegemonic forces** supporting the status quo. **Such a quick dismissal** of those who appear insufficiently **oppositional raises a serious problem for proponents of transformative politics,** however, **because the effort to maintain a coherent counter-hegemonic identity threatens to undermine the democratic inclusiveness that transformative politics prizes. This dismissive attitude has** also **blinded many advocates of transformative politics to potential support existing within policy professionalism.** Despite its prevailing image as a technocratic enterprise, policy professionalism has long harbored internal differences of method and commitment which have become increasingly apparent in recent years as policy professionals have interacted with dissenting social movements. This potential support for transformative politics at least throws into question a stance of pure and simple resistance even though the rationale for strong oppositional accent is certainly not eliminated. Continues **The project of a transformative politics dispenses altogether with a centralizing move and relies strategically upon the emergence of a decentered hegemony** through the complementary interplay of heterogeneous social movements. The strategic coherence of transformative politics depends on its counter-hegemonic posture: opposition to a prevailing configuration of power/knowledge. However, a Foucauldian manner of **resistance, focused on the local and the particular, is insufficient for the coherent conceptualization of a** post-Marxist **strategy defined in terms of comprehensive change toward radical democracy**. In contradistinction to Marxism, the project of a transformative politics does promote inclusion of diverse social forces. Yet, even though this transformative orientation explicitly encourages openness, there is at least provisional identity – hence principle exclusion – already implicit in the notions of opposition and transformation. In strategic terms, using the principle of exclusion often means neglecting the significance of historical irony and paradox. **Current departures in policy professionalism promise to make dissenting voices more significant in policy discourse**. Consequently**, those engaged in the theory and practice of transformative politics cannot afford to ignore policy professionalism** and the incipient changes within it. **One possible response would be to affirm a rigorously oppositional stance rejecting any reformist tendencies.** Such a response, of course, might well be guided by a reasonable assessment of power alignments in particular contexts. Yet, another possibility in certain contexts would be to avoid this temptation—against which theorists of transformative politics often warn—to think in exclusionary terms and to imagine that social change can be directed from some untainted posture of theoretical purity. **This possibility suggests the need for a flexible orientation**, for a greater appreciation of irony and paradox. **If those guided by an agenda of a transformative politics were to move in this direction, abandoning a standpoint of pure refusal and engaging more directly with policy professionalism as a site of contention, the significance of the voices of dissent would be ever clearer.**

#### The need for policy focus is necessary- critical practice that refuses to advocate concrete political change offers no hope for those for those suffering from oppression

Ling 01

[L.H.M. Senior Lecturer, Institute of Social Studies, the Netherlands."Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West (International Political Economy)"]

**Without concrete action for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti¬cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change'** (Shapiro, 1992: 49), **the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do they have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action?** After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In **not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac¬tice, analysis from policy,** deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en¬sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti¬cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28) **Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic¬tims of the West's essentialist conceits** (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, **dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it'** (Spegele, 1992: 174).

### Fairness outweighs education

#### Fairness is a precursor – they make debate into an echo chamber which decreases clash. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. **Activists** also **must engage in deliberation** among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, **our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth** ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

### AT Have to win aff is no dialogue

#### RULES of DIALOGUE are key – bad T interpretations make the dialogue TERRIBLE even if it’s TECHNICALLY a dialogue

Bostad 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf>¶ Finn Bostad is Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at The Norwegian¶ University of Science and Technology in the field of human communication¶ and new technology. He has run and worked on national and university¶ projects on meaning-making in Internet environments, published¶ internationally on electronic discourse, and supervised a research programme¶ on ICT and learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. He is currently researching multimedia semiotics

Very often a dialogue exists only if the persons involved in the communication act observe and **respect some rules** of dialogism, and some of these main ‘rules’ or principles may be a mutual trust or reciprocity (Rommetveit 1992), a sharing of power and comprehension that gives everybody an equal opportunity to have his or her voice heard. In addition there must be a conscious effort on the part of the participants to **achieve something together** and actively participate in the process of negotiating meaning that a dialogue is. Negotiated meaning, or understanding, grows out of the response as ‘[u]nderstanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other’ (Bakhtin 1981: 282). It is possible to generate a long catalogue of such principles, which Linell does in his work (Linell 1998). There is also a **wide range** of dialogical varieties from, at the one end, a **top-down monologue where one party dominates communication** and leaves no room for sharing and participation, to, at the other end, a communicative event where power and dominance is more or less equally shared between the participants. In this near ideal situation there is no real centre of power, but a sharing of it.

### 2NC SSD Good

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume our switch side arguments – we don’t think you should have to say racism is good and racism is bad, but rather that you should have to defend a plan that gives a method to solve racism on the aff and another, or the same method on the neg

#### Switch side debate teaches dynamic engagement - solves education and ground

Mitchell 10

Avid Stone Skipper, Ardent Badminton Player, Associate Professor &Director of Debate at University of Pittsburgh [Gordon, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1]

Yet the picture grows more complex when one considers what is happening over at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where environmental scientist Ibrahim Goodwin is collaborating with John W. Davis on a project that uses switch-side debating to clean up air and water. In April 2008, that initiative brought top intercollegiate debaters from four universities to Washington, D.C., for a series of debates on the topic of water quality, held for an audience of EPA subject matter experts working on interstate river pollution and bottled water issues. An April 2009 follow-up event in Huntington Beach, California, featured another debate weighing the relative merits of monitoring versus remediation as beach pollution strategies. “We use nationally ranked intercollegiate debate programs to research and present the arguments, both pro and con, devoid of special interest in the outcome,” explains Davis. “In doing so, agency representatives now remain squarely within the decision-making role thereby neutralizing overzealous advocacy that can inhibit learned discourse.”7 The intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives vary quite a bit simply by virtue of the contrasting policy objectives pursued by their sponsoring agencies (foreign policy versus environmental protection). Significant process-level differences mark off the respective initiatives as well; the former project entails largely one-way interactions designed to sluice insight from “open sources” to intelligence analysts working in classified environments and producing largely secret assessments. In contrast, the EPA’s debating initiative is conducted through public forums in a policy process required by law to be transparent. This granularity troubles Greene and Hicks’s deterministic framing of switch-side debate as an ideologically smooth and consistent cultural technology. In an alternative approach, this essay positions debate as a malleable method of decision making, one utilized by different actors in myriad ways to pursue various purposes. By bringing forth the texture inherent in the associated messy “mangle of practice,”8 such an approach has potential to deepen our understanding of debate as a dynamic and contingent, rather than static, form of rhetorical performance.

#### Switch-side debating on the topic is uniquely important. It allows debaters to become better advocates and increases critical thinking

Dybvig and Iverson 99

Kristin Chisholm Dybvig, and Joel O. Iverson, Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy, http://www.uvm.edu/~debate/dybvigiverson1000.html

Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues.

#### Switch-side debate develops a unique educational flexibility --- arguing both sides allows students to see the interconnection between varied subjects

**Muir ‘93**

(Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 282-5)

The debate over moral education and values clarification parallels in many ways the controversy over switch-side debate. Where values clarification recognizes no one set of values, debate forces a questioning and exploration of both sides of an issue. Where cognitive-development emphasizes the use of role playing in the inception of moral judgment, debate requires an empathy for alternative points of view. Where discussion provides an opportunity for expressions of personal feelings, debate fosters an analytic and explicit approach to value assessment. Freelev describes the activity this way: Educational debate provides an opportunity for students to consider the significant problems in the context of a multivalued orientation. They learn to look at a problem from many points of view. As debaters analyze the potential affirmative cases and the potential negative cases, including the possibility of negative counterplans, thev being to realize the complexity of most contemporary problems and to appreciate the worth of a multivalucd orientation; as they debate both sides of a proposition under consideration, they learn not only that most problems of contemporary affairs have more than one side but also that even one side of a proposition embodies a considerable range of values. The comparison between moral education and debate is useful because it contextualizes the process of moral development within an educational setting. Several objections have been raised about the practice of moral education, and these objections have direct relevance to the issue of switch-side debate. A view of debate as a form of moral education can be developed by addressing questions of efficacy, isolation from the real world. and of relativism. The first issue is one of effectiveness: Do clarification activities achieve the espoused goals? Social coercion and peer pressure, for example, still occur in the group setting, leaving the individual choice of values an indoctrination of sorts. Likewise, the focus of clarification exercises is arguably less analytic than expressive, less critical than embroyonic. The expression of individual preferences may be guided by simple reaction rather than by rational criteria. These problems arc minimized in the debate setting, especially where advocacy is not aligned with personal belief. Such advocacy requires explicit analysis of values and the decision criteria for evaluating them. In contemporarv debate, confronted with a case they believe in, debaters assigned to the negative side have several options: present a morass of arguments to see what arguments "stick," concede the problem and offer a "counterplan"a s a better way of solving the problem, or attack the value structure of the affirmative and be more effective in defending a particular hierarchy of values. While the first option is certainly exercised with some frequency, the second and third motivations arc also often used and are of critical importance in the development of cognitive skills associated with moral judgment. For example, in attacking a case that restricts police powers and upholds a personal right to privacy, debaters might question the reasoning of scholars and justices in raising privacy rights to such significant heights (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut and other landmark cases), offer alternative value structures (social order, drug control), and defend the criteria through which such choices are made (utilitarian vs. deontological premises). Even within the context of a "see what sticks" paradigm, these arguments require debaters to assess and evaluate value structures opposite of their own personal feelings about their right to privacy. Social coercion, or peer pressure lo adopt certain value structures, is minimized in such a context because of competitive pressures. Adopting a value just because everyone else does may be the surest way of losing a debate. A second objection to debate as values clarification, consonant with Ehninger's concerns about gamesmanship, is the separation of the educational process from the real world. A significant concern here is how such learning about morality will be used in the rest of a student's life. Some critics question whether moral school knowledge "may be quite separate from living moral experience in a similar way as proficiency in speaking one's native language generally appears quite separate from the knowledge of formal grammar imparted by school." Edelstein discusses two forms of segmentation: division between realms of school knowledge (e.g., history separated from science) and between school and living experience (institutional learning separate from everyday life). Ehninger's point, that debate becomes a pastime, and that application of these skills to solving real problems is diminished if it is viewed as a game, is largely a reflection on institutional segmentation. The melding of different areas of knowledge, however. is a particular benefit of debate, as it addresses to is considerable importance in a real world setting. Recent college and high school topics include energy policy, prison reform, care for the elderly, trade policy, homelessness. and the right to privacy. These topics are notable because they exceed the knowledge boundaries of particular school subjects, they reach into issues of everyday life, and they are broad enough to force student to address a variety of value appeals. The explosion of "squirrels," or small and specific cases. in the 1960s and 1970s has had the effect of opening up each topic to many different case approaches. National topics are no longer of the one-case variety (as in 1955's "the U.S. should recognize Rcd China"). On the privacy topic, for example, cases include search and seizure issues, abortion, sexual privacy, tradeoffs with the first amendment, birth control, information privacy, pornography, and obscenity. The multiplicitv of issues pavs special dividends for debaters required to defend both sides of many issues because the value criteria change from round to round and evolve over the year. The development of flexibility in coping with the intertwining of' issues is an essential component in the interconnection of knowledge, and is a major rationale for switch-side debate.

### AT Rules = power

#### Rules are necessary to give discussions direction and closure --- the alternative is endless talking that does nothing to combat structural oppression

**Tonn ‘05**

(Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)

Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and others to consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.17 First, because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"18 Second, because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."19

### AT No T version of aff

#### There is a topical version of the aff – you could tax the rich to lead to energy in communities and inner cities – that solves at least some zones of sacrifice

#### A plan text doesn’t disregard their discussion – middle of the road K affs prove that the kritik can still happen

#### That solves exclusion

Kenn 1

Associate Professor of Law and Director, Community Development Law Clinic, Syracuse University College of Law (Deborah, Fall 2001 “Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and Beyond.” 11 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 35. p. lexis. // WPDU-JR)

Until an effort equal to the efforts to create and maintain housing segregation and its consequences is initiated, supported, and perpetuated in our country, we can expect our racist legacy to continue and intensify. The effort must start with dismantling the racist institutions of housing segregation, white privilege, school segregation, and discrimination in the criminal justice system. **The systemic problem of racism must be attacked systemically. Again, Professor Williams states: With regard to all these configurations, let me just say that I am certain that the solution to racism lies in our ability to see its ubiquity but not to concede its inevitability. It lies in the collective and institutional power to make change, at least as much as with the individual will to change. It also lies in the absolute moral imperative to break the childish, deadly circularity of centuries of blindness to the shimmering brilliance of our common, ordinary humanity. n203 Above all, each individual (and I'm speaking here to white people) needs to acknowledge that they can either be part of the problem or part of the solution. Continuing merrily along, enjoying our white privilege, oblivious to the negative impact we have on our black neighbors, makes us complicit in the centuries of racism that brought us to our racist present. Doing nothing is doing everything to  [\*72]  be a part of the problem**. In the eloquent words of Professor June Jordan: We need, each of us, to begin the awesome, difficult work of love: loving ourselves so that we become able to love other people without fear so that we can become powerful enough to enlarge the circle of our trust and our common striving for a safe, sunny afternoon near to flowering trees and under a very blue sky. n204 **We can continue to travel the path of hatred and distrust or we can choose to begin dismantling the institutions borne of the distrust between races. Which kind of world do we want to live in - a world of hate or a world of love? Will we choose a world that isolates, separates, and wreaks unimaginable suffering on entire communities of people, or a world that celebrates the diversity of people and welcomes differences between people for the richness it brings to our lives?**

#### Policy-oriented debate empower minority students – when they participating with the systems that produce change, they are more willing to be risk takers and change agents – it facilities debaters to become social critics because of the intensive research – that’s the Warner and Bruschke 1 evidence

### Disad

#### Engaging the policy infrastructure of energy policy is crucial to activism – the hard divide between activists and policymakers is oversimplifying which turns their advocacy

Guilhot ’05

Guilhot, research fellow – Social Science Research Council, prof sociology – LSE, ‘5¶ (Nicolas, The Democracy Makers, p. 11-13)

**The actors who contributed the most to** constructing and **expanding the field of promoting democracy are those who were able to play on different levels, to occupy pivotal positions at the junction of academe, national** and international **institutions, activist movements, and** to **mobilize the diversified resources** **of** all **these fields** — knowledge, affiliations, networks, financial re­sources, etc. **They were able to appear as** both **reformist and realist, to ac­commodate** different **agendas, and** therefore to **establish strong positions.**¶In order to characterize these actors, it is useful to think of them in some sense as "double agents." While more is involved, to make this somewhat ironic reference to characters in spy novels captures well the intrinsic am­bivalence involved. Yet, my intent is less to be provocative than to provoke thought. To speak of "double agents" is a way to take into account the mul­tiple affiliations of social actors, rather than to ascribe to them a unilateral role and to confine them within a limited area of social relations or a single institutional context. Indeed, **most actors**, and the more dominant ones in particular, **occupy multiple positions in different areas of society** (Boltanski 1973). In that sense, it is highly reductive — actually, **it is epistemologically wrong** —**to assign them a unique property** or a set of necessarily congruent characteristics. For instance, **one can be** at the same time **a political science professor, an occasional consultant** for the National Security Council, **and the board member of an** important international human rights **NGO.** Should we speak of a "state actor" or of a "non-state actor," to use two fashionable labels having currency in the academic literature on interna­tional relations and transnational networks? In 1988, the World Bank hired James Clark, former head of Oxfam's policy unit, in order to improve its relations with NGOs: is he a representative of the interests of international financial institutions, or of the NGO sector? Really, such **clear-cut concepts are no longer operational** (if they ever were) **when it comes to providing a reliable sociological analysis of international processes. The same thing can be said about** other related notions, such as "**civil society** actors" **or "human rights activists": such notion**s cannot be taken as appropriate descriptions of social actors for they **capture only specific roles** negotiated **in specific con­texts**. Therefore, using the notion of "double agents" (or multiplying the affiliations and speaking of "triple agents" or even multiple agents, as sug­gested ironically by Peter Sloterdijk in the epigraph of this introduction) is also intended as a reminder of the fact that **social actors can act in different capacities according to the arenas in which they engage. This capacity to multiply affiliations** and positions **is** indeed **the** very **stuff of which networks are made.** By the same token, **this notion has** also a **critical intent**: it shows that **the symbolic boundaries between the national and the international, between** the **governmental and** the **nongovernmental**, between the for-profit and the non-profit, **the scientific and the activist**, **are** actually **constructs rather than facts**, and that **these** artificial **partitions are blurred by the be­havior of agents who constantly shift between these "capacities**" but have at the same time and for the same reason an interest in the maintenance of such boundaries.¶ By acting in different guises or capacities, social actors can indeed engage in several arenas and participate in different networks. **These divisions** and boundaries **are maintained by** the practitioners themselves but also, as we shall see, by **scholars** of political science or international relations **who con­stantly** produce and **reproduce categories such as "non-state actor,"** "NGO representative," "local group," "**grass-roots movement," etc., separating** **artificially ideal roles** that are actually **merged within dense social networks.** Notwithstanding the constant work of division and classification that they pertoim, the twilight world of global governance and market democracies is inhabited only by double agents.¶ By using this notion, my aim is not to deconstruct the categories of agency to work toward some kind of post-modern dissolution of social identities. On the contrary, **keeping in mind that actors cannot be confined** to a single domain of social life is a sound methodological precaution that **avoids re­ductive ascriptions and makes the researcher more receptive to empirical complexity.** In particular, it takes some distance with a too superficial "con­structivism" that has tended to define these new international actors exclusively in terms of their location within advocacy networks (e.g. Keck & Sikkink 1998) or "epistemic communities" (Haas 1992). It calls for taking into consideration other social properties —professional careers, class, position within professional or institutional hierarchies, resources used (eco­nomic, cultural, scientific, etc.) and access to resources — and for resituating liu universalistic and moralistic agendas of these agents within well-defined social contexts.

#### That’s critical to effective activism —proves decisionmaking turns the case and prevents right-wing take-over

Lockman ‘05

Lockman, Chair – Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies @ NYU, Spring ‘5

¶ (Zachary, “Critique from the Right: The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, Muse)

**There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East** at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century [End Page 83] these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. **Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media.** It is striking that the great bulk of **the "talking heads**" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to **come** not from academia but **from professional pundits**, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. **Whatever their knowledge** (**or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did**. **They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism** of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment.¶ This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. **Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law**. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet.¶ Nonetheless, in the **after**math of **September 11th, critical** (and even moderate) **voices were largely drowned out by the right**, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public [End Page 84] outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa'ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

#### Right-wing takeover makes their impacts inevitable

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Nonetheless, **in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public** [End Page 84] **outrage** against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. **They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan** (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa'ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) **and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction**. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.