# 1AC

## plan

#### The United States Federal Government should obtain, through alternative financing, electricity from small modular reactors for military facilities in the United States.

## dod adv

#### DoD bases are vulnerable to grid disruptions which destroys command infrastructure – only SMR’s can solve

Robitaille 12

(George, Department of Army Civilian, United States Army War College, “Small Modular Reactors: The Army’s Secure Source of Energy?” 21-03-2012, Strategy Research Project)

In recent years, the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) has identified a security issue at our installations related to the dependence on the civilian electrical grid. 1 The DoD depends on a steady source of electricity at military facilities to perform the functions that secure our nation. The flow of electricity into military facilities is controlled by a public grid system that is susceptible to being compromised because of the age of the infrastructure, damage from natural disasters and the potential for cyber attacks. Although most major functions at military installations employ diesel powered generators as temporary backup, the public grid may not be available to provide electricity when it is needed the most. The United States electrical infrastructure system is prone to failures and susceptible to terrorist attacks. 2 It is critical that the source of electricity for our installations is reliable and secure. In order to ensure that our military facilities possess a secure source of electricity, either the public system of electric generation and distribution is upgraded to increase its reliability as well as reducing its susceptibility to cyber attack or another source of electricity should be pursued. Although significant investments are being made to upgrade the electric grid, the current investment levels are not keeping up with the aging system. Small modular reactors (SMRs) are nuclear reactors that are about an order of magnitude smaller than traditional commercial reactor used in the United States. SMRs are capable of generating electricity and at the same time, they are not a significant contributor to global warming because of green house gas emissions. The DoD needs to look at small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) to determine if they can provide a safe and secure source of electricity. Electrical Grid Susceptibility to Disruptions According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board, the DoD gets ninety nine percent of their electrical requirements from the civilian electric grid. 3 The electric grid, as it is currently configured and envisioned to operate for the foreseeable future, may not be reliable enough to ensure an uninterrupted flow of electricity for our critical military facilities given the influences of the aging infrastructure, its susceptibility to severe weather events, and the potential for cyber attacks. The DoD dependency on the grid is reflected in the $4.01 Billion spent on facilities energy in fiscal year 2010, the latest year which data was available. 4 The electricity used by military installations amounts to $3.76 billion. 5 As stated earlier, the DoD relies on the commercial grid to provide a secure source of energy to support the operations that ensure the security of our nation and it may not be available when we need it. The system could be taken down for extended periods of time by failure of aging components, acts of nature, or intentionally by cyber attacks. Aging Infrastructure. The U.S electric power grid is made up of independently owned power plants and transmission lines. The political and environmental resistance to building new electric generating power plants combined with the rise in consumption and aging infrastructure increases the potential for grid failure in the future. There are components in the U.S. electric grid that are over one hundred years old and some of the recent outages such as the 2006 New York blackout can be directly attributed to this out of date, aging infrastructure. 6 Many of the components of this system are at or exceeding their operational life and the general trend of the utility companies is to not replace power lines and other equipment until they fail. 7 The government led deregulation of the electric utility industry that started in the mid 1970s has contributed to a three decade long deterioration of the electric grid and an increased state of instability. Although significant investments are being made to upgrade the electric grid, the **many years of prior neglect will require a considerable amount of time and funding to bring the aging infrastructure up to date**. Furthermore, the current investment levels to upgrade the grid are not keeping up with the aging system. 8 In addition, upgrades to the digital infrastructure which were done to increase the systems efficiency and reliability, have actually made the system more susceptible to cyber attacks. 9 Because of the aging infrastructure and the impacts related to weather, the extent, as well as frequency of **failures is expected to increase in the future.** Adverse Weather. According to a 2008 grid reliability report by the Edison Electric Institute, sixty seven per cent of all power outages are related to weather. Specifically, lightning contributed six percent, while adverse weather provided thirty one percent and vegetation thirty percent (which was predominantly attributed to wind blowing vegetation into contact with utility lines) of the power outages. 10 In 1998 a falling tree limb damaged a transformer near the Bonneville Dam in Oregon, causing a cascade of related black-outs across eight western states. 11 In August of 2003 the lights went out in the biggest blackout in North America, plunging over fifty million people into darkness over eight states and two Canadian provinces. Most areas did not have power restored four or five days. In addition, drinking water had to be distributed by the National Guard when water pumping stations and/or purification processes failed. The estimated economic losses associated with this incident were about five billion dollars. Furthermore, this incident also affected the operations of twenty two nuclear plants in the United States and Canada. 12 In 2008, Hurricane Ike caused approximately seven and a half million customers to lose power in the United States from Texas to New York. 13 The electric grid suffered numerous power outages **every year** throughout the United States and the number of outages is expected to increase as the infrastructure ages without sufficient upgrades and weather-related impacts continue to become more frequent. Cyber Attacks. The civilian grid is made up of three unique electric networks which cover the East, West and Texas with approximately one hundred eighty seven thousand miles of power lines. There are several weaknesses in the electrical distribution infrastructure system that could compromise the flow of electricity to military facilities. The flow of energy in the network lines as well as the main distribution hubs has become totally dependent on computers and internet-based communications. Although the digital infrastructure makes the grid more efficient, it also makes it more susceptible to cyber attacks. Admiral Mr. Dennis C. Blair (ret.), the former Director of National Intelligence, testified before Congress that “the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and other critical infrastructures. 14 ” The Intelligence Community assesses that a number of nations already have the technical capability to conduct such attacks. 15 In the 2009 report, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Blair stated that “Threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st Century for the United States and our allies.”16 In addition, the report highlights a growing array of state and non-state actors that are targeting the U.S. critical infrastructure for the purpose of creating chaos that will subsequently produce detrimental effects on citizens, commerce, and government operations. These actors have the ability to compromise, steal, change, or completely destroy information through their detrimental activities on the internet. 17 In January 2008, US Central Intelligence Agency senior analyst Tom Donahue told a gathering of three hundred international security managers from electric, water, oil & gas, and other critical industry, that data was available from multiple regions outside the United States, which documents cyber intrusions into utilities. In at least one case (outside the U.S.), the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities. Mr. Donahue did not specify who executed these attacks or why, but did state that all the intrusions were conducted via the Internet. 18 During the past twenty years, advances in computer technologies have permeated and advanced all aspects of our lives. Although the digital infrastructure is being increasingly merged with the power grid to make it more efficient and reliable, it also makes it more vulnerable to cyber attack. In October 2006, a foreign hacker invaded the Harrisburg, PA., water filtration system and planted malware. 19 In June 2008, the Hatch nuclear power plant in Georgia shut down for two days after an engineer loaded a software update for a business network that also rebooted the plant's power control system. In April 2009, The Wall Street Journal reported that cyber spies had infiltrated the U.S. electric grid and left behind software that could be used to disrupt the system. **The hackers came from China, Russia and other nations and were on a “fishing expedition” to map out the system**. 20 According to the secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano at an event on 28 October 2011, cyber–attacks have come close to compromising the country’s critical infrastructure on multiple occasions. 21 Furthermore, during FY11, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team took action on more than one hundred thousand incident reports by releasing more than five thousand actionable cyber security alerts and information products. 22 The interdependence of modern infrastructures and digital based systems makes any cyber attacks on the U.S. electric grid potentially significant. The December 2008 report by the Commission on Cyber Security for the forty fourth Presidency states the challenge plainly: “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration”. 23 The susceptibility of the grid to being compromised has resulted in a significant amount of resources being allocated to ensuring the systems security. Although a substantial amount of resources are dedicated to protecting the nation’s infrastructure, it may not be enough to ensure the continuous flow of electricity to our critical military facilities. SMRs as they are currently envisioned may be able to provide a secure and independent alternative source of electricity in the event that the public grid is compromised. SMRs may also provide additional DoD benefit by supporting the recent government initiatives related to energy consumption and by circumventing the adverse ramifications associated with building coal or natural gas fired power plants on the environment.

#### Those communication breakdowns go nuclear

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

The DOD interest in small reactors derives largely from problems with base and logistics vulnerability. Over the last few years, the Services have begun to reexamine virtually every aspect of how they generate and use energy with an eye toward cutting costs, decreasing carbon emissions, and reducing energy-related vulnerabilities. These actions have resulted in programs that have significantly reduced DOD energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions at domestic bases. Despite strong efforts, however, two critical security issues have thus far proven resistant to existing solutions: bases’ vulnerability to civilian power outages, and the need to transport large quantities of fuel via convoys through hostile territory to forward locations. Each of these is explored below. Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that **critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are** almost **entirely dependent on the national transmission grid** . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.8 More recently, awareness has been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months.9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, **during an extended blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations**. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that **blinding an opponent with a grid blackout** **could escalate to nuclear war**. America’s current **opponents**, however, **may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility**. In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “**islands**” of energy self-sufficiency. The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that lower power consumption on bases and by constructing renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. **Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases**. Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more than a few days after the civilian grid went offline Unlike other alternative sources of energy, **small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to grid outages**. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, the reactors could be designed to produce enough power not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical services in surrounding towns during long-term outages. Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would be greatly reduced.

#### China will shut down the US grid and annex Taiwan – global nuclear war

Derene 9

(Glenn – Defense Analyst @ Popular Mechanics, “How Vulnerable is U.S. Infrastructure to a Major Cyber Attack?” October 1, 2009, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/4307521)

The next world war **might not start with a bang, but with a blackout**. An enemy could send a few lines of code to control computers at key power plants, causing equipment to overheat and melt down, plunging sectors of the U.S. and Canadian grid into darkness. Trains could roll to a stop on their tracks, while airport landing lights wink out and the few traffic lights that remain active blink at random. In the silence and darkness, citizens may panic, or they may just sit tight and wait for it all to reboot. Either way, much of the country would be blind and unresponsive to outside events. **And that might be the enemy's objective: Divert America's attention while mounting an offensive against another country.** Pentagon planners have long understood the danger of cyber attacks on U.S. military networks. Indeed, the Defense Department's Global Information Grid is one of the most frequently targeted computer networks on Earth. But the cat-and-mouse game of information espionage on military networks is not the only digital threat that keeps national-security experts up at night. There is a growing concern over the vulnerability of far more tangible assets essential to the economy and well-being of American citizens. Much of the critical infrastructure that keeps the country humming--water-treatment facilities, refineries, pipelines, dams, the electrical grid--is operated using a hodgepodge of technologies known as industrial control systems. Like banks and telecommunications networks, which are also generally considered critical infrastructure, these industrial facilities and utilities are owned by private companies that are responsible for maintaining their own security. **But many of the control systems in the industrial world were installed years ago with few or no cyber-security features**. That wasn't a big problem when these systems were self-contained. But in the past two decades, many of these controls have been patched into company computer networks, which are themselves linked to the Internet. And when it comes to computer security, a good rule of thumb is that any device that is computer-controlled and networked is vulnerable to hacking. Bad-guy hackers pulling the plug on public utilities is a common theme of Hollywood films, including 2007's Live Free or Die Hard, but such scenarios present more than a mere fictional scare to U.S. intelligence officials. According to Melissa Hathaway, cyber-coordination executive for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the list of potential adversaries in a cyber attack is long, ranging from disgruntled employees to criminals to hostile nations. Most experts agree that China and Russia routinely probe our industrial networks, looking for information and vulnerabilities to use as leverage in any potential dispute. James Lewis, a cyber-security expert for the policy think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), says that although cyber warfare couldn't cripple the U.S., it could serve as an effective military tactic. "If I were China, and I were going to invade Taiwan," he says, "and I needed to complete the conquest in seven days, then it's an attractive option to turn off all the electricity, screw up the banks and so on." Could the entire U.S. grid be taken down in such an attack? "The honest answer is that we don't know," Lewis says. "And I don't like that answer."

#### Unification causes south china sea conflict

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The Washington Quarterly, If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?, SUMMER 2002.

In practical terms, concern about a future threat from China encompasses the strategic advantages that unification with Taiwan would bring to Beijing. Probably more significant than any other factor, by eliminating China’s needs to build toward a hostile takeover of Taiwan, to protect itself from Taiwan, and to plan for a potential conflict with the United States over Taiwan, unification could release a significant percentage of China’s resources. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be free to change its priorities, redeploy its forces, and reconceptualize its strategic objectives. For Washington, this change means a less predictable, more flexible, and potentially less-burdened opponent, though one still noted for its lack of transparency. Beijing’s recovery of Taiwan could in fact lead to a more significant projection of Chinese naval and air power beyond coastal waters. With the continuing need to manage a maritime frontier that includes disputed interests in the South China Sea, China might be tempted to contest the U.S. military presence in the region and strive for greater force-projection capabilities. Although China has pledged that Taiwan under “one country, two systems” will retain its own autonomous military and that the PLA will not station units on the island, no absolute guarantees are protecting crucial sea lanes carrying oil and other sensitive goods past Taiwan. Commercial channels from the South China Sea do not generally pass through the Taiwan Strait but do parallel the east coast of Taiwan, coming as close as 75 nautical miles, as ships travel north toward Japan, Korea, and Russia. These transportation routes would be more vulnerable to interruption by China if Taiwan were under Beijing’s control. Indeed, China has at times been less than scrupulous about respecting international waters. Angered by Canberra’s support for Washington in the EP-3 spy plane crisis in 2001, China harassed an Australian naval flotilla, claiming it had intruded into Chinese waters as it sailed through the Taiwan Strait, even though the strait is an international waterway under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.8 As former U.S. ambassador to China James R. Lilley has noted, Taiwan “is the cork in China’s bottle.” China’s reclamation of Taiwan would “end what China feels to be a blockade on its abilities to control its surrounding seas.” With Taiwan in mainland hands, Lilley observes, Beijing could diminish the potential vulnerability it feels because “as much as 50 percent of China’s economy depends on foreign trade, about 90 percent of which is transported by ship.”9 In addition, the enhancement of Beijing’s maritime security would almost certainly alarm Japanese military planners. A Chinese presence along Japan’s shipping routes and abutting its Ryukyu island chain would risk giving Beijing an opportunity to “strangle the world’s second-largest economy.” Further, China would gain greater proximity to disputed oil and natural gas fields in the Senkaku/Diaoyutai area. During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when Tokyo and Washington were revising their defense agreements to clarify mutual obligations, China’s aggressive use of missiles led the normally cautious Japanese to agree to a tougher set of commitments than first intended. Tokyo sought to make clear to Beijing that neither intimidating Taiwan nor disturbing the peace in areas around Japan was acceptable.

#### Nuclear war

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", [www.huntingtonnews.net/14446](http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446))

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

#### Deterrence by denial is key

Bonnie Glaser, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, 4/13/12, Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences, http://csis.org/files/publication/120413\_gf\_glaser.pdf

Under the current administration, the pendulum in U.S. policy toward China has swung from attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing back against Chinese assertiveness and challenges to international laws and norms. Getting tougher with Beijing was necessary, but it has also created unintended consequences that the next administration, either a second Obama team or a Republican lineup, will have to contend with.

The Obama administration’s initial policy in 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a G2 condominium that would make decisions over the heads of others. Those concerns were unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted the U.S. approach as weakness, which, along with China’s economic success and America’s struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that manifested itself in a series of intimidating actions in China’s neighborhood. Subsequent entreaties by regional states to counterbalance China increased U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the U.S. Asia “pivot” has prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about intensified U.S.-China strategic competition.

In the run-up to the leadership transition that will take place at China’s 18th Party Congress this fall, Beijing is inwardly focused and unlikely to act on its fears. However, 2013 could see a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leadership’s judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a great power.

Signs of a potential harsh reaction are already detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming leadership to stand up to the United States. Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines. For example, an article published in China’s Global Times, a jingoistic newspaper owned by the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, called for China to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities.

Deng Xiaoping’s guideline to keep a low profile in the international arena, designed more than two decades ago to cope with uncertainty produced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is increasingly seen by China’s elite and public as irrelevant and even harmful to the task of defending Chinese ever-expanding “core interests.” Some voices are calling for closer alignment with Moscow and promoting the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a new “pole” in the international arena to strengthen the emerging powers against the West.

Xi Jinping, who will assume the helm as China’s new leader later this year, will be under pressure from many domestic constituencies to more forcefully defend Chinese interests in the international arena. Seeking to quickly consolidate his power and enhance the legitimacy of the Communist Party, Xi and his newly installed Politburo Standing Committee colleagues may be more willing than their predecessors to test drive a policy that is more confrontational.

The U.S. response to a more muscular Chinese foreign and military policy, should it appear, will have to be carefully calibrated. Ignoring greater Chinese assertiveness would fuel the belief—already emerging in China and elsewhere— that the United States is in inexorable decline. History shows that when great powers falter, China does not hesitate to seize the opportunity to advance its interests, especially in the South China Sea. As American forces withdrew from Vietnam in the mid-1970s, the Chinese grabbed the Paracel Islands from Saigon. Similarly, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and the United States terminated its base agreement with the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef to the dismay of Manila.

Yet a hostile and overbearing U.S. response would confirm Chinese suspicions that the United States seeks to contain its rise, which could cement the emergence of a U.S.-China Cold War. In addition, it would further alarm regional states who seek at all costs to avoid having to choose between the United States and China.

U.S. policy will need to combine firmness with subtlety. A strategy will need to be shaped that protects regional stability and reassures China’s neighbors, but also avoids greater U.S.- China strategic competition and the classic security dilemma, wherein each side believes that growing capabilities reflect hostile intent and responds by producing that reality. Sustained attention and commitment of sufficient resources to the Asia- Pacific region will be key to assuaging the doubts of regional friends and allies about U.S. staying power. The United States also will need to maintain the military capabilities necessary to deter Chinese aggression.

#### SMR’s “island” bases by providing constant reliable power

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

Having a reliable source of electricity is critically important for many DoD installations. Fort Meade, Maryland, which hosts the National Security Agency’s power intensive computers, is an example of where electricity is mission critical. Installations need to be more robust against interruptions caused by natural forces or intentional attack. Most installations currently rely on the commercial electricity grid and backup generators. Reliance on generators presents some limitations. A building dedicated generator only provides electricity to a specific building when there is a power outage. Typically, diesel standby generators have an availability of 85 percent when operated for more than 24 hours [38]. Most DoD installations keep less than a 5-day supply of fuel. Small nuclear power plants could contribute to electrical energy surety and survivability. Having nuclear power plants networked with the grid and other backup generating systems 5 could give DoD installations higher power availability during extended utility power outages and more days of utility-independent operation. Existing large commercial nuclear power plants have an availability of over 90 percent. When a small nuclear power plant is networked with existing backup generating systems and the grid, overall availability values could be as high as 99.6 percent [39]. Since proposed small reactors have long refueling intervals (from 4 to 30 years), if power from the commercial grid became unavailable, a small reactor could provide years of electrical power independent of the commercial grid [4]. Power assurance to DoD installations also involves three infrastructure aspects of electricity delivery: electrical power transmission, electricity distribution, and electricity control (of distribution and transmission). Electric power transmission is the bulk transfer of electrical energy from generating plants to substations located near population centers. Electricity distribution networks carry electricity from the substations to consumers. Electricity control is the management of switches and connections to control the flow of electricity through transmission and distribution networks. Typically, transmission lines transfer electricity at high voltages over long distances to minimize loss; electricity distribution systems carry medium voltages. For electrical power transmission, very little additional infrastructure is required to incorporate small nuclear power plants because they would be located on or near the DoD installation being serviced. However, redundancy in transmission lines would make the overall network more robust. Electricity control capabilities, such as self-healing 6 and optimization of assets to increase operational efficiency, could improve overall power availability; however, they are not necessary for the integration of small nuclear power plants. Key components for improving electricity control include advanced electricity meters and electricity meter data management. These tools are needed in order to establish islanding, a condition in which a portion of the utility system, which contains both load and generation, is isolated from the remainder of the utility system and continues to operate. Since the power generation capacities of small nuclear power plants are larger than required for most DoD bases, islanding could extend to adjacent communities if sufficient technical upgrades were performed to systems outside of the installation. This contributes to DoD missions because civilians and service members working on the installation often live with their families in adjacent communities. The power would ensure that critical services such as emergency response, waste water treatment, and hospitals could be maintained.

#### DoD bypasses regulatory hurdles and safety hazards

Loudermilk 11

Micah J. Loudermilk, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, 5/31/11, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, [www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375](http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375)

Path forward: Department of Defense as first-mover Problematically, despite the immense energy security benefits that would accompany the wide-scale adoption of small modular reactors in the US, with a difficult regulatory environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, skeptical public opinion, and of course the recent Fukushima accident, the nuclear industry faces a tough road in the battle for new reactors. While President Obama and Energy Secretary Chu have demonstrated support for nuclear advancement on the SMR front, progress will prove difficult. However, a potential route exists by which small reactors may more easily become a reality: the US military. The US Navy has successfully managed, without accident, over 500 small reactors on-board its ships and submarines throughout 50 years of nuclear operations. At the same time, serious concern exists, highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2008, that US military bases are tied to, and almost entirely dependent upon, the fragile civilian electrical grid for 99% of its electricity consumption. To protect military bases’ power supplies and the nation’s military assets housed on these domestic installations, the Board recommended a strategy of “islanding” the energy supplies for military installations, thus ensuring their security and availability in a crisis or conflict that disrupts the nation’s grid or energy supplies. DOD has sought to achieve this through decreased energy consumption and renewable technologies placed on bases, but these endeavors will not go nearly far enough in achieving the department’s objectives. However, by placing small reactors on domestic US military bases, DOD could solve its own energy security quandary—providing assured supplies of secure and constant energy both to bases and possibly the surrounding civilian areas as well. Concerns over reactor safety and security are alleviated by the security already present on installations and the military’s long history of successfully operating nuclear reactors without incident. Unlike reactors on-board ships, small reactors housed on domestic bases would undoubtedly be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation and certification, however, with strong military backing, adoption of the reactors may prove significantly easier than would otherwise be possible. Additionally, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, general fears over the use and expansion of nuclear power will ease, creating inroads for widespread adoption of the technology at the private utility level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, action by DOD as a “first mover” on small reactor technology will preserve America’s badly struggling and nearly extinct nuclear energy industry. The US possesses a wealth of knowledge and technological expertise on SMRs and has an opportunity to take a leading role in its adoption worldwide. With the domestic nuclear industry largely dormant for three decades, the US is at risk of losing its position as the global leader in the international nuclear energy market. If the current trend continues, the US will reach a point in the future where it is forced to import nuclear technologies from other countries—a point echoed by Secretary Chu in his push for nuclear power expansion. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will guarantee the short-term survival of the US nuclear industry and will work to solidify long-term support for nuclear energy. Conclusions In the end, small modular reactors present a viable path forward for both the expansion of nuclear power in the US and also for enhanced US energy security. Offering highly safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant designs, SMRs have the potential to bring carbon-free baseload distributed power across the United States. Small reactors measure up with, and even exceed, large nuclear reactors on questions of safety and possibly on the financial (cost) front as well. SMRs carry many of the benefits of both large-scale nuclear energy generation and renewable energy technologies. At the same time, they can reduce US dependence on fossil fuels for electricity production—moving the US ahead on carbon dioxide and GHG reduction goals and setting a global example. While domestic hurdles within the nuclear regulatory environment domestically have proven nearly impossible to overcome since Three Mile Island, military adoption of small reactors on its bases would provide energy security for the nation’s military forces and may create the inroads necessary to advance the technology broadly and eventually lead to their wide-scale adoption.

## water

#### Global water scarcity’s inevitable – causes war and kills billions

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

The battles of yesterday were fought over land. Those of today are over energy. But the battles of tomorrow may be over water. Along with population growth and increasing per capita water consumption, massive pollution of the world's surface water systems has placed a great strain on remaining supplies of clean fresh water. Global deforestation, destruction of wetlands, dumping of pesticides and fertilizer into waterways, and global warming are all taking a terrible toll on the Earth's fragile water system.

The combination of increasing demand and shrinking supply has attracted the interest of global corporations who want to sell water for a profit. The water industry is touted by the World Bank as a potential trillion-dollar industry. Water has become the “blue gold” of the 21st century.

In many parts of the world, one major river supplies water to multiple countries. Climate change, pollution and population growth are putting a significant strain on supplies. In some areas renewable water reserves are in danger of dropping below the 500 cubic meters per person per year considered a minimum for a functioning society.

In recent times, several studies around the globe show that climatic change is likely to impact significantly upon freshwater resources availability. In India, demand for water has already increased manifold over the years due to urbanization, agriculture expansion, increasing population, rapid industrialization and economic development. At present, changes in cropping pattern and land-use pattern, over-exploitation of water storage and changes in irrigation and drainage are modifying the hydrological cycle in many climate regions and river basins of India.

Due to warming and climate change rainfall trend has been badly affected worldwide. This change has adversely affected the groundwater recharge.

Water scarcity is expected to become an even more important problem than it is today.

In a case study of Jharkhand state of India groundwater recharging is mainly dependent on rainfall. Though Jharkhand receives sufficient amount of rainfall (900 to 1400 mm/year) but from last several years the rainfall pattern is very erratic. From last two years Ranchi city the capital of Jharkhand state received sufficient rainfall but distribution of rainfall was not uniform. It rained heavily just for two to three days in the month of August and September which resulted in heavy runoff and less infiltration affecting groundwater level.

The process of urbanization and industrialization from last 20 years has caused changes in the water table of Jharkhand State of India as a result of decreased recharge and increased withdrawal. Many of the small ponds which were main source of water in the surrounding areas are now filled for different construction purpose affecting the water table.

By 2100, water scarcity could impact between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people, says a leaked draft of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report due to be published in April 2007. The report focuses on the consequences of global warming and options for adapting to them. In February 2007 the panel released a report on the scientific basis of climate change.

The IPCC predicts critical water shortages in China and Australia, as well as parts of Europe and the United States. Africa and poor countries such as Bangladesh would be most affected because they were least able to cope with drought.

Major cities worldwide may face a water shortage crisis by 2050 if relevant governments don't react quickly. The water shortage will mostly affect basic daily needs such as drinking, cooking, bathing and washing clothes, and the poor residents of the world's major cities in developing countries are the ones who will suffer most.

"By 2050, big cities that will not have enough water available nearby include Beijing, New Delhi, Mexico City, Lagos and Tehran. China and India will be particularly hard hit unless significant new efforts are taken by their cities,".

There are several principal manifestations of the water crisis.

1. Inadequate access to safe drinking water for about 884 million people.

2. Inadequate access to water for sanitation and waste disposal for 2.5 billion people.

3. Groundwater over drafting (excessive use) leading to diminished agricultural yields.

4. Overuse and pollution of water resources harming biodiversity.

5. Regional conflicts over scarce water resources sometimes resulting in warfare.

Potential Hot Spots:

Egypt: A coalition led by Ethiopia is challenging old agreements that allow Egypt to use more than 50 percent of the Nile’s flow. Without the river, all of Egypt would be desert.

Eastern Europe: Decades of pollution have fouled the Danube, leaving down-stream countries, such as Hungary and the Republic of Moldova, scrambling to find new sources of water.

Middle East: The Jordan River, racked by drought and diverted by Israeli, Syrian and the Jordanian dams, has lost 95 percent of its former flow.

Former Soviet Union: The Aral sea, at one time the world’s fourth largest inland sea, has lost 75 percent of its water because of diversion programs begun in the 1960s.

There are many other countries of the world that are severely impacted with regard to human health and inadequate drinking water. The following is a partial list of some of the countries with significant populations (numerical population of affected population listed) whose only consumption is of contaminated water:

 Sudan: 12.3 million

 Venezuela: 5.0 million

 Ethiopia: 2.7 million

 Tunisia: 2.1 million

 Cuba :1.3 million

#### Those wars go global

Reilly ‘2

(Kristie, Editor for In These Times, a nonprofit, independent, national magazine published in Chicago. We’ve been around since 1976, fighting for corporate accountability and progressive government. In other words, a better world, “NOT A DROP TO DRINK,” <http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/25/culture1.shtml>)

\*Cites environmental thinker and activist Vandana Shiva Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke—probably North America’s foremost water experts

The two books provide a chilling, in-depth examination of a rapidly emerging global crisis. “Quite simply,” Barlow and Clarke write, “unless we dramatically change our ways, between one-half and two-thirds of humanity will be living with severe fresh water shortages within the next quarter-century. … The hard news is this: Humanity is depleting, diverting and polluting the planet’s fresh water resources so quickly and relentlessly that every species on earth—including our own—is in mortal danger.” The crisis is so great, the three authors agree, that the world’s next great wars will be over water. The Middle East, parts of Africa, China, Russia, parts of the United States and several other areas are already struggling to equitably share water resources. Many conflicts over water are not even recognized as such: Shiva blames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in part on the severe scarcity of water in settlement areas. As available fresh water on the planet decreases, today’s low-level conflicts can only increase in intensity.

#### And nuclear

Weiner ‘90

(Jonathan, Visiting Professor of Molecular Biology at Princeton University. The Next One Hundred Years: Shaping the Fate of Our Living Earth, p. 214)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in the single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

#### Water scarcity causes Central Asian war

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

That's been a constant dilemma for the Central Asian states since they became independent after the Soviet break-up.

Much of Central Asia's water flows from the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, leaving downstream countries Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan dependent and worried about the effects of planned hydropower plants upstream.

Tashkent fears that those two countries' use of water from Central Asia's two great rivers -- the Syr Darya and Amu Darya -- to generate power will diminish the amount reaching Uzbekistan, whose 28 million inhabitants to make up Central Asia's largest population.

After the collapse of communism in the 1990s, a dispute arose between Hungary and Slovakia over a project to dam the Danube River. It was the first of its type heard by the International Court of Justice and highlighted the difficulty for the Court to resolve such issues decisively. There are 17 European countries directly reliant on water from the Danube so there is clear potential for conflict if any of these countries act selfishly.

Experts worry that dwindling water supplies could likely result in regional conflicts in the future. For example, in oil-and-gas rich Central Asia, the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hold 90 percent of the region's water resources, while Uzbekistan, the largest consumer of water in the region, is located downstream.

#### Extinction

**Blank 2k** [Stephen J. - Expert on the Soviet Bloc for the Strategic Studies Institute, “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region”, World Affairs. 9-22]

Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.(77)

#### No diplomacy or institutions

Adam Radin 10, masters in security studies from the naval postgraduate school, “the security implications of water: prospects for instability or cooperation in south and central asia”, March, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518674>

Water, an issue so important to numerous facets of each state’s economy and overall stability, must not be left to loosely observed and nonbinding agreements. Tajikistan has even gone as far as to appeal to the United Nations General Assembly to focus on the “Central Asia water dilemma.”142 In a region that is still developing, and where the government’s survival rely more on its relations with it people versus its regional neighbors, domestic needs will continue to trump international cooperation. As Linn notes in his plan, the need for global actors to take an active role is likely needed in order for sustained cooperation. Additionally, this also provides an opportunity for Russia to actively insert itself through diplomacy and infrastructural investments, seeing that they still consider the CARs under their sphere of influence.143

The chapter presents a contrasting case study to South Asia, as in Central Asia water is not viewed as a regional security issue, but in terms of fulfilling short-term domestic needs. Without the looming threat of conflict or significant retribution from regional neighbors, cooperation is consistently undervalued and abandoned once domestic pressures increase. The problem with this pattern is that resources will likely continue to deteriorate and the CARs will continue to be dependent on each other to provide water and energy. Without sustained and flexible cooperation, the region at the very least will see greater stresses on government to provide for their populations, leading to domestic and potential regional instability.

#### Indo-Pak water scarcity’s coming – causes escalatory disputes

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

Such is the deep nexus between water and global warming that the increased frequency of climate change-driven extreme weather events like hurricanes, droughts and flooding, along with the projected rise of ocean levels, is likely to spur greater interstate and intrastate migration- especially of the poor and the vulnerable- from delta and coastal regions to the hinterland.

As the planet warms, water grow scarcer. Global warming will endanger the monsoon, which effects much greater than those of drought alone-particularly in India given that 70 percent of India’s rainfall comes from the monsoon.

The declining snow cover and receding glaciers in the Himalayan state of Jammu and Kashmir could trigger renewed hostilities between India and Pakistan, neighbouring states in the South Asian region that are at odds on a host of issues.

The two countries share the Indus River, one of the longest rivers in the world. The river rises in southwestern Tibet and flows northwest through the Himalayas. It crosses into the Kashmir region, meandering to the Indian and Pakistani administered areas of the territory.

Pakistan and India have long been embroiled in a territorial dispute over Kashmir, but have so far managed to uphold a World Bank-mediated Indus Water Treaty (IWT) that provides mechanisms for resolving disputes over water sharing. Any drastic reduction in the availability of water in the region has the potential of causing a war between the hostile south Asian neighbors.

The Indus water system is the lifeline for Pakistan, as 75 to 80 percent of water flows to Pakistan as melt from the Himalayan glaciers. This glacier melt forms the backbone of irrigation network in Pakistan, with 90 percent of agricultural land being fed by the vastly spread irrigation network in Pakistan, one of the largest in the world. Any disruption of water flow would cause a grave impact on agriculture produce in Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing treaty between the Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank (then the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The treaty was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan. The treaty was a result of Pakistani fear that since the source rivers of the Indus basin were in India, it could potentially create droughts and famines in Pakistan, especially at times of war. However, India did not revoke the treaty during any of three later Indo-Pakistani Wars.

Until now, the Indus Water Treaty has worked well, but the impact of climate change would test the sanctity of this treaty. Under the treaty signed in 1960, the two countries also share five tributaries of the Indus river, namely, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The agreement grants Pakistan exclusive rights over waters from the Indus and its westward-flowing tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab, while the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers were allocated for India’s use.

Transboundary water sharing between India and Pakistan will become an extremely difficult proposition as surface water would become a scarce commodity with the depletion of water reserves up in the mountains.

The sharing of the Ganges waters is a long-standing issue between India and Bangladesh over the appropriate allocation and development of the water resources of the Ganges River that flows from northern India into Bangladesh. The issue has remained a subject of conflict for almost 35 years, with several bilateral agreements and rounds of talks failing to produce results.

#### Goes nuclear

Zahoor ‘11

(Musharaf, is researcher at Department of Nuclear Politics, National Defence University, Islamabad, “Water crisis can trigger nuclear war in South Asia,” <http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?77008-Water-Crisis-can-Trigger-Nuclear-War-in-South-Asia>, AM)

South Asia is among one of those regions where water needs are growing disproportionately to its availability. The high increase in population besides large-scale cultivation has turned South Asia into a water scarce region. The two nuclear neighbors Pakistan and India share the waters of Indus Basin. All the major rivers stem from the Himalyan region and pass through Kashmir down to the planes of Punjab and Sindh empty into Arabic ocean. It is pertinent that the strategic importance of Kashmir, a source of all major rivers, for Pakistan and symbolic importance of Kashmir for India are maximum list positions. Both the countries have fought two major wars in 1948, 1965 and a limited war in Kargil specifically on the Kashmir dispute. Among other issues, the newly born states fell into water sharing dispute right after their partition. Initially under an agreed formula, Pakistan paid for the river waters to India, which is an upper riparian state. After a decade long negotiations, both the states signed Indus Water Treaty in 1960. Under the treaty, India was given an exclusive right of three eastern rivers Sutlej, Bias and Ravi while Pakistan was given the right of three Western Rivers, Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The tributaries of these rivers are also considered their part under the treaty. It was assumed that the treaty had permanently resolved the water issue, which proved a nightmare in the latter course. India by exploiting the provisions of IWT started wanton construction of dams on Pakistani rivers thus scaling down the water availability to Pakistan (a lower riparian state). The treaty only allows run of the river hydropower projects and does not permit to construct such water reservoirs on Pakistani rivers, which may affect the water flow to the low lying areas. According to the statistics of Hydel power Development Corporation of Indian Occupied Kashmir, India has a plan to construct 310 small, medium and large dams in the territory. India has already started work on 62 dams in the first phase. The cumulative dead and live storage of these dams will be so great that India can easily manipulate the water of Pakistani rivers. India has set up a department called the Chenab Valley Power Projects to construct power plants on the Chenab River in occupied Kashmir. India is also constructing three major hydro-power projects on Indus River which include Nimoo Bazgo power project, Dumkhar project and Chutak project. On the other hand, it has started Kishan Ganga hydropower project by diverting the waters of Neelum River, a tributary of the Jhelum, in sheer violation of the IWT. The gratuitous construction of dams by India has created serious water shortages in Pakistan. The construction of Kishan Ganga dam will turn the Neelum valley, which is located in Azad Kashmir into a barren land. The water shortage will not only affect the cultivation but it has serious social, political and economic ramifications for Pakistan. The farmer associations have already started protests in Southern Punjab and Sindh against the non-availability of water. These protests are so far limited and under control. The reports of international organizations suggest that the water availability in Pakistan will reduce further in the coming years. If the situation remains unchanged, the violent mobs of villagers across the country will be a major law and order challenge for the government. The water shortage has also created mistrust among the federative units, which is evident from the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had to intervene for convincing Sindh and Punjab provinces on water sharing formula. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) is responsible for distribution of water among the provinces but in the current situation it has also lost its credibility. The provinces often accuse each other of water theft. In the given circumstances, Pakistan desperately wants to talk on water issue with India. The meetings between Indus Water Commissioners of Pakistan and India have so far yielded no tangible results. The recent meeting in Lahore has also ended without concrete results. India is continuously using delaying tactics to under pressure Pakistan. The Indus Water Commissioners are supposed to resolve the issues bilaterally through talks. The success of their meetings can be measured from the fact that Pakistan has to knock at international court of arbitration for the settlement of Kishan Ganga hydropower project. The recently held foreign minister level talks between both the countries ended inconclusively in Islamabad, which only resulted in heightening the mistrust and suspicions. The water stress in Pakistan is increasing day by day. The construction of dams will not only cause damage to the agriculture sector but India can manipulate the river water to create inundations in Pakistan. The rivers in Pakistan are also vital for defense during wartime. The control over the water will provide an edge to India during war with Pakistan. The failure of diplomacy, manipulation of IWT provisions by India and growing water scarcity in Pakistan and its social, political and economic repercussions for the country can lead both the countries toward a war. The existent A-symmetry between the conventional forces of both the countries will compel the weaker side to use nuclear weapons to prevent the opponent from taking any advantage of the situation. Pakistan's nuclear programme is aimed at to create minimum credible deterrence. India has a declared nuclear doctrine which intends to retaliate massively in case of first strike by its' enemy. In 2003, India expanded the operational parameters for its nuclear doctrine. Under the new parameters, it will not only use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike but will also use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike on Indian forces anywhere. Pakistan has a draft nuclear doctrine, which consists on the statements of high ups. Describing the nuclear thresh-hold in January 2002, General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, in an interview to Landau Network, said that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons in case India occupies large parts of its territory, economic strangling by India, political disruption and if India destroys Pakistan's forces. The analysis of the ambitious nuclear doctrines of both the countries clearly points out that any military confrontation in the region can result in a nuclear catastrophe. The rivers flowing from Kashmir are Pakistan's lifeline, which are essential for the livelihood of 170 million people of the country and the cohesion of federative units. The failure of dialogue will leave no option but to achieve the ends through military means.

#### Only SMR’s solve

IAEA 7, “Economics of Nuclear Desalination: New Developments and Site Specific Studies”, July, <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1561_web.pdf>

Seventy percent of the planet is covered with water, but only 2.5% of that is fresh water. Nearly 70% of this fresh water is frozen in the icecaps of Antarctica and Greenland. Most of the rest is in the form of soil moisture or in deep inaccessible aquifers or comes in the form of heavy rains and floods that are difficult to contain and exploit. Consequently, only less than 0.008% (about 70 000 km3) of the world’s water is readily accessible for direct human use, and even that is very unevenly distributed. Recent statistics show that currently 2.3 billion people live in water-stressed areas and among them 1.7 billion live in water-scarce areas, where the water availability per person is less than 1000 m3/year. In fact, the situation is expected to worsen further since, by 2025, the number of people suffering from water stress or scarcity could swell to 3.5 billion, out of which 2.4 billion would live in water-scarce regions. Water scarcity is a global issue. Every year new countries are affected by growing water problems.

It is for this reason that the Millennium Declaration by UN General Assembly in 2000 set up a target

to halve, by the year 2015, the world population, which is unable to reach, or to afford, safe drinking

water. Vision 21: shared vision for Hygiene, Water Supply and Sanitation, has a target to provide

water, sanitation and hygiene for all by 2025.

Better water conservation, water management, pollution control and water reclamation are all part of the integrated solution to projected water stresses. So too are new sources of fresh water, including the desalination of seawater.

Desalination technologies have been well established since the mid-20th century and widely deployed in the Middle East and North Africa. The contracted capacity of desalination plants has increased steadily since 1965 and is now about 36 million m3/day worldwide, as shown in Figure 1. This capacity could cater to world’s population roughly 6 litres a day per capita of fresh potable water. If this capacity were available to 1.5 billion in the world without direct access to drinking water, it would provide approximately 20 litres/day/capita.

Large scale commercially available desalination processes can generally be classified into two categories: (a) distillation processes that require mainly heat plus some electricity for ancillary equipment, and (b) membrane processes that require only electricity. In the first category (distillation) there are two major processes: multi-stage flash (MSF) and multi-effect distillation (MED). In both processes, seawater is heated; the steam that evaporates is condensed and collected as freshwater; and the residual brine is discharged.

In the second category (membranes) is the reverse osmosis process (RO), in which pure water passes from the high-pressure seawater side of a semi-permeable membrane to the low-pressure freshwater side. The pressure differential must be high enough to overcome the natural tendency for water to move from the low concentration freshwater side of a membrane to the high concentration seawater side in order to balance osmotic pressures.

The energy for the desalination plants is generally supplied in the form of either steam or electricity. Conventional fossil fuel-powered plants have normally been utilized as the primary sources but their intensive use raises increasing environmental concerns, specifically in relation to greenhouse gas emissions (Section 1.3.3). The depleting sources and the future price uncertainty of the fossil fuels and their better use for other vital industrial applications are also the factors to be considered.

1.3. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN DESALINATION

The world energy requirements are presently met from oil, coal, gas, hydro, nuclear and renewable energies in that order as shown in Table 1.

It is now universally recognized that there will be an increase in the world’s requirement for electricity over the next few decades. The present trend towards meeting this demand includes the building of fossil fuel plants, particularly combined cycle gas fired plants.

However, the spiralling increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has resulted in setting the emission targets in international meetings held at Toronto, Rio de Janeiro and Kyoto. The IAEA predicts that the GHG emissions would be 36-50% higher by 2010 compared to 1990 levels. Many analysts, therefore, feel that the only viable alternative to fossil fuels is nuclear energy to reduce the rate of increase of GHG, particularly, carbon dioxide.

Yet another incentive for nuclear power is to maintain diversity of supply. A national strategy limited to one particular form of energy (fossil fuels) will be vulnerable to increased fuel costs and pressures from exporting countries.

Nuclear power is a proven technology, which has provided more than 16% of world electricity supply in over 30 countries. More than ten thousand reactor-years of operating experience have been accumulated over the past 5 decades.

There are many reasons which favour a possible revival of the nuclear power production in the years to come. It is thus expected that this revival would also lead to an increased role of nuclear energy in non-electrical energy services, which, at the moment, are almost entirely dominated by fossil energy sources. Among various utilization of nuclear energy for non-electrical products, using it for the production of freshwater from seawater (nuclear desalination) has been drawing broad interest in the IAEA Member States as a result of acute water shortage issues in many arid and semi-arid zones worldwide. With technical co-ordination or support of the IAEA, several demonstration programs of nuclear desalination are also in progress in several Member States to confirm its technical and economical viability under country-specific conditions

The desalination of seawater using nuclear energy is a feasible option to meet the growing demand for potable water. Over 175 reactor-years of operating experience on nuclear desalination have already been accumulated worldwide.

1.3.1. Nuclear desalination

In the IAEA terminology, nuclear desalination is defined to be the production of potable water from seawater in a facility in which a nuclear reactor is used as the source of energy for the desalination process. Electrical and/or thermal energy may be used in the desalination process on the same site. The facility may be dedicated solely to the production of potable water, or may be used for the generation of electricity and production of potable water, in which case only a portion of the total energy output of the reactor is used for water production.

The design approaches for a nuclear desalination plant are essentially derived from those of the nuclear reactor alone, with some additional aspects to be considered in the design of a desalination plant and its integration with the nuclear system.

All nuclear reactor types can provide the energy required by the various desalination processes. In this regard, it has been shown that Small and Medium Reactors (SMRs) offer the largest potential as coupling options to nuclear desalination systems in developing countries. The development of innovative reactor concepts and fuel cycles with enhanced safety features as well as their attractive economics are expected to improve the public acceptance and further the prospects of nuclear desalination.

The coupling with nuclear system is not difficult technically but needs some consideration in (a)

avoiding cross-contamination by radioactivity, (b) providing backup heat or power sources in case the

nuclear system is not in operation (e.g. for refuelling and maintenance), (c) incorporation of certain

design features, minimising the impact of the thermal desalination systems’ coupling to the nuclear

reactors (Section 1.6).

1.3.2. Why nuclear desalination?

The International Atomic Energy Agency is a specialized organization of the UN system that seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The institutional basis for the IAEA’s involvement in nuclear desalination is in its Statute and Medium Term Strategy.

Article II of the IAEA Statute provides that:

“ The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”.

This refers implicitly to nuclear desalination as an option for the use of nuclear technologies.

The same applies to the Article III of the Statute, which authorizes the IAEA:

“ To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world….”; (Article III, A.1); and

“To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic energy.” (Article III, A.3).

In addition, Objective A.3 of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy requires the Agency:

“ To support and facilitate the development of new and emerging applications of nuclear technologies by co-generation and heat applications, including seawater desalination”.

Request of assessing feasibility of using nuclear energy for seawater desalination was first made by the five North African countries to the IAEA in 1989 and the General Conference adopted its resolution to resume the study. These countries are located in semi-arid zones and already suffer from water shortages.

In recent years, interests have been also been indicated by Member States in South and South East Asia for the feasibility, as well as the demonstration, of nuclear desalination projects. The issue has since then been repeatedly stressed at the General Conference (Committee on the Whole) and supported by many Member States including most members of Group-77. The support stems not only from their expectation of its possible contribution to the freshwater issue but has also been motivated by a variety of reasons that include: the economic competitiveness of nuclear desalination in areas lacking cheap hydropower or fossil fuel resources, energy supply diversification, conservation of fossil fuel resources and spin-off effects of nuclear technology for industrial development.

Looking to the future, there are several reasons for focusing now on expanding nuclear power’s contribution to desalination. Apart from the expanding demand for freshwater and the increasing concern about GHG emissions and pollution from fossil fuels, there is a renewed and growing emphasis on small and medium sized nuclear reactors, and this is particularly important for desalination because the countries most in need of new sources of freshwater often have limited industrial infrastructures and relatively weaker electricity grids. The size of the grid limits the possibilities for integrating a co-generating nuclear power plant into the grid to supply the electricity market, in addition to meeting the energy requirements of a desalination plant. The largest power unit that can be integrated into an electricity grid must not exceed about 10-20 % of the total grid capacity. Of course, smaller nuclear reactors would be more appropriate for remote areas that are not suitable for connections to the grid.

For nuclear desalination to be attractive in any given country, two conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously: a lack of water and the ability to use nuclear energy for desalination. In most regions, only one of the two is present. Both are present for example in China, the Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan. These regions already account for almost half the world’s population, and thus represent a potential long term market for nuclear desalination. The market will expand further to the extent that regions with high projected water needs, such as the Middle East and North Africa, increase their nuclear expertise and capabilities.

1.3.3. Environmental impact of desalination by fossil fuelled energy sources

Desalination is an energy intensive process. A future desalination strategy based only on the use of fossil fuelled systems is not sustainable: Fossil fuel reserves are finite and must be conserved for more important uses such as transport, petrochemical industry etc. Besides, the demands for desalted water would continue increasing as population grows and standards of living improve. Conservation measures such as the modernisation of water networks to minimise leakages, the recycling of used water etc. will certainly reduce the future water demands slightly but they would not be able to halt the dissemination of desalination plants and consequently of the fossil fuelled based systems for the production of needed electricity and heat.

The following paragraphs illustrate the damaging consequences of such a policy by taking the example of the Mediterranean region.

Following the recent “Blue Plan” [2], the total available natural water resources (1), based on the statistics from 1990 to 1998, in the principle countries of the Mediterranean region, are as shown in Table 2.

The projected demands (3) for the year 2025 [31] are also included in Table 1.

It is obvious that available natural water resources would rather decrease in 2025 because of increased pollution, over exploitation and other human activities. However, to keep matters simple, it would be supposed that they would remain at the same level as in 1998.

It can be observed that, in 2025, the total projected water deficit (balance) in the Mediterranean region would of the order of 294 km3/per year.

Not all this required capacity would be met by desalination plants. Current contribution of desalination is of the order of 1 to 2 %. If it is supposed that in 2025, this contribution would be about 2.5 %, then the total required desalting capacity would be 7.3 km3/year (20.1 million m3/day).

According to the EC ExternE study2, the total emissions of GHG per MW(e).h of electricity produced by representative fossil fuelled power plants in France, are as presented in Table 3.

The specific heat and electricity consumptions of three main desalination plants are given in Table 4, [3].

The data presented in the above Tables allows to calculate the approximate3 total GHG emissions produced by the fossil fuelled plants and the three desalination plants.

Results for a total desalting capacity of 20.1 million m3/day are presented in Table 5.

It can thus be concluded that for a desalting capacity of 20.1 million m3/day in the Mediterranean region alone, required in 2025, one would produce, depending upon the energy source and the desalination process used,

13 to 264 million tonnes/year of CO2.

1350 to 1 310 000 tonnes/year of SOx.

21 100 to 540 000 tonnes/year of NOx.

1190 to 40 000 tonnes/year of particles.

The potential levels of GHG and particle emissions on the world scale could then be more than double these figures.

These could naturally be avoided through the use of nuclear energy.

#### Key to deescalate conflicts

Palley ‘11

Reese Palley, The London School of Economics, 2011, The Answer: Why Only Inherently Safe, Mini Nuclear Power Plans Can Save Our World, p. 168-71

The third world has long been rent in recent droughts, by the search for water. In subsistence economies, on marginal land, water is not a convenience but a matter of life and death. As a result small **wars have been fought, rivers diverted, and wells poisoned in what could be a warning of what is to come as industrialized nations begin to face failing water supplies.** Quite aside from the demand for potable water is the dependence of enormous swaths of industry and agriculture on oceans of water used for processing, enabling, and cleaning a thousand processes and products. It is interesting to note that fresh water used in both industry and agriculture is reduced to a nonrenewable resource as agriculture adds salt and industry adds a chemical brew unsuitable for consumption. More than one billion people in the world already lack access to clean water, and things are getting worse. Over the next two decades, the average supply of water per person will drop by a third, **condemning millions** of people **to** waterborne **diseases** and an avoidable premature death.81 So **the stage is set for water access wars between** the **first and the third worlds**, between **neighbors** downstream of supply, between **big industry** and big agriculture, between **nations**, between **population** centers, and ultimately between you and the people who live next door for an already inadequate world water supply that is not being renewed. **As populations inevitably increase, conflicts will intensify**.82 It is only by virtue of the historical accident of the availability of nuclear energy that humankind now has the ability to remove the salt and other pollutants to supply all our water needs. The problem is that **desalination is an intensely local process**. Some localities have available sufficient water from renewable sources to take care of their own needs, but not enough to share with their neighbors, and it **is here that the scale of nuclear energy production must be defined locally.** Large scale 1,000 MWe plants can be used to desalinate water as well as for generating electricity However we cannot build them fast enough to address the problem, and, if built they would face the extremely expensive problem of distributing the water they produce. Better, much better, would be to use small desalinization plants sited locally. Beyond desalination for human use is the need to green some of the increasing desertification of vast areas such as the Sahara. Placing twenty 100 MWe plants a hundred miles apart along the Saharan coast would green the coastal area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, a task accomplished more cheaply and quickly than through the use of gigawatt plants.83 This could proceed on multiple tracks wherever deserts are available to be reclaimed. Leonard Orenstein, a researcher in the field of desert reclamation, speculates: If most of the Sahara and Australian outback were planted with fast-growing trees like eucalyptus, the forests could draw down about 8 billion tons of carbon a year—nearly as much as people emit from burning fossil fuels today. As the forests matured, they could continue taking up this much carbon for decades.84 **The use of small, easily transported**, easily **sited**, and walk away **safe nuclear reactors dedicated to desalination is the only answer** to the disproportionate distribution of water resources that have distorted human habitation patterns for millennia. Where there existed natural water, such as from rivers, great cities arose and civilizations flourished. Other localities lay barren through the ages. We now have the power, by means of SMRs profiled to local conditions, not only to attend to existing water shortages but also to smooth out disproportionate water distribution and create green habitation where historically it has never existed. **The endless wars that have been fought**, first over solid bullion gold and then over oily black gold, **can now engulf us in the desperate reach for liquid blue gold. We need never fight these wars again as we now have the nuclear power to fulfill the** biblical **ability to “strike any local rock and have water gush forth**.”

#### It’s economically viable

Gamini Seneviratne 7, Nuclear News’s Vienna Correspondent, “Research projects show nuclear

desalination economical”, April, <http://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/nn/docs/2007-4-3.pdf>

The desalination of seawater using nuclear power is cost-effective compared with other primary energies, according to researchers in 10 countries who have studied various options at specific sites in their own countries. Their findings show nuclear to be at least competitive in all cases.

Researchers from Argentina, China, Egypt, France, India, Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and the United States focused on the economics of producing potable water by using various desalination technologies and energy sources at particular sites. The participants followed an agreed procedure throughout a coordinated research project (CRP), Economics of Nuclear Desalination— New Developments and Site-specific Studies, set up by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The findings of the studies, carried out over three years and ending in November 2006, are included in a technical document (IAEA-TECDOC) already at the printer.

“There is a dire shortage of fresh water for drinking in many countries already, and when you realize that 70 percent of the planet is covered with water but only 2.5 percent of that is fresh water, it is hardly surprising,” Ibrahim Khamis, who heads the IAEA’s desalination unit, told Nuclear News. He added that 70 percent of that fresh water is frozen in the polar icecaps and Greenland, and most of the rest is in soil moisture, inaccessible underground aquifers, or comes as heavy rain that is difficult to capture. “So only some 0.008 percent, about 70 000 km3, is readily available, and even that is very unevenly distributed.”

According to Khamis, recent statistics show 2.3 billion people living in water stressed areas, 1.7 billion of them in areas where the availability is on average less than 1000 m3 a year. Given human population growth and the increasing demands of industry and agriculture, the projections point to a continuously worsening situation, even if the effects of global warming are not taken into account. Khamis said he foresaw a time when nuclear power will be sought for desalination rather than for electricity generation, at least in some specific regions of the world such as the Middle East. “You can live without electricity for quite a long time; without water, only a matter of days.” The U.S. study, which was undertaken by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), notes that “the need for fresh water, high-purity water, and other grades of water for various domestic, industrial, and agricultural applications is ever increasing in the United States.” Demand is driven mainly by population, as well as continuous economic and technological growth, and it is predicted that more than an additional 60 billion m3 of water a year will be needed for municipal and light industrial uses by the year 2020. An additional 11–19 liters per day per person will be needed to generate hydrogen, should transportation be based mainly on hydrogen-powered vehicles in the future. “Cogeneration of water and power could offer a major portion of the additional water needed, in addition to providing much needed energy for maintaining sustainable development and growth,” the ANL report says.

The IAEA report says that desalinating seawater is not the only solution under discussion for remedying the water scarcity, but it is an important one. There are essentially two methods: distillation using heat, and the use of membranes and electricity directly. The two main distillation modes, known as multistage flash (MSF) and multieffect distillation (MED), both involve heating seawater to produce steam, followed by evaporation, condensation, and, finally, pure water collection. The method using membranes, which is called reverse osmosis (RO), uses electricity to create a pressure differential across a semipermeable membrane, allowing fresh water to pass through to the low-pressure side, and leaving salty seawater on the high-pressure side.

Desalination plant capacity worldwide is close to 40 million m3 today, mostly by distillation using fossil energy, and mostly in the Middle East and North Africa. Nuclear desalination has so far been exclusively for use within the nuclear power plants themselves, except at the Soviet-built BN-350 fast reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, which supplied potable water to local communities until it was shut down in 1999.

Currently, only India supplies nuclear desalinated water outside the plant site. Having earlier used MSF to get plant-use water, it has also integrated RO to the desalination unit at its Kalpakkam pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR) in Chenai, and it has begun (experimentally) supplying some water outside the power station. Pakistan has begun a similar project at its Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) to couple a 1600 m3/day MED unit to the nuclear plant, which earlier operated a 454 m3/day RO facility for plant use.

Fresh water is needed for many purposes. Saudi Arabia alone already irrigates crops with desalinated water. A number of countries, notably Egypt, the Persian Gulf States, Israel, Jordan, and Libya, depend on the technology to maintain tourism. Khamis said nuclear desalination has been held back by two key factors: economics, and the unavailability of reactors of appropriate size.

The CRP addressed the former, comparing cost performance between reactor plus desalination method combinations. The perception that nuclear is less cost-effective than other energy sources was repudiated by the studies.

The report says that the country case studies “have shown that in general, the nuclear desalination costs can vary from $0.5 to $0.94/m3 for RO, from $0.6 to $0.96/m3 for MED, and from $1.18 to $1.48/m3 for MSF plants. All nuclear options are economically attractive as compared with the gas turbine combined-cycle–based desalination systems, as long as gas prices remain higher than $150/toe [metric tons oil equivalent] or $21/bbl [barrel].”

## solvency

#### DoD acquisition of SMR’s ensures rapid military adoption

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities— that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace. 28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 [FOOTNOTE 29: There are numerous actions that the Federal Government could take, such as conducting or funding research and development, stimulating private investment, demonstrating technology, mandating adoption, and guaranteeing markets. Military procurement is thus only one option, but it has often played a decisive role in technology development and is likely to be the catalyst for the U.S. small reactor industry. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Kira R. Fabrizio and David C. Mowery, “The Federal Role in Financing Major Inventions: Information Technology during the Postwar Period,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 to the Present, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 283–316.] Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 **Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology** as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now. Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 **If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now**. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, **DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.** Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors.38 Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and **proliferation resistance**.

#### Alternative financing arrangements reduce costs and spur unique development

Fitzpatrick, Freed and Eyoan, 11

Ryan Fitzpatrick, Senior Policy Advisor for Clean Energy at Third Way, Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy at Third Way, and Mieke Eoyan, Director for National Security at Third Way, June 2011, Fighting for Innovation: How DoD Can Advance CleanEnergy Technology... And Why It Has To, content.thirdway.org/publications/414/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_Fighting\_for\_Innovation.pdf

The DoD has over $400 billion in annual purchasing power, which means **the Pentagon could provide a sizeable market for new technologies**. **This can increase a technology’s scale of production, bringing down costs, and making the product** **more likely to successfully reach commercial markets**. **Unfortunately**, many potentially significant clean energy **innovations never get to the marketplace, due to a lack of capital** **during** the development and **demonstration stages. As a result,** **technologies that could help the military** meet its clean energy security and cost goals **are being abandoned or co-opted by competetors like China** before they are commercially viable here in the U.S. **By focusing its purchasing power on innovative products that will** help **meet its energy goals, DoD can provide** more **secure** and **cost-effective energy to the military—producing tremendous long-term savings**, while also **bringing** potentially **revolutionary technologies to the public**. Currently, many of these **technologies are passed over during** the **procurement** process **because of** higher **upfront costs—even if these technologies can reduce life-cycle costs** to DoD. The Department has only recently begun to consider life-cycle costs and the “fullyburdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) when making acquisition decisions. However, initial reports from within DoD suggest that the methodology for determining the actual FBCF needs to be refined and made more consistent before it can be successfully used in the acquisition process.32 The Department should fast-track this process to better maximize taxpayer dollars. Congressional appropriators— and the Congressional Budget Office—should also recognize the **savings that can be achieved by procuring advanced technologies to promote DoD’s energy goals**, even if these procurements come with higher upfront costs. Even if the Pentagon makes procurement of emerging clean energy technologies a higher priority, it still faces real roadblocks in developing relationships with the companies that make them. Many clean energy innovations are developed by small businesses or companies that have no previous experience working with military procurement officers. Conversely, many procurement officers do not know the clean energy sector and are not incentivized to develop relationships with emerging clean energy companies. Given the stakes in developing domestic technologies that would help reduce costs and improve mission success, the Pentagon should develop a program to encourage a better flow of information between procurement officers and clean energy companies—especially small businesses. Leverage Savings From Efficiency and Alternative Financing to Pay for Innovation. **In an age of government-wide austerity and tight** Pentagon **budgets**, current congressional **appropriations are simply not sufficient** to fund clean energy innovation. **Until Congress decides to direct additional resources** for this purpose, the **Defense** Department **must leverage** the money and other **tools it already has** to help develop clean energy. This can take two forms: repurposing money that was saved through energy efficiency programs for innovation and using alternative methods of financing to reduce the cost to the Pentagon of deploying clean energy. For several decades **the military has made** modest **use alternative financing** mechanisms t**o fund** clean **energy** and efficiency **projects when appropriated funds were insufficient**. In a 2010 report, GAO found that while only 18% of renewable energy projects on DoD lands used alternative financing, these projects account for 86% of all renewable energy produced on the Department’s property.33 This indicates that alternative financing can be particularly helpful to DoD in terms of bringing larger and more expensive projects to fruition. One advanced financing tool available to DoD is the energy savings performance contract (ESPC). These agreements allow DoD to contract a private firm to make upgrades to a building or other facility that result in energy savings, reducing overall energy costs without appropriated funds. The firm finances the cost, maintenance and operation of these upgrades and recovers a profit over the life of the contract. While mobile applications consume 75% of the Department’s energy,34 DoD is only authorized to enter an ESPC for energy improvements done at stationary sites. As such, Congress should allow DoD to conduct pilot programs in which ESPCs are used to enhance mobile components like aircraft and vehicle engines. This could accelerate the needed replacement or updating of aging equipment and a significant reduction of energy with no upfront cost. To maximize the potential benefits of ESPCs, DoD should work with the Department of Energy to develop additional training and best practices to ensure that terms are carefully negotiated and provide benefits for the federal government throughout the term of the contract.35 This effort could possibly be achieved through the existing memorandum of understanding between these two departments.36 The Pentagon should also consider using any long-term savings realized by these contracts for other energy purposes, including the promotion of innovative technologies to further reduce demand or increase general energy security. In addition to ESPCs, **the Pentagon** also **can enter into** extended agreements with utilities to use DoD land to generate electricity, or for the **long-term purchase of energy**. **These** **innovative financing mechanisms**, known respectively as enhanced use leases (EULs) and power purchase agreements (PPAs), **provide a valuable degree of certainty to third party generators**. In exchange, the **Department can leverage its existing resources**—either its land or its purchasing power—**to negotiate lower electricity rates** and dedicated sources of locallyproduced power with its utility partners. **DoD has unique authority among federal agencies to enter extended 30-year PPAs**, but only for geothermal energy projects and only with direct approval from the Secretary of Defense. Again, limiting incentives for clean energy generation to just geothermal power inhibits the tremendous potential of other clean energy sources to help meet DoD’s energy goals. Congress should consider opening this incentive up to other forms of clean energy generation, including the production of advanced fuels. Also, given procurement officials’ lack of familiarity with these extended agreements and the cumbersome nature of such a high-level approval process, the unique authority to enter into extended 30-year PPAs is very rarely used.37 DoD should provide officials with additional policy guidance for using extended PPAs and Congress should simplify the process by allowing the secretary of each service to approve these contracts. Congress should also investigate options for encouraging regulated utility markets to permit PPA use by DoD. Finally, when entering these agreements, the Department should make every effort to promote the use of innovative and fledgling technologies in the terms of its EULs and PPAs. CON C L U S ION **The Defense Department is in a unique position to foster and deploy innovation in clean energy technologies**. This has two enormous benefits for our military: it will make our troops and our facilities more secure and it will reduce the amount of money the Pentagon spends on energy, freeing it up for other mission critical needs. If the right steps are taken by Congress and the Pentagon, the military will be able to put its resources to work developing technologies that will lead to a stronger fighting force, a safer nation, and a critical emerging sector of the American economy. **The Defense Department has helped give birth to technologies and new economic sectors dozens of times before**. For its own sake and the sake of the economy, **it should make clean energy innovation its newest priority**.

#### SMR’s are super cost-effective and safe

Ioannis N. Kessides and Vladimir Kuznetsov 12, Ioannis is a researcher for the Development Research Group at the World Bank, Vladimir is a consultant for the World Bank, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries”, August 14, Sustainability 2012, 4(8), 1806-1832

SMRs offer a number of advantages that can potentially offset the overnight cost penalty that they suffer relative to large reactors. Indeed, several characteristics of their proposed designs can serve to overcome some of the key barriers that have inhibited the growth of nuclear power. These characteristics include [23,24]: \* • Reduced construction duration. The smaller size, lower power, and simpler design of SMRs allow for greater modularization, standardization, and factory fabrication of components and modules. Use of factory-fabricated modules simplifies the on-site construction activities and greatly reduces the amount of field work required to assemble the components into an operational plant. As a result, the construction duration of SMRs could be significantly shorter compared to large reactors leading to important economies in the cost of financing. \* • Investment scalability and flexibility. In contrast to conventional large-scale nuclear plants, due to their smaller size and shorter construction lead-times SMRs could be added one at a time in a cluster of modules or in dispersed and remote locations. Thus capacity expansion can be more flexible and adaptive to changing market conditions. The sizing, temporal and spatial flexibility of SMR deployment have important implications for the perceived investment risks (and hence the cost of capital) and financial costs of new nuclear build. Today’s gigawatt-plus reactors require substantial up-front investment—in excess of US$ 4 billion. Given the size of the up-front capital requirements (compared to the total capitalization of most utilities) and length of their construction time, new large-scale nuclear plants could be viewed as “bet the farm” endeavors for most utilities making these investments. SMR total capital investment costs, on the other hand, are an order of magnitude lower—in the hundreds of millions of dollars range as opposed to the billions of dollars range for larger reactors. These smaller investments can be more easily financed, especially in small countries with limited financial resources. SMR deployment with just-in-time incremental capacity additions would normally lead to a more favorable expenditure/cash flow profile relative to a single large reactor with the same aggregate capacity—even if we assume that the total time required to emplace the two alternative infrastructures is the same. This is because when several SMRs are built and deployed sequentially, the early reactors will begin operating and generating revenue while the remaining ones are being constructed. In the case of a large reactor comprising one large block of capacity addition, no revenues are generated until all of the investment expenditures are made. Thus the staggered build of SMRs could minimize the negative cash flow of deployment when compared to emplacing a single large reactor of equivalent power [25]. \* • Better power plant capacity and grid matching. In countries with small and weak grids, the addition of a large power plant (1000 MW(e) or more) can lead to grid stability problems—the general “rule of thumb” is that the unit size of a power plant should not exceed 10 percent of the overall electricity system capacity [11]. The incremental capacity expansion associated with SMR deployment, on the other hand, could help meet increasing power demand while avoiding grid instability problems. \* • Factory fabrication and mass production economies. SMR designs are engineered to be pre-fabricated and mass-produced in factories, rather than built on-site. Factory fabrication of components and modules for shipment and installation in the field with almost Lego-style assembly is generally cheaper than on-site fabrication. Relative to today’s gigawatt-plus reactors, SMRs benefit more from factory fabrication economies because they can have a greater proportion of factory made components. In fact, some SMRs could be manufactured and fully assembled at the factory, and then transported to the deployment site. Moreover, SMRs can benefit from the “economies of multiples” that accrue to mass production of components in a factory with supply-chain management. \* • Learning effects and co-siting economies. Building reactors in a series can lead to significant per-unit cost reductions. This is because the fabrication of many SMR modules on plant assembly lines facilitates the optimization of manufacturing and assembly processes. Lessons learned from the construction of each module can be passed along in the form of productivity gains or other cost savings (e.g., lower labor requirements, shorter and more efficiently organized assembly lines) in successive units (Figure 6). Moreover, additional learning effects can be realized from the construction of successive units on the same site. Thus multi-module clustering could lead to learning curve acceleration. Since more SMRs are deployed for the same amount of aggregate power as a large reactor, these learning effects can potentially play a much more important role for SMRs than for large reactors [26]. Also, sites incorporating multiple modules may require smaller operator and security staffing. \* • Design simplification. Many SMRs offer significant design simplifications relative to large-scale reactors utilizing the same technology. This is accomplished thorough the adoption of certain design features that are specific to smaller reactors. For example, fewer and simpler safety features are needed in SMRs with integral design of the primary circuit (i.e., with an in vessel location of steam generators and no large diameter piping) that effectively eliminates large break LOCA. Clearly one of the main factors negatively affecting the competitiveness of small reactors is economies of scale—SMRs can have substantially higher specific capital costs as compared to large-scale reactors. However, SMRs offer advantages that can potentially offset this size penalty. As it was noted above, SMRs may enjoy significant economic benefits due to shorter construction duration, accelerated learning effects and co-siting economies, temporal and sizing flexibility of deployment, and design simplification. When these factors are properly taken into account, then the fact that smaller reactors have higher specific capital costs due to economies of scale does not necessarily imply that the effective (per unit) capital costs (or the levelized unit electricity cost) for a combination of such reactors will be higher in comparison to a single large nuclear plant of equivalent capacity [22,25]. In a recent study, Mycoff et al. [22] provide a comparative assessment of the capital costs per unit of installed capacity of an SMR-based power station comprising of four 300 MW(e) units that are built sequentially and a single large reactor of 1200 MW(e). They employ a generic mode to quantify the impacts of: (1) economies of scale; (2) multiple units; (3) learning effects; (4) construction schedule; (5) unit timing; and (6) plant design (Figure 7). To estimate the impact of economies of scale, Mycoff et al. [22] assume a scaling factor n = 0.6 and that the two plants are comparable in design and characteristics—i.e., that the single large reactor is scaled down in its entirety to ¼ of its size. According to the standard scaling function, the hypothetical overnight cost (per unit of installed capacity) of the SMR-based power station will be 74 percent higher compared to a single large-scale reactor. Based on various studies in the literature, the authors posit that the combined impact of multiple units and learning effects is a 22 percent reduction in specific capital costs for the SMR-based station. To quantify the impact of construction schedule, the authors assume that the construction times of the large reactor and the SMR units are five and three years respectively. The shorter construction duration results in a 5 percent savings for the SMRs. Temporal flexibility (four sequentially deployed SMRs with the first going into operation at the same time as the large reactor and the rest every 9 months thereafter) and design simplification led to 5 and 15 percent reductions in specific capital costs respectively for the SMRs. When all these factors are combined, the SMR-based station suffers a specific capital cost disadvantage of only 4 percent as compared to the single large reactor of the same capacity. Thus, the economics of SMRs challenges the widely held belief that nuclear reactors are characterized by significant economies of scale [19].

#### DoD installations are key – market pull

Jeffrey **Marqusee 12**, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the Department of Defense, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovation”, March, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf>

The key reason that DoD cannot passively rely on the private sector to provide a suite of new, cost-effective energy technologies is the difficulty of the transition from research and development to full deployment. Many have noted this challenge; it is often described as the “Valley of Death,” a term widely used in the early and mid-1990s to describe the obstacles to commercialization and deployment of environmental technologies. DoD’s environmental technology demonstration program, the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP), was created to overcome that hurdle. Why can’t DoD rely on the Department of Energy (DOE) to solve the commercialization and deployment problem? DOE has a mixed record in this area. Reasons for past failures at DOE are: 1) the lack of a market within DOE for the technologies; 2) overly optimistic engineering estimates; 3) lack of attention to potential economic or market failures; 4) a disconnect between business practices at DOE and commercial practices, which leads to demonstration results that are not credible in the private sector; and 5) programs completely driven by a technology “push,” rather than a mix of technology push and market-driven pull.81 Many of these issues can be viewed as arising from the first: the lack of a market within DOE. Since DOE is neither the ultimate supplier nor buyer of these technologies at the deployment scale, it is not surprising that there are challenges in creating a system that can bring technologies across the Valley of Death. DoD’s market size allows it to play a critical role in overcoming this challenge for the energy technologies the department’s installations require, as it has for environmental technologies. In addressing the barriers energy technologies face, and understanding the role DoD installations can play, it is important to understand the type and character of technologies that DoD installations need. Energy technologies span a wide spectrum in costs, complexities, size, and market forces. Installation energy technologies are just a subset of the field, but one that is critical in meeting the nation’s and DoD’s energy challenges. DOE, in its recent strategic plans and quadrennial technology review, has laid out the following taxonomy (figure 3.5): It is useful to divide these energy technologies into two rough classes based on the nature of the market and the characteristics of deployment decisions. There are technologies whose capital costs at full scale are very high, for which a modest number of players will play a key role in implementation decisions. Examples include utility-scale energy generation, large-scale carbon sequestration, commercial production of alternative fuels, nextgeneration utility-grid-level technologies, and manufacturing of new transportation platforms. Some of these technologies produce products (e.g., fuel and power from the local utility) that DoD installations buy as commodities, but DoD does not expect to buy the underlying technology. A second but no less important class of energy technologies are those that will be widely distributed upon implementation, and the decisions to deploy them at scale will be made by thousands, if not millions, of decision makers. These include: 1) Technologies to support improved energy efficiency and conservation in buildings; 2) Local renewable or distributed energy generation; and 3) Local energy control and management technologies. Decisions on implementing these technologies will be made in a distributed sense and involve tens of thousands of individual decision makers if they are ever to reach large-scale deployment. These are the energy technologies that DoD installations will be buying, either directly through appropriated funds or in partnership with third-party financing through mechanisms such as Energy Saving Performance Contracts (ESPCs) or Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). In the DOE taxonomy shown above, these distributed installation energy technologies cover the demand space on building and industrial efficiency, portions of the supply space for clean electricity when restricted to distributed generation scale, and a critical portion in the middle where microgrids and their relationship to energy storage and electric vehicles reside.

#### Plenty of expertise

Armond Cohen 12, Executive Director of the Clean Air Task Force, “DoD: A Model for Energy Innovation?”, May 29, <http://www.catf.us/blogs/ahead/2012/05/29/dod-a-model-for-energy-innovation/>

Unlike most other agencies, including the Energy Department, the Pentagon is the ultimate customer for the new technology it helps create, spending some $200 billion each year on R&D and procurement. The implications of DoD’s role as customer have not been widely appreciated, as: · DoD, uniquely in government, supports multi-year, billion-dollar “end to end” innovation efforts that produce technology that is continuously tested, deployed and refined on bases and in the field, providing real world feedback that leads to increases in performance and reductions in cost. By contrast, most of the federal government’s civilian energy innovation efforts involve research loosely connected at best with the few commercialization efforts that it supports. · DoD and its contractors know how to bring together multiple innovations to achieve system-level advances leading to big performance gains (examples range from nuclear submarines to unmanned aircraft to large-scale information systems). This systems approach is precisely what is needed to advance clean energy technologies. · Relatively stable, multi-year funding allows the Pentagon to pursue “long cycle” innovation that is necessary for large, capital- intensive technologies and supports a highly capable contractor base that can respond to changing national security demands. · The Pentagon’s scope and budget has allowed it to experiment with new and creative innovation tools such as the well-known Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency, which has produced extraordinary technological breakthroughs; and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program, which develops and demonstrates cost-effective improvements in environmental and energy technologies for military installations and equipment. · Because of DoD’s size and demands for performance and reliability, it is unique among government and private sector organizations as a demonstration test-bed. Smart-grid technologies and advanced energy management systems for buildings are already poised to benefit from this aspect of the Pentagon’s innovation system. · DoD has collaborated effectively with other federal agencies, including the Department of Energy and its predecessors (for example, to advance nuclear energy technologies). Continuing competition and cooperation between DoD and DOE will spur energy innovation.  DoD’s innovation capabilities can enhance U.S. national security, improve U.S. international competitiveness, and spur global energy restructuring and greenhouse gas emissions reductions. At the same time, while providing enormous opportunities to develop and test energy efficiency technologies and small scale distributed energy appropriate to forward bases, the Pentagon is unlikely to become an all-purpose hub for advancing all categories of clean-energy technologies, because its energy innovation activities will be sustainable only where they can support the nation’s defense capabilities. Therefore, many other large-scale technologies that are of great importance to improving the environment, such as carbon-free central station generation or zero carbon transportation, may not as easily fit with DoD’s mission. Possible exceptions might include small modular nuclear reactors that can be used for producing independent, non-grid power at military bases, or, conceivably, zero-carbon liquid fuels other than anything resembling current generation biofuels.

#### No workforce shortage

ITA 11

(International Trade Administration, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors” Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report, February 2011, US Department of Commerce)

A serious obstacle to the resurgence of traditional nuclear power in the United States is the eroded domestic manufacturing capacity for the major nuclear components. A robust program of building SMRs, however, could make use of existing domestic capacity that is already capable of completely constructing most proposed SMR designs. **SMRs would not require the ultra-heavy forgings that currently can only be made overseas.** U.S. suppliers say that firms could retool using existing capabilities and resources and could source most of the components of SMRs here in the United States. This ability could mean tremendous new commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and workers.

A substantial SMR deployment program in the United States could result in the creation of many new jobs in manufacturing, engineering, transportation, construction (for site preparation and installation) and craft labor, professional services, and ongoing plant operations. As SMR manufacturers prove their designs in the domestic market, **they will likely consider export opportunities**. The modular nature of SMRs and their relative portability means that locating export-oriented SMR manufacturing and assembly could make sense for U.S. companies, as opposed to the localiza-tion that is typically necessary for building larger reactors

## link uq

#### DoE just massively increased SMR incentives, but it fails

DoD Energy Blog, 2/16/11, Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power, dodenergy.blogspot.com/2011/02/good-things-in-small-packagessmall.html

They conclude that DOD should lead the charge for small reactors to meet their own needs as well as to make sure that the US leads that industry’s development. When first written the paper mentioned that most of the technology was stymied somewhere between the drawing board and production. But there is good news in the President’s 2011 Budget for nukes. The New York Times reported that the budget contains $500 million over five years for DOE to complete two designs and secure National Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. The reactors will be built entirely in a factory and trucked to the site, like “modular homes”. Sounds just like what Dr. Andres ordered. **Only problem is that $500 million is only about half of the cost to get to NRC approval. Actual production is in the $2 billion neighborhood**, and that is a pricey neighborhood. Enter Amory Lovins. Amory has often derided the cost for nuclear power as an unnecessary expenditure. His argument is that micropower is the way of the future, not big honking gigawatt nuclear power plants. Although there has been a resurgence in the interest in nuclear power, **it is still difficult to find private investments willing to underwrite the expense**. Maybe the development of small nukes for national security reasons will lead to cost effective small nukes for distributed micropower nationwide. Small reactors for FOBs are more problematic. Even Bagram only needs about 25 MW with other FOBS being smaller. Security will be the first concern. If someone tries a smash and grab at Fort Hood they have to go through a couple of armored divisions and have a long way to got to get away. Kabul to Peshawar is only 128 miles. Cost shouldn’t be an overriding factor in considering secure power, but even at a 75% cost reduction in production, half a billion for 25MW is a bit much. Of course if you could produce a 300MW system, Bagram could air condition Kabul! The real soft power. My buddy, T.C. the fighter pilot, would tell you that DOD's mission is to fight and win the Nation's wars, not spark business recovery. DOD needs to focus on conserving energy. “Reducing the consumption at Miramar by 50% might save a lot of fuel and money, but I'd rather reduce consumption by 50% at PB Jugroom even though the savings in gallons and dollars are tiny.” Reducing demand reduces risk. All that being said, it may well be worth DOE and DOD efforts to explore the potential. It is something that may be beyond the means of commercial entities, but not government (See China). If there is going to be a market here, let us not be left behind as we have been with other alternative energy production means.

#### And there are 3 demo projects in progress, but no incentives

ANA 12

(Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, “ Documents Reveal Time-line and Plans for “Small Modular Reactors” (SMRs) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Unrealistic and Promise no Funding” June 8, 2012, <http://www.ananuclear.org/Issues/PlutoniumFuelMOX/tabid/75/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/558/Default.aspx>)

“While SRS may superficially appear to present certain attractive aspects for the location of SMRs, the site has not had experience with operation of nuclear reactors in over twenty years and has no current expertise in reactor operation,” said Clements. “While DOE is set to chose two SMR designs to fund for further development, SRS affirms that no construction funds will be provided, leaving vendors with the difficult and perhaps insurmountable task to find private funding for SMR construction.”

Two of the three separate “Memoranda of Agreement” for three different and still hypothetical SMR designs include deployment timelines which are already admitted by DOE to be inaccurate since they were signed less than six months ago.

#### Taiwan shootouts go nuclear

Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, ‘11

(Charles, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April)

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

# 2AC

## t

#### Financial incentives induce production using cash – that includes power purchasing

Webb 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Precision – our definition’s from the DoE

Waxman 98 **–** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

## k

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

**Jackson**, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, **‘11**

(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).

The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

#### Nuclear technocracy’s key to solve

Nordhaus 11, chairman – Breakthrough Instiute, and Shellenberger, president – Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology – University of California, Santa Cruz, 2/25/‘11

(Ted and Michael, <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the_long_death_of_environmenta>)

Tenth, we are going to have to get over our suspicion of technology, especially nuclear power. There is **no credible path** to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power. It is the only low carbon technology we have today with the demonstrated capability to generate large quantities of centrally generated electrtic power. It is the low carbon of technology of choice for much of the rest of the world. Even uber-green nations, like Germany and Sweden, have reversed plans to phase out nuclear power as they have begun to reconcile their energy needs with their climate commitments. Eleventh, we will need to embrace again the role of the state as a direct provider of public goods. The modern environmental movement, borne of the new left rejection of social authority of all sorts, has embraced the notion of state regulation and even creation of private markets while largely rejecting the generative role of the state. In the modern environmental imagination, government promotion of technology - whether nuclear power, the green revolution, synfuels, or ethanol - almost always ends badly. Never mind that virtually the entire history of American industrialization and technological innovation is the story of government investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Think of a transformative technology over the last century - computers, the Internet, pharmaceutical drugs, jet turbines, cellular telephones, nuclear power - and what you will find is government investing in those technologies at a scale that private firms simply cannot replicate. Twelveth, big is beautiful. The rising economies of the developing world will continue to develop whether we want them to or not. The solution to the ecological crises wrought by modernity, technology, and progress will be more modernity, technology, and progress. The solutions to the ecological challenges faced by a planet of 6 billion going on 9 billion will not be decentralized energy technologies like solar panels, small scale organic agriculture, and a drawing of unenforceable boundaries around what remains of our ecological inheritance, be it the rainforests of the Amazon or the chemical composition of the atmosphere. Rather, these solutions will be: large central station power technologies that can meet the energy needs of billions of people increasingly living in the dense mega-cities of the global south without emitting carbon dioxide, further intensification of industrial scale agriculture to meet the nutritional needs of a population that is not only growing but eating higher up the food chain, and a whole suite of new agricultural, desalinization and other technologies for gardening planet Earth that might allow us not only to pull back from forests and other threatened ecosystems but also to create new ones. The New Ecological Politics The great ecological challenges that our generation faces demands an ecological politics that is **generative, not restrictive.** An ecological politics capable of addressing global warming will require us to reexamine virtually every prominent strand of post-war green ideology. From Paul Erlich's warnings of a population bomb to The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," contemporary ecological politics have consistently embraced green Malthusianism despite the fact that the Malthusian premise has persistently failed for the better part of three centuries. Indeed, the green revolution was exponentially increasing agricultural yields at the very moment that Erlich was predicting mass starvation and the serial predictions of peak oil and various others resource collapses that have followed have continue to fail. This does not mean that Malthusian outcomes are impossible, but neither are they inevitable. **We do have a choice** in the matter, but it is not the choice that greens have long imagined. The choice that humanity faces is not whether to constrain our growth, development, and aspirations or die. It is whether we will continue to innovate and accelerate technological progress in order to thrive. Human technology and ingenuity have repeatedly confounded Malthusian predictions yet green ideology continues to cast a suspect eye towards the very technologies that have allowed us to avoid resource and ecological catastrophes. But such solutions will require environmentalists to abandon the "small is beautiful" ethic that has also characterized environmental thought since the 1960's. We, the most secure, affluent, and thoroughly modern human beings to have ever lived upon the planet, must abandon both the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature.

**The status quo is structurally improving**

Indur **Goklany 10**, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Part III — Have Higher US Population, Consumption, and Newer Technologies Reduced Well-Being?)”, April 24, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iii-have-higher-us-population-consumption-and-newer-technologies-reduced-well-being/#more-9194>

In my previous post I showed that, notwithstanding the Neo-Malthusian worldview, human well-being has advanced globally since the start of industrialization more than two centuries ago, despite massive increases in population, consumption, affluence, and carbon dioxide emissions. In this post, I will focus on long-term trends in the U.S. for these and other indicators. Figure 1 shows that despite several-fold increases in the use of metals and synthetic organic chemicals, and emissions of CO2 stoked by increasing populations and affluence, life expectancy, the single best measure of human well-being, increased from 1900 to 2006 for the US. Figure 1 reiterates this point with respect to materials use. These figures indicate that since 1900, U.S. population has quadrupled, affluence has septupled, their product (GDP) has increased 30-fold, synthetic organic chemical use has increased 85-fold, metals use 14-fold, material use 25-fold, and CO2 emissions 8-fold. Yet life expectancy advanced from 47 to 78 years. Figure 2 shows that during the same period, 1900–2006, emissions of air pollution, represented by sulfur dioxide, waxed and waned. Food and water got safer, as indicated by the virtual elimination of deaths from gastrointestinal (GI) diseases between 1900 and 1970. Cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses — the single most important pressure on species, ecosystems, and biodiversity — was more or less unchanged from 1910 onward despite the increase in food demand. For the most part, life expectancy grew more or less steadily for the U.S., except for a brief plunge at the end of the First World War accentuated by the 1918-20 Spanish flu epidemic. As in the rest of the world, today’s U.S. population not only lives longer, it is also healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite quantum improvements in diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) now occur 8–11 years later than a century ago. Consistent with this, data for New York City indicate that — despite a population increase from 80,000 in 1800 to 3.4 million in 1900 and 8.0 million in 2000 and any associated increases in economic product, and chemical, fossil fuel and material use that, no doubt, occurred —crude mortality rates have declined more or less steadily since the 1860s (again except for the flu epidemic). Figures 3 and 4 show, once again, that whatever health-related problems accompanied economic development, technological change, material, chemical and fossil fuel consumption, and population growth, they were overwhelmed by the health-related benefits associated with industrialization and modern economic growth. This does not mean that fossil fuel, chemical and material consumption have zero impact, but it means that overall benefits have markedly outweighed costs. The reductions in rates of deaths and diseases since at least 1900 in the US, despite increased population, energy, and material and chemical use, belie the Neo-Malthusian worldview. The improvements in the human condition can be ascribed to broad dissemination (through education, public health systems, trade and commerce) of numerous new and improved technologies in agriculture, health and medicine supplemented through various ingenious advances in communications, information technology and other energy powered technologies (see here for additional details). The continual increase in life expectancy accompanied by the decline in disease during this period (as shown by Figure 2) indicates that the new technologies reduced risks by a greater amount than any risks that they may have created or exacerbated due to pollutants associated with greater consumption of materials, chemicals and energy, And this is one reason why the Neo-Malthusian vision comes up short. It dwells on the increases in risk that new technologies may create or aggravate but overlooks the larger — and usually more certain — risks that they would also eliminate or reduce. In other words, it focuses on the pixels, but misses the larger picture, despite pretensions to a holistic worldview.

#### War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

Millennium - Journal of International Studies *May 2008* vol. 36 *no. 3 575-595*

Douglas Bulloch, IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science.

He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics, during which time he spent a year editing Millennium: Journal of International Studies

But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

#### Their conception of violence is reductive and can’t be solved

Boulding 77

Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung

Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published

Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science.

He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

#### No

Anderson 9/9/12

Corby, served from 2010 to 2011 as a committee member for the National Academy of Sciences study on uranium mining in Virginia. Anderson has more than 33 years of academic and applied global industrial experience in mining, metallurgical, energy, chemical, environmental, and materials engineering. He holds a Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the University of Idaho, “What the uranium mining study said and did not say,” <http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/commentary/2012/sep/09/tdcomm03-what-the-uranium-mining-study-said-and-di-ar-2187800/>, AM

Much of the concern about uranium mining in Virginia is based on fears of an improbable catastrophic natural disaster releasing mill tailings. The NAS study directly addressed this concern and found that, "Over the past few decades, improvements have been made to tailings management systems to isolate tailings from the environment." Specifically, the report identified below-ground tailings disposal as a way to eliminate the possibility of catastrophic storm or flood-induced releases. Another concern expressed is the potential for groundwater contamination from the mine or tailings. Again, the NAS report addressed this directly: "To date, modern tailings disposal cells have been effective at preventing groundwater contamination." The report emphasized the effectiveness of runoff and wastewater collection systems, as well as buffer zones and groundwater monitoring wells surrounding the site to detect the slightest elevations in contaminant levels and prevent contaminated water from escaping the site.

#### Claims of nuclear colonialism represent Western romanticism about the “ECOLOGICAL INDIAN”

Krech 99

The Ecological Indian:

Myth and History

Professor: Anthropology and Environmental Studies Phone: 863-7056 Phone 2: 863-3251 Shepard\_Krech\_III@Brown.EDU Ph.D. Harvard U 1974 Brown University Research Profile Page for Shepard Krech III Shepard Krech III conducts research on the intersections of humans and the natural world; anthropology and history, and material culture and the development of museums. Current projects are on time in indigenous cultures, bird-human interactions, and environmental knowledge. All research and writing is informed by ethnography in and a general geographical focus on native North America. Interests Born in New York City, educated at Yale (B.A.), Oxford (B.Litt.) and Harvard (Ph.D.), Shepard Krech III is professor of anthropology and environmental studies, and director of the Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology, at Brown University. He has received major fellowships and grants from the National Humanities Center (twice), Woodrow Wilson International Center, NEH, Canadian Embassy, and Wenner-Gren Foundation. He has written over 150 essays and reviews, lectured widely, and is the author or editor of 11 books and monographs, including Praise the Bridge That Carries You Over; Indians, Animals and the Fur Trade; A Victorian Earl in the Arctic; The Subarctic Fur Trade; Collecting Native America, 1870-1960; The Ecological Indian (1999); Encyclopedia of World Environmental History (ed. with J. R. McNeill and C. Merchant, 2004), Spirits of the Air (2009); and Indigenous Environments (MS ed. with David Gordon). The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (W. W. Norton, 1999) was discussed on radio coast-to-coast and reviewed or featured in over 100 publications in more than one dozen languages, including The New Yorker, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, The New Republic, New York Review of Books, Times Literary Supplement [TLS], Chronicle of Higher Education, Times Higher Education Supplement, Der Spiegel, NRC Handelsblad, and others. Reviewers remark that the book "teaches us everything we have wanted to know about American Indians and the environment" (New York Times), is "ground-breaking and myth-busting" (Wisconsin Public Radio), and "is what good science should be" (Detroit News). The book was the subject of a session at the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association, a conference in Laramie, Wyoming, and the edited collection, Native Americans and the Environment (eds. M. Harkin and D. R. Lewis [U. Nebraska Press]). Critics refer to the three-volume Encyclopedia of World Environmental History (Routledge, 2004) as edited with "great insight and skill" (James G. Speth) and "the most ambitious effort yet to offer a comprehensive overview of the long-term history of human interactions with the natural world on a truly planetary scale" (William Cronon). Early comments from anthropology and environmental history on Spirits of the Air (University of Georgia Press, 2009) include "superbly researched and splendidly illustrated" (Raymond Fogelson), "insightful" (Carolyn Merchant), and "exhaustive" (Charles Hudson); and from ornithology and the professional birding world a "landmark work" (Kenn Kaufman) and "thought-provoking." (Donald and Lillian Stokes). Shepard Krech III is past-president (2004-05) of the American Society for Ethnohistory and a trustee of the National Humanities Center. A lifelong birder and environmentalist, he lives in Washington, D.C. and Sedgwick, Maine.

Uranium mining simultaneously affected the Navajo with active tailings, one large spill, ground and animal contamination, and irradiated workers. For years these huge projects have roiled Navajo and Hopi politics, exacerbating splits between antidevelopment traditionalists (to whom environmentalist outsiders have been drawn) and prodevelopment progressives; they also led to demands for indigenous control over—if not a halt to—the extraction of resources.10 But what should be made of the differences of opinion among the Navajo? Of Hopi Indians who favor strip-mining, arguing that the most important part of their guiding philosophy and prophecy is to know "how to use the gifts of Mother Earth"? Of Miccosukee Indians, who proposed building sixty-five houses in Everglades National Park against the objections of the Park Service and environmentalists whispering that they are poor stewards of the land and therefore undeserving of special rights as Indians? Of the Alaskan Inupiat, who killed hundreds of caribou in the 1970s, used only part of the kill, left bloated carcasses behind, and were accused by white hunters (who had acted in virtually identical fashion themselves) of placing the herds in jeopardy? Of the Wisconsin Chippewa, who reportedly let thousands of fish spoil in warm weather? Of Rosebud Sioux activists, who wanted to stop use of the reservation for off-reservation trash out of concern—as the tribal chairman remarked facetiously—for Mother Earth, yet had never protested Rosebud's existing open dumps? Of Crow Indians and Indians from Wind River, the joint ShoshoneArapahoe reservation in Wyoming, who, in separate incidents, killed many elk and, to the horror of big-game hunters and biologists, reputedly took only choice cuts for themselves, or only meat or antlers for sale, leaving many animals to rot? Or of the Ute who want a dam and reservoir—over strong objections from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund—probably to transport low-sulfur coal through a coal slurry pipeline to power plants at some future time?11 For the sake of a simple narrative, critics who excoriate the larger society as they absolve Indians of all blame sacrifice evidence that in recent years, Indian people have had a mixed relationship to the environment. They victimize Indians when they strip them of all agency in their lives except when their actions fit the image of the Ecological Indian. Frozen in this image, native people should take only what they need and use all that they take, and if they must participate in larger markets, far better it be to profit from hydroponic vegetables, fish, or other "traditional" products than from oil, coal, trash, and like commodities. As one journalist remarked, "native people are supposed to be keepers of the earth, not protectors of its poisons."12 The connections between Indians and nature have been so tightly drawn over five hundred years, and especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, that many non-Indians expect indigenous people to walk softly in their moccasins as conservationists and even (in Muir's sense) preservationists. When they have not, they have at times eagerly been condemned, accused of not acting as Indians should, and held to standards that they and their accusers have seldom met.

#### ESSENTIALISM – ecological Indian views rooted in essentialism which destroys BOTH sovereignty AND cultural practice

Ishiyama and Tallbear 01

Noriko Ishiyama

Rutgers University, Department of Geography

54 Joyce Kilmer Avenue, Piscataway NJ 08854, USA

tel: 1-732-247-5720

noriko@eden.rutgers.edu

Kimberly TallBear

International Institute for Indigenous Resource Management

444 S. Emerson Street, Denver CO 80209, USA

tel: 1-303-733-0481 fax: 1-303-744-9808

[kimberlytallbear@iiirm.org](mailto:kimberlytallbear@iiirm.org)

Cultural essentialism as it informs assertions by some American Indians of a more “authentic” or morally pure identity and as it informs other peoples’ perceptions of “authentic” Indians has been integral to the development of the environmental justice movement. Within such movement, a highly generalized rhetoric has been used to advocate what has been described as a “holistic tribal world-view” (27). The environmental justice movement has built on the widespread belief within broader environmentalist circles that American Indians were the original and perfect conservationists. The movement has applied this belief to people of color to varying degrees for the purpose of organizing across racial lines (28). While an effective organizing strategy, the movement has promoted what is a problematic generalization of a culturally diverse population and has dismissed the cultural and political legitimacy of those who do not share the stereotypical ideology by espousing a dichotomous Native American traditionalist vs. assimilationist paradigm. Identity politics as they play out in the difficult process of understanding and defining sovereignty— especially as it is perceived and exercised within the intellectual confines of the Skull Valley debate— have been integral to political action undertaken by tribal members with distinct beliefs. Margene Bullcreek, one of the main tribal opponents of the Skull Valley decision and somewhat of a hero in environmental justice circles, has voiced her acceptance of both the ecological stereotype and the assimilationist/traditionalist paradigm that conditions legitimate tribal governance on such a restrictive definition of authentic indigenity: As . . . a traditionalist, I want to be able to say that we ought to protect where we're from and not to destroy it. Because we need to strengthen our . . . government to be strong, to be able to have a government to govern ourselves. I say this because right now we do not have a strong government. We do not have traditionalists on our council. If we did, they would oppose this [hosting a high-level radioactive waste storage facility on the reservation] (29) Margene Bullcreek, Skull Valley Goshute Tribal Member Similarly, a Utah history scholar asked to comment on the Skull Valley situation generalized about what he sees as two identity choices for Indian people: You have traditionalists who resist European inroads in their lives, and you have . . .assimilationists [who] take what they can, and sometimes that pertains to [compromising] religious beliefs like veneration of the land and its spiritual meaning (30) Dr. Michael Quinn, leading scholar on Mormon and Utah history Margene Bullcreek has also directly stated her definition of sovereignty (31): Sovereignty means who we are. We need to protect who we are. Our tribal leaders are taking traditional cultures away from us, using the corporation language. They are taking away some spirit, which has always been in the tribe. In the Skull Valley land-use debate, divisive Goshute identity politics, struggles for self-determination, and the politics of tribal sovereignty have the potential to clash with the agenda of the environmental justice movement. Goshute elected tribal leaders have explicitly expressed their annoyance with paternalistic suggestions by environmental justice advocates that they have “sold out” their traditions and have become victims of environmental injustice. Goshute tribal leadership has emphasized tribal capacity for environmental management and its right to self-determination based on tribal sovereignty. Chairman, Leon Bear, was quoted on the front page of the New York Times: I don’t belong to two nations. I belong to one—the Skull Valley Goshute Nation. . . We are alive and well and a sovereign nation. And we’re using that sovereignty to attract the only business we can get to come here (32). Tribal identity politics as they play out in the process of defining sovereignty have clearly influenced the environmental decision-making of the Goshutes. The tribe’s utilization of sovereignty in order to strike a business deal with PFS contradicts the image of American Indians as perfect preservationists. The position of that government certainly challenges the stereotype of Indian people solely as passive victims and perhaps this also feeds sentiment in environmental justice circles that this tribal government is not a legitimate government because it does not consist of “traditionalists” as defined according to a narrow, generalized, and romanticized definition of tradition. In the predominant environmental justice view, sovereignty is respectfully acknowledged, but its implications of self-determination seem to be lost in that movement’s understanding of the scope of tribal responsibilities and choices. Sovereignty seems to be characterized not as the ability of indigenous peoples or tribal nations to make decisions in what they see as the best interests of their communities and then develop the institutions and financing to implement those decisions, but as the freedom to live according to a romanticized and uncomplicated view of tradition. However, this is not to say that there are not specific cultural practices connected to specific tribes and lands that involve specific resources and spiritual relationships. Sometimes, such practices and resources do indeed have sacred connotations. However, specific cultural claims do not generally inform environmental justice discussions and they haven’t informed the debate in Skull Valley. Rather, generalizations and stereotypes are advocated in the defense of tribes and this not only undermines sovereignty, but it may even undermine dynamic cultural practice in the long-term.

## qer

#### DoD already established its recommendations for SMR adoption

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

Recognizing nuclear power as a potential benefit to Department of Defense (DoD) facilities, Congress directed the DoD, in section 2845 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2010, to “conduct a study to assess the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations” [12]. Specifically, the study is to consider the following topics:

• Options for construction and operation

• Cost estimates and the potential for life-cycle cost savings

• Potential energy security advantages

• Additional infrastructure costs

• Effect on the quality of life of military personnel

• Regulatory, state, and local concerns

• Effect on operations on military installations

• Potential environmental liabilities

• Factors that may impact safe colocation of nuclear power plants on military installations

• Other factors that bear on the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants on military installations.

To meet this requirement, the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, DUSD(I&E), asked CNA to conduct this feasibility study. The CNA effort was directed by a steering group consisting of representatives from DUSD (I&E), each of the military departments, DOE, NRC, and DOE Labs. This report documents our analysis and findings.

#### AND—It recommended against being an early adopter—proves the CP can’t establish a bureaucratic consensus for the plan

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

The most significant risk for SMR power plants is associated with being an early adoptor of new technology. From a DoD perspective, economic feasibility depends on negotiating arrangements for the project that ensure DoD is not responsible for FOAK expenses. Having contractor owners and operators would reduce operating risks associated with being an early adoptor. If partners can’t be found who are willing to bear the FOAK and early adoptor risks then DoD should not undertake such a project. The recent MOU between DOE and DoD identifies a framework for cooperation and partnership for sharing risks associated with this type of project.

#### Perm do both

#### No implementation

Barlas 12

Stephen, Columnist @ Financial Executive, 1/1, Lexis

But it is highly unlikely that Obama's blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past so-called blueprints from other presidents, or perhaps more importantly, whether a print is even necessary. Obama's policy is a loosely knit set of policies that focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Obama plan is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies. Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, former undersecretary of Energy for Science, says QTR is limited in scope and all DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he says. At this point there is no indication that DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S, president--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's football Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. But regardless of the rhetoric of president after president, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. Natural Gas Making Inroads The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the shale revolution, EIA forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical Co. are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer AG is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia and Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. and LyondellBasell Co., are considering expanding operations in the United States. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken (stretching from Canada to North Dakota and Montana) and Eagles Ford (South Texas) shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to around $86.07. EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which were made without federal subsidies, or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, co-director of the Energy Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council and a member of the Electricity Advisory Board at DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," Cavanagh says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he adds. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, deputy director, Energy Forum at the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy and Development Corp. (now a part of Devon Energy Corp.) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research and development," Med-lock notes. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures of energy companies such as Solyndra Corp., the Chapter 11 filing of Beacon Power Corp. and other less publicized busts reduce, if not kill, the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bipartisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000), which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations. Besides impact on the federal deficit, politics, too, often impede progress on otherwise sensible policies. Politics apparently have clogged up the proposed Keystone XL oil pipeline extension from Canada. Environmentalists, a Democratic constituency, oppose the project, arguing it would create more greenhouse gas emissions than necessary and pose a potential drinking water danger for Nebraska residents because it passed over the Ogallala Aquifer. That view is shared by Nebraska's Republican Gov. Dave Heineman, whose views are opposite those of all the can presidential candidates, each of whom supported U.S. approval of Keystone XL. Labor unions, another key Democratic constituency, support the project that TransCanada, the project sponsor, says will bring more than 11 8,000 person-years of employment to workers in the states of Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska. If the Keystone debate features Democrats versus Democrats and Republicans versus Republicans, efforts to substitute domestic natural gas for foreign petroleum features business versus business.

#### CP predetermines outcome and forces rushed process --- both independently gut solvency

Sands 11 (Derek, Inside Energy with Federal Lands, 11/21, Lexis)

In the wake of a major internal report on the future of the Energy Department's technology roadmap, the agency's top scientist cautioned last week that political and economic factors would be even more difficult to solve than the technical challenges. Steven Koonin, DOE's under secretary for science, told lawmakers on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee that using the agency's recently released Quadrennial Technology Review as a basis for a government-wide policy under a separately planned Quadrennial Energy Review would be challenging. "A QER dealing with technology and policy will be far more complex, with many possible goals, and many more participants," Koonin said at the hearing Tuesday. "I don't believe we know how to do it right at the moment, and because it needs to be done right, it should not be done in haste." The QER would be modeled on a similar military policy review that the Pentagon performs every four years. That broader energy review would be led by DOE, and is aimed at coordinating energy policy across federal agencies. While DOE wrapped up the first-of-its-kind technology review in September, it has not yet set a timeframe for a QER. The technology review concluded that DOE should make broad changes in how it doles out billions of dollars in energy-technology spending in coming years, shifting from an emphasis on funding new power-plant technologies to providing more money for the next generation of transportation technologies (IE, 3 October, 1). At Tuesday, hearing, Koonin testified on two bills that would require cross-government energy policy reviews. Koonin stepped down from his post as under secretary on Friday, and his appearance before the committee was his last. The Energy Research and Development Coordiation Act (S. 1807) introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman, a New Mexico Democrat and the committee's chairman, would require federal agencies involved in energy R&D to coordinate their planning and budget process. The Quadrennial Energy Review Act (S. 1703), introduced by Senator Mark Pryor, an Arkansas Democrat, and co-sponsored by Senate Lisa Murkowski, the senior Republican on the committee, would require a comprehensive review of federal energy programs and technologies every four years. Apart from Pryor and Murkowski, that bipartisan bill has attracted two Republican and four Democratic co-sponsors, including Bingaman. While Koonin said developing a quadrennial energy review would be difficult, he also said it would be a crucial step. "Technology development absent an understanding of what is shaping the policy and market contexts in which it would get deployed is not a very productive exercise," Koonin said. "We absolutely have to bring the technology, the policy, the market environments together in a coherent picture if we want to make progress on the challenges we are facing." Murkowski echoed that view, saying a quadrennial energy review could help stabilize a national energy policy. "I have long believed that our nation needs to develop an energy policy that can endure — a policy that won't be completely revamped every time a new administration comes into office, or every time Congress passes a new Energy Policy Act," Murkowski said. "It's hard to believe that we don't already require something like the QER." However, she also acknowledged the difficulties that will come with developing such a broad-ranging policy, and urged an open process. "Any study or plan must involve all parties from the start," Murkowski said. "If there is not buy-in across the political aisle, from Capitol Hill to the White House, from industry and NGOs alike, there is little chance the review will help generate a long-term strategy that can survive changes in administrations or in Congress." This view was shared by Ernest Moniz, the director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Initiative and a member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. That group recommended that DOE do a technology review, and that the administration begin a QER process. "A test of the [technology review] is whether it will indeed stimulate the kind of discussion that can build sufficient agreement to support long-term stable portfolio planning with both administration and Congressional endorsement," Moniz told the lawmakers during the hearing.

## elections – bandow

#### No difference between Obama and Romney on foreign policy

Aaron David **Miller 12**, scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, “Barack O'Romney”, May 23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney

I raise the idea to drive home a broader point. Despite his campaign rhetoric, Romney would be quite comfortable carrying out President Obama's foreign policy because it accords so closely with his own. And that brings up an extraordinary fact. What has emerged in the second decade after 9/11 is a remarkable consensus among Democrats and Republicans on a core approach to the nation's foreign policy. It's certainly not a perfect alignment. But rarely since the end of the Cold War has there been this level of consensus. Indeed, while Americans may be divided, polarized and dysfunctional about issues closer to home, we are really quite united in how we see the world and what we should do about it. Ever wondered why foreign policy hasn't figured all that prominently in the 2012 election campaign? Sure, the country is focused on the economy and domestic priorities. And yes, Obama has so far avoided the kind of foreign-policy disasters that would give the Republicans easy free shots. But there's more to it than that: Romney has had a hard time identifying Obama's foreign-policy vulnerabilities because there's just not that much difference between the two. A post 9/11 consensus is emerging that has bridged the ideological divide of the Bush 43 years. **And it's going to be pretty durable**. Paradoxically, both George W. Bush's successes and failures helped to create this new consensus. His tough and largely successful approach to counterterrorism -- specifically, keeping the homeland safe and keeping al Qaeda and its affiliates at bay through use of special forces, drone attacks, aggressive use of intelligence, and more effective cooperation among agencies now forms a virtually unassailable bipartisan consensus. As shown through his stepped-up drone campaign, Barack Obama has become George W. Bush on steroids. And Bush 43's failed policies -- a discretionary war in Iraq and a mismanaged one in Afghanistan -- have had an equally profound effect. These adventures created a counter-reaction against ill-advised military campaigns that is now bipartisan theology as well. To be sure, there are some differences between Romney and Obama. But with the exception of Republicans taking a softer line on Israel and a tougher one on Russia -- both stances that are unlikely to matter much in terms of actual policy implementation -- there's a much greater convergence. Yes, in the interests of winning votes, Romney will hone a few choice attacks in the campaign to come: "The president is weak and an apologizer, I'm not!" "The president doesn't believe in American leadership, I do!" These tropes, however, are either meaningless or inaccurate, and aren't likely to resonate much with a foreign policy-fatigued public.

#### Romney is posturing, Putin doesn’t care

Turkish Weekly 9/6/12

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/141414/romney%C3%ADs-tough-russia-rhetoric-an-election-ploy-analysts-say.html>

Romney’s Tough Russia Rhetoric An Election Ploy, Analysts Say But relations have also taken several high-profile hits recently, such as when Putin accused the United States of sponsoring the anti-Kremlin opposition rallies that erupted after last December’s parliamentary elections. The two countries have also locked horns on Syria, with U.S. officials accusing Russia of aiding and abetting Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad. Kremenyuk notes it’s difficult to ascertain just how successful the U.S.-Russian “reset” truly was – and whether that trend could follow Romney to the White House. “Anyone can understand whatever he wants about the ‘reset’: an improvement? To some extent we improved [our relations],” he said. “But does that mean we have now finally identified a new agenda, what both nations want from each other? No.” For his part, Putin said Wednesday he is ready to work with the next U.S. president regardless of who wins in the November election, so long as that person is ready to work with Russia “Whoever the American public elects, we will work with them,” he told RT TV in an interview on Wednesday. “But we will work together only as effectively as our partners want to.” Lukyanov, of Russia in Global Affairs, said the Kremlin has largely taken Romney’s sharp comments with a grain of salt. “When Romney repeatedly said that Russia is the main geopolitical foe of the United States, it was actually perceived with irony, because no one – including the most hawkish Americans – believes that,” he said. “This is seen as a sign of his inexperience and very little interest [in Russia].”

#### Both candidates have same Iran policy

Aaron David **Miller 12**, scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, “Barack O'Romney”, May 23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney

It's not only on these core assumptions that the candidates share a broad agreement. These principles translate into specific policies where it would be tough to tell the difference between a Romney and an Obama presidency: Iran: Sorry, I just don't see any significant difference between the way Obama is handling Iran's nuclear program and the way Romney might as president. And that's because there's seems to be an inexorable arc to the Iranian nuclear problem. If by 2013 sanctions and negotiations don't produce a sustainable deal and Iran continues its quest for a nuclear weapon, one of two things is going to happen: Israel is likely to strike, or we will. If it's the former, both Obama and Romney would be there to defend the Israelis and manage the mess that would follow. Both would be prepared to intercede on Israel's behalf if and when it came to that. As for a U.S. strike, it's becoming a bipartisan article of faith that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. And both men are prepared to use military strikes against Iran's nuclear sites as a last resort, even if it only means a delay (and that's what it would mean) in Iran's quest for nukes.

#### Taliban talks failing now

Matt Vasilogambros 10-2, National Journal, “U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal Unlikely in Afghanistan”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/u-s-taliban-peace-deal-unlikely-in-afghanistan-20121002

The U.S. is abandoning hope for a peace agreement with the Taliban, The New York Times reports, as NATO’s top leader told a British newspaper that the coalition is considering a quicker withdrawal of Western troops.

Once a key part of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, commanders on the ground and officials in Washington doubt the U.S. and the Taliban can have substantive peace talks, The Times reported.

Instead, the U.S. will work to secure a peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government, a deal that will eventually require approval from Pakistan. Substantive talks with the Taliban, officials told The Times, will most likely only happen after the withdrawal of American forces in 2014.

“It’s a very resilient enemy, and I’m not going to tell you it’s not,” a senior coalition officer told The Times. “It will be a constant battle, and it will be for years.”

Meanwhile, as so-called "green-on-blue" attacks, in which Afghan security forces have turned their weapons on their NATO counterparts, have increased this year, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Monday that Western troops may withdrawal from Afghanistan sooner the 2014 deadline, the U.K.’s Guardian reports.

Rasmussen said the recent attacks have been successful in undermining the “trust and confidence” between NATO and Afghan troops. With more than 50 such killings this year—far surpassing last year's count of 35—NATO might speed up its exit, Rasmussen said.

China impact is just campaign rhetoric-history on our side

Agence France Presse 7/6/12 HEADLINE: China -- again the villain in US election

Top Chinese leaders, increasingly wise to the ways of US politics, are understood to have told Obama that they expect a measure of anti-Beijing rhetoric in the US election. But Beijing seems interested in a return of managed stability after November -- evident in the negotiated exit from a crisis over blind dissident Chen Guangcheng, who took refuge in the US embassy in Beijing. History would suggest things will smooth over next year. For all of Clinton's raging against Beijing for instance, he was the president who steered China into the WTO, doing more than any other leader to assure its rise as an economic superpower. In 2008, candidate Obama said president George W. Bush should boycott the Beijing Olympics. But the next year, President Obama enjoyed a state dinner at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

## elections

#### The result is locked in – debate proves

Downie 10/4

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/obama-lost-the-first-debate-but-he-will-still-win-the-election/2012/10/04/9c3b7eb8-0deb-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_blog.html>

James Downie is a reporter-researcher at The New Republic. Previously, he worked at Foreign Policy, TIME, and Campus Progress. Born and raised in Washington, D.C., he graduated from Columbia University, where he edited its undergraduate news blog, The Bwog.

Furthermore, most post-debate polling bumps come from previously undecided voters, of which there is a historically small amount in this campaign, thus making it even less likely that Romney could exceed past norms. And Romney would need to outdo history by quite a distance — only Harry Truman has come back from a national deficit as large or larger than Romney’s at this point in the campaign. If Romney would have to pull off a miracle to close the gap in national polling, he has no shot at matching the president in the electoral college. As mentioned above, forecasters commonly predict that Obama already has a big lead of safe and leaning states. If we assume Romney will improve in the polls, there would be around nine “swing states”: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin. There’s one problem here for Romney: He is trailing, and has been consistently trailing, in all but two — North Carolina, where he’s held a small lead, and Florida, this election’s closest thing to a 50-50 state. Romney doesn’t need to win two out of those nine; in almost every scenario, he will need six or seven out of those nine to win, including at least two or three states where he is behind by several points more than he is nationally. All of which brings me to the final point: Given the state of the race before last night’s debate, even most Romney backers would agree that a Romney victory would require a flawless campaign the rest of the way from Romney and a blunder or two from Obama. After six years of both these men running for and/or being president of the United States, is there really anyone out there who thinks Mitt Romney can go a month without making a single mistake? Who thinks Barack Obama, who has been playing it safe for at least several months now, will suddenly make a reckless error, as opposed to a merely lackluster performance? (Or, if you’re Sean Hannity and co., do you believe the lamestream media will suddenly forget their liberal bias and stop protecting the president while assaulting Mitt Romney?) Seriously, does anyone believe that? The fact is that, come October, presidential elections cannot permanently change course over a few days or hours (unlike, say, media narratives). The majority of voters have already made their decision, and the debates won’t provide enough of a boost to alter the contest’s trajectory. Sadly for Romney, the path the race is stuck on ends with his defeat.

#### Undecided voters aren’t paying attention

Harry Enten, Guardian election expert, 10/4/12, If Mitt Romney won the debate, will he win the election?, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/04/mitt-romney-won-debate-win-election

We cannot expect that this or any one debate will turn an Obama edge into a large Romney lead. Romney is down by about 3 percentage points in the Real Clear Politics average. Only 5% of the electorate is truly undecided. Most of these undecided voters weren't watching the debate and probably won't make their choice until election day.

#### No impact to reduced turnout

Nate Cohn, New Republic Election Expert, Part-Time Georgetown Coach -- his articles go through a TNR editing process and are available for all on his blog, he has been profiled on New York Magazine and MSNBC, 10/1/12, Obama’s College Voter Trump Card, [www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/107974/obamas-college-voter-trump-card](http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/107974/obamas-college-voter-trump-card)

Even if turnout among these voters is down 18 percent—and that’s beneath 2004, by the way—the total number of young, disproportionately non-white, and Obama-friendly voters actually increases from 23.5 to 25.7 million.

Even in this relatively low-turnout scenario, 6.5 million new 18-22 year olds will enter the electorate and they can go a long way toward helping Obama compensate for declining turnout among ’08 voters or an increase in conservative turnout. If they vote 63-37 for Obama, the president would net-1.7 million voters.

If non-white or young voters turned out at ’08-levels in 2012, demographics would actually ensure that Obama does even better than he did four years ago. These same demographic trends give Democrats a bit of breathing room to withstand modest declines in enthusiasm among young voters without actually falling far behind where they stood four years ago.

With this in mind, it’s no surprise that Obama opened his campaign at Ohio State University, or that Michelle Obama is holding rallies on college campuses across the battleground states. Today’s college students didn’t vote four years ago, and even an underwhelming turnout from America's most diverse age group could help the Obama campaign make up for losses among voters who have abandoned their cause since 2008.

#### Candidates won’t talk about environment

Plummer, 2012

Bradford Plummer, September/October 2012, Audubon Magazine, "Has The Environment Become A Nn-Issue In The 2012 Presidential Race," [www.audubonmagazine.org/articles/living/has-environment-become-non-issue-2012-presidential-race](http://www.audubonmagazine.org/articles/living/has-environment-become-non-issue-2012-presidential-race)

Apart from a few jabs here and there over the Keystone XL oil pipeline, this election season Barack Obama and Mitt Romney would rather talk about the economy than the environment.

“It’s pretty clear that there’s been a conscious decision on both sides not to engage with these issues this year,” says Robert J. Brulle, currently a fellow at Stanford and a professor at Drexel University who studies environmental politics and media effects.

Elections haven’t always been so greenless. Back in 2008 rising awareness about climate change pushed both Obama and John McCain to thoughtfully engage in a conversation about our warming planet—including in this magazine (see “Face-Off," September-October 2008). This time around, however, with the U.S. economy still wheezing, many Americans seem to have tuned out. A Gallup poll from 2012, for example, found that Americans’ worries about air and drinking water pollution had fallen to their lowest point in decades. Such polls, explains Brulle, have likely led candidates to steer away from topics like climate. And green groups, for their part, have struggled to find a coherent, compelling message to rally voters. When influential figures aren’t talking about green issues, media coverage tends to drop, too. “It’s a self-reinforcing cycle,” Brulle says.

#### They’ll never abandon Obama

Munro, 8-31

Neil Munro, Daily Caller's White House correspondent, 8-31-2012, Daily Caller, “Obama still has the green energy vote for 2012,” <http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/30/obama-still-has-green-energy-vote-for-2012/2/>

But the environmentalists’ importance is also offset by their apparent reluctance to abandon Obama, even when he supports policies they dislike.

For example, a monthly survey of 1,000 registered voters by Public Policy Polling shows that Obama still maintains a favorable rating of 87 percent among liberals, and an unfavorable rating of 12 percent, down roughly 4 percentage points from a score of 91 percent and 7 percent in March.

#### No internal link

Wang 9/27/12

Herman, writer for The Barrel, a Platts energy forecasting blog, “Even with US gasoline prices at a higher number, energy isn’t a big deal in White House race,” <http://blogs.platts.com/2012/09/27/energy_campaign/>, AM

The respected polling firm Gallup asked voters in August what the most important issue facing the country was, and only 1% cited energy. That’s down sharply from the 25% of poll respondents who cited energy as the top issue in the days before the 2008 election, in which Republicans coined the rallying cry “Drill, baby, drill!” in response to high oil and gasoline prices. This time around, the economy, unemployment, general dissatisfaction with government and health care are greater concerns for voters, said Frank Newport, editor in chief of The Gallup Poll. Energy “doesn’t show up when we [ask voters] to tell us in your own words why you’re voting for the candidates,” he said. “We just don’t see much evidence that it’s a high top-of-mind issue in the campaign.”

#### Syria overwhelms the link

Dreyfuss, 10/4/12

Robert Dreyfuss is a freelance investigative journalist, [http://www.thenation.com/blog/170356/turkeys-nato-trap-obama#](http://www.thenation.com/blog/170356/turkeys-nato-trap-obama)

Turkey, a NATO member with a religious-Sunni, right wing political base, is setting a dangerous trap for President Obama. The United States cannot let itself be drawn into war with Syria by virtue of its formal alliance with Turkey, through NATO. Already, Turkey has been shelling Syria. For more than a year, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan has been itching for a fight with Syria, and now – following a minor incident involving a single mortar shell that crossed the Syrian-Turkish border – he may get one. If he does, the United States has to stay out of it. Weirdly, it isn’t even known who fired the mortar, which landed in a Turkish village. As the New York Times reports: “It was unclear if the mortar that struck Turkey was fired by government forces or by rebels fighting to oust the government of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.” The problem for Obama is, if he backs Turkey in what is looking increasingly like Turkish nationalist frenzy, a combination Sunni-Muslim solidarity with Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood rebels and old Ottoman Empire wistfulness, he’ll find himself involved in yet another Middle East war with no end. And if he doesn’t, count on Mitt Romney to accuse him of abandoning a NATO ally.

#### New military spending swings Florida and other battlegrounds

Thompson, 12

(Political Columnist-Forbes, “The Florida Effect: How Military Votes Could Hand Romney the White House,” 8/21, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/08/21/the-florida-effect-how-military-votes-could-hand-romney-the-white-house/print/)

Much has been written about the wrangling and irregularities that surrounded Bush’s controversial victory — Gore actually won the popular vote nationwide — but one crucial factor in Bush’s Florida win has been largely overlooked. If Eglin Air Force Base in the state’s western Panhandle had been located in Alabama rather than Florida, Al Gore would have been sitting in the White House on 9-11. The counties around Eglin generated the most lopsided totals in the state favoring Bush, with the main county where the base is located giving Gore less than one in four votes. Not coincidentally, the only other county in the state where Bush did so well and Gore so badly was near the Navy’s big bases at Jacksonville. As the Wikipedia entry for that county observes, it is “a popular choice of residence for military personnel” stationed at those bases. So it was George Bush who was sitting in the White House on 9-11, because military votes had enabled him to overcome strong support for Gore in places like Miami-Dade County, winning a majority in both Florida and the Electoral College. Had Gore prevailed in Florida there probably wouldn’t have been an Iraq war three years later, and there might not have even been terrorist attacks on 9-11 since there would have been less disruption to the nation’s security team. Paradoxically, the preference of voters near big military bases in Florida for a “strong leader” like Bush may have led to a decade of war. But that’s just speculation; what is very real is the role that **voters motivated by military interests play in national elections** — a role that usually favors GOP presidential candidates. I’m not just talking about active-duty military personnel stationed at big bases in swing states like Colorado, Ohio and Virginia. I’m also referring to dependents whose lifestyles are determined by military pay and benefits, reservists residing in all 50 states, veterans who have retained their ties to the military, and civilians working at big bases whose jobs are endangered every time the Pentagon cuts spending. Add all these constituencies up, and they **amount to a pretty sizable voting bloc for any presidential candidate who is willing to throw money at the military.** Lately, those candidates have tended to be Republicans. Although Democrats presided over most of the big military buildups of the last century, their party’s thinking about defense was transformed by the Vietnam War. The left wing of the party became decidedly anti-military, just as the transition to an All Volunteer Force was making the military more conservative in its political leanings. This ideological divide, which has been documented by analysts such as Thomas Ricks, has made military voters more inclined to support Republicans than they were before Vietnam. It appears that the end of conscription and the growing professionalization in the ranks has produced a political culture tending to favor conservatives. Voters with ties to the military are not a large part of the electorate, so the impact of these trends on elections isn’t noticeable in most states. But in states like Florida that are fairly evenly balanced between supporters of the two national parties, the military vote can decide election outcomes. That’s especially true in presidential elections, because of the way in which the Electoral College awards votes on a winner-take-all basis from state to state. Since candidates can secure all of a state’s Electoral College votes with a modest plurality in the statewide balloting, military voters potentially exercise a disproportionate influence in states that are otherwise evenly balanced between the parties. Florida is the biggest prize in this sweepstakes given its rapid population growth. The 1990 census gave it 25 Electoral College votes because based on its population it had 23 members in the House of Representatives and the constitutionally mandated two U.S. Senators. The 2000 census gave it two more representatives and thus two more votes in the college. The 2010 census added two additional representatives, giving the Sunshine State a total of 29 Electoral College votes. So in this year’s balloting, Florida will be the only swing state that can deliver over a tenth of the 270 Electoral College votes candidates need to secure the presidency.

# 1AR

## 2ac – at: water wars securitization

#### Your K doesn’t matter because water war is as real as it gets

Dinar 2

SAIS Review 22.2 (2002) 229-253

Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation

Shlomi Dinar is a Ph.D. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is concentrating in environment, negotiation, conflict, and cooperation. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Captain Jerome E. Levy. This paper benefited from the Anna Sobol Levy Fellowship, a fellowship supported by Captain Levy. The author would also like to thank Benjamin Miller, Emanuel Adler, and the editors of this journal for very constructive comments. This article was originally inspired from an essay that originally appeared in International Negotiation. Shlomi Dinar, "Negotiation and International Relations: A Framework for Hydropolitics," International Negotiation 5, no. 2 (2000).

The dichotomy of conflict and cooperation over water and its relationship to national and regional security reflects the reality of hydropolitics. While military clashes have been associated with water, the concept of security does not end with nor does it only imply armed conflict. Because the pursuit of peace, and thus conflict and cooperation, constitutes the flip side of security, water is indeed relevant to the concept of security. It is this phenomenon that traditionalists have cast off as irrelevant and other rejectionists of the environment-security link have ignored.

Linking security with the environment does not increase the possibility that nations will engage in more armed action against other states for the sake of natural resources such as water. Albeit minimal, evidence already exists as to the military skirmishes and military threats that have taken place over water. Nations will engage in armed conflict and political disputes over water **whether or not scholars acknowledge the link** between the environment and security. Similarly, the existence of more than 3,600 water treaties, the oldest dating to 805 AD, demonstrates a rich history of cooperation [End Page 239] over water regardless of scholarly debate on cooperation and the environment. The debate regarding the link between water, conflict, and cooperation is thus futile and has become a scholarly debate marred by polemics and semantics.

Given its geographical attributes, freshwater truly straddles the notion of sovereignty that traditionalists cherish so deeply and the international or regional conception that environmental globalists hold true. The problems that arise from shared water resources are both national and regional in nature. Similarly, the solutions that are needed to solve such problems are both national and regional. Most importantly for the debate on the environment and security, however, the impediments to cooperation and the instigation of conflict over water are both national and international in their sources. States in particular regions will continue to see water as a national security concern. Even though a regional agreement may be the best solution to states' water problems, they will continue to couch their need to access sufficient and clean freshwater in security and nationalist terms.

## 2ac threat con

#### No impact – threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

## A2 lng prices

#### Commercialization solves cost-competitiveness

Jim Hopf 12, senior nuclear engineer with more than 20 years of experience in shielding and criticality analysis and design for spent fuel dry storage and transportation systems. He has been involved in nuclear advocacy for 10+ years, and is a member of the ANS Public Information Committee. He is a regular contributor to the ANS Nuclear Café, “Congressional debate over terms of future 123 agreements”, May 7, <http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/05/07/congressional-debate-over-terms-of-future-123-agreements/>

Also of note is the fact that natural gas prices in the U.S. are currently very low (~$2/MBTU) and may stay relatively low for some time. This may limit the prospects for new nuclear here in the U.S. This makes access to international markets—where natural gas prices are much higher—even more important to the U.S. nuclear industry. Small modular reactors (SMRs) in particular, are an area where the U.S. may be able to take the technological lead and reestablish leadership in the world nuclear industry. A healthy market for those SMRs, however, would be necessary.

## 2ac no root cause

#### Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

**Sharpe**, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, **‘10**

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.**

In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **always in danger of passing over** the **salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology.

We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

## 1ar hager

#### Their impact is wrong – debate over even the most technical issues improves decision-making and advocacy

**Hager**, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, **‘92**

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects. Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany. In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, **grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems.** Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but **to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens** through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots **energy protest in West Germany** is twofold. First, it **produced major substantive changes in public policy.** Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

## 1ar epistemology

#### Causes endless paradigm wars

**Wendt**, professor of international security – Ohio State University, **‘98**

(Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will **inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. **Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method.**

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘**paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged**, **or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.

Broad indicts of epistemology don’t take out our impacts – you should weigh **specific evidence** to get closer to the truth

**Kratochwil**, professor of international relations – European University Institute, **‘8**

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

In what follows, I claim that the shift in focus from “demonstration” to science as practice provides strong prima facie reasons to choose pragmatic rather than traditional epistemological criteria in social analysis.

Irrespective of its various forms, the epistemological project includes an argument that all warranted knowledge has to satisfy certain field- independent criteria that are specified by philosophy (a “theory of know- ledge”). The real issue of how our concepts and the world relate to each other, and on which non-idiosyncratic grounds we are justified to hold on to our beliefs about the world, is “answered” by two metaphors. The first is that of an inconvertible ground, be it the nature of things, certain intuitions (Des- cartes’ “clear and distinct ideas”) or methods and inferences; the second is that of a “mirror” that shows what is the case.

There is no need to rehearse the arguments demonstrating that these under- lying beliefs and metaphors could not sustain the weight placed upon them. A “method” à la Descartes could not make good on its claims, as it depended ultimately on the guarantee of God that concepts and things in the outer world match. On the other hand, the empiricist belief in direct observation forgot that “facts” which become “data” are – as the term suggests – “made”. They are based on the judgements of the observer using cultural criteria, even if they appear to be based on direct perception, as is the case with colours.4

Besides, there had always been a sneaking suspicion that the epistemo- logical ideal of certainty and rigour did not quite fit the social world, an objection voiced first by humanists such as Vico, and later rehearsed in the continuing controversies about erklären and verstehen (Weber 1991; for a more recent treatment see Hollis 1994). In short, both the constitutive nature of our concepts, and the value interest in which they are embedded, raise peculiar issues of meaning and contestation that are quite different from those of description. As Vico (1947) suggested, we “understand” the social world because we have “made it”, a point raised again by Searle concerning both the crucial role played by ascriptions of meaning (x counts for y) in the social world and the distinction between institutional “facts” from “brute” or natural facts (Searle 1995). Similarly, since values are constitutive for our “interests”, the concepts we use always portray an action from a certain point of view; this involves appraisals and prevents us from accepting allegedly “neutral” descriptions that would be meaningless. Thus, when we say that someone “abandoned” another person and hence communicate a (contestable) appraisal, we want to call attention to certain important moral implica- tions of an act. Attempting to eliminate the value-tinge in the description and insisting that everything has to be cast in neutral, “objective”, observational language – such as “he opened the door and went through it” – would indeed make the statement “pointless”, even if it is (trivially) “true” (for a powerful statement of this point, see Connolly 1983).

The most devastating attack on the epistemological project, however, came from the history of science itself. It not only corrected the naive view of knowledge generation as mere accumulation of data, but it also cast increasing doubt on the viability of various field-independent “demarcation criteria”. This was, for the most part, derived from the old Humean argument that only sentences with empirical content were “meaningful”, while value statements had to be taken either as statements about individual preferences or as meaningless, since de gustibus non est disputandum. As the later dis- cussion in the Vienna circle showed, this distinction was utterly unhelpful (Popper 1965: ch. 2). It did not solve the problem of induction, and failed to acknowledge that not all meaningful theoretical sentences must correspond with natural facts.

Karl Popper’s ingenious solution of making “refutability” the logical cri- terion and interpreting empirical “tests” as a special mode of deduction (rather than as a way of increasing supporting evidence) seemed to respond to this epistemological quandary for a while. An “historical reconstruction” of science as a progressive development thus seemed possible, as did the specification of a pragmatic criterion for conducting research.

Yet again, studies in the history of science undermined both hopes. The different stages in Popper’s own intellectual development are, in fact, rather telling. He started out with a version of conjectures and refutations that was based on the notion of a more or less self-correcting demonstration. Con- fronted with the findings that scientists did not use the refutation criterion in their research, he emphasised then the role of the scientific community on which the task of “refutation” devolved. Since the individual scientist might not be ready to bite the bullet and admit that she or he might have been wrong, colleagues had to keep him or her honest. Finally, towards the end of his life, Popper began to rely less and less on the stock of knowledge or on the scientists’ shared theoretical understandings – simply devalued as the “myth of the framework” – and emphasised instead the processes of communica- tion and of “translation” among different schools of thought within a scien- tific community (Popper 1994). He still argued that these processes follow the pattern of “conjecture and refutation”, but the model was clearly no longer that of logic or of scientific demonstration, but one that he derived from his social theory – from his advocacy of an “open society” (Popper 1966). Thus a near total reversal of the ideal of knowledge had occurred. While formerly everything was measured in terms of the epistemological ideal derived from logic and physics, “knowledge” was now the result of deliberation and of certain procedural notions for assessing competing knowledge claims. Politics and law, rather than physics, now provided the template.

Thus the history of science has gradually moved away from the epistemo- logical ideal to focus increasingly on the actual practices of various scientific communities engaged in knowledge production, particularly on how they handle problems of scientific disagreement.5 This reorientation implied a move away from field-independent criteria and from the demonstrative ideal to one in which “**arguments” and the “weight” of evidence had to be appraised**. This, in turn, not only generated a bourgeoning field of “science studies” and their “social” epistemologies (see Fuller 1991), but also suggested more generally that the traditional understandings of knowledge production based on the model of “theory” were in need of revision.

If the history of **science** therefore **provides strong reasons for a pragmatic turn**, as the discussion above illustrates, what remains to be shown is how this turn relates to the historical, linguistic and constructivist turns that preceded it. To start with, from the above it should be clear that, in the social world, we are not dealing with natural kinds that exist and are awaiting, so to speak, prepackaged, their placement in the appropriate box. The objects we investi- gate are rather conceptual creations and they are intrinsically linked to the language through which the social world is constituted. Here “constructivists”, particularly those influenced by Wittgenstein and language philosophy, easily link up with “pragmatists” such as Rorty, who emphasises the product- ive and pragmatic role of “vocabularies” rather than conceiving of language as a “mirror of nature” (Rorty 1979).

Furthermore, precisely because social facts are not natural, but have to be reproduced through the actions of agents, any attempt to treat them like “brute” facts becomes doubly problematic. For one, even “natural” facts are not simply “there”; they are interpretations based on our theories. Secondly, different from the observation of natural facts, in which perceptions address a “thing” through a conceptually mediated form, social reality is entirely “arti- ficial” in the sense that it is dependent on the beliefs and practices of the actors themselves. This reproductive process, directed by norms, always engenders change either interstitially, when change is small-scale or adaptive – or more dramatically, when it becomes “transformative” – for instance when it produces a new system configuration, as after the advent of national- ism (Lapid and Kratochwil 1995) or after the demise of the Soviet Union (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994). Consequently, any examination of the social world has to become in a way “historical” even if some “structuralist” theories attempt to minimise this dimension. [. . .]

**Therefore a pragmatic approach to social science and IR seems both necessary and promising**.

On the one hand, it is substantiated by the failure of the epistemological project that has long dominated the field. On the other, it offers a **different positive heuristics** that challenges IR’s traditional disciplin- ary boundaries and methodological assumptions. Interest in pragmatism therefore does not seem to be just a passing fad – even if such an interpre- tation cannot entirely be discounted, given the incentives of academia to find, just like advertising agencies, “new and improved” versions of familiar products.

## global research

Global Research and Chossudovsky = holocaust deniers, conspiracy theorists, generally insane

Jewish Tribune, 8/25/’5

(<http://www.jewishtribune.ca/tribune/jt-050825-05.html>)

B’nai Brith Canada reacted with concern after reviewing materials posted on the GlobalResearch.ca web site run by Michel Chossudovsky, a professor of economics at the University of Ottawa, which are rife with anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and Holocaust denial.

“There is no doubt about it. The material on the site is full of wild conspiracy theories that go so far as to accuse Israel, America and Britain of being behind the recent terrorist bombings in London. They echo the age-old antisemitic expressions that abound in the Arab world, which blame the Jews for everything from 9/11 to the more recent Tsunami disaster,” said Frank Dimant, executive vice president of B’nai Brith Canada.

“We have written to officials at the University of Ottawa, which appears to have no formal affiliation to Global Research, to convey our deep concern. We have asked the university to conduct its own investigation of this propagandist site and to take appropriate action under its academic policies. We trust that the university will fulfill its responsibility – first and foremost to its student body – to take all necessary steps to ensure that such poisoned messaging does not find its way into the classroom.”

The story broke last weekend in the Ottawa Citizen in an article by Pauline Tam.

The Citizen said the web site also reprints articles from other writers that accuse Jews of controlling the US media and masterminding the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Other postings suggest Israel, the U.S. and Britain are the real perpetrators of the recent attacks on London.

The site, which is not hosted by the university, is run by Chossudovsky, and came to the attention of B'nai Brith Canada after receiving public complaints.

The organization singles out a discussion forum, moderated by Chossudovsky, that features a subject heading called Some Articles On The Truth of the Holocaust. The messages have titles such as Jewish Lies of Omission (about the ‘Holocaust’), Jewish Hate Responsible For Largest Mass Killing at Dachau, and Did Jews Frame the Arabs for 9/11?

Another posting suggests the number of Jews who died at Auschwitz during the Second World War is inflated.

## sustainable

**The system’s sustainable**

Ann F. **Wolfgram 5**, junior fellow at Massey College – Phd in history from Toronto, “Population, Resources & Environment: A Survey of the Debate”, January 1, <http://www.voxfux.com/features/malthusian_theory/malthusian_theory.htm>

The resource category of minerals is, by nature, varied and broad, encompassing minerals such as copper and coal. In recent years, the mineral that has drawn the most public attention has been petroleum, particularly in reference to consumption and perceived scarcity. Because it is such a well-known mineral, let us take petroleum as a case-in-point for minerals as related to the population-resources question. Neo-Malthusian approach: In years past, the main concern coming from this sector was fear of total mineral resource depletion. In an on-going public debate between Lester Brown, of the Neo-Malthusian school, and Julian Simon, Simon wagered that mineral resources were not being depleted, because price, which reflects scarcity, did not rise but declined in the long-term. Simon won the wager. (Simon’s position will be discussed later in this section.) In recent years, the neo-Malthusian argument, especially with regard to petroleum has shifted from concern over resource depletion to effects of mining and mineral usage on the environment. Fears over land degradation due to mining, air pollution due to burning petroleum, water pollution due to oil spills and industry waste, among other things, are now the main thrust of the neo-Malthusian argument with regard to minerals resources, petroleum in particular. These will be discussed in a later section devoted to population and environment. Scientific evidence: According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), domestic oil reserves have declined over the past decade. However, **this should not naively be thought to be a sign that the world is rapidly running out of oil**. Rather, it means that less oil was being produced by oil companies. The DOE pointed to several economic and industry trends that impacted domestic reserves, such as the sharp decrease in drilling due to the collapse of crude oil prices in 1986, the shift within the petroleum industry to drilling for natural gas, and restrictions on oil exploration in oil-prone places in the United States. (32) Domestic and world oil resources are difficult to quantify in that, in addition to known high-grade resources, there are lower-grade oil reserves which can be tapped using new technologies, as well as oil fields that have yet to be discovered. In 1995, the Department of Interior’s estimate for undiscovered recoverable oil plus inferred resources of domestic crude oil was 132 billion barrels, which was six times larger than the 1995 proven reserves. (33) It must also be remembered that the most oil reserves lie outside of the United States. People-as-Problem-Solvers: Predictably, one of the responses of the human creativity/ technological advancement proponents is that technological development will allow for a greater efficiency in the use of minerals resources. However, there is a second dimension to technological development that they point to: technological advancements may also mean less dependence on a given resource. For instance, historically, wood and steam were the primary sources of energy prior to oil. With the advent of the internal combustion engine, petroleum became the primary energy resource. Thus, the development of new technologies caused a shift in the demand for certain resources. In the future, our sources of energy may be nuclear power, solar power or wind power. As Julian Simon, a self-described optimist in these matters, argues, # trends in energy costs and scarcity have been downward over the entire period for which we have data. **And such trends are usually the most reliable bases for forecasts**. From these data we may conclude with considerable confidence that energy will be less costly and more available in the future than in the past. The reason that the cost of energy has declined in the long-run is the fundamental process of (1) increased demand due to growth of population and income, which raises prices and hence constitutes opportunity to entrepreneurs and inventors; (2) the search for new ways of supplying the demand for energy; (3) the eventual discovery of methods which leave us better off than if the original problem had not appeared. (34) Thus, according to Simon theory based on historical data, either new technologies will develop, thereby lessening the need for more petroleum, or scarcity will eventually arise, thus spurring invention and development of new technologies.

## 2ac impact d

#### Racism is not the root cause – resolving it doesn’t solve conflict

**Mertus 99** (Professor Julie Mertus is the co-director of Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs. She has written widely on human rights and gender, conflict, the Balkans, U.S. foreign policy and U.N. institutions. She is the author or editor of ten books, including Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, named "human rights book of the year" by the American Political Science Association) and, most recently Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions and The United Nations and Human Rights. Before entering academia, she worked as a researcher, writer and lawyer for several human rights and humanitarian organizations., J.D., Yale Law School; B.S. Cornell University, International Council on Human Rights Policy, “THE ROLE OF RACISM AS A CAUSE OF OR FACTOR IN WARS AND CIVIL CONFLICT”, http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/167/112\_-\_The\_Role\_of\_Racism\_as\_a\_Cause\_of\_or\_Factor\_in\_Wars\_and\_Civil\_Conflict\_Mertus\_\_Julie\_\_1999.pdf)

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICTS WITH RACIAL DIMENSION: ROLES OF RACISM 18. The above discussion demonstrates a primary characteristic of conflicts with a racial dimension. Political mobilisation linked to real and imagined group differences arises where the state’s administrative structures and legal institutions distribute scarce resources based on ethnic/national differences. The problem is particularly acute where, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, lead positions in military and police forces are distributed based on group identity.20 Yugoslavia and Rwanda are textbook examples of cases in which the controlling entity (the state, the party, the colonial entity) “for its own administrative convenience and in order to improve control over local élites, may select certain ethnic élites and organisations as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage.”21 This favouritism based on group identity serves to polarise societies and, additionally, to institutionalise and make acceptable intragroup suspicion and hatred. 19. In Rwanda and Kosovo, polarisation and racism played a role, not as the root cause of conflict, but as a tool of élites. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, many of those who participated in the propaganda inciting racism, were intellectuals.22 It is characteristic of conflicts with a racist dimension that élites have the ability to manipulate racism because of other conditions incountry, such as: structural poverty, unmet human development needs, comparative deprivation of one group to another, media manipulation of misunderstandings among the general populace, and the absence of human rights, the rule of law and civil and political institutions

encouraging citizen participation. Where a group perceives a threat to its interests and values, rising counterélites find playing the racist/nationalist/ chauvinist card a particularly useful tool to assert a right to rule to protect the “true” national or ethnic interest. In Rwanda and Kosovo, extremist élites played upon the deep fears and frustrations of the populace. 20. In Rwanda, the enemy was often portrayed in racialised terms, as of polluted and inferior stock.23 For example: The newspaper Kangura (under the editorship of Hassan Ngeze) published the “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which referred to the Tutsis as “evil,” and their intermarriage with Hutus a pollution of “pure Hutu.” Propaganda especially encouraged the killing of Tutsi children, so that Tutsi genes would not reemerge. Women and girls (who were frequently the victims of sex-based torture and killings) were often the specific subject matter of propaganda. For instance, they were often portrayed as having the innate qualities of “seductress-spies.” Being considered more beautiful, they were also considered to be more sexual, and were accused of sleeping with their “Tutsi brothers.” The newspaper Kangura (again in its ten commandments for Hutus) stated that: Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? Leon Mugesera (Vice-President of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development) gave a speech at his group’s rally on 22 November 1992, where he referred to the Tutsis as Inyenzi, which means “cockroaches” - a term often used by his party in propaganda about the Tutsis. His statements were often repeated on RadioTélévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), a station renown for its role in broadcasting similar types of propaganda. Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) had also broadcast propaganda about the RPF, claiming that not only did they kill people, but they dissected them and ate them, thus making the RPF appear inhuman. People who married those of the opposing group were said to produce children who were “hybrids.” People who attempted to pass for members of the opposing group were like “beings with two heads.” Propagandists also played upon the theme that Tutsis were not originally from the area, and therefore were outsiders who could not be trusted. Those Tutsis who had reached positions of importance e.g. in government, were said to have slipped “like snakes” to infiltrate those positions. 21. In Kosovo, hate propaganda against Kosovar Albanians was not as blatantly racist but instead were “nationalist’ or chauvinist.” Nonetheless, as the 80’s progressed, the discourse became increasingly racist. Some examples follow:24 Media throughout the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, portrayed Albanians as “less civilised” and less cultured. Albanian women were said to be “baby factories.” Images of Albanian women in the press rarely showed educated, urban Albanian women. Albanian men were said to be “savages.” Images of Albanian men in the press rarely showed educated, urban Albanian men. Kosovar Albanians were accused of being rapists, although in reality they were actually less likely to be accused of rape than members of other national groups. Blanket acceptance of allegations of Albanian sexual misdeeds were corporal, that is racist. Whenever the public needed to be reminded about the victimisation of Serbs and the barbaric nature of Albanians, the image of Djordje Martinovic was conveniently invoked. Martinovic is an ethnic Serb who claimed to have been raped with a bottle by two Albanians. As a violent crime of the most “unspeakable nature,” the act itself was “written on the body.” The power of the Martinovic case lay in its ability to invoke the primary image of Serb oppression: the Ottoman Turk’s practice of impaling their victims with a stick. With respect to the Martinovic and other cases, the media tapped into historic racism against Turks and Muslims. Albanians were equated with Turkish and Muslim peoples (while in reality, Albanians do not identify as such; they are not “Turks” and some Albanians are Catholic or Orthodox). Albanians were continually portrayed as fanatical, sly and evil – enemies from within. For example, when a young Yugoslav army recruit named Aziz Keljmendi shot four men dead in his barracks, Albanians as a group were accused of aiding the crime. 22. The problem in the former Yugoslavia was not the complete absence of free speech. While the government cracked down against the activities of some nationalist journalists and others critical of Tito’s legacy, it can also be said that the most virulent hate speech in Yugoslavia was made possible due to an increase in free speech.25 In contrast, in Rwanda information was suppressed through direct government harassment of and control over journalists and through tight controls on the right to freedom of movement which made it easier for authorities to cover up human rights abuses and to present their own version of state-sponsored and state-condoned violence. 26 23. Despite the differences in relative degrees of free speech, the core problem in Rwanda and Kosovo was the same. In both areas, speech went unchallenged due to a lack of institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental informational monopolies, the absence of common public forums for the free and safe exchange of diverse ideas, and the absence of a prerequisite for a “well developed” civil society: “the set of institutions and social norms that make pluralism a civil process of persuasion and reconciling of differences.”27 The electronic media was the most powerful force in both Kosovo and Rwanda due to its ability to reach rural populations (Rwanda relied largely on radio, former Yugoslavia radio and television), and in both cases an ethic prevailed of biased journalism. 24. Racist discourse masterfully regenerates historical mythology and creates a culture of victimisation. Once one feels like a victim, it is much easier to be a perpetrator. Many types of hate propaganda are useful in creating a culture of victimisation, but racist discourse wields particularly potent power. Once a person can be called genetically inferior or not human at all – the height of racism - killing thus becomes justified, easy, and noble. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, hate propaganda was used in this manner to play upon memories of real and imagined past domination by the minority. Racist discourse was particularly effective in creating an enemy “other” because it tapped into the audience’s predispositions. The violent result, however, was not preordained by “tribal hatreds.” Rather, it was the deliberate result of a carefully calculated political campaign driven by a racist/nationalist/genocidal ideology, and helped along by the structural and institutional shortcomings of the societies. 25. In Kosovo, the state-sponsored and state-condoned hate propaganda offered support for a virulent chauvinist agenda that included military and paramilitary abuses. In Rwanda, the connection between militias and racist media was even more pronounced: the media was used to disseminate instructions as to when and how to kill.28 Although some of those participating in the killings were government army and militia members, many of those who joined in the killings were “peasants,”29 and the young and young adults formed a large part of the audience for such stations as Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Although they would not normally have engaged in the torture and killing of their fellow citizens, many claimed that the propaganda broadcast by the government radio convinced them that it was the only action to take. One such man said “I did not believe the Tutsis were coming to kills us, but when the government radio continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutus – when this was repeated over and over – I began to feel some kind of fear.”30 In Rwanda, the historic system of racial classification offered an easy guide for the killings. Singling out the enemy was also easy in Kosovo because of extreme polarisation between the two groups. 26. The racist ideology in Kosovo and Rwanda led to brutal racist acts as hate manifested itself in attempts to destroy the “other.”31 Serbian and Hutu militias subjected Albanian and Tutsi women (and in some cases men) to acts of sexual violence – individual rapes, gang rapes, rapes with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels and sexual mutilation. In Rwanda, Hutu militias slaughtered Tutsis en masse and in Kosovo Albanians were forcibly deported. In both cases, men, women and children civilians were murdered, imprisoned, and tortured. These acts were racist because they were made possible by the dehumanisation of the “other”; these severe and systematic violent acts were said to be necessary to “preserve” the superior group, that is the Serbs or Tutsis. These crimes were also at their core “political” as they were perpetuated, directed or sanctioned by military and political leaders with a view toward fulfilling their political goals. 27. The historical failure of the court systems to address fairly and adequately intergroup violence gave perpetrators the sense that violence for political ends was “normal” and that such actions could be undertaken with virtual impunity. The absence of the rule of law, coupled with economic deprivations and a lack of democratic institutions, made Rwanda and Kosovo structurally extremely violent societies susceptible to a culture of hate. The outbursts of murderous violence then was “not something new, but primarily part of a continuum of everpresent violence in which violence is the answer to violence, and in which victims temporarily become perpetrators and then victims again.”32 Addressing the use of racism in conflict then means addressing the underlying the structural causes of violence. Until this happens, the cycle of violence will continue.