## Round Report, 1-Off Consumption K, Bioterror rhetoric turn, Imperialism turn

## 2AC Case O/W K

#### Case is a disad to the K –\_\_\_\_\_ is necessary to solve the aff

#### a) Cyber attacks are the number one US security threat –that’s ABC News ‘11 – only treating the energy grid as a \_\_\_\_ will sponsor the provision of small nuclear reactors to prevent cyber attacks. Two impacts:

#### 1) Cyber attacks will eventually draw the US into conflicts. That’s Gelinas ’10.

#### 2) Stopping blackouts key to prevent the grid from being vulnerable to terrorist attacks that will escalate to extinction due to bio attack. Extend Defense Science Board ‘8, Blair ‘12, Lilliefors ‘12, and National Strategy for Biosurveillance ‘12.

#### b) Without SMRs, the US loses leadership in nuclear tech that’s Loudermilk. US leadership key to prevent prolif, The impact is extinction as a result of great power wars and escalation of regional conflicts. That’s Cimbala ‘8, Kroenig ’12, and Kroenig ‘9.

### Case Outweighs

#### Our war scenarios still outweigh and turn the critique – War heightens all forms of destruction including the impacts of he critique. Bataille’s theories apply to primitive, not modern societies – err aff on impact calculus.

Allen Stoekle 2007 “bataille’s peak: energy, waste, and postsustainability” p. 52-54

But the same thing could be said, again for want of a better term, of the various ways this “part” is diluted or betrayed: what we might call, to differentiate it, “bad duality” (in contradistinction to the “good” duality of the transgression, in angoisse, of the recognized limits of self, body, and world). “Bad duality,” as I crudely put it, is the indulgence in expenditure out of personal motives: to gain something for oneself (glory, social status) or for one’s social group or nation (booty, territory, security). From the chief who engages in potlatch, all the way to the modern military planners of nuclear war—all conceive of a brilliant, radical destruction of things as a useful contribution: to one’s own social standing, to the position or long- term survival of one’s own society And yet, for all that, Bataille recognizes a kind of devolution in warfare: earlier (sacrificial) war and destructive gift-giving still placed the emphasis on a spectacular and spectacularly useless destruction carried out on a human scale. Later warfare, culminating in nuclear war, heightens the intensity of destructiveness while at the same time reducing it to the status of simple implement§ Marked 12:23 § : one carries out destructive acts (e.g., Hiroshima) to carry out certain useful policy goals. “Primitive” war, then, was closer to what I have dubbed “good” duality. Implicit in Bataille’s discussion of war, from the Aztecs to the Americans, is the loss of intimacy. Aztec war was thoroughly subordinated, both on the part of victor and vanquished, to the exigencies of passion; as time went on, it seems that martial glory came to be associated more and more with mere rank. Self-interest replaced the “intimate,” exciting destruction of goods and life. Modern nuclear war is completely devoid of any element of transgression or dread; it is simply mechanized murder, linked to some vague political or economic conception of necessity Ultimately, for this reason, war in Bataille’s view must be replaced by a modern version of potlatch in which one nation-state (the United States) gives without counting to others (the Europeans, primarily). Modern war remains, for all that, an example of mankind’s tendency to   
- expend. It is merely an extreme example of an inability to recognize depense for what it is. It thereby constitutes a massive failure of self-consciousness:   
“bad duality” as the melding of the “tendency to expend” with the demand j. for utility and self-interest.

### Framework

#### 1. Framework: the affirmative must defend a topical plan, the negative must defend the status quo or a competing policy option.

#### a) Best for real world education – our fw most closely resembles how policymakers decide on advocacy.

#### b) Fairness – our interp provides a clear way to compare two advocacies by weighing impacts which is essential to fairness. Their fw makes opportunity cost impossible and invites judge intervention.

#### c) Predictability – our fw ensures predictable aff ground because we predict args based upon our aff literature.

#### d) Infinitely regressive – there are an infinite number of philosophical perspectives from which they can argue

### Perm Solvency

#### Perm: do both.

#### And, the permutation is the only way to solve the criticism – the ideal of excess and the alt’s “joy before death” in the face of the 1ac’s extinction claims is inseperable from dread or a serious realization of the consequential impact of death as an experential limit. The alt is only a false aesthetic of transgression.

Allen Stoekle 2007 “bataille’s peak: energy, waste, and postsustainability” p. 52-54

Having said all this, one should stress that this Bataillean ideal—for that’s what it is, really—is itself already double, mixed with a recognition of the other reality. The angoisse—anguish, dread—before this “inner experience” is a human cut of sense, meaning, and purpose with which one engages when one comes to “face death.” “Joy before death” is not separable from a dread that serves to instill a human meaning in an otherwise cosmic, but limitless and hence nonhuman, event. Without dread, in other words, the “subject” merely melds with the ambient surroundings, like an animal. It is dread—which includes the very human knowledge of the limit, of death — that serves to demarcate the event and thus give it meaning. A limit that is recognized, affirmed, at the instant of its transgression.   
Meaning? Does that mean it is “significant”? For what? For some useful purpose? Not entirely. Dread entails a recognition of limits, of course, but also their defiant overcoming; much like Mozart and Da Ponte’s unstoppable Don Giovanni, the “subject” recognizes and affirms the limit only to overcome it, in defiance. In the same way, transgression inevitably entails an affirmation, along with an overcoming, of interdiction. Sacrifice entails dread: it is “communication”—but communication of dread (OC, 7:518). Bataille also makes it clear that dread is intimately tied to sense, even to reason. As he puts it in some unpublished notes to The Limits of the Useful (written shortly before The Accursed Share): To anyone who wants glory, the inevitable dread must first beshown Dread distances only impertinence [outrecuidance]. The danger of “strong feelings” is that one will speak of them before experiencing them: one tries to provoke them by verbal violence, but one only ends up introducing violence without force. (OC, 7: 512) Bataille goes on to speak of the ancient Mexicans, but their “reality” only underscores the need for an “anguished [angoisse] and down to earth [terre a terre] research.” A “slow rigor” is required to “change our notion of ourselves and of the Universe” (OC, 7: 512).   
All this is ultimately important because it shows us the dual nature of Bataille’s project. It is not just an affirmation of death, madness, wild destruction, and the leap into the void. Thee terms, associable with excess, expenditure, indicate “events” or “experiences” (for want of better words) moved toward—they can never simply be grasped, attained—what would seem to be their contrary: interdiction, the limit, down-to-earth research. Transgression would not be transgression without the human limit of meaning—of interdiction, of scarcity—against which it incessantly moves. Bataille’s method is not that of the raving madman but of the patient economist, writing against a “closed” economy, and of the Hegelian, writing against a narrow consciousness that would close off ecstasy, expenditure, and loss. Indeed, the final point Bataille wishes to reach is a higher “self-consciousness,” not of a stable and smug universal awareness but of a knowledge facing, and impossibly grasping, a general economy of loss—in dread. Thus Bataille can write of a self-consciousness that “humanity will finally achieve in the lucid vision of a linkage of its historical forms” (OC, 7: 47;AS, 41).

### Environmental Securitization Good

#### ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL AND INCENTIVIZE CONSERVATION.

CHALECKI 2K7 [Elizabeth, “environmental security: a case study of climate change”, pacific institute for studies in development, environment and safety, Asst. Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College<http://www.pacinst.org/reports/environment_and_security/env_security_and_climate_change.pdf>]

The security of individuals, communities, nations, and the entire global community is increasingly jeopardized by unpremeditated, non-military environmental threats. These threats are self-generated: we perpetrate them on ourselves, by fouling our air and water, and overharvesting our land. These threats are not felt equally around the world. Southern countries face severe problems from desertification, while northern industrial countries deal with acid rain, and polar regions see large depositions of persistent organic chemical pollutants. Climate change will cause uneven effects over the entire globe for the next fifty to 100 years, with some countries benefiting and others suffering. Despite these omnipresent connections, environmental issues are still not high on the national security agenda. Those who study environmental problems such as deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change generally don’t see the connection through to its higher-order effects, and those who study security problems such as non-proliferation, terrorism, and civil conflict often don’t recognize the environmental roots and effects of these problems. So why is this such a hard gap to bridge? Thinking in this multidisciplinary way is not traditional for either environmentalists or security specialists, § Marked 12:25 § the majority of whom have defined their fields in specific ways. Consequently the nexus of environmental security is seen neither as a security issue nor an environmental issue. However, environmental issues are often security concerns because even without directly causing open conflict, they have the potential to destabilize regimes, displace populations, and lead to state collapse. The environment is the planetary support system on which all other human enterprises depend. If political, social, cultural, religious, and most importantly economic systems are to remain secure and viable, the environment must also remain secure and viable. This makes global environmental conditions a legitimate national security concern for all countries.

#### AND, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS INCREASING IN THE SQUO WHICH NO UNIQUE RISK OF THEIR IMPACT – ONLY A RISK THE ALT TRIGGERS A UNIQUE DISAD BY DESTROYING THE METHOD OF ENABLING SOLUTIONS TO DISEASE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION.

LeBoeuf and Broughton 2k8

[aline and emma, “securitization of health and environmental issues: process and effects. A research outline”, may, Insitut Francais des Relations Internationales publication online, junior research fellow at IFRI, MA in International Relations from London School of Economics and Political Science]

Be it HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, climate change, etc., many health and environmental issues are now commonplace in international news, political debates, and even global policy arenas like the United Nations Security Council. However, not so many years ago, those subjects were still taken to be secondary, technical issues having to be dealt with at the national level, with the rare occasion when international cooperation was prescribed. Why did the worlds of health and environment become so important in the national and international policy agendas? This article posits that such a development is the result of a growing conceptualisation of health and environmental issues as security issues. § Marked 12:25 § From the moment an issue is perceived to have potentially negative implications on “our” security – because it results in too many deaths, or inflicts too much damage, for instance, it takes on increased significance and importance; we will be more inclined to devote part of our limited resources to our own protection against this perceived threat. As a result, actions, albeit only declaratory, will often be taken. At the heart of our research lies a fundamental interest that is not geared towards the process through which a health or environmental issue *becomes* a security issue – what, as many others, we call here the process of “securitization” – but towards the impacts, the consequences and the effects of this process. As such, the three-year research programme that we are launching with this working paper will focus on the *impacts* of the securitization process.1 Before one can start working on the impact of a particular object of study, one must first understand the very nature of this object. This paper thus puts forward a description and an analysis of the process of securitization of health and environment, and sets the stage for our future work on the effects of this securitization.

Health and environmental issues have been increasingly “securitized” in the last twenty years. In other words, they have increasingly been considered as security issues. This securitization process has had many effects, one of which being that it contributed to raise the stakes of several issues linked to global health and the environment, like HIV/AIDS or global warming. It also encouraged the development of new policies, the creation of new agencies, institutions, norms, or governance options to try to solve these issues.

#### CRITICALLY STUDYING ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS THE SQUO. INCREASING SECURITIZATION IS INEVITABLE AND NONUNIQUE – THE ONLY QUESTION IS ONE OF USE-VALUE NO RISK OF OFFENSE.

HERBECK AND FLITNER 2010

[johannes michael a climate of insecurity? october universitat bremen chair of the research center for sustainability research associate of environmental studies]

Climate change has developed into a key concern of a globalised world with huge attention in popular and media discourses and with consequences in virtually all fields of science and politics. As a cross-cutting issue climate change is connecting distant and sometimes highly controversial fields. Hence it is not surprising that climate change is also grouped together with all imaginable regional and global conflicts. And when applying a rather broad understanding of conflict it is generally quite plausible that climate change is going to have an effect on intra- and international tensions. The security implications of climate change are still a relatively new issue in the evolution of the climate change debate. In the run-up to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) UN Secretary General Ban KiMoon stated that climate change is likely to “(…) become a major driver of war and conflict” (UN NEWS CENTRE 2007: 1). At about the same time a study was released by a think tank funded by the US Department of Defence (DoD) focussing on the impacts of climate change for the national security of the United States and explicitly dealing with strategic and operative challenges for the US military (CNA 2007). In the following a number of similar studies have been released by consulting agencies para-statal and non-governmental organisations of which the study of the German Advisory Council on Global Change entitled “Climate Change as a Security Risk” attracted special interest in the German-speaking world (WBGU 2008). Taking a more essayistic approach a book entitled “Klimakriege” (Climate wars) by cultural psychologist Harald Welzer was published little later (Welzer 2008) further spreading the debate into a wider public. In the US just recently the issue was picked up by journalist Gwynne Dyer and published under the same title (Dyer 2010). By now the issue is well established if still heavily debated both within public and even more within scientific discourses on the social impacts of climate change. With regard to those rather loose often unspecified connections recently established in different types of publications it seems quite apt to talk about a ‘securitization’ of climate change if this term is understood as describing nothing more than a growing association of a topic with security issues. In general this trend of connecting conflicts to changing environmental conditions builds upon an older debate regarding the impacts of natural resource scarcity on conflicts (for many others see Homer-Dixon 1999). Dalby (1992) Flitner & Soyez (2006) Oßenbrügge (2007) and Korf & Engeler (2007) have pointed out that linking natural degradation processes to security issues usually results in a problematical decrease of analytical perspectives and reduced options for problem solving.

#### AND, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS INEVITABLE – GLOBAL WARMING MAKES PEOPLE REACT TO RESOURCE SCARCITY CONCERNS, NO MATTER HOW EPISTEMOLOGICALLY FLAWED, THE ALT CAN’T CHANGE PERCEPTION.

CHALECKI 2K7

[Elizabeth, “environmental security: a case study of climate change”, pacific institute for studies in development, environment and safety, Asst. Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College<http://www.pacinst.org/reports/environment_and_security/env_security_and_climate_change.pdf>]

Climate change will mean more natural disasters as a result of shifting weather and precipitation patterns. The Midwest will face a greater risk of tornadoes and riverine floods, the Gulf Coast and other shorelines will face a greater risk of high seas and hurricanes, and (due to changes in amount and timing of precipitation) the West will face greater risk of wildfires. These disasters will change the readiness of the military by forcing the reallocation of troops away from combat operations toward disaster relief. In addition, countries less able to cope with natural disasters will likely face large numbers of refugees, either internally or from nearby countries. As they compete with the local population for scarce resources, civil and ethnic unrest may require peacekeeping troops.

#### Perm do the plan and the alt in all other instances. This puts them in a double bind either A) the perm solves the alt isn’t strong enough to over com

#### AND, THE U.S. LEADS THE WORLD IN SECURITIZATION – ALT CAN’T OVERCOME CULTURAL AND GOVERNMENTAL POWER ACCRUED THROUGH SECURITY. WE MUST USE SECURITY’S POWER STRATEGICALLY RATHER THAN ABANDON IT.

LeBoeuf and Broughton 2k8

[aline and emma, “securitization of health and environmental issues: process and effects. A research outline”, may, Insitut Francais des Relations Internationales publication online, junior research fellow at IFRI, MA in International Relations from London School of Economics and Political Science]

The United States, with an obvious “national security” approach, have [sic][has] clearly been the leading state actor in health and environmental securitization. This leadership position could be attributed to the sheer size of the International Relations and security research field in the U.S., and its privileged position and relationship with administrations and policy- makers. The securitization of health and environmental issues took hold in the U.S. specifically during the Clinton administration – possibly on account of the need to find “new” issues to justify the maintenance of Cold War levels of State expenditures. Environment was first mentioned as a security issue in Bush’s 1991 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which states that “we must arrange Earth’s natural resources in ways that protect the potential for growth and opportunity for present and future generations.”33 In his 1994 NSS, Clinton declared that “environmental degradation” was a security risk.34 During his term, he also emphasised that infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, posed “a threat to US national security because of its catastrophic social consequences, particularly in the developing world.”35 Since then, health and environment have remained on the U.S. security agenda but always as secondary security issues, especially when compared to the importance given to other threats, such as terrorism.

### Case

#### Reps don’t shape reality—focusing on them obscures material and political analysis which turns the criticism

Tuathail 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engagethere is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant,. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Masking Disad—discursive criticism masks the problem and prevents legitimate solutions.

Meisner 95 (Mark, professor of environmental studies at York University, (Mark, “Resourcist Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature”, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)

Changing the language we use to talk about non-human nature is not a solution. As I suggested, language is not the problem. Rather, it seems more like a contagious symptom of a deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined. Resourcist language is both an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further¬more, language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives the appearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible. In a recent article on feminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meanings are socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined by a culture that is still largely sexist. The words may have shifted, but the meanings and ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatment of a single symptom. Consequently, language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

#### Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.

Ravenal ‘9

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Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non§ Marked 12:20 § -rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

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## 2AC- Top Level

#### Heg is sustainable- challengers can’t make up the power differential, and trends point toward continued unipolarity

Beckley ‘12

(Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)

More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the true military gap because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States “more bang for the buck” – each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is determined by a country’s level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political factors. As noted earlier, China’s per capita income has declined relative to that of the United States. China’s defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S. share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while China’s share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, an independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found “no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States.…The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and its allies.”207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-­‐2008 Source: Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-­‐2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-­‐2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-­‐thumping. China can “pose problems without catching up,” compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies, local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe China’s “anti-area-­‐denial” capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim – the Pentagon is developing sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt the strategic importance of China’s capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities, especially in littorals and low-­‐altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes, weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might continue to rise in place – steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And what the trends suggest is that America’s economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future.

#### Decline makes all their turns worse- US will be more violent post decline

Dupont June ‘12

(Alan, professor of international security and director of the Institute for International Security and Development at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, An Asian Security Standoff, The National Interest, lexis)

What of the argument that America should accept the inevitable and share power with China as an equal? Paralleling the G-2 would be an Asia-2, allowing Beijing and Washington to divide the region into spheres of influence in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union managed a politically bifurcated Europe during the early part of the Cold War. While superficially appealing because it holds out the prospect of a peaceful transition to a new international order, power sharing between the United States and China is unlikely to work for two reasons. First, no U.S. administration, regardless of its political complexion, would voluntarily relinquish power to China, just as China wouldn’t if the roles were reversed. Second, China’s new great-power status is hardly untrammeled. Nor is it guaranteed to last, for the country faces formidable environmental, resource, economic and demographic challenges, not to mention a rival United States that shows no sign of lapsing into terminal decline despite its current economic travails. Sooner than it thinks, Beijing may have to confront the prospect of a resurgent Washington determined to reassert its strategic interests.

#### Their turns are inevitable – no us withdrawal – we’ll be engaged globally – the only question is effectiveness

Shalmon and Horowitz 09

(Dan, Graduate Student in the PhD Program in Political Science - International Relations at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mike, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania- Philadelphia, Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world**.** Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

#### Turn – Sustaining now key to a peaceful transition when heg collapses.

Dolman 6

(Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “ Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” March 10th, Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=408,)

Dolman: Well, I think that some assumptions that you made are extremely problematic. You know, the Soviet Union launched twenty ASATs into space and those were the worst of debris smashing into other satellites. Did that cause a debris problem? No, because it is a planned orbital mechanics issue that the kinetic force of that engagement goes into the atmosphere and debris is burned up on reentry. There are thus ways to use weapons in space that don’t really cause a debris problem, and there are ways to use them that ac-tually clean up space in orbit. But also I agree with you. **No hegemon,** no empire, no state or business **lasts forever. Does that mean that we should accelerate** our own **decline?** No. It is important to do things to extend it. The United States inevitably will lose its power relative to the rest of the world, so **it needs to set up the conditions that are seen as** beneficial around the world **in such a way that whoever replaces the U**nited **S**tates **is going to be in the same sort of liberal mode that the U**nited **S**tates **had been,** the same type of benevolent hegemon or follow-on power. What **it cannot** do is **set up a situation where the next power is** likely to be **antithetical to those ideas. What I am talking about is extending** the period of **American heg**emony **into the foreseeable future, not creating a permanent empire** in that sense, but **continuing** to have **a situation where there is a power to** create and **enforce** some sort of **order.**