# 1NC

## off

#### The aff’s invocation of death impacts is necrophilia, a blind obsession with body counts that ends in extinction. Vote neg to reject death impacts—this is a gateway issue—if they win death impacts are good, the rest of the 1NC applies—we won’t cross-apply to prove links

Erich **Fromm 64**, PhD in sociology from Heidelberg in 1922, psychology prof at MSU in the 60’s, “Creators and Destroyers”, The Saturday Review, New York (04. January 1964), pp. 22-25

People are aware of the possibility of nuclear war; they are aware of the destruction such a war could bring with it--and yet they seemingly make no effort to avoid it. Most of us are puzzled by this behavior because we start out from the premise that people love life and fear death. Perhaps we should be less puzzled if we questioned this premise. Maybe there are many people who are indifferent to life and many others who do not love life but who do love death. There is an orientation which we may call love of life (biophilia); it is the normal orientation among healthy persons. But there is also to be found in others a deep attraction to death which, following Unamuno's classic speech made at the University of Salamanca (1938), I call necrophilia. It is the attitude which a Franco general, Millán Astray, expressed in the slogan "Long live death, thus provoking Unamuno’s protest against this "necrophilous and senseless cry." Who is a necrophilous person? He is one who is attracted to and fascinated by all that is not alive, to all that is dead; to corpses, to decay, to feces, to dirt. Necrophiles are those people who love to talk about sickness, burials, death. They come to life precisely when they can talk about death. A clear example of the pure necrophilous type was Hitler. He was fascinated by destruction, and the smell of death was sweet to him. While in the years of success it may have appeared that he wanted only to destroy those whom he considered his enemies, the days of the Götterdämmerung at the end showed that his deepest satisfaction lay in witnessing total and absolute destruction: that of the German people, of those around him, and of himself. The necrophilous dwell in the past, never in the future. Their feelings are essentially sentimental; that is, they nurse the memory of feelings which they had yesterday--or believe that they had. They are cold, distant, devotees of "law and order." Their values are precisely the reverse of the values we connect with normal life; not life, but death excites and satisfies them. If one wants to understand the influence of men like Hitler and Stalin, it lies precisely in their unlimited capacity and willingness to kill. For this they' were loved by the necrophiles. Of the rest, many were afraid of them and so preferred to admire, rather than to be aware of, their fear. Many others did not sense the necrophilous quality of these leaders and saw in them the builders, saviors, good fathers. If the necrophilous leaders had not pretended that they were builders and protectors, the number of people attracted to them would hardly have been sufficient to help them seize power, and the number of those repelled by them would probably soon have led to their downfall. While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the necrophilous principle is all that which does not grow, that which is mechanical. The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. All living processes, feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things. Memory, rather than experience--having, rather than being--are what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object--a flower or a person--only if he possesses it; hence, a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world. That is why we find the paradoxical reaction that he would rather lose life than possession, even though, by losing life, he who possesses has ceased to exist. He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life. He is deeply afraid of life, because it is disorderly and uncontrollable by its very nature. The woman who wrongly claims to be the mother of the child in the story of Solomon's judgment is typical of this tendency; she would rather have a properly divided dead child than lose a living one. To the necrophilous person justice means correct division, and they are willing to kill or die for the sake of what they call, justice. "Law and order" for them are idols, and everything that threatens law and order is felt as a satanic attack against their supreme values. The necrophilous person is attracted to darkness and night. In mythology and poetry (as well as in dreams) he is attracted to caves, or to the depth of the ocean, or depicted as being blind. (The trolls in Ibsen's Peer Gynt are a good example.) All that is away from or directed against life attracts him. He wants to return to the darkness {23} of the womb, to the past of inorganic or subhuman existence. He is essentially oriented to the past, not to the future, which he hates and fears. Related to this is his craving for certainty. But life is never certain, never predictable, never controllable; in order to make life controllable, it must be transformed into death; death, indeed, is the only thing about life that is certain to him. The necrophilous person can often be recognized by his looks and his gestures. He is cold, his skin looks dead, and often he has an expression on his face as though he were smelling a bad odor. (This expression could be clearly seen in Hitler's face.) He is orderly and obsessive. This aspect of the necrophilous person has been demonstrated to the world in the figure of Eichmann. Eichmann was fascinated by order and death. His supreme values were obedience and the proper functioning of the organization. He transported Jews as he would have transported coal. That they were human beings was hardly within the field of his vision; hence, even the problem of his having hated or not hated his victims is irrelevant. He was the perfect bureaucrat who had transformed all life into the administration of things. But examples of the necrophilous character are by no means to be found only among the inquisitors, the Hitlers and the Eichmanns. There are any number of individuals who do not have the opportunity and the power to kill, vet whose necrophilia expresses itself in other and (superficially seen) more harmless ways. An example is the mother who will always be interested in her child's sickness, in his failures, in dark prognoses for the future; at the same time she will not be impressed by a favorable change nor respond to her child's joy, nor will she notice anything new that is growing within him. We might find that her dreams deal with sickness, death, corpses, blood. She does not harm the child in any obvious way, yet she may slowly strangle the child's joy of life, his faith--in growth, and eventually infect him with her own necrophilous orientation. My description may have given the impression that all the features mentioned here are necessarily found in the necrophilous person. It is true that such divergent features as the wish to kill, the worship of force, the attraction to death and dirt, sadism, the wish to transform the organic into the inorganic through "order" are all part of the same basic orientation. Yet so far as individuals are concerned, there are considerable differences with respect to the strength of these respective trends. Any one of the features mentioned here may be more pronounced in one person than in another. Furthermore, the degree to which a person is necrophilous in comparison with his biophilous aspects and the degree to which a person is aware of necrophilous tendencies and rationalizes them vary considerably from person to person. Yet the concept of the necrophilous type is by no means an abstraction or summary of various disparate behavior trends. Necrophilia constitutes a fundamental orientation; it is the one answer to life that is in complete opposition to life; it is the most morbid and the most dangerous among the orientations to life of which man is capable. It is true perversion; while living, not life but death is loved--not growth, but destruction. The necrophilous person, if he dares to be aware of what he feels, expresses the motto of his life when he says: "Long live death!" The opposite of the necrophilous orientation is the biophilous one; its essence is love of life in contrast to love of death. Like necrophilia, biophilia is not constituted by a single trait but represents a total orientation, an entire way of being. It is manifested in a person's bodily processes, in his emotions, in his thoughts, in his gestures; the biophilous orientation expresses itself in the whole man. The person who fully loves life is attracted by the process of life in all spheres. He prefers to construct, rather than to retain. He is capable of wondering, and he prefers to see something new to the security of finding the old confirmed. He loves the adventure of living more than he does certainty. His approach to life is functional rather than mechanical. He sees the whole rather than only the parts, structures rather than summations. He wants to mold and to influence by love, by reason, by his example--not by force, by cutting things apart, by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they were things. He enjoys life and all its manifestations, rather than mere excitement. Biophilic ethics has its own principle of good and evil. Good is all that serves life; evil is all that serves death. Good is reverence for life (this is the main thesis of Albert Schweitzer, one of the great representatives of the love of life--both in his writings and in his person), and all that enhances life. Evil is all that stifles life, narrows it down, {24} cuts it into pieces. Thus it is from the standpoint of life-ethics that the Bible mentions as the central sin of the Hebrews: "Because thou didst not serve thy Lord with joy and gladness of heart in the abundance of all things." The conscience of the biophilous person is not one of forcing oneself to refrain from evil and to do good. It is not the superego described by .Freud, a strict taskmaster employing sadism against oneself for the sake of virtue. The biophilous conscience is motivated by its attraction to life and joy; the moral effort consists in strengthening the life loving side in oneself. For this reasons the biophile does not dwell in remorse and guilt, which are, after all, only aspects of self-loathing and sadness. He turns quickly to life and attempts to do good. Spinoza's Ethics is a striking example of biophilic morality. "Pleasure," he says, "in itself is not bad but good; contrariwise, pain in itself is bad." And in the same spirit: "A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life." Love of life underlies the various versions of humanistic philosophy. In various conceptual forms these philosophies are in the same vein as Spinoza's; they express the principle that the same man loves life; that man's aim in life is to be attracted by all that is alive and to separate himself from all that is dead and mechanical. The dichotomy of biophilia-necrophilia is the same as Freud's life-and-death instinct. I believe, as Freud did, that this is the most fundamental polarity that exists. However, there is one important difference. Freud assumes that the striving toward death and toward life are two biologically given tendencies inherent in all living substance that their respective strengths are relatively constant, and that there is only one alternative within the operation of the death instinct--namely, that it can be directed against the outside world or against oneself. In contrast to these assumptions I believe that necrophilia is not a normal biological tendency, but a pathological phenomenon--in fact, the most malignant pathology that exists in mail. What are we, the people of the United States today, with respect to necrophilia and biophilia? Undoubtedly our spiritual tradition is one of love of life. And not only this. Was there ever a culture with more love of "fun" and excitement, or with greater opportunities for the majority to enjoy fun and excitement? But even if this is so, fun and excitement is not the same as joy and love of life; perhaps underneath there is indifference to life, or attraction to death? To answer this question we must consider the nature of our bureaucratized, industrial, mass civilization. Our approach to life becomes increasingly mechanical. The aim of social efforts is to produce things, and. in the process of idolatry of things we transform ourselves into commodities. The question here is not whether they are treated nicely and are well fed (things, too, can be treated nicely); the question is whether people are things or living beings. People love mechanical gadgets more than living beings. The approach to man is intellectualabstract. One is interested in people as objects, in their common properties, in the statistical rules of mass behavior, not in living individuals. All this goes together with the increasing role of bureaucratic methods. In giant centers of production, giant cities, giant countries, men are administered as if they were things; men and their administrators are transformed into things, and they obey the law of things. In a bureaucratically organized and centralized industrialism, men's tastes are manipulated so that they consume maximally and in predictable and profitable directions. Their intelligence and character become standardized by the ever-increasing use of tests, which select the mediocre and unadventurous over the original and daring. Indeed, the bureaucratic-industrial civilization that has been victorious in Europe and North America has created a new type of man. He has been described as the "organization man" and as homo consumens. He is in addition the homo mechanicus. By this I mean a "gadget man," deeply attracted to all that is mechanical and inclined against all that is alive. It is, of course, true that man's biological and physiological equipment provides him with such strong sexual impulses that even the homo mechanicus still has sexual desires and looks for women. But there is no doubt that the gadget man's interest in women is diminishing. A New Yorker cartoon pointed to this very amusingly: a sales girl trying to sell a certain brand of perfume to a young female customer recommends it by remarking, "It smells like a new sports car." Indeed, any observer of men's behavior today will confirm that this cartoon is more than a clever joke. There are apparently a great number of men who are more interested in sports-cars, television and radio sets, space travel, and any number of gadgets than they are in women, love, nature, food; who are more stimulated by the manipulation of non-organic, mechanical things than by life. Their attitude toward a woman is like that toward a car: you push the button and watch it race. It is not even too farfetched to assume that homo mechanicus has more pride in and is more fascinated by, devices that can kill millions of people across a distance of several thousands of miles within minutes than he is frightened and depressed by the possibility of such mass destruction. Homo mechanicus still likes sex {25} and drink. But all these pleasures are sought for in the frame of reference of the mechanical and the unalive. He expects that there must be a button which, if pushed, brings happiness, love, pleasure. (Many go to a psychoanalyst under the illusion that he can teach them to find the button.) The homo mechanicus becomes more and more interested in the manipulation of machines, rather than in the participation in and response to life. Hence he becomes indifferent to life, fascinated by the mechanical, and eventually attracted by death and total destruction. This affinity between the love of destruction and the love of the mechanical may well have been expressed for the first time in Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto (1909). "A roaring motor-car, which looks as though running on a shrapnel is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace. … We wish to glorify war--the only health-giver of the world-militarism, patriotism, the destructive arm of the Anarchist, the beautiful Ideas that kill the contempt for woman." Briefly then, intellectualization, quantification, abstractification, bureaucratization, and reification--the very characteristics of modern industrial society--when applied to people rather than to things are not the principles of life but those of mechanics. People living in such a system must necessarily become indifferent to life, even attracted to death. They are not aware of this. They take the thrills of excitement for the joys of life and live under the illusion that they are very much alive when they only have many things to own and to use. The lack of protest against nuclear war and the discussion of our "atomologists" of the balance sheet of total or half-total destruction show how far we have already gone into the "valley of the shadow of death."1 To speak of the necrophilous quality of our industrial civilization does not imply that industrial production as such is necessarily contrary to the principles of life. The question is whether the principles of social organization and of life are subordinated to those of mechanization, or whether the principles of life are the dominant ones. Obviously, the industrialized world has not found thus far an answer, to the question posed here: How is it possible to create a humanist industrialism as against the bureaucratic mass industrialism that rules our lives today? The danger of nuclear war is so grave that man may arrive at a new barbarism before he has even a chance to find the road to a humanist industrialism. Yet not all hope is lost; hence we might ask ourselves whether the hypothesis developed here could in any way contribute to finding peaceful solutions. I believe it might be useful in several ways. First of all, an awareness of our pathological situation, while not yet a cure, is nevertheless a first step. If more people became aware of the difference between love of life and love of death, if they became aware that they themselves are already far gone in the direction of indifference or of necrophilia, this shock alone could produce new and healthy reactions. Furthermore, the sensitivity toward those who recommend death might be increased. Many might see through the pious rationalizations of the death lovers and change their admiration for them to disgust. Beyond this, our hypothesis would suggest one thing to those concerned with peace and survival: that every effort must be made to weaken the attraction of death and to strengthen the attraction of life. Why not declare that there is only one truly dangerous subversion, the subversion of life? Why do not those who represent the traditions of religion and humanism speak up and say that there is no deadlier sin than love for death and contempt for life? Why not encourage our best brains--scientists, artists, educators--to make suggestions on how to arouse and stimulate love for life as opposed to love for gadgets? I know love for gadgets brings profits to the corporations, while love for life requires fewer things and hence is less profitable. Maybe it is too late. Maybe the neutron bomb, which leaves entire cities intact, but without life, is to be the symbol of our civilization. But again, those of us who love life will not cease the struggle against necrophilia.

## off

#### Obama will solve fiscal cliff in the lame duck

Marcus, staff writer for the Washington Post, 10/27/2012

(Ruth, “How will fiscal cliff get fixed? It depends on who wins,” http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/how-will-fiscal-cliff-get-fixed-it-depends-on-who/article\_32ad6002-981e-52fd-abbb-597f60771dec.html)

Betting on Congress to do something - anything - is, as Samuel Johnson said of second marriages, the triumph of hope over experience. Betting on a lame-duck Congress to do anything of consequence is even more foolhardy.

Yet the Congress that limped back to town after the 2010 election was surprisingly fruitful. It extended expiring tax cuts, lifted the ban on gays in the military, and ratified a nuclear arms treaty.

**Could the 2012 lame duck be similarly productive?** **I'm uncharacteristically optimistic** - especially if President Obama is re-elected.

This is not a partisan assessment. Congress' primary post-election task will be to screech to a halt **before plunging off the fiscal cliff** of expiring tax cuts and looming budgetary sequester.

If Mitt Romney is elected, the well-honed instinct of Congress will be to do what it does best: punt. Romney has already said he would not want to see the lame-duck session try to craft some kind of grand bargain on taxes and spending.

Rather, he would prefer a reprieve of some months - extending the tax cuts, postponing the sequester - to come up with his own plan. Would an exiting Obama really veto an extension? Would he have the remaining juice to force a bargain? It's hard to see either happening.

Can-kicking in the event of a Romney victory is the safest bet, and in some ways the fairest outcome. The voters will have spoken. Let the new president and the new Congress deal with the problem.

**The calculus is different if Obama is re-elected**. The composition of Congress probably won't change much; if anything, Republicans are apt to have a narrower House majority, providing **an incentive for cooperation** while the GOP retains greater leverage.

There are four pieces of evidence to support this admittedly rosy scenario:

First, a bipartisan group of senators has been working intensively to craft a deal along the lines suggested by the Simpson-Bowles debt commission, a stew of revenue increases, tax reform, spending cuts and entitlement changes.

Second, **the administration has been working on a parallel track**, **with a debt-reduction plan to be unveiled soon after Election Day**. **Obama almost made it to the mountaintop once before** with Speaker John Boehner. Whatever the reasons that deal unraveled - did Obama chicken out? did Boehner balk? - both men see a budget deal as a legacy moment.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go **until he faces re-election**, US President Barack **Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions**, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign **pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels** and tackling climate change **have not passed muster with Congress**, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but **the White House has been unable to repeat** this **success in other energy policy areas** ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Successful Obama honeymoon is make or break for the economy

Newman, chief business correspondent for U.S. News & World Report, 10/26/2012

(Rick, “The Fiscal Cliff Masks an Improving Economy,” http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2012/10/26/the-fiscal-cliff-masks-an-improving-economy)

If President Barack Obama wins a second term, he may **enjoy the kind of honeymoon he didn't get the first time around**. And if Republican challenger Mitt Romney wins, he may wonder why Obama got all that gray hair.

At the moment, economists, politicos and pundits are obsessed with the looming election, to be followed by a tense lame-duck session in which Congress and the president must figure out what to do about the "fiscal cliff." If all of the tax hikes and spending cuts set to go into effect at the end of the year actually do, **it could torpedo economic growth and cause another recession**. Congress could also delay those big decisions or dicker indefinitely, **with the economy shackled to political ineptitude**.

But if Congress does its job, and legislates some kind of compromise, the prospects for the economy could brighten considerably in 2013. "Assuming the fiscal cliff is resolved in a relatively benign manner, a post-resolution rebound is likely," Bank of America Merrill Lynch advised in a recent report. There are several reasons for optimism:

Housing seems to have turned around for good. After a six-year housing bust, prices seemed to have stopped falling in most markets, and mortgage rates remain near record lows. A variety of indicators show that real estate agents, home builders and even buyers are increasingly bullish. That could turn housing from a drag on the economy into a driver of growth. "The odds are strong that housing will resume its long-absent role as a key contributor to GDP growth," says Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist of the Economic Outlook Group.

Consumers are surprisingly upbeat. Confidence surveys show an unusual divergence between business leaders, who have been getting gloomier, and ordinary people, who have been feeling better. The gap might exist because business leaders get paid to worry about problems like the fiscal cliff and the European debt crisis, while regular people may be tuning out such worries. If the economy manages to bypass the cliff, rising consumer confidence could generate a kind of self-sustaining lift.

Car sales are robust. Auto sales have become one of the stronger segments of the economy, despite higher gas prices and a weak job market. That suggests a few important things: Credit is loosening up, including subprime lending; many consumers feel confident enough to make big purchases; and the Federal Reserve's low-interest-rate policy may actually be working, at least in the car market.

Business spending is poised to pick up. CEOs have increasingly voiced their concern over political gridlock in Washington, deferring plans to invest or hire. That's probably slowing the economy today, which partly explains anemic growth of just 2 percent. But that might also indicate pent-up demand. "Corporations have accumulated profits and increased cash, suggesting they are primed for greater investment," according to Merrill Lynch. And with nearly $2 trillion of cash on hand, corporations have the means to administer quite a jolt to the economy, if their leaders choose to.

#### Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## off

#### Obama retains narrow lead

Levy, 10/26

(Polling Editor-Huffington Post, “Obama Holds Slim Lead In Ohio Polls” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/26/ohio-polls-obama\_n\_2025563.html)

President Barack Obama, who continues to run neck-and-neck with challenger Mitt Romney in national polls, got some good news Friday in the crucial battleground state of Ohio, where three new polls showed him with a slim lead. Obama led Romney 50 percent to 46 percent among Ohio likely voters, according to a CNN/ORC poll conducted Oct. 23 through Oct. 25. That's close to where the candidates stood at the beginning of the month. Among independent voters, Obama led 49 percent to Romney's 44 percent. The CNN poll surveyed 741 likely voters, with a 3.5 percent margin of error. Two other polls in the state, from the American Research Group and Purple Strategies, also showed Obama edging Romney, in each case by two percentage points. A poll released Wednesday by Rasmussen showed the candidates tied. HuffPost Pollster's estimate gives Obama the lead in Ohio by more than two percentage points. With the margin so close, both campaigns remain focused on winning the state. Obama and Romney each held Ohio rallies this week and plan to return over the weekend.

#### Environmentalists oppose CCS for oil

Plumer, 12

(Washington Post Columnist, 10/11, “How’s that big carbon-capture push going? Slowly. Too slowly,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/11/so-you-want-to-stash-your-carbon-emissions-underground/)

**Environmentalists tend to be divided over carbon-capture technology**. Those in favor, like James Fallows, argue that coal isn’t going away, so we need to figure out how to blunt the impact of all that pollution. **Opponents counter that CCS is too pricey, that there’s a risk the stored carbon-dioxide could leak out, and that we should just phase out coal use altogether and shift to renewable energy.**

#### Enviro on the brink – flips the election

Schnur 12

Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Obama win key to stop European missile defense – failure collapses Russias nuke deterrent and causes war

Levi 12

(David Meir, Prof of History @ San Jose State University and writes and lectures on Middle East topics, “Russia Wants Obama Re-Elected” May 11th, 2012, <http://frontpagemag.com/2012/david-meir-levi/russia-wants-obama-re-elected/>)

At an international conference on Thursday, May 3, organized at Russia’s initiative, the Russian delegates showed computer-generated images of a hypothetical Russian pre-emptive missile attack on segments of a missile defense shield and early warning system that the US and NATO want to put in place in Turkey, Rumania and Poland. Quite a scary threat from the former USSR’s 900-pound gorilla and one-time global nuclear super-power. NATO says that the missile defense system is meant to counter Iran’s threats of a WMD Shi’ite Armageddon. However, the Russians are not comforted, because they fear that the NATO anti-missile missiles could also be used to shoot down Russian nuclear-armed missiles aimed at the West; and such a potential threat from the west could “undermine their country’s nuclear deterrent[.]” The Russians organized the Thursday conference in order to place their threat on the table, loud and clear, and make public their demand that they get a written agreement that the West will never use its missiles against Russia. Currently, the USA and NATO have refused to put such a promise in writing, although Russia-NATO agreements on missile defense cooperation date back to 2010. The timing of this meeting is important. It comes shortly before a NATO conference due to take place in Chicago later this month at which NATO will publicize its success in getting its missile-defense system up and running. Russia’s pre-emptive threat of a missile war against the West if the West does not agree to its demands puts a big kink in the Chicago conference. But according to the Wall Street Journal article, **Russia’s** alarming **saber-rattling is** really **a façade to hide a “tacit agreement to put off serious talks until next year,” by which time Obama, if re-elected, could “clear the way for a deal” and work on Russia’s behalf against NATO to find ways to accommodate the Russian demands**. The Russian presenter on Thursday was direct and unambiguous that Russia prefers to work with Obama as a second-term president, and to cooperate with his vision of a “reset” in the USA- Russia relationship, rather than to joust with Romney whose election they feel will make things “surely … more difficult.” So what the Russians have actually said is: if you want to keep the Russian bear from getting aggressive, elect Obama, not Romney. This is an unusually overt attempt by a foreign power to influence American elections, but it is not surprising since Romney has been harshly critical of Obama’s “reset” vision. The Wall Street Journal made the obvious connection between this impasse and the “hot mic” incident in March where Obama told Russian Prime Minister Medvedev to tell Russian soon-to-be President Vladimir Putin to temporarily back off regarding this issue since Obama would have “more flexibility” to deal with it after the November 6 elections. As reporters gathered for a news conference in Seoul, South Korea, Obama leaned over to his Russian counterpart. Without realizing a microphone was open, he said: “This is my last election and after my last election I have more flexibility,” …referring to his ability to reach a deal with Russia on missile defense. Medvedev replied: “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir,” a reference to the incoming Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Obama attempted to weasel out of the implications of his gaffe by explaining to reporters in Korea that arms control negotiations are extremely complex and require bipartisan cooperation in the U.S.; so they cannot be a public issue just months before presidential and congressional elections. But “I don’t think it’s any surprise that you can’t start that a few months before a presidential and congressional elections in the United States,” simply does not address the core problem. His intention to hide his willingness to be flexible toward Russia about Russian demands couched in cold-war terminology relating to the possibility of nuclear war bespeak his awareness that these intentions will not be acceptable to the American voting public; and this is all the more reason to make them public. Romney said it was alarming that Obama was “looking for greater flexibility where he doesn’t have to answer to the American people in his relations with Russia … [Russia is] without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe. They fight every cause for the world’s worst actor. The idea that he has more flexibility in mind for Russia is very, very troubling indeed.” The New York Times version of this issue made no mention of the “hot mic” incident but did point out that Russian leaders have refused Obama’s request that the Kremlin pressure Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to comply with the UN’s cease-fire plans. The Times also noted that Obama himself stalled the progress of the NATO plans for the early warning and missile defense system because he sought a “reset” in the USA’s relationship with Russia, and Russian concerns about the NATO early warning system were a stumbling block to Obama’s plans. Obama’s willingness to be flexible toward the Russian demands may stem in part from the desire to co-opt the Kremlin into pressuring Assad; but it also seems clear that Obama, not knowing that he was speaking to Medvedev in front of a hot microphone, did not want to let the American electorate know of his intentions for flexibility toward Russia regarding the NATO missile defense system impasse. In other words, his flexibility toward Russia, if it were made public, might hinder his re-election. And the Russians are not ungrateful. Obama’s pay-back for his willingness to be flexible next year is Russia’s endorsement of his re-election by telling the world, at this conference, that if the USA elects Romney, there might be war with Russia. An American special envoy to the Russian conference indicated that the American delegation was not sympathetic to the Russian demands and unwilling to offer the limitations that Russia wants. She stated: “There’s nothing I can imagine that will stop us making these deployments on time.” Well, actually there is: Obama’s re-election.

#### Extinction

Sharavin et al 7

(Major General Alexander Vladimirov, Vice President of the Military Expert Board; - Colonel General Vladimir Yesin, Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law; - Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems; and - Alexander Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Defense and Security, July 20)

Ivashov: Numerous scenarios and options are possible. Everything may begin as a local conflict that will rapidly deteriorate into a total confrontation. An ultimatum will be sent to Russia: say, change the domestic policy because human rights are allegedly encroached on, or give Western businesses access to oil and gas fields. Russia will refuse and its objects (radars, air defense components, command posts, infrastructure) will be wiped out by guided missiles with conventional warheads and by aviation. Once this phase is over, an even stiffer ultimatum will be presented - demanding something up to the deployment of NATO "peacekeepers" on the territory of Russia. Refusal to bow to the demands will be met with a mass aviation and missile strike at Army and Navy assets, infrastructure, and objects of defense industry. NATO armies will invade Belarus and western Russia. Two turns of events may follow that. Moscow may accept the ultimatum through the use of some device that will help it save face. The acceptance will be followed by talks over the estrangement of the Kaliningrad enclave, parts of the Caucasus and Caspian region, international control over the Russian gas and oil complex, and NATO control over Russian nuclear forces. The second scenario involves a warning from the Kremlin to the United States that **continuation of the aggression will trigger retaliation with the use of all weapons in nuclear arsenals**. It will stop the war and put negotiations into motion. Yesin: I'm firmly convinced that there will be no war as long as Russia retains the nuclear deterrent potential. If, however, a war between Russia and the United States breaks out (a war, not a petty local conflict), then it will end in a global Apocalypse. Vladimirov: Whatever the scenarios may be, I'm convinced that only one end is possible - our utter victory. This war will be an undisputable crime against mankind. It may only end in defeat of the United States of America. How can the Apocalypse be avoided? Sharavin: We should take care to avoid confrontations with the United States (try as I might, I cannot perceive a single valid reason for Russia to want a confrontation). And of course, Russia should concentrate on actual as opposed to virtual development of its Armed Forces. Ivashov: Russia should restore the might of its army and potential of its defense industry. It should concentrate on research into and design of new weapons. As for the national military doctrine, it should include a clause allowing for the use of nuclear arms against a full-scale aggression. Also importantly, Russia needs allies. Yesin: American ambitions should be firmly countered on the basis of Russian economic and military might. First and foremost, on the basis of the Russian nuclear forces. The existence of these forces is a guarantee that there will be no wars between Russia and the United States.

## off

#### The fifty states should provide a tax credit for enhanced oil recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide in the United States.

#### States solve

NEORI 12

The National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), formed by Center for

Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) and the Great Plains Institute (GPI), Feb 2012, CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf

OVERVIEW OF MODEL STATE INCENTIVES FOR CO2-EOR DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLEMENT FEDERAL SUPPORT

Several states have incentives to encourage CO2 capture and transport from power plants and industrial facilities, which complement federal grants, tax credits, and other support mechanisms. States with these incentives have provided critical support for projects to advance toward deployment. Furthermore, as with the new federal tax credit recommended in this report, state incentives for commercial CO2 capture and pipeline projects have the potential to be revenue positive, stimulate local oil production, and spur economic activity at a time when most states face profound fiscal challenges.

NEORI recommends consideration, adoption or adaptation of the following state policies to complement federal policy and encourage commercial deployment of CO2 capture and transport technologies.

Severance tax reduction and/or extension of existing severance tax reduction for oil produced with CO2 from anthropogenic sources. This policy provides a percent- age reduction in the severance tax for oil production, if the taxpayer uses CO2-EOR techniques and/or uses anthropogenic CO2 for EOR. It creates an incentive to pursue CO2-EOR and use CO2 from man-made sources, although it would only work for states with a production or severance tax.

## warming

Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

Adaptations solve ocean acid

Idso, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “The Potential for Adaptive Evolution to Enable the World's Most Important Calcifying Organism to Cope with Ocean Acidification,” *CO2 Science* Vol. 15, No. 28, July)

In an important paper published in the May 2012 issue of Nature Geoscience, Lohbeck et al. write that "our present understanding of the sensitivity of marine life to ocean acidification is based primarily on short-term experiments," which often depict negative effects. However, they go on to say that phytoplanktonic species with short generation times "may be able to respond to environmental alterations through adaptive evolution." And with this tantalizing possibility in mind, they studied, as they describe it, "the ability of the world's single most important calcifying organism, the coccolithophore Emiliania huxleyi, to evolve in response to ocean acidification in two 500-generation selection experiments."

Working with freshly isolated genotypes from Bergen, Norway, the three German researchers grew them in batch cultures over some 500 asexual generations at three different atmospheric CO2 concentrations - ambient (400 ppm), medium (1100 ppm) and high (2200 ppm) - where the medium CO2 treatment was chosen to represent the atmospheric CO2 level projected for the beginning of the next century. This they did in a multi-clone experiment designed to provide existing genetic variation that they said "would be readily available to genotypic selection," as well as in a single-clone experiment that was initiated with one "haphazardly chosen genotype," where evolutionary adaptation would obviously require new mutations. So what did they learn?

Compared with populations kept at ambient CO2 partial pressure, Lohbeck et al. found that those selected at increased CO2 levels "exhibited higher growth rates, in both the single- and multi-clone experiment, when tested under ocean acidification conditions." Calcification rates, on the other hand, were somewhat lower under CO2-enriched conditions in all cultures; but the research team reports that they were "up to 50% higher in adapted [medium and high CO2] compared with non-adapted cultures." And when all was said and done, they concluded that "contemporary evolution could help to maintain the functionality of microbial processes at the base of marine food webs in the face of global change [our italics]."

In other ruminations on their findings, the marine biologists indicate that what they call the swift adaptation processes they observed may "have the potential to affect food-web dynamics and biogeochemical cycles on timescales of a few years, thus surpassing predicted rates of ongoing global change including ocean acidification." And they also note, in this regard, that "a recent study reports surprisingly high coccolith mass in an E. huxleyi population off Chile in high-CO2 waters (Beaufort et al., 2011)," which observation is said by them to be indicative of "across-population variation in calcification, in line with findings of rapid microevolution identified here."

Methane release not happening and no impact

Archer, computational ocean chemist – University of Chicago, 3/6/’10

(David, “Arctic Methane on the Move?” <http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/03/arctic-methane-on-the-move/>)

For some background on methane hydrates we can refer you here. This weeks’ Science paper is by Shakhova et al, a follow on to a 2005 GRL paper. The observation in 2005 was elevated concentrations of methane in ocean waters on the Siberian shelf, presumably driven by outgassing from the sediments and driving excess methane to the atmosphere. The new paper adds observations of methane spikes in the air over the water, confirming the methane’s escape from the water column, instead of it being oxidized to CO2 in the water, for example. The new data enable the methane flux from this region to the atmosphere to be quantified, and they find that this region rivals the methane flux from the whole rest of the ocean.

What’s missing from these studies themselves is evidence that the Siberian shelf degassing is new, a climate feedback, rather than simply nature-as-usual, driven by the retreat of submerged permafrost left over from the last ice age. However, other recent papers speak to this question.

Westbrook et al 2009, published stunning sonar images of bubble plumes rising from sediments off Spitzbergen, Norway. The bubbles are rising from a line on the sea floor that corresponds to the boundary of methane hydrate stability, a boundary that would retreat in a warming water column. A modeling study by Reagan and Moridis 2009 supports the idea that the observed bubbles could be in response to observed warming of the water column driven by anthropogenic warming.

Another recent paper, from Dlugokencky et al. 2009, describes an uptick in the methane concentration in the air in 2007, and tries to figure out where it’s coming from. The atmospheric methane concentration rose from the preanthropogenic until about the year 1993, at which point it rather abruptly plateaued. Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, so it ought to plateau if the emission flux is steady, but the shape of the concentration curve suggested some sudden decrease in the emission rate, stemming from the collapse of economic activity in the former Soviet bloc, or by drying of wetlands, or any of several other proposed and unresolved explanations. (Maybe the legislature in South Dakota should pass a law that methane is driven by astrology!) A previous uptick in the methane concentration in 1998 could be explained in terms of the effect of el Nino on wetlands, but the uptick in 2007 is not so simple to explain. The concentration held steady in 2008, meaning at least that interannual variability is important in the methane cycle, and making it hard to say if the long-term average emission rate is rising in a way that would be consistent with a new carbon feedback.

Anyway, so far it is at most a very small feedback. The Siberian Margin might rival the whole rest of the world ocean as a methane source, but the ocean source overall is much smaller than the land source. Most of the methane in the atmosphere comes from wetlands, natural and artificial associated with rice agriculture. The ocean is small potatoes, and there is enough uncertainty in the methane budget to accommodate adjustments in the sources without too much overturning of apple carts.

Could this be the first modest sprout of what will grow into a huge carbon feedback in the future? It is possible, but two things should be kept in mind. One is that there’s no reason to fixate on methane in particular. Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, while CO2 essentially accumulates in the atmosphere / ocean carbon cycle, so in the end the climate forcing from the accumulating CO2 that methane oxidizes into may be as important as the transient concentration of methane itself. The other thing to remember is that there’s no reason to fixate on methane hydrates in particular, as opposed to the carbon stored in peats in Arctic permafrosts for example. Peats take time to degrade but hydrate also takes time to melt, limited by heat transport. They don’t generally explode instantaneously.

For methane to be a game-changer in the future of Earth’s climate, it would have to degas to the atmosphere catastrophically, on a time scale that is faster than the decadal lifetime of methane in the air. So far no one has seen or proposed a mechanism to make that happen.

CO2 isn’t key

Watts, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims.

“Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change.

Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society.

For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said.

For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.”

There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.”

Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.”

Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models.

But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.”

Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”

He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.”

Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.)

Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.”

He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.”

He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman.

Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued.

Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

Warming locked in—current construction and no international deal means it will be runaway

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

The world is likely to build so many fossil-fuelled power stations, energy-guzzling factories and inefficient buildings in the next five years that it will become impossible to hold global warming to safe levels, and the last chance of combating dangerous climate change will be "lost for ever", according to the most thorough analysis yet of world energy infrastructure.

Anything built from now on that produces carbon will do so for decades, and this "lock-in" effect will be the single factor most likely to produce irreversible climate change, the world's foremost authority on energy economics has found. If this is not rapidly changed within the next five years, the results are likely to be disastrous.

"The door is closing," Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International Energy Agency, said. "I am very worried – if we don't change direction now on how we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is the minimum [for safety]. The door will be closed forever."

If the world is to stay below 2C of warming, which scientists regard as the limit of safety, then emissions must be held to no more than 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the level is currently around 390ppm. But the world's existing infrastructure is already producing 80% of that "carbon budget", according to the IEA's analysis, published on Wednesday. This gives an ever-narrowing gap in which to reform the global economy on to a low-carbon footing.

If current trends continue, and we go on building high-carbon energy generation, then by 2015 at least 90% of the available "carbon budget" will be swallowed up by our energy and industrial infrastructure. By 2017, there will be no room for manoeuvre at all – the whole of the carbon budget will be spoken for, according to the IEA's calculations.

Birol's warning comes at a crucial moment in international negotiations on climate change, as governments gear up for the next fortnight of talks in Durban, South Africa, from late November. "If we do not have an international agreement, whose effect is put in place by 2017, then the door to [holding temperatures to 2C of warming] will be closed forever," said Birol.

But world governments are preparing to postpone a speedy conclusion to the negotiations again. Originally, the aim was to agree a successor to the 1997 Kyoto protocol, the only binding international agreement on emissions, after its current provisions expire in 2012. But after years of setbacks, an increasing number of countries – including the UK, Japan and Russia – now favour postponing the talks for several years.

Both Russia and Japan have spoken in recent weeks of aiming for an agreement in 2018 or 2020, and the UK has supported this move. Greg Barker, the UK's climate change minister, told a meeting: "We need China, the US especially, the rest of the Basic countries [Brazil, South Africa, India and China] to agree. If we can get this by 2015 we could have an agreement ready to click in by 2020." Birol said this would clearly be too late. "I think it's very important to have a sense of urgency – our analysis shows [what happens] if you do not change investment patterns, which can only happen as a result of an international agreement."

Nor is this a problem of the developing world, as some commentators have sought to frame it. In the UK, Europe and the US, there are multiple plans for new fossil-fuelled power stations that would contribute significantly to global emissions over the coming decades.

The Guardian revealed in May an IEA analysis that found emissions had risen by a record amount in 2010, despite the worst recession for 80 years. Last year, a record 30.6 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon dioxide poured into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels, a rise of 1.6Gt on the previous year. At the time, Birol told the Guardian that constraining global warming to moderate levels would be "only a nice utopia" unless drastic action was taken.

The new research adds to that finding, by showing in detail how current choices on building new energy and industrial infrastructure are likely to commit the world to much higher emissions for the next few decades, blowing apart hopes of containing the problem to manageable levels. The IEA's data is regarded as the gold standard in emissions and energy, and is widely regarded as one of the most conservative in outlook – making the warning all the more stark. The central problem is that most industrial infrastructure currently in existence – the fossil-fuelled power stations, the emissions-spewing factories, the inefficient transport and buildings – is already contributing to the high level of emissions, and will do so for decades. Carbon dioxide, once released, stays in the atmosphere and continues to have a warming effect for about a century, and industrial infrastructure is built to have a useful life of several decades.

Yet, despite intensifying warnings from scientists over the past two decades, the new infrastructure even now being built is constructed along the same lines as the old, which means that there is a "lock-in" effect – high-carbon infrastructure built today or in the next five years will contribute as much to the stock of emissions in the atmosphere as previous generations.

The "lock-in" effect is the single most important factor increasing the danger of runaway climate change, according to the IEA in its annual World Energy Outlook, published on Wednesday.

Existing carbon triggers the impact

Daniel **Rirdan 12**, founder of The Exploration Company, “The Right Carbon Concentration Target”, June 29, <http://theenergycollective.com/daniel-rirdan/89066/what-should-be-our-carbon-concentration-target-and-forget-politics?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=The+Energy+Collective+%28all+posts%29>

James Hansen and other promi­nent cli­ma­tol­o­gists are call­ing to bring the CO2 atmos­pheric level to 350 parts per million. In fact, an orga­ni­za­tion, 350.org, came around that ral­ly­ing cry. This is far more radical than most politicians are willing to entertain. And it is not likely to be enough. The 350ppm target will not reverse the clock as far back as one may assume. It was in 1988 that we have had these level of car­bon con­cen­tra­tion in the air. But wait, there is more to the story. 1988-levels of CO2 with 2012-levels of all other green­house gases bring us to a state of affairs equiv­a­lent to that around 1994 (2.28 w/m2). And then there are aerosols. There is good news and bad news about them. The good news is that as long as we keep spewing mas­sive amounts of particulate matter and soot into the air, more of the sun’s rays are scattered back to space, over­all the reflec­tiv­ity of clouds increases, and other effects on clouds whose over­all net effect is to cool­ing of the Earth sur­face. The bad news is that once we stop polluting, stop run­ning all the diesel engines and the coal plants of the world, and the soot finally settles down, the real state of affairs will be unveiled within weeks. Once we fur­ther get rid of the aerosols and black car­bon on snow, we may be very well be worse off than what we have had around 2011 (a pos­si­ble addi­tion of 1.2 w/m2). Thus, it is not good enough to stop all green­house gas emis­sions. In fact, it is not even close to being good enough. A carbon-neutral econ­omy at this late stage is an unmit­i­gated disaster. There is a need for a carbon-negative economy. Essentially, it means that we have not only to stop emitting, to the tech­no­log­i­cal extent pos­si­ble, all green­house gases, but also capture much of the crap we have already out­gassed and lock it down. And once we do the above, the ocean will burp its excess gas, which has come from fos­sil fuels in the first place. So we will have to draw down and lock up that carbon, too. We have taken fos­sil fuel and released its con­tent; now we have to do it in reverse—hundreds of bil­lions of tons of that stuff.

China outweighs and won’t be influenced by the plan

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Birol also warned that China – the world's biggest emitter – would have to take on a much greater role in combating climate change. For years, Chinese officials have argued that the country's emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries, it was not required to take such stringent action on emissions. But the IEA's analysis found that within about four years, China's per capita emissions were likely to exceed those of the EU.

In addition, by 2035 at the latest, China's cumulative emissions since 1900 are likely to exceed those of the EU, which will further weaken Beijing's argument that developed countries should take on more of the burden of emissions reduction as they carry more of the responsibility for past emissions.

In a recent interview with the Guardian recently, China's top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, called on developing countries to take a greater part in the talks, while insisting that developed countries must sign up to a continuation of the Kyoto protocol – something only the European Union is willing to do. His words were greeted cautiously by other participants in the talks.

Continuing its gloomy outlook, the IEA report said: "There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is under way. Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO2 emissions to a new high. Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400bn (£250.7bn)."

Meanwhile, an "unacceptably high" number of people – about 1.3bn – still lack access to electricity. If people are to be lifted out of poverty, this must be solved – but providing people with renewable forms of energy generation is still expensive.

Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said: "The decisions being made by politicians today risk passing a monumental carbon debt to the next generation, one for which they will pay a very heavy price. What's seriously lacking is a global plan and the political leverage to enact it. Governments have a chance to begin to turn this around when they meet in Durban later this month for the next round of global climate talks."

One close observer of the climate talks said the $400bn subsidies devoted to fossil fuels, uncovered by the IEA, were "staggering", and the way in which these subsidies distort the market presented a massive problem in encouraging the move to renewables. He added that Birol's comments, though urgent and timely, were unlikely to galvanise China and the US – the world's two biggest emittters – into action on the international stage.

"The US can't move (owing to Republican opposition) and there's no upside for China domestically in doing so. At least China is moving up the learning curve with its deployment of renewables, but it's doing so in parallel to the hugely damaging coal-fired assets that it is unlikely to ever want (to turn off in order to) to meet climate targets in years to come."

#### Can’t solve---would need an unprecedented increase in CCS that isn’t feasible

Plumer, 12

(Washington Post Columnist, 10/11, “How’s that big carbon-capture push going? Slowly. Too slowly,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/11/so-you-want-to-stash-your-carbon-emissions-underground/)

So how’s that going? A big new report from the Global CCS Institute takes stock of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects around the world as of 2012. And progress has been… rather slow. While a handful of carbon-capture projects are coming online, there’s still nowhere near enough to make a major contribution toward tackling climate change. What’s more, **no one has yet figured out how to effectively capture and bury emissions from coal-fired power plants** — a tantalizing idea that could have a huge impact around the world. If it could ever work. Worldwide, there are just eight CCS projects in operation. Most of those involve taking carbon-dioxide from gas processing and fertilizer plants and pumping it down into older oil wells to flush out hard-to-reach crude oil, a technique known as “enhanced oil recovery.” The United States has four such carbon-capture projects now operating, including the Val Verdes Gas Plants in western Texas. Altogether, these eight projects are storing 23 million tons of carbon-dioxide underground each year. The number is expected to rise to 16 projects capturing 36 million tons of carbon-dioxide per year by 2015. That’s not too shabby—it’s like taking six million cars off the road (though that’s partially offset by the additional oil production). But this is also considered woefully insufficient. According to the International Energy Agency, the world needs something like 130 CCS projects by 2020 to meet its climate targets. **We’re nowhere close.** Moreover, no country has yet figured out how to capture and bury carbon-dioxide from coal-fired power plants effectively. Given that China and India are burning coal at a furious pace, there’s a lot of hope for this technology. But efforts to develop “clean coal” (the polite euphemism) in the United States are foundering, even after Congress shelled out $6.9 billion for deployment. There are a few demonstration projects in the works, but the technology is still too pricey — CCS coal plants cost about 75 percent more than regular coal plants.

CO2 boosts plant performance and prevents mass starvation—avoids extinction

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11

(S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems.‖ This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet.‖ Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature. Many other researchers have broached this subject. In a paper recently published in the Annual Review of Plant Biology, three scientists associated with the Institute of Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA) write that meeting the global increase in agricultural demand during this century ―is predicted to require a doubling of global production,‖ but ―the world has limited capacity to sustainably expand cropland,‖ and this capacity is actually ―shrinking in many developed countries.‖ Thus, Zhu et al. (2010) state, ―meeting future increases in demand will have to come from a near doubling of productivity on a land area basis,‖ and they conclude ―a large contribution will have to come from improved photosynthetic conversion efficiency,‖ estimating ―at least a 50% improvement will be required to double global production.‖ The researchers‘ reason for focusing on photosynthetic conversion efficiency derives from the experimentally observed facts that increases in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration increase the photosynthetic rates of nearly all plants, and those rate increases generally lead to equivalent—or only slightly smaller—increases in plant productivity on a land area basis. That provides a solid foundation for their enthusiasm in this regard. In their review of the matter, however, they examine the prospects for boosting photosynthetic conversion efficiency in an entirely different way: genetically, without increasing the air‘s CO2 content. ―Improving photosynthetic conversion efficiency will require,‖ the three scientists state, ―a full suite of tools including breeding, gene transfer, and synthetic biology in bringing about the designed alteration to photosynthesis.‖ For some of these ―near-term‖ endeavors, they indicate ―implementation is limited by technical issues that can be overcome by sufficient investment,‖ meaning they can ―be bought.‖ But several ―mid-term‖ goals could take 20 years or more to achieve; and they state ―even when these improvements are achieved, it may take an additional 10–20 years to bring such innovations to farms in commercial cultivars at adequate scale.‖ And if that is not bad enough, they say of still longer-term goals that ―too little of the science has been undertaken to identify what needs to be altered to effect an increase in yield,‖ while in some cases they acknowledge that what they envision may not even be possible, as in developing a form of RuBisCO that exhibits a significant decrease in oxygenation activity, or in designing C3 crops to utilize the C4 form of photosynthetic metabolism. Clearly, we do not have the time to gamble on our ability to accomplish what needs to be done in order to forestall massive human starvation of global dimensions within the current century. Therefore—in addition to trying what Zhu et al. suggest—we must rely on the ―tested and true: the CO2-induced stimulation of plant photosynthesis and crop yield production. And all we need to do in this regard is to refrain from interfering with the natural evolution of the Industrial Revolution, which is destined to be carried for some time yet on the backs of fossil-fuel-driven enterprises that can provide the atmosphere with the extra carbon dioxide that will be needed to provide the extra increase in crop growth that may mean the difference between global food sufficiency and human starvation on a massive scale a mere few decades from now. Another take on the matter has been provided by Hanjra and Qureshi (2010). They begin their treatment of the subject by quoting Benjamin Franklin‘s well-known homily, ―When the well is dry, we know the worth of water,‖ and they write we ―must not lose sight of surging water scarcity.‖ Noting ―population and income growth will increase the demand for food and water,‖ they contend ―irrigation will be the first sector to lose water, as water competition by non-agricultural uses increases and water scarcity intensifies.‖ As ―increasing water scarcity will have implications for food security, hunger, poverty, and ecosystem health and services,‖ they report ―feeding the 2050 population will require some 12,400 km3 of water, up from 6800 km3 used today.‖ This huge increase, they continue, ―will leave a water gap of about 3300 km3 even after improving efficiency in irrigated agriculture, improving water management, and upgrading of rainfed agriculture,‖ as per the findings of de Fraiture et al. (2007), Molden (2007), and Molden et al. (2010). This water deficiency, according to Hanjra and Qureshi, ―will lead to a food gap unless concerted actions are taken today.‖ Some of the measures they propose are to conserve water and energy resources, develop and adopt climate-resilient crop varieties, modernize irrigation, shore up domestic food supplies, reengage in agriculture for further development, and reform the global food and trade markets. To achieve these goals, they write, ―unprecedented global cooperation is required,‖ which by the looks of today‘s world is an exceedingly remote possibility. What, then, can we do to defuse the ticking time-bomb of this looming food and water crisis? One option is to do nothing: don‘t mess with the normal, unforced evolution of civilization‘s means of acquiring energy. This is because on top of everything else we may try to do to conserve both land and freshwater resources, we will still fall short of what is needed to be achieved unless the air‘s CO2 content rises significantly and thereby boosts the water use efficiency of Earth‘s crop plants and that of the plants that provide food and habitat for what could be called ―wild nature,‖ enabling both sets of plants to produce more biomass per unit of water used. To ensure this happens, we will need all of the CO2 that will be produced by the burning of fossil fuels, until other forms of energy truly become more cost-efficient than coal, gas, and oil. In fact, these other energy sources will have to become much more cost-efficient before fossil fuels are phased out, because the positive externality of the CO2-induced increase in plant water use efficiency provided by the steady rise in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration due to the burning of fossil fuels will be providing a most important service in helping us feed and sustain our own species without totally decimating what yet remains of wild nature. In yet another paper to address this important issue—this one published in the Journal of Proteome Research—Sarkar et al. (2010) write, ―increasing population and unsustainable exploitation of nature and natural resources have made ‗food security‘ a burning issue in the 21st century,‖ echoing the sentiments expressed by Farrell (2009), who noted ―the alarming increase in biofuel production, the projected demand for livestock products, and the estimated food to feed the additional 700 million people who will arrive here by 2016, will have unprecedented consequences,‖ among which are likely to be that ―arable land, the environment, water supply and sustainability of the agricultural system will all be affected,‖ and not in a positive way. Furthermore, when the human population of the globe reaches 8.7–11.3 billion by the year 2050 (Bengtsson et al., 2006), the situation will become truly intolerable, unless something is done, far in advance of that date, to mitigate the situation dramatically. Thus, as Sarkar et al. suggest, ―a normal approach for any nation/region is to strengthen its agricultural production for meeting future demands and provide food security.‖ But a major difficulty, which could spoil mankind‘s ability to do so, is the ongoing rise in the atmosphere‘s ozone concentration. This is the subject of Sarkar et al.‘s new paper. In a study designed to elucidate the many ways in which ozone (O3) is harmful to plants, the eight researchers grew two high-yielding cultivars (Sonalika and HUW 510) of wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) outdoors at the Agriculture Research Farm of India‘s Banaras Hindu University. This was done within open-top chambers maintained at the ambient O3 concentration and at elevated O3 concentrations of 25 percent and 50 percent above ambient during the peak O3 period of the day (10:00 to 15:00 hours local time) for a total of 50 days, during which time they measured numerous responses of the plants to the two levels of ozone enrichment. Sarkar et al. determined, among several other things, that the moderate increases in the air‘s O3 concentration resulted in higher foliar injury, a reduction in photosynthetic efficiency, induced inhibition in photochemical efficacy of photosystem II, lowered concentrations of photosynthetic pigments and proteins, and what they describe as ―drastic reductions‖ in RuBisCO large and small subunits, while noting major leaf photosynthetic proteins and important energy metabolism proteins were also ―drastically reduced.‖ Discussing the results, the scientists from India, Japan, and Nepal remark that anthropogenic activities have made ozone a ―major environmental pollutant of our time,‖ while noting some are predicting it to be an even ―greater problem for the future.‖ Adding this dilemma to the problem of feeding the world over the next few decades and beyond makes humanity‘s future look incredibly bleak. Thus, Sarkar et al. suggest we focus on ―engineering crops for future high O3,‖ concentrating on maintaining ―effective stomatal conductance of plants which can avoid O3 entry but not hamper their productivity.‖ We agree. But not knowing to what extent we will be successful in this endeavor, we also need to do something we know will work: allowing the air‘s CO2 content to rise, unimpeded by the misguided efforts of those who would curtail anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the guise of fighting what they claim is anthropogenic-induced global warming. This contention is largely theoretical and wholly unproven, but we know, as a result of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of real-world experiments, that atmospheric CO2 enrichment increases both the productivity and water-use efficiency of nearly all plants, and that it often more than compensates for the negative effects of O3 pollution. Introducing another review of food security studies pertinent to the challenge of feeding 9 billion people just four decades from now, Godfray et al. (2010) note ―more than one in seven people today still do not have access to sufficient protein and energy from their diet and even more suffer some form of micronutrient malnourishment,‖ citing the FAO (2009). Although ―increases in production will have an important part to play‖ in correcting this problem and keeping it from worsening in the future, mankind ―will be constrained by the finite resources provided by the earth‘s lands, oceans and atmosphere,‖ This set of difficulties they describe at the end of their review as constituting a ―perfect storm.‖ In considering ways to mitigate these problems, the first question they ask is: ―How can more food be produced sustainably?‖ They state the primary solution to food shortages of the past was ―to bring more land into agriculture and to exploit new fish stocks,‖ but they note there is precious little remaining of either of these pristine resources. Thus, they conclude ―the most likely scenario is that more food will need to be produced from the same or less land.‖ As they suggest, ―we must avoid the temptation to sacrifice further the earth‘s already hugely depleted biodiversity for easy gains in food production, not only because biodiversity provides many of the public goods upon which mankind relies, but also because we do not have the right to deprive future generations of its economic and cultural benefits.‖ And, we might add, because we should be enlightened enough to realize we have a moral responsibility to drive no more species to extinction than we already have sent to that sorry state. So how can these diverse requirements all be met simultaneously? A clue comes from Godfray et al.‘s statement that ―greater water and nutrient use efficiency, as well as tolerance of abiotic stress, are likely to become of increasing importance.‖ And what is there that can bring about these changes in mankind‘s crops? You guessed it: carbon dioxide. Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 increase the photosynthetic prowess of essentially all of the Earth‘s plants, while generally reducing the rate at which they transfer water from the soil to the air. In addition, more CO2 in the air tends to enhance the efficiency with which plants utilize nutrients in constructing their tissues and producing the edible portions that we and all of Earth‘s animals depend upon for our very existence. Focusing on the water scarcity aspect of the food shortage problem, Kummu et al. (2010) write, ―due to the rapidly increasing population and water use per capita in many areas of the world, around one third of the world‘s population currently lives under physical water scarcity (e.g. Vorosmarty et al., 2000; Alcamo et al., 2003; Oki and Kanae, 2006).‖ But despite the large number of water scarcity studies conducted over the years, ―no global assessment is available of how this trend has evolved over the past several centuries to millennia.‖ Thus they conducted a study covering AD 0 to 2005. This analysis was carried out for ten different time slices, defined as those times at which the human population of the globe was approximately double the population of the previous time slice. Global population data for these analyses were derived from the 5‘ latitude x 5‘ longitude-resolution global HYDE dataset of Klein Goldewijk (2005) and Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010), while evaluation of water resources availability over the same period was based on monthly temperature and precipitation output from the climate model ECBilt-CLIO-VECODE, as calculated by Renssen et al. (2005). After completing these assessments, the four researchers found ―moderate water shortage first appeared around 1800, but it commenced in earnest from about 1900, when 9% of the world population experienced water shortage, of which 2% was under chronic water shortage (<1000 m3/capita/year).‖ Thereafter, from 1960 onwards, they write, ―water shortage increased extremely rapidly, with the proportion of global population living under chronic water shortage increasing from 9% (280 million people) in 1960 to 35% (2300 million) in 2005.‖ And currently, they continue, ―the most widespread water shortage is in South Asia, where 91% of the population experiences some form of water shortage,‖ while ―the most severe shortage is in North Africa and the Middle East, where 77% and 52% of the total population lives under extreme water shortage (<500 m3/capita/year), respectively.‖ To alleviate these freshwater shortages, Kummu et al. state measures generally have been taken to increase water availability, such as building dams and extracting groundwater. But they note ―there are already several regions in which such measures are no longer sufficient, as there is simply not enough water available in some regions.‖ In addition, they observe, ―this problem is expected to increase in the future due to increasing population pressure (e.g. United Nations, 2009), higher welfare (e.g. Grubler et al., 2007) [and] production of water intensive biofuels (e.g. Varis, 2007, Berndes, 2008).‖ Hence, they conclude there will be an increasing need for many nonstructural measures, the first and foremost of which they indicate to be ―increasing the efficiency of water use.‖ This characteristic of nearly all of Earth‘s plants is almost universally promoted by atmospheric CO2 enrichment.

Causes food wars and extinction

Brown, 9 – founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute

(Lester R, “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation

One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.

For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.

I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States   Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

Negative feedbacks stop runaway warming

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11

(S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

According to Lindzen and Choi, all 11 models employed in the IPCC‘s analysis ―agree as to positive feedback,‖ but they find that they all disagree—and disagree ―very sharply‖—with the real-world observations that Lindzen and Choi utilized, which imply that negative feedback actually prevails. Moreover, the presence of that negative feedback reduces the CO2-induced propensity for warming to the extent that their analysis of the real-world observational data yields only a mean SST increase ―of ~0.5°C for a doubling of CO2.‖ How does one decide which of the two results is closer to the truth? Real-world data would be the obvious standard against which to compare model-derived results, but since Lindzen and Choi‘s results are indeed based on real-world measurements, the only alternative we have is to seek other real-world results. Fortunately, there are several such findings, many of which are summarized by in Idso (1998), who describes eight ―natural experiments‖ that he personally employed in prior studies to determine ―how earth‘s near-surface air temperature responds to surface radiative perturbations.‖ The eight natural experiments used by Idso were (1) the change in the air‘s water vapor content that occurs at Phoenix, Arizona with the advent of the summer monsoon, (2) the naturally occurring vertical redistribution of dust that occurs at Phoenix between summer and winter, (3) the annual cycle of surface air temperature caused by the annual cycle of solar radiation absorption at the Earth‘s surface, (4) the warming effect of the entire atmosphere caused by its mean flux of thermal radiation to the surface of the Earth, (5) the annually averaged equator-to-pole air temperature gradient that is sustained by the annually averaged equator-to-pole gradient of total surface-absorbed radiant energy, (6) the mean surface temperatures of Earth, Mars, and Venus relative to the amounts of CO2 contained in their atmospheres, (7) the paradox of the faint early sun and its implications for Earth‘s thermal history, and (8) the greenhouse effect of water vapor over the tropical oceans and its impact on sea surface temperatures. These eight analyses, in the words of Idso, ―suggest that a 300 to 600 ppm doubling of the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration could raise the planet‘s mean surface air temperature by only about 0.4°C,‖ which is right in line with Lindzen and Choi‘s deduced warming of ~0.5°C for a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 content. Hence, there would appear to be strong real-world data that argue against the overinflated CO2-induced global warming predicted by state-of-the-art climate models.

## china

#### The plan doesn’t impact energy security

Herberg—their author—12

Mikkal Herberg, Asian Energy Security Program Research Director, 1/26/12, Hearing on “China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States”, <http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/Herberg_USCC%20testimony_26%202012.pdf>

Despite the concerns of many that China is “locking up” oil supplies for the future that won’t be available to others and, therefore, distorting oil markets and undermining the energy security of other countries, China’s NOCs and Beijing’s support for acquiring overseas “equity barrels” controlled by national companies are very unlikely to have a significant impact on the availability of oil in global oil markets. China’s three major NOCs currently produce an estimated 1.5 million equity barrels of oil per day (MMBD) abroad. However, this represents less than one-third of China’s daily oil imports.

Moreover, China’s oil import demand is growing at an average of nearly one-half million barrels per day each year so the reality is that China’s oil import needs are rapidly outrunning their NOCs’ ability to accumulate investments in equity production abroad. China will increasingly be deeply dependent on the stability of the global oil market; the equity oil strategy is hopelessly inadequate as an energy security strategy. Many analysts in China understand this already. In any event, most oil produced by China’s NOCs abroad is not sent back to China but, instead is sold into regional markets at the best netback value just as other IOCs do. And the global market of internationally traded oil is over 50 MMBD which dwarfs China’s equity barrels. And to the extent China sources its crude imports from one set of countries, it leaves other barrels from other countries available to other buyers. The more Persian Gulf crude it imports, the less West African crude it imports. The global oil market is quite fungible, transparent, and flexible. Certainly China’s large and rapidly growing oil demand does impact global prices since China is the largest single source of world oil demand growth. But the choice of countries from which it imports does not directly impact prices.

**No impact to cooperation and it’s impossible**

Aaron L. **Friedberg 12**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and the author of A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. From 2003 to 2005, he served as a Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President, “Bucking Beijing”, Foreign Affairs, September / October

Recent events have raised serious doubts about both elements of this strategy. Decades of trade and talk have not hastened China's political liberalization. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by an intensified crackdown on domestic dissent. At the same time, the much-touted economic relationship between the two Pacific powers has become a major source of friction. And despite hopes for enhanced cooperation, Beijing has actually done very little to help Washington solve pressing international problems, such as North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons or Iran's attempts to develop them. Finally, far from accepting the status quo, China's leaders have become more forceful in attempting to control the waters and resources off their country's coasts. As for balancing, the continued buildup of China's military capabilities, coupled with impending cuts in U.S. defense spending, suggests that the regional distribution of power is set to shift sharply in Beijing's favor.

WHY WE CAN'T ALL JUST GET ALONG

Today, China's ruling elites are both arrogant and insecure. In their view, continued rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is essential to China's stability, prosperity, and prestige; it is also, not coincidentally, vital to their own safety and comfort. Although they have largely accepted some form of capitalism in the economic sphere, they remain committed to preserving their hold on political power.

The CCP'S determination to maintain control informs the regime's threat perceptions, goals, and policies. Anxious about their legitimacy, China's rulers are eager to portray themselves as defenders of the national honor. Although they believe China is on track to become a world power on par with the United States, they remain deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological subversion. And despite Washington's attempts to reassure them of its benign intentions, Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims to block China's rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of government.

Like the United States, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued an essentially constant approach toward its greatest external challenger. For the most part, Beijing has sought to avoid outright confrontation with the United States while pursuing economic growth and building up all the elements of its "comprehensive national power," a Chinese strategic concept that encompasses military strength, technological prowess, and diplomatic influence. Even as they remain on the defensive, however, Chinese officials have not been content to remain passive. They have sought incremental advances, slowly expanding China's sphere of influence and strengthening its position in Asia while working quietly to erode that of the United States. Although they are careful never to say so directly, they seek to have China displace the United States in the long run and to restore China to what they regard as its rightful place as the preponderant regional power. Chinese strategists do not believe that they can achieve this objective quickly or through a frontal assault. Instead, they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the ancient military strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile.

The failure to date to achieve a genuine entente between the United States and China is the result not of a lack of effort but of a fundamental divergence of interests. Although limited cooperation on specific issues might be possible, the ideological gap between the two nations is simply too great, and the level of trust between them too low, to permit a stable modus vivendi. What China's current leaders ultimately want -- regional hegemony -- is not something their counterparts in Washington are willing to give. That would run counter to an axiomatic goal of U.S. grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers.

The reasons for this goal involve a mix of strategic, economic, and ideological considerations that will continue to be valid into the foreseeable future.

#### Global governance is locked in

**World Outline**, postgraduate student in international affairs at King’s College, **1/24**/2012

[“How valuable is multilateral diplomacy in a post-9/11 world?,” <http://worldoutline.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/how-valuable-is-multilateral-diplomacy-in-a-post-911-world/>]

At the turn of the last century, 189 world leaders convened at the Millennium Summit and approved the Millennium Declaration which outlined eight specific goals that the United Nations was to achieve by 2015.[4] Yet, just a year later the 9/11 terrorist attacks tilted the world upon its head. The Security Council was rallied into action after the attacks and unanimously backed the United States against the threat which had caused so much devastation.[5] However, a wounded United States became increasingly relentless and unilateral in their ‘War on Terror’; when the Security Council refused to authorise a US attack upon an allegedly nuclear-armed Iraq, the United States, led by George. W. Bush, launched the assault anyway without UN approval.[6] This has been referred to as the ‘crisis of multilateralism’, as the United States undermined the very institution of which it is the biggest financial contributor and the most influential player.[7] If the founding member of the UN was refusing to follow the guidelines of the institution then why should other states follow the rules? This act set a worrying precedent for the rest of the world and, as Kofi Annan asserted, ‘undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems’.[8] Other instances of American unilateralism are Bush’s abstention from the Human Rights Council, his refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol and the US departure from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United States was losing sight of the benefits that multilateral diplomacy has to offer. However, the arrival of Barack Obama at the Oval Office has **revived multilateral values within US foreign policy**. The Obama administration has realised that it must now engage with the UN and this has marked a ‘**transitional moment in the history of multilateralism**’.[9] In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama acknowledged the fact that the US had been successful after the Second World War by pursuing their interests within multilateral forums such as the United Nations and not outside of them.[10] The global financial crisis of 2008 and the European Union’s sovereign debt crisis have demonstrated just how interdependent the economies of the western world are and these crises have created an age of austerity in which multilateralism is needed more than ever before.[11] The US has overstretched its resources and is now currently winding down two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; they have realised that they simply do not have the means to conduct their foreign affairs exclusively anymore. **Clear indications of Washington’s improved multilateral engagement with the UN** since Obama’s inauguration, **and the changing attitude in US foreign policy**, are the economic sanctions negotiated over Iran, Obama’s decision for the US to join the Human Rights Council and, more specifically, its participation in the recent Libya mission. In Libya, the US provided support for the mission, yet played a subdued role in the campaign, allowing its European counterparts to take the lead. In contrast to his predecessor, Obama is displaying pragmatism rather than sentimentalism in his search for partners, making alliances in order to adapt to the emerging multipolar world; this is typified by Obama’s recent visit to the Asia-Pacific and his tour of South America (Brazil, Chile and El Salvador) in 2010. For the time being, US unipolarity looks to be a thing of the past; its **foreign policy is changing from Bush’s unilateralism at the start of the century to a more multilateral approach at the beginning of a new decade** under Obama.[12] This is the **correct precedent** that the most powerful nation in the world should be setting for other states to follow. The fact that the US is now engaging with the UN to counter global problems has restored the credibility that the UN had lost after the Iraq debacle and, by setting this example, **other nations will follow suit** and the international community as a whole can only benefit. From this change in US foreign policy, it is clear that multilateral diplomacy is of more value today than it was a decade ago.

#### No China/India war

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 223

However, conflict between China and India appears even less likely than war between India and Pakistan, and economics is the reason. Bilateral trade increased from a paltry $2.3 billion in FY 2001 to $25.7 billion in FY 2007.22“ Furthermore, both nations recognize the need to maintain stability in order to attract foreign investment.“ Since 1981, India and China have held thirty—one rounds of peace talks. In April 2005 alone, India and China agreed on eleven new accords and agreed to a “strategic partnership.” In 2006, called the Year of India-China Friendship, that partnership progressed as the two economic powers agreed to secure oil resources and reopened the Nathu La border; in addition, the Chinese premier visited India.“ Furthermore, recent discussions and confidence measures between India, China, and Pakistan have decreased tensions over Kashmir. Nevertheless, low-level tension remains over the border dispute in Arunachal Pradesh and the fact that India harbors Tibet’s government in exile.

#### Nationalism is the root cause of Senkakus conflict – not energy

Park Min-hee, Beijing correspondent for Hankyoreh, 9/28/2012

<http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/553832.html>

Maoism may indeed be the single most powerful religion in China today. As rage against widespread corruption, income inequality, and injustice combines with anxieties over an economy that is losing steam by the day, people in China have been turning to their old leader. In his book "China in Ten Words," Yu Hua writes that the many problems that emerged after development may be "precisely why Mao keeps being brought back to life." A dangerous combination, fed by discontent with reality, is taking shape between China's left wing and patriots, who are presenting nostalgia for the Mao days as some kind of alternative.

In Japan, we can also find shadows reminiscent of this growing Sinocentrism. **The latest round of friction was touched off by Japan's far right**, **which irresponsibly exploited a territorial issue in the hopes of winning political points**. Having lost their way amid a Fukushima nuclear crisis, an economy mired in quicksand, an aging society, and the disgruntlement of young people robbed of opportunity, these right-wingers have derided the Peace Constitution and any kind of reflection on history, and are working to promote a sense of nostalgia for the glories of the militarist [imperial] era.

Japan's right-winger par excellence may be Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara, whose declaration of the Senkaku Islands' nationalization back in April hinted at the conflict to come. History shows that Japan's acquisition of Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands in 1885 was the result of expansionist incursions. The Cold War order that the US built in Northeast Asia after the Second World War is what left the potential for territorial disputes over Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands. Even after this latest development, it is difficult to find any words of reflection in Japan - anyone willing to say that **the claims of dominion over Senkaku are tied to a history of invasion**, or that the situation worsened because of the breaking of an implicit agreement at the time Tokyo and Beijing established relations.

Meanwhile, far right-leaning former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a man who denies that comfort women were forcibly mobilized, is considered likely to win reelection. East Asia is now under threat from the Chinese left and the Japanese right, both of whom are turning to nostalgia rather than tackling their real issues. **The Senkaku conflict is just a symptom of a deeply rooted problem of multiple contradictions and political confusion in both countries**.

#### China is rapidly modernizing – most qualified sources agree they’ll achieve area denial capability

Norton, international trade correspondent and Asia expert – Barron’s, 6/27/’11

(Leslie P, “Dragon Fire,” Barron’s)

Even the most casual observer seems to know that China's economy has been growing at a roughly 10% annual rate for much of the past decade. Less recognized and arguably more important to the state of the world is the fact that China's defense spending rose even faster than that -- 12% or more a year between 2000 and 2009.

"The accelerating pace of China's defense budget increases is driving countries in the region, as well as the U.S., to react to preserve a balance of power and stability," says Jacqueline Newmyer, head of Long-Term Strategy Group, a Cambridge, Mass.-based defense consultant. "There is a real potential for arms races to emerge," she adds. "While once we assumed we'd have access to areas to conduct anti-terrorism or anti-insurgency operations, now we're compelled to think about preserving our ability to gain access to East Asia."

Stephen Rosen, Harvard's Beton Michael Kaneb professor of national security and military affairs, agrees. "All of us are clearly moving in that direction: We, the Japanese, the Indians. The only thing stalling it now are fiscal problems in Japan and the United States," says the former advisor to one-time presidential hopeful Rudy Giuliani.

Highlighting one of the fastest military buildups in history was China's debut of its stealth jet just hours before the January visit to Beijing by outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The fighter will rival the U.S.'s F-22 Raptor, the world's only operational stealth fighter. Larger than the F-22, with bigger fuel tanks, it will fly higher, faster and with less chance of detection. It's one of many Chinese weapons that will impede the U.S. military's ability to roam freely in the region.

#### And, war is inevitable

**Friedberg 5**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45

Realist pessimists note that, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers, at least insofar as their more established counterparts in the international system are concerned. This is the case, in the realists’ view, regardless of regime type; it was as true of a rising, democratic United States as it was of a rising, autocratic Germany. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, “The external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialization and economic development.”31 There appear to be a number of reasons for this pattern. As a state’s capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. Rising powers seek not only to secure their frontiers but to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials, and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home, defend their foreign friends and allies, and promulgate their values; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their legitimate say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been succinctly summarized by Robert Gilpin: “A more wealthy and more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.”32 As they seek to assert themselves, rising powers are often drawn to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutional arrangements, and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were relatively weak. Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs. Like Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, rising powers tend to want their “place in the sun,” and this often brings them into conflict with more established great powers, which are typically the architects and principal beneªciaries of the existing international system.33 The collision between the expanding interests of a rising power and those of its more established counterparts can be dealt with in a number of ways, but the resulting disputes are seldom resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to its position, a dominant power (or coalition of status quo powers) may attempt to use force preventively to destroy a rising state before it can achieve its full potential. Less bellicose, established powers have also at times sought to appease emerging states, looking for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions without conºict and to engage them and incorporate them peacefully into an existing international order. However sincere and well intentioned these efforts may be, they have usually failed. Sometimes the reason is clearly the character of the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, for example, a rising power may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively committing suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less extensive, the status quo powers may be too reluctant to make reasonable concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and leading to escalating demands. Successful policies of engagement/appeasement are certainly possible in theory, but in practice they have proven to be difficult to implement.34 Looking at the raw facts of its expanding economy and growing military capabilities, most realist pessimists would be content to conclude that China is a rising power and that, as such, it is unlikely to behave differently than have others of its type throughout history. Thus Huntington, after describing the correlation in past cases between rapid internal growth and external expansion, predicts that China too will “undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in the coming decades.”35 Similarly, according to John Mearsheimer, so long as China’s power continues to grow, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, [will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon.”36 Some analysts go a step further, arguing that China is especially likely to behave assertively, even at the risk of coming into conflict with others. Recent Chinese history, the “century of humiliation” that began with the Opium Wars of the 1840s and ended only with the ªnal expulsion of foreign powers from the mainland after World War II, appears to have left China’s leaders and its people acutely sensitive to perceived slights to national honor and prestige and especially alert to threats around their periphery.37 As a result of the painful experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, contemporary Chinese strategists may be even more eager than they might otherwise be to establish a sphere of influence or zone of control that would prevent such threats from reemerging in the future.38 Reaching even further back into the past, other observers point to the fact that, before its decline and domination by outside powers, China was for many centuries the preponderant force in Asia and the hub of a Sinocentric Asian international system. As they adapt to the reality of their growing power and look for models to guide their behavior under increasingly favorable conditions, the leadership in Beijing could hearken back to this earlier era of glory and seek to reestablish China as East Asia’s preponderant power.39 Some U.S. government agencies have concluded that China’s current leaders aim to “maximize [China’s] influence within East Asia relative to the U.S.” or, more bluntly, to become “the preeminent power in Asia.”40 If this is true, and assuming that the United States continues to adhere to its century-old policy of opposing the dominance of either half of Eurasia by a hostile power or coalition, the stage will be set for an intense and possibly protracted strategic competition between the two Pacific giants.41

#### There’s no impact to a war now – we would quickly demolish China, ending modernization and growth

Ross, staff writer – the National Interest, ‘5

(Robert, “Assessing the China Threat,” The National Interest, Fall)

The outcome of any war between the United States and China would be devastating for Chinese interests. As General Zhu Chenghu recently observed, China has "no capability to fight a conventional war against the United States." Indeed, China would face near inevitable defeat, with the military, political and economic costs far outweighing any costs incurred by the United States. China would risk losing its entire surface fleet, and it would expose its coastal territory, including its port facilities and its surface vessels at port, to U.S. air and missile strikes. The economic costs would also be devastating. China would lose access to Western technologies for many years after the war. It would also lose its peaceful international environment and risk its "peaceful rise" as its economy shifted to long-term war-footing and its budget contended with a protracted U.S.-Chinese arms race, undermining domestic infrastructure development and long-term civilian and defense technology development. Finally, the political costs would be prohibitive. A military loss to the United States could well destroy the nationalist credentials of the Chinese Communist Party and cause its collapse.

#### Area denial causes Chinese aggression, allied prolif and kills heg

Friedberg, 2009

Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Sep-Oct 2009, “Menace,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/menace-3818

FAST-FORWARD to the present. America's ability to project power into the western Pacific, once unchallenged, is now threatened by the maturation of what Pentagon planners refer to as China's "anti-access/area-denial" strategy. The goal here is not to match the Americans ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop certain specialized capabilities designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. forces to operate freely anywhere close to China's coasts. In the past decade, Beijing has made considerable progress toward achieving this goal. Every one of the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its presence in East Asia will soon be within range of bombardment by repeated salvos of precisely targeted Chinese conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time, the PLA is in the process of knitting together a network of satellites, onshore radars and other sensors that will permit it to locate and track an enemy's surface ships hundreds of miles off its coasts and then use a combination of torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles to sink or disable them. America's huge and costly aircraft carriers are the key to its global power-projection capabilities. In a future crisis, Washington might have little choice but to pull them far back from China's coasts, well beyond the effective range of their aircraft. This would dramatically reduce their ability to provide air defense for U.S. friends or to conduct strikes against Chinese forces on land or at sea. In addition to these more direct modes of attack, the PLA is experimenting with antisatellite weapons and techniques for taking down an enemy's computer networks, thereby rendering him deaf and blind during the critical opening phases of a war. On the defensive side of the equation, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is turning out attack submarines at a record pace and developing sophisticated undersea mines; it is in the process of completing a massive new submarine base adjacent to the South China Sea, and has reportedly begun to deploy an undersea detection system that would aid it in engaging U.S. submarines operating off its shores. Finally, China is investing heavily in "passive defenses" (hiding or hardening critical facilities) and in advanced radars and surface-to-air missiles, including some that may be effective against "stealthy" Western aircraft and cruise missiles. THIS COMBINATION of rapidly advancing offensive and defensive capabilities is beginning to raise doubts in the region about America's ability to defend its allies and project its power. What is worse, over the next several years there will be an increasing danger that, in an extreme crisis, China's leaders might believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the United States out of the western Pacific and blunting its initial, retaliatory response, all without striking the American homeland and without the need to fire a single nuclear weapon. If it were successful, such an attack would leave a president with some agonizing choices. Much as during the cold war, if faced with the possibility of a quick conventional defeat in Western Europe, American decision makers would have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. But, as was true then, the plausibility of escalatory threats will diminish as the probability of retaliation rises. Beijing is fast approaching the point where it will have a secure second-strike force capable of dealing a devastating blow no matter how hard the United States might try to prevent it. As risky as an American attack on Chinese nuclear forces, ports, airfields and communications centers would be today, it will be considerably more so a few years from now. Beijing is in the process of deploying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will be far less vulnerable than their predecessors. In addition to its small force of fixed, single-warhead ICBMs, over the next few years China will place in service several dozen hard-to-locate road-mobile and submarine-launched missiles, each capable of striking the United States with multiple warheads. OF COURSE, there are alternatives to the nightmare of nuclear war. If Washington chose not to use nuclear weapons, it might respond to a Chinese attack by engaging in "horizontal escalation," hitting back at another location where the opponent is vulnerable and U.S. forces still enjoy an overwhelming advantage. The most obvious way to do this, though perhaps not the only one, would be to use America's global naval strength and airpower to cut China off from the sea. This is an arena of military competition in which the United States maintains overwhelming superiority. While the PLAN may be able to contest control of its immediate coastal waters, its capabilities fall off rapidly with distance. If the United States wanted tomorrow to constrict China's maritime access to oil, minerals and markets, there would be very little Beijing could do in direct response. Chinese strategists are acutely aware of this potential vulnerability and they are hard at work on a variety of projects which, taken together, may help to mitigate the danger. Included among these are: a strategic petroleum reserve; transcontinental pipelines to Russia and Central Asia; the pursuit of undersea resources close to China's coasts; new transportation routes through Southeast Asia that would permit oil and gas from the Middle East to bypass the narrow straits off Indonesia; the construction of ports and airfields in Myanmar and Pakistan that could be used in an emergency by a future Chinese air and naval "rapid-deployment force"; a deepening strategic relationship with Iran that could provide a bridgehead to the Persian Gulf; and the development of aircraft carriers and long-range nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the construction of large numbers of diesel subs, which will give the PLAN some capacity to defend China's sea-lanes and perhaps to attack the shipping of its rivals. If produced in sufficient numbers, the same antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM) that will soon threaten American aircraft carriers could also be used against commercial vessels. Using a combination of missiles and submarines, Beijing might be able to impose a blockade of its own on key American allies like Japan, perhaps weakening its will to stay in the fight or, better yet, dissuading it from ever joining with the United States in the first place. AMERICA'S INFLUENCE in and access to Asia will be drastically reduced, with harmful long-term consequences for its security, prosperity and ability to promote the spread of liberal democracy, if it is seen to be in long-term decline relative to China or, even worse, if it appears irresolute, incompetent, unwilling or simply unable to fulfill its commitments. Other governments will then have no choice but to reconsider their national strategies either by developing their own nuclear capabilities or-worse-by bandwagoning with Beijing.

#### Nuclear war

Barnett, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3/7/’11

(Thomas, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.  It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.  But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

# 2NC

## States CP Solvency

#### Their Claussen

NEORI’s centerpiece recommendation is a competitively awarded, revenue-positive federal production tax credit for capturing and transporting CO2 to stimulate CO2-EOR expansion. This federal tax credit would more than pay for itself because it will lead to **additional oil production** subject to existing tax treatment. The new incentive will enable a variety of industry sectors to market new sources of CO2 to the oil industry, and to reduce their carbon footprints. It will drive innovation and cost reduction in CO2 capture and compression, and help build out a national CO2 pipeline system.

For the near term and until the broader credit is in place, NEORI also recommends specific “good government” changes to improve the workability of the existing carbon capture and storage credit known as Section 45Q.

Of course, states also have an important role to play in fostering CO2-EOR deployment. This is why NEORI identifies existing state policies that should serve as models for policymakers in other states to adopt and tailor to their particular needs.

#### States fill in for lack of federal action

NEORI 12

The National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), formed by Center for

Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) and the Great Plains Institute (GPI), Feb 2012, CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf

States also have an important role to play in fostering CO2-EOR deployment by implementing incentive policies that can complement the federal production tax credit recommended in this report. A number of states have already taken the lead, filling the current vacuum left by the absence of adequate federal policy. Therefore, this report identifies existing state policies that NEORI mem- bers believe should serve as models for policy-makers in other states to adopt and tailor to their particular needs.

#### Empirically effective—universal state adoption of incentives key

NEORI 12

The National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), formed by Center for

Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) and the Great Plains Institute (GPI), Feb 2012, CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf

STATE INCENTIVES FOR CO2-EOR DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLEMENT FEDERAL SUPPORT

Some states’ support for deployment of specific CO2 capture projects exceeds that of the federal government in terms of dollar value over the life of a project. Indeed, commercial capture projects now under construction or nearing construction are located in states that have significant incentive policies in place to complement available federal grants, tax credits and other support.

As with the new federal tax credit recommended in this report, state anthropogenic CO2-EOR incentives for commercial CO2 capture and pipeline projects have the potential be revenue positive at a time when most states face profound fiscal challenges. These incentive policies can stimulate production and economic activity that would not otherwise occur by making available new CO2 supplies to produce additional oil from already devel- oped fields that would otherwise not be produced using conventional technologies.

While implementation of a more robust federal tax credit is critical to reach much greater EOR deployment levels, a number of states with EOR potential still lack adequate incentives to complement federal policy and encourage commercial project development. They now have the opportunity to build on the experience of states that have pioneered incentives and to spur CO2-EOR ex- pansion by adopting or modifying those states’ existing policies to meet their specific needs.

## AT: Investor Signal

State policies are a better signal for investors

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because **most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level**. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are **made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged**. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop **more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success**.

6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized, and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance Funding

For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success. 2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3. Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible. 5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6. Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization activities across states and regions.

Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed

Milford, 12

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,” http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)

As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.

Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that **states have been the clean energy innovators**. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date, these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3 billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every week of the year, all across the country.

Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the **potential to enlist major capital players such as institutional investors** and pension funds that look for **longer term, more predictable returns** from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with **investors that finance at scale.** So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country.Oddly enough, until now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding tools to finance clean energy.

So we have a **unique financing situation for clean energy**. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space, with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in Washington and the **uncertainty over federal support is** unwelcome, it need **not mean a death knell for** the clean **energy** industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.

## AT: State Fiat Bad

The States CP is the topic---jurisdictional questions are key to energy production debates

Kay, 12

(Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

**Questions about energy production** and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st Century. Some **go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism,** as an underlying but ever-present friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “**the choice of regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy**. That may explain why Americans have traditionally **shed so much** metaphorical and genuine **blood deciding what are essentially jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions.”**

A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific influences include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and increased awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and production. Another element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a broad based consensus over energy policy at the federal level, despite calls for such a policy that date back to at least the Nixon administration. These have been superimposed on shifting political trends in other areas, including the expanding national political divide. After the crest of federal adoption of new environmental legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) government forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and property rights movements.

In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of economic and environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information technology) by promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local empowerment in others. Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on the national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but insufficiently appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial hydraulic fracturing technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” reserves of shale and other rocks. The second and third involve the generation and distribution of electricity: where the authority to site electricity generating stations is vested, and who has the authority to site transmission lines that move electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of consumption. These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense tangle.

Turns decision-making—policy decisions lack meaning if they ignore the states’ role

Kay, 12

(Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

New Yorkers are “spilling blood” - in the metaphorical sense suggested above - over whether local, state or federal government should control the fate of hydraulic fracturing in NYS. Blood pressures have also risen over who should permit moderately sized electric generating facilities and control the siting of natural gas and electricity transmission corridors. Not infrequently, advocates who argue for or against federal or state or “home rule” in one context reflexively take the opposite position in another. This may make strategic sense in the heat of battle over specific policy decisions about particular energy technologies or fuels or sites. However, **a danger exists for** partisans and **policy makers who fail to lift their line of sight above the battlefield**. **Unless** principled **arguments about the benefits and costs of rebalancing federalism are considered**, the distribution of power and passion that lead to precedent and victory in one arena may well simply **set the stage for defeat in another.** Sovocool suggests that “marble cake” federalism is the best suited and most practical approach to energy policy making. Be that as it may, it should be evident that the claimed benefits of each approach he lists are more of a promise than a guarantee. The point of this paper is not to identify a universally preferred structure of federalism, but **to advocate that energy literacy incorporate basic governance principles**. This would require all involved to step back from the fray for a harder look at the implications of energy federalism for long term strategic concerns as well as short term tactical arguments.

## AT: No 50 State

CP is real world---NGA acts together on energy issues

ENN, 1

(Environmental News Network, 8/17, Governors Want State, Local Input into National Energy Plans, Lexis)

The governors of the 50 states, 3 territories, and 2 commonwealths have adopted a comprehensive national energy policy emphasizing conservation.

At the closing session of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the National Governors Association last week in Providence, R.I., the governors sent a message to the White House that state and local authorities must have input into the nation's energy plans. "The policy sends a clear message that solving our nation's energy problems demand more conservation, especially utilizing renewable fuels like ethanol," said Iowa Gov. Thomas Vilsack, chairman of the association's Committee on Natural Resources. Ensuring "environmental quality" comes second in the list of 10 principles

## Compliance Fees 1NC

#### Moody

One proposal being discussed in a number of states, including Hawaii and New York, would defer the ability of holders of state tax credits from redeeming those tax credits for up to two or three years.

States have the cash to pay

Milford, 12

(Sr. Fellow-Brookings & President-Clean Energy Group, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic Development,”

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0111\_states\_energy\_funds)

In sum, the need of the hour is for smarter strategies and greater funding for clean energy economic development that will enable states to innovate, manufacture, and export in the clean energy space. Too few states are engaged in rigorous and robust efforts to bolster this dynamic source of growth. And yet, state clean energy funds—by redirecting portions of their funds towards economic development activities—can play an important role in filling this gap and contributing to economic transformation and job-creation in U.S. states and metropolitan areas. III. Toward A New State Approach

And so U.S. states, as classic “laboratories of experimentation,” should build on leading-edge CEFs’ recent experiments with economic development and move more expansively to spur economic growth in clean energy. To that end, this paper suggests a number of strategies for best utilizing CEFs that states can explore in pursuit of clean energy economic development. In this regard, it is worth noting that state CEFs are public entities with a unique history of success in financing clean energy projects that can now be brought to bear on the need in many states for more aggressive clean energy economic development. In a time of tough fiscal austerity and reluctance to dedicate new funds, then, state public CEFs are in **a perfect position to institute** a new set of economic development **strategies to create thriving clean energy industries**. To act on this promise, states without clean energy funds should consider establishing dedicated clean energy revenue streams to engage in project finance and smart industry support. These states typically do not have dedicated support for either clean energy projects or clean energy-related economic development activities. **A range of sources for these funds exists** and includes general revenue bonds, tax or lottery revenues, pollution charges, and renewable portfolio standard (**RPS) compliance fees.** However, experience has shown that electricity surcharges set on electricity consumption or “wires charges” tend to be the most stable and reliable revenue source, as well as the most fair as they internalize the environmental consequences of electricity purchases. States should examine these sources as potential bases for the establishment of new clean energy funds. In those states where CEFs already exist, fund administrators should seek to expand the funds’ economic development role. Specifically, states with funds should pursue four major agendas:

➤ Reorient a significant portion of state CEF money to clean energy-related economic development

➤ Develop detailed state-specific clean energy market data

➤ Link clean energy funds with economic development entities, development finance organizations and other stakeholders in the emerging industry

➤ Collaborate with other state, regional, and federal efforts to best leverage public and private dollars and to learn from each other’s experiences

Along these lines state clean energy leaders should: Reorient a significant portion (at least 10 percent of the total portfolio) of state CEF money to clean energy-related economic development. Over the last decade, states with clean energy funds have dedicated almost $3 billion to individual project support. That has made it possible to create thousands of clean energy projects across the country. But only a small fraction of this funding has been dedicated to activities and investments aimed at bolstering clean energy economic development. Given that, it is time to increase state budgets for economic development activities. For that reason, state clean energy fund administrators should consider reorienting a portion of their existing program funding to economic development programs. In addition, this expansion of funding sources should also tap financing from existing economic development and CDFI resources as well as matching funding from federal programs to incentivize states to invest more in clean energy-related economic development strategies. What is required from a technical perspective to enable this transition? In most cases, existing enabling legislation or regulatory authority will allow states to reorient their CEFs to include a significant economic development agenda. For states that have existing CEF legislative authorization, those laws generally give the agencies managing the funds the authority to not only fund clean energy projects but also related economic development and innovation activities. In these cases, an internal administrative decision should allow CEF administrators to develop and fund clean energy-related economic development programs. In fact, many of the CEFs mentioned in this report have already made this turn and are already engaged in some sort of economic development activities.

## AT: Links to Politics

States avoid politics

Rabe, 7

(Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan, “Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance Systems,” Governance, Vol. 20, Issue 3, July)

Those more active states include many that have conventionally been among the most innovative in environmental and energy policy, particularly those lodged along the respective national coasts, but they increasingly include a diverse set from other regions such as the Southwest and Midwest (Rabe 2006). Most of the initiatives have been enacted with **minimal partisan rancor** and have not been dominated by a single political party. Most of these also appear quite **capable of enduring once partisan control of a state government**, including the governorship, **changes hands, and have not proven very controversial to enact** or implement. Clearly, state agencies have played a central role in policy development, building coalitions rather quietly around policies that are tailored around relatively inexpensive reduction opportunities. This is entirely consistent with a pattern of “bureaucratic autonomy” and agency-based entrepreneurship that has been established in other American policy contexts (Carpenter 2001; Mintrom 2002).

These steps have often been linked to early signs of climate change as manifest in a particular state, thereby framed as a response to a specific environmental problem facing the state. A further source of bipartisan appeal for these initiatives has been the promise of multiple benefits, whereby agency advocates demonstrate the potential of a program not only to reduce greenhouse gases but also to achieve other goals, such as reduction of conventional air pollutants, reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels, and longer term regulatory predictability to electrical utilities and other regulated entities, as well as economic development opportunities (Rabe 2004). Hence, a considerable part of the appeal of state-based climate policy initiatives has been the simultaneous pursuit of environmental protection and potential contribution to economic growth or stability. Indeed, much of this comports with Eugene Bardach's definition of smart practice: “What makes a practice smart is that the method also involves taking advantage of some latent opportunity for creating value on the cheap” (Bardach 1998, 36). In contrast, climate policy initiatives, whether or not they meet the definition of smart practices, are simply much harder to find at the Canadian provincial level. Only one of the 10 provinces, Manitoba, begins to approach the 15 most active American states in terms of the breadth and rigor of its greenhouse gas reduction strategy. Instead, most provinces remain focused on preliminary study of the issue and consideration of alternative policies that might be established at some future point. Among the three or four more active provinces, climate policy is almost exclusively confined to nonbinding “goals” and voluntary efforts. Any regulatory provisions, or exact rules to guide reduction, are focused narrowly on provincially funded activity, such as a mandate in Alberta to purchase a set of hybrid vehicles for government use. Fifteen years after Rio and nearly a decade after the signing of Kyoto, it remains very difficult to discern much of a pulse on serious climate policy development in most provinces, quite contrary to the experience of a growing and diverse set of American states. American state engagement on climate policy may be every bit as surprising as Canadian provincial disengagement. Given conventional depictions of the United States as a North American climate policy laggard and Canada as a devoted adherent to Kyoto, why are so many—and such diverse—states apparently taking the lead in devising policies to reduce greenhouse gases? Why do the American states offer an increasingly large and robust set of policy initiatives where there is no evidence of a comparable trend in Canada? Subsequent discussion will explore three distinct factors that emerged through the comparative case analysis to explain this variability. Differing Intergovernmental Context The divergent paths of the respective federal governments on Kyoto served to create very distinct contexts for states and provinces to consider their own policy development options. These differing contexts were clearly unintended by-products of the very different ways in which the debate over Kyoto, involving both those steps leading toward final negotiations and consideration of possible ratification, played out in Washington and Ottawa. In turn, they illustrate the very differing roles that subnational units—states and provinces—played in these processes, with attendant impacts on their own involvement in climate policy development. A hallmark of the American federal government through the two Clinton administrations and the second Bush presidency has been **a consistent inability to reach agreement** on legislation related to environmental protection, energy, and other areas vitally important to climate change. During this period, every possible partisan configuration within the American two-party system has existed for at least some period of time and yet a consistent outcome has been lack of domestic policy consensus, even in terms of needed updating of established legislation such as air quality (Binder 2003). This divide is equally evident in the international climate realm, as the Clinton administration agreed to Kyoto in December 1997 even though a number of its key provisions directly contradicted a Senate resolution that passed by a 95–0 vote six months earlier. A few states sent representatives to Kyoto and earlier rounds of negotiation but they were not formally consulted either in developing the treaty or in examining ways in which the Senate might be persuaded to ratify it. Instead, Kyoto was widely recognized through the remaining three years of the Clinton administration as doomed politically, so much so that the administration never submitted it to the Senate for ratification nor actively developed a strategy seeking ratification. In many respects, the 2001 actions by the Bush administration were anticlimactic and neither the 2000 nor 2004 Democratic presidential nominees offered any blueprint for jump-starting Kyoto. In many respects, Kyoto was politically “dead on arrival” but nonetheless attracted tremendous division and controversy in Washington during subsequent years. As states were essentially excluded from this process, they had a relatively quiet decade in which to think about climate change, in terms of both how it might affect them in distinct ways and how they might fashion their own policies to reduce greenhouse gases and simultaneously promote economic development. In some instances, states have clearly responded to a perception that climate change poses serious threats to their residents—such as sea-level rise in coastal states and severe droughts in agricultural states—and that there is a significant environmental need to craft responsive policies as soon as possible. But these responses have also been coupled with efforts to design policy that “fits” the economic and political realities of a particular state. These are intended to minimize any economic disruptions that might occur during implementation and to take maximum advantage of economic development opportunities that may stem from early action on climate change. What has been missing in these state policy processes is the kind of anguished, often moralistic, rhetoric that has polarized national debate and made any semblance of consensus at that level so elusive. Instead, state policy deliberations over climate change have benefited from a kind of **“political cover”** provided by the widely held presumption that states lacked the incentives, resources, or authority necessary to play any serious role. Many states used this extended period to reflect seriously about the issue of climate change and how they might begin to respond to it. Many began with symbolic initiatives and analytical exercises, gradually moving toward policy development as ideas converged and opportunities arose. At various points, these efforts took institutional form, such as creation of a cross-agency task force or designation of a unit with a lead role in policy development. All of this continued apace, receiving surprisingly little attention from environmental groups, the media, or federal policymakers, while the latter continued to dominate public attention by thrashing over the details of Kyoto and its aftermath. This served to give state officials considerable time to contemplate climate policy options, including the forging of policies that made considerable political, economic, and environmental sense for them to pursue unilaterally, with the reasonable expectation that no federal action of any consequence was in the offing.

Avoids political consequences

Prasad, 12

(Sociology Prof-Northwestern, “State-level renewable electricity policies and reductions in carbon emissions,” Energy Policy, Volume 45, June)

Despite the hesitant pace of environmental policy at the national level, there is a proliferation of environmental policy at the state level, where ‘‘an almost stealth-like process of policy development’’ has been underway for over two decades (Rabe, 2004:11). Many state governments have determined that envir- onmental policy is necessary and feasible, and have experimented with several different policy approaches, particularly on the question of facilitating alternative energy. These state policies are surprising in many ways. For example, they are often driven by bipartisan coalitions, and, perhaps because of their **lower visibility**, they seem to have **escaped** the **partisan wrangling** that has limited national-level policy. Both George W. Bush and Christine Todd Whitman were pioneers of alternative energy policy at the state level, as governors of Texas and New Jersey respectively, before they went on to obstruct environmental policy at the federal level as president and head of the EPA (Rabe, 2004: 1). Texas, a state that produces reliably conservative and anti-environmental contingents at the national level, is a leader in wind energy (Rabe, 2004: 50). Environmental policy-making at the state level is pragmatic and catholic, with many different approaches being tried. Because electricity generation accounts for 41% of all CO2 emissions and is the largest single source of CO2 emissions (EPA, 2011:ES-8; Carley, 2011), many states have focused their efforts on the electric power sector. One of the main sites of policy innovation has been the attempt to increase the generation of electricity from renewable sources.

Low political visibility

Rabe, 4

(Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan, Statehouse and Greenhouse, P. 22)

But this is not what occurred in the states examined in this study. Instead, a much quieter process of policy formation has emerged, even during more recent years, when the pace of innovation has accelerated and the intent of many policies has been more far-reaching. This is not to suggest that climate-related episodes have been irrelevant or that leading environmental groups have played no role in state policy development. Contrary to the kinds of political brawls so common in debates about climate change policy at national and international venues, however, state-based policymaking has been far less visible and contentious, often cutting across traditional partisan and interest group fissures. It has, moreover, been far more productive in terms of generating actual policies with the potential to reduce greenhouse gas releases.

Informal nature allows states to escape backlash

Rabe, 4

(Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan, Statehouse and Greenhouse, P. 27)

Second, state-level policymaking is often quite different from what occurs in Washington. As at the federal level, state governments can bog down in partisan squabbles and succumb to the powers of influential interest groups. But in many states, policymaking is far more informal, and entrepreneurial opportunities may be considerably greater, than in Washington. In the absence of particularly strong opposition from interest groups, entrepreneurs may have a much better opportunity to establish and sustain supportive networks. These may involve other agencies, interest groups, or allied elcted officials and may have been established over an extended period, over a decade in some of the state climate change cases. Consequently, many state capitals may offer particularly promising entrepreneurshi. The mezzo level in many state agencies, such as environmental protection and energy, is much less densely staffed than in their federal counerparts, and the layers between an agency and the governor’s office are likely to be much thinner. This allows and individual to emerge as the trusted resident expert on a particular topic, such as climate change, able to get important messages to prominent places in the state governance structure p opportunities, particularly for relatively “new” issues for which and infrastructure of established policies and interest group positions has not been created.

## 2nc no extinction

Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

Sea level rise is junk science—models empirically fail

Gupta, Climate Change Research Centre @ University of New South Wales, et al., ‘12

(Alexander Sen, “Climate Drift in the CMIP3 Models,” *Journal of Climate* Vol. 25, Issue 13, p. 4621-4640)

As discussed above, drift in temperature and salinity dominates 20C3M trends throughout most of the subsurface ocean. In the calculation of steric sea level rise, a given temperature or salinity change will generally have less effect at depth than near the surface. As the amount of expansion for a given change in temperature or salinity is itself a function of temperature, salinity, and pressure (in particular warmer water expands more than colder water for the same increase in heat content), the changes in temperature near the warm surface ocean have a proportionally larger influence on steric sea level rise than temperature changes in the cold deeper ocean (at least away from the wellmixed high-latitude regions). Nevertheless, given that the global warming signal over the twentieth century is predominantly limited to the top few hundred meters, in most regions, while ocean drift extends through the entire water column, drift still introduces considerable bias into both regional and global sea level rise.

The CMIP3 models show a broad range of estimates for steric sea level rise over 1950–2000 (Fig. 10a). The spread in the raw 20C3M estimates is considerable (standard deviation ;0.76 mm yr21 with a multimodel mean of 0.45 mm yr21). In addition a number of the models indicate a lowering of sea level over the period. For the drift-corrected sea level rise (i.e., by using drift corrected temperature and salinity) values become considerably more consistent (standard deviation ;0.36 mm yr21) and all models now indicate a rise in sea level. While considerable intermodel variability still exists the driftcorrected multimodel mean (;0.59 mm yr21) is consistent with the Domingues et al. (2008) observational estimate (0.526 0.08 mm yr21, for 0–700 m, 1950–2003). Figure 10a shows raw 20C3M trends and drift-corrected estimates of forced trend for steric sea level rise, including multiple ensemble members where available; ensemble members for a given model are generally initialized from the same PICNTRL experiment but from different points in time, usually separated by multiple years (Table 1). Nevertheless the drift, which is derived from different time periods from a single PICNTRL simulation, is very similar across ensemble members, suggesting that the linear drift approximation is valid and that natural variability is not having a major effect on the drift estimates. Figure 10b shows a scatter of the raw 20C3M trend magnitudes versus drift magnitudes. The drift-related error varies considerably across the models from less than 10% to over 200% for the ECHAM4 model (see previous discussion of this model).

As with surface drift, subsurface drift in temperature and salinity is spatially heterogeneous and so can result in a larger bias on regional scales. This is particularly important for assessing twentieth-century regional changes, where the steric component of sea level rise is a major component of the total (e.g., Domingues et al. 2008). Figure 11 shows both the raw 20C3M and driftcorrected 1950–2000 trends for three models (calculated from the surface to the bottom). A few models (e.g., MRI-CGCM2.3.2) have a well-equilibrated preindustrial control throughout the ocean and so are essentially untroubled by drift. However, most models are significantly affected in certain regions. In fact for many models and regions the sign of the sea level trend is changed by the spurious drift. For instance in the CSIRO Mk3.0 model the steric sea level anomaly over much of the tropics and midlatitudes, estimated from the raw 20C3M temperature and salinity, changes sign once the drift is taken into account.

Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11

(S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).

## oceans

Recent history disproves the impact

Idso, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “Two Centuries of Reef Growth in the Southern South China Sea,” *CO2 Science* Vol. 15, No. 20, May)

The authors write that "rising atmospheric CO2 and global warming are regarded as fatal threats to coral reefs," noting that "the IPCC has reported that by the end of this century, coral reefs will be the first ecological system that will become extinct," citing Wilkinson (2004). However, they say "others contend that rising seawater temperature is conducive to enhanced coral calcification, and increased calcification will be higher than the decline caused by rising CO2," so that "coral calcification will increase by about 35% beyond pre-industrial levels by 2100, and no extinction of coral reefs will occur in the future," citing McNeil et al. (2004). So who's right?

What was done

In an attempt to shed some light on this important question, in late May of 2004 and 2007 Shi et al. extracted core samples of coral skeletons from several massive live and dead Porites lutea colonies comprising part of the Meiji Reef in the southern South China Sea, after which they analyzed their skeletal calcification rates by means of X-ray photography, which enabled them to construct a nearly three-century-long history of coral calcification rate for the period 1716-2005.

What was learned

The results of the six scientists' efforts are depicted in the figure below.

As best we can determine from the Chinese scientists' graph, over the period of time depicted - when climate alarmists claim the world warmed at a rate that was unprecedented over the past millennium or two, and when the atmosphere's CO2 concentration rose to values not seen for millions of years - the two "fatal threats to coral reefs," even acting together, could not prevent coral calcification rates on Meiji Reef from actually rising by about 11% over the past three centuries.

What it means

It certainly looks like the infamous IPCC has gotten it all wrong when it comes to predicting the effects of rising temperature and atmospheric CO2 concentration on coral calcification rates ... because you better believe that nature's got it right.

Framing issue—gigantic uncertainties in ocean sciences mean default to zero risk

Idso, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU, ‘12

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “The Unsettled Science of Ocean Warming and Acidification,” *CO2 Science* Vol. 15, No. 19, May)

In an eye-opening "perspective" article published a couple of years ago in the 9 December 2009 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, three researchers from the Marine Biogeochemistry Section of the Leibniz Institute of Marine Sciences in Kiel, Germany, describe their assessment of various possible responses of the global ocean's seawater carbonate system, plus its physical and biological carbon pumps, to ocean warming and associated changes in vertical mixing and overturning circulation, as well as the closely-allied phenomena of ocean acidification and carbonation.

All of these phenomena, many of which are nonlinear and extremely complicated, are interlinked; and Riebesell and his colleagues thus conclude, from their objective review of the pertinent scientific literature, that the magnitude and even the sign of the global ocean's carbon cycle feedback to climate change are, in their words, "yet unknown."

They note, for example, that "our understanding of biological responses to ocean change is still in its infancy." With respect to ocean acidification, in particular, they write that the impact it will have on marine life "is still uncertain," and that the phenomenon itself is but "one side of the story," the other side being what they call "ocean carbonation," which, as they describe it, "will likely be beneficial to some groups of photosynthetic organisms." Thus, they write that "our present understanding of biologically driven feedback mechanisms is still rudimentary," and that with respect to many of their magnitudes, "our understanding is too immature to even make a guess." What is more, they imply that even what we do think we know could well be wrong, because, as they elucidate, "our present knowledge of pH/CO2 sensitivities of marine organisms is based almost entirely on short-term perturbation experiments, neglecting the possibility of evolutionary adaptation."

## 2nc warming inevitable

#### Clausen says

**2 degrees Celsius**. This is the level where many scientists say we can **manage the risks** of climate change

That means 6 degree warming’s inevitable

**AP 9** (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

Low threshold—less than 2 degrees is sufficient to cause their impacts

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Climate scientists estimate that global warming of 2C above pre-industrial levels marks the limit of safety, beyond which climate change becomes catastrophic and irreversible. Though such estimates are necessarily imprecise, warming of as little as 1.5C could cause dangerous rises in sea levels and a higher risk of extreme weather – the limit of 2C is now inscribed in international accords, including the partial agreement signed at Copenhagen in 2009, by which the biggest developed and developing countries for the first time agreed to curb their greenhouse gas output.

Gas and developing countries offset US emissions reductions

Marshall, climate reporter – New Scientist, 8/20/’12

(Michael, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22196-lowest-us-carbon-emissions-wont-slow-climate-change.html>)

It looks like good news, but it's not. The US has recorded a sharp fall in its greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. Thanks to a rise in the use of natural gas, emissions are at their lowest since 1992. The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported.

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), energy-related CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades. Emissions are normally high between January and March because people use more heating in the winter, but last winter was mild in the US.

The EIA says that an increase in gas-fired power generation, and a corresponding decline in coal-fired, contributed to the fall in emissions. Burning natural gas produces fewer emissions than burning coal, and natural gas is currently unusually cheap in the US thanks to a glut of shale gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing or "fracking".

If gas companies continue to expand their shale gas operations, the US could generate even more electricity from gas, and its emissions could fall for several years, says Kevin Anderson of the University of Manchester, UK.

However, this will not slow down climate change. US coal consumption has fallen, but production is holding steady and the surplus is being sold to Asia. As a result, the US is effectively exporting the coal-related emissions.

"Gas is less bad than burning the coal, but only if you keep the coal in the ground," Anderson says.

Proponents of natural gas argue that it is a "transition fuel" that we can burn for a few years while we install low-carbon infrastructure such as wind farms and nuclear power stations.

That viewpoint looks increasingly untenable. "If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy.

## 2nc china outweighs

And every other country

Koetzle, 8 - Ph.D. and Senior Vice President of Public Policy at the Institute for Energy Research

(William, "IER Rebuttal to Boucher White Paper", <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/>

Take for example the following chart from the Energy Information Agency (EIA).[[6]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/" \l "_ftn6" \o "_ftnref6) This chart presents a detailed view of current and projected world energy-related CO2 emissions (1990 to 2030). This chart shows that in 2004, the United States accounted for approximately 22% of world CO2 emissions. By 2030, the EIA estimates that the United States’ share of these emissions will fall to about 18.5%. It also shows where the increases in CO2 emissions will occur over the next two decades: in the developing (i.e. non-OECD) countries. Currently energy-related CO2 emissions are roughly equivalent between OECD (developed) and non-OECD countries; by 2030 this ratio will change: Developed countries will be responsible for less than 40% of emissions. Notice specifically that China’s and India’s CO2 emissions are estimated to increase by 139% and 94% respectively. As the Committee White Paper notes, several states and regions have acted in the absence of federal legislation to enact GHG reduction programs. California, for example, passed AB 32 which establishes a goal of reducing emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020. California currently accounts for about 6.7% of total United States emissions[[7]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/" \l "_ftn7" \o "_ftnref7); and about 1.5% of world-wide energy-related CO2 emissions. If California were successful in achieving this very significant reduction in emissions, how would this impact net global CO2 emissions? The answer is not much. California’s reduction by 2030 would reduce the growth in United States emissions by about 13%; and the reduction would only offset about 4% of China’s increase in emissions over the same period. This table also helps to illustrate what happens to global net CO2 emissions, given reduction scenarios undertaken by an individual nation or a group of nations. For example, if the United States were to unilaterally reduced emissions by 30% or 40% below 2004 levels[[8]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/" \l "_ftn8" \o "_ftnref8) by 2030; net global CO2 emissions would still increase by more than 40%. The reason is straightforward: either of these reduction levels is offset by the increases in CO2 emissions in developing countries. For example, a 30% cut below 2004 levels by 2030 by the United States offsets less than 60% of China’s increase in emissions during the same period. In fact, even if the United States were to eliminate all CO2 emissions by 2030, without any corresponding actions by other countries, world-wide emissions would still increase by 30%. If the United States were joined by the other OECD countries in a CO2 reduction effort, net emissions would still significantly increase. In the event of an OCED-wide reduction of 30%, global emissions increase by 33%; a reduction of 40% still leads to a net increase of just under 30%. Simply put, in order to hold CO2 emissions at 2004 levels, absent any reductions by developing nations like China and India, all OECD emissions would have to cease.[[9]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/" \l "_ftn9" \o "_ftnref9)

## at: china models

China won’t model the plan

Wortzel, 8 - Former Director of Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation

(Larry et al, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov, p. google)

Despite the importance to China of its energy supply, and the environmental effects on China and other nations from consumption of that energy, China’s governmental apparatus regulating these policy areas, and the actions taken within them, is weak and largely ineffective. This can be attributed to a lack of institutional capacity for formulating sound policy, a discomfort with free market principles that if adopted and enforced would help China achieve some of its objectives more easily, a lack of will, and a consequent lack of resource commitment to establish new policies and enforce existing policies that seek to lower energy demand, increase energy efficiency, and promote environmentally sound practices. The problems within China’s policy-making structure occur at both the central government and local government levels. Central government problems primarily are obstacles to establishing sound national policies as a result of competing interests within ministries and organizations of the central government. Local problems most often are challenges in implementing policy, some of them caused by dif ferent interests that motivate local government decision making.

Coordination

Wortzel, 8 - Former Director of Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation

(Larry et al, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Nov, p. google)

Given that the Ministry of Environmental Protection has no control over the budgets of local environmental bureaus and therefore can have little influence over staffing, programs, and funding decisions, the disjuncture between the central government and local governments remains quite large. As a recent *Economist Intelligence Unit* report argues, *[The Ministry of Environmental Protection] has a larger budget and greater bureaucratic clout than [the State Environmental Protection Agency] did. Unlike [the agency], [the ministry’s] status as a full ministry allows it to bargain with provincial authorities on an equal footing. But* authority related to environmental protection remains highly fragmented**,** split both among various central-government ministries, and between [the ministry] and local environmental protection bureaux . . . controlled by local governments. This dysfunctional power structure makes it hard to co-ordinate policies and often renders [the ministry’s] work ineffective. 125

## links

#### So insufficient

**Logan et al. 07** – Senior associate @ World Resources Institute [Logan, Joanna Lewis (Senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), and Michael B. Cummings (JD candidate @ Georgetown University and former Business/Solutions Fellow @ Pew Center on Global Climate Change), “For China, the shift to climate-friendly energy depends on international collaboration,” Boston Review, January/February 2007, pg. http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/loganlewiscummings.php]

All these factors combined call into question the Chinese central government’s ability to move down a different, more climate-friendly path without meaningful international engagement and assistance. It is therefore critically important for the international community to increase bilateral and multilateral collaboration with China to address shared energy and environmental concerns before it commits to half a century of carbon-intensive infrastructure. Five areas are particularly well-suited for further engagement and offer strong opportunities to expand global benefits:

Energy efficiency. Efforts to improve energy efficiency are the most effective and affordable measures China can take to meet development goals while reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Continuing its tradition of relatively impressive energy-efficiency policies, China recently approved new fuel-economy standards for its rapidly growing passenger-vehicle fleet that are more stringent than those in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Moreover, the government has set an extraordinarily ambitious target of cutting energy intensity by one fifth by 2010.

International partners can help China to build on these important efforts, in particular by promoting the business, financial, and regulatory skills needed for energy-efficiency projects and standards, and to reform policies that impede market-driven projects. Developing incentives for accelerated technology transfer, particularly for the private sector, are also crucial. Many of these efforts are already underway, and Chinese government officials are open to proposals that can help them meet their targets. Foreign partners need to be open and flexible so that their efforts can have maximum impact.

Energy security with climate benefits. China’s booming economy has required a huge expansion in imported raw material, especially oil, since 2001. Chinese national oil companies have begun to purchase oil and gas assets around the globe as a way to increase energy security. Some nations view these actions with alarm, since there are potentially destabilizing military, political, and economic implications. From a climate perspective, China’s growing interest in coal liquefaction is also alarming because making transportation fuels from coal through chemical transformation sends approximately twice as much CO2 into the atmosphere as using standard crude oil.

Better integrating China into the processes of managing the global energy system would make it a more helpful partner in managing that system. Increased participation in the IEA, G-8 and other global bodies involved in high-level energy dialogues would provide opportunities for developing shared understandings on topics affecting global energy security. Such dialogues could lead to energy-security-enhancing initiatives with climate benefits, and could lead the way toward climate-focused dialogue between the major energy consumers of the world. But any such endeavours will need to be backed by meaningful actions. China and its international partners could also discuss deeper technical collaboration on vehicle technologies, alternative fuels, and associated policies. However, any partnerships first need to focus on a dramatically improved atmosphere of trust and sincerity.

Advanced coal technologies and carbon sequestration. For the past few years, China has built, on average, one new large power plant each week. Provided that it can overcome technical, financial, regulatory, and social barriers, carbon capture and storage (CCS) may become a critical option for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions from fossil-burning plants throughout the world, but especially in coal-intensive countries such as China. While China is unlikely to invest in CCS systems for coal plants in the next decade or two due to the cost, it is looking to collaborate on advanced coal technology research including coal gasification. China is also keenly interested in enhanced oil-recovery methodologies that could use carbon dioxide in the process. CO2-enhanced oil recovery can help anchor early investments in CCS infrastructure that might otherwise have to wait for a more comprehensive climate policy. //1ac

#### Your about joint drilling

**Zha & Hu 07** – Professor of International Studies @ Renmin University & Professor of Politics @ University of Hong Kong [Zha Daojiong & Hu Weixing, “Promoting Energy Partnership in Beijing and Washington,” Washington Quarterly • 30:4 Autumn 2007, pp.105–115

Policy dialogues are certainly useful. Yet, as is true of so many other venues for government communication, they often result in being a means for defend­ing one side’s own policy orientations. Partnership, on the other hand, is action oriented. Although China and the United States are not yet strategic partners in the field of energy, actions in the spirit of partnership are certainly desirable.

First, Washington should continue to col­laborate with Beijing on China’s energy tech­nology development. The logic for doing so is simple: energy saved in China means an in­crease in worldwide supply and a reduction of pollutants into the air, which migrate across the Pacific Ocean. The areas for action in­clude working to increase the use of nuclear and other cleaner forms of power, improv­ing recovery rates of coal and oil production, achieving better user efficiency, and replacing technologically obsolete plants. In addition, China and the United States can benefit from discussing how to address policy issues associated with energy use such as fuel and electric power price systems, urban planning, and the encour­agement of lifestyle changes to enable energy conservation.

In order to promote energy technology development in China, it is es­sential for U.S. companies to see the benefits of participation. For U.S. and other international companies, two issues stand in the way of the transfer of energy-saving technologies to China: inadequate Chinese protection of intel­lectual property rights of foreign technology and low-cost competition from Chinese-made equipment. As such, transfer of the best available technologies, a frequent suggestion of Chinese government officials, is often regarded as undesirable by the U.S. business community.

Energy conservation in China and environmental protection is nonetheless a matter of urgency and in the interest of the entire world. The U.S. govern­ment has sound reason to provide incentives for U.S. businesses to establish a stronger presence in China’s energy development and environmental protec­tion. Intellectual property rights concerns are legitimate. One compromise is for U.S. technology companies to partner with their Chinese counterparts to produce better-than-available (though not the most high-end) energy technol­ogies and equipments for adoption in China. This approach can establish in­tellectual property rights protection within the Chinese system from the start, with Chinese partners having an interest in protecting their own investments. As for concerns about competition from cheaper Chinese-made energy-saving technologies, energy conservation is a worldwide task. Such competition thus ought to be viewed as a benign if not welcome development.

Second, the governments of China and the United States ought to explore ways for their energy companies to jointly enlarge the global supply of oil and other forms of energy. Chinese oil companies are already collaborating with U.S. and other international oil companies through subcontracting arrange­ments. Serious competition between Chinese and U.S. companies as well as other international oil companies takes place when they pursue wholly owned or equity in­vestment in the same asset in a third country. Chinese oil investment decisions baffle their U.S. competitors when profit margins are esti­mated to be considerably lower than those of other companies, raising suspicions of politi­cal motives. When Beijing and Washington are viewed as condoning such company behavior through diplomacy, they inadverdently help strengthen the leverage of the third country, in­creasing the cost of extraction for all. Rather than providing cover for each other’s energy companies to compete in third-country markets, the two gov­ernments should find ways to encourage joint ventures in oil extraction.

Chinese-U.S. joint ventures in oil development could help to lower the costs for oil companies associated with competitive bidding for the same en­ergy assets. They would also help dissuade the appeal of resource nationalism to oil-exporting states. This approach can certainly contribute to confidence building between the political establishments in Beijing and Washington.

Reinforcing Interdependence

Energy security as a bilateral issue between China and the United States has the potential to become contentious. Although energy has little chance of being the issue that diffuses the myriad tensions between Beijing and Washington, energy cooperation in the spirit of partnership can help improve the status quo. Pg. 112-115

#### They don’t impact SUPPLY, which is what Glaser SCS internal link is about—how does coop over CCS stop

Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency.

#### Or

ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger.

#### Tons of US production now—the plan doesn’t boost global markets

**Ignatius 12** (David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. Ignatius joined The Post in 1986 as editor of its Sunday Outlook section. In 1990 he became foreign editor, and in 1993, assistant managing editor for business news. He began writing his column in 1998 and continued even during a three-year stint as executive editor of the International Herald Tribune in Paris. Earlier in his career, Ignatius was a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, covering at various times the steel industry, the Justice Department, the CIA, the Senate, the Middle East and the State Department. Ignatius grew up in Washington, D.C., and studied political theory at Harvard College and economics at Kings College, Cambridge., 5/4/2012, "An economic boom ahead?", www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-economic-boom-ahead/2012/05/04/gIQAbj5K2T\_story.html)

First, the case that America is entering a new era of energy security: My expert here is Robin West, a friend who is chairman of PFC Energy, a Washington-based advisory group. He argues in a series of recent reports to clients that, because of the rapid expansion of oil and gas production from shale, America is likely to become by 2020 the world’s No. 1 producer of oil, gas and biofuels — eclipsing even the energy superpowers, Russia and Saudi Arabia. West explains that the natural-gas boom will mean a dramatic change in energy imports and, thus, the security of U.S. energy supplies. He forecasts that combined imports of oil and natural gas will fall from about 52 percent of total demand in 2010 to 22 percent by 2020. The totals are even more impressive if supplies from Canada are included. “This is the energy equivalent of the Berlin Wall coming down,” contends West. “Just as the trauma of the Cold War ended in Berlin, so the trauma of the 1973 oil embargo is ending now.” The geopolitical implications of this change are striking: “We will no longer rely on the Middle East, or compete with such nations as China or India for resources.”

## 2nc war inevitable

#### Only war in the future escalates

Office of the Secretary of Defense, July, ‘5 (<http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf>)

China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic missile force. This could provide a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent and counterstrike capability. It is fielding more survivable missiles capable of targeting India, Russia, virtually all of the United States, and the Asia-Pacific theater as far south as Australia and New Zealand. Beijing maintains a small strategic arsenal. Its stated nuclear weapons doctrine remains one of “no first use.” China’s future strategic force will likely comprise enhanced silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs (currently deployed), solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 (initial operational capability 2005-06) and DF-31A ICBMs (IOC 2007-09), and sea-based JL-2 SLBMs (IOC 2008-10). China will also maintain a force of nuclear-armed CSS-5 MRBMs for regional contingencies. China currently deploys approximately twenty silo-based, liquid-propellant CSS-4 ICBMs, which constitute its primary nuclear deterrent. The Second Artillery also maintains approximately twenty liquid-fueled, more limited-range CSS-3 ICBMs to sustain its regional nuclear deterrent. The Second Artillery will likely keep this older missile in service until it is replaced by the more survivable, road-mobile DF-31. China supplements the aged CSS-2s with solid-propellant, road-mobile CSS-5 MRBMs. The introduction of the road-mobile DF-31-series ICBMs will supplement China’s silo-based strategic force. The mobility of the new DF-31-class missiles will enable these systems to operate over a larger area, making them more difficult to locate and neutralize. The introduction of a new generation of SLBMs on China’s new ballistic-missile submarine will provide an additional survivable nuclear option. Finally, replacement of the older, silo-based CSS-4 Mod 1 with the longer range CSS-4 Mod 2, coupled with the ongoing migration to mobile, solid-fueled systems will enhance the operational capabilities and survivability of China’s strategic missile force.

## 2nc us will win

#### And, nuclear primacy means US victory

Lieber, Professor of Poli Sci – Notre Dame, and Press, Professor of Poli Sci – University of Pennsylvania, ‘7

(Keir and Daryl, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, July/August)

But meanwhile, the United States steadily improved its “counterforce” capabilities—those nuclear weapons most effective at targeting an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. Even as it reduced the number of weapons in its nuclear arsenal, the U.S. made its remaining weapons more lethal and accurate. The result today is a global nuclear imbalance unseen in 50 years. And nowhere is U.S. nuclear primacy clearer—or potentially more important—than in the Sino-U.S. relationship.

China has approximately 80 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, but only a few of them—those assigned to single-warhead DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—can reach the continental United States. (There is no definitive, unclassified count of China’s DF-5 ICBMs, but official U.S. statements have put the number at 18.) China has neither modern nuclear ballistic-missile submarines nor long-range nuclear bombers. Moreover, China’s ICBMs can’t be quickly launched; the warheads are stored separately, and the missiles are kept unfueled. (Unlike the solid fuel used in U.S. missiles, the liquid fuel used to propel Chinese ICBMs is highly corrosive.) Finally, China lacks an advanced early-warning system that would give Beijing reliable notice of an incoming attack.

This small arsenal fulfilled China’s strategic requirements in the 20th century, but it is now obsolete. The current Chinese force was designed for a different era:when China was a poor nation with a limited role on the world stage, and when U.S. and Soviet missiles were too inaccurate to carry out a disarming strike—even against Beijing’s small force. But China’s international presence is expanding, and America’s counterforce capabilities have soared. Moreover, one of the biggest constraints that would deter American leaders from contemplating a disarming strike is fading away. In the past, a U.S. preemptive attack would have generated horrific civilian casualties, but that may soon cease to be the case.

#### At worst, it wouldn’t go nuclear or draw in outside powers

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. **Shlapak**, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200**7**

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

#### But we would still win

Lieber, Professor of Poli Sci – Notre Dame, and Press, Professor of Poli Sci – University of Pennsylvania, ‘7

(Keir and Daryl, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, July/August)

Perhaps as important, the United States is pursuing a slew of nonnuclear weapons that will provide officials options they may find more palatable if they decide to attack an adversary’s nuclear arsenal. These include precision “bunker buster” conventional bombs, high-speed long-range cruise missiles, and conventionally armed ballistic missiles—each of which could be used to destroy enemy missile silos. Furthermore, Washington is undertaking initiatives—including advances in antisatellite warfare and in wide-area remote sensing, designed to find “relocatable” mobile missile launchers—that will make China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. Even a missile-defense system substantially boosts U.S. offensive counterforce capabilities. Critics of this system are right in claiming that it could not shield America from even a modest nuclear attack (e.g., 25 warheads), because it would be easily overwhelmed by decoy warheads and the “penetration aids” that would accompany an adversary’s missiles. But it could enhance offensive nuclear capabilities, by “mopping up” a small number of incoming warheads that survived a U.S. first strike.

#### Any scenario results in US victory

Lieber, Professor of Poli Sci – Notre Dame, and Press, Professor of Poli Sci – University of Pennsylvania, ‘7

(Keir and Daryl, “Superiority Complex,” The Atlantic, July/August)

By putting its nuclear forces on alert, however, China’s leaders would compel a U.S. president to make a very difficult decision: to accede to blackmail (by agreeing to a cease-fire and pressuring the Taiwanese to renounce independence), to assume that the threat is a bluff (a dangerous proposition, given that each Chinese ICBM carries a city-busting 4,000-kiloton warhead), or to strike the Chinese missiles before they could be launched.

How do America’s growing counterforce capabilities affect this scenario? First, American nuclear primacy may prevent such a war in the first place. China’s leaders understand that their military now has little hope of defeating U.S. air and naval forces. If they also recognize that their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable—and that placing it on alert might trigger a preemptive strike—the leaders may conclude that war is a no-win proposition.

Second, if a war over Taiwan started anyway, U.S. nuclear primacy might help contain the fighting at the conventional level. Early in the crisis, Washington could quietly convey to Beijing that the United States would act decisively if China put its vulnerable nuclear arsenal on alert.

Finally, if China threatened to launch nuclear attacks against America’s allies, its territory, or its forces in Asia, nuclear primacy would make a preemptive first strike more palatable to U.S. leaders. Any decision to attack China’s ICBM force, though, would be fraught with danger. A missile silo might have escaped detection. Furthermore, a strike on China’s 18 ICBMs would leave Beijing with roughly 60 shorter-range nuclear missiles with which to retaliate against U.S. forces and allies in the region. However, in the aftermath of a “clean” disarming strike—one that killed relatively few Chinese—American leaders could credibly warn that a Chinese nuclear response would trigger truly devastating consequences, meaning nuclear attacks against a broader target set, including military, government, and possibly even urban centers. In light of warnings from Chinese defense analysts and from within China’s military that it might use nuclear weapons to avoid losing Taiwan, an American president might feel compelled to strike first. In this terrible circumstance, he or she would reap the benefits of the past decade’s counterforce upgrades.

## at: other countries drawn in

#### Everyone will take the US side

Kissinger, Former Secretary of State, 6/13/’5

(Henry, “China: Containment Won’t Work,” Washington Post)

In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoid choosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism. They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radical Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or anti-Chinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American insistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India's Muslim population.

## 2nc laundry list impact

#### China rise causes terrorism, secession, and prolif – goes nuclear

Zakaria, Editor @ Newsweek, 12/1/’9

(Fareed, <http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/fareed_zakaria/2008/12/wanted_a_new_grand_strategy_1.html>)

Some have seized on the fact that emerging markets are slumping to argue that the era of Western dominance isn't over yet. But the rise of the non-Western world -- which began with Japan in the 1950s, then continued with the Asian tigers in the 1960s, China in the 1980s and India and Brazil in the 1990s -- is a broad and deep trend that is likely to endure.

For some countries, the current economic crisis could actually accelerate the process. For the past two decades, for example, China has grown at approximately 9 percent a year and the United States at 3 percent. For the next few years, American growth will likely be 1 percent and China's, by the most conservative estimates, 5 percent. So, China was growing three times as fast as the United States, but will now grow five times as fast, which only brings closer the date when the Chinese economy will equal in size that of the United States. Then contrast China's enormous surplus reserves to America's massive debt burden: the picture does not suggest a return to American unipolarity.

The "rise of the rest," as I have termed it, is an economic phenomenon, but it has political, military and cultural consequences. In one month this past summer, India was willing to frontally defy the United States at the Doha trade talks, Russia attacked and occupied parts of Georgia, and China hosted the most spectacular and expensive Olympic Games in history (costing more than $40 billion). Ten years ago, not one of the three would have been powerful or confident enough to act as it did.

Even if their growth rates decline, these countries will not return quietly to the back of the bus. The "Global Trends" report identifies several worrying aspects of the new international order--competition for resources like oil, food, commodities and water; climate change; continued terrorist threats; and demographic shifts. But the most significant point it makes is that these changes are taking place at every level and at great speed in the global system. Nations with differing political and economic systems are flourishing. Subnational groups, with varied and contradictory agendas, are on the rise. Technology is increasing the pace of change. Such ferment is usually a recipe for instability. Sudden shifts can trigger sudden actions -- terrorist attacks, secessionist outbreaks, nuclear brinksmanship.

# 1NR

## bmd

#### Levi evidence says Obama will compromise BMD so Russia puts pressure on Assad –- that ends regional sectarian violence

Nasr 11

(Vali – professor at Tufts University, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, If the Arab Spring Turns Ugly, 8/27/2011 The New York Times, p. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/opinion/sunday/the-dangers-lurking-in-the-arab-spring.html?pagewanted=all>)

Syria today stands at the edge of such an upheaval. The brutality of Bashar al-Assad’s regime is opening a dangerous fissure between the Alawite minority, which rules the country, and the majority Sunni population. After Mr. Assad’s butchery in the largely Sunni city of Hama on July 31, on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni group, accused the regime of conducting “a war of sectarian cleansing.” It is now clear that Mr. Assad’s strategy is to divide the opposition by **stoking sectarian conflict**. Sunni extremists have reacted by attacking Alawite families and businesses, especially in towns near the Iraq border. The potential for a broader clash between Alawites and Sunnis is clear, and it would probably not be **confined to Syria**. Instead, it would carry a risk of **setting off a regional dynamic** that could overwhelm the hopeful narrative of the Arab Spring itself, replacing it with a much aggravated **power struggle along sectarian lines**. That is because throughout the Middle East there is a **strong undercurrent** of simmering sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shiites, of whom the Alawites are a subset. Shiites and Sunnis live cheek by jowl in the long arc that stretches from Lebanon to Pakistan, and the region’s two main power brokers, Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, are already jousting for power. So far this year, Shiite-Sunni tensions have been evident in countries from Bahrain to Syria. But put together, they could force the United States to rethink its response to the Arab Spring itself. Sectarianism is an **old wound** in the Middle East. But the recent popular urge for democracy, national unity and dignity has opened it and made it feel fresh. This is because many of the Arab governments that now face the wrath of protesters are guilty of both suppressing individual rights and concentrating power in the hands of minorities. The problem goes back to the colonial period, when European administrators manipulated religious and ethnic diversity to their advantage by giving minorities greater representation in colonial security forces and governments. Arab states that emerged from colonialism promised unity under the banner of Arab nationalism. But as they turned into cynical dictatorships, failing at war and governance, they, too, entrenched sectarian biases. This scarred Arab society so deeply that the impulse for unity was often no match for the deep divisions of tribe, sect and ethnicity. The struggle that matters most is the one between Sunnis and Shiites. The war in Iraq first unleashed the destructive potential of their competition for power, but the issue was not settled there. The Arab Spring has allowed it to **resurface by weakening states** that have long kept sectarian divisions in place, and brutally suppressed popular grievances. Today, Shiites clamor for greater rights in Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while Sunnis are restless in Iraq and Syria. This time, each side will most likely be **backed by a nervous regional power**, eager to protect its interests. For the past three decades the Saudi monarchy, which sees itself as the guardian of Sunni Islam, has viewed Iran’s Shiite theocracy as its nemesis. Saudis have relied on the United States, Arab nationalism and Sunni identity to slow Iran’s rise, even to the point of supporting radical Sunni forces. The Saudis suffered a major setback when control of Iraq passed from Sunnis to Shiites, but that made them more determined to reverse Shiite gains and rising Iranian influence. It was no surprise that Saudi Arabia was the first Arab state to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus earlier this month. The imprint of this rivalry was evident in regional conflicts before the Arab Spring. Saudis saw Iran’s hand behind a rebellion among Yemen’s Houthi tribe — who are Zaydis, an offshoot of Shiism — that started in 2004. Iran blamed Arab financing for its own decade-long revolt by Sunni Baluchis along its southeastern border with Pakistan. And since 2005, when Shiite Hezbollah was implicated in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a popular Sunni prime minister who was close to the Saudis, a wide rift has divided Lebanon’s Sunni and Shiite communities, and prompted Saudi fury against Hezbollah. The sectarian divide in Lebanon shows no sign of narrowing, and now the turmoil in Syria next door has brought Lebanon to a knife’s edge. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s audacious power grab has angered Saudi Arabia. Officials in Riyadh see the turn of events in Lebanon as yet another Iranian victory, and the realization of the dreaded “Shiite crescent” that King Abdullah of Jordan once warned against. In March, fearing a snowball effect from the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia drew a clear red line in Bahrain, where a Shiite majority would have been empowered had pro-democracy protests succeeded in ousting the Sunni monarchy. The Saudis rallied the Persian Gulf monarchies to support the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain in brutally suppressing the protests — and put Iran on notice that they were “ready to enter war with Iran and even with Iraq in defense of Bahrain.” The Saudis are right to be worried about the outcome of sectarian fights in Lebanon and Bahrain, but in Syria it is Iran that stands to lose. Both sides understand that the final outcome will decide the pecking order in the region. **Every struggle** in this rivalry therefore matters, and every clash is **pregnant with risk for regional stability**. The turn of events in Syria is particularly important, because Sunnis elsewhere see the Alawite government as the **linchpin in the Shiite alliance** of Iran and Hezbollah. The Alawite-Sunni clash there could quickly draw in both of the major players in the region and **ignite a broader regional sectarian conflict** among their local allies, from Lebanon to Iraq to the Persian Gulf and beyond.

#### World War 3

Forostenko 11

(Anna, Worst Case Scenario: Will Ongoing Conflicts Lead To a World War? Global Research, , 4/22/2011 p. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24453>)

The conflicts in the Middle East and Africa are growing. An opinion poll conducted among experts by the Voice of Russia shows that they believe that in a worst-case scenario, these conflicts could **lead to a world war**. The outcome of presidential election triggered clashes in Nigeria. According to official reports, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the south, won 60 percent of votes, while his opponent, Muhammadu Buhari won only little more than 30 percent. The opposition is dissatisfied with the results. As a result, Buhari’s supporters launched attacks on Christians and even set fire to several churches. In response, young Christians attacked mosques. Some experts draw a parallel between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, disintegration of which into North and South was averted only after the interference of the UN peacekeepers and the French forces. This means that Nigeria may experience a similar fate. It will have to get foreign assistance or it will disintegrate. Meanwhile, the foreign factor could trigger disintegration of Libya, says a senior lecture of the political science faculty of the St. Petersburg University, Gumer Isaev. “Libya will disintegrate only in case its situation is deadlocked. This will depend on whether there will be foreign interference or not. If foreign countries interfere, Libya will be divided into at least two parts,” Gumer Isaev said. The head of the department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan of the Institute of the CIS countries, Andrei Grozin disagrees with him. The historical borders of Libya were established artificially after colonial rule, and consequently, the country will hardly remain within these borders in the future, says the expert. It’s a different case that ongoing uprisings in several countries have been triggered only by internal problems such as unemployment, poor income, dissatisfied young people and privileges to a small group of people. Lately, a third force has been backing these uprisings, says Andrei Grozin. “This is happening not so roughly and blankly like during the colour revolutions in the former Soviet republics. Clearly, the coordinators of these processes have learned to assess the specifics of each country creatively. At present, all is done skillfully, delicately, and accurately using various aspects of information technology for each country by taking into account local specifics, Andrei Grozin said. Possibly, Salafis could be such a group in Syria. According to Syrian authorities, they are behind the unrest in Homs and Baniyas. However, this could only be the tip of the iceberg. According to several experts, Syria is becoming the battlefield where the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran clash. Most likely, Saudi Arabia has a country to lean on, the United States. This means the entire region will face a **serious conflict and world powers will be involved**. This will be a conflict between various political orientations. Saudi Arabia will be backed by the U.S. and several countries of the European Union, while Iran will be supported by third world nations and perhaps China.

#### Failure to compromise on BMD hurts relations and Russia will withdraw from START

Weir 11

(Fred Weir, writer for CSM, 6.8.11, Christian Science Monitor, “New US-Russia arms race? Battle lines grow over missile defense.,” <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0608/New-US-Russia-arms-race-Battle-lines-grow-over-missile-defense/(page)/2)>

The Russians say rhetorical pledges aren't good enough. "Russia wants commitments and legal guarantees which the Obama administration is not able to provide," says Vladimir Dvorkin, an expert with the Security Center at the official Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. "Political stubborness on both sides makes it difficult to have a constructive dialogue on this topic." The Kremlin appears deeply concerned about the Pentagon's "Phased Adaptive" missile defense plan, which envisages about 440 antimissile interceptors based on 43 ships and two European land bases, in Poland and Romania, by the end of this decade. The biggest worry, Russian experts say, is the later phases of the project, which will see large numbers of the advanced SM-3 "Block II" interceptors deployed beginning in 2018. "The situation completely changes with the realization of the (later) stages of the missile defense plan," Lt. Gen. Andrei Tretyak, of Russia's General Staff, told journalists last month. "This is a real threat to our strategic nuclear forces." Gen. Tretyak said that exhaustive studies ordered by Russia's Defense Ministry have concluded that the planned deployments would pose a sufficient menace to Russian intercontinental missiles that Russia's strategic parity with the US would be undermined, **along with the basic principles of the New START treaty.** Wording inserted into that treaty by Russia specifically **allows it to withdraw** if the West deploys antimissile weapons "capable of significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces." Sign up now to receive our daily World Editor's Picks newsletter. Our best stories, in your inbox. A Russian withdrawal from New START might bring all progress **in US-Russia relations to a halt**, and greatly encourage foreign policy hardliners on both sides. Obama and Medvedev, both of whom face looming reelection battles, need to avoid that and find a formula that at least allows Russia and the US to continue talking amicably about missile defense cooperation, experts say. The outcome of Thursday's meeting between Mr. Gates and Mr. Serdyukov will be closely watched for the positive, or negative, signal it sends. "New START was the single real success of the US-Russia reset of relations, and it would be politically bad for both Obama and Medvedev if it were seen to be a failure," says Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "But the only sure way to save it is to move forward and tackle the thorny issue of missile defense," he says. "The burning need of both presidents to win a political success can break the logjam in these talks and make the nuts-and-bolts negotiators move along faster. This can be solved, but it will take political will."

#### Extinction

Collins and Rojansky 10

(James – director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ex-US ambassador to the Russian Federation, and Matthew – deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Why Russia Matters, Foreign Policy, , 8/18/2010 p. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/18/why_Russia_matters>)

Russia's nukes are still an existential threat. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons in stockpile and hundreds still on hair-trigger alert aimed at U.S. cities. This threat will not go away on its own; cutting down the arsenal will require direct, bilateral arms control talks between Russia and the United States. New START, the strategic nuclear weapons treaty now up for debate in the Senate, is the latest in a long line of bilateral arms control agreements between the countries dating back to the height of the Cold War. To this day, it remains the only mechanism granting U.S. inspectors access to secret Russian nuclear sites. The original START agreement was essential for reining in the runaway Cold War nuclear buildup, and New START promises to cut deployed strategic arsenals by a further 30 percent from a current limit of 2,200 to 1,550 on each side. Even more, President Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, have agreed to a long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. But they can only do that by working together.

## warming

#### Obama win key to global climate deal

The Hill 12

(“Report says global climate deal hinges on Obama reelection” By Ben Geman, 01/05/12, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/202539-report-global-climate-deal-hinges-on-obama-reelection-)

Prospects for striking a binding global climate deal by 2015 are probably **toast** if President Obama loses in November. That’s among the conclusions in a wide-ranging, new climate and green energy outlook from banking giant HSBC’s research branch. A major outcome from the United Nations climate talks in December was a plan to craft a deal by 2015 — one that would include big, developing nations such as China — and have it come into force by 2020. But Obama’s main Republican White House rivals are critical of emissions limits and skeptical of climate science. HSBC predicts an international agreement by 2015 is highly unlikely if Obama loses the election. From their research note: [T]he prospects for a new global climate deal in 2015 **depend** considerably on the election of a pro-climate action president. The election of a President opposed to climate action will not only damage growth prospects for low-carbon solutions in the USA itself, **but** will **make the hard task of negotiating a new global agreement** by 2015 almost impossible.

## turnout

Green voters are even more important after losses with other groups

Munro, 8-31

Neil Munro, Daily Caller's White House correspondent, 8-31-2012, Daily Caller, “Obama still has the green energy vote for 2012,” http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/30/obama-still-has-green-energy-vote-for-2012/2/

Obama still has the green energy vote for 2012

Advocates for the $7 billion pipeline — including labor unions — say it will create 20,000 good jobs and reduce gasoline-price disruptions. That’s a message that resonates with the swing-voting independents that Obama needs to win next November.

But there’s little evidence so far that progressives’ disappointment with Obama’s environmental policies threatens to reduce their turnout on election day, or that it pressures White House officials to make additional concessions to environmentalists during a political season dominated by the public’s demand for additional jobs.

Monday’s colorful, TV-ready protests against the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada’s oil fields to U.S consumers took place in Lafayette Park, in front of the White House.

The day’s events included 100 peaceful arrests of environmentalists and celebrities, a multi-faith spiritual event in Lafayette Park, press club speeches by environmental leaders, and numerous suggestions that approval of the pipeline by Obama will cost his campaign votes, volunteers and donations. Hundreds of others have already been arrested, and numerous environmental groups have contributed to two weeks of protest.

If Obama approves the pipeline, environmental activist Andrew Driscoll predicted he would not vote to re-elect him. “He hasn’t done anything to earn our vote yet,” said the Massachusetts activist. “The fate of humanity, the fate of the planet” will be determined by Obama’s pipeline decision, he said.

“If he approves it, it will be a huge blow, not only for our future, but also for this administration,” said Elijah Zarlin, a campaign manager at CREDO Action, an Atlanta-based progressive group. The protesters “are the people who are maybe going to vote for Obama, and are the people Barack will lose” if he approves the pipeline, he added.

However, the leadership of the green movement isn’t threatening to break with Obama over this one decision. (RELATED: Gore: Global warming skeptics are this generation’s racists)

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Instead, they are balancing their goal of stopping the pipeline with the need to keep their supporters motivated even when the public opposes regulation of job-producing companies, and with their shared desire to avoid the election of a GOP president, such as Texas Gov. Rick Perry.

The protests, arrests, caravans and petitions help make the president uncomfortable and reduce the chance that he’ll side with industry interests, said Philip Radford, Greenpeace’s executive director. The movement won’t accept a compromise offer from the White House, but will instead try to defeat the pipeline at the federal, state and local levels, he said. “This will be an embarrassment for the president,” he predicted.

“If the tar-sands pipeline is approved [by Obama], we will be back and our numbers will grow,” said James Hansen, a NASA scientist and political advocate. “For the sake of our children and grandchildren, we must find someone who is worthy of our dreams.”

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Green activists’ importance to Obama’s re-election campaign is boosted by Obama’s losses among other voters, including whites, women, Hispanics and younger voters. Gallup’s daily poll on August 29 already showed Obama’s approval rate at 38 percent, and his disapproval rate at 55 percent.

Obama credibility on energy and the environment key to youth turnout

Brownstein, 2010

Ronald Brownstein, National Journal Group's Editorial Director, 6-17-2010, CongressDaily, “On Energy, Green Issues, Generation Gap Is Pronounced,” http://ecoaffect.org/2010/06/18/on-energy-green-issues-generation-gap-is-pronounced/

Generation Gap On almost every major question examined in the latest weekly Society for Human Resource Management/National Journal Congressional Connection Poll, young people lean much more heavily than older adults toward green-tilting positions favored by environmentalists and President Obama.

That gap is a much more powerful and persistent trend in the survey, conducted by the Pew Research Center, than other divides that usually separate the population — such as the differences in opinion between men and women, whites and nonwhites, and whites with and without college educations. The survey, conducted from June 10-13, surveyed 1,010 adults; it has a 4-point error margin, with larger error margins for subgroups.

Asked, for instance, to identify the top priority for U.S. energy policy, fully 65 percent of young people say the highest goal should be protecting the environment, while just 29 percent say the top goal should be to keep energy prices low.

For older Americans, the balance shifts steadily toward price. Those aged 30-49 also prioritize the environment (60 percent) over price (32 percent); but the numbers shift to 53 percent for the environment and 41 percent price for those aged 50-64. And with seniors, the priorities flip, with 47 percent picking price and just 40 percent the environment.

These sorts of results help explain why White House Chief of Staff Emanuel believes a highly visible debate over energy leading into the November election could help somewhat reverse the usual falloff in midterm turnout among young people.

On average since 1992, the share of the vote cast by voters under 30 has been fully one-third lower in midterm than presidential elections, according to calculations from exit polls by Emory University political scientist Alan Abramowitz. That's obviously a major risk for Democrats, because Obama's standing remains much stronger with young people than with older adults: in this week's Congressional Connection Poll, Obama's favorability rating among adults under 30 (72 percent) is a head-turning 27 percentage points higher than his 45 percent favorability among seniors.

In an interview, Emanuel said that while it's not possible to fundamentally reshape traditional turnout patterns, "at the margins" more young people could be inspired to vote by a legislative debate that shows Democrats committing to moving toward alternative energy and Republicans resisting the change. "It's a way to get them engaged in the coming election," he said. "They see it as being about the future, and less about energy policy."

The shape of the coming energy debate remains uncertain. While environmentalists still hope to pass comprehensive energy legislation that would include legislated reductions in carbon emissions, the administration has sent mixed signals on whether it believes such an approach can obtain the 60 votes required to clear the Senate.

Like Senate Democratic leaders, Obama has left the door open to scaled-down "energy-only" legislation that might jettison carbon limits but maintain incentives to increase production of renewable energy. Some senior House Democrats, like Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman, the co-author of the climate bill the House passed last June, have suggested that if the Senate passes an energy-only plan, carbon limits could be added during the conference process.

However the legislative maneuvering ultimately unfolds, it's clear that young people align more strongly than older Americans with Obama's positions in the energy and environmental debate.

"This reflects the broader political generation gap," said Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center. "People under 30 years of age, or under 35, are more liberal across the board. They are certainly more environmentally sensitive, compared to older people, where there is more of a division of opinion."

In the poll, nearly three-fourths of adults under 30 said they favored including in any energy legislation mandatory limits on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions linked to climate change. That compares to about two-thirds of those aged 30-64, and just 46 percent of seniors. A near-monolithic 93 percent of young people said they favored including in any bill requirements that utilities generate more power from wind, solar and other renewable sources. That idea drew nearly as broad support from middle-aged respondents, and backing from around three-fourths of seniors.

Equally telling, young people, by a resounding 2-1, said they trusted Obama more than congressional Republicans in deciding whether to regulate greenhouse gases. Middle-aged respondents more narrowly preferred Obama over Republicans while seniors placed more trust in Republicans by a 42 percent to 28 percent margin. White seniors preferred the Republicans over Obama by two-to-one.

Young people didn't differ as much from their elders on what to do next about offshore drilling. Only one-fifth of young adults said they wanted to ban offshore drilling, actually a slightly smaller percentage than seniors (almost one-fourth). Nearly one-third of young people still want to expand offshore drilling, and the largest group (just under two-fifths) would continue to operate existing wells, but ban additional ones.

In other ways, though, young people expressed less enthusiasm than older Americans about measures to promote more **conventional** sources of **energy**. They were less likely than those aged 49 and older to say they favored including in energy legislation incentives for increased development of nuclear power, and expanded exploration of coal, oil and gas. Still, a solid three-fifths of young adults favored more exploration for fossil fuels.

Kohut said it was too early to tell whether a visible energy debate would help politically energize younger voters — but that Democrats needed something to give them a jolt. "They need some way to get people who are core Obama supporters energized again," he said. "Because all of the conservative trends we saw in [the 2009 election] were in part a function of Republican energy, but also a function of Democrats being asleep."

Just a smidgeon of a link is enough

Goodman, 7-2

Peter Goodman, business editor of the Huffington Post, 7-2-2012, "How Loss of Enthusiasm Among Young voters Could Cost Obama The Presidencywww.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/01/how-loss-of-enthusiasm-could-cost-obama-election\_n\_1620253.html

Obama's campaign operatives describe multiple pathways leading to reelection. Obama might compensate for soft support among men by boosting his showing among women. He could lose Florida, which he won narrowly last time, but still win Ohio, where the auto bailout has generated jobs. He might lose Ohio and Florida, but still ride to victory via a strong performance in western states such as Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico and Arizona.

But most of the available pathways share one essential component: Obama needs a dominant showing among young voters.

"The youth vote is incredibly important, and particularly for Obama," says Mark Penn, the pollster who served as Bill Clinton's data guru, and Hillary Clinton's chief strategist on her bid for the White House. "It was his core base in 2008."

In three states, Virginia, Indiana and North Carolina, voters under 30 decisively tipped the scales in Obama's favor, turning what would have been defeats into victories. North Carolina presents the clearest case. George W. Bush carried the state by more than 12 percentage points in both 2000 and 2004. Among voters 30 and over, Obama lost to the Republican nominee, Sen. John McCain, according to exit polls. But he took 73 percent of the under-30 electorate, and that gave him the state by a mere 14,000 votes – less half one of one percent.

According to the consensus view among political strategists, 11 states now considered tossups will determine the outcome of the 2012 race: North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Ohio, Florida, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, Iowa, and Missouri. These states collectively hold more than half of the 270 electoral votes needed to claim the presidency. Obama lost only two of these states last time -- Missouri, where he came within one percent, and Arizona, home to McCain. In seven of the nine states he won, he took at least 60 percent of the under-30 vote, according to analysis by CIRCLE. In an eighth state, Virginia, he narrowly missed the 60 percent mark.

Evidence of discontent among young voters has pollsters seriously questioning whether Obama will be able to engineer a similar showing this time.

Obama's heavy dependence on youth votes in battleground states explains why the Romney campaign is expending resources courting younger voters, including appearances at universities. On its face, this strategy might seem like a waste of energy and money: Romney not only trails badly in polls among young people, but Democrats tend to have a much easier time winning younger voters, given their liberal proclivities on social issues, environmental regulation and foreign policy. But for Romney, the objective is not to win a large share of votes. It is to deprive Obama of a smidgen of his base – a potentially decisive smidgen.

## momentum

#### No

Silver, 10/25

(“Oct. 24: In Polls, Romney’s Momentum Seems to Have Stopped,” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/oct-24-in-polls-romneys-momentum-seems-to-have-stopped/#more-36636)

But there are other times when the notion of momentum is behind the curve — as it probably now is if applied to Mitt Romney’s polling. Mr. Romney clearly gained ground in the polls in the week or two after the Denver debate, putting himself in a much stronger overall position in the race. However, it seems that he is no longer doing so. Take Wednesday’s national tracking polls, for instance. (There are now eight of them published each day.) Mr. Romney gained ground in just one of the polls, an online poll conducted for Reuters by the polling organization Ipsos. He lost ground in five others, with President Obama improving his standing instead in those surveys. On average, Mr. Obama gained about one point between the eight polls. This is the closest that we’ve come in a week or so to one candidate clearly having “won” the day in the tracking polls — and it was Mr. Obama. The trend could also be spurious. If the race is steady, it’s not that hard for one candidate to gain ground in five of six polls (excluding the two that showed no movement on Wednesday) just based on chance alone. What isn’t very likely, however, is for one candidate to lose ground in five of six polls if the race is still moving toward him. In other words, we can debate whether Mr. Obama has a pinch of momentum or whether the race is instead flat, but it’s improbable that Mr. Romney would have a day like this if he still had momentum. The FiveThirtyEight model looks at a broader array of polls — including state polls — in order to gauge the overall trend in the race. Our “now-cast” also finds a slightly favorable trend for Mr. Obama over the course of the past 10 days or so. Mr. Romney’s position peaked in the “now-cast” on Friday, Oct. 12, at which point it estimated a virtual tie in the popular vote (Mr. Obama was the projected “winner” by 0.3 percentage points). As of Wednesday, however, Mr. Obama was 1.4 percentage points ahead in the “now-cast”, meaning that he may have regained about 1 percentage point of the 4 points or so that he lost after Denver. Mr. Obama’s chances of winning the Electoral College were up in the FiveThirtyEight forecast to 71 percent on Wednesday from 68.1 percent on Tuesday. It’s not yet clear how much of this, if any, has to do with the final presidential debate in Florida this Monday, which instant polls regarded Mr. Obama as having won. Instead, it’s been more of a slow and unsteady trajectory for him, with Mr. Obama often taking two steps forward but then one step back. It’s also not out of the question that the apparent trend just represents statistical noise. At the same time, there is more reason to take a potential change in the polls seriously if it is precipitated by a news event like the debate. The tracking polls that were released on Wednesday contained only one full day of interviews that postdated the Florida debate. If the debate moved the needle toward Mr. Obama, it should become more apparent in the coming days. The battleground state polls that came in on Wednesday were generally very close to our model’s current projections. For instance, there were three Ohio polls published on Wednesday; one showed a tied race there, while the other two showed Mr. Obama ahead by margins of two and five points.That’s pretty much what you’d expect to see out of a trio of Ohio polls if Mr. Obama’s lead there were about two points, which is where our model now has it. Some of the polls, especially the Time Magazine poll which had Mr. Obama five points ahead in Ohio, seemed to set off a lot of discussion on Twitter, as though people were surprised that Mr. Obama still held the lead there. But these polls are really nothing new. Since the Denver debate, Mr. Obama has held the lead in 16 Ohio polls against 6 for Mr. Romney. In Nevada, Mr. Obama has had the lead in 11 polls, to Mr. Romney’s 1. Mr. Obama has led in all polls of Wisconsin since the Denver debate, and he has had five poll leads in Iowa to one for Mr. Romney. Part of the confusion (and part of the reason behind the perception that Mr. Romney is still gaining ground in the race) may be because of the headlines that accompany polls. We’re still getting some polls trickling in where the most recent comparison is to a poll conducted before the Denver debate. We should expect Mr. Romney to gain ground relative to a poll conducted before Denver. (Mr. Romney may have lost a point or so off his bounce, but he has clearly not lost all of it). But it isn’t news when he does; Mr. Romney’s Denver gains had long ago become apparent, and priced into the various polling averages and forecast models. The question, rather, is whether Mr. Romney is gaining ground relative to the post-Denver polls — or if, as Wednesday’s polls seemed to imply, the race instead may have ticked back slightly toward Mr. Obama.

## early voting

#### Early voting doesn’t lock-in outcome—still have 60% of the electorate to go

Dailey, 10/24

(Columnist-BBC News Magazine, “Early voting: Is the election already decided?,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20047369)

For the first time, the US president is voting early, and he's not alone - 6.5 million Americans have already voted, nearly two weeks before election day. So is it possible the election has already been decided? President Barack Obama will make history this week when he steps into a Chicago voting booth and casts his ballot - a full 10 days ahead of Election Day. It's meant to raise awareness for early voting, which both campaigns think could be the key to this election. Early voting used to be relegated just to expatriates and military members who sent in absentee ballots. But this election, experts predict that at least 35% will cast an early vote this year, up from 30% in 2008. And in crucial swing states like Florida, Colorado, Iowa and Ohio, that number might be much higher. "Colorado is one where 85% of the votes are going to be cast prior to election day," says Michael McDonald, an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University. "Florida is going to be close to two-thirds. In Ohio, they're on pace for 40-45% early voting." All these states, he says, have mechanisms that make it easy for citizens to cast their vote ahead of the 6 November election. Though early voting has begun in most states that allow it, the votes themselves won't be counted until election day. But McDonald - who tracks how many early votes have been cast and, when possible, by which political party - says that it may be possible to determine the eventual winner by watching hotly-contested swing states. "In 2008, the week before the election I became convinced that Obama had won because he was doing so well in Colorado and Colorado played so prominently in the electoral map at that time," he says. **In 2012, however, the race is too close to read the early voting tea leaves** - but McDonald says the bulk of early votes will come in next week, at which point stronger trends might point to an eventual winner. Early voting in one form or another has been a factor in American politics for at least 20 years, says Trey Hood, associate professor of political science at the University of Georgia. Then, states like Texas and Tennessee hoped to increase voter turnout by providing more chances to vote. Currently, 32 states and the District of Columbia offer voters a chance to cast their ballot before election day - either through "no excuse" absentee ballots, which can be requested without explanation, or early voting centres, which are often open on weekends, when it's easier for some voters to get to the polls. (In every state, members of the military, federal employees, and citizens living abroad are all able to request absentee ballots.) In the last election - when thousands of early votes cast for Barack Obama put him ahead in states like North Carolina - early voting went from being a matter of convenience to a political strategy. "It got people thinking - how does early voting effect the campaign cycle in terms of mobilising voters?" says Hood. Now, both campaigns are focusing on early voters as a way to make sure their candidates get as many votes as possible. "We don't have an election day here, we have 11 election days," says Joe Zepecki, the Wisconsin communications director for Obama for America. When Wisconsin's early voting centres opened up this week, the Obama campaign led organised trips to the polls, and some die-hard Obama supporters camped outside the centres in order to cast their vote on day one. Meanwhile, Romney supporters are trumping the increased rate of Republican voters as a portent of the eventual election results. "NORTH CAROLINA: GOP voting early at 126% of 2008 levels while Dems turning out at 97%. Now 50k more GOP have voted vs similar point in 2008," tweeted Adrian Gray, a former director of strategy at the Republican National Committee The extended election cycle allows campaigns to extend their message to the crucial undecided and independent voters. "Every person who casts an early vote, the campaigns are able to go on to the next person on the list," says McDonald. "They can go further down that list and start contacting people who are low-to-moderate propensity voters and not just focus on high intensity voters."

## voters won’t know

#### Recent polls disprove

Finzel, 10/21

(Analyst-Waggener Edstrom, Election 2012: The Presidential Candidates, Energy Policy and Social Media, http://waggeneredstrom.com/blog/2012/10/21/election-2012-energy-policy/)

Although we may all be tired of the presidential campaign advertisements flooding the airwaves (especially if you live in a swing state), many of us are still interested in the differences between the two major party candidates on key issues. One such issue, energy, was addressed in the second presidential debate and has spurred substantive discussion online. To understand the impact on the national dialogue, Waggener Edstrom Worldwide conducted a national online survey to gauge the importance of energy to voters and analyzed social and online media to understand where conversations about energy are taking place. Our national online survey of public opinion was conducted Oct. 9–10, 2012. The results: **47 percent of respondents** said energy policy is one reason they are voting for Obama or Romney. While that number may be a bit surprising to people who don’t regularly follow energy, the social media dialogue around energy policy offers even more insight. Our research team analyzed results of more than 8 million tweets, Facebook posts and blog posts. They looked at the types of energy that were most discussed and how closely linked each candidate was to that type. As you can see in our Election 2012 infographic, President Obama was discussed online with the phrase “energy and the environment” 16 percent more than Gov. Romney, and Gov. Romney appeared 73 percent more frequently than President Obama in discussions about “energy independence.” Perhaps not surprising when you look at the candidates’ energy platforms, but you can draw your own conclusions. It’s fascinating to see where conversations about energy are taking place: according to our sample, the place to be online for wind or solar energy discussions is Twitter. Oil and coal are discussed most on Facebook. And natural gas and nuclear energy? Find a blog to read. In the presidential campaign, energy has been mostly on the sidelines, but that **doesn’t mean it isn’t important to voters** and that they aren’t talking about it online. And those conversations can certainly set up the energy policy dialogue we’ll all need to have in the months to come.

#### It’s key in Ohio

Sweet, 10/15

(Columnist-Sun Times, All eyes on Ohio’s voters in Obama-Romney race, http://www.suntimes.com/news/sweet/15778122-452/all-eyes-on-the-buckeye-state.html)

CINCINNATI — Michelle Obama, Paul Ryan and Ann Romney all stumped in the Buckeye State on Monday — with the Obama and Romney teams throwing massive assets at this crucial battleground. With early voting starting in Ohio on Oct. 2, it has been election month in Ohio more than Election Day. Mitt Romney was here on Saturday, President Barack Obama returns on Wednesday and Bill Clinton and Bruce Springsteen hit Thursday to bolster the Obama drive. Michelle Obama tried to spur early voting in general and Ohio in particular by mailing her absentee ballot with a public flourish. Ryan also looked for early votes. Ann Romney worked to turnout women voters. At Ohio Wesleyan University in the city of Delaware, the first lady said: “Today I voted for my husband! Yes! It felt so good. Right now, my absentee ballot, it’s on its way to Illinois, my home state — which means that we are one vote closer to re-electing my husband and moving this country forward for four more years. “So forgive me if I’m a little excited today — for me, it was Election Day,” she said. She also stopped in Cleveland, where she closed her speech by urging people to take a campaign bus to the early voting site “to cast your ballot for Barack Obama.” Ryan, the GOP vice presidential nominee, touched down at Luken Field here for a brief rally where a top agenda item was early voting. “Friends, don’t forget, early voting’s already started here in Ohio. . . . What that means is you can vote early so that on Election Day, you can help get people to the polls. You can help make the phone calls. You can help give people rides. This election’s so important, we even need you to talk to your relatives to get them out,” Ryan said. Ohio has 18 electoral votes and an outsized place in the history of electing presidents. The state has picked the winner since 1964 — and no Republican has won the White House without Ohio. Romney has a tougher time than Obama getting to 270 electoral votes without Ohio. In 2008, Obama won Ohio with 51.5 percent of the vote to 46.6 percent for Sen. John McCain. The realclearpolitics.com average on Monday night gave Obama a 2.2-percentage point lead in Ohio. Ohio has remained a battleground largely because of its geographic, ethnic, racial and economic diversity. No one media market rules the state. “Ohio is a microcosm of America,” former Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland, a Democrat, told me. “I tell people if you would shrink America, you would end up in Ohio.” No one city dominates the politics of the state and each metro area has its own personality: Cincinnati has a Southern flavor; Cleveland is more Northeast; Columbus, Midwest. Add to that a portion of that state that is part of Appalachia. “By far, the overwhelming issue in Ohio is jobs,” John Green, director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron, told me. The Romney and Obama ads running in Ohio markets — by the campaigns and allies — have a heavy focus on the economy. The economic diversity of the state has kept the jobless rate below the national average the past year — and that’s to Obama’s advantage. **Adding a “new wrinkle” in the 2012 contest**, Green said, **are energy issues that are unique to Ohio.** Ohio has new shale gas fields and a coal mining industry. Romney is accusing Obama of stifling Ohio energy producers through federal regulations and pledges on the stump and in an ad that is in heavy rotation in the Cincinnati market to assist in “producing our own energy in the ground in Ohio.”

## link

#### Environmental groups don’t want subsides for carbon capture—viewed as an alt to clean energy

Gunther, 12

(Columnist-Green Biz, 3/12, http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/03/12/direct-air-carbon-capture-oil-answer-fracking)

Environmentalists still need some convincing. David Hawkins, the veteran climate campaigner with the Natural Resources Defense Council, observed that air capture has “morphed very rapidly from a technology whose purpose is to remove CO2 to a technology whose purpose is to produce CO2.” There’s a risk, he said, that **commercial imperatives could lead the startups to drift away from their environmental mission.** “We didn’t decide to pursue scrubbers by relying on the market for gypsum as the driver,” he said.

Steve Hamburg, chief scientist of the Environmental Defense Fund, said the air-capture industry needs to be clear about how it is measuring CO2 benefits, if any, and transparent about its needs for energy, water and land.

“It’s a promising technology,” Hamburg acknowledged. “**But promising for what?”**

## coal

#### Not enough coal voters to matter – and it’s non-unique

Shear, staff writer for the New York Times, 10/27/2012

(Michael, http://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/us/politics/romney-seeks-virginia-coal-country-edge.xml?pagewanted=all)

"Romney is a political chameleon," says Richard L. Trumka, the president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., and a former head of the United Mine Workers. "He will say anything that he thinks people want to hear. For him to say he's a friend of coal is absolutely ridiculous."

But **even longtime Democrats** in the state concede that Mr. Romney is making a forceful push for votes in the Ninth Congressional District, which encompasses the state's half-dozen coal counties. One of Mr. Romney's ads, appearing frequently on television, begins with a coal miner saying, "Obama is ruining the coal industry." Mr. Romney held a rally in Abingdon, Va., this month. His son Matt spoke to 7,500 people last week in Grundy, a town of just 996 people.

Dave Saunders, a veteran Democratic strategist who lives in the region, said: "Three things are sacred in Southwest Virginia - the Holy Bible, moonshine and coal. That's all I got to say. They will get big numbers in the Ninth. No question at all."

The Republican effort to gather votes for Mr. Romney has been supplemented by an aggressive and mostly negative campaign by third-party groups backed by conservatives and energy interests. The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity has a television ad blasting "heavy-handed E.P.A. regulations." A radio ad by the American Energy Alliance says the "president and his Washington cronies have declared war on affordable energy." A TV ad by the same group urges miners to "Vote no on Obama's failing energy policy."

The president has cited reports that the coal miners in Mr. Romney's ad were coerced by their employers to be there, an accusation that some of the miners have denied. But even if some of the outrage at Mr. Obama is being exaggerated by outside groups, locals say that much of it is a genuine expression of the frustration at seeing jobs die in the region.

In September, several hundred coal miners were furloughed for at least two months because of rising costs and shrinking demand. The company, Consol, announced on Wednesday that some workers will remain idled even after mining resumes the first week of November.

Other plants have shut down for good, citing in part foreign competition. Larry Lambert, 61, is one of the unlucky miners who spent a day this week at a résumé-writing seminar, which was a requirement for picking up his unemployment check.

"The E.P.A. has put so many strangleholds on the power companies they can't burn the coal we are mining," Mr. Lambert said. He added that Mr. Obama seemed appealing four years ago, but has **betrayed coal miners**.

And yet, it is not clear that there are enough voters like Mr. Lambert to offset the president's strength in Northern Virginia. About 750,000 people live in southwest Virginia, less than a third of the number in the suburban counties near Washington.

Democratic strategists working on Mr. Obama's behalf said Mr. Romney would probably win 60 percent of the vote in the region. But they say the shift in the state's population means that the huge margins will not be worth as much for Mr. Romney's campaign.

"In the 12 years I've been in elected office, we continue to see pretty dramatic population shift," said Mark Warner, one of the state's two Democratic senators. "The numbers just aren't there."

# 2NR

## ohio 2nr

#### Romney econ campaign won’t work in Ohio

LoGiurato, 10/24

(Columnist-Business Insider, “A Crucial Disparity That's Pushing Obama To A Potentially Devastating Win In Ohio,” http://www.businessinsider.com/ohio-poll-obama-romney-time-economy-jobs-2012-10

President Barack Obama has a significant 5-point lead over Republican Mitt Romney in a new Time magazine poll of Ohio, the crucial battleground state that has enormous implications on Election Night. What's pushing Obama to the lead is a key disparity in voters' opinion of the state's economy vs. the nation's economy. Overall, 51 percent of voters think Ohio's economy is on the right track, compared with just 43 percent that say it is off on the wrong track. The numbers are similar with self-identified Independents in the poll — by a 51-45 split, they say it's on the right track. Of the group that says Ohio's economy is going in the right direction, 65 percent are voting for Obama. Ohio's views of its own economy are markedly different than how the state's voters perceives the national economy. Only 41 percent think it's on the right track, compared with 54 percent that say it's off on the wrong track.

#### Independents put him over the top

LoGiurato, 10/26

(Columnist-Business Insider, “Another Solid Obama Lead In A New Ohio Poll Is Terrible News For Mitt Romney,” http://www.businessinsider.com/ohio-poll-obama-romney-cnn-orc-2012-10)

Another new poll of Ohio gives President Barack Obama a comfortable lead over Mitt Romney in the Buckeye State, a troubling sign for the Republican nominee in a near-**must win state**. Obama leads Romney 50-46 in Ohio, according to the new poll from CNN/ORC. It very closely mirrors the results of recent Quinnipiac and Time magazine polls. Among registered voters in the CNN poll, Obama's lead expands to 7 points. What pushes Obama to a lead in the new CNN poll are leads with women and Independents and a stronger-than-normal showing with white voters. He grabs 56 percent of the female vote compared with Romney's 42 percent, and Obama leads Romney by 5 points among Independents. Meanwhile, he only trails by 9 points among white voters, which is slimmer than his national numbers. Obama also has a huge, 21-point lead among respondents that already voted in the Buckeye State. Ohio is one of three crucial states to watch on Election Night — because, along with Wisconsin and either Nevada or Iowa, it provides Obama with a very easy path to Electoral College victory.

#### Newest polls

Sink, 10/26

(Columnist-The Hill, “Poll: Obama tops 50 percent in Ohio, up four points on Romney,” http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/polls/264373-poll-obama-tops-50-percent-in-ohio-up-four-on-romney)

President Obama hit the crucial 50 percent threshold in the latest poll of Ohio and now leads Mitt Romney by 4 points in the pivotal battleground state, according to a new poll released Friday by CNN. The slight but significant lead mirrors other recent polling in the state, and should come as a relief to the president's campaign, which has largely staked its reelection hopes on holding the Buckeye State. The poll carried a margin of error of 3.5 percent, just below the president's lead. The president was boosted in the state by a significant lead among women, leading Romney 56 to 42 percent. Romney posted a smaller advantage among men, leading the president 50 to 44 percent.