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#### A. Interpretation ---

#### 1. Nuclear energy production is measured by installed capacity

#### IAEA 8 [International Atomic Energy Agency, “A Newsletter of the Division of Nuclear Power,” Nuclear Power Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, <http://www.iaea.org/Resources/Women/pdf/nenp0908.pdf>]

Energy production of nuclear power plants is a result of an installed capacity and effectiveness of its utilization. In 2007 there was no permanent shutdown, compared to eight in 2006, therefore the installed capacity was driven by investment into construction of new NPPs and into power uprating of existing reactor units. Three new reactors were connected to the grid and one long-term shutdown reactor was reconnected. The total installed capacity of the nuclear industry has risen from 369.8 to 372.2 GW(e) during 2007. Utilization of installed capacity can be measured by the energy availability factor (EAF). It is the percentage of maximum energy generation the plant is ready to supply to the electrical grid to meet its demand.

#### 2. Production incentives are used to stimulate output --- distinct from R&D

**Suranovic 10** [Steve, associate professor of economics and international affairs at the George Washington University, PhD in economics from Cornell, International Trade: Theory and Policy, v. 1.0, “8.2 Domestic Production Subsidies,” <http://catalog.flatworldknowledge.com/bookhub/reader/28?e=fwk-61960-ch08_s02>]

Domestic production subsidies are generally used for two main reasons. First, subsidies provide a way of raising the incomes of producers in a particular industry. This is in part why many countries apply production subsidies on agricultural commodities: it raises the incomes of farmers. The second reason to use production subsidies is to stimulate output of a particular good. This might be done because the product is assumed to be critical for national security. This argument is sometimes used to justify subsidies to agricultural goods, as well as steel, motor vehicles, the aerospace industry, and many other products. Countries might also wish to subsidize certain industries if it is believed that the industries are important in stimulating growth of the economy. This is the reason many companies receive research and development (R&D) subsidies. Although R&D subsidies are not strictly production subsidies, they can have similar effects.

#### 3. For is exclusive

Clegg, 95 - J.D., 1981 Yale Law School; the author is vice president and general counsel of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. (Roger, “Reclaiming The Text of The Takings Clause,” 46 S.C. L. Rev. 531, Summer, lexis)

Even if it made no sense to limit the clause to takings "for public use"--and, as discussed below, it might make very good sense--that is the way the clause reads. It is not at all ambiguous. The prepositional phrase simply cannot be read as broadening rather than narrowing the clause's scope. Indeed, a prepositional phrase beginning with "for" appears twice more in the Fifth Amendment, and in both cases there is no doubt that the phrase is narrowing the scope of the Amendment. n20

#### B. Violation --- the plan is an incentive for R&D

#### C. Vote neg ---

#### 1. LIMITS – allowing research & development of random energy sources expands the topic to a theoretical number of energy sources – impossible to predict.

#### 2. GROUND – the only unified neg ground is energy production – futuristic sources guarantee the aff AT WORSE a massive delay before they link to the only ground on the topic.

### 1NC ASPEC

#### Power in the federal government is divided into three branches—the affirmative does not specify

Rotunda 1 (18 Const. Commentary 319, “THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE POLITCAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND MORRISON,” lexis)

The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a self-interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose more federal control over the people and the states. n10 Hence, they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federalism [\*321] chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the "states qua states." n11 The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress.

#### Voting Issue

#### One—negative ground—specification is key to generate specific uniqueness and link magnitude so generic energy production now doesn’t non-unique our disads. Gives us textual competition for counterplans and key to high tech solvency arguments

#### Two—education—specification is a prerequisite to energy policy.

Tomain 90—Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law [Tomain, Joseph P., “The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy” (1990), Faculty Articles and Other Publications, Paper 130, http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac\_pubs/130]

IV. CONCLUSION

The direct message of the dominant model is that United States energy policy is market driven. The implication of this message is equally clear. Given the structural setting of a complex policymaking process that is woven throughout government and is directly affected by the tensions created by separation of powers and federalism, no comprehensive national energy policy of any detail is likely to develop despite executive, legislative, or administrative desires to do so.

There are ideological and pragmatic reasons behind this conclusion. The first reason, grounded in the liberal tradition, is that the country is "generally suspicious" of central planning. Rather than have an imitation Japanese or European industrial policy, the United States economy continues to run on private competition. Granted, the government will attempt to halt large accumulations of corporate power through antitrust enforcement. Still, though, countervailing government control of the economy through heavy central planning is simply not an accepted way of doing business.

A second and corollary reason is that although government is used as a backstop to prevent large aggregations of corporate power, government will also promote and support competitive businesses. The New Deal was not so much an experiment in social policythough it was clearly that-as it was an example of the federal government stimulating the economy by getting business on its feet again.

Third, there is a commitment to the hard energy path of largescale, high-technology, capital intensive energy production. This commitment finds its roots in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. This history makes it difficult for policy makers and decision makers to design and implement alternative energy policies, thus putting the burden of change on proponents 'of alternatives.

Fourth, also echoing the liberal tradition, there is an underlying faith in the market. The country's efforts to achieve the virtues of the market-color blindness, individual liberty, eqmility, and technological innovations-may not reach a Utopian plateau, but government controls are worse approximations. The country's faith in the market forms the baseline, and government will only intervene if cracks in the baseline are perceived.

Thus the dominant model of U.S. energy policy is firmly based in the tenets of democratic capitalism: private ownership and production; competition; no overt central planning; wariness of monopoly; and government support of each of the other elements. The hope is that our national economy and our quality of life can flourish if (1) markets are relatively clear, (2) entry and exits are relatively inexpensive, and (3) corporate power is relatively dispersed. Indeed, the ideology of domestic energy policy rests upon the idea that inter-industry and intra-industry competition are highly desirable~' Moreover, such industrial pluralism ultimately serves the public interest by providing relatively abundant energy at relatively stable prices. Economic efficiency, economic growth, economies of scale, and a cautious eye on market power thus define the public interest in energy. So says the dominant model. What remains to be seen is whether the dominant model has significant longevity given contemporary concerns about the continued use of fossil fuels and environmental degradation. Before the environmental consequences of hard path energy production can be adequately addressed, however, the dominant structure of domestic energy policymaking and policy must be acknowledged. Hopefully, this article has provided that acknowledgement.

#### 2AC clarifications are too late—the 1AC plan is used to generate counterplan competition—2AC or CX clarification justifies aff conditionality and kills any neg predictability

### 1NC DA 1

#### Obama winning with betting markets – best predictors

THOMSON 10 – 24 – 12 has been a semi-pro baseball player in France, an editorial cartoonist for Newsday, and a reporter [Keith Thomson, How Gamblers -- History's Most Accurate Election Forecasters -- Are Betting on 2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keith-thomson/how-gamblers--historys-mo_b_2011534.html?utm_hp_ref=elections-2012>]

I don't like uncertainty. The current presidential polls -- Gallup with Romney leading by three percent, CBS with Obama up by two percent, aggregators split on whose nose is ahead -- are a hotbed of uncertainty. Fortunately there are veritable election oracles I can turn to instead: gamblers.

In 2004, Gallup failed to forecast the winner of the popular vote for president -- for the second straight election. Halfway through Election Day 2004, various exit polls showed Kerry with the lead. Meanwhile 91 percent of bettors on Betfair.com had their money on Bush. The betting markets also were correct on the winner in each of the 50 states.

Before the 2008 election, I spoke to Koleman Strumpf, a University of Kansas economics professor who tracks betting trends. "Relative to the polls, the betting markets have to think hard about what they're saying since they are putting their money at stake," he said. "Also polls tend to reflect what people are thinking at a given moment, versus a forecast of what will happen on election day -- post-convention bounces, for instance."

Added Paulick Report editor Ray Paulick, one of America's top horseracing handicappers and a political prediction markets aficionado, "Gamblers have more experience with cheaters. They take voter fraud into their metrics. Polls don't. Nor do polls take into account intangibles like how each state's secretary of state factors in or systems within a state designed to eliminate voters."

In 2008, 90 percent of gamblers correctly forecast an Obama victory. They were also on the money with 48 of 50 states.

Gamblers' success in this arena is nothing new. In presidential races beginning in 1896, the New York Times, Sun, and World provided daily betting quotes. The papers' sources were bookies who had agents at every stump and whistle-stop to gather intel and quantify popular sentiment. Between 1884 and 1940, the bettors erred on just one of sixteen elections, Wilson's 1916 upset of Hughes.

Ironically, polls sent gamblers to the sideline. "Prior to Gallup's introduction in 1936, newspapers had little to report about the election horse race other than the betting markets," Strumpf explains. "When scientific polls came along, newspapers had something to report other than markets they were oftentimes uncomfortable with."

The same discomfort led to states relegating such gamblers to outlaws. The Internet has given rise to new forums, however. As of this writing, betting at the three biggest prediction markets is as follows: Betfair has Obama with a 64 percent chance to win to Romney's 36 percent; Intrade has the president at 58 percent; and the Iowa Electronic Markets have the president at 59 percent. Oddschecker shows bookmakers to be even more bullish on Obama.

Why are the polls and gamblers so far apart?

"The answer highlights one of the main differences between the polls and markets like Intrade," Intrade's exchange operations manager Carl Wolfenden told me. "The polls ask who you're going to vote for -- a question that requires an emotional response. Intrade asks who you think will win -- a rational question that requires someone to look at the facts and real world events, such as polls, debates, speeches, gaffes, scandals and crises. One of these facts is the Electoral College, which isn't accounted for in polls."

Why the big lead for Obama?

"Our markets recognize that Romney probably needs to win Ohio to beat Obama," Wolfenden says. "And so the price for Obama to be reelected has closely tracked his probability of winning Ohio. So while Romney may lead in the polls, and he may have flipped a number of other key states -- such as Florida, Virginia, Colorado -- to his side of the ledger, our markets appear to believe that without Ohio he can't get it done."

Strumpf adds: "I think the big message in this election cycle is that polls are giving conflicting answers, and unless you are willing to look at several state-level polls, it is hard to make sense of it all. The prediction markets like Intrade cut through all this and give us a single number to focus on."

#### Small Changes Matter - Now is key – small shifts have big impacts

SILVER 10 – 20 – 12 Elections Guru [nate Silver, Oct. 20: Calm Day in Forecast, but Volatility Ahead, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/oct-20-calm-day-in-forecast-but-volatility-ahead/>]

What makes this challenging is that although something like a half-point shift is hard to detect in the polls, it is also potentially meaningful given how late it is in the race and how close the contest is.

The most natural analogy might be to a baseball game. Scoring a run in the first inning is worth something, but it won’t shift the win probabilities all that much: there’s too much that can happen later on in the game.

We’re now in the political equivalent of the eighth inning, however. A run scored in the eight inning is potentially much more important than one in the first.

The reason I say “potentially” is that it makes a tremendous difference depending what the score is. In a blowout, the eighth inning won’t matter at all. A team down 9-1 is almost certainly going to lose; but so will one that gets a solo home run and trails 9-2 instead.

(The political equivalent: Walter Mondale, in 1984, improved to a 17-point deficit from a 20-point deficit in national polls after his first debate with Ronald Reagan. This may have helped him to carry his home state of Minnesota, and lose the Electoral College 525-13 rather than 535-3.)

But if the score is tied, or if it’s a one-run game, a run scored in the eighth will make a huge difference.

That’s where we find ourselves right now in the presidential race. This election is close and is likely to end up that way. There’s about a 50-50 chance that the election will end up within 2.5 percentage points, according to the forecast, against only a 15 percent chance that either candidate will win by five points or more.

For this reason, the percentage estimates in the forecast are likely to be volatile from here on out.

**Plan drives a wedge into Obama’s base**

**Mick 6-19**-10 [Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm]

Despite these small victories, President **Obama's nuclear vision faces** many impending **obstacles**.  **Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste**, some **environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.**  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

**And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012**.  That is the year when he will face **reelection**.  That **may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups -- the environmental lobby -- has become one of his staunchest critics**.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Enviro on the brink – flips the election

Schnur 12

Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Obama win key to stop European missile defense – failure collapses Russias nuke deterrent and causes war

Levi 12

(David Meir, Prof of History @ San Jose State University and writes and lectures on Middle East topics, “Russia Wants Obama Re-Elected” May 11th, 2012, <http://frontpagemag.com/2012/david-meir-levi/russia-wants-obama-re-elected/>)

At an international conference on Thursday, May 3, organized at Russia’s initiative, the Russian delegates showed computer-generated images of a hypothetical Russian pre-emptive missile attack on segments of a missile defense shield and early warning system that the US and NATO want to put in place in Turkey, Rumania and Poland. Quite a scary threat from the former USSR’s 900-pound gorilla and one-time global nuclear super-power. NATO says that the missile defense system is meant to counter Iran’s threats of a WMD Shi’ite Armageddon. However, the Russians are not comforted, because they fear that the NATO anti-missile missiles could also be used to shoot down Russian nuclear-armed missiles aimed at the West; and such a potential threat from the west could “undermine their country’s nuclear deterrent[.]” The Russians organized the Thursday conference in order to place their threat on the table, loud and clear, and make public their demand that they get a written agreement that the West will never use its missiles against Russia. Currently, the USA and NATO have refused to put such a promise in writing, although Russia-NATO agreements on missile defense cooperation date back to 2010. The timing of this meeting is important. It comes shortly before a NATO conference due to take place in Chicago later this month at which NATO will publicize its success in getting its missile-defense system up and running. Russia’s pre-emptive threat of a missile war against the West if the West does not agree to its demands puts a big kink in the Chicago conference. But according to the Wall Street Journal article, Russia’s alarming saber-rattling is really a façade to hide a “tacit agreement to put off serious talks until next year,” by which time Obama, if re-elected, could “clear the way for a deal” and work on Russia’s behalf against NATO to find ways to accommodate the Russian demands. The Russian presenter on Thursday was direct and unambiguous that Russia prefers to work with Obama as a second-term president, and to cooperate with his vision of a “reset” in the USA- Russia relationship, rather than to joust with Romney whose election they feel will make things “surely … more difficult.” So what the Russians have actually said is: if you want to keep the Russian bear from getting aggressive, elect Obama, not Romney. This is an unusually overt attempt by a foreign power to influence American elections, but it is not surprising since Romney has been harshly critical of Obama’s “reset” vision. The Wall Street Journal made the obvious connection between this impasse and the “hot mic” incident in March where Obama told Russian Prime Minister Medvedev to tell Russian soon-to-be President Vladimir Putin to temporarily back off regarding this issue since Obama would have “more flexibility” to deal with it after the November 6 elections. As reporters gathered for a news conference in Seoul, South Korea, Obama leaned over to his Russian counterpart. Without realizing a microphone was open, he said: “This is my last election and after my last election I have more flexibility,” …referring to his ability to reach a deal with Russia on missile defense. Medvedev replied: “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir,” a reference to the incoming Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Obama attempted to weasel out of the implications of his gaffe by explaining to reporters in Korea that arms control negotiations are extremely complex and require bipartisan cooperation in the U.S.; so they cannot be a public issue just months before presidential and congressional elections. But “I don’t think it’s any surprise that you can’t start that a few months before a presidential and congressional elections in the United States,” simply does not address the core problem. His intention to hide his willingness to be flexible toward Russia about Russian demands couched in cold-war terminology relating to the possibility of nuclear war bespeak his awareness that these intentions will not be acceptable to the American voting public; and this is all the more reason to make them public. Romney said it was alarming that Obama was “looking for greater flexibility where he doesn’t have to answer to the American people in his relations with Russia … [Russia is] without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe. They fight every cause for the world’s worst actor. The idea that he has more flexibility in mind for Russia is very, very troubling indeed.” The New York Times version of this issue made no mention of the “hot mic” incident but did point out that Russian leaders have refused Obama’s request that the Kremlin pressure Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to comply with the UN’s cease-fire plans. The Times also noted that Obama himself stalled the progress of the NATO plans for the early warning and missile defense system because he sought a “reset” in the USA’s relationship with Russia, and Russian concerns about the NATO early warning system were a stumbling block to Obama’s plans. Obama’s willingness to be flexible toward the Russian demands may stem in part from the desire to co-opt the Kremlin into pressuring Assad; but it also seems clear that Obama, not knowing that he was speaking to Medvedev in front of a hot microphone, did not want to let the American electorate know of his intentions for flexibility toward Russia regarding the NATO missile defense system impasse. In other words, his flexibility toward Russia, if it were made public, might hinder his re-election. And the Russians are not ungrateful. Obama’s pay-back for his willingness to be flexible next year is Russia’s endorsement of his re-election by telling the world, at this conference, that if the USA elects Romney, there might be war with Russia. An American special envoy to the Russian conference indicated that the American delegation was not sympathetic to the Russian demands and unwilling to offer the limitations that Russia wants. She stated: “There’s nothing I can imagine that will stop us making these deployments on time.” Well, actually there is: Obama’s re-election.

#### Extinction

Sharavin et al 7

(Major General Alexander Vladimirov, Vice President of the Military Expert Board; - Colonel General Vladimir Yesin, Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law; - Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems; and - Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Defense and Security, July 20)

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that **continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals**. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion. Yesin: I'm firmly convinced that there will be no war as long as Russia retains the nuclear deterrent potential. If, however, a war between Russia and the United States breaks out (a war, not a petty local conflict), then it will end in a global Apocalypse. Vladimirov: Whatever the scenarios may be, I'm convinced that only one end is possible - our utter victory. This war will be an undisputable crime against mankind. It may only end in defeat of the United States of America. How can the Apocalypse be avoided? Sharavin: We should take care to avoid confrontations with the United States (try as I might, I cannot perceive a single valid reason for Russia to want a confrontation). And of course, Russia should concentrate on actual as opposed to virtual development of its Armed Forces. Ivashov: Russia should restore the might of its army and potential of its defense industry. It should concentrate on research into and design of new weapons. As for the national military doctrine, it should include a clause allowing for the use of nuclear arms against a full-scale aggression. Also importantly, Russia needs allies. Yesin: American ambitions should be firmly countered on the basis of Russian economic and military might. First and foremost, on the basis of the Russian nuclear forces. The existence of these forces is a guarantee that there will be no wars between Russia and the United States.

### 1NC DA 2

#### Electricity demand is driving Natgas to a price equilibrium that is sustainable for producers

Santos 4/24/12—Independent trader, analyst and algorithmic trading expert w/16 years of experience [Pauol Santos, Natural Gas In 2012: Electric Generation Switch Implications, Seeking Alfa, April 24, 2012, pg. http://seekingalpha.com/article/524061-natural-gas-in-2012-electric-generation-switch-implications]

There are several important observations to be made from this table:

The increased demand from dispatch switching in electricity generation really eats up the increased production from the shale revolution. Not only does it do so, but it might be underestimated in this analysis, because of the distortion the unfavorable weather creates (the growth rate in natural gas usage would probably have been even greater under normal weather).

The natural gas production increase year-over-year is now disappearing because of the drop in rig counts. This happens against a backdrop of increased usage and thus hastens equilibrium in the market. Equilibrium will naturally be found at a higher price, because the rigs started going away at a higher price as well, and will require a higher price to come back.

The impact of lower or stagnated production against increasing demand is such that excluding the net imports, it's even likely that net withdrawals would result under a regular summer. With a hot summer—not modeled here—it would be likely that we'd see net withdrawals considering imports. Indeed, given the week-to-week variation in all the variables, such might happen even under a regular summer.

Finally, this model, optimistic in its production projections and somewhat pessimistic in demand, still sees only a 1267 bcf net injection taking inventories to around 3800-3850 bcf at the peak of the injection cycle, far from the 4100-4400 that are considered the demonstrated and theoretical storage capacities. So there's not only a good chance that storage capacity won't be exhausted, but also a chance that the market will be surprised by how little gas will be injected (though at the start of the cycle there can still be a good deal of injection).

Conclusion

Due to the incredible impact the dispatch switching of coal-fired generation for natural gas generation is having on increased natural gas usage, as well as the impact the low prices are having on drilling for natural gas, the market might come into equilibrium sooner than previously expected, so natural gas prices recognizing this reality might have significant upside even before the end of 2012. 2013 now seems certain to have higher prices as well, something I had already speculated on before. Obviously higher prices will alleviate both of these developments, leading to less coal substitution and to a resumption in drilling—but still this implies an equilibrium at higher prices.

Given this conclusion, I took a small long position in natural gas October 2012 call options at the $2.50 strike.

The implications for coal stocks such as Peabody Energy ([BTU](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/btu)), Alpha Natural Resources ([ANR](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/anr)), CONSOL Energy ([CNX](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cnx)), Arch Coal ([ACI](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/aci)) and James River Coal ([JRCC](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/jrcc)) depend on how much natural gas moves. The rise in natural gas prices might not be enough to impact coal substitution or prices significantly (anything less than a 40% pop doesn't change the equation much). Still, if a coal panic doesn't happen in the next two months, the sector should be broadly safer from there on.

The implications for natural gas producers are on the whole more directly positive as natural gas prices are predicted to move up, though natural gas producers heavily reliant on shale gas, such as Chesapeake ([CHK](http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/chk)), might have trouble with the depletion rates.

#### Nuclear incentives discourage nat-gas investments—utilities will pursue fuel diversity if the price is right.

C2ES 12 [Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “NATURAL GAS IN THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR,” May 2012]

According to the latest Energy Information Administration (EIA) [Annual Energy Outlook](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/) (AEO), natural gas-fired generation is expected to be just over 25 percent of the total generation mix in 2020, rising to 27 percent in 2035.

Fuel diversity is an important consideration for utilities looking to reduce their reliance on any particular energy source. The trend away from coal toward greater reliance on natural gas creates a potential fuel diversity risk, especially considering the volatile price history of natural gas. Coal will continue to be a significant source of electricity in some regions and for some utilities, but other utilities look increasingly likely to be getting nearly all of their baseload generation from only two sources: natural gas and nuclear power.

Levelized cost (Figure 4) [represents](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle, converted to equal annual payments and expressed in terms of real dollars to remove the impact of inflation. It reflects overnight capital cost, fuel cost, fixed and variable O&M cost, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each plant type. The availability of various incentives including state or [federal tax credits](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) can also impact the calculation of levelized cost. The [values shown](http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/index.cfm) in the figure below do not incorporate any such incentives. Natural gas-fired combined-cycle generation technologies are projected to be the least expensive options in the coming years. Utilities looking at their bottom lines and public utility commissions looking for low-cost investment decisions will favor the construction of natural gas-fired technologies, leading to a greater reliance on natural gas in the coming years.

#### A nat gas equilibrium price is critical to manufacturing

Magill 8/22/12 [Jim Magill, “Manufacturers, producers see different futures for US natural gas supplies,” Platts, 22 Aug 2012, http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/6582012]

The rapid development of US shale natural gas resources has created an opportunity for the nation to establish a new energy paradigm, provided that the proper energy policies are put into place, speakers at the North American Prospect Expo said in Houston said Wednesday.

Jim Tramuto, vice president of Southwestern Energy, pointed to his company's success at tapping into the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, as an example of what shale gas producers in basins across the country have been able to accomplish in a few years.

"We have finally cracked the code," he said. "We are now up over 2 Bcf/d in the Fayetteville Shale. We've already produced over 2 Tcf of gas and this year alone we have drilled 450 wells in the Fayetteville Shale."

But he said the exploration-and-production industry's success in boosting US gas production has cut gas prices to a level that is unsustainable.

"We can produce it, but if we can't sell it and it's not used, we won't realize the return we all are expecting," he said. State and local politicians need to implement policies that serve to encourage the production of and foster the creation of markets for shale gas, he added.

The increase in US gas production has also led to the rebirth of the domestic chemical and manufacturing sectors, Ken Bromfield, North American commercial director with Dow Chemical, said.

"We have an unprecedented opportunity with shale gas to push the reset button on the US energy economy," he Psaid.  
"Manufacturing is back," he added, saying industry has announced plans to build about $80 billion of projects in the next five years, as a result reasonably priced natural gas. Dow alone has announced $4 billion of new manufacturing projects, Bromfield said.

But he warned that this rosy scenario could be ruined by a rush to build new terminals for the export of liquefied natural gas. He said he favors policies that would encourage the use of gas to produce manufactured goods, which then could be exported at eight times the value than exporting the gas alone would bring.

On the sidelines of the conference, he told Platts that an effort to begin exporting large volumes of LNG could slow down the manufacturing renaissance.

Bromfield said Dow doesn't think that restricting LNG exports will hurt producers' profits. "We think that there's a demand [from] manufacturing that is already in progress and more is coming; that there can be an equilibrium point and we can have it all."

#### Cheap gas is key to tackle the deficit.

Kohler 3/2/12 [Alan Kohler, “The death of peak oil,” Business Spectator, Published 7:17 AM, 29 Feb 2012 Last update 6:38 PM, 2 Mar 2012, pg. http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/peak-oil-shale-gas-fracking-energy-nuclear-budget-pd20120229-RWR7C?opendocument&src=rss

The importance of this for the world is hard to exaggerate. The distribution of energy on the planet is shifting: the stranglehold that Middle Eastern dictatorships have over the world’s energy supply is loosening and just as the rise of manufacturing in China shifted the world’s economic axis, so will the rise of shale energy in North America.

There will be a rapid substitution of coal by cleaner gas, especially as (or perhaps if) emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes spread.

It means renewable energy and nuclear will become less and less economic as the supply of gas increases, whether it’s from coal seams or shale. Gas is less carbon intensive than coal, but it still produces greenhouse gases, so it may be that the policy response to reduce global warming will actually have to increase if the world moves too far towards gas and away from renewables and nuclear.

If the United States could become self-sufficient in energy, its current account deficit would disappear and the US dollar would start rising again.

In fact, shale energy could be responsible for the resurgence of the United States as an economic superpower, with cheap local energy underpinning the second coming of its manufacturing industry as well as helping to balance its twin deficits—the current account and federal budget.

#### The impact is US isolationism—perception of decline risks war.

Lieberthal & O'Hanlon 7/3/12—Foreign policy scholars @ Brookings Institution [Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal (Professor of Poli Sci @ [University of Michigan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Michigan)) & Dr. Michael O'Hanlon (Lecturer of Poli Sci @ [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University)), “The real national security threat: America's debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2012, pg. http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703,0,1409615.story

Drones, kill lists, computer [viruses](http://www.latimes.com/topic/health/diseases-illnesses/viral-diseases-infections-HEDAI0000071.topic) and administration leaks are all the rage in the current political debate. They indeed merit serious scrutiny at a time when the rules of war, and technologies available for war, are changing fast. That said, these issues are not the foreign policy centerpiece of the 2012 presidential race.

Economic renewal and fiscal reform have become the preeminent issues, not only for domestic and economic policy but for foreign policy as well. As the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm.Michael G. Mullen, was fond of saying, national debt has become perhaps our top national security threat. And neither major presidential candidate is doing enough about it. This issue needs to be framed as crucial not just for our future prosperity but for international stability as well.

The United States has been running trillion-dollar deficits, resulting in a huge explosion in the country's indebtedness. Publicly held debt now equals 70% of Gross Domestic Product, a threshold many economists consider significant and highly worrisome. Making matters worse, half of our current deficit financing is being provided by foreigners. We are getting by with low interest rates and tolerable levels of domestic investment only because they find U.S. debt attractive, which may not last.

According to the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, President Obama's long-term budget plan would allow publicly held debt as a fraction of GDP to rise further, up to 75%, within a decade. Mitt Romney's proposal, featuring tax cuts and defense spending increases and as-yet-unspecified (and thus less than fully credible) entitlement reform, appears worse. It would probably drive publicly held debt to 95% of GDP over the same period. Put differently, though both are serious and pragmatic men, neither major party's presidential candidate is adequately stepping up to the plate, with Romney's plan the more troubling of the two.

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### Extinction

Burford 12—PhD candidate in Poli Sci @ University of Auckland [Lyndon Burford (New Zealand representatives on the Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia-Pacific region. This study group is hosted by the ASEAN Regional Forum.,) “No Such Thing as a Free Lunch,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 19, Issue 2, 2012, pg. 229-239

Nuclear activities create inherent security risks. Threats arising from military nuclear activities include, among other things, the further dissemination or use of nuclear weapons—including limited or full-scale nuclear war, whether accidental, miscalculated, or intentional—and nuclear or radiological accidents or terrorism, which in extreme cases may lead to nuclear war.7 In the civilian sector, the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima disasters demonstrated that severe nuclear accidents might also threaten international security. Today, nuclear risks are increasing due to a range of factors: the threat of further nuclear dissemination, the development of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the growth of dual-use industries and strategic trade flows, and the potential horizontal and vertical expansion of nuclear energy programs. The nature of these risks transcends national borders. As a result, nuclear risks cannot be addressed effectively by a single powerful state, or even a coalition of committed states. The weakest link in the chain undermines the security of all countries, so maintaining international security requires all countries to support nuclear control efforts.

### 1NC K

#### Focus on energy production produces chronic failure. Energy becomes an end-in-itself with no social or ethical guidance.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 20-21] **[Gender paraphrased]**

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133- 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy's social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the "great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise." Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford ( 1964). Governance "by the people" consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests ( 1964: I) that the classical idea of democracy includes "a group of related ideas and practices ... [including] communal self-government ... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community." Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which "deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence" (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

#### Appeal to specific nuclear technology magnifies the problem of authoritarian expertise. They depoliticize social choice about the purpose of technology.

Wynne 11—Brian Wynne Science Studies and Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change @ Lancaster (UK) [*Rationality and Ritual* 2nd Edition p. 8-11] [Gender Paraphrased]

Such detachment of ambitious technological commitment from organized fantasy has to be a hope; but this hope also has to be interrogated, cold-bloodedly, carefully, and openly. As I tried to assert in this book, nuclear proponents including its scientists belied their own claims to objective hard-factual discipline, with their intense and unbridled emotional commitments clearly evident. These scientistic emotions (and their denial) manifested profound insecurities on the part of their agents, combined with an effective assumption of almost superhuman powers. Thus the mutual identification and reinforcement of nuclear technology with a culture of exaggeration is no less real and no less dangerous just because other technologies have also suffered from similar such idolatry in the past (Ezrahi, 1990) as well as since the 1980s. Although it was Lewis Strauss - a non-scientist head of the scientific body for both weapons and civil nuclear power, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) - who voiced in 1954 the infamous promise that his generation's children would enjoy 'electrical energy too cheap to meter' (Strauss, 1954; Weart, 1988, p166), what is notable is the refusal of any nuclear expert to refute such fatuous promises made in the public name of their science (Laurence, 1959, p251).10 If science claims the credit for the putative benefits from such technologies, as it does, then it cannot easily distance itself from the related discredits - nor from the arguments over which is which. Paradoxically, as nuclear energy prepares to return, society still has not come to terms with the cultural significance of its mass-destructive and apocalyptic military origins and consequences. With the failure of the Atoms for Peace programme and its global institutional UN 'safeguards' supposedly to arrest nuclear weapons proliferation (granted that it must have slowed it down), the systematic and sustained social unrealism of this 60-year commitment cannot but encourage a continuing sense of public unease and distrust of nuclear energy technologies, even if the reprocessing option is forestalled. The imagery of Figure 1 is referred to in Chapter 2 of the original book, but was not printed there. Looking back now, I realize I did not do justice to the issues it raised. Thanks to various theoretical, technological and public developments since then, it deserves fuller treatment now. The image is from a supplement on 'The Atomic Age' published by the Financial Times in 1956, at the birth of both the UK civil nuclear power programme (claimed to be the first in the world) and the UN global Atoms for Peace programme.11 This 50-page publication celebrated the Queen's forthcoming opening of the Calder Hall (Windscale) nuclear electricity (and weapons plutonium) reactors.12 This imagery did not just project nuclear technology as human perfection. It portrayed much more about the nuclear imagination and its mode of public communication and self-promotion, thus of nuclear technology's material social being. This includes its normative characterization (and performance, as explained below) of 'the public' which it imagined as part of the nuclear era. It emphasized the religious forces and feelings animating this science-inspired technology, the epitome of modern scientific rationality as public authority. The technology is shown not just as precise, pure, pristine and clinical. It is also hovering in its own superhuman realm, above the Earth and beyond mere human life, even surrounded by a glowing celestial halo. The text indicates an imagined (and desired) awestruck public: 'Millions of people ['mankind'] stand amazed at the prospect of heat light and power from a source that cannot even be seen.' There is not the slightest sense of a technology and its embodied science that envisages any hint of public engagement: indeed quite the opposite, only distant awe, exclusion and admiration. These extra-terrestrial, extra-social experts 'know best', not only about nuclear power, but about what is best for '[hu]mankind'. Public exclusion, subordination, passivization and alienation are here actively cultivated, through symbolic action. The Windscale book is about how this same kind of symbolic imagination of 'the public' was, through a participatory public inquiry, its report and parliamentary and media uptake, enacted into material performance in later policy culture and commitments. These processes, their forms of reason and discourse, can be said to have performed a particular imagination of their public, and encouraged the material enactment of that imagination into society. If we also refer back here to the practices of pollution management at the Windscale-Sellafield site, as reflected in Dunster's 1958 description earlier of how routine marine radioactive discharges were set, we can see in this account, and in the ensuing environmental contamination and human exposures from this, a performance of nuclear technology's imagined publics. We can see from not only the typical symbolism but also in corresponding material practices that as democratic participants, worthy of respectful recognition and to be given standing as part of the moral --community in which nuclear technology exists, effectively there is no public. It has been one of the most significant shifts of collective understanding amongst many - contributed by the late twentieth century social sciences and humanities, that symbolic actions carry corresponding changes in material social relations. Thus the normatively imposed social relations of technoscience here are not just symbolically projected, but also materially performed. In addition to the instances noted above, a further routinized example of the latter was the sustained extreme secrecy and misinformation that was practised by the UK nuclear authorities behind the scenes of this 1956 flood of positive publicity, and in imposed assumptions-in-practice about what people's concerns, needs and capacities are and should be. These were in no need of co ll ective negotiation; they were subsumed into the dominant assumed ontology. Inquiry inspector Mr Justice Parker's later empiricist framing and interpretation of the Windscale inquiry's conflicting ontological commitments, as these were embodied in the irreconcilable arguments of the parties but represented by him as measurable - and measured by him - against an empirically discoverable standard, did the same. Despite all the noise and fury of public debate and controversy, his discrete translations of expressed public concerns into his own terms were not subjected to any direct accountable scrutiny. Of course, his rational arguments in favour of THORP's approval were, but that is not what I am referring to here. This book still stands as a sole, modest and utterly marginal witness to this.

#### Technocratic management makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### Critique is a prior question—starting with incentives dodges issues of social and environmental sustainability.

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 22-24]

Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major 'energy futures' under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new technologies-conventional or sustainable-that will govern the energy sector and accumulate capital mjght be described as centaurian technics21 in which the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high . technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities, contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere. Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson's assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the "cultural logic of late capitalism." Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is important-even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy visions equally presume that a social order governed by a 'democratic' ideal of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and social justice is studiously observed by both·proposals. Likewise, both agree to, or demur on, the question of capitalism's sustainability.22 Nothing is said on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be. If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct, then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of acquiescence to things as they are. Building an inquiry into energy as a social project will require the recovery of a critical voice that can interrogate, rather than concede, the discourse's current moorings in technological politics and capitalist political economy. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate an energy-society order in which energy systems evolve in response to social values and goals, and not simply according to the dictates of technique, prices, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to between 550Q and 900Q Fahrenheit (300Q and 500Q Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the lifeworld of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life . Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism are successfully declined. In L 928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965: 52) explained why the democratic-authoritarian bargain and Western capitalism should be rejected: God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. Unless the capitalists of India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or being destroyed by them. As Gandhi's remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our political-economic problem. The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

### 1NC Solvency

#### NRC restrictions are the single biggest roadblock for SMRs—delays, lack of human and technical capacity, and zoning restrictions.

Nick Cunningham, October 2012. Policy Analyst for Energy and Climate at the American Security Project. “Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power,” American Security Project, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf>.

The most difficult challenge currently facing SMRs is the institutional barriers. Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not certified a single SMR design. Despite the variety of SMR designs from several nuclear vendors, the NRC has lacked sufficient human and technical capacity to license small modular reactors in the past.33 Even as policymakers have expressed greater interest in SMRs in recent years, the licensing process for a new design takes several years at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.34¶ Also, many regulations create a difficult environment for small reactors and favor large reactors. For example, the NRC requires 10 mile emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants,¶ making it difficult to site a small reactor near urban centers where it could be used for energy applications other than centralized electricity generation.35¶ SMRs will need to overcome this long history of institutional bias towards large reactors. As the most prominent licensing body for the nuclear industry worldwide, the NRC to a certain degree, shapes the global future for nuclear power. If the NRC does not lead on small modular reactors, it may be an uphill battle for the SMR industry.

#### Can’t globalize—export restricitons

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

### 1NC—No Water Wars

#### No water wars AND no impact to water scarcity

Allouche 11—Jeremy Allouche, research Fellow, water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, former professor – MIT, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies [“The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” *Food Policy*, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3–S8, Science Direct]

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ( [FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ( [Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ( [Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### 1NC—No Prolif

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Prolif is super slow—empirics disprove their fear mongering.

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon.

Yet there is another possibility. The Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate.

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves.

NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED

"Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

#### Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

#### Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves more lives than it costs.

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

Seng 98 (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### AT: Manu add on

#### And we control impact uniqueness—manufacturing revival now due to nat gas.

Ebinger et al. 12—Senior fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings [Charles Ebinger (Professor in energy economics @ Johns Hopkins and Georgetown), Kevin Massy (Director of the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings) & Govinda Avasarala (Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative @ Brookings), “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, Policy Brief 12-01, MAY 2012

The shale gas boom has many industrial producers and chemical companies anticipating an increase in U.S. industrial and manufacturing competitiveness and petrochemicals production. A December 2011 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted in association with the National Association of Manufacturers, notes an increase in U.S. manufacturing activity due to shale gas development and suggests one million additional manufacturing jobs could be created in EIA’s high shale gas recovery scenario (in which 50 percent more shale gas is recovered relative to the reference case) compared with its low shale recovery scenario (in which 50 percent less is recovered). 49 A particular area of interest is the resurgence in ethylene production and the manufacturing of ethylene-based goods in the United States. Ethylene, which is a principal component in a variety of goods ranging from anti-freeze to trash-bags, is produced from ethane, a byproduct of natural gas. Cheap domestic natural gas has provided chemical producers a global competitive advantage in ethane—and therefore ethylene—production, particularly compared with producers in Europe where ethylene is derived principally from naphtha, an oil-based product. Because crude oil prices have not dropped in parallel with gas prices in the United States, U.S. industrial producers are thus globally competitive again. As a result, a number of industrial producers are looking to reinvest in plants in the United States. 50 Bayer MaterialScience is opening an ethane cracker in West Virginia (the first cracker in the Marcellus) and Dow Chemical and Shell Chemical have announced plans to expand and open, respectively, crackers on the Gulf Coast. According to analysis by the American Chemistry Council (ACC), an industry trade association, a 25 percent increase in the supply of ethane in the United States could result in 17,000 direct new jobs in the chemical industry, 395,000 indirect jobs, and around $44 billion in additional federal, state, and local tax revenue over 10 years. 51 To achieve such returns ACC presumes an infusion of over $16 billion of private capital, and includes an assessment of induced impacts—“employment and output supported by the spending of those employed directly or indirectly by the sector.” While the ACC does not make explicit assumptions about the shape of the U.S. natural gas supply curve or the future price of natural gas, it also assumes sustained low gas prices, and resultantly high oil-to-gas price ratio. While some analysts may take legitimate issue with the assumptions behind the projected job-creation figures, it is clear that the U.S. petrochemical and manufacturing sector will be a prominent competitor and potential beneficiary of abundant domestic natural gas. In Part II, the study will analyze the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the potential for a “renaissance” in the industrial sector. Pg. 17-18

### 2NC—No Prolif

#### No widespread prolif—

Proliferating states have dysfunctional management of nuclear programs due to weak political institutions. The quality of technical workmanship is low; there is no coordination among technical teams, and mistakes cause finger pointing and delays—that’s Hymans.

#### Prefer our evidence—

First—it takes into account globalization which has spread nuclear know-how and tech. Prolif has still slowed proving the problems listed above can’t be fixed.

Second—people have been predicting a prolif breakout for 50 years and it has never manifested—prefer empirics which are objective and untainted by ideology.

#### Prolif is slow and stable—their ev is hysteria.

Mueller 9—John Mueller is a professor of political science and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University [October 23, 2009, “The Rise of Nuclear Alarmism,” *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/the\_rise\_of\_nuclear\_alarmism?page=full]

We have also endured decades of hysteria over the potential for nuclear proliferation, even though the proliferation that has actually taken place has been both modest and substantially inconsequential. When the quintessential rogue state, communist China, obtained them in 1964, CIA Director John McCone sternly proclaimed that nuclear war was "almost inevitable." But far from engaging in the "nuclear blackmail" expected at the time by almost everyone (except Johnson, then working at the State Department), China built its weapons quietly and has never made a nuclear threat.

Still, the proliferation fixation continues to flourish. For more than a decade, U.S. policy obsessed over the possibility that Saddam Hussein's pathetic and technologically dysfunctional regime in Iraq could in time obtain nuclear weapons (it took the more advanced Pakistan 28 years), which it might then suicidally lob, or threaten to lob, at somebody. To prevent this imagined and highly unlikely calamity, a war has been waged that has probably resulted in more deaths than were suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

Today, alarm is focused on the even more pathetic regime in North Korea, which has now tested devices that if detonated in the middle of New York's Central Park would be unable to destroy buildings on its periphery. There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted that it has no intention of developing the weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is lying, it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless, a very considerable waste of money and effort, and "absolute" primarily in their irrelevance.

As for the rest of the world, the nuclear age is clearly on the wane. Although it may not be entirely fair to characterize disarmament as an effort to cure a fever by destroying the thermometer, the analogy is instructive when it is reversed: When a fever subsides, the instrument designed to measure it loses its usefulness and is often soon misplaced. Thus far the former contestants in the Cold War have reduced their nuclear warheads by more than 50,000 to around 18,000. Other countries, like France, have also substantially cut their nuclear arsenals, while China and others have maintained them in far lower numbers than expected.

Total nuclear disarmament hardly seems to be in the offing -- nuclear metaphysicians still have their skill sets in order. But a continued decline seems likely, and experience suggests that formal disarmament agreements are scarcely necessary in all this -- though they may help the signatories obtain Nobel Peace Prizes. With the demise of fears of another major war, many of the fantastically impressive, if useless, arms that struck such deep anxiety into so many for so long are quietly being allowed to rust in peace.

### 2NC Framing Cards

#### The framing question of the debate is not whether there is a risk prolif breaks down—it’s whether or not a world of prolif is more peaceful—default neg on the record of nuclear peace.

Sechser 5 (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics specializing in International Security—Stanford U., “How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer”, Presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 4-7, \*I had to ILL this. I don’t think it’s available online)

A second counterargument to the optimist position is the claim that even if proliferation optimism enjoys greater theoretical tenability than previously thought, this does not make its position practically viable. Betts (1999: 65-66) writes that policy makers “do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. . . one exception to the rule may be too many.”13 Likewise, Feaver (1993: 162) argues that even 99.5% prognostic accuracy would be insufficient for proliferation optimism to mount a persuasive case: “At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time. Most is not all.” And Sagan (2003b: 184) contends that until military organizations are “perfect,” there is sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the effects of proliferation.14 As long as there is a chance that proliferation might entail some negative effects, the argument holds, then why not play it safe? This staggering burden of proof is flawed for two reasons. First, obscures the cost-benefit analysis inherent in any policy deliberation. The appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons will result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. The issue is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. If one believes, for example, that nuclear proliferation would eventually result in a preventive war somewhere but that it would also deter numerous conventional wars, then the net overall benefit might justify a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. Second, the argument obscures the fact that proliferation pessimism to date does not possess a “99.5%” record of accuracy—rather, its record stands at 100%. Of course, the absence of nuclear catastrophe in the past does not assure its absence in the future. But theories ultimately aim to predict outcomes, and despite unearthing a trove of nuclear near-misses, the theory of proliferation pessimism has not succeeded in accomplishing this task. Existing research has successfully shown that the theory’s predicted causal mechanisms have operated in organizations that handle nu-clear weapons, but this is not the same as showing that these mechanisms generate the theory’s predicted outcomes. Even a major counterforce strike against a new nuclear power would not immediately vindicate pessimism—at least not until case study researchers were able to show that the causal mechanisms they specified (that is, preventive war pressures triggered by military biases) were indeed in operation.

#### History must underwrite your policy choices—default to empirics.

Graham 94—professor emeritus of history, California [Otis, *Losing Time*, p 4]

Yet the status quo, defended by no one, prevailed. Years of vigorous dis­cussion led only to policy paralysis. Many explanations for this outcome arise in the recounting. But a major agent of mischief was misuse of history, in many forms. Distorted versions of history inflated the important potential of industrial policies; onslaughts of counter-history lessons equally distorted what Industrial Policy was about. Together, these played a large role in preventing the de­gree of policy rationalization that was intellectually within reach. Our policy system might perhaps have done worse, and people who think so might wish to leave well enough alone. I write front a more hopeful persuasion that if history was allowed its limited but invaluable uses, and if misuses of it were curbed, our policy system could improve upon this outcome. Hence this effort to build on and extend the growing body of research and thought that would discourage the policy misuses while charting the way to judicious policy uses of the past. The debate over these matters did not end in 1990. This book is written in that hazard-filled zone between the beginning and the end of things. I was encouraged in this risk by an observation by two commentators on Britain in the early stages of Thatcherism, that "books generally come to an end before the problems they describe." Historians usually reverse that dictum to read: "problems had best come to an end before books are written to describe them," but this book is directed less to historians than to the policy community—from voting periphery to the presidential cen­ter—who must make history-based judgments with or without expert advice. The past misunderstood guarantees future intellectual trouble. Policymakers are fated soon to reengage the Industrial Policy issue. This time error and delay may well exact a much higher price than the first time around, in the 1980-1990 indian summer of America's economic leadership.

#### And a consensus of experts vote neg

Seliktar 11—Ofira Seliktar, Political Science Professor at Gratz [2011, “Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Rationality,” The ‘Eye of the Beholder’ Problem,” J. of the ME and Africa, v. 2, issue 2, p. Taylor & Francis]

Nuclear optimists have outranked nuclear pessimists both numerically and in most discursive venues. A majority of noted IR professors (such as John Mearsheimer, Steven Walt, Robert Jervis, Robert Betts, and Francis Gavin) are in the former category. Most top-ranking Iran experts (such as Ray Takeyh, Karim Sadjapour, Abbas Milani, Kenneth Pollack, and Daniel Byman) have also embraced nuclear optimism. Prestigious think tanks—such as the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and the International Crisis Group)—have published reports based on the assumption that Iran has the required nuclear rationality. Foreign Affairs (published by CFR), Foreign Policy (published by Carnegie), Middle East Journal (published by the Middle East Institute), and the Middle East Policy Journal (published by Middle East Policy Center) have likewise embraced nuclear optimism. 57 Invoking the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, the intelligence community seems inclined to adopt nuclear optimism. The NIE regards Tehran as a rational actor, whose “decisions are guided by a cost/benefit approach rather than a rush to weapons.” 58

#### Aff ev is biased

Betts 2k—Prof and the Dir., Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia [Richard, *The Coming Crisis*, ed Utgoff, 64-5]

The Waltz argument cannot be brushed off, but surprisingly few academic strategists besides Scott Sagan have refuted it in detail. Although most intellectuals as well as normal people oppose proliferation, writings arguing the benefits are more obtrusive in the literature of international relations theory. Why this difference between conventional wisdom and some currents of academic fashion? One reason is that outside of political science departments, people in the United States do not approach the question as detached analysts shorn of national identity. They do not abstract themselves from the policy interests of the United States, and do not care nearly as much about resolving the security anxieties of non-nuclear countries as they do about minimizing the chances that nuclear weapons will ever be used anywhere. The world is an uncertain place, where parsimonious theories about stability may or may not prove correct, but where our own country would have less to worry about if we were the only ones to have weapons of mass destruction. It is easier for officials than for analysts to apply shameless double standards and recommend policies that are better for the United States than for other countries that want strategic independence.

### 2NC Conventional War

#### Conventional wars outweigh:

#### Prolif reduces the frequency and impact of conventional war. Even if conflicts occur they are carefully limited—as soon as you start adding nuclear states into a crisis scenario the likelihood of escalation drastically decreases. Prefer this impact to nebulous “conflict” scenarios. Asal & Beardsly is the only evidence that uses statistical, empirical and predictive studies.

#### Default to deterrence—other strategies empirically fail more—arms control and diplomacy have horrible records—that’s Preston.

#### Prefer our evidence—it’s grounded in history, which should be your guide because it’s not tainted by ideology.

#### The benefits far outweigh the costs. Even if some deterrence failure happens it is VERY unlikely because powers quickly learn the consequences of weapons and moderate the own behavior. That’s Preston.

#### Conventional war outweighs—

#### Conventional conflicts are inevitable and deadly. 62 million died in World War II vs. only 200,000 from nuclear weapons. Only a nuclear deterrent can deescalate these conflicts. Vietnam-Cambodia, Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait, Eretria-Ethiopia, Vietnam-China and El Salvador-Honduras all killed millions.

#### Benefits outweigh the costs 40 to 1.

de Mesquita and Riker 82 (Bruce Bueno and William, Dept. Pol. Sci.—Rochester, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 302-303)

One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 11 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations to either irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over 40 to 1. This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life. It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss. Still, we do not rule it out, but rather note that it is exactly such estimates that must be made in calculating the trade-offs between gains and losses from nuclear proliferation. One might expect, for instance, that selection of candidates for proliferation might be based partially on the calculation of the marginal effect on expected costs in life and property from not standing in the way of the candidate in question. Thus, proliferation would be resisted where the expected marginal effect would be an increase in loss of life and property over nonproliferation, but would be encouraged where the marginal effect was otherwise.

#### Same effect as nuclear war

Jianguo 95—Major General, frmr assoc. prof and Dean of the Antichemical Warfare Academy [Wu, Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/jianguo.htm]

What merits our attention is that in a high-tech conventional war, a nuclear environment may still emerge even if nuclear weapons are not used. The more society advances, the greater the demands for energy will be. In order to satisfy the demands for energy, nuclear power stations were built. According to the data released by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March 1994, at the end of 1993 there were 430 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of approximately 345 million kw operating in various places throughout the world; these accounted for more than 17 percent of the world's gross power generation. It is predicted that by 2001, there will be 558 nuclear power generating units with a total installed capacity of approximately 460 million kw all worldwide, which will account for 24 percent of the world's gross power generation. The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is a piece of joyous news to mankind. Meanwhile, the extensive use of nuclear energy also constitutes a latent threat to peace and the existence of human beings. The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in April 1986 inflicted air pollution on 16 Russian oblasts and victimized 250,000 people. In Ukraine, 370,000 people suffered injuries in varying degrees as land covering 40,000 square meters was polluted, and more than 2,000 residential areas were evacuated. In future high-tech warfare, if an enemy intentionally or unintentionally attacks nuclear power plants or other facilities using nuclear energy with high-tech conventional weapons, the secondary nuclear radiation produced and the nuclear environment brought about would likewise do harm. In June 1981, Israel dispatched four aircraft to launch a sudden attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor southeast of the capital Baghdad, dropping 16 tons of bombs in two minutes and hitting all the targets. Fortunately, the reactor was not yet operational; otherwise the attack would have resulted in very serious consequences.

#### Nuclear war wouldn’t cause extinction—their claims are exaggerations and ignore 90% of the world.

Martin 82—Brian Martin is an associate professor of Science, Technology, and Society at University of Wollongong [“Critique of nuclear extinction,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1982, pp. 287-300, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82jpr.html]

To summarise the above points, a major global nuclear war in which population centres in the US, Soviet Union, Europe and China ware targeted, with no effective civil defence measures taken, could kill directly perhaps 400 to 450 million people. Induced effects, in particular starvation or epidemics following agricultural failure or economic breakdown, might add up to several hundred million deaths to the total, though this is most uncertain.

Such an eventuality would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, but it is far from extinction. Even in the most extreme case there would remain alive some 4000 million people, about nine-tenths of the world's population, most of them unaffected physically by the nuclear war. The following areas would be relatively unscathed, unless nuclear attacks were made in these regions: South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Oceania and large parts of China. Even in the mid-latitudes of the northern hemisphere where most of the nuclear weapons would be exploded, areas upwind of nuclear attacks would remain free of heavy radioactive contamination, such as Portugal, Ireland and British Columbia.

Many people, perhaps especially in the peace movement, believe that global nuclear war will lead to the death of most or all of the world's population.[12] Yet the available scientific evidence provides no basis for this belief. Furthermore, there seem to be no convincing scientific arguments that nuclear war could cause human extinction.[13] In particular, the idea of 'overkill', if taken to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading.[14]

In the absence of any positive evidence, statements that nuclear war will lead to the death of all or most people on earth should be considered exaggerations. In most cases the exaggeration is unintended, since people holding or stating a belief in nuclear extinction are quite sincere.[15]

Another major point to be made in relation to statements about nuclear war is that almost exclusive attention has been focussed on the 'worst case' of a major global nuclear war, as indeed has been done in the previous paragraphs. A major global nuclear war is a possibility, but not the only one. In the case of 'limited' nuclear war, anywhere from hundreds of people to many tens of millions of people might die.[16] This is a real possibility, but peace movement theory and practice have developed almost as if this possibility does not exist.

### AT: Conventional War Unlikely

#### Any reason conventional war won’t happen applies to nuclear war as well. Deterrence, economic interdependence and global norms apply are costs that are MAGNIFIED by the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.

#### This argument is a reason to vote negative. History shows conventional conflicts are RARE in the recent era but nuclear conflicts are NONEXISTENT.

#### Conventional war is probable. Sound deterrent strategies should guide policy analysis.

Horowitz and Shalmon 9 (Michael, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—U. Pennsylvania, Dan, Senior Analyst—Lincoln Group and Graduate Student—Georgetown U., Orbis, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” 53:2, ScienceDirect)

Some scholars question the notion that state-on-state warfare has become unlikely. Army Colonel Gian Gentile argues that the COIN community's analysis “more than anything else… stakes a claim on the future,” concluding that Iraq does not provide a “model” for America's future wars.15 U.S. Air Force (USAF) Major General Charles Dunlap has argued that land forces “will be of little strategic import in the next war.”16 Gentile disagrees with Dunlap but also with the COIN community, writing that “‘legacy’ large-scale battles… might, in fact, still be looming on the horizon.” Citing Iranian, North Korean and Chinese threats, he argues that planners “could (and should) imagine many types of conflict in the near-to-medium term, not all or even most of them counterinsurgencies.” 17 Michael Mazarr assails the “naïve… assumption that the world has been rendered immune from the requirement for deterrence of major conventional war,” referencing possible threats from rogue states, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).18 Referencing similar threats, Dunlap attacks the COIN community for believing that “human nature will change, that peer competitors will not arise and that the rest of the world will not attempt to challenge U.S. air power.”19 Metz calls for defense thinkers to “jettison the concept of counterinsurgency,” which he describes as having “outlived its usefulness,” and rethink how they understand irregular threats, since “not all armed conflict is war.”20 This is similar to Mazarr's argument that the use of military force is not the most effective way of winning COIN operations. Whereas COIN advocates argue for minimizing the costs of irregular warfare commitments by dedicating units to enhancing the capabilities of friendly regimes—especially those facing Islamic radicalism—Posen and Metz oppose most capacity-building efforts because twenty first century insurgency is “not simply a variant of war” but is rather “part of systemic failure and pathology,” requiring comprehensive social re-engineering.21 Consequently, host nation governments and the United States have inherently conflicting interests. Mazarr makes an even broader argument, claiming that given the character of twenty first century irregular warfare, militaries should de-emphasize COIN and focus on conventional warfighting.22 Reversing McMaster's argument, the essential traditionalist claim is that focusing on irregular war, for which violent tools are ill-suited, will undermine the U.S. military's role in doing what it does best—preventing and winning full-scale interstate wars.

### 2NC War Defense

#### Small arsenals check the impact, that’s Seng—

#### Fewer weapons mean fewer people “in the loop”. This creates better training of operators and increases contact with central authorities preventing accidents. It also reduces standardization of operation procedure which increases crisis flexibility preventing miscalculation.

#### And proliferators won’t be aggressive—

Shen 11—Simon Shen, IR prof @ Hong Kong Inst of Ed. [2011, “Have Nuclear Weapons Made the DPRK a Rogue State?” J. of Comparative Asian Development, v. 10, iss. 2, t&f]

In our traditional mentality, the determination to denuclearize the DPRK quite explicitly assumes that nuclear weapons are evil; as Scott Sagan (2003, p. 49) puts it, “Nuclear weapons have been given a bad name.” This negative perception of nuclear weapons is built upon the basis of the huge devastation that would result in the world if a nuclear war, of whatever scale, broke out. Coupled with the peculiar nature of the DPRK's autocratic regime, a nuclear-armed DPRK is then perceived as too hostile and destructive to its neighbours. However, applying the analogy of “more may be better”, an alternative discourse with respect to nuclear proliferation maintained by Waltz could well pinpoint a far more optimistic scenario. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Waltz asserts that nuclear proliferation not only reduces the possibility of going to war, but also encourages new nuclear states, which used to rule in a radical manner domestically, to behave in an increasingly rational manner diplomatically. At the extreme, Waltz suggests that nuclear proliferation may maintain peace rather than threaten global security. Surprisingly, the application of his theory to the DPRK is rather limited; and is confined only to media reports (Swami, 2010). In his classic study Waltz (1995) proposes five fundamental assumptions to illustrate his argument. First, he argues that the international system is anarchical, i.e., no global authority protects security, provides public goods or controls domestic affairs above the state level. As a result, states have to ensure their own security by preventing attack from other states themselves. In other words, the anarchical system drives states to self-help. The absence of a world government then prompts individual states to gain access to weapons to compensate for a sense of insecurity. Acquisition of nuclear weapons and inducement of an arms race between states show the self-help system at work. Second, as “states coexist in a condition of anarchy”, they try hard to advance the sophistication of weapons and enhance military capability as much as possible to avoid aggression from adversaries (Waltz, 1995, p. 4). This self-strengthening process is what Waltz calls “security maximization”. What do states do with their weapons throughout this process? Waltz thinks that states mainly possess the weapons for a defensive purpose. When a state enhances its military capability (the relevant gain), its neighbouring states immediately face relevant loss to the military equilibrium. In consequence, the latter have to strengthen their military power in response to the relevant loss in order to maintain a balance of power. Waltz (1995, p. 5) explains the defensive intention of security maximization as follows: One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong. To build defenses so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil, I call this the defensive ideal. However, this statement does not imply that these states will not use weapons to attack others. In the event that a state perceives gains from aggression to outweigh the cost of war, battle might break out. Waltz argues that this scenario is unlikely to happen between nuclear powers. Since Waltz, different schools deriving from neo-realism have offered different assumptions on the likeliness of conflicts owing to different assessments of uncertainty and risk, such as offensive realism or defensive realism. Some might put the defensive rationale by indicating that states tend to keep the nuclear weapons as an “existential deterrent” so as to deter others from military actions (Naval Studies Board & US Research Council, 1997). Third, Waltz (1995, pp. 7, 9) maintains that nuclear weapons, unlike conventional weapons, give “an easy clarity” for states to predict the action of other states and thereby “makes war less likely”. This is because all states realize that nuclear weapons have the potential to cause unlimited and devastating suffering. At the extreme, the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) sends a very clear message to both sides should two nuclear powers go to war. In contrast, as the suffering from conventional weapons can be to some extent contained, states might deem the cost of such war affordable and recklessly wage war and suffer the results of miscalculation. Waltz (1995, p. 9) defines the fundamental essence of nuclear weapons thus: In a nuclear world, prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of opposing forces. … In a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Fourth, Waltz (1995, p. 7) assumes state actors are rational and are able to predict scenarios as well as calculate their self-interests, so that states will not take the risk of going to war when they predict the battle could only “win much and might lose everything”. Waltz offers the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate this point. As nuclear weapons can wreak unlimited damage to states, the strategy of MAD further makes states cautious. This deterrent effect in a nuclear world consequently avoids any miscalculation of gains and losses. Regardless of the regime type, historical context and the political spectrum, nuclear weapons and nuclear wars constantly imply a massive relevant loss to states, thus preventing them from going to war. Even if the historical context might determine a nuclear pair, such as the US and the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan, many realists argues that rational calculation is more fundamental than bitterness (Rajain, 2005). As Waltz (1995, p. 12) puts it: “Those who believe that bitterness causes wars assume a close association that is seldom found between bitterness among nations and their willingness to run high risks.” In short, states will not go to nuclear war as they are rational actors in international relations. Fifth, when calculation of the prospects makes nuclear states reluctant to go to war, Waltz suggests horizontal nuclear proliferation is encouraged in world politics while vertical proliferation is made redundant. “Vertical proliferation” of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, was demonstrated during the Cold War, especially between the US and the Soviet Union, when the number of nuclear warheads and their technological quality rapidly increased. Waltz (1995, p. 7) argues that further vertical proliferation is unnecessary since only a few nuclear weapons and a “second strike” capability may be a sufficient deterrent to other would-be attackers. Rather, “horizontal proliferation”, which means the spread of nuclear weapons to different countries, is seen by Waltz as more crucial in preserving peace in the world. When more states possess nuclear weapons, calculations about using them become complicated (Waltz, 1995, p. 15). States will thus be reluctant to take the risk of starting a nuclear war because of the uncertainty of the response from other states and the certainty of unlimited nuclear destruction to both sides should a nuclear response be elicited. This helps exclude the option of using nuclear weapons for the mere purpose of interest maximization.

#### Deterrence breakdowns don’t cause full-scale nuclear war

Waltz 3 Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 34-35

States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory," in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 38

Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.

A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less- destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II.

### 2NC Preventive Strikes

#### 1. No preventive war—the risk of escalation and backlash is too high. Any uncertainty is an absolute deterrent in the world of nukes. That’s Shen.

#### Empirics prove preventive wars either don’t happen or don’t escalate

Rousseau 2k (David, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Penn, "Proliferation Module," http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~rousseau/archived\_web/psci150/modules/pro/lecture1.htm)

Second, opponents of proliferation claim that states acquiring nuclear weapons have enduring rivals. These critics argue that injecting nuclear weapons into these already volatile relationships will result in violence. New nuclear power could launch preemptive or preventative strikes. These people argue that the existence of a rivalry greatly increases the probability the nuclear weapons will be used. History has demonstrated that only states facing a hostile external environment will be willing to spend the billions and billions of dollars necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the existence of a enduring and hostile rival does not pose a real danger for two reasons. First, history shows that injecting nuclear weapons into long term hostile situations does not result in war. The United States allowed the Soviets to get nuclear weapons in 1949 without initiating violence. The Soviets allowed the British to get nuclear weapons in 1952 without initiating violence. The Soviets allowed France to get nuclear weapons in 1960 without initiating violence. The United States and Soviet Union allowed the Chinese to get nuclear weapons in 1964 without initiating violence. The Chinese allowed India to get nuclear weapons in 1974 without initiating violence. The Indians allow Pakistan to get nuclear weapons in the 1990's without initiating violence. Nuclear proliferation has not lead to either conventional or nuclear war. Second, if an existing nuclear power engages in a preventative strike, it will not be the end of the world. Israel's preventative strike against the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981 did not result in the use of nuclear weapons. While the attack was personal tragedy for those killed in the raid, it would not lead me to conclude that proliferation is very dangerous.

### 2NC Crisis Instability

#### Crisis decision-making is stable and MORE SO under nuclear crises than conventional crises, turning their arguments.

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 55-57)

What are the implications of policy maker sensitivity to context for deterrence? Firstly, it clearly relates to how receptive policy makers will be to threats made by opponents. For example, De Rivera (1968, 53) suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio (the strength of the signal relative to the strength of confusing background stimuli), the rewards and costs associated with recognizing (or not) the signals, and the general expectations of the observer play a role in whether initiator or defender threats are heard by the other. Secondly, for sensitive leaders (those high in complexity), they are highly unlikely to make rapid, impulsive decisions in even a conventional crisis, let alone a nuclear one. Such leaders are known for having extremely slow, deliberative, and cautious decision processes that seek out tremendous amounts of information for consideration prior to making decisions (Preston 2001). As a result, such policy makers would be exceedingly unlikely to "rush to judgment" and misperceive the relatively simple cost/loss equation created by nuclear weapons. They also would be highly attentive to signaling from potential adversaries in such a nuclear deterrence environment. In contrast, for insensitive leaders (those low in complexity), they would be far more likely to "rush to judgment," miss warning signals from potential adversaries, and pay little attention to information or feedback from the external environment. Such leaders would be far more vulnerable to the psychological malfunctions of selective perception, use of stereotypes and faulty analogies, and groupthinktype malfunctions (see Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977; 't Hart 1994; 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). Hence, the risk of miscalculation or challenges to deterrence from such leaders would undoubtedly be greater than would be the case for sensitive leaders. At the same time, the fact that such leaders also view the world in simple, black-and-white terms and do not necessarily tune into nuances suggests they would be far more likely to accept the quite simplistic, black-and-white cost/loss benefit equation nuclear weapons thrust upon security relationships. Historically, American presidents scoring both high and low in complexity, sensitive ones like Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as less sensitive ones such as Truman, Johnson, and Reagan, have all (despite their rhetoric) shown great caution when making foreign policy decisions that could in any way provoke a true nuclear response from an opponent. Indeed, Truman and Johnson (in Korea and Vietnam respectively) both recognized the serious constraints which the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons posed on the unlimited exercise of American power in both conflicts (see Preston 2001). The reactions of policy makers under the immense stress of nuclear crises has also been pointed to by deterrence skeptics as likely leading to greater chances for decisional pathologies (e.g., misperception, motivated misperceptions, avoidance of value trade-offs, groupthink) to impact decision making and lead to deterrence failure (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis 1976; Lebow 1981, 1987; Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990). And while such dangers are clearly of concern, their application to nuclear confrontations has historically not resulted in these kinds of malfunctions. In fact, it is only in cases of conventional deterrence relationships—characterized by far less clear-cut and ambiguous cost/benefit equations—that one routinely sees these kinds of decisional pathologies. Even Janis (1972) cites the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, his lone nuclear crisis, as being an example of good group decision making and avoidance of groupthink. Similarly, George (1991) de scribes the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of excellent crisis management (see also Preston 2001). And Blight (1992) notes that for policy makers, the fear of nuclear war (a "shattered crystal ball") served as an "adaptive device" preventing JFK and the ExComm from taking reckless actions and seeking every possible means to avoid a nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, a substantial literature in political psychology (Janis and Mann 1977; Hermann 1979; Hermann and Hermann 1990; "t Hart 1994) warns that policy makers reactions and decision making patterns under intense stress deteriorate and become less effective as the levels increase—an element that can never be fully removed from considerations of the resilience of nuclear deterrence under severe crises conditions.

### 2NC Proximity

#### 1. Proximity has no net effect—states near each other are more likely to fight conventional wars over borders, resources, or ethnic groups. Makes deterrence MORE necessary. Plus proliferators acknowledge nukes are purely defensive—that’s Shen

#### 2. Turn: Proximity reinforces deterrence stability guaranteeing stable second strike and minimizing preemption incentives.

McNaughter 90 (Thomas, Senior Fellow—Brookings, International Security, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War”, 15:2, Autumn, JSTOR)

Does this promise instability until secure second strike capabilities are in place. Gerald Steinberg argues that it does, and that the geographic proximity of antagonists in the region makes the problem of crisis instability even more dangerous in the Middle East than it was between the superpowers.71 It seems more logical, however, to argue that the physical proximity of Middle Eastern powers makes it inappropriate to transfer superpower logic to local confrontations. Precisely because Iran and Iraq share a common border, the variety of delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction available to these antagonists goes well beyond ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, to include trucks, small aircraft, small tactical missiles, and even artillery. Although Israel and Iraq are separated by Jordan, weapons of mass destruction could still be delivered by trucks, by aircraft, and by small missiles trucked into Jordan. Proximity multiplies the range of available delivery means, and thus reduces the viability of preemption as a defense. Put another way, under these conditions “secure second strike” capabilities of some sort are much more easily available. The acquisition of ballistic missiles does not fundamentally change this equation. Population distributions in many of these countries reinforce this logic. Populations in Israel, Iraq, and Syria are highly concentrated; Israel and Iraq, in particular, are little more than “two-target” states for real “city-busting” weapons. U.S. strategists who contemplated the usefulness of preemption never saw it as 100 percent effective; at best it would have held casualties to a minimum. For two-target states, however, any remaining weapons of mass destruction promise disaster. Thus preemptive attacks on an adversary’s delivery means are unlikely to save any Middle Eastern power from nuclear destruction, assuming the adversary possesses a nuclear arsenal of reasonable size. Nor should regional leaders feel compelled to fire nuclear weapons first to eliminate opponents’ missile delivery systems. Assuming that those leaders wish to fire nuclear weapons in the first place, their decision to do so will depend mainly on their assessment of their adversary’s retaliatory capabilities, which will be impossible to eliminate.

### Extra

#### Hegemonic transition inevitable

Haass 8 (Richard, Pres.—CFR, Foreign Affairs, “Bottom of Form The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, May/June, L/N)

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States' fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007. Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice -- militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. NONPOLAR DISORDER The increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. With so many more actors possessing meaningful power and trying to assert influence, it will be more difficult to build collective responses and make institutions work. Herding dozens is harder than herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.

#### Prolif makes the transition stable preventing great power war

Alagappa 8 (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 484)

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and cornpellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India's confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them are frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large-scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

### 2NC—No Water Wars

#### No water wars—

#### Empirics show 80% of water-related incidents were limited to rhetoric. Two thirds of water tensions resulted in cooperation and treaties—that’s Allouche.

#### Prefer our evidence—it cites overwhelming data sets and is verified by the historical record. Prefer empirics—they aren’t tainted by ideology whereas their evidence is a product of media alarmism and academically discredited Malthusian predictions.

#### Water wars are a myth—overwhelming empirical evidence

Weinthal and Vengosh 11—\*Erika Weinthal is Associate Professor of Environmental Policy at the Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke University and \*\*Avner Vengosh is a Professor of Geochemistry and Water Quality and chair of the Water and Air Resources program at the Nicholas School of Environment in Duke University [ed. Richard Parker, Marni Sommer, “Water and Conflict,” ch. 26, *Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health*, Taylor & Francis, Feb 1, 2011]

By the end of the twentieth century, it was thus widely assumed that water scarcity would be a driver of conflict between nation states, especially in the arid regions of MENA. World leaders such as former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, famously warned, ‘the next war in the Middle East will he fought over water, not politics' (Vesilind 1993: 53). The Economist, furthermore, predicted in 1999 that '[w]ith 3.5 billion people affected by water shortages by 2050, conditions are ripe for a century of water conflicts.’ The empirical evidence, however, has yet to support such prophecies. Rather, when it comes to water resources at the interstate level, cooperation is much more ubiquitous. The historical record shows that states rarely if ever go to war over water; in parsing more than 1,800 state-to-state water interactions in trans-boundary basins between 1946 and 1999, Wolf et al. (2003) demonstrated that none have led to formal war. Yet such encouraging findings should not obscure the fact that the ‘[MENA] region has a striking absence of inclusive and comprehensive international water agreements on its most significant trans-boundary water courses’ (World Bank 2007: 80). The Nile River Basin, which is shared by ten countries and inhabited by approximately 150 million people, for example, has a long history of tension (e.g. Egypt-Sudan conflicts in the l950s). In spite of current progress with the Nile Basin Initiative (World Bank 2007: 83), Egypt - the dominant downstream riparian (i.e. water user along the river) - continues to appropriate more than 90 per cent of the Nile River.

With the maturation of the field of water conflict and cooperation, the notion of impending water wars has come to be better understood as a ‘myth’ rather than a ‘reality’ (Bencala and Dabelko 2008). This is not to say that tensions do not exist among states regarding their shared and limited water resources, but rather there is a growing realisation that the source of conflict is emanating from disagreements within a country due to a lethal combination of population growth, unsustainable water withdrawals, lack of adequate water management, weak institutions, and pressure for economic development (e.g. see Wolf 2007). The Pacific Institute's Water Conflict Chronology indicates that between 2000 and 2009, most occurrences of water conflict were at the sub-national level, of which nearly half were development disputes. Examples in 2009 include hundreds of Mumbai residents in India protesting water cuts that resulted in one person being killed and dozens injured, and violent clashes in Ethiopia over access to water in the Somali border region.

#### Cooperation over water outweighs—interdependence prevents conflict

Deen 6—Thalif, internationally awarded U.N. bureau chief and editor of the U.N. edition of the IPS journal [“'Water Wars' a Myth, Say Experts,” 8/25/06, Inter Press Service News Agency, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34465]

STOCKHOLM, Aug 25 (IPS) - The world's future wars will be fought not over oil but water: an ominous prediction made by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the British ministry of defence and even by some officials of the World Bank. But experts and academics meeting at an international conference on water management in the Swedish capital are dismissing this prediction as unrealistic, far-fetched and nonsensical. "Water wars make good newspaper headlines but cooperation (agreements) don't," says Arunabha Ghosh, co-author of the upcoming Human Development Report 2006 themed on water management. The annual report, commissioned by the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), is to be released in December. In reality, Ghosh told the meeting in Stockholm, there are plenty of bilateral, multilateral and trans-boundary agreements for water-sharing -- all or most of which do not make good newspaper copy. Asked about water wars, Prof. Asit K. Biswas of the Mexico-based Third World Centre for Water Management, told IPS: "This is absolute nonsense because this is not going to happen -- at least not during the next 100 years." He said the world is not facing a water crisis because of physical water scarcities. "This is baloney," he said. "What it is facing is a crisis of bad water management," argued Biswas, who was awarded the 2006 international Stockholm Water Prize for "outstanding achievements" in his field. The presentation ceremony took place in Stockholm Thursday. According to the Paris-based U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), one-third of all river basins are shared by more than two countries. Globally, there are 262 international river basins: 59 in Africa, 52 in Asia, 73 in Europe, 61 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 17 in North America. Overall, 145 countries have territories that include at least one shared river basin. Between 1948 and 1999, UNESCO says, there have been 1,831 "international interactions" recorded, including 507 conflicts, 96 neutral or non-significant events, and most importantly, 1,228 instances of cooperation. "Despite the potential problem, history has demonstrated that cooperation, rather than conflict, is likely in shared basins///

," UNESCO concludes. The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) says that 10- to 20-year-old arguments about conflict over water are still being recycled. "Such arguments ignore massive amounts of recent research which shows that water-scarce states that share a water body tend to find cooperative solutions rather than enter into violent conflict," the institute says. SIWI says that during the entire "intifada" -- the ongoing Palestinian uprising against Israel in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza -- the only thing on which the two warring parties continued to cooperate at a basic level was their shared waters. "Thus, rather than reaching for arguments for the 'water war hypotheses,' the facts seem to support the idea that water is a uniting force and a potential source of peace rather than violent conflict." SIWI said. Ghosh, co-author of the UNDP study, pointed out several agreements which were "models of cooperation", including the Indus Waters Treaty, the Israel-Jordan accord, the Senegal River Development Organisation and the Mekong River Commission. A study sponsored by the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars points that despite newspaper headlines screaming "water wars are coming!", these apocalyptic warnings fly in the face of history. "No nations have gone to war specifically over water resources for thousands of years. International water disputes -- even among fierce enemies -- are resolved peacefully, even as conflicts erupt over other issues," it says. The study also points out instances of cooperation between riparian nations -- countries or provinces bordering the same river -- that outnumbered conflicts by more than two to one between 1945 and 1999. Why? "Because water is so important, nations cannot afford to fight over it. Instead, water fuels greater interdependence. By coming together to jointly manage their shared water resources, countries can build trust and prevent conflict," argues the study,

### 2NC—Scarcity Doesn’t Matter

#### Even if tensions over water cause conflict, scarcity isn’t the issue—

#### Disparate access to water results in tensions—there is plenty of water, people just can’t access. Prefer our evidence—it assumes water stresses arising from climate change and still concludes neg—that’s Allouche.

#### Scarcity isn’t the cause of water conflicts

Allouche 11—Jeremy Allouche, research Fellow, water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, former professor – MIT, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies [“The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” *Food Policy*, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3–S8, Science Direct]

What seem to be emerging, in fact, is that geographical scale and intensity of conflict are inversely related. However, water-related conflicts are caused more by the way in which water use is governed than by water scarcity (see for example the ongoing tensions between landowners and poorer peasants in the Chittoor District, India, over the lowering of the water table). The outcome of local conflicts tends to reflect societal problems. The evidence that countries engage in wars specifically over water is poor but there is little doubt that water conflicts are common at the inter-sector, inter-community, inter-farm and inter- (and intra-) household levels. Access and control over water, political power, and social and gender relations are the major drivers causing water crises, especially at the local level (see for example Mehta, 2005).

### 1NC—Indo-Pak Impact

#### Aff can’t solve—Indian dams makes war inevitable

Daly 12—John C.K. Daly is the chief analyst at the energy news site Oilprice.com. Dr. Daly received his Ph.D. in 1986 from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London [April 13, 2012, “Troubled Waters: Has The India-Pakistan Water Conflict Reached A Boiling Point?” http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/has-the-india-pakistan-water-conflict-reached-a-boiling-point.13-04.html]

In an editorial entitled “War With India Inevitable” published in Lahore's ‘The Nation’ on Sunday, the newspaper's Editor-in-Chief and Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust Chairman, Majid Nizami, asked his fellow citizens to prepare for a war with India over water issues.

Nizami also told those attending the "Pakistan-India relations: Our rulers’ new wishes" session at Aiwan-e-Karkunan Tehrik-e-Pakistan, that, "Indian hostilities and conspiracies against the country will never end until she is taught a lesson."

While The Nation – a conservative daily that is part of the Nawa-i-Waqt publishing group – may have a circulation of just 20,000 readers, its close ties to Pakistan's highest military circles mean that Nizami's comments should hardly be rejected out of hand.

Tellingly, Nizami's audience at the session also included some high ranking Pakistani officials, including Nazaria-i-Pakistan Vice Chairman Dr Rafique Ahmed; Pakistan Movement Workers-Trust Chairman, retired Colonel Jamshed Ahmed Tareen; former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed Khan; Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Secretary General Qari Zawar Bahadur; retired Air Marshall Khurished Anwar Mirza; retired Brigadier Hamid Saeed Akhtar and Jamaat-e-Islami Lahore Chief Ameer-ul-Azeem, among others.

At the heart of the issue are Pakistan's concerns over India's ongoing construction of two hydroelectric dams on the upper reaches of the Indus River. The Indus, which begins in Indian-controlled Kashmir and flows through both India and Pakistan, is Pakistan's primary freshwater source, on which 90 percent of its agriculture depends.

The 45-megawatt, 190-feet tall Nimoo-Bazgo concrete dam and the 44-megawatt Chutak hydroelectric power project, Islamabad believes, will reduce the Indus River's flow towards Pakistan, and are capable of storing up to 4.23 billion cubic feet of water, which will violate the terms of the bilateral 1960 Indus Water Treaty.

“Already the Indus is experiencing water flows that are down 30 percent from its normal levels. According to a number of Pakistani agriculture and water experts, the nation is heading towards a massive water shortage in the next couple of years due to insufficient water management practices and storage capacity, which will be exacerbated by the twin Indian hydroelectric projects.”

So, if push comes to shove, who's got Pakistan's back? China.

During the Boao Forum for Asia held in China's southern Hainan Island on 1 April, Pakistan and China agreed to support each other "in all circumstances" and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs.

Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani told Chinese Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang: "China's friend is our friend, and China's enemy is ours," adding that Pakistan considers China's security as its own security and supports China's position on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Li replied that China would support Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity in every situation, telling Gilani: "No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity."

It might be noted here that in October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban missile crisis, India and China fought a brief but bitter war along their disputed Himalayan border. Fifty years later, China and India have yet to resolve their border issues over Kashmir; and China continues to claim most of India's Arunachal Pradesh territory to the base of the Himalayas in the absence of any definitive treaty delineating the border.

Kashmir today also remains the site of the world's largest and most militarized territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China (Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas).

No guesses therefore as to whom Beijing might back should Pakistani-Indian tensions continue to rise.

Accordingly, the only way to keep the peace may be, as to paraphrase Ronald Reagan in Berlin: "Prime Minister Singh, tear down those dams!" Just don't bet on it.

### No Water Wars—AT: Indo-Pak

#### Water wars won’t escalate between India and Pakistan – they’ve already weathered the perfect storm and other issues cause tension

Alam 2—PhD in political geography from Durham University on the negotiations between India and Pakistan and a trained mediator [Undala, “Questioning the water wars rationale: a case study of the Indus Waters Treaty,” Dec 1, 2002, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-2567100/Questioning-the-water-wars-rationale.html]

The water wars rationale forecasts war between countries dependent upon a shared water resource if there is water scarcity, competitive use and the countries are enemies due to a wider conflict. Following this rationale, a war should have occurred between India and Pakistan over the Indus basin waters. Instead, the countries negotiated an international water treaty and have maintained it for over 40 years through two wars and the nuclear era. In trying to explain India and Pakistan's successful cooperation over water, as recommended by Biswas (1992), the author has had unique access to the Indus basin files in the World Bank's archives (see Alam 1998). (2) The water wars rationale Drawing heavily on the situation in the Middle East, the water wars rationale reasons that given water's critical role (3) in a country's survival if there is water scarcity amidst a wider conflict, and enemy states depend on same shared resources, each country will try to ensure that it has the access to water that it needs. Controlling access to water is vital for national security and, therefore, highly political. Under a wider conflict, the spectre of an enemy controlling another country's water supply is untenable. This means that each country might wage war to safeguard its supply (Gleick 1993a). In other words, because water is scarce, vital, a security issue and demand is outstripping supply, states will go to war with their competitors to secure supplies. This implies that '"[w]ater [w]ars" are, unfortunately, likely to be of more and more common occurrence in the future' (Young et al. 1994). Water wars are understood to be international wars between states triggered and sustained solely over issues arising from access to water. This is to distinguish them from water-related conflicts within countries, and water used as a weapon. The concept derives from the Middle East's increasing demand for water due to urbanization, industrialization, increasing populations, consumerism and irrigated agriculture (Postel 1992; Falkenmark and Lindh 1993; Gleick 1993a; Richards and Waterbury 1996; Biswas 1997), and the political nature of water use in the region (Naff and Matson 1984; Starr and Stoll 1988; Anderson 1988 1994; Beschorner 1992; Bulloch and Darwish 1993; Gleick 1993c; Guyatt 1998; Naff 1994; Haddad and Mizyed 1996; Medzini 1996; Waterbury 1997; Soffer 1999). Expecting a water war in the Indus basin Following the water wars rationale, India and Pakistan should have gone to war over the Indus waters. All the ingredients were present -- two enemies engaged in a wider conflict; a riparian completely dependent upon the Indus waters; water scarcity despite large average runoffs; and poverty preventing the construction of infrastructure to offset this scarcity (Alam 1998; Ali 1967; Alvi 1962; Government of Pakistan 1953a 1953b 1958a 1958b 1958c; Gulhati 1973; Lilienthal 1966 1976; Michel 1967; Shivananda 1961). The enmity between India and Pakistan has its roots in the movement to gain independence from Great Britain. The principal fault line ran along religious lines and placed Hindus against Muslims. The process by which the British partitioned the Indian sub-continent in 1947 into independent India and Pakistan helped to fuel this animosity. In particular, the issue of Kashmir has persistently aggravated Indo-Pakistan relations. Partition led to a number of disputes between the countries, for example, over refugee property and currency exchange rates. Over the latter issue, Pakistan even spoke of an economic war fuelled by the belief that 'there is a large element in India that does not accept the partition of India, that is still talking and planning to undo what they insist was a mistake' (Lilienthal 1966). Another source of Indo-Pakistan tensions was the Indus waters dispute.

#### No impact to central asia.

Clais, ’10 [Jonas, United States Institute of Peace, “Preventing Conflict in the “Stans”,” 4-23, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2021%20Preventing%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Stans.pdf>]

Despite this litany of conflict drivers, Central Asia has remained relatively peaceful for the past 20 years, apart from the 1992 Tajik civil war. Unlike most regions at low risk of conflict, Central Asia cannot rely on its institutional capacity to pave the road to self-sustainable peace. Although very effective in the short term, some of the factors mitigating conflict are unsustainable sources of stability. The Soviet legacy, characterized by extreme deprivation and violent suppression, nonetheless operates as a conflict-managing factor in Central Asia. Quantitative studies established a quasi-consensus among scholars on the negative effect of both extreme democracy and extreme autocracy on the risk of civil war, anocracies being most conflict-prone. 6 The brutal Soviet practices hardened and intimidated the population///

, discouraging popular uprisings. Current law enforcement tools used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are often Soviet-inherited and serve as effective yet inhumane conflict management instruments. A recent report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee condemned the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, stressing the excessive use of torture. The Kyrgyz security forces, on the other hand, are rather ineffective, providing a safe-haven to militant groups based in the region. In Tajikistan, the civil conflict bred war fatigue, reducing the odds that an opportunistic leader will be able to mobilize Tajiks to violently undermine their government. Though they cannot assure stability in the long term, some of the region’s financial and socioeconomic lifelines also mitigate conflict in the short term. International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as individual countries, provide vital assistance to Central Asia’s development. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of the aid is lost to corruption before it reaches its targets. Chinese and Russian capital injections offer some breathing space, as well as crucial investments in economic infrastructure. Yet, as indicated earlier, these benefactors may demand political concessions in return. Migrant remittances also serve as an important source of revenue for the region, especially in Tajikistan, where remittances make up almost half of the country’s gross domestic product—by far the highest number worldwide.

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## \*\*\* 1NR

### Overview

#### Levi evidence says Obama will compromise BMD so Russia puts pressure on Assad –- that ends regional sectarian violence

Nasr 11 (Vali – professor at Tufts University, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, If the Arab Spring Turns Ugly, 8/27/2011 The New York Times, p. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/opinion/sunday/the-dangers-lurking-in-the-arab-spring.html?pagewanted=all>)

Syria today stands at the edge of such an upheaval. The brutality of Bashar al-Assad’s regime is opening a dangerous fissure between the Alawite minority, which rules the country, and the majority Sunni population. After Mr. Assad’s butchery in the largely Sunni city of Hama on July 31, on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni group, accused the regime of conducting “a war of sectarian cleansing.” It is now clear that Mr. Assad’s strategy is to divide the opposition by stoking sectarian conflict. Sunni extremists have reacted by attacking Alawite families and businesses, especially in towns near the Iraq border. The potential for a broader clash between Alawites and Sunnis is clear, and it would probably not be confined to Syria. Instead, it would carry a risk of setting off a regional dynamic that could overwhelm the hopeful narrative of the Arab Spring itself, replacing it with a much aggravated power struggle along sectarian lines. That is because throughout the Middle East there is a strong undercurrent of simmering sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shiites, of whom the Alawites are a subset. Shiites and Sunnis live cheek by jowl in the long arc that stretches from Lebanon to Pakistan, and the region’s two main power brokers, Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, are already jousting for power. So far this year, Shiite-Sunni tensions have been evident in countries from Bahrain to Syria. But put together, they could force the United States to rethink its response to the Arab Spring itself. Sectarianism is an old wound in the Middle East. But the recent popular urge for democracy, national unity and dignity has opened it and made it feel fresh. This is because many of the Arab governments that now face the wrath of protesters are guilty of both suppressing individual rights and concentrating power in the hands of minorities. The problem goes back to the colonial period, when European administrators manipulated religious and ethnic diversity to their advantage by giving minorities greater representation in colonial security forces and governments. Arab states that emerged from colonialism promised unity under the banner of Arab nationalism. But as they turned into cynical dictatorships, failing at war and governance, they, too, entrenched sectarian biases. This scarred Arab society so deeply that the impulse for unity was often no match for the deep divisions of tribe, sect and ethnicity. The struggle that matters most is the one between Sunnis and Shiites. The war in Iraq first unleashed the destructive potential of their competition for power, but the issue was not settled there. The Arab Spring has allowed it to resurface by weakening states that have long kept sectarian divisions in place, and brutally suppressed popular grievances. Today, Shiites clamor for greater rights in Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while Sunnis are restless in Iraq and Syria. This time, each side will most likely be backed by a nervous regional power, eager to protect its interests. For the past three decades the Saudi monarchy, which sees itself as the guardian of Sunni Islam, has viewed Iran’s Shiite theocracy as its nemesis. Saudis have relied on the United States, Arab nationalism and Sunni identity to slow Iran’s rise, even to the point of supporting radical Sunni forces. The Saudis suffered a major setback when control of Iraq passed from Sunnis to Shiites, but that made them more determined to reverse Shiite gains and rising Iranian influence. It was no surprise that Saudi Arabia was the first Arab state to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus earlier this month. The imprint of this rivalry was evident in regional conflicts before the Arab Spring. Saudis saw Iran’s hand behind a rebellion among Yemen’s Houthi tribe — who are Zaydis, an offshoot of Shiism — that started in 2004. Iran blamed Arab financing for its own decade-long revolt by Sunni Baluchis along its southeastern border with Pakistan. And since 2005, when Shiite Hezbollah was implicated in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a popular Sunni prime minister who was close to the Saudis, a wide rift has divided Lebanon’s Sunni and Shiite communities, and prompted Saudi fury against Hezbollah. The sectarian divide in Lebanon shows no sign of narrowing, and now the turmoil in Syria next door has brought Lebanon to a knife’s edge. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s audacious power grab has angered Saudi Arabia. Officials in Riyadh see the turn of events in Lebanon as yet another Iranian victory, and the realization of the dreaded “Shiite crescent” that King Abdullah of Jordan once warned against. In March, fearing a snowball effect from the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia drew a clear red line in Bahrain, where a Shiite majority would have been empowered had pro-democracy protests succeeded in ousting the Sunni monarchy. The Saudis rallied the Persian Gulf monarchies to support the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain in brutally suppressing the protests — and put Iran on notice that they were “ready to enter war with Iran and even with Iraq in defense of Bahrain.” The Saudis are right to be worried about the outcome of sectarian fights in Lebanon and Bahrain, but in Syria it is Iran that stands to lose. Both sides understand that the final outcome will decide the pecking order in the region. Every struggle in this rivalry therefore matters, and every clash is pregnant with risk for regional stability. The turn of events in Syria is particularly important, because Sunnis elsewhere see the Alawite government as the linchpin in the Shiite alliance of Iran and Hezbollah. The Alawite-Sunni clash there could quickly draw in both of the major players in the region and ignite a broader regional sectarian conflict among their local allies, from Lebanon to Iraq to the Persian Gulf and beyond.

#### World War 3

Forostenko 11 (Anna, Worst Case Scenario: Will Ongoing Conflicts Lead To a World War? Global Research, , 4/22/2011 p. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24453>)

The conflicts in the Middle East and Africa are growing. An opinion poll conducted among experts by the Voice of Russia shows that they believe that in a worst-case scenario, these conflicts could lead to a world war. The outcome of presidential election triggered clashes in Nigeria. According to official reports, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south, won 60 percent of votes, while his opponent, Muhammadu Buhari won only little more than 30 percent. The opposition is dissatisfied with the results. As a result, Buhari’s supporters launched attacks on Christians and even set fire to several churches. In response, young Christians attacked mosques. Some experts draw a parallel between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, disintegration of which into North and South was averted only after the interference of the UN peacekeepers and the French forces. This means that Nigeria may experience a similar fate. It will have to get foreign assistance or it will disintegrate. Meanwhile, the foreign factor could trigger disintegration of Libya, says a senior lecture of the political science faculty of the St. Petersburg University, Gumer Isaev. “Libya will disintegrate only in case its situation is deadlocked. This will depend on whether there will be foreign interference or not. If foreign countries interfere, Libya will be divided into at least two parts,” Gumer Isaev said. The head of the department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan of the Institute of the CIS countries, Andrei Grozin disagrees with him. The historical borders of Libya were established artificially after colonial rule, and consequently, the country will hardly remain within these borders in the future, says the expert. It’s a different case that ongoing uprisings in several countries have been triggered only by internal problems such as unemployment, poor income, dissatisfied young people and privileges to a small group of people. Lately, a third force has been backing these uprisings, says Andrei Grozin. “This is happening not so roughly and blankly like during the colour revolutions in the former Soviet republics. Clearly, the coordinators of these processes have learned to assess the specifics of each country creatively. At present, all is done skillfully, delicately, and accurately using various aspects of information technology for each country by taking into account local specifics, Andrei Grozin said. Possibly, Salafis could be such a group in Syria. According to Syrian authorities, they are behind the unrest in Homs and Baniyas. However, this could only be the tip of the iceberg. According to several experts, Syria is becoming the battlefield where the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran clash. Most likely, Saudi Arabia has a country to lean on, the United States. This means the entire region will face a serious conflict and world powers will be involved. This will be a conflict between various political orientations. Saudi Arabia will be backed by the U.S. and several countries of the European Union, while Iran will be supported by third world nations and perhaps China.

#### Failure to compromise on BMD hurts relations and Russia will withdraw from START

Weir 11 (Fred Weir, writer for CSM, 6.8.11, Christian Science Monitor, “New US-Russia arms race? Battle lines grow over missile defense.,” <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0608/New-US-Russia-arms-race-Battle-lines-grow-over-missile-defense/(page)/2)>

The Russians say rhetorical pledges aren't good enough. "Russia wants commitments and legal guarantees which the Obama administration is not able to provide," says Vladimir Dvorkin, an expert with the Security Center at the official Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. "Political stubborness on both sides makes it difficult to have a constructive dialogue on this topic." The Kremlin appears deeply concerned about the Pentagon's "Phased Adaptive" missile defense plan, which envisages about 440 antimissile interceptors based on 43 ships and two European land bases, in Poland and Romania, by the end of this decade. The biggest worry, Russian experts say, is the later phases of the project, which will see large numbers of the advanced SM-3 "Block II" interceptors deployed beginning in 2018. "The situation completely changes with the realization of the (later) stages of the missile defense plan," Lt. Gen. Andrei Tretyak, of Russia's General Staff, told journalists last month. "This is a real threat to our strategic nuclear forces." Gen. Tretyak said that exhaustive studies ordered by Russia's Defense Ministry have concluded that the planned deployments would pose a sufficient menace to Russian intercontinental missiles that Russia's strategic parity with the US would be undermined, along with the basic principles of the New START treaty**.** Wording inserted into that treaty by Russia specifically allows it to withdraw if the West deploys antimissile weapons "capable of significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces." Sign up now to receive our daily World Editor's Picks newsletter. Our best stories, in your inbox. A Russian withdrawal from New START might bring all progress in US-Russia relations to a halt, and greatly encourage foreign policy hardliners on both sides. Obama and Medvedev, both of whom face looming reelection battles, need to avoid that and find a formula that at least allows Russia and the US to continue talking amicably about missile defense cooperation, experts say. The outcome of Thursday's meeting between Mr. Gates and Mr. Serdyukov will be closely watched for the positive, or negative, signal it sends. "New START was the single real success of the US-Russia reset of relations, and it would be politically bad for both Obama and Medvedev if it were seen to be a failure," says Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "But the only sure way to save it is to move forward and tackle the thorny issue of missile defense," he says. "The burning need of both presidents to win a political success can break the logjam in these talks and make the nuts-and-bolts negotiators move along faster. This can be solved, but it will take political will."

#### Extinction

Collins and Rojansky 10 (James – director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ex-US ambassador to the Russian Federation, and Matthew – deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Why Russia Matters, Foreign Policy, , 8/18/2010 p. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/18/why_Russia_matters>)

Russia's nukes are still an existential threat. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons in stockpile and hundreds still on hair-trigger alert aimed at U.S. cities. This threat will not go away on its own; cutting down the arsenal will require direct, bilateral arms control talks between Russia and the United States. New START, the strategic nuclear weapons treaty now up for debate in the Senate, is the latest in a long line of bilateral arms control agreements between the countries dating back to the height of the Cold War. To this day, it remains the only mechanism granting U.S. inspectors access to secret Russian nuclear sites. The original START agreement was essential for reining in the runaway Cold War nuclear buildup, and New START promises to cut deployed strategic arsenals by a further 30 percent from a current limit of 2,200 to 1,550 on each side. Even more, President Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, have agreed to a long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. But they can only do that by working together.

### WIETZ

**Romney undermines it.**

Bandow 12—Senior Fellow at CATO [Doug Bandow, 4/23/12, Romney and Russia: Complicating American Relations, National Interest, p. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/romney-russia-complicating-american-relationships-6836]

Mitt Romney has become the inevitable Republican presidential candidate. He’s hoping to paint Barack Obama as weak, but his attempt at a flanking maneuver on the right may complicate America’s relationship with Eastern Europe and beyond. Romney recently charged Russia with being America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” As Jacob Heilbrunn of National Interest pointed out, this claim embodies a monumental self-contradiction, attempting to claim “credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the one hand [while] predicting dire threats from Russia on the other.” Thankfully, the U.S.S.R. really is gone, and neither all the king’s men nor Vladimir Putin can put it back together. It is important to separate behavior which is grating, even offensive, and that which is threatening. Putin is no friend of liberty, but his unwillingness to march lock-step with Washington does not mean that he wants conflict with America. Gordon Hahn of CSIS observes: Yet despite NATO expansion, U.S. missile defense, Jackson-Vanik and much else, Moscow has refused to become a U.S. foe, cooperating with the West on a host of issues from North Korea to the war against jihadism. Most recently, Moscow agreed to the establishment of a NATO base in Ulyanovsk. These are hardly the actions of America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s charge is both silly and foolish. This doesn’t mean the U.S. should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Moreover, treating Moscow like a foe will make Russia more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union—and especially Washington’s determination to continue expanding NATO. After all, if another country ostentatiously called the U.S. its chief geopolitical threat, ringed America with bases, and established military relationships with areas that had broken away from the U.S., Washington would not react well. It might react, well, a lot like Moscow has been reacting. Although it has established better relations with the West, Russia still might not get along with some of its neighbors, most notably Georgia, with its irresponsibly confrontational president. However, Washington should not give Moscow additional reasons to indulge its paranoia.

### AT: UQ – Turnout

Close with green voters.

Munro, 8-31 Neil Munro, Daily Caller's White House correspondent, 8-31-2012, Daily Caller, “Obama still has the green energy vote for 2012,” http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/30/obama-still-has-green-energy-vote-for-2012/2/

Obama still has the green energy vote for 2012

Advocates for the $7 billion pipeline — including labor unions — say it will create 20,000 good jobs and reduce gasoline-price disruptions. That’s a message that resonates with the swing-voting independents that Obama needs to win next November.

But there’s little evidence so far that progressives’ disappointment with Obama’s environmental policies threatens to reduce their turnout on election day, or that it pressures White House officials to make additional concessions to environmentalists during a political season dominated by the public’s demand for additional jobs.

Monday’s colorful, TV-ready protests against the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada’s oil fields to U.S consumers took place in Lafayette Park, in front of the White House.

The day’s events included 100 peaceful arrests of environmentalists and celebrities, a multi-faith spiritual event in Lafayette Park, press club speeches by environmental leaders, and numerous suggestions that approval of the pipeline by Obama will cost his campaign votes, volunteers and donations. Hundreds of others have already been arrested, and numerous environmental groups have contributed to two weeks of protest.

If Obama approves the pipeline, environmental activist Andrew Driscoll predicted he would not vote to re-elect him. “He hasn’t done anything to earn our vote yet,” said the Massachusetts activist. “The fate of humanity, the fate of the planet” will be determined by Obama’s pipeline decision, he said.

“If he approves it, it will be a huge blow, not only for our future, but also for this administration,” said Elijah Zarlin, a campaign manager at CREDO Action, an Atlanta-based progressive group. The protesters “are the people who are maybe going to vote for Obama, and are the people Barack will lose” if he approves the pipeline, he added.

However, the leadership of the green movement isn’t threatening to break with Obama over this one decision. (RELATED: Gore: Global warming skeptics are this generation’s racists)

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Instead, they are balancing their goal of stopping the pipeline with the need to keep their supporters motivated even when the public opposes regulation of job-producing companies, and with their shared desire to avoid the election of a GOP president, such as Texas Gov. Rick Perry.

The protests, arrests, caravans and petitions help make the president uncomfortable and reduce the chance that he’ll side with industry interests, said Philip Radford, Greenpeace’s executive director. The movement won’t accept a compromise offer from the White House, but will instead try to defeat the pipeline at the federal, state and local levels, he said. “This will be an embarrassment for the president,” he predicted.

“If the tar-sands pipeline is approved [by Obama], we will be back and our numbers will grow,” said James Hansen, a NASA scientist and political advocate. “For the sake of our children and grandchildren, we must find someone who is worthy of our dreams.”

Advocates for the $7 billion pipeline — including labor unions — say it will create 20,000 good jobs and reduce gasoline-price disruptions. That’s a message that resonates with the swing-voting independents that Obama needs to win next November.

Green activists’ importance to Obama’s re-election campaign is boosted by Obama’s losses among other voters, including whites, women, Hispanics and younger voters. Gallup’s daily poll on August 29 already showed Obama’s approval rate at 38 percent, and his disapproval rate at 55 percent.

Just a smidgeon of a link is enough

Goodman, 7-2 Peter Goodman, business editor of the Huffington Post, 7-2-2012, "How Loss of Enthusiasm Among Young voters Could Cost Obama The Presidencywww.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/01/how-loss-of-enthusiasm-could-cost-obama-election\_n\_1620253.html

Obama's campaign operatives describe multiple pathways leading to reelection. Obama might compensate for soft support among men by boosting his showing among women. He could lose Florida, which he won narrowly last time, but still win Ohio, where the auto bailout has generated jobs. He might lose Ohio and Florida, but still ride to victory via a strong performance in western states such as Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Arizona.

But most of the available pathways share one essential component: Obama needs a dominant showing among young voters.

"The youth vote is incredibly important, and particularly for Obama," says Mark Penn, the pollster who served as Bill Clinton's data guru, and Hillary Clinton's chief strategist on her bid for the White House. "It was his core base in 2008."

In three states, Virginia, Indiana and North Carolina, voters under 30 decisively tipped the scales in Obama's favor, turning what would have been defeats into victories. North Carolina presents the clearest case. George W. Bush carried the state by more than 12 percentage points in both 2000 and 2004. Among voters 30 and over, Obama lost to the Republican nominee, Sen. John McCain, according to exit polls. But he took 73 percent of the under-30 electorate, and that gave him the state by a mere 14,000 votes – less half one of one percent.

According to the consensus view among political strategists, 11 states now considered tossups will determine the outcome of the 2012 race: North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Ohio, Florida, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, Iowa, and Missouri. These states collectively hold more than half of the 270 electoral votes needed to claim the presidency. Obama lost only two of these states last time -- Missouri, where he came within one percent, and Arizona, home to McCain. In seven of the nine states he won, he took at least 60 percent of the under-30 vote, according to analysis by CIRCLE. In an eighth state, Virginia, he narrowly missed the 60 percent mark.

Evidence of discontent among young voters has pollsters seriously questioning whether Obama will be able to engineer a similar showing this time.

Obama's heavy dependence on youth votes in battleground states explains why the Romney campaign is expending resources courting younger voters, including appearances at universities. On its face, this strategy might seem like a waste of energy and money: Romney not only trails badly in polls among young people, but Democrats tend to have a much easier time winning younger voters, given their liberal proclivities on social issues, environmental regulation and foreign policy. But for Romney, the objective is not to win a large share of votes. It is to deprive Obama of a smidgen of his base – a potentially decisive smidgen.

### AT: UQ – Economy

#### No Romney momentum --- post jobs report.

Silver, 10/25 (“Oct. 24: In Polls, Romney’s Momentum Seems to Have Stopped,” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/oct-24-in-polls-romneys-momentum-seems-to-have-stopped/#more-36636)

But there are other times when the notion of momentum is behind the curve — as it probably now is if applied to Mitt Romney’s polling. Mr. Romney clearly gained ground in the polls in the week or two after the Denver debate, putting himself in a much stronger overall position in the race. However, it seems that he is no longer doing so. Take Wednesday’s national tracking polls, for instance. (There are now eight of them published each day.) Mr. Romney gained ground in just one of the polls, an online poll conducted for Reuters by the polling organization Ipsos. He lost ground in five others, with President Obama improving his standing instead in those surveys. On average, Mr. Obama gained about one point between the eight polls. This is the closest that we’ve come in a week or so to one candidate clearly having “won” the day in the tracking polls — and it was Mr. Obama. The trend could also be spurious. If the race is steady, it’s not that hard for one candidate to gain ground in five of six polls (excluding the two that showed no movement on Wednesday) just based on chance alone. What isn’t very likely, however, is for one candidate to lose ground in five of six polls if the race is still moving toward him. In other words, we can debate whether Mr. Obama has a pinch of momentum or whether the race is instead flat, but it’s improbable that Mr. Romney would have a day like this if he still had momentum. The FiveThirtyEight model looks at a broader array of polls — including state polls — in order to gauge the overall trend in the race. Our “now-cast” also finds a slightly favorable trend for Mr. Obama over the course of the past 10 days or so. Mr. Romney’s position peaked in the “now-cast” on Friday, Oct. 12, at which point it estimated a virtual tie in the popular vote (Mr. Obama was the projected “winner” by 0.3 percentage points). As of Wednesday, however, Mr. Obama was 1.4 percentage points ahead in the “now-cast”, meaning that he may have regained about 1 percentage point of the 4 points or so that he lost after Denver. Mr. Obama’s chances of winning the Electoral College were up in the FiveThirtyEight forecast to 71 percent on Wednesday from 68.1 percent on Tuesday. It’s not yet clear how much of this, if any, has to do with the final presidential debate in Florida this Monday, which instant polls regarded Mr. Obama as having won. Instead, it’s been more of a slow and unsteady trajectory for him, with Mr. Obama often taking two steps forward but then one step back. It’s also not out of the question that the apparent trend just represents statistical noise. At the same time, there is more reason to take a potential change in the polls seriously if it is precipitated by a news event like the debate. The tracking polls that were released on Wednesday contained only one full day of interviews that postdated the Florida debate. If the debate moved the needle toward Mr. Obama, it should become more apparent in the coming days. The battleground state polls that came in on Wednesday were generally very close to our model’s current projections. For instance, there were three Ohio polls published on Wednesday; one showed a tied race there, while the other two showed Mr. Obama ahead by margins of two and five points.That’s pretty much what you’d expect to see out of a trio of Ohio polls if Mr. Obama’s lead there were about two points, which is where our model now has it. Some of the polls, especially the Time Magazine poll which had Mr. Obama five points ahead in Ohio, seemed to set off a lot of discussion on Twitter, as though people were surprised that Mr. Obama still held the lead there. But these polls are really nothing new. Since the Denver debate, Mr. Obama has held the lead in 16 Ohio polls against 6 for Mr. Romney. In Nevada, Mr. Obama has had the lead in 11 polls, to Mr. Romney’s 1. Mr. Obama has led in all polls of Wisconsin since the Denver debate, and he has had five poll leads in Iowa to one for Mr. Romney. Part of the confusion (and part of the reason behind the perception that Mr. Romney is still gaining ground in the race) may be because of the headlines that accompany polls. We’re still getting some polls trickling in where the most recent comparison is to a poll conducted before the Denver debate. We should expect Mr. Romney to gain ground relative to a poll conducted before Denver. (Mr. Romney may have lost a point or so off his bounce, but he has clearly not lost all of it). But it isn’t news when he does; Mr. Romney’s Denver gains had long ago become apparent, and priced into the various polling averages and forecast models. The question, rather, is whether Mr. Romney is gaining ground relative to the post-Denver polls — or if, as Wednesday’s polls seemed to imply, the race instead may have ticked back slightly toward Mr. Obama.

### link uniqueness

#### Nuclear power not mentioned now or perceived

JOHNSON ’12 (John; Nuclear Energy Insider, “US Campaign Trail: is nuclear in the equation?” 4/25, <http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/us-campaign-trail-nuclear-equation>)

Alternative energy policies have received a fair amount of publicity from the Obama administration, although nuclear power specifically is rarely mentioned on the campaign trial, primarily due to perceived safety questions.¶ Just the same, the Obama Administration is considered a nuclear supporter, having made several moves to help jumpstart America’s nuclear energy industry.¶ Obama plugged nuclear power during his first State Of The Union speech several years ago, and has generally been upbeat about the energy source’s future in the U.S.

#### Obama distancing himself from nuclear issues in the run-up to the election

LEVINE 9/7/12 (Gregg; Contributing Editor and Former Managing Editor – Firedoglake and Contributing Writer for Truthout, “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” <http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/>)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever.

That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means):

We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles.

Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.”

But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina.

That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.”

But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term.

Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this):

[W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build.

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important.

### OTHER ISSUES / NO ONE HEARS

#### Recent polls disprove

Finzel, 10/21 (Analyst-Waggener Edstrom, Election 2012: The Presidential Candidates, Energy Policy and Social Media, http://waggeneredstrom.com/blog/2012/10/21/election-2012-energy-policy/)

Although we may all be tired of the presidential campaign advertisements flooding the airwaves (especially if you live in a swing state), many of us are still interested in the differences between the two major party candidates on key issues. One such issue, energy, was addressed in the second presidential debate and has spurred substantive discussion online. To understand the impact on the national dialogue, Waggener Edstrom Worldwide conducted a national online survey to gauge the importance of energy to voters and analyzed social and online media to understand where conversations about energy are taking place. Our national online survey of public opinion was conducted Oct. 9–10, 2012. The results: **47 percent of respondents** said energy policy is one reason they are voting for Obama or Romney. While that number may be a bit surprising to people who don’t regularly follow energy, the social media dialogue around energy policy offers even more insight. Our research team analyzed results of more than 8 million tweets, Facebook posts and blog posts. They looked at the types of energy that were most discussed and how closely linked each candidate was to that type. As you can see in our Election 2012 infographic, President Obama was discussed online with the phrase “energy and the environment” 16 percent more than Gov. Romney, and Gov. Romney appeared 73 percent more frequently than President Obama in discussions about “energy independence.” Perhaps not surprising when you look at the candidates’ energy platforms, but you can draw your own conclusions. It’s fascinating to see where conversations about energy are taking place: according to our sample, the place to be online for wind or solar energy discussions is Twitter. Oil and coal are discussed most on Facebook. And natural gas and nuclear energy? Find a blog to read. In the presidential campaign, energy has been mostly on the sidelines, but that **doesn’t mean it isn’t important to voters** and that they aren’t talking about it online. And those conversations can certainly set up the energy policy dialogue we’ll all need to have in the months to come.

#### It’s key in Ohio

Sweet, 10/15 (Columnist-Sun Times, All eyes on Ohio’s voters in Obama-Romney race, http://www.suntimes.com/news/sweet/15778122-452/all-eyes-on-the-buckeye-state.html)

CINCINNATI — Michelle Obama, Paul Ryan and Ann Romney all stumped in the Buckeye State on Monday — with the Obama and Romney teams throwing massive assets at this crucial battleground. With early voting starting in Ohio on Oct. 2, it has been election month in Ohio more than Election Day. Mitt Romney was here on Saturday, President Barack Obama returns on Wednesday and Bill Clinton and Bruce Springsteen hit Thursday to bolster the Obama drive. Michelle Obama tried to spur early voting in general and Ohio in particular by mailing her absentee ballot with a public flourish. Ryan also looked for early votes. Ann Romney worked to turnout women voters. At Ohio Wesleyan University in the city of Delaware, the first lady said: “Today I voted for my husband! Yes! It felt so good. Right now, my absentee ballot, it’s on its way to Illinois, my home state — which means that we are one vote closer to re-electing my husband and moving this country forward for four more years. “So forgive me if I’m a little excited today — for me, it was Election Day,” she said. She also stopped in Cleveland, where she closed her speech by urging people to take a campaign bus to the early voting site “to cast your ballot for Barack Obama.” Ryan, the GOP vice presidential nominee, touched down at Luken Field here for a brief rally where a top agenda item was early voting. “Friends, don’t forget, early voting’s already started here in Ohio. . . . What that means is you can vote early so that on Election Day, you can help get people to the polls. You can help make the phone calls. You can help give people rides. This election’s so important, we even need you to talk to your relatives to get them out,” Ryan said. Ohio has 18 electoral votes and an outsized place in the history of electing presidents. The state has picked the winner since 1964 — and no Republican has won the White House without Ohio. Romney has a tougher time than Obama getting to 270 electoral votes without Ohio. In 2008, Obama won Ohio with 51.5 percent of the vote to 46.6 percent for Sen. John McCain. The realclearpolitics.com average on Monday night gave Obama a 2.2-percentage point lead in Ohio. Ohio has remained a battleground largely because of its geographic, ethnic, racial and economic diversity. No one media market rules the state. “Ohio is a microcosm of America,” former Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland, a Democrat, told me. “I tell people if you would shrink America, you would end up in Ohio.” No one city dominates the politics of the state and each metro area has its own personality: Cincinnati has a Southern flavor; Cleveland is more Northeast; Columbus, Midwest. Add to that a portion of that state that is part of Appalachia. “By far, the overwhelming issue in Ohio is jobs,” John Green, director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron, told me. The Romney and Obama ads running in Ohio markets — by the campaigns and allies — have a heavy focus on the economy. The economic diversity of the state has kept the jobless rate below the national average the past year — and that’s to Obama’s advantage. **Adding a “new wrinkle” in the 2012 contest**, Green said, **are energy issues that are unique to Ohio.** Ohio has new shale gas fields and a coal mining industry. Romney is accusing Obama of stifling Ohio energy producers through federal regulations and pledges on the stump and in an ad that is in heavy rotation in the Cincinnati market to assist in “producing our own energy in the ground in Ohio.”

### personality

Personality outweighs policies and it’s too late to change voters minds

**Beinart ‘12** (2012 Peter Beinart nytimes.com Peter Alexander Beinart is an American political pundit. A former editor of The New Republic, he has written for Time, The New York Times, The New York Review of Books among other periodicals, and is the author of three books. He is associate professor of journalism and political science at City University of New York, senior political writer for The Daily Beast

Back in 2004, I debated Jonah Goldberg about the presidential election. Bush will win, Jonah said, because after sniffing both of these guys for a while, Americans have simply decided they don’t like Kerry very much. Nonsense, I said. Likeability is in the eye of the beholder. Most Americans think the country is on the wrong track. Democrats have the demographic advantage. But I was too clever by half. Jonah was basically right. Eight years later, something similar may be happening. Conventional wisdom suggests that an incumbent presiding over a people this unhappy should lose. According to a June poll by the Pew Research Center, only 11 percent of Americans think the economy is “excellent” or “good.” Only 28 percent (PDF) are “satisfied with the way things are going in the country.” Americans think (PDF) the country is on the “wrong track” by a margin of almost two to one. And to a significant degree, they blame Barack Obama. A January Pew poll found that only 38 percent approve of **the** way he’s handling the economy. On the budget deficit, only 34 percent approve. On energy, it’s 36 percent. When asked in June which candidate is best capable of “improving economic conditions”—clearly the election’s dominant issue—Pew found that Mitt Romney bests Obama by eight points. Yet despite all this, about as many Americans approve of the job Obama’s doing as disapprove. And he leads slightly in the polls. Which is to say, there’s a yawning gap between how Americans feel the country is doing and how they feel Obama is doing. There’s even a significant gap between the way they feel about Obama’s performance on key issues and the way they feel about his performance overall. The most plausible explanation is that a lot of Americans just simply like the guy. When Obama took office in 2009, Americans held wildly positive views of his personal characteristics. According to Pew, 92 percent considered him a “good communicator,” 87 percent deemed him “warm and friendly,” 81 percent said he “cares about people like me,” 79 percent thought him “well-informed,” and 76 percent judged him “trustworthy.” Since then, each of those numbers has declined between 10 and 20 points. But they began at such stratospherically high levels that even with the drop, the public’s perception of Obama as a person remains remarkably cheery. Perhaps it’s because compared to past presidencies, Obama’s has been less plagued by scandal. Perhaps it’s because Obama’s personal story still makes people proud of America. Perhaps it’s because Obama is widely considered intelligent and well-spoken. Perhaps it’s because, like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, but unlike John Kerry and Al Gore, he has that intangible quality: authenticity. He seems comfortable in his own skin. For whatever reason, Americans seem to give Obama the benefit of the doubt. When Pew asked them to describe him in a word earlier this year, the second most popular answer was “incompetent.” “Socialist” came in fourth. But the first, third, fifth and sixth most popular adjectives were “good,” “intelligent,” “honest,” and “trying.” The contrast with Mitt Romney could not be starker. According to the June Pew, while Romney leads on the economy, Obama enjoys a 31 point advantage on “connect[ing] to ordinary Americans.” He leads by 19 points on being “willing to take [an] unpopular stand.” By a 14 point margin, Americans consider him more “honest and truthful.” According to Gallup, Americans deem him more “likeable” by a whopping 17 points. This 2012 election may, in fact, be the most personality-driven **in** recent **memory**. For several presidential election cycles now, Pew has been asking voters why they support their favored candidate: “Leadership,” “Experience,” “Stand on Issues,” or “Personality.” Among Romney supporters, 4 percent cite personality, the same percentage as cited it for Al Gore in 2000. For John McCain in 2008, the figure was 3 percent. For George W. Bush and John Kerry in 2004, it was 8 percent each. For Obama this year, it’s 18 percent. In recent weeks, **Democrats have been** fretting that **it’s too late to change people’s opinion about the economy**. **That’s true.** But **it may also be too late to change their opinions about what Obama and Romney are like as people**. And for better or worse, **that may matter more.**

### did not hear about keystote

**No one pays hears about the plan**

**Wood ‘12** (Elisa, energy reporter, "What Voters Don't Know About Energy" AOL Energy -- August 8 -- energy.aol.com/2012/08/08/what-voters-don-t-know-about-energy/?icid=trending1)

Funny thing about Americans. We've got strong opinions about what's wrong with energy, especially when gasoline prices rise, but our passion tends to exceed our understanding. Polling indicates we hold strong sentiments about energy independence and renewables. Yet key details elude us. More than half of Americans cannot name one type of renewable energy and nearly 40 percent can't identify a fossil fuel, according to New York-based research organization Public Agenda. Many wrongly think the US gets most of its oil from the Middle East, and few realize that it will be years before green energy makes up a large portion of our resource mix. Even when there is money on the table, we are often oblivious. An Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll found that **less than 20 percent** of Americans **know important details about** energy efficiency rebates, tax credits, and other **incentives** available to them. *Big, controversial energy news passes us by*. Half of the population is unaware of TransCanada's Keystone XL project, according to a Yale University and George Mason University study, despite the uproar over President Obama's decision to deny the project a presidential permit in January.

### bundled

**Says bill that discussed got bundled in the past not that the plan wuld --- no reason why that's true of the AFF what would it get bundled with?**

**HAC ’12** (US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Washington, April 25 “Fiscal Year 2013 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill Approved by Appropriations Committee” http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=292584

The House Appropriations Committee **today** approved the **f**iscal **y**ear **2013** Energy and Water and Related Agencies Appropriations bill. The legislation provides **the** **annual funding** for the various agencies and programs under the Department of Energy (**DoE**) and other related agencies, and totals $32.1 billion – a cut of $965 million below the President’s budget request. “This bill makes targeted investments to encourage near-term job creation, improve public safety and regional commerce, strengthen national defense programs within the Department of Energy, and help reduce escalating energy costs that are putting pressure on family budgets around the country. Funding for important programs **was balanced by cutting spending in other areas** – putting tasks that are better suited for the private sector in the hands of entrepreneurs, while focusing tax dollars where they are best and most appropriately used,” Rogers said. Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairman Rodney Frelinghuysen also commented on the bill: “This legislation **prioritizes investments in our nuclear** security enterprise, programs to address gasoline prices, and opportunities to advance American competitiveness and get people back to work here at home,” Frelinghuysen said.

### link Wall

**Anti-nuclear environmentalist groups take every advantage to protest nuke power --- the plan sets them off.**

**Gamble 11**. [Jack, nuclear industry engineer, “Antinuclear Activists Will Try to Equate Hiroshima with Fukushima” Nuclear Fissionary -- July 25 -- http://nuclearfissionary.com/2011/07/25/antinuclear-activists-will-try-to-equate-hiroshima-with-**fukushima/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+NuclearFissionary+%28Nuclear+Fissionary%29]**

But that won’t stop the antinuclear fear mongers from writing editorials and planning protests of nuclear power on the 66th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, 2011.¶ What better way to manipulate the headlines than to put their fear mongering spin on a historical anniversary? This is exactly what they’ve done with Hurricane Katrina, the BP Oil Spill, wildfires, floods, 9/11, and any other major events for the last few decades. When you have no shame and sell fear for a living, I suppose there is little standing in your way.

**Public perception is what’s key --- the short-term nature of the link outweighs their long-term link turns.**

**Duffy 12**. [Bobby, MD of Ipsos MORI Social Research Institue, “After Fukushima Public Opinion is Still Unclear on Nuclear Power” Huffington Post -- November 3 -- http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/bobby-duffy/fukushima-public-opinion-nuclear\_b\_1335016.html]

As with all aspects of opinions and policy on energy, the drivers are as varied as the social, political and economic contexts of different countries. It is also partly because people themselves are balancing competing concerns.¶ Five factors come out consistently as the key issues on energy for the public: ahead of everything is cost, then four concerns - CO2 emissions, security of supply or dependence on other countries, the threat of nuclear disasters and the need for investment in renewables - all vie for the next most important.¶ But even here the challenge for policy-makers is that it's not actual dependency, reliability of renewable sources or real risks of nuclear disaster that drives public opinion, it is perceptions of them. Just to take the example of dependency on other countries, you might expect that high dependency countries would support nuclear more, as dependency is something people would generally like to avoid and nuclear power supply is at least within national control.

**Their link turns assume squo levels of nuke power – the world of the AFF is massively unpopular – how the question is asked is key.**

**Mariotte 12** [Michael, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos -- June 5 -- http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say]

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

**Obama has a huge lead with women now.**

**Yanover 9-19**. [Yori, journalist, "With Romney Stuck Practically Everywhere, It’s Obama’s Race to Lose" Jewish Press -- www.jewishpress.com/news/yoris-daily-news-clips/with-romney-stuck-practically-everywhere-its-obamas-race-to-lose/2012/09/19/]

And the final blow to the Romney campaign: a poll released last week by CBS News and The New York Times showed Obama with a 53% -41% lead among women.¶ This national average of a 12% lead grows to as much as 14% and 16% among women in states like Virginia, where recent anti-abortion legislation by Republican lawmakers and governors have convinced women that they must vote for Obama despite everything else, to preserve their reproductive rights. The Democrats have been as effective on convincing women Obama will protect their right to an abortion as they have been at warning elderly voters that Ryan will take away their medicate and social security.

**Women hate nuke power.**

**Newport 12**. [Frank, PhD, Editor in Chief, “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima” Gallup -- March 26 -- http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx]

Although Republicans continue to be more supportive than Democrats of the use of nuclear energy, these political differences are dwarfed by the 30-point gender gap in views on nuclear energy. Men are more likely than women to be Republicans, but politics alone do not explain the gap in support for nuclear energy between men and women. Something about nuclear energy apparently strikes a strongly negative chord in the minds of the nation's women, making them one of the few demographic segments of any type in which opposition to nuclear power is higher than 50%.

**They’re key to swing states.**

**Casserly 12**. [Meghan, staff writer, “Where women matter most in election 2012” Forbes -- June 7 -- http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/06/07/election-2012-mitt-romney-obama-women-battleground-states/]

But why is the female vote so attractive to presidential candidates? According to Dianne Bystrom, the director of the Carrie Chapman Catt Center for Women and Politics at Iowa State University, the reason the gender gap is so important isn’t the popularity points, but the fact that more women are registered to vote than men in most states, and a much higher female turnout rate at the polls. “It’s sheer numbers,” she says. In the 2008 election, 60.4% of the female population over the age of 18 showed up at the polls. Men? Just under 56%. In plainer terms, 10 million more women than men voted. Quite simply: more female voters=more female power, particularly in battleground states.¶ Swing states, or the undecided “battleground” states that don’t historically vote with a specific party, are traditionally where candidates spend the most time eating pancakes, shaking hands and kissing babies and old people, particularly towards the end of campaign season. At this point, notes Susan Carroll, a senior scholar at the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, we begin to hear a lot of talk about “soccer moms.” Why’s that? As elections draw near, the few remaining undecided voters become priority. According to Carroll, “It’s traditionally the case that these voters are women.”¶ Presidential candidates, then, must be ready to snap them up—at town hall meetings and barbecue joints where they attempt to speak with female voters on the issues they weigh the most important. “The set of issues tend to be the same but the priorities men and women give them are different,” says Carroll, who says that men weigh the economic debt at a top priority where women tend to hold healthcare and education in high regard. “Women voters are incredibly important at the end of an election cycle,” she says, “They’re the voters who are up for grabs and candidates are prepared to win them over on the issues that matter most.”¶ And so, in battleground states where women out-vote men in the hundreds of thousands, the female voice becomes even more powerful than that of her sisters in solidly blue or red states. With that in mind, Obama and Romney would be smart to court Pennsylvanian women over New Yorkers, Floridians over Oklahomans. “Of course women are targeted,” says Bystrom. “When you look at the difference between the number of men and number of women, there are simply more women to woo.” For their ease (and yours, as it’s forever important for a women to known her own value—and that of her vote), we’ve crunched the Census data on the gender divide on voting in the most contentious states this fall.