# 1NC

## 1nc core

A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

The plan is not a restriction on production, it’s a restriction that requires buying renewables – that’s anti-topical

#### Restrictions must be prohibitive

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Cross-x proves they’re also extra-topical because of interrogation on top of the restriction removal

C. You should vote negative:

Decisionmaking----Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

#### An open model creates the best politics and arguments

Torvalds and Diamond ‘1

[Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "**What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument."** (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer.

The first time people hear about the open source approach, it sounds ludicrous. That's why it has taken years for the message of its virtues to sink in. Ideology isn't what has sold the open source model. It started gaining attention when it was obvious that open source was the best method of developing and improving the highest quality technology. And now it is winning in the marketplace, an accomplishment has brought open source its greatest acceptance. Companies were able to be created around numerous value-added services, or to use open source as a way of making a technology popular. When the money rolls in, people get convinced. One of the least understood pieces of the open source puzzle is how so many good programmers would deign to work for absolutely no money. A word about motivation is in order. In a society where survival is more or less assured, money is not the greatest of motivators. It's been well established that folks do their best work when they are driven by a passion. When they are having fun. This is as true for playwrights and sculptors and entrepreneurs as it is for software engineers. The open source model gives people the opportunity to live their passion. To have fun and to work with the world's best programmers, not the few who happen to be employed by their company. Open source developers strive to earn the esteem of their peers. That's got to be highly motivating.

Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.**

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to **challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making**. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### Inclusion of non-topical advocacy in environmental justice is debilitating – only LIMITS and FOCUS enable effective prioritization

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Its relatively congenial and accessible structure belies two basic limitations. One is that, like the environmental justice movement that inspired it, NEJAC is unable to define or focus on a set of policy priorities smaller than the full universe of federal, state, and local environmental justice issues. Painstakingly participatory in orientation, hopping among issues as they arise and ideas as they are generated, the council is a mechanism appropriate to conveying, and perhaps amplifying, demands, but not for deciding which ones deserve priority or how they should be compromised on behalf of other goals. like the October 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, which yielded its seventeen principles of environmental justice through political and highly ideological accumulation rather than discriminating analysis, NEJAC is not the place to look for hard thinking about the boundaries of, or potential tradeoffs embedded in, environmental justice. The prevailing council view appears to be that all communities and all voices within them are more or less equally legitimate and deserving. Accordingly, their main concern is to enhance the overall "community presence" whenever and wherever possible. That, for example, is why the council successfully prodded the EPA to allow the creation of an indigenous peoples subcommittee in 1995; several NEJAC members had long been concerned that "issues important to indigenous peoples had not been addressed adequately by the existing committee structure of NEJAC."39 The council listens sympathetically to public comments and encourages the EPA or other agencies to take action. Its focus, especially within its subcommittees, is less on health or risk than on ferreting out and elevating community perspectives. But NEJAC eschews anything like a formal comparative assessment among the claims brought before it and there is no pressure from the EPA, or from anywhere else for that matter, for it to behave otherwise. Not surprisingly, NEJACs determination to achieve maximum inclusiveness can be procedurally debilitating at times. For example, in December 1996, at NEJACs eighth meeting in Baltimore, the public comment calendar was overcrowded, as is often the case; more than thirty individuals were signed up to speak. Chairman Moore, as usual, gently and repeatedly reminded both council members and the public of the "need to move along" to get through the list. But then a pair of Native American activists offered a rambling joint presentation that ended by calling for NEJAC to help free imprisoned activist Leonard Peltier, whom many observers have long believed to have been unjustly convicted for the murder of two FBI agents. The flow of public comment immediately halted as various council members (including chairman Moore) offered damning opinions regarding Peltier's incarceration. As the council began discussing what action it might appropriately take, no one dared venture what might appear obvious: that whatever the merits of Peltier's case, an EPA advisory council was simply an inappropriate forum in which to address that issue.

## energy metaphors

#### Energy metaphors look like science but aren’t – they’re the ILLUSION of explanation

Zepf 10

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International Forum of Psychoanalysis. 2010; 19: 314

Without knowing exactly what the metaphor1 of Freud’s cathectic-theoretical statements stands for so that ‘‘in consequence admitted metaphors such as ‘energy’ . . . have no specific content and can be filled to suit one’s fancy’’ (Nagel, 1959, p. 41) his formulations present unresolved riddles. Unresolved riddles do not solve problems, but as Kubie (1947), S. 511) states, the metaphor of ‘‘quantitative variations gives us a feeling of scientific maturity.’’ This feeling, however, is ‘‘in fact . . . premature and illusory’’ (1947, S. 511) because the ‘‘energy-distribution model,’’ as Habermas (1968/ 1972, p. 253) correctly argues, ‘‘only creates the semblance that psychoanalytic statements are about measurable transformations of energy,’’ and that they ‘‘imply observability of the events they are about. But these events are never observed\*nor can they be observed.’’ Although economic-energetic statements cannot explain any of this, being metaphorical and tautological in nature, some authors are in favour of holding onto the energetic-economic model, their main arguments being as follows: . One day in the future, psychical energy will be measurable. . At some point in the future, the model will allow a connection with other sciences, especially neurophysiological science. . We are in need of this model to provide order and to systematise clinical data. . It is leading to new insights. The first two arguments are contradicted by the fact that energy distributions can never be measured by the language-bound psychoanalytic method, and that a metaphorical model never can substitute for a metatheory. It is only via such a metatheory that insights into the same object from different science disciplines could be adequately mediated. The reasoning in the third argument overlooks the fact that a metaphorical ordering and systematization of clinical data can only yield apparent knowledge of that data’s interrelations, and in reality this is as remote from their real interrelations as, for instance, the anger of gods is remote from the conditions of lightning in a thunderstorm. Therefore, metaphors cannot provide us with new insights and can only offer us other metaphors. Furthermore, if we content ourselves with these metaphors as explanations, we have not only satisfied ourselves with a false understanding, but also become blind to the real problems and the need for explanations that are more pertinent to the issues.

#### Misapplications of energy metaphors are the worst form of scientism

Clarke 1

Energy Forms:

Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics

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Scientism has formerly been conceptualized according to what Bruno Latour calls the diffusion model of the sociological field. In this model, science is privileged over other discourses as a ground of epistemological origin and sealed off from the irrationality of the rest of culture. On the diffusion model, scienrism is an epiphenomenon of real science, the relatively irrational social excess of scientific production. The diffusion model enforces a regime of sociological separatism; it produces an erroneous "belief in the existence of a society separated from technoscience.\*\*1 This diffusionist model of scientism is itself a relic of the social sciences\* own scientists bid for intellectual authority, lain Cameron and David O. Edge's classic exposition of scientism operates within the diffusionist framework, in which all scientistic commerce is conceived as a one-way outflow from a privileged scientific source: "Scientism is present where people draw on widely shared images and notions about the scientific community and its beliefs and practices in order to add weight to arguments they are advancing, or to practices they are promoting. . . . Those who use scientistic language acknowledge and respect the authority of the scientific community, and wish to capitalize on that authority.... In so doing, they reinforce and consolidate that authority.\*\*2 From this perspective, the modern proliferation of physical, biological, and mathematical scicntisms is seen as a relatively vitiated part of the cultural interaction among well-demarcated disciplinary realms of science, technology, and society. Diffusionist scientisms are illegitimate offspring of science that cobble to a extrascientific object the cultural aura of science's own epistemological prestige, typically by an extension of scientific terminology, imagery, and/or methodology. This adaptation can be deliberate or unwitting, earnest or satirical. It can be more or less successful as an intellectual or a social gambit. But irrespective of its discursive success or failure, scientism on the diffusion model is a sloppy affair, the random "spillover" of science into society, an inappropriate and at worst abusive extension of scientific terms or practices. For instance, the pioneering sociologist Max Weber "criticized positivism and scientific naturalism, singling out the social energeticists—Ernest Solvay and Wilhclm Ostwald—for their 'umstiilpung,' or spillover, of the 'world picture' of scientific disciplines into the 'worldviews' of the social sciences, where they ought not have a place."5 On the diffusion model, such extensions of scientific concepts are illicit displacements of authority from science to nonscientific matters, a transfer, sometimes a plunder, of science's social prestige. Scientisms are aberrant discourses circulating through social channels free of scientific control yet demanding some level of literal credence for what are at best overworked figurative conceptions. These abuses bottom out in "pseudoscience"—bogus representations or active misuses of scientific ideas. In sum, as a repository for derivative and deformed conceptions scientism has typically been a term of bad intellectual repute.

#### Scientism enables Nazism, ecocide and posthuman disaster – unchecked devotion to so-called objective rationality allows us to exterminate whole groups in the name of progress

Yates 10

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<http://vmyates.posterous.com/when-science-became-doctrine>

cites TODOROV Tzvetan Todorov (Bulgarian: Цветан Тодоров) (born March 1, 1939 in Sofia) is a Franco-Bulgarian philosopher. He has lived in France since 1963 writing books and essays about literary theory, thought history and culture theory. Todorov has published a total of 21 books, including The Poetics of Prose (1971), Introduction to Poetics (1981), The Conquest of America (1982), Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (1984), Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps (1991), On Human Diversity (1993), Hope and Memory (2000), and Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism (2002). Todorov's historical interests have focused on such crucial issues as the conquest of The Americas and the Nazi and Stalinist concentration camps.

Held at the RSA in December, Tzvetan Todorov’s discussion of the enlightenment was altogether thought provoking, however it was a minor reference that really caught my attention. Todorov highlighted what he thought to be one fault line left by the enlightenment movement, namely the idea that science can take us anywhere and can teach us everything. A relatively benign concept, it was initially recognized by enlightenment thinkers as both fallible and containing limitations. It has been steadily revolutionized, however, to the point where “scientism” forms what many conceive of as an ideological movement. The basic understanding of scientism is that it is a view that espouses the superiority of science over all other interpretations of life, for example the religious and philosophical. The radicalization is in the overreaching of the discipline into other areas where scientific enquiry may not have jurisdiction, and the sense that there is no other appropriate means of interpreting our reality. Todorov discussed scientism as fuelling the evolution of totalitarianism within Europe through the growing sense of biological understanding. Resultantly, we are capable of accelerating the work of nature and eliminating whatever is perceived as a “lower” form of life. An apt example that could be brought in would be the prominence of scientific experimentation and profiling used under the Nazi regime, or even the elimination of bourgeois or minority groups, a commonly repeated formula in European history. For Todorov the permanent cycle of ‘improvement’ we are seeing from science is dangerous, potentially leading us on a path which could very well end disastrously, either for environmental reasons, or because of the encroaching involvement of science in the creation or reconfiguration of humans. And this is something with which ethicists in particular have been grappling for as long as science has been experimentally intervening with humans; the fear that in offering the ability to, for example, ‘design’ our children we will create a race which eliminates everything that is seen as an ‘unwanted characteristic.’

## case

#### They don’t solve UNICOR labor – absent energy production, prisoners will be forced to manufacture other things

#### They also can’t remove the restriction because the advocacy statement says ‘we should’ and they have no ev saying the four of us can influence UNICOR

**Oil capitalism’s sustainable**

Ann F. **Wolfgram 5**, junior fellow at Massey College – Phd in history from Toronto, “Population, Resources & Environment: A Survey of the Debate”, January 1, <http://www.voxfux.com/features/malthusian_theory/malthusian_theory.htm>

The resource category of minerals is, by nature, varied and broad, encompassing minerals such as copper and coal. In recent years, the mineral that has drawn the most public attention has been petroleum, particularly in reference to consumption and perceived scarcity. Because it is such a well-known mineral, let us take petroleum as a case-in-point for minerals as related to the population-resources question. Neo-Malthusian approach: In years past, the main concern coming from this sector was fear of total mineral resource depletion. In an on-going public debate between Lester Brown, of the Neo-Malthusian school, and Julian Simon, Simon wagered that mineral resources were not being depleted, because price, which reflects scarcity, did not rise but declined in the long-term. Simon won the wager. (Simon’s position will be discussed later in this section.) In recent years, the neo-Malthusian argument, especially with regard to petroleum has shifted from concern over resource depletion to effects of mining and mineral usage on the environment. Fears over land degradation due to mining, air pollution due to burning petroleum, water pollution due to oil spills and industry waste, among other things, are now the main thrust of the neo-Malthusian argument with regard to minerals resources, petroleum in particular. These will be discussed in a later section devoted to population and environment. Scientific evidence: According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), domestic oil reserves have declined over the past decade. However, **this should not naively be thought to be a sign that the world is rapidly running out of oil**. Rather, it means that less oil was being produced by oil companies. The DOE pointed to several economic and industry trends that impacted domestic reserves, such as the sharp decrease in drilling due to the collapse of crude oil prices in 1986, the shift within the petroleum industry to drilling for natural gas, and restrictions on oil exploration in oil-prone places in the United States. (32) Domestic and world oil resources are difficult to quantify in that, in addition to known high-grade resources, there are lower-grade oil reserves which can be tapped using new technologies, as well as oil fields that have yet to be discovered. In 1995, the Department of Interior’s estimate for undiscovered recoverable oil plus inferred resources of domestic crude oil was 132 billion barrels, which was six times larger than the 1995 proven reserves. (33) It must also be remembered that the most oil reserves lie outside of the United States. People-as-Problem-Solvers: Predictably, one of the responses of the human creativity/ technological advancement proponents is that technological development will allow for a greater efficiency in the use of minerals resources. However, there is a second dimension to technological development that they point to: technological advancements may also mean less dependence on a given resource. For instance, historically, wood and steam were the primary sources of energy prior to oil. With the advent of the internal combustion engine, petroleum became the primary energy resource. Thus, the development of new technologies caused a shift in the demand for certain resources. In the future, our sources of energy may be nuclear power, solar power or wind power. As Julian Simon, a self-described optimist in these matters, argues, # trends in energy costs and scarcity have been downward over the entire period for which we have data. **And such trends are usually the most reliable bases for forecasts**. From these data we may conclude with considerable confidence that energy will be less costly and more available in the future than in the past. The reason that the cost of energy has declined in the long-run is the fundamental process of (1) increased demand due to growth of population and income, which raises prices and hence constitutes opportunity to entrepreneurs and inventors; (2) the search for new ways of supplying the demand for energy; (3) the eventual discovery of methods which leave us better off than if the original problem had not appeared. (34) Thus, according to Simon theory based on historical data, either new technologies will develop, thereby lessening the need for more petroleum, or scarcity will eventually arise, thus spurring invention and development of new technologies.

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

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(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).

The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

#### Chicken egg dilemma disproves eco-racism

Glasgow 5

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NOT IN ANYBODY'S BACKYARD? THE NON-DISTRIBUTIVE PROBLEM WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In a series of articles, Vicki Been set forth a particularly powerful critique of environmental justice studies. n29 Been notes that most studies examined the contemporary makeup of a neighborhood impacted by a LULU, not its makeup at the time of siting. n30 This method ignores the possibility that a LULU would lower nearby housing prices, causing affluent residents to move away. These residents would be replaced by lower-income individuals, attracted by the lower housing prices. As a result of these market dynamics, even LULUs located in a wealthy neighborhood could later become surrounded by the poor. n31 This "chicken-or-the-egg" dilemma has plagued the environmental justice literature. n32

#### Whiteness is not the root cause – resolving it doesn’t solve conflict

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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICTS WITH RACIAL DIMENSION: ROLES OF RACISM 18. The above discussion demonstrates a primary characteristic of conflicts with a racial dimension. Political mobilisation linked to real and imagined group differences arises where the state’s administrative structures and legal institutions distribute scarce resources based on ethnic/national differences. The problem is particularly acute where, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, lead positions in military and police forces are distributed based on group identity.20 Yugoslavia and Rwanda are textbook examples of cases in which the controlling entity (the state, the party, the colonial entity) “for its own administrative convenience and in order to improve control over local élites, may select certain ethnic élites and organisations as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage.”21 This favouritism based on group identity serves to polarise societies and, additionally, to institutionalise and make acceptable intragroup suspicion and hatred. 19. In Rwanda and Kosovo, polarisation and racism played a role, not as the root cause of conflict, but as a tool of élites. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, many of those who participated in the propaganda inciting racism, were intellectuals.22 It is characteristic of conflicts with a racist dimension that élites have the ability to manipulate racism because of other conditions incountry, such as: structural poverty, unmet human development needs, comparative deprivation of one group to another, media manipulation of misunderstandings among the general populace, and the absence of human rights, the rule of law and civil and political institutions encouraging citizen participation. Where a group perceives a threat to its interests and values, rising counterélites find playing the racist/nationalist/ chauvinist card a particularly useful tool to assert a right to rule to protect the “true” national or ethnic interest. In Rwanda and Kosovo, extremist élites played upon the deep fears and frustrations of the populace. 20. In Rwanda, the enemy was often portrayed in racialised terms, as of polluted and inferior stock.23 For example: The newspaper Kangura (under the editorship of Hassan Ngeze) published the “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which referred to the Tutsis as “evil,” and their intermarriage with Hutus a pollution of “pure Hutu.” Propaganda especially encouraged the killing of Tutsi children, so that Tutsi genes would not reemerge. Women and girls (who were frequently the victims of sex-based torture and killings) were often the specific subject matter of propaganda. For instance, they were often portrayed as having the innate qualities of “seductress-spies.” Being considered more beautiful, they were also considered to be more sexual, and were accused of sleeping with their “Tutsi brothers.” The newspaper Kangura (again in its ten commandments for Hutus) stated that: Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? Leon Mugesera (Vice-President of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development) gave a speech at his group’s rally on 22 November 1992, where he referred to the Tutsis as Inyenzi, which means “cockroaches” - a term often used by his party in propaganda about the Tutsis. His statements were often repeated on RadioTélévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), a station renown for its role in broadcasting similar types of propaganda. Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) had also broadcast propaganda about the RPF, claiming that not only did they kill people, but they dissected them and ate them, thus making the RPF appear inhuman. People who married those of the opposing group were said to produce children who were “hybrids.” People who attempted to pass for members of the opposing group were like “beings with two heads.” Propagandists also played upon the theme that Tutsis were not originally from the area, and therefore were outsiders who could not be trusted. Those Tutsis who had reached positions of importance e.g. in government, were said to have slipped “like snakes” to infiltrate those positions. 21. In Kosovo, hate propaganda against Kosovar Albanians was not as blatantly racist but instead were “nationalist’ or chauvinist.” Nonetheless, as the 80’s progressed, the discourse became increasingly racist. Some examples follow:24 Media throughout the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, portrayed Albanians as “less civilised” and less cultured. Albanian women were said to be “baby factories.” Images of Albanian women in the press rarely showed educated, urban Albanian women. Albanian men were said to be “savages.” Images of Albanian men in the press rarely showed educated, urban Albanian men. Kosovar Albanians were accused of being rapists, although in reality they were actually less likely to be accused of rape than members of other national groups. Blanket acceptance of allegations of Albanian sexual misdeeds were corporal, that is racist. Whenever the public needed to be reminded about the victimisation of Serbs and the barbaric nature of Albanians, the image of Djordje Martinovic was conveniently invoked. Martinovic is an ethnic Serb who claimed to have been raped with a bottle by two Albanians. As a violent crime of the most “unspeakable nature,” the act itself was “written on the body.” The power of the Martinovic case lay in its ability to invoke the primary image of Serb oppression: the Ottoman Turk’s practice of impaling their victims with a stick. With respect to the Martinovic and other cases, the media tapped into historic racism against Turks and Muslims. Albanians were equated with Turkish and Muslim peoples (while in reality, Albanians do not identify as such; they are not “Turks” and some Albanians are Catholic or Orthodox). Albanians were continually portrayed as fanatical, sly and evil – enemies from within. For example, when a young Yugoslav army recruit named Aziz Keljmendi shot four men dead in his barracks, Albanians as a group were accused of aiding the crime. 22. The problem in the former Yugoslavia was not the complete absence of free speech. While the government cracked down against the activities of some nationalist journalists and others critical of Tito’s legacy, it can also be said that the most virulent hate speech in Yugoslavia was made possible due to an increase in free speech.25 In contrast, in Rwanda information was suppressed through direct government harassment of and control over journalists and through tight controls on the right to freedom of movement which made it easier for authorities to cover up human rights abuses and to present their own version of state-sponsored and state-condoned violence. 26 23. Despite the differences in relative degrees of free speech, the core problem in Rwanda and Kosovo was the same. In both areas, speech went unchallenged due to a lack of institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental informational monopolies, the absence of common public forums for the free and safe exchange of diverse ideas, and the absence of a prerequisite for a “well developed” civil society: “the set of institutions and social norms that make pluralism a civil process of persuasion and reconciling of differences.”27 The electronic media was the most powerful force in both Kosovo and Rwanda due to its ability to reach rural populations (Rwanda relied largely on radio, former Yugoslavia radio and television), and in both cases an ethic prevailed of biased journalism. 24. Racist discourse masterfully regenerates historical mythology and creates a culture of victimisation. Once one feels like a victim, it is much easier to be a perpetrator. Many types of hate propaganda are useful in creating a culture of victimisation, but racist discourse wields particularly potent power. Once a person can be called genetically inferior or not human at all – the height of racism - killing thus becomes justified, easy, and noble. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, hate propaganda was used in this manner to play upon memories of real and imagined past domination by the minority. Racist discourse was particularly effective in creating an enemy “other” because it tapped into the audience’s predispositions. The violent result, however, was not preordained by “tribal hatreds.” Rather, it was the deliberate result of a carefully calculated political campaign driven by a racist/nationalist/genocidal ideology, and helped along by the structural and institutional shortcomings of the societies. 25. In Kosovo, the state-sponsored and state-condoned hate propaganda offered support for a virulent chauvinist agenda that included military and paramilitary abuses. In Rwanda, the connection between militias and racist media was even more pronounced: the media was used to disseminate instructions as to when and how to kill.28 Although some of those participating in the killings were government army and militia members, many of those who joined in the killings were “peasants,”29 and the young and young adults formed a large part of the audience for such stations as Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Although they would not normally have engaged in the torture and killing of their fellow citizens, many claimed that the propaganda broadcast by the government radio convinced them that it was the only action to take. One such man said “I did not believe the Tutsis were coming to kills us, but when the government radio continued to broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutus – when this was repeated over and over – I began to feel some kind of fear.”30 In Rwanda, the historic system of racial classification offered an easy guide for the killings. Singling out the enemy was also easy in Kosovo because of extreme polarisation between the two groups. 26. The racist ideology in Kosovo and Rwanda led to brutal racist acts as hate manifested itself in attempts to destroy the “other.”31 Serbian and Hutu militias subjected Albanian and Tutsi women (and in some cases men) to acts of sexual violence – individual rapes, gang rapes, rapes with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels and sexual mutilation. In Rwanda, Hutu militias slaughtered Tutsis en masse and in Kosovo Albanians were forcibly deported. In both cases, men, women and children civilians were murdered, imprisoned, and tortured. These acts were racist because they were made possible by the dehumanisation of the “other”; these severe and systematic violent acts were said to be necessary to “preserve” the superior group, that is the Serbs or Tutsis. These crimes were also at their core “political” as they were perpetuated, directed or sanctioned by military and political leaders with a view toward fulfilling their political goals. 27. The historical failure of the court systems to address fairly and adequately intergroup violence gave perpetrators the sense that violence for political ends was “normal” and that such actions could be undertaken with virtual impunity. The absence of the rule of law, coupled with economic deprivations and a lack of democratic institutions, made Rwanda and Kosovo structurally extremely violent societies susceptible to a culture of hate. The outbursts of murderous violence then was “not something new, but primarily part of a continuum of everpresent violence in which violence is the answer to violence, and in which victims temporarily become perpetrators and then victims again.”32 Addressing the use of racism in conflict then means addressing the underlying the structural causes of violence. Until this happens, the cycle of violence will continue.

#### Attributing all domination to whiteness is disabling and super reductive

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Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an omnipresent and all-powerful historical force. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, for the impoverishment of humanity. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b: 153).

Despite noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a monolithic category, most of the literature still proceeds to do so, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct" whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (Stowe 1996:77).

For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to identify and measure a concept— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, it ends up meaning hardly anything.

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## subotnik

Their specific form of advocacy SHUTS DOWN DEBATE – starting with personal experiential narratives makes it IMPOSSIBLE to NEGATE

SUBOTNIK 98

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, **the central** CRT **message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly**, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - **but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly**.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, **it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly** n75 **- destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition**. n77

[\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If **through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, **has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences** which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, **the kinds of issues** raised by Williams **are too important** in their implications  [\*698]  for American life **to be confined to communities of color.** If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, **it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse** to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

## t version

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(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

Dialogism is critical to make personal experience more effective as a tool of resistance

Gooding-Williams 3

Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy

Robert Gooding-Wiliams

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Issue

Constellations

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Consider, for example, the view held by many (though not all) African Americans that the (comparatively) low, average socioeconomic status of African-Americans, because it is due to the cumulative effects of racial slavery and antiblack racism, is an injustice for which African Americans deserve compensation. Some white Americans will dismiss this assertion of injustice, largely because they are "reluctant to see the present social plight of blacks as the result of American slavery."65 Still, were these whites to learn something of American racial slavery and of its impact 011 African-American life, they could begin to see that the argument for reparations is plausible, and begin to share with the African-Americans who advance that argument a common moral ground for further deliberations, hi other words, through the study of African American social history, they could begin to acknowledge the cogency of the considerations in light of which many African-American black persons, in reflecting on that history, have insisted that being black in America involves collective injustice. Supposing that they augmented this study with inquiry into the central themes of African-American political thought66 (as it has evolved, say from the writings of Martin Delaney to those of Martin King), they could enlarge the common ground by beginning to recognize the range and force of African-American perspectives oil other race-related issues.

It would be a mistake, of course, to think that multiculturalism needs to be race-conscious only when addressing the self-understandings of black persons or, by analogy the self-understandings of racially classified but non-black "persons of color." America is also a nation of racially classified whites and white persons; and white personliood, we know, cuts across ethnic lines. Again, by analogy to blacks who become black persons, whites who become white persons let their descriptions of themselves as white matter to the ways in which they live their lives. David Roediger's work on the racial formation of Irish-American workers is relevant here, as it provides a model for historical inquiry that illuminates the social construction and etlmic cultural significance of white racial identities.67 Also important, in this context, is Toni Morrison's book. Playing in the Dark. Reflecting 011 the nature of American literature, Morrison writes: that cultural identities are formed and informed by a nation's literature, and... what seemed to be 011 the 'mind' of the literature of the United States was the selfconscious construction of the American as a new white man. Emerson's call for this new man 111 'The American Scholar" indicates the deliberateness of the construction the conscious necessity for establishing the difference. But the writers who responded to this call, accepting or rejecting it. did not look solely to Europe to establish a reference for difference. There was a very theatrical difference underfoot. Writers were able to celebrate and deplore an identity already existing or rapidly taking a form that was elaborated through racial difference. That difference provided a huge payout of sign, symbol, and agency in the process of organizing, separating, and consolidating identity . . .6S

For Morrison, reading American writers after Emerson (e.g.. Poe and Twain) is a matter of engaging complicated constructions of white racial identities implicated in a racial ideology ("American Africanism" is Morrison's phrase) that assigns multiple meanings to the African presence in America. Self-consciously constructing a literature in light of descriptions of themselves as white, the "founding writers of young America" were white persons (in my sense of the term) for whom the figure of the black African became a "staging ground and arena for the elaboration of the quintessential American identity."® For my purposes, Morrison's short study is valuable, because it affords some excellent examples of the ways multicultural inquiry can explore the cultural construction of white racial identities and their connection to the promotion of racial ideologies. In America, multicultural education cannot avoid race, because socially constructed racial identities - those of black persons and white persons alike come into view 110 matter what class or ethnic perpsective one occupies in crosscultural deliberations. And while one ought not to conflate multiculturalism with struggles against racism and economic injustice, or promote it as a substitute for such straggles, multicultural education, by being race conscious, can contribute to an understanding of the issues posed by these struggles.70

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Unpredictability makes their advocacy less effective

Gerald Graff, University of English& Education, University of Illinois at Chicago, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures The Life of The Mind, ‘3, p. 11-12

But an even more important point that some readers of my work have missed is that the ultimate motivation of my argument for teaching the conflicts is the need to clarify academic culture, not just to resolve spats among academics or cultural factions. My assumption is that an institution as rife with conflicts as the American school and college can clarify itself only by making its ideological differences coherent. But even if our cultural and educational scene were a less contentious place than it is, the centrality of controversy to learning would still need to be stressed. For there exists a deep cognitive connection between controversy and intelligibility. John Stuart Mill pointed up the connection when he observed that we do not understand our own ideas until we know what can be said against them. In Mill's words, those who "have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them ... do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess."9 In other words, our very ability to think depends on contrast-on asking "as opposed to what?" This "dialogical" or contrastive character of human cognition has long been a given of modern thought, but the academic curriculum with its self isolated courses has yet to reflect it. When schooling is bad or dull, it is often because the curriculum effaces this element of contrast or as-opposed-to-whatness from students' view. the academic habit of evading conflict helps obscure the life of the mind.

## at: we meet

#### They don’t meet

They say “we should remove” which does not utilize federal government action---Ericson card from the 1nc is crystal clear that the res phrasing requires simulation

They’re not topical either way---there is no UNICOR restriction—they remove a contract through which the federal government buys solar power, if anything that’s a DISINCENTIVE for solar power, which is ANTI-TOPICAL

They have no cards describing their mechanism---new aff means burden is obviously on them or they could just make stuff up and we would never be able to reply

Anell says a restriction is a legal prohibition on production—the law says you must buy solar panels from a certain source, none of that makes sense.

They’re also extra topical—clearly voting only for the plan text is pointless—they have no credible argument for why the aff breaks down environmental racism by removing one restriction—the CX is clear that you’revoting a stance, which is so vague that we can’t even argue against it.

2AC proves—answers our solvency arguments by saying that we are a discussion, and obviously don’t advocate change—that’s fine, but that shouldn’t be linked the ballot question, which should be about simulation.

Ambiguity is a reason to err neg – T is a big time investment. We shouldn’t have to corner them into defending a plan just to get back to square one – the only neg advantage is time. Also ask yourself honestly—what are voting for when you vote aff? Reforming UNICOR? A dialogue about UNICOR? Resisting the ontological basis of blackness? I don’t think it’s clear, which is a reason why you should err neg because they clearly avoid clash

And, plan ambiguity links harder to clash – distracts all 1NC attention, creates shallow debate and encourages run and gun.

#### New affs argument is an even if tiebreaker—even if they are topical, a new aff forecloses engagement and is an independent link to dialogue because it destroys stasis AND encourages monologism

## 2nc at: switch side bad

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

## at: environmental justice

#### The flip side is overinclusion, which tanks any risk analysis because by trying to INCLUDE all viewpoints WITHOUT LIMITS

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Conceptual Drawbacks of Environmental Justice From a rationalizing perspective, a major problem with the environmental justice version of the democratizing critique is that, like ecopopulism more generally, it threatens to worsen the problem of environmental policy's missing priorities. As Walter Rosenbaum elaborates: like the man who mounted his horse and galloped off in all directions, the EPA has no constant course. With responsibility for administering nine separate statutes and parts of four others, the EPA has no clearly mandated priorities, no way of allocating scarce resources among different statutes or among programs within a single law. Nor does the EPA have a congressional charter, common to most federal departments and agencies, defining its broad organizational mission and priorities.... Congress has shown little inclination to provide the EPA with a charter or mandated priorities, in good part because the debate sure to arise on the relative merit and urgency of different environmental problems is an invitation to a political bloodletting most legislators would gladly avoid. Intense controversy would be likely among states, partisans of different ecological issues, and regulated interests over which problems to emphasize; the resulting political brawl would upset existing policy coalitions that themselves were fashioned with great difficulty. Moreover, setting priorities invites a prolonged, bitter debate over an intensely emotional issue: should the primary objective of environmental protection be to reduce public risks associated with environmental degradation as much as seems practical or—as many environmentalists fervently believe—is the goal to eliminate all significant forms of pollution altogether?18 Environmental justice inevitably enlarges this challenge of missing priorities, and for similar reasons. As noted earlier, the movement is a delicate coalition of local and ethnic concerns unable to narrow its grievances for fear of a similar "political bloodletting."1? Overt de-emphasis or removal of any issue or claim would prompt the affected coalition members (for example, groups, communities, or tribes) to disrupt or depart it. And chances are they would not leave quietly but with evident resentment and perhaps accusatory rhetoric directed at the persons and organizations remaining. Real priority-setting runs contrary to radical egalitarian value premises, and no one (perhaps least of all a strong democratizer) wants to be deemed a victimizer. Therefore movement rhetoric argues that no community should be harmed and that all community concerns and grievances deserve redress. Scholar-activist Robert Bullard proposes that "the solution to unequal protection lies in the realm of environmental justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become a 'sacrifice zone."20 When pressed about the need for environmental risk priorities, and about how to incorporate environmental justice into priority setting, Bullard's answer is a vague plea for nondiscrimination, along with a barely more specific call for a "federal 'fair environmental protection act™ that would transform "protection from a privilege to a right."21 Bullard's position is fanciful and self-contradictory, but extremely telling. He argues essentially that the way to establish environmental priorities is precisely by guaranteeing that such priorities are impossible to implement. This is symptomatic of a movement for which untrammeled citizen voice and overall social equity are cardinal values. Bullard's position also epitomizes the desire of movement intellectuals to avoid speaking difficult truths (at least in public) to their allies and constituents. Ironically, in matters of health and risk, environmental justice poses a potentially serious, if generally unrecognized, danger to the minority and low-income communities it aspires to help. By discouraging citizens from thinking in terms of health and risk priorities (that is, by taking the position, in effect, that every chemical or site against which community outrage can be generated is equally hazardous), environmental justice can deflect attention from serious hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones.

#### Environment justice must be approached through CONCRETE POLICY analysis that WEIGHS disadvantages– only SWITCH SIDE works

Foreman 98

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More frequent resort to a rationalizing, if not solely economic, perspective would encourage minority and low-income citizens and community leaders to think more carefully about priority-setting and myriad tradeoffs. Might widespread successes of NIMBY (not in my back yard) initiatives keep older and dirtier pollution sources active longer and thus adversely affect minority and low-income persons living adjacent to those sources? By the same token, does local insistence on full treatment at some Superfund sites (that is, the obsession with Breyer's "last ten percent") mean that risks elsewhere that might have been addressed under a more limited or flexible regime will not get attended to at all? Such questions cannot be answered here, but the disinclination even to pose them is troubling. That a "nobody should suffer" position advocating maximum citizen engagement could have perverse effects will be painful for many even to consider. But honestly confronting the reality that no environmental amenity (with the possible exception of planetary gravity) is equally distributed may help make citizens more likely to ask hard questions about which inequities matter most. A more careful and comprehensive set of environmental equity comparisons than has been produced to date would probably conclude that there is reason for cheer on some fronts. After all, many Native Americans residing on tribal land, along with rural blacks, doubtless breathe far cleaner air than many far wealthier city dwellers. Of course, once broader social equity concerns—the real motivation for much environmental justice advocacy—are factored in, any clean air advantage may appear insignificant. If Albert Nichols is right that failure to set environmental priorities based on risk has only worsened the inequities faced by minority and low-income communities, then there is even more compelling reason for greater reliance on a rationalizing approach. Writes Nichols in a direct critique of Bullard: If we accept the argument that the existing (politicized] approach has paid insufficient attention to the health and environmental risks faced by minority communities, what does that then say about a risk-based alternative? A strategy that emphasized attacking the largest and most easily reduced risks first would appear to represent a major gain for minority communities. To the extent that such communities bear unusually high risks as a result of past discrimination or other factors, a risk-based approach would redirect more resources to these communities. Indeed, a risk-based approach would give highest priority to attacking precisely the kinds of problems that most concern Bullard.23 If conventional environmental justice advocacy cannot confront risk magnitudes honestly, it cannot help much in the assessment and management of tradeoffs, either of the risk/risk or risk/benefit varieties. The notion that attacking some risks may create others is largely foreign to environmental justice—beyond a fear that attacking the risk of poverty with industrial jobs may expose workers to hazardous conditions. A focus on community inclusion, although necessary to the ultimate acceptability of decisions, offers no automatic or painless way to sort through tradeoffs.24 When confronted with choices posing both risks and benefits— such as a proposed hazardous waste treatment facility that would create jobs, and impose relatively low risks, in a needy area—environmental justice offers, along with disgust that such horrendous choices exist, mainly community engagement and participation. But because such situations tend to stimulate multiple (and often harshly raised) local voices on both sides of the issue, activists are at pains to decide where (besides additional participation and deliberation) the community's interest lies. Because an activist group will be in close touch with both the fear of toxics and the hunger for economic opportunity, the organization itself may be torn. The locally one-sided issue presents far preferable terrain for activists. It should surprise no one that activists are anxious to deemphasize community-level disagreement of this sort. Nor is it surprising to learn from the head of a prominent environmental justice organization that her group tries to avoid situations that pose precisely these locally polarizing tradeoffs.25 Faced with such tensions, environmental justice partisans may simply retreat into cant, attacking a system that facilitates "environmental blackmail," allowing disadvantaged communities to become "hooked on toxics."26

# 1NR

## eco-justice

#### Best SYNTHESIS of studies disproves environmental racism

Foreman 98

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Christopher Boerner and Thomas Lambert have observed that many studies suffer from severe methodological difficulties or are too limited in scope to reliably indicate broader patterns.66 Indeed, once contrary findings and thoughtful criticisms are taken adequately into account, even a reasonably generous reading of the foundational empirical research alleging environmental inequity along racial lines must leave room for profound skepticism regarding the reported results. Taken as a whole this research offers, at best, only tenuous support for the hypothesis of racial inequity in siting or exposure, and no insight into the crucial issues of risk and health impact.

#### This also answers their arguments about how we refused to engage – bullard’s wrong

Kevin 97

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Robert Bullard's study of incinerators and landfills in Houston also contains methodological problems. Bullard did not explain the methodology used to arrive at his findings. n75 For example, rather than census tracts, Bullard used "neighborhoods" as his unit of analysis, but did not specify how he defined this term; thus, it is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of his analysis. n76 Bullard classified some neighborhoods as predominantly minority based on his own observations, despite census data showing that the census tract concerned was predominantly white. n77 Additionally, Bullard may have left some solid waste sites out of his analysis. n78 Therefore, depending upon the demographics of the location of the sites, Bullard's conclusions about disproportionate impacts may be inaccurate. n79

## no root cause

#### Prefer nuance – history proves an all-or-nothing diagnosis of whiteness obscures individuals’ agency, which can make all the difference

**Kolchin 2**, Professor of History at Delaware University, (Peter, “ Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jun., 2002), pp. 154-173, JSTOR)

The central question one must confront in evaluating whiteness studies is the salience of whiteness as an explanation for exploitation, injustice, and, more gener- ally, the American past. In addressing that question, the matter of context becomes crucial. Simply put, in making whiteness omnipresent, whiteness studies authors risk losing sight of contextual variations and thereby undermining the very understand- ing of race and whiteness as socially constructed.

Nonhistorians are particularly prone to deprive whiteness of historical context. As Roediger notes in pointing to "tensions" within the field of whiteness studies, "much cultural studies work in the area lacks historical grounding and ignores or miscon- ceives the emphasis on class relations common among historians of whiteness." In Scenes of Subjection, for example, the literary scholar Saidiya V. Hartman portrays white racism as a constant unaffected by any change in the social order, including "the nonevent of emancipation," and sees virtually everything done to or for African Americans as an expression of that racism. A similar inattention to context underlies Brodkin's attribution of American prejudice against Jews (their "temporary darken- ing") to the desire to exploit them as industrial laborers, without bothering to place that prejudice in the framework of the long European history of anti-Semitism-an anti-Semitism that was not always rooted in economic interest and did not always require that Jews be seen as nonwhite. Writing as if racism were a uniquely American illness, the American studies scholar George Lipsitz muses that "it must be the con- tent of our character.'19 But inattention to context bedevils many of the historians as well. In White Women's Rights, for example, one of the few historical works to examine the way whiteness shaped the experiences and behavior of women, Louise Michele Newman too often strays from her intriguing exploration of the impact on feminism of a par- ticular form of evolutionary racism and generalizes about the views of "white women," who resisted patriarchy for themselves but sought to impose it on "inferior" races. Pushing far beyond the sensible observation that most white feminists shared the racial prejudices common among whites in the late nineteenth and early twenti- eth centuries, she understates the range and complexity of feminist thought and argues that racism was "an integral, constitutive element" of feminism itself, or as she puts it, "feminism developed . .. as a racialized theory of gender oppression."20 Such overgeneralization is especially prevalent among historians who rely heavily on image, representation, and literary depiction. Grace Elizabeth Hale's densely writ- ten but fascinating book, Making Whiteness, has the rare advantage among whiteness studies works of dealing with that part of the country where race has most pervasively shaped social relations: the South. But Hale loses much of that advantage by paying virtually no attention to social relations and confusing what is southern with what is more generally American until the reader is unsure whether she is describing south- ern whiteness or American whiteness, or whether she thinks that it does not make any difference. The South, she concludes, "lies not south of anywhere but inside us." Never really explaining what she means by "whiteness" (which at times she equates with segregation) or whose interests it served, she is on equally slippery ground in confronting chronological context. "Whites [all? most? some?] created the culture of segregation," she proclaims, "in large part to counter black success." This thesis is perfectly plausible, if undemonstrated. But in arguing that the myths of the happy slave and of criminal Reconstruction were products of the late-nineteenth-century imagination, Hale largely ignores earlier versions of those myths propounded by pro- tagonists in the struggles over slavery and Reconstruction; the arguments that she treats as new were appropriations and modifications of arguments previously forged in real social relations. Indiscriminately mixing fiction and nonfiction as documenta- tion, she confuses description (at which she is very good) with explanation and almost totally ignores interest and politics in her delineation of the "making" of whiteness .21 Although Jacobson pays more attention to contextual variation, he too can paint with a very broad brush, in the process placing a heavy explanatory burden-I believe too heavy-on whiteness. His focus on image and representation makes it difficult to judge the prevalence of particular ideas, because in quoting extensively from racist stereotypes, he makes no effort to give equal time to the opponents of such views. Brilliantly exploring racial depictions of diverse immigrant groups that Americans would later consider ethnic rather than racial and thereby showing the subjective character of race, he too often blurs a crucial distinction between "race" on the one hand and "nation," "nationality," and "ethnicity" on the other. For if both race and nation are constructed (imagined) communities, they are differently con- structed: whereas race implies inherent, immutable characteristics, national and eth- nic identity can be conceived of as inherent but need not be. Throughout much of American history, Americans have promiscuously combined racial and nonracial thinking in differentiating among groups; sometimes they assumed that differences were inherent, sometimes not, and often they failed to articulate clear positions on the question (no doubt because they had not formulated such positions). Jacobson himself notes in passing that discrimination was not always based on color or race- "The loudest voices in the organized nativism of the 1 840s and 1 850s harped upon matters of Catholicism and economics, not race"-but he tends to assume the bio- logical nature of arguments that could as easily be interpreted as cultural. (See, for example, his citation of the assertion in the 191 1 publication A Dictionary of Races or Peoples that "'the savage manners of the last century are still met with amongst some Serbo-Croatians of to-day"' as evidence for emphasis on the "physical properties" of race.)22

The role of whiteness in this process of distinguishing among groups remains murky. On one hand, Jacobson portrays the 1840s-1920s as a period of "variegated whiteness" in which white Americans saw some whites as whiter than others, warns us not to "reify a monolithic whiteness," and speaks of a "system of 'difference' by which one might be both white and racially distinct from other whites." On the other, he speaks of the "process by which Celts or Slavs became Caucasians." The unresolved issue here is the extent to which Americans conceived of whiteness (rather than other criteria such as religion, culture, ethnicity, and class) as the main ingredi- ent separating the civilized from the uncivilized.23 There can be no doubt, for example, that many antebellum Americans viewed the Irish as a degraded and savage people, but whether they saw lack of whiteness as the key source of this inferior status is dubious; to most Americans, for whom Protestant- ism went hand in hand with both republicanism and Americanism, the Irish immi- grants' Catholicism was far more alarming than their color. Indeed, some abolitionists managed to combine a passionate belief in the goodness and intellectual potential of black people with an equally passionate conviction of the unworthiness of the Irish, and in the 1850s many nativists saw little difficulty in moving from the anti-Irish Know-Nothing party into the antislavery Republican party, a trajectory that would have been truly remarkable had their dominant perception of the Irish been that they were nonwhite. And as Jacobson points out, the 1790 law that limited naturalization to "free white persons" "allowed Irish immigrants entrance as 'white persons"'; in what sense, then, should one speak of their subsequently "becoming" white? This can make sense if whiteness is to be understood metaphorically, meaning "acceptable," but Jacobson and other whiteness studies authors clearly intend the term to serve as more than a metaphor; indeed, if it is understood only metaphori- cally, much of their analysis collapses.24

The overworking of whiteness is especially noteworthy in the work of David Roe- diger, for he professes greater interest in specific social relations than many whiteness studies authors. Nevertheless, his argument too often depends on blurring important distinctions among whites, thereby belying the commonality of the "wages of white- ness" he outlines. His starting point is promising: living in a slaveholding republic, white workers in the (northern) United States increasingly defined themselves by what they were not blacks, slaves. But defining oneself as not-black and as not-slave are not at all the same, and Roediger's fudging on that crucial point is especially strik- ing coming from someone who usually pays such careful attention to language. The "not-slave" formulation led to the elaboration of a "free-labor" ideology that com- bined an emphasis on the dignity of labor with a condemnation of chattel slavery as the antithesis of free, republican (that is, American) values; the "not-black" variation led to a racist denigration of nonwhites and the insistence that the United States was a "white man's country." The two views could go together, but often they did not, and Roediger's argument that whiteness was an essential element of free-labor ideol- ogy is unpersuasive. If some labor radicals took what amounted to the proslavery position that slaves in the South were better off than "free" white workers in the North, others did not, and the argument in any case rested less on the degree of whiteness than on the degree of exploitation. Similarly, Roediger's thesis that in rejecting the term "servant" in favor of "hired hand" and "help," workingmen were "becoming" white conflates two very different forms of resistance to dependence that could be, but were not always, combined. The uppity domestics who tormented Frances Trollope in Cincinnati expressed little or no concern for whiteness as they asserted their American equality, and they contrasted their rights, not with black dependence, but with that stemming from English hierarchy. Responding disdain- fully to Trollope's expectation that she would eat in the kitchen, one servant typically "turned up her pretty lip, and said, 'I guess that's 'cause you don't think I'm good enough to eat with you. You'll find that won't do here."'25

The question is not whether white racism was pervasive in antebellum America- it was-but whether it explains as much as Roediger and others maintain. In an argu- ment further developed by Ignatiev, Roediger asserts that "it was by no means clear that the Irish were white." They present little evidence, however, that most Ameri- cans viewed the Irish as nonwhite. (To establish this point one would have to analyze the "racial" thought of Americans about the Irish, a task that neither Roediger nor Ignatiev undertakes.) Indeed, the whiteness studies authors often display a notable lack of precision in asserting the nonwhite status of despised groups. Roediger sug- gests that Irish whiteness was "by no means clear"; Ignatiev speaks of "strong tenden- cies . . . to consign the Irish, if not to the black race, then to an intermediate race located between white and black"; Neil Foley, in discussing prejudice against poor whites in central Texas, proclaims that "not all whites . . . were equally white" and suggests that landlords felt that their tenants "lacked certain qualities of whiteness"; Brodkin states that "for almost half a century, [Jews] were treated as racially not- quite-white." What is at issue is not the widespread hostility to and discrimination against the Irish, Jews, poor whites, and multiple other groups, but the salience of whiteness in either explaining or describing such hostility and discrimination. The status of southern poor whites is especially telling, for despite persistent "racial" stereotypes of them as shiftless, slovenly, and degraded, such stereotypes did not usu- ally include denials of their whiteness. Americans have had many ways of looking down on people without questioning their whiteness.26

A brief consideration of the ideology of four prominent nineteenth-century Amer- icans-the Confederate vice president Alexander H. Stephens, Illinois's Democratic senator Stephen A. Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and Ohio's Republican senator Ben- jamin F. Wade-illustrates the risk of overemphasizing whiteness. Like most white Americans, all four were in some sense committed to whiteness. In his famous speech hailing the secession of the southern states, Stephens boldly identified as the "corner- stone" of the new government "the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition." In the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, Douglas mercilessly denounced his Republican challenger as a supporter of black equality and boasted that "this gov- ernment was made on the white basis.... It was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men." Lincoln responded that he did not favor "political and social equality between the white and black races"; noting the "physical difference" between the races, he proclaimed that "inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong, hav- ing the superior position." Upon his arrival in Washington, D.C., in 1851, Wade complained that "the Nigger smell I cannot bear," adding that the food was "all cooked by Niggers until I can smell and taste the Nigger."27

Yet any treatment of those four men that stopped at their common commitment to whiteness would be so incomplete as to be totally misleading. Stephens was an ardent Confederate whereas the other three were committed Unionists. Their differ- ences on slavery and black rights were even more notable. Stephens was a defender of slavery and black racial subordination. Douglas saw slavery as a minor issue whose fate should be left to local (white) control. Lincoln believed that slavery was morally wrong as well as socially degrading, eschewed the race-baiting that Douglas and many other white Americans took for granted, and in his debate with Douglas imme- diately qualified his support for white supremacy with the ringing assertion that whether or not "the negro" was equal in all respects, "in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal ofJudge Douglas, and the equal of every living man." Wade was an ardent opponent of slavery, who became one of the most enthusiastic proponents of a radical Reconstruc- tion policy designed to remake the South and provide equal rights for the former slaves, as well as a sturdy champion of the rights of women and of labor. In short, what is most significant about the careers of the four men lies, not in their shared expressions of whiteness, but in the sharply divergent positions they took on the major issues of their era. Whiteness turns out to be a blunt instrument for dissecting the nuances-or even the major outlines-of their political ideology and behavior.28

## ontology

#### Ontology is a DESTRUCTIVE HISTORICAL FICTION based on information classification

**Shirky 5**

Clay Shirky, teacher of NYU's graduate Interactive Telecommunications Program, 03/15/05

<http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail470.html>

I hold a joint appointment at NYU, as an Associate Arts Professor at the Interactive Telecommunications Program (ITP) and as a Distinguished Writer in Residence in the Journalism Department. I am also a Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, and was the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Lecturer at Harvard's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in 2010.

There are many ways to organize data: labels, lists, categories, taxonomies, **ontologies.** Of these, ontology -- assertions about essence and relations among a group of items -- seems to be the highest-order method of organization. Indeed, the predicted value of the Semantic Web assumes that ontological successes such as the Library of Congress's classification scheme are easily replicable. Those successes are not easily replicable. Ontology, far from being an ideal high-order tool, is a **300-year-old hack**, now nearing the end of its useful life. **The problem ontology solves is not how to organize ideas but how to organize things** -- the Library of Congress's classification scheme exists not because concepts require consistent hierarchical placement, **but because books do**. The LC scheme, when examined closely, is riddled with inconsistencies, bias, and gaps. Top level geographic categories, for example, include "The Balkan Penninsula" and "Asia." The primary medical categories don't include oncology, defaulting to the older and now discredited notion that cancers were more related to specific organs than to common processes. And the list of such oddities goes on. The reason the LC scheme is accumulating these errors faster than they can correct them is the physical fact of the book, which makes a card catalog scheme necessary, and constant re-shelving impossible. Likewise, it enforces **cookie-cutter categorization** that doesn't reflect the polyphony of its contents--there is a literature of creativity, for example, made up of books about art, science, engineering, and so on, and yet those books are not categorized (which is to say shelved) together, because the LC scheme doesn't recognize creativity as an organizing principle. For a reader interested in creativity, the LC **ontology destroys value rather than creating it.**

As we have learned from the Web, when data is decoupled from physical presence, it is fluid enough to be grouped differently by different readers, and on different days. The Web's main virtue, in handling data, is to transmute organization from an a priori, content-based judgment to one that can be ad hoc, context-based, socially embedded, and constantly altered. The Web frees us from needing to argue about whether The Book of 5 Rings "is" a business book or a primer on war -- it is plainly both, and not only are we freed from making that judgment firmly or in advance, we are freed from needing to make it explicit at all.

This talk begins by exploring the rise of ontological classification. In the period after the invention of the printing press but before the invention of the search engine, intellectual production was vested in books, objects that were numerous but opaque. When you have more than a few hundred books, categorization becomes a forced move, even if the categories are somewhat arbitrary, because without categories, you can no longer locate individual books.

#### It causes academic regression and can’t explain things

**Owen 2** (David, professor of social and political philosophy and deputy director of the Centre for Philosophy and Value at the University of Southampton, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2002 31: 653)

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind.

The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.

The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

## things getting better

#### Multiple statistical measures prove structural inequality improving

Currie 8

<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-long-march-of-racial-progress/>

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Measuring racial progress is all about perspective. Since Appomattox, the struggle for racial equality has seen triumphs and setbacks alike. On balance, however, the story of race relations in America is one of extraordinary change and transformation. According to Princeton historian James McPherson, the rate of black illiteracy dropped from roughly 90 percent in 1865 to 70 percent in 1880 and to under 50 percent in 1900. “From the perspective of today, this may seem like minimal progress,” McPherson wrote in his 1991 book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (a collection of essays). “But viewed from the standpoint of 1865 the rate of literacy for blacks increased by 200 percent in fifteen years and by 400 percent in thirty-five years.” McPherson also noted that the share of school-age black children attending school jumped from 2 percent in 1860 to 34 percent in 1880. “During the same period,” he said, “the proportion of white children of school age attending school had grown only from 60 to 62 percent.” In 1908, 100 years before the election of America’s first black president, there was a bloody race riot in Springfield, Illinois, which began when an angry mob surrounded a prison where a black man falsely accused of rape was being held. As columnist George Will has observed, “The siege of the jail, the rioting, the lynching, and mutilating all occurred within walking distance of where, in 2007, Barack Obama announced his presidential candidacy.” Over the past century, the racial attitudes of white Americans have undergone a sea change. The shift toward greater racial tolerance was driven by many factors, including blacks’ participation in World War II, the integration of professional sports and the military, and the civil rights movement. “Even as Americans were voting more conservatively in the 1980s, their views on race were becoming more liberal,” Wall Street Journal senior editor Jonathan Kaufman wrote recently. “More than three quarters of whites in 1972 told pollsters that ‘blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.’ Two-thirds of whites that same year said they opposed laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of homes. Forty percent said whites had the right to live in segregated neighborhoods.” However, “By the end of 1980s, all those numbers had fallen markedly and [they] continued to fall through the following decades.” As University of Michigan sociologist Reynolds Farley points out in a new paper, there are now 41 African Americans serving in the House of Representatives, compared to only six when the Kerner Commission issued its famous report on race and poverty in 1968. During the years following the Kerner Report, “The slowly rising incomes of black men and the more rapidly rising incomes of black women produced an important economic change for African Americans,” Farley writes. “In 1996, for the first time, the majority of blacks were in the economic middle class or above, if that means living in a household with an income at least twice the poverty line.” According to Farley, “Only three percent of African Americans could be described as economically comfortable in 1968. That has increased to 17 percent at present. This is an unambiguous sign of racial progress: one black household in six could be labeled financially comfortable.” He notes that the black-white poverty gap “is much smaller now” than it was in the late 1960s. Residential and marriage trends are also encouraging. “The trend toward less residential segregation that emerged in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s continues in this century,” says Farley. Meanwhile, interracial marriage rates have increased dramatically. “At the time of the Kerner Report, about one black husband in 100 was enumerated with a white spouse. By 2006, about 14 percent of young black husbands were married to white women.”

#### Afro-pessimism is inaccurate and is used to justify white supremacism

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The Ordeal Of Integration:

Progress And Resentment In America's "Racial" Crisis

Orlando Patterson is a Jamaican-born American historical and cultural sociologist known for his work regarding issues of race in the United States, as well as the sociology of development

In the attempt to understand and come to terms with the problems of Afro-Americans and of their interethnic relations, the country has been ill served by its intellectuals, policy advocates, and leaders in recent years. At present, dogmatic ethnic advocates and extremists appear to dominate discourse on the subject, drowning out both moderate and other dissenting voices. A strange convergence has emerged between these extremists. On the left, the nation is misled by an endless stream of tracts and studies that deny any meaningful change in America's "Two Nations," decry "The Myth of Black Progress," mourn "The Dream Deferred," dismiss AfroAmerican middle-class status as "Volunteer Slavery," pronounce AfroAmerican men an "Endangered Species," and apocalyptically announce "The Coming Race War." On the right is complete agreement with this dismal portrait in which we are fast "Losing Ground," except that the road to "racial" hell, according to conservatives, has been paved by the very pQlicies intended to help solve the problem, abetted by "The Dream and the Nightmare" of cultural changes in the sixties and by the overbreeding and educational integration of inferior Afro-Americans and very policies intended to help solve the problem, abetted by "The Dream and the Nightmare" of cultural changes in the sixties and by the overbreeding and educational integration of inferior Afro-Americans and lower-class Euro-Americans genetically situated on the wrong tail of the IQ "Bell Curve." If it is true that a "racial crisis" persists in America, this crisis is as much one of perception and interpretation as of actual socioeconomic and interethnic realities. By any measure, the record of the past half century has been one of great achievement, thanks in good part to the suecess of the government policies now being maligned by the left for not having gone far enough and by the right for having both failed and gone too far. At the same time, there is still no room for complacency: because our starting point half a century ago was so deplorably backward, we still have some way to go before approaching anything like a resolution.